War and State in Africa

War and the State in Africa Author(s): Jeffrey Herbst Source: International Security, Vol. 14, No.
4 (Spring, 1990), pp. 117-139 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538753 . Accessed: 03/11/2013 15:15
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Security.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 170.140.26.180 on Sun, 3 Nov 2013 15:15:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Warand tfie State in
Afnica
Jeffrey Herbst
MIostanalyses assume thatin Africa, as elsewhere, stateswill eventually becomestrong. But this maynot be truein Africa, wherestatesare developing in a fundamentally new environment. Lessons drawnfrom thecase ofEuropeshow thatwar is an important cause of stateformation thatis missing in Africa today.The crucial rolethatwarhas playedin theformation ofEuropeanstates has long been noted.SamuelP. Huntington arguedthat"warwas thegreatstimulus to statebuilding," and CharlesTillywentso faras to claimthat"warmade "I Similarly, the state,and the statemade war. two of the mostsuccessful statesin theThirdWorldtoday,SouthKoreaand Taiwan,are largely "warfare"statesthathave been molded,in part,by the near constant threat of external and state aggression.However,studiesof politicaldevelopment in Africa consolidation World and manyother partsoftheThird have all but ignored theimportant rolethatwar can playin political development. The roleofwar has notbeen examined becausethevastmajority ofstates in Africa in the worldgainedindependence and elsewhere without having to resort and have notfaceda security threat to combat sinceindependence.2
I am grateful to Henry Bienen, Aaron Friedberg,Elizabeth Hart, Dave Rawson, the International Relations Discussion Group at PrincetonUniversity, and two anonymous readers for helpful comments.
and International Jeffrey Herbst is Assistant Professor Woodrow Wilson of Politics Affairs, School, Princeton University.
1. Samuel P. Huntington,Political Orderin Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 123; and Charles Tilly, "Reflectionson the History of European State-Making,"in Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation ofNationalStatesin Western Europe(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1975), p. 42. An important recentaddition to this literature is Brian M. Downing, 'Constitutionalism,Warfareand Political Change in Early Modern Europe," Theory and Society, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January1988), pp. 7-56. The general literature on warfare'seffect on societyis voluminous. An early work which concentrateson some of the themes examined here is Hans J. Renfroe,Jr.(Westport,Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982). 2. For instance, in MorrisJanowitz'sclassic study of the military in the developing world, the political,social, and economic functionsof the military are studied extensively but the potential effectsof war, or of peace, are not analyzed. Morris Janowitz, The Militaryin the Political
Delbruck, History ofthe ArtofWar within the Framework Vol. III, trans. ofPolitical History, Walter
Development ofNewNations: An Essayin Comparative Analysis (Chicago:University of Chicago

Press, 1964), p. 12.
International Security, Spring 1990 (Vol. 14, No. 4)
? 1990bythePresident and FellowsofHarvard Collegeand oftheMassachusetts Institute ofTechnology.
117
International Security 14:4 1118
Thosescholars who have analyzedthemilitary in thedeveloping worldhave studiedthe armedforces' rolein economic and political processesbut have not examinedthe changes thatwar could potentially effect on a state.3 Studying the military and studying warfare are not the same, especially in the area of stateconsolidation, because warfare has independent effects on economic policies,administrative and thecitizenry's structures, relationship withthe statethathave verylittle to do withthe military.4 Finally, beyond the usual problem of trying to studytheimpactof a factor thatis missing, thereis a less excusablenormative bias which has sometimes prevented studentsof politicsfromexamining the effects of war. The questionof whether it is only possible to createa nationout of "blood and iron" is apparently one thatmanyanalysts findtoo disturbing to examine.5 of the Europeancase withthatof Africa is therefore crucial Comparison to understanding whetherthe analogyholds. War in Europe played an important role in the consolidation of many now-developedstates:war in revenuecollection; it forced caused the stateto become more efficient leadersto dramatically improve administrative capabilities; and it createda could climate and important aroundwhicha disparate symbols population the Whilethere unify. is little reasonto believethatwar would have exactly same domestic in Africa effects todayas it did in Europe severalcenturies can accomplish in times countries ago, itis important to ask ifdeveloping of to do. I concludethatthey peace what war enabled Europeancountries and probably cannotbecause fundamental changesin economicstructures are difficult, ifnotimpossible, aboutwhencountries societal beliefs to bring are notbeingdisrupted threat. or undersevereexternal The nextsectionof thisarticle outlines how war affected stateformation in Europe,withparticular to twocrucial attention thecreation developments: of centralized and efficient structures to collect taxes,and the development of nationalism. I then comparethe Europeanexperience of state-building to the relative has experienced sincethe through warfare peace thatAfrica 1960s.WhileAfrican stateshave benefited from peace, theirdevelopment
3. The literature is reviewed by HenryBienen,"ArmedForcesand NationalModernization: Continuing theDebate,"Comparative Vol. 16,No. 1 (October Politics, 1983), pp. 1-16. 4. Gabriel ofModern andNations," Ardent, "Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure States 5. A useful A. Hall, "Warand theRise corrective to theconventional viewis provided byJohn oftheWest," in ColinCreighton and Martin Shaw,eds., TheSociology ofWar andPeace (London: Macmillan, 1987).
in Tilly,TheFormation ofNationalStates,p. 89.
j 119 WarandtheState inAfrica
has been stunted by theveryproblems thatwar helpedEuropeancountries to solve. I thenevaluatethe possibilities thatAfrican statesmight develop strategies to solvethesefundamental problems in times ofpeace. I conclude thatsome stateswill probably be unsuccessful in finding ways of building the statein timesof peace and will therefore remainpermanently weak. Accordingly, the international will community have to develop non-traditionalpoliciesforhelpinga new brandof states:thosethatwillcontinue to exist butthat willnotdevelop.Otherstates, perceiving that peace locksthem intoa permanently weak position, maybe tempted to use war as a means ofresolving their otherwise intractable problems ofstateconsolidation. Effects ofWaron State Consolidation: TheEuropean Case It is instructive to lookat war'simpact on Europeansocieties because,as will be notedbelow,war in Europehelped alleviatesome of the problems that affect African countries today.At themostbasic level,war in Europeacted as a filter whereby weak stateswere eliminated and political arrangements thatwere not viableeither were reformed or disappeared.Weak statesdo in Europetoday-Belgium exist is one example-butthenear-constant threat of war did prompt moststatesto becomestronger to survive. The contrast between thisevolutionary and thecurrent in theThird development situation aid will World,where even statesthatare largelydependenton foreign It is, of course, is dramatic. continueto existforthe foreseeable future, notto generalize important too muchbecausewarhad manydifferent effects in a variety overtime,and even in the same periodstatesreacted of ways to external threats. theability ofEuropeanstatesto However,war did affect in many increase taxation and contributed to theforging ofnational identities Itis therefore countries. toexamine thepotential ofexternal important impact threat to better stateconsolidation in theThird understand World.
TAXES
effect ofwar in Europeanhistory was to cause Perhapsthe mostnoticeable the state to increaseits ability to collectsignificantly more revenuewith and less publicresistance. ofEuropean greater Giventhefreedom efficiency states to attack could each other, thosestatesthatcouldraisemoney quickly witha warthat lead to significant threaten their successfully neighbors might Richard Beanwrites, "Once thepower destruction. damageorevencomplete one oncehe had to taxhad been successfully appropriated byany sovereign,
14:4 | 120 International Security
thatstate intoacquiescence, used thatpowerto bribeor coercehis nobility could face all neighboring stateswiththe choiceof beingconqueredor of Whilesuccessin war dependson centralizing authority and raising taxes."6 and morale ofthetroops, manyfactors including technology, tactics, raising condition to prevent defeat.Statesthat sufficient revenuewas a necessary did not raise sufficient revenueforwar perished.As MichaelMann notes, "A statethatwishedto survive had to increase to pay itsextractive capacity forprofessional armiesand/or navies.Those thatdid notwould be crushed on the battlefield and absorbedintoothers-thefateof Poland,of Saxony, ofBavaria in [theseventeenth and eighteenth centuries]. No Europeanstates to escape the conclusion thata were continuously at peace. It is impossible thanthemilipeaceful statewould have ceased to existeven morespeedily tarily inefficient actually did."7 Waraffects itputstremendous statefinances for tworeasons.First, strains on leadersto findnew and moreregularsourcesof income.Whilerulers may recognize thattheirtax system is inadequate,a war maybe the only thing that forces them to expendthenecessary political capital and undertake the coercion required to gain morerevenue.For instance, in Mann's study of taxation in Englandbetween1688and 1815,he findsthattherewere six majorjumpsin staterevenueand thateach corresponds withthebeginning ofa war.8The association the need to fight and theneed to collect between revenue is perhapsclearest in Prussia, wherethemaintaxcollection agency was calledtheGeneralWarCommissariat.9 to acquiesceto increased taxation Second, citizensare muchmorelikely to their willoverwhelm whenthenationis at war,because a threat survival In fact,taxation otherconcerns have about increasedtaxation. theymight fora war can be thought collective ofas a "lumpy" good: notonlymustthe amount population pay to get thegood, butit mustalso pay a considerable in revenue morethanthe current leveloftaxation, because a smallincrease
6. Richard Bean, "Warand theBirth of theNationState," Journal ofEconomic History, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March1973),p. 220. 7. MichaelMann, "Stateand Society, An Analysis of English StateFinances," 1130-1815: in Mann, States, Warand Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology Basil Blackwell, (Oxford: 1988), 8. MichaelMann, TheSources ofSocialPower (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1986), p. 486. in MichaelDuffy, 9. MichaelDuffy, "The Military and theState,1500-1800," Revolution ed., TheMilitary Revolution and theState, 1500-1800, Exeter Studiesin History No. 1 (Exeter, U.K.: University ofExeter, 1980),p. 5.
p. 109.
WarandtheState inAfrica | 121
In this threat thestate.10 is often notenoughto meetthenew security facing a bridge: must fora war is liketaxation forbuilding way,taxation everyone in revenue willnotbe enough, pay to buildthebridgeand a smallincrease halfa war,is useless. becausehalfa bridge, likefighting Thus, war oftencauses a "ratchet effect" wherebyrevenue increases level butdoes notdeclineto theante bellum whena nationis fighting sharply have invested thesunken whenhostilities have ceased.11 Once governments the collection and routinized of costs in expandingtax collection systems those structures new sourcesof revenue,the marginal costs of continuing thatwill are quitelow and theresources collect can be used for they projects enhancetheruling group'ssupport. at other timesoften Whileit is nota universal rule,war in othersocieties playedthe same kind of role thatwar did in Europe.For instance, Joseph in his study Smaldone oftheSokotoCaliphate writes (inwhatis now Nigeria) between1500and 1800: and extension War was the principal forthe establishment of instrument and for the politicalauthority over subjectpeopte and foreign territory, of that authority. The deand reinforcement organization, maintenance, the sectorsof mands of perennialwar evoked institutions to subordinate crucialto the interests of thesemilitarized society polities.The permanent requirement to mobilize humanand material resources for military purposes [i.e., taxation] intensified tendencies towardthe monopolization of power and theelaboration institutions of socialcontrol.12 ofauxiliary the SouthKoreanand Taiwanesestateshave been able to extract Similarly, so manyresources theirsocieties in partbecause the demandsto be from the stateintodeveloping constantly vigilant provoked efficient mechanisms for and controlling collecting resources dissident groups.13 A highly extractive statealso could cloakdemandsforgreater resources in appeals fornational in thefaceofa determined unity enemy.
10. "Lumpy" goodsare products whicharenotuseful ifonlypartis purchased. Margaret Levi, OfRuleandRevenue (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press,1988),pp. 56-57. 11. Mann,Sources ofSocial Power, pp. 483-490. 12. JosephP. Smaldone,Warfare in theSokoto Caliphate: Historical and Sociological Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1977),p. 139.The samepointis madeby Richard L. Roberts in his Warriors, Merchants, andSlaves: TheState andthe Economy inthe Middle Niger Valley, 1700-1914 (Palo Alto:Stanford University Press,1987),p. 20. 13. Joel S. Migdal,Strong Societies andWeak States: State-Society Relations andState Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1988),p. 274.
14:4 j 122 International Security
NATIONALISM
in Europe. Waralso had a majorimpacton thedevelopment ofnationalism Indeed,thepresenceofa palpableexternal threat maybe thestrongest way to generatea commonassociation betweenthe stateand the population. External threats have such a powerful effect on nationalism because people thatthey realizein a profound manner areunderthreat becauseofwho they are as a nation;theyare forced to recognize thatit is onlyas a nationthat theeffects they can successfully defeat thethreat. Anthony Giddensrecounts ofstates'sovereignty, ofWorldWarI: "The Warcanalizedthedevelopment tying thisto citizenship and to nationalism in sucha profound way thatany otherscenario[ofhow the international would be ordered] system came to MichaelHoward notes appear as little morethanidle fantasy."'14 Similarly, the visceral of nationalism impactof wars on the development throughout Europe: from Self-identification as a Nationimpliesalmostby definition alienation in thegroup-memory other and themostmemorable communities, incidents in conflict consisted withand triumph overothercommunities. Francewas Marengo, Austerlitz and Jena: military triumph settheseal on thenew-found it had been a nationfor nationalconsciousness. Britain was Trafalgar-but battles Russia fourhundredyears,sincethoseearlier Crecyand Agincourt. wasthetriumph and Sedan.15 of 1812.Germany wasGravelotte In Europe therewas an almostsymbiotic relationship betweenthe state's extractive war increasedboth as the population capacityand nationalism: threat thatthey and was convinced shouldpaymoreto thestate, by external unitedaroundcommonsymbols and as, at the same time,the population wars thatwere important of nationalism. memories components Fighting it is possibleto have people pay moretaxes maybe the onlyway whereby withthestate. and at thesame timefeelmorecloselyassociated Warin the Era TheAbsence Modern ofInterstate the Whiletrying to studythechaos causedby administrative disintegration, humanrights and large-scale forceful of ethnic crushing challenges, abuses,
Critique of Historical andViolence, vol. II ofA Contemporary 14. Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State ofCalifornia Press,1985),p. 235. Materialism (Berkeley: University Press,1978),p. 9. Emphasis Nation State (Oxford: Clarendon 15. MichaelHoward,War andthe in theoriginal.
WarandtheState inAfrica 1123
manyscholars have generally assumedthatpoor countries todayfaceeven moreexternal challengesthanEuropeanstatesdid in their formative periIn fact, ods.16 sincetheend oftheSecondWorld fewThird World War,very stateshave fought wars of thetypethataffected theevolution interstate of Europeanstates.The few ThirdlWorld interstate wars thathave occurred have obscured thefactthat (e.g., India-Pakistan, Iran-Iraq, China-Vietnam) thevastmajority ofThird World do notfacesignificant states mostofthetime external Stateslike Israel,SouthKorea,or Taiwan,wherenational threats. in nationalpolitics, survival has been a real consideration are exceptional and even thesecountries have survived intact. destinedforwar giventhe coloEven in Africa, the continent seemingly there nially-imposed boundaries and weak political has notbeen authorities, one involuntary era boundary changesincethe dawn of the independence in thelate 1950s,and veryfewcountries faceeven theprospect ofa conflict in Africa withtheir thathave occurred were Mostoftheconflicts neighbors. not,as in Europe,wars of conquestthatthreatened the existence of other butconflicts wereresolved states, overlesserissues that without threatening the existence of anotherstate.For instance, Tanzaniainvaded Uganda in 1979to overthrow Idi Amin,not to conquerUganda. Similarly, the war in theWestern Saharais a colonial question, nota conflict between independent states.Even South Africa's destabilization efforts againstits neighbors are primarily attempts to influence the policiesof the majority-ruled countries, not to changethe bordersof the region.Lesothoor Swazilandwould not existtoday if South Africa In the few had any real territorial ambitions. conflicts thatdid have thepotential to threaten theexistence fundamentally ofstates-Somalia'sattempt in the1970sand Libya'swar to invadeEthiopia againstChad in the 1970sand 1980s-the aggressor did notsucceed.17 African stateshave seldomfought interstate wars and the continent has not witnessedsignificant boundary changes,because independent leaders
16. See, forinstance, Joseph LaPalombara, "Penetration: A CrisisofGovernmental Capacity," in LeonardBinder, et al., Crisesand Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1971),p. 222. 17. In 1977 Somalia,as part of its irredentist projectto create"Greater Somalia,"invaded Ethiopia in the hope of annexing the Ogaden; theEthiopians, withsignificant help from the Soviet Unionand Cuba, defeated Somaliain 1978.DavidD. Laitin and Said S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search ofa State (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, In 1973Libyan 1987),pp. 140-143. forces invadedChad by moving forces intothedisputed Aozou strip. The Libyanmilitary presence gradually expandeduntila dramatic seriesof conflicts withtheChadiangovernment (heavily supported theLibyans by Franceand the UnitedStates)in 1987forced to agreeto an end to hostilities. John Wright, Libya, Chad andthe Central Sahara (London:Hurst, 1989), pp. 126-146.
14:4 1124 International Security
havecontinued thesystem ofboundary maintenance that thecolonial powers first developedto regulate thescramble for Africa in thelate1800s.18 African leadersrecognized in theearly 1960sthat a potentially large number ofgroups wouldwantto secede from thestatestheyare presently or in, tojoin others create entirely thecontinent new ones. In order toprevent from beingthrown intothe chaos of large-scale boundarychangesin whichthe stability and integrity of any statecould be threatened, theycreated a system of explicit norms,propoundedby the Organization of African Unityin 1963,which declaredany changein the inherited to be illegitimate. colonialboundaries Most of the continent has, accordingly, refusedto recognizeboundary changes(e.g., Biafra, Eritrea) even wheretheprinciple ofself-determination might have led themto do so. Thissystem in preserving has been successful African national boundaries and has so far deterred almost all countries from initiating the kind of conquestwars thatwere so commonin European history. The system thatmaintained the inherited borders as inviolate was because two of thelargest somewhat stateson strengthened inadvertently, thecontinent (Nigeriaand Zaire),whichcould conceivably have threatened their muchsmaller facedsignificant the neighbors, secessionist threats (from Ibo and Kataganese respectively) and therefore worked resolutelyto thenormthattheborders shouldnotbe changed. strengthen The stability in Africa, is a remarkable of new states,especially developmentgiventhatthevast majority of theoverone hundred countries in the ThirdWorldthathave gainedtheir since1945are poor,have independence weakadministrative and consist that aresplintered ofpopulations structures, lines.In other thekindof alongregional or ethnic words,theyare precisely statesthatbefore1945were routinely invadedand takenoverby stronger in theThird statesin their or by external fewstates region powers.Yet,very evident and political faceany sigWorld, despitetheir military weaknesses, nificant external threat. In contrast, Tillyestimates, the "enormous majority" of statesin Europe failed. and longperiods withno majorfighting Peace was theexception were almostunknown, weak stateswere routinely and as forcenturies defeated absorbed rulers.19 Thepsychology ofEurope populations regularly byforeign in its formative centuries, where state survivalwas a veryreal issue of
18. Thisargument is developedin Jeffrey Herbst, "The Creation and Maintenance ofNational Boundaries in Africa," International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Fall1989),pp. 673-692. 19. Tilly, "Reflections on theHistory ofEuropean State-Making," p. 38.
constant concernto leaders,is so different from the outlookfacingThird World leaderstodayas to suggest thatthere has been a fundamental change in the survival prospects of weak statesand thatcontrol of territory is no longer correlated withmilitary power.20 Problems ofState Consolidation inAfrica in their African statesfacenumerous problems efforts to consolidate power. Theyare poor, shortof trained and confront manpower, thatare societies often fragmented and have little orientation to the stateas a whole. Many other ThirdWorld nations facethesesame problems are often although they in Africa, mostextreme of thecontinent and thefragility giventhe poverty of the states. Elites can come to power but, given the precariousness of in countries control whererulesgoverning leadership and successionhave notbeen institutionalized, theymaybe displaced.Once theylose power,or are prevented from have no other gaining it,ambitious politicians opportunity to accumulate wealthor powerbecausethestatecontrols thebadges of statusand manyofthefree-floating in theeconomy, resources suchas they are.21Even when theydo control the apex of the state,elitesmayfeelthat because of theircountry's to exogenousshocks(e.g., sudden vulnerability raw material and the presenceof sharpdropsin the priceof their exports) and well-connected multinational sophisticated enterprises minority groups in in Indians East in Lebanese West are not (e.g., Africa, Africa), they really and therefore control oftheir own destiny arevulnerable. As a result oftheir grossinsecurities, these"lame Leviathans"' try to control everdesperately greater partsofsociety through outright ownership or regulation. However, sincethey areweak,their arealmost efforts inevitably clumsy, heavy-handed, and authoritarian. theaveragestatein Africa to other statesis Therefore, although compared small(as measuredby government of grossdospendingas a percentage
20. Ibid.,p. 81.
21. RichardHodder-Williams,An Introduction to thePolitics ofTropical Africa (London: Allen and
Unwin,1984),p. 95. 22. ThomasM. Callaghy, in Africa: "The Stateand theDevelopment ofCapitalism Theoretical, in Donald Rothchild Historical, and Comparative Reflections," and NaomiChazan, eds., The
Precarious Balance:Stateand Society in Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Westview,1988), p. 82.
14:4 1 126 International Security
mestic product [GDP]),23 itappearsto be too largebecauseitsclumsy extractiveefforts cause so muchdamagecompared to thebenefits thatit delivers. Thus arises the image of so many African statesas "overdeveloped" or "swollen."24 The problems can be illustrated confronted by statesin Africa by comparing their experience withEuropeanstatesin twoareaswherewar had a significant impact: thestate'sability to extract resources through taxes, and thedegreeofnationalism in thecountries southoftheSahara. A classicexampleof how weak statepowercauses the stateto institute desperate and self-defeating economic policiesis in thearea of government revenue.Government revenueposes a majorproblem forall African states and manyothersin the ThirdWorld.These statesare desperately shortof revenueto fundeven minimal stateservices (e.g., pay nurses'salaries, buy books forschools,supplytransport foragricultural extension that services) theirpopulations have long been promised.In additionto theserecurrent and moreefficient arein need ofmoreextensive costs,Third World countries taxsystems because theprocessofdevelopment requires largeexpenditures and on infrastructure to promote economic the country activity throughout to handle the ramifications of development, the largeexpenses especially W. Arthur incurred byurbanizing countries.25 Lewisestimates that thepublic in Third sector World countries shouldbe spending on theorder of20 percent of GDP on services, exclusiveof defenseand debtrepayment.26 However, when defense(2.5 percentof GDP) and debt repayments (3.4 percentof the averageAfrican GDP) are subtracted, country spends only15.7 percent ofitsGDP on all government are onlyrough functions.27 Whilethesefigures economicstatistics, estimates given the problemsassociatedwithAfrican African crisis states. theydo illustrate theextent ofthefiscal facing in Africa, and statistical structures Due to the weaknessof administrative and manygovernments of foreign relyon taxation trade,because imports
23. The shareof totalgrossdomestic product of sub-Saharan African statesis smaller, at 21.6 are from percent, thanthe developing country averageof 25.5 percent. (Bothfigures 1984.) International Monetary Fund (IMF), Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1988 (Washington, D.C.: IMF,1988),p. 94. 24. See, forinstance, LarryDiamond,"Class Formation in the SwollenAfrican State,"The and NzongolaJournal ofModern African Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (December 1987),pp. 592-596; in Nzongola-Ntalaja, Revolution and Ntalaja,"The Crisisof the Statein Post-Colonial Africa," Counter-Revolution inAfrica (London:Zed Books,1987),p. 85. 25. W. Arthur Lewis, The Evolution of theInternational Economic Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1978),p. 39. 26. W. Arthur Lewis,Development Planning: TheEssentials ofEconomic Policy (New York: Harper and Row,1966),p. 115. 27. Calculated from IMF,Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1988,pp. 58, 74, and 94.
inAfrica WarandtheState 1127
exports mustphysically pass through a relatively smallnumberof border posts thatcan be easilymanned.Thus, the averageAfrican statedepends on revenuefrom tariffs for20.5 percent of totalrevenue,comparedto all developing countries which,on average,gain 12.9 percent of their revenue from tariffs, and industrialized countries wheretariffs accountforonly1.3 percent oftotalrevenue.28 indirect trade the statethrough taxeson foreign Unfortunately, funding damages nationaleconomiesbecause leadersare compelledto erectevergreater administrative controls on imports. Thesetariffs promote corruption, smuggling and, mostimportantly, over-valued becausegovexchange rates, ernments rather thanthemarket to growto relyon administrative controls regulateimports.Overvaluedexchangeratesin turnlead to wide-spread damagewithin poorereconomies as exporters are universally thepophurt, ulationis encouragedto become dependenton imported food,and black markets quickly developto takeadvantageofdistorted prices.29 Beyondthe immediate damage caused by a tax system dependent on imports and exof tax system is particularly forThirdWorld ports,thistype inappropriate in countries. of slow and steadyincreases These countries need guarantees in orderto accomrevenueabove therateof economic government growth and communications plishthetaskscrucial to development: buildtransport establish and createeducational systems, utilities, systems.30 Another majorproblem facing leadersin Africa is theabsenceofa strong consensus withthestate.The lackofa popular overnational popularidentity resources and the state'sclumsy efforts to extract purposeboth aggravates is itself exacerbated by an insecure, authoritarian elite.Indeed, the picture ofAfrican societies is ofpopulations widely accepted today trying desperately to escape the clutches thanbecoming of the state,rather moreinvolvedin it,and certainly notwilling to pay moretaxesto it.31 Twenty-five yearsafter "thenationalist in mostAfrican period,"thereare fewsignsof nationalism countries despitethenow pro forma exhortations from propaganda organsto in engage state-building. Indeed, the majority of statesstillhave difficulty viablesymbols creating to attract theloyalties oftheir citizens.
28. Calculated from ibid.,p. 54.
29. See World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An AgendaforAction(Wash30. Alex Radian, Resource Mobilization inPoorCountries: TaxPolicies Implementing (New Brunswick, 31. See Rothchildand Chazan, The Precarious Balance.
ington, D.C.: World Bank,1981),pp. 24-30. NJ: Transaction Books,1980),pp. 13-17.
in African thereare todayveryfewattempts Not surprisingly, therefore, a national consensus on majorissues,muchless a national countries to forge identity. Forinstance, mostformulas to decrease inter-ethnic tension concentrate onlyon ameliorating the negative aspectsof ethnic conflict by accomit through structures and preferential modating decentralized government in are inappropriate such as federalism often policies.32 However,formulas where nationalinstitutions are not strong.Federalist solutions countries brokedown in Sudan and Uganda,amongother places,because theincentivesforleadersto attempt to gaintotalcontrol weremuchgreater thanthe barriers posed by recently adoptedinstitutional arrangements.33 Moreover, no matterhow well accommodationist formulas of intra-societal conflict in Africa in the ThirdWorldwould and elsewhere work,almosteveryone agreethata morebasic national loyalty by all societal groupswould stillbe desirable.However,the means by whichto induce a disparatesocietyto identify morewiththe nation-state are unknownin Africa and fewin the current era are even attempting to speculateon how to developa national consensus. Difficulties ofState Consolidation without War Warin Europeplayed such an important role in the evolution of the state and society's withthe statebecause it is extraordimechanism relationship elemental to reform outsidetimesofcrisis, narily difficult, partsofthegova real change ernmental or to effect system, such as the meansof taxation, in nationalidentity. For instance, sincetaxesare so consequential to every a largenumber ofpolitical businessdecision, thetaxsystem overtime reflects madebythestate withdifferent interest bargains groups.Often governments findit too politically subsidiesto thosetheywant difficult to providedirect to favor, so thetaxsystem is a convenient backdoor to aid politically impor32. See, forinstance, Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press,1985),pp. 563-680. 33. Bugandahad a degreeof autonomy whenUganda gainedindependence and theKabaka, the traditional rulerof the Bugandapeople,was the country's first president. However, this Minister theKabaka arrangement fellapartin 1966whenthenPrime Milton Oboteoverthrew and invadedBuganda.Crawford Young,ThePolitics ofCultural Pluralism (Madison:University of Wisconsin GaafarMohamedNimeiri of the Press, 1976),pp. 149-156.In 1983,President which Sudaneffectively abrogated theAddisAbabaagreement had given autonomy toSouthern in a civilwar eversince.MansourKhalid,Nimeiri Sudan. The Sudan has been embroiled and
theRevolution ofDis-May (London: KPI, 1985), pp. 234-240.
inAfrica WarandtheState 1129
The political bargainsthatconopprobrium. tantgroupswithout incurring ownbecauseindividuals oftheir stitute thetaxsystem developa momentum and and businessesbase theirfuture economic decisionson the incentives in theexisting calledthe Schumpeter taxcode. Indeed,Joseph disincentives and claimedthat"thespirit ofhard,nakedfacts" fiscal system "a collection the deeds its policymay of a people, its cultural level, its social structure, in its fiscalhistory, strippedof all prepare-all this and more is written phrases."3 in theleveloftaxation even minor changessuch as alterations Therefore, in thetaxburden, as theUnitedStatesand mostWestern or shifts European tremendous have made in the last few years,engender political countries groupsbut all thosethat favored political battles.Not onlythe previously will forcefully followedthe signalssentout by government oppose simply are even more ofthetaxsystem fiscal reform. Greater changesin thenature taxsystems that "last difficult. EdwardAmes' and Richard Rapp's conclusion untilthe end of the government thatinstituted them"and thattax systems in someEuropeancountries from thethirteenth and survived "almost intact" fourteenth until thelateeighteenth century maybe an exaggeration, centuries a particular for system but their conclusions suggestjust how muchinertia Otherthanwar,no revenuecan developovertime.35 collecting government typeof crisisdemandsthatthe stateincreasetaxeswithsuch forcefulness, and fewothersituations would impelcitizens to acceptthosedemands,or at least not resistthem as strongly mighthave. It is as theyotherwise that"the formation of standing therefore hard to counter Tilly'sargument to extraction and the largest armiesprovidedthe largestsingleincentive overthelongrunofEuropean meansofstatecoercion state-making."36 single faceso often, may Domesticsecurity threats, ofthetypeAfrican countries force the stateto increaserevenue;however, thesecrisesare almostnever as graveas the typeof external threat theEuropeanstateshad to confront, of the state.In addition, because theydo not threaten the veryexistence domestic conflicts resultin fragmentation and considerable hostility among different of the population. the statedoes not necesAs a result, segments achievethegreater revenue byan external efficiency gainsengendered sarily
34. JosephA. Schumpeter, "The Crisisof the Tax State,"in Alan T. Peacock,et al., eds., International Economic Papers, No. 4 (London:Macmillan, 1954),pp. 6-7. 35. EdwardAmesand Richard T. Rapp,"TheBirth and DeathofTaxes:A Hypothesis," Journal ofEconomic History, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March1977),p. 177. 36. Tilly, "Reflections on theHistory ofEuropean State-Making," p. 73.
International 14:4 j 130 Security
crisis.Indeed, in a civilwar-as in Nigeriain the late 1960s-partsof the stateare fighting in tax againsteach other, whichhardly promotes efficiency in allowing collection. Public acceptanceof tax increases,a crucialfactor in timesofwar,willbe a much Europeanstatesto extract greater resources morecomplicated issue in civildisputes.As Mann notes,"thegrowth ofthe modern state, as measured byfinances, is explained primarily notin domestic terms butin terms ofgeopolitical relations ofviolence."37 The obstaclesposed by largepeasant populations, significant nonmonetarizedsectors, and widespreadpoverty are, of course,important contributorsto therevenuecrisis oftheAfrican state.However, theseproblems do notfully explain whypoorstates do notextract greater resources from society in a manner thatis less economically harmful. Factors such as political will, and the population's to be taxed-issues administrative ability, willingness in thatcan be affected by the decisionsof political leaders-are also crucial level of taxunderstanding why statesare unableto achievetheir potential Levi successfully ationin a benignmanner.38 For instance, shows Margaret thatin such diversecases as republican France and Rome, Englandin the Middle Ages, eighteenth-century and twentieth-century Britain, Australia, levels of taxation were affected primarily by political constraints facedby rulers, despitethe factthatmostof theseeconomies also posed significant barriers to increased taxcollection.39 Nor has therebeen any successin developing meansto cause the poputhanfighting a war.Nationalism, lation to identify morewiththestate, other which was nevernearly outside themajor as strong orwidespread (especially in Africa as manyhad thought, was palpablein thelatecolonial cities) period because there was a "relevant other"-thecolonialists-who couldbe easily identified as oppressors and aroundwhicha nominal national identity could be built.40 in mostAfrican there has However, sinceindependence countries, been no "relevant difficult to other"to oppose, so it has been extremely createnation-wide of identity. Therehas therefore been no way of symbols in Africasuch as wars forgedin Europe. a nationalidentity generating
37. Mann, SourcesofSocial Power,p. 490.
in Taxation in Developing International Fund 38. Raja J.Chelliah, "Trends Countries," Monetary Staff Papers, Vol. 18,No. 2 (July 1971), p. 312.On thepossibility ofchanging fiscal arrangements
in Africa,see Dennis Anderson, ThePublicRevenue and Economic Policyin African Countries, World
BankDiscussion PaperNo. 19 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank,1987),pp. 14-15.

39. For instance, see Levi, Of Rule and Revenue, p. 105. by Young, ThePoliticsofCulturalPluralism, p. 42.
in developing 40. The importance of the "relevant other" concept groupcohesion is explored
WarandtheState inAfrica j 131
Anthony Smith writes, "thecentral difficulty of'nation-building' in muchof Africa and Asia is thelack of any sharedhistorical mythology and memory on whichstateelitescan setabout'building' thenation.The 'nation'[is built up] from thecentral fundofculture and symbolism and mythology provided "41 The result by sharedhistorical experiences. is theanomiein mostAfrican countries today. It couldbe arguedthatthelackofnationalism simply reflects thefact that African countries are artificial groupings of disparate peoples and therefore are notreally nation-states. However,no "natural" are mature nation-states atbirth with that populations havereadily agreedtoa central identity. Rather, thegoal ofthosewho wantto create thenation-state is to convince different groupsthattheydo, in fact, sharea common identity. Thisis whyeven in Europe,whichtoday seems to have nation-states thatare more "natural" thanAfrica's, war had such a crucial roleto playin theforging of common identities. thatwar fostered in Europebetween Indeed, the symbiotic relationship taxcollection and nationalism is absentin Africa, because thereis precisely no external threat to encourage people to acquiescein the state'sdemands, and no challengethat causes themto respondas a nation.Instead,the African state'sclumsy efforts at greater extraction are metby popularwithdrawalrather a united a thanby populace around common identity. Of course,not all wars led to the strengthening of administrative institutionsand greater For example,JosephStrayer notes thatthe nationalism. HundredYears War "was so exhausting forbothsides thatit discouraged thenormal oftheapparatus ofthestate.Therewas a tendency development to postponestructural to solve problems on an ad hoc basis rather reforms, than [to create]new agenciesof government, to sacrifice forimefficiency "42However,the HundredYears War was exceptional mediateresults. because of its lengthand it therefore did not allow rulersto consolidate the gains usuallyachievedafter facinga shortperiodof external danger.Yet in prorecordsuggeststhatwar was highly efficient overall,the historical in Europe, and thatit would be much more motingstate consolidation difficult forstatesto accomplish thesame tasksin peacetime.
41. Anthony D. Smith,"State-Making and Nation-Building," in John A. Hall, ed., States in History (Oxford: BasilBlackwell, 1986),p. 258. 42. Joseph R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins ofthe Modern State (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1970),p. 60.
International 14:4 1132 Security
AreThere Peaceful Routes toState Consolidation? need to transform ThirdWorldcountries and other SinceAfrican important their fiscal and parts oftheir governmental systems, including arrangements, avenueofwarto aid butdo nothave thetraditional to promote nationalism, a pathother than them,theimmediate questionis whether theycan follow thatadopted by Europe to consolidatestate power and to develop new and thestate. betweensociety national to reducethedivisions identities revenuebecause the Once again it is interesting to focuson government are sucha good issue is so decisivein itsown right and becausetaxsystems In an age withreducedlevels of reflection of the basic bargainsin society. to interstate war, African countries are faced withthe problemof trying increase the capacity of the statewithout beingable to use wars to "ratchet fiscal inertia, up" thestate'sextractive ability. Giventheevidence ofEuropean when it is clearthatit willbe even moredifficult to institute majorreforms in normalcircumstances. The one clearchanceAfrican statesare operating did have to institute was at independence, because countries majorreforms at thatmoment thatsignificant new political arrangements werein suchflux initiatives could be undertaken. Indeed, someAfrican countries (e.g., Mozin their (e.g., ambique, Angola)did makemassivechanges political economy theseparticular were nationalization, collectivization); unfortunately, reforms socialist distorted economies even ruinous becausetheir economically policies becomesthenormorethanin mostAfrican countries. Once independence itbecomesextraordinarily diffimal situation, as it has in African countries, cultfor ofpolitical suchas fiscal leadersto makebasicreforms arrangements, and Morton whichmight hurtpowerful systems, groups.As PeterBachrach Baratznotedin the context dominant of American politics, values, myths, and institutions rituals, quicklyossifyso thatcrucialissues, such as fiscal Thereappearsto be no impetus from reform, are noteven on theagenda.43 the current signifiinside African countries to disrupt fiscalarrangements thatthereis currently a significant cantly. Indeed, much of the argument economic and thatthiscrisiswas caused by malfunctioning crisisin Africa, outsidethecontinent.44 government policies,came from
43. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "TwoFacesofPower," American Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 4 (December 1962),p. 950.
44. For instance, the World Bank's report, Accelerated in Sub-Saharan Development Africa,was
in notingthe dimensions crucial of Africa's economic crisis;it set the agenda forreform of African economies.
However, itcouldbe arguedthatstructural adjustment, pressedon African countries by the International Fund (IMF), the WorldBank,and Monetary bilateral donors, couldservemanystate-making functions. As external actors and of theway the state dedicated to fundamental reforms of the economy to thesamerigidities operates, theIMF and other donorsare notsubject that paralyzedomestic reformers. The IMF and otheractorswho insiston fundamental reform African for in their couldpressure states significant changes tax system.Demands froman external actorare similar to war, in thata leadercan legitimately argueto itspopulation thatithas no choicein asking themto makeverydifficult because it is undertoo muchexternal sacrifices pressure. It wouldbe a majormistake, however, to taketoo fartheanalogy between of war. For instance, pressure from actorssuch as the IMF and the effects warproducedsuch spectacular becausethe gainsin governmental efficiency stateitself felt The IMF,or any other threatened. cannotproducethat actor, has been leastsuccessful when it has feeling; indeed,structural adjustment triedto addressthe issues of how the stateitself operatesin areas such as The cost to the stateitselfin public enterprises or fiscalarrangements.45 to adopt a structural can be severe,butfallsfar failing adjustment program shortof what war would threaten. The IMF will never cause a state to a statecan simply disappear.At worst, opt forthehighcostofbreaking off relations withtheIMF. Nordoes external ofthetypetheFundexerts pressure produce anychange in national Whileleaderscan occasionally identity. rallypeople againstthe external threat thesesentiments arenotlongposed by"imperialists," usually betweeninterlasting because the population maybe unableto distinguish national actorssupposedly draining away thenation'sfundsduring a structuraladjustment and thosenational leaderswho led their exercise, country intosucha spectacular debacle.WhileEurope'sleadersin previous economic centuries treated their wellby modern it was hardly populations standards, thatpeople would be better usuallyunambiguous offiftheywon the war thaniftheylost. The prospects ofstructural adjustment somekindofnationalism fostering based on resisting is also limited because theIMF is not reallya foreigners
45. Jeffrey Herbst,"Political Impediments to Economic Rationality: WhyZimbabweCannot Reform its PublicSector," TheJournal ofModern African Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (March1989), pp. 67-85.
"relevant other" to a largely peasantpopulation, and cannot inducechanges in national consciousness of thetypethatwarsin Europeproduced.Unlike a war wherethe entirepopulationwas threatened because of its national identity, structural adjustment willhelpcertain groupsunambiguously (e.g., peasantswho growexport crops),clearly hurtsome (e.g., theurbanpopulationdependenton imported food),and have ambiguous effects on many others.Further, the intensity in shared experience that a war generates cannotbe replicated simply by, say,protracted overthe IMF's negotiations Extended Fund Facility. TheLikelihood ofWarin Africa Ifinternal reform seemsimprobable and there is no other external threat that can perform quite the same role as war,the questionbecomeswhether at some pointin thefuture African leaderswillbeginto see war as a potential avenueforstate-making. Some leadersmaylookto warsimply becausethey are truly concerned about the fateof the nationand see no otheroption. Others withnation-building, butmayfind maynotbe concerned particularly thattheircountries have suffered economicdeclineforso long that the their for own personal enrichment havebecomeseverely possibilities limited, and therefore will seek to seize the assets of othercountries. So far,the thathas preserved boundaries has not been signifithe continent's system itobviousthat tested becausemostleadersconsidered werebetter cantly they offwith theirinherited boundariesthan theywould be in a chaoticwar be lost.However, situation wheresovereignty or considerable territory might in the context of decades of economic especially decline,it is possiblethat someAfrican thebenefits leadersmayrecalculate ofa peace thatlocksthem intoperpetual state'sexweakness.Instead,theymaytryto increasetheir tractive and divert their citizens from inter-ethnic ability squabbles byseizing a fight with ofprovocations, to provoke upon themultitude alwayspresent, the extreme states.Paul Colinvauxpresents case forthe prosneighboring war in Africa: pectsofinterstate
Africaholds the greatestpossibilitiesforthe aspiringgeneral....
willbe battles betweenAfrican nations as theybuildtheir African continent in a new imageis as certain in history. as anything For each country there and numbersall rise must come times when wealth,hopes, ambitions,
That there
an aggression together. It thenneeds onlyaccessto high-quality weaponsfor to be an attractive undertaking.46 Ifsignificant interstate warsbreakoutwhenprovocations are smallbutelites realizewhat war could do forthe stateand the nation,it would not be a in Africa increasedinterstate warfare new development. strikingly Rather, war in Africa would simplybe a return to the Europeannorm.Whether todaywould actually bringabout the same kind of changesthatit did in butthepossibility that leadersmight become Europecenturies ago is unclear, so desperatethattheytryin some fundamental way to alterthe political rulesunderwhichtheir shouldnotbe ignored. nationsfunction are the that could bringabout significant Many possible provocations interstate war in Africa. thereare plenty of borderdisputesand Certainly, dominaof ethnic fragments groupsthatneed to be rescuedfrom "foreign tion"toprovide for hostile action other African enoughrationalization against versusFrench),47 countries. betweenlanguageblocs (e.g., English Conflicts disputesover controlof crucialriversand railroads(especiallygiven the or the simpleneed to have moreland for number ofland-locked countries), thatdouble everytwenty populations yearsprovidemanyotherpotential leadersmight reasonsforwar in Africa. More thana fewAfrican someday a brilliant consolidator ofa "new nation," on theonly agreewithBismarck, realway to unitea fragmented people: Prussia. . ., as a glanceat themap willshow,couldno longer wearunaided on its long narrowfigure the panoplywhichGermany forits serequired it mustbe equallydistributed curity; over all Germanpeoples. We should getno nearerthe goal by speeches,associations, decisions ofmajorities; we shouldbe unable to avoid a seriouscontest, a contest whichcould onlybe settled by blood and iron.18 Although African countries had moreor less equal defensecapabilities at independence, the growing differential in force projection capabilities have led some to suggestthatAfrica willexperience muchgreater resort to force in the future. Inventories of tanksand otherarmored vehiclesas well as
46. Paul Colinvaux, TheFates A Biological ofNations: Theory ofHistory (London:Penguin, 1980), pp. 219-220. 47. Ibid.,p. 219. 48. Otto,Princevon Bismarck, Bismarck, theMan and theStatesman: BeingtheReflections and Reminiscences ofOtto, Prince vonBismarck, Written andDictated byHimself hisRetirement after from translated Office, underthesupervision ofA.J.Butler, Vol. I (New York: Harperand Brothers, 1899), p. 313.
artillery, jet fighters, and navalcraft have increased considerably throughout the continent. For instance, just in the periodbetween1966and 1981,the number ofcountries in sub-Saharan Africa withtanksincreased from twoto eighteen, the number wentfrom withfieldartillery seven to thirty-six, the number withlightarmorwentfrom thirteen to thirty-six, and the number possessingjet aircraft went fromsix to twenty-one.49 Countriessuch as Nigeriaand Zaire have developedmilitary thatare fargreater capabilities than theirneighbors'. So far,the assuranceof stability thatis the central advantage ofthecurrent African statesystem has almostalwaysbeen more attractive than whateverreasons African leaders may have had to begin conflict withtheirneighbors. However,as President Nyerere of Tanzania showedwhen he invadedUganda to depose Idi Amin,even strong proponentsofAfrican norms can be driven to interstate conflict ifthey believethat thecostsof not actingare highenough.In the future, African leadersmay find that, despiteall their efforts, economic reform cannot and they progress cannotgettheir to unitearoundnational it is conceivable citizenry symbols; thatthenthe deterrent value of the normsof sovereignty may seem much less powerful thanthey do now.Ifthesenorms no longer provided protection to a large numberof states,theywould lose all meaningthroughout the African continent. Whilethetiming ofthesewarsis notpredictable, itshould be obviousthatthe incentives thatAfrican leadershave to incitewars for and maybecomemuchstronger thepurposesofstate-making are significant in the future reform timesofbusiness when the futility of domestic during as usual, thatis, peace, becomesclear. A NewDevelopment ThePermanently Weak State: Muchofthisdiscussion for African has focused on thepotential opportunities statesthat,in a European-type have engagedin battle, statesystem, might used warin order to further won (orat leastnotlosttoobadly),and thereby statebuilding. it be that another class ofstates However, should recognized
inBruce 49. William G. Thom, E. Arling"Sub-Saharan Africa's Changing Military Capabilities,"
(Boulder, Colo.: haus and Pauline H. Baker, eds., AfricanArmies:Evolutionand Capabilities
in Black Military Capabilities Westview, 1986),p. 101. See also Walter L. Barrows, "Changing Africa's International Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press,1985),p. 99 and p. 120;and Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 Henry Bienen, "African Militaries as Foreign Policy Actors," International (Fall1980),p. 176.
MilitaryInfluence and Africa,"in William Foltz and Henry Bienen, eds., Armsand theAfrican:
in Africa is directly affected by thecurrent absenceofwar:thosestatesthat wouldhave lostbadlyand wouldhavebeen absorbed These bythewinners. left statesrangefrom thosethatare just geographic anachronisms by colonialism (e.g., The Gambia,Djibouti), and verysmallstates in theshadowof giants(e.g., Benin and Togo, close to Nigeria,or Rwanda and Burundi lack significant resources fordevelbordering Zaire), to those thatsimply In Europeduring theformative or defense(e.g., Mali, Mauritania). opment centuries, disintegration ofweak stateslikethesewas a regular occurrence. Weak statesthatwere defeatedthenbecame the poorerregionsof richer had a chanceto shareintherevenue countries, butat leastthey and resources of a viable state.Yet the absence of a truly statesystemthat competitive penalizesmilitary weaknessmeansthateven thosestatesthathave no other prospects than long-term dependenceon international aid will survivein their crippled form fortheforeseeable future. Perhapstheonlytaskof state consolidation that theseotherwise weakstates can accomplish is tophysically within the stableboundaries of the African state capturetheirpopulations The presenceof permanently weak statesthatwillnotbe eliminated is a in international and one thatposes noveldevelnew development relations so far,no matter opmentchallenges.All theoretical workon development what the ideologicalpredisposition has implicitly assumed of the authors, thatsomehowthe nation-states as theycurrently existare viable arrangeifonlytheyfollow theproper ments and receive fordevelopment, strategies Thisassumption was approtheinternational enoughhelp from community. states theEuropeancontext wherecenturies ofwarhad eliminated priate for thatsimply havenotbeen werenotviable.However, for whose states Africa, testedby an international thatseverely system punishespolitical weakness, thereis littlereason to believe thatmanyof themwill be able to have a favorable enough geographic position,control adequate naturalresources, and construct of a significant of their gain the support portion populations, structures to ever develop. In the long term,these strongadministrative statesmaydisappearifinterstate warsfinally do breakout in Africa. In the meantime, what is to be done with statesthatexistbut cannot We have been develop?It is fartoo earlyto writeoff any state'sprospects. ofmanystates aboutthedevelopment bothin Africa wrong prospects (where
in Africa," thePolitics ofProtest, and StateConsolidation "Migration, 50. See Jeffrey Herbst, system.50
African Affairs, forthcoming.
scholars weretoo optimistic) and elsewhere in theworld, suchas EastAsia.5' It would also be morally unacceptable simplyto allow these countries to gradually slide from the world'sview intoa twilight of perpetual poverty because natureand history have been unkindto them.However,thought mustbe givento nontraditional alternatives foraid to states thatin previous times would simply have been defeated and absorbed by stronger neighbors in a war.Forinstance, theinternational community might consider rewarding those countries in the ThirdWorldthathave takenin economicmigrants from non-viable states.52 The Westcould consider providing additional aid to thosecountries willing to engagein some kindofregional integration to mitigate the problemsof unchanging boundaries, much as countries that have adoptedmorerational economic policies haveattracted greater aid from donors.The worldmay simply have to recognize thata certain number of countries are lockedintonon-viable and developa long-term positions, approachto their welfare rather thanacting surprised timetheinevitable every famine or ecological disaster occurs. Conclusion It is important notto glorify war.The warsthat Europewentthrough caused immense suffering forgenerations and wholesaledestruction of some societies. Yet it is undeniablethat out of this destruction emergedstronger and moreunified political arrangements No one wouldadvocate populations. war as a solutionto Africa's and economicproblems, where the political costsof interstate war could be even higher thanin Europe.It is doubtful that,if African countries do start fighting wars, theywill undergoexactly the same processesof stateconsolidation in Europe. thatwar engendered itshouldbe recognized However, that there is very that African little evidence in the ThirdWorld, willbe able to findpeaceful countries, or manyothers In particular, the stateand develop nationalidentities. ways to strengthen theprospects but simply forstatesthatwillnot disappear, cannotdevelop, mustbe examined. At thesame time, that we mustrecognize thepossibility
51. In the 1950sAmerican administrations debatedwhether SouthKorea could achieveany increase in livingstandards and ifAmerican aid shouldbe devotedto simply preventing the country from getting poorer. CliveCrook, "Trial and Error," TheEconomist, September 23, 1989, p. 4. 52. See Jeffrey Herbst,"Migration Helps Poorestof Poor,"WallStreet Journal, June15, 1988, p. 12.
some African leaders in the future may come to believethatthe costs of peace-limits on reform possibilities and a fragmented population-are so IfAfrican highthatwar maynot seem likesuch an undesirable alternative. leadersdo indeed make thiscalculation, the suffering thatAfrica has seen in thelasttwenty-five yearsmayonlybe a preludeto muchmoredangerous developments.

War and State in Africa

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Descrizione originale:

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

War and State in Africa

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

War and the State in Africa Author(s): Jeffrey Herbst Source: International Security, Vol. 14, No.

Warand tfie State in

Development ofNewNations: An Essayin Comparative Analysis (Chicago:University of Chicago

International Security, Spring 1990 (Vol. 14, No. 4)

? 1990bythePresident and FellowsofHarvard Collegeand oftheMassachusetts Institute ofTechnology.

International Security 14:4 1118

j 119 WarandtheState inAfrica

14:4 | 120 International Security

WarandtheState inAfrica | 121

14:4 j 122 International Security

WarandtheState inAfrica 1123

14:4 1124 International Security

WarandtheState inAfrica 1125

21. RichardHodder-Williams,An Introduction to thePolitics ofTropical Africa (London: Allen and

14:4 1 126 International Security

inAfrica WarandtheState 1127

ington, D.C.: World Bank,1981),pp. 24-30. NJ: Transaction Books,1980),pp. 13-17.

International Security 14:4 1128

inAfrica WarandtheState 1129

International 14:4 j 130 Security

BankDiscussion PaperNo. 19 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank,1987),pp. 14-15.

WarandtheState inAfrica j 131

International 14:4 1132 Security

WarandtheState inAfrica 1133

International Security 14:4 1134

WarandtheState inAfrica 1135

International Security 14:4 1136

WarandtheState inAfrica 1137

African Affairs, forthcoming.

International Security 14:4 1138

WarandtheState inAfrica 1139

Potrebbero piacerti anche