124. DRILON VS LIM GR No.

112497, August 4, 1994 FACTS: Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. The court cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter, while the second is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions is accordance with law. ISSUES: The issues in this case are (1) whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional; and (2) whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than supervision, over the local government HELD: The judgment of the lower court is reversed in so far as its declaration that Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional but affirmed the said lower courts finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.

Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court carefully examined every exhibit and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process.

125 Reyes vs. CA G.R. 118233 DEC. 10, 1999 Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan implemented several tax ordinances on printing and publication, on the sale or transfer of real property, for social housing, imposed new rates of business tax and an annual Ad valorem tax on real property. These ordinances were alleged to be unconstitutional by petitioners because they were promulgated without previous public hearing thereby constituting deprivation of property without due process of law. The appeal was dismissed for being filed out of time or more than 30 days after the effectivity of the ordinances. Their petition having been denied, they filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition which affirmed the Secretary of Justice. ISSUES: a. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the Secretary of Justice who dismissed the prohibition suit, on the ground that it was filed out of time? b. Whether or not the lack of mandatory public hearings prior to the enactment of the ordinances render them void on the grounds of deprivation of property without due process? RULING: a. The law clearly requires that the dissatisfied taxpayer who questions the validity or legality of a tax ordinance must file his appeal to the Secretary of Justice, within 30 days from effectivity thereof. In case the Secretary of Justice decides the appeal, a period of 30 days is allowed for an aggrieved party to go to court. But if the Secretary does not act thereon, after the lapse of 60 days, a party could already proceed to court to seek relief. These 3 separate periods are given for compliance as a prerequisite before seeking redress in court. For this reason, the courts construe these provisions as mandatory. b. In accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidences showing that procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment. In this case, petitioners have not proved that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan failed to conduct the required public hearings before enacting said ordinances
126 HAGONOY MARKET VENDORS ASSN V HAGONOY G.R No. 137621 PUNO, J.; Feb. 6, 2002 kiyo NATURE

Petition for Review of CA Resolution FACTS - Hagonoy enacted Kautusan Blg. 28 on Oct. 1996, increasing stall rentals of market vendors in Hagonoy. Art. 3 provided it would take effect upon approval. The ordinance was posted from Nov. 4-25, 1996. Petitioner Assns members were personally given copies on Nov. 1997; petitioners president appealed with the SoJ (over a year after its approval) assailing its constitutionality and claiming it was unaware of the posting. Respondent contended that the ordinance took effect in Oct. 1996 by operation of law and that the appeal was time-barred. The SoJ, citing Tanada vs Tuvera, held that ordinances effectivity retroacted to the date of its approval and that the appeal was filed beyond the 30 day limit from the date of approval. Its MFR denied, petitioner appealed with the CA which was denied for formal deficiencies. Its second MFR was denied, hence this appeal. ISSUE WON petitioners appeal was already time-barred HELD YES. Sec. 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code provides that any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within 30 days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within 60 days from receipt of the appeal. The appeal will not suspend the effectivity of the ordinance and accrual of payment of the tax charged. Within 30 days from the partys receipt of the decision or the lapse of the 60 day period without the SoJ acting on the appeal, the party may file appropriate proceedings. -in the instant case, petitioner filed his appeal only in Dec. 1997, over a year after the ordinance took effect in 1996. The periods provided in Sec. 187 are mandatory; hence, the appeal was rightly dismissed as it was clearly time-barred. Since taxes are the lifeblood of the State, the validity of such revenue measures cannot be left uncertain for considerable lengths of time. Dispositive IN VIEW WHEREOF, petition is DISMISSED

127 TY VS. TRAMPE G.R. NO. 117577, DEC. 1, 1995. FACTS:

Petitioners were assessed by the municipal assessor for realty taxes over their real properties. They asked for reconsideration and thinking this is not yet enough, they filed a petition for prohibition in the RTC. HELD: Coming down to specifics, Sec. 9 of P.D. 921 requires that the schedule of values of real properties in the Metropolitan Manila area shall be prepared jointly by the city assessors in the districts created therein: while Sec. 212 of R.A. 7160 states that the schedule shall be prepared "by the provincial, city and municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area for the different classes of real property situated in their respective local government units for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned. . . ." It is obvious that harmony in these provisions is not only possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistent with the legislative intent and policy. By reading together and harmonizing these two provisions, we arrive at the following steps in the preparation of the said schedule, as follows: 1. The assessor in each municipality or city in the Metropolitan Manila area shall prepare his/her proposed schedule of values, in accordance with Sec. 212, R.A. 7160. 2. Then, the Local Treasury and Assessment District shall meet, per Sec. 9, P.D. 921. In the instant case, that district shall be composed of the assessors in Quezon City, Pasig, Marikina, Mandaluyong and San Juan, pursuant to Sec. 1 of said P.D. In this meeting, the different assessors shall compare their individual assessments, discuss and thereafter jointly agree and produce a schedule of values for their district, taking into account the preamble of said P.D. that they should evolve "a progressive revenue raising program that will not unduly burden the taxpayers" 3. The schedule jointly agreed upon by the assessors shall then be published in a newspaper of general circulation and submitted to the sanggunian concerned for enactment by ordinance, per Sec. 212, R.A. 7160. Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to judicial action can prosper, there is a wellsettled exception in cases where the controversy does not involve questions of fact but only of law. In the present case the parties, even during the proceedings in the lower court on 11 April 1994, already agreed "that the issues in the petition are legal", and thus, no evidence was presented in said court. In laying down the powers of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, R.A. 7160 provides in Sec. 229 (b) that "(t)he proceedings of the Board shall be conducted solely for the purpose of ascertaining the facts . . . ." It follows that appeals to this Board may be fruitful only where questions of fact are involved. Again, the protest contemplated under Sec. 252 of R.A. 7160 is needed where there is a question as to the reasonableness of the amount assessed. Hence, if a taxpayer disputes the reasonableness of an increase in a real estate tax assessment, he is required to "first pay the tax" under protest. Otherwise, the city or municipal treasurer will not act on his protest. In the case at bench however, the petitioners are questioning the very authority and power of the assessor, acting solely and independently, to impose the assessment and of the treasurer to collect the tax. These are not questions merely of amounts of the increase in the tax but attacks on the very validity of any increase.

128 Systems plus computer colleges vs. Local government of Caloocan. BY C Y Systems plus computer colleges vs. Local government of Caloocan. Facts. 1. The petitioner is a none-stock and a none-profit educational institution and so enjoying a property tax exemption from the local government on its buildings but not on a parcel of land which petitioner is renting from its syster company consolidated assembly and pair management. 2. On January 28 1998, petitioner requested respondent Local government of Caloocan through the city assessor and administrator Manahan to extent tax exemption to the parcel of land claiming that it is being used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes pursuant to Article VI. Section 28 of the 1987 constitution which was denied by the respondent on the ground that the parcel of land was owned by the consolidated assembly which derived income therefrom from rental and other taxes assumed by the petitioner so the land therefore is not being used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes. 3. OnFebuary 15 1999, the petitioner and the consolidated assembly and pair management entered in to an agreement where consolidated and pair management is donating the land to the petitioner. 4. The petitioner wrote the city assessor about the new agreement and seeking a reconsideration on respondents earlier denial for the application for tax exemption but was denied again by the respondent reasoning that: a. The consolidated and pair management being the syster company of the petitioner donated the land to it to avoid payment of taxes. b. The grant of tax exemption rest upon a theory that exemption benefits a body of people and not to lessen the burden of individual or corporation. c. There is no showing that the real property donated to the petitioner is being used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes. 5. The petitioner filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional trial court of Caloocan who dismiss it for being premature so petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the supreme court imputing grave abuse of discretion on the RTC is dismissing the case. Issue. Whether or not, the RTC is correct in dismissing the case filed by the petitioner on the ground of being premature. According to the supreme court, the RTC was correct when it dismissed the case for being premature because the petitioner fail to exhaust all administrative remedies. The decision of the city assessor regarding the taxability of the subject real property should be appealed to the local board of assessment appeals. The petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the conserned administrative agency and directly seek redress to the court even on the pretext of raising

a supposedly pure question of law without violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedy. So the petition for certiorari was denied.

135
AQUINO VS QUEZON CITY G.R. No. 137534 March 3, 2006 FACTS: This case involves two petitions for review on certiorari involving the decisions declaring valid theauction sales of two real properties by the Quezon City Local Gov t for failure to pay real property taxes.The first case deals with a lot formerly owned by petitioners Aquino. Petitioners withheld payment of the realproperty taxes as a form of protest for the gov t of then President Marcos. As a result of the nonpayment, theproperty was sold by the Quezon City local government, through the Treasurer's Office, at public auction to private respondent Aida Linao, the highest bidder. Petitioners claimed that they learned of the sale about 2 years later. They fixed as action for annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages against the respondents.The seconds case deals with a property located In Cubao, Quezon City in the name of Solomon Torrado.According to petitioner heirs, Torrado paid taxes on the improvements on Lot 8 but not on the lot itself becausethe Treasurer's Office could not locate the index card for that property. For failure to pay real property taxesfrom 1976 to 1982, the City Treasurer sent a Notice of Intent to Sell to Torrado to his address indicated in the taxregister, which simply states as 'ButuanCity. The notice was returned by reason of 'Insufficient Address. Next sentwas a Notice of Sale of Delinquent Property. This was sent to the same address and similarly returned unclaimed. Thereafter, a public auction was held and the lot was sold to Veronica Baluyot, who mortgaged the property toSpouses Uy who then sold it to DNX Corp for failure to pay the mortgaged debt. Also, a Notice of Sold Propertywas subsequently sent to Torrado which was returned unclaimed. ISSUE: Was there a failure on the part of the Quezon City Local Gov t to satisfy the notice requirements before selling the property for tax delinquency? RULING: Definitely, there is no more logical way to construe the whole chapter on 'Collection of Real PropertyTax (Sections 56 to 85) than to stress that while three methods are provided to enforce collection on realproperty taxes, a notice of delinquency is a requirement regardless of the method or methods chosen.It is incorrect for the respondents to claim that notice of delinquency has limited application only to distraint of personal property. They mistakenly lumped Section 65 exclusively with Sections 68

to 72 and, in so doing,restricted its application from the other tax remedies. Section 65 is to be construed together with Sections 66 and78 and all three operate in reference to tax methods in general.Petitioners are correct in insisting that two notices must be sent to the taxpayer concerned. Nevertheless,respondents still prevail because the Court is satisfied that the two-notice requirement has been complied withby the Treasurer's Office.

137 Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. CA GRN 134114 July 6, 2001 De Leon, Jr. &: Facts: CTA Dismissed petitioners motion to grant refund on allegedly overpaid impost duties, on its various importations of milk and milk products in the amount of 5M. Petitioners were assessed customs duties and advance sales taxes by Collector of Customs for each separate importations on the basis of the published Home Consumption Value. Petitioners paid the same but under protests. On October 1986, petitioner finally failed a claim for refund of before BIR and the following day, filed the petition for review with CTA which ordered BIR to refund P 4,489 representing the overpaid advance and Sales Taxes. The refund for alleged overpaid customs duties amounting to P 5.008M were left with the collector of customs undecided after almost 6 years. On Aug 22, 1990, petition filed a petition for review with CTA dismissed for what of jurisdiction. Case was filed with CA on certiorari (Rule 45) but dismissed for CTA jurisdiction is not concurrent with the appellate jurisdiction of Commissioner since there was no decision yet from Collector from Customs. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled for alleged overpayment of customs duties on importations thus be remanded to CTA for further review. Ruling: We find that the recommended remand of the case to CTA is warranted. For the proper verification and determination of the factual basis and merits of this petition and in order that the ends of substantial justice and fair play my be sub served. Tariff and Customs Code provides that in all claims for refund of customs duties are paid and upon receipts of such claims is mandated to verify the same by the record of his office. In such claim is found correct and in accordance with law, the collector shall certify the same to the commissioner with his recommendation together with all the necessary papers and documents. Solutio indebt its misplaced because there is no factual showing that the collection was more than what is required of the petitioner when it made the importations. There is no factual finding yet that petitioner is indeed entitled to its claim of overpayment and if how much is he entitled.

139 Provident Tree Farms vs Batario, Jr. 231 SCRA 463 Facts : PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a Philippinecorporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in itsplantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it supplies to a local matchmanufacturer solely for production of matches. In consonance with the statepolicy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec.36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code 1 confers on entities like PTFI a set ofincentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and"woodderivated" products. Private respondent A. J. International Corporation(AJIC) imported four (4) containers of matches from Indonesia, which the Bureauof Customs, and two (2) more containers of matches from Singapore. Uponrequest of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the Department ofNatural Resources and Environment issued a certification that "there areenough available softwood supply in the Philippines for the match industry atreasonable price." PTFI then filed with the Regional Court of Manila acomplaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary restrainingorder against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin thelatter from importing matches and "woodderivative" products, and the Collectorof Customs from allowing and releasing the importations.AJIC moved todismiss the case asseverating that the enforcement of the import ban under Sec.36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of theBureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Courtto compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legalbasis .Issue : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. Ruling : PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting thelegality of match importations may already take the nature of an administrativeproceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from interferingwith it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . .. thecourts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which iswithin the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the questiondemands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the specialknowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determinetechnical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential tocomply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrativeboards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability tohear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factualmatters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, hasbecome well nigh indispensable 140 Chief State Prosecutor JOVENCITO R. ZUO, ATTY. CLEMENTE P. HERALDO, Chief of the Internal Inquiry and Prosecution Division-customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (IIPD-CIIS), and LEONITO A. SANTIAGO, Special Investigator of the IIPD-CIIS vs

JUDGE ARNULFO G. CABREDO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Tabaco City, Albay AM. No. RTJ-03-1779 April 30, 2003 ______________________________________ Facts: Atty. Winston Florin, the Deputy Collector of Customs of the Sub-Port of Tabaco, Albay, issued on September 3, 2001 Warrant of Seizure and Detention (WSD) No. 06-2001against a shipment of 35, 000 bags of rice aboard the vessel M/V Criston for violation of Sec. 2530 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP). A few days, after the issuance of the warrant of seizure and detention, Antonio Chua, Jr. and Carlos Carillo, claiming to be consignees of the subject goods, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City, Albay a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The said petition sought to enjoin the Bureau of Customs and its officials from detaining the subject shipment. By virtue of said TRO, the 35,000 bags of rice were released from customs to Antonio Chua, Jr. and Carlos Carillo. In his complaint, Chief State Prosecutor Zuo alleged that respondent Judge violated Administrative Circular No. 7-99, which cautions trial court judges in their issuance of TROs and writs of preliminary injunctions. Said circular reminds judges of the principle, enunciated in Mison vs. Natividad, that the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it to naught. Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the TRO was illegal and beyond the jurisdiction of the RTC. Held: The collection of duties and taxes due on the seized goods is not the only reason why trial courts are enjoined from issuing orders releasing imported articles under seizure and forfeiture proceedings by the Bureau of Customs. Administrative Circular No. 7-99 takes into account the fact that the issuance of TROs and the granting of writs of preliminary injunction in seizure and forfeiture proceedings before the Bureau of Customs may arouse suspicion that the issuance or grant was fro considerations other than the strict merits of the case. Furthermore, respondent Judges actuation goes against settled jurisprudence that the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle and put it to naught. Respondent Judge cannot claim that he issued the questioned TRO because he honestly believed that the Bureau of Customs was effectively divested of its jurisdiction over the

seized shipment. Even if it be assumed that in the exercise of the Collector of Customs of its exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases, a taint of illegality is correctly imputed, the most that can be said is that under these circumstance, grave abuse of discretion may oust it of its jurisdiction. This does mean, however, that the trial court is vested with competence to acquire jurisdiction over these seizure and forfeiture cases. The proceedings before the Collector of Customs are not final. An appeal lies to the Commissioner of Customs and, thereafter, to the Court of Tax Appeals. It may even reach this Court through an appropriate petition for review. Certainly, the RTC is not included therein. Hence, it is devoid of jurisdiction. Clearly, therefore, respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition and issue the questioned TRO. It is a basic principle that the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings of dutiable goods. A studious and conscientious judge can easily be conversant with such an elementary rule.