ROSENDO ALBA VS. CA GR NO.

164041, JULY 29, 2005 FACTS: On October 21, 1996 private respondent Rosendo Herrera filed a petition for cancellation of the following entries in the birth certificate of Rosendo Alba Herrera Jr., to wit: (1) the surname Herrera as appended in the name of the child; (2) the reference to private respondent as the father of the minor child; and (3) the alleged marriage of private respondent to the childs mother, Armi Alba on August 4, 1982 in Mandaluyong City. He claimed that the alleged entries are false and that it was only on September 1996 that he learned of the existence of the said birth certificate. Private respondent alleged that he married only once on June 28, 1965 with Ezperanza C. Santos and never contracted marriage with Armi nor fathered Rosendo Alba Herrera Jr. in support thereof he presented certifications stating that he have no record of marriage with Armi from the CR of Mandaluyong City and the NSO. On the scheduled hearing on February 26, 1997, the counsel from the office of the Solicitor General appeared but filed no opposition to the petition. Armi was not present on said date. The trial court rendered a decision which became final and executor. Armi and petitioner minor filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the CA which it dismissed holding that petitioner failed to prove that private respondent employed fraud and purposely deprived them of their day in court. Hence the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child shall use the surname of their mother. RULED: Under Article 176 of the Family Code illegitimate children shall use the surname of the mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case thay may bear the fat hers surname. In the case at bench it is clear that Armi was never married to private respondent hence the petitioner minor is an illegitimate child. Considering that private respondent strongly asserts that he is not...

CERUILA VS. DELANTARGR NO. 140305 DECEMBER 9, 2005 FACTS: Spouses Platon and Librada Ceruila filed an action for annulment and cancellation of the
birthcertificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar, the child-victim in the rape case involving RomeoJalosjos for the reasons that said birth certificate was made an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and therefore invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein.On April 11, 1997 the RTC rendered its decision granting the petition. On July 15, 1997 Rosilynrepresented by her legal guardian filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment in thepetition for cancellation of entry of her birth certificate claiming that she and her guardian werenot notified of the petition and the subsequent judgment and learned about the same only fromthe news on May 16, 1997. On June 10, 1999 the CA granted the petition and declared null andvoid the decision of the RTC. The motion for reconsideration filed by spouses Ceruila wasdenied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:w/o the requirements of Rule 108 were complied with.

HELD:In the case at bar only the Civil Registrar of Manila was served summons, who,however, did not participate in the proceedings. This alone is clearly not sufficient to complywith the requirements laid down by the rules. The claim that lack of summons on Rosilyn wascured by publication of the order setting the case for hearing is not correct. Summons must stillbe served, not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with therequirements of fair play on due process. This is but proper to afford the person concerned theopportunity to protect her interest if she so chooses.Rosilyn was never made a party at all to the proceedings seeking the cancellation of her birth certificate. Neither did petitioners make any effort to summon the Solicitor General. RP Vs bOLANTE FACTS: Respondent filed a petition for change of name before the RTC. She alleged that her registered name (birth certificate) is Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante which she did not use; but instead the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante appears in all her school as well as in her other public and private records.

The RTC upon finding that the petition is sufficient in form and substance ordered respondent to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication, and set the hearing on Feb. 20, 2001. At the scheduled Feb. 20 initial hearing the RTC ordered the respondent to file a written formal offer of evidence.

The Clerk of Court acting on courts express directive for a resetting issued another notice for a hearing and a second resetting was made after notice was given scheduled on September 25, 2001 and actually held.

On the Sept. 25 hearing, respondent presented several documents without any objection on the part of petitioner, represented by the OSG. She also took the witness to state the purpose of her petition which was to have her registered name changed to that which she had actually been using thru the years. She testified that she wanted to secure a passport issued with her correct name and to avoid any complication on her records upon her retirement.

The RTC granted the petition and the appellate court affirmed the same, hence; the current case. Petitioner argued that the jurisdictional facts were not complied with as prescribed by Rule 103 Section 3 in which xxx the date set for hearing shall not be within 30 days prior to an election nor within 4 months after the last publication of the notice. Petitioner argued that the notices were published on these dates: Nov. 23, 30 and December 7 and the hearing was set on Feb. 20 which is within the

prohibited period of 4 months. Petitioner also argued that the reasons given by respondent is not sufficient to grant the request for change of name.

ISSUE: (1) WON the jurisdictional facts were not complied with (that the hearing was made within the 4 months prohibited period), thus; the petition should be dismissed. (2) WON the reason provided by the petitioner is insufficient to grant the request for change of name. HELD: (1) NO. The Jurisdictional requirements were complied with. The notice of hearing was published in the Nov. 23, 30 and Dec. 7, counted from the last day of publication of the order, the initial hearing scheduled on Feb 20 is indeed within the 4-month prohibited period prescribed under the RoC. However, the RTC; upon realizing the error, lost no time in rectifying its mistake by rescheduling, with due notice to all concerned, the initial hearing for several times, finally settling for Sept 25, 2001. In a petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, any person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The OSG shall appear on behalf of the government. In the present case the republic was fully apprised of the new dates of the initial hearing, therefore; there is no need for a republication of notice. The Sept. 25 hearing was already outside the 4-month prohibited period, thus the jurisdictional requirement of publication was complied with. (2) NO. The SC said that a person can be authorized to change his name appearing in either his certificate of birth or civil registry upon showing not only of reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change, but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Certain grounds to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonourable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change will avoid confusion; (c) when one has been continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (d) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name will prejudice public interest. In the case at bar, respondents submission for a change of name is with proper and reasonable reason. She has, since she started schooling, used the given name and has been known as Maria Eloisa, though Roselle Eloisa was in her birth certificate. Her scholastic records, government records; drivers license, PRC license and the quick count document by COMELEC attest that she has been using the said name all her life.

In order to avoid confusion; the current petition should be granted.

CORPUZ v. TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010) FACTS: Petitioner Corpuz, a naturalized Canadian citizen married respondent Sto. Tomas but subsequently filed for divorce in Canada which was granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. Two years later, Corpuz fell in love with another Filipina. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree on his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce decree by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grant aliens the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree. RESOLUTION: No. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens BUT the foreign divorce decree obtained by such alien, may be proven in court and recognized according to our rules of evidence. Thus, it serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of the alien, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.