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CI Boom 2014 Mar lists critical infrastructure disasters. What can be done to mitigate
such incidents are in my main analysis document.1 Last updated 2014 Mar 26
Version 1.48
Table of Contents, allow up to level 4 Summary ......................................................................................................................... 2 Tags 14........................................................................................................................ 4 CI disaster stories 2014 March ........................................................................................... 4 2014 Mar Ky Coal Fine / Mn Legislation........................................................................ 5 Ky Penalties ................................................................................................................ 5 Mn Legislature ............................................................................................................ 5 2014 Mar-Apr Detroit MI Disaster Training .................................................................. 6 2014 Mar-Apr Futurist Learning from Failure ............................................................... 6 2014 Mar 2 Ark-TN Motorists stuck on I-40 and I-55 ................................................... 7 Mar 4 NJ gas explosion via Serial Sabotage Contractor................................................. 7 Mar 4 Most companies lack good disaster planning........................................................... 7 DRP Acronyms ........................................................................................................... 8 Disaster Planning Report ............................................................................................ 9 Personal Experience.................................................................................................. 11 Personal Suggestions ................................................................................................ 11 2014 Mar 5 Indonesia ammunition explosion .............................................................. 13 Mar 5 Asteroid passes nearer Moon than Earth............................................................ 13 Mar 6 Asteroid passes nearer Earth than Moon............................................................ 13 Mar 6 OH Cleveland house explodes ........................................................................... 14 Mar 8 Duke Energy dumped coal ash and passes the buck .......................................... 14 Mar 8 Asia Airliner goes missing ................................................................................. 14 Mar 10 Duke spills more coal ash................................................................................. 15 Mar 10 NTSB report on 2012 Dec Sissonville WV disaster ........................................ 15 Familiar pipeline rupture stories ............................................................................... 16 Mar 12 NTSB investigating NYC gas explosion and fire ............................................ 16 Mar 13 FEMA update on NYC gas etc. => buildings collapse ................................ 18 Mar 14 Mumbai India building collapse....................................................................... 19 Mar 17 Oh oil contaminates nature preserve ................................................................ 19 Mar 26 update ........................................................................................................... 20 Mar 18 Seattle WA news helicopter crash.................................................................... 20 Mar 18 Canadian protests murder of hundreds............................................................. 20 Mar 22 WA mudslide.................................................................................................... 20 Mar 23 FEMA briefing ............................................................................................. 21 Mar 26 FEMA update ............................................................................................... 21 Mar 24 Il Chicago Train ............................................................................................... 22
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Lawsuits .................................................................................................................... 23 Ms. Jefferson foot broken, and other injuries ....................................................... 23 Ms Thomas cannot walk ....................................................................................... 24 Ms. Weaver knees crippled................................................................................... 24 Mar 26 updates.......................................................................................................... 24 Mar 26 Boston fire ........................................................................................................ 24 Mar 26 NTSB more safety alerts .................................................................................. 25 Continued in more documents .......................................................................................... 25
Summary
The following is also description in Scribd upload, of what is relevant to this time line segment. Events & new info, in 2014 Mar time line, were in, or about: Asteroids; Canada; India; Indonesia; USA. Types of Incidents:2 Air Landings at wrong airports, investigated by NTSB Malaysian Airlines MH370 tragedy governments conceal data and tell lies, triggering an international snipe hunt News helicopter crash in Seattle WA
Biggest or Worst (as opposed to biggest news coverage because of event location) Hundreds of native women massacred in Canada, whose government does nothing about it. Scale of Homeless Vets in America. Economy still in trouble, and impact of the Debt Malaysian MH370 airliner Sissonville WV memories recalled in NTSB report explaining how it happened 50 buildings impacted in WA state mudslide 55 homes damaged in explosion caused by safety violations by a contractor, in which this was the third place the same outfit had misbehaved this way. $ billion costs of Duke negligence to be passed on to Dukes customers . $ 27.5 million fine for water pollution Days stuck on highway in winter storm, which was totally predicted Coal Industry in trouble KY Water toxic pollution multiple incidents Duke Energy multiple incidents WV drinking water people still not back to normal
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In many cases, I do not yet know as much as I want to know about the incidents.
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First Responder Training Detroit First Aid Disaster Training what to do before the professionals arrive Minnesota Legislature struggles to do their duty Disaster Planning missing from most Companies Oil Spills and Gas Leak Disasters Carnage thanks to Serial (unintentional safety negligence) Sabotage Contractor, still in business Pipe Line ruptures thanks to infrastructure used until it dies of old age NTSB Investigations Safety Alerts Unusual spectacular events Canada massacres hundreds of Native Americans Chicago commuter train climbs escalator Indian buildings fall down Malaysian MH370 saga WA state mudslide Winter Storms vs. unprepared travelers Mar 2 Ark-TN I-40 & I-55 As usual, many of the disasters could have been avoided, or significantly mitigated if only: Work shifts should be adjusted so that people who must work when people normally sleep, are not put in a position where they will be working exhausted. Utilities need disaster response assistance, since they can take over an hour to get crews to site of a leak, while the fire dept can take 2-3 minutes response time to the same site. Alternatively, train personnel within the fire dept to turn off the fas. This should be more practical than the current support system for para medics with the fire departments. Railroad industry has advanced so that trains on a collision course with disaster can be detected in time to stop that disaster. Implementing this is expensive, but not as expensive as having the collisions. Pipeline operators should be trained to recognize indications that a rupture may have occurred so that they can cut off the flow as rapidly as possible. They also need cut-off valves at strategic intervals, so it does not take hours to send people to the valves which need to be cut-off. People, who smell gas leaks, should report them promptly, and know how to get out of harms way. Exit place of risk first, notify relevant authorities, stay out until they sound the all clear. Staying silent, while waiting until the explosion, if you survive it, should get you charged with manslaughter. 3 Critical Infrastructure disasters 2014 Mar Here is the main document: http://www.scribd.com/doc/114094060/CI-Boom-Analysis
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Management should include planning to protect the enterprise from likely problems. Legislators get properly briefed on industries they are supposed to do oversight of, and fund regulations and enforcement. Laws known, to the people and organizations they apply to, and obeyed. Infrastructure, which is known to be ancient, receives more frequent inspection and maintenance, than that which is brand new. Government leaders, and first responder organizations, should be educated in the risks facing their communities, probabilities of disaster, and how best to mitigate. Fixing something includes testing to make sure it is correctly implemented. Disaster recovery needs rapid correlation of relevant facts. Construction work should plan to avoid breaking utility lines. Bad weather means dont go out in it, unless properly prepared for the probable consequences. Astronomy needs funding support so all rocks in sky at risk of hitting planet Earth are identified in sufficient time to avert big collisions. But most of this is not happening, so we get these disasters and crises, which are familiar stories, because they happen again and again, with great regularity. There are also some recurring disasters for which I do not yet have a good solution idea, like those I have stated above.
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Air, Disaster, Industry, Pollution, Oil spill, Gas leak, fire, explosion, NTCB, FEMA, Duke Energy, training, negligence, Chicago,
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government safety and environmental regulations poorly communicated to where there is need to know them typically government inspectors visit a microscopic fraction of places they know about, and educate thru infraction notification, while there are many thousands of relevant places unknown to regulatory agencies; Stupid behavior can trigger totally avoidable disasters, which happen piecemeal in community after community, different places which fail to learn from a million other communities, until it is their turn to experience the same type event. I think theres a mentality which says Nothing has gone wrong for years, so we can ignore risks that anything might go wrong. This leads to infrastructure dying of old age in a disaster costing far more than had it been inspected and repaired regularly, over the years.
Ky Penalties
The first news story I read about the Kentucky Coal Fine was dated March 6 in the Louisville Courier Journal.4 Kentucky will receive $687,500 as its share of a $27.5 million fine that federal authorities say is the largest ever assessed for water-pollution permit violations, imposed by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and various state government environmental regulators. Besides Kentucky, the discharges occurred in Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia and West Virginia. In addition to the fine, Bristol, Va.-based coal producer Alpha Natural Resources Inc. and dozens of its subsidiaries will spend $200 million to reduce illegal toxic discharges into hundreds of waterways across Kentucky and four other Appalachian states, according to the proposed settlement. The EPA documented between 2006 and 2013 at least 6,289 permit-limit violations for pollutants that include iron, water acidity, suspended solids, aluminum, manganese, selenium and salinity. The violations occurred at 794 discharge points, or outfalls, the federal government said.
Mn Legislature
I could not even find a date on the article about Minnesota legislative effort. I first read it on March 20.
http://www.courier-journal.com/article/20140305/NEWS01/303050097/1008/Kentucky-to-share-in-27-5million-fine-over-water-pollution
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There are things desired by some Mn legislators, leading to bills proposing relevant actions.5 First responders should have better training for dealing with oil fires when pipelines are breached, or trains derailed. Companies experiencing these disasters should do a better job of keeping the government informed on what they are doing to try to prevent them. Another study is needed to inform legislators about long term needs. The state needs to fund more inspectors.
http://www.twincities.com/politics/ci_25383158/oil-disaster-preparedness-targeted-by-minnesotacommittee 6 http://www.hometownlife.com/article/20140122/NEWS06/301220040/Sign-up-emergency-disastertraining
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taking adequate steps to protect their data and IT systems . This is based on a survey of 1,000 companies Information Technology (IT) personnel, and relevant executives.11 I would not be surprised if the percentage of unpreparedness for governments is higher than these figures for companies. See ACEP Report Card near beginning of Jan 2014 time line for how that plays out by US states, which is more focused on medical preparedness than other kinds of disaster management. Key findings include:
64% of respondents surveyed say that their organization's disaster recovery (DR) budget is inadequate and underfunded. More than 60% report that they do not have a fully documented disaster recovery plan, and among the minority that does, 23% of respondents have never tested those plans. Approximately 1/3 say that they test their plan only once or twice a year, and more than 65% of those organizations do not pass their own DR tests. 78% of respondents have experienced outages of critical applications, and of that group, 63% say that losses ranged from a few thousand dollars to over $5M. Of the respondents who have experienced outages, approximately 28% say their organization lost datacenter functionality for up to weeks at a time.
For more information about the Disaster Recovery Preparedness Council visit their website at www.drbenchmark.org, or contact at info@drbenchmark.org
Theres to be a webinar on the state of Disaster Preparedness on March 28, 2014. 12 Council Chairman Steve Kahan is scheduled to speak about this topic at Disaster Recovery Journal's Spring World 2014, allegedly the industry's largest business continuity conference and exhibit, taking place March 30 - April 2, 2014 in Orlando, Fla.
DRP Acronyms
DR = Disaster Recovery DRP = Disaster Recovery Preparedness DRPC = Disaster Recovery Preparedness Council13 IT = Information Technology PII = Personal Identity Information
RTO = Recovery Time Objectives RPO = Recovery Point Objectives
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Based on the benchmark survey results, the DR Preparedness Council recommends that organizations consider implementing several steps to help ensure business continuity regardless of industry or evolving threats. 1. 1. Build a DR plan for everything you need to recover, including applications, networks and document repositories, business services such as the entire order processing system, or even your entire site in the event of an outage 18 or disaster.19
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http://drbenchmark.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ANNUAL_REPORTDRPBenchmark_Survey_Results_2014_report.pdf I downloaded this. It is 21 pages, 908 k. I name my downloads based on publisher, topic vintage. I called this copy DRPC Preparedness 2014. I organize my downloads in folders by general subject matter. I stored this one in folder: STUDIES / NATIONAL SECURITY / CYBER SECURITY AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE which has a dozen other PTFs there on such topics as: Annual reports on various kinds of cyber security risks and breaches, such as phishing, targets of hacking and malware. Briefing for or by US Congress. My own tips for personal cyber security. Industrial control systems and SCADA vulnerabilities, breaches. US Presidential orders or plans, for national cyber security enhancement. 15 http://drbenchmark.org/ 16 http://drbenchmark.org/category/blog/ 17 http://drbenchmark.org/resources/ 18 Outages can occur thanks to human error, natural disasters like earthquakes and severe weather, problems at a critical supplier of a public utility An outage can include loss of:
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2. 3. 2. Define Recovery Time Objectives (RTO) & Recovery Point Objectives (RPO) for critical applications. Without these important metrics, you cannot set proper expectations and assumptions from management, employees, vendors and customers about your DR capabilities and how to improve them. 4. 5. 3. Test critical applications frequently to validate they will recover within RTOs/RPOs. For DR preparedness to improve, companies must begin to automate these processes to overcome the high cost in time and money of verifying and testing their DR plans.
Public and private delivery services, due to roads blocked by flooding, landslides, or the results of an earthquake no snail mail, no way to get goods shipped out, no way to get raw materials delivered, your work force has trouble commuting o In one personal experience incident, co-workers arranged a boat service to convoy personnel and goods between points inside and outside the flooded areas, where vans provided road transportation for employees, and connected to depots of UPS FedX and various other delivery services. Public utility electric power o In one personal experience incident, my employer was without electric power for weeks, but we were able to conduct our operations in the day time. Public utility water supply cant use toilets, drinking fountains, may be ordered to evacuate if the water sprinklers are inoperative Public utility phone service how will you conduct business if customers vendors cannot reach you, you cannot reach them, and fax machines are inoperative o In one personal experience incident, we located other companies outside the outage area, and arranged to use their fax. We arranged with the phone company to have all calls to our fax machine forwarded to our friendly neighbor. We arranged to have co-workers visit that site at regular intervals during each work day. Public utility Internet service no access to e -mail for example o In one personal experience incident, a laptop could talk to a phone cell tower. That laptop was placed outside in a tent, with an extremely long extension cord, because our metal roof interfered with cell reception, and the weather was not good. Co-workers took turns connecting this way to their e-mail. We had a variety of ways to get the e-mail between this laptop and the personal PCs. o Tip: If you try this, make sure that where one extension cord plugs into another, this connection is not where the rainwater can get to it. o Tip: if you try this with a PC connected to the company network, check out specifications on distance connected devices may be from a company network server. Your business must shut down access to some critical service, because it has been breached, and not yet repaired. 19 Remember that a large part of any company can be records outside of the computer system, such as file cabinets, and the know-how of the work force. Remember also that a lot of software is licensed to particular hardware. In the IBM OS world, you can reload 100% backup on a totally different server platform, and everything works perfectly, provided the software licensing has authorized itself to operate on the CPU serial number of the backup server. In the PC world, software often cannot be restored from a backup to the same or a different PC. The software must be installed, and registered, and might not be possible to do so, if you have an old version. Only the data used by the software can be accessed on another PC, and only if you have additional support to merge data between what might be there native, and what is coming from the backup archives.
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Personal Experience
I have had personal experience with several corporate disasters, where there was no corporate planning for the particular disaster which occurred, but intelligent personnel, within the company, very rapidly responded and saved the day. Provided a company has such personnel, who are permitted by management to rapidly react to implement new things to deal with the new situation, then I believe that no plan is needed. There are an infinity of different bad things which can happen, unexpectedly. Can a company function with an infinity of disaster recovery plans, training in all of them? Or is it better off with some generic protections, such as off-site backup? I had one employer where computer backup media was stored in a fire proof safe. Then a company across the street from us had a fire. They also had been using a fire proof safe. This taught us that a fire proof safe only blocks fire, not heat. All of their backups were melted. Off-site rotation is much safer from perspective of preserving the backups in case of disaster. However, there have been many breaches thanks to off-site media getting lost or stolen. So you have to give some thought how best to mitigate that risk. A friend of mine was office manager at a company where the off-site media was stored at their home. One weekend, when they were out of town, both the office and home were burglarized. Fortunately they had paper records sufficient to keep the business operating, but then when their insurance company paid for total replacement of hardware and software, they learned that they could no longer get all that stuff companies had gone out of business, models had upgraded. Their list of needed hardware and software, was not up to date with cost of getting back in business with that stuff, or its equivalent. We can learn from the bad stuff which happens to other people, to avoid that also happening to us. We can also see wise things being done by some companies, and copy those wise practices ourselves. At one point in the evolution of one of my employers, we were very dependent on some hardware, which would break down from time to time, and take 2-5 days for the repair service provider to get us back in business. So we bought some extras, and got much faster recovery. 1. Standard device-A breaks down. 2. We replace it with hardware copy-C from our spare parts room. 3. The problem area is back in business within minutes, because we are practiced at swapping out parts. 4. The malfunctioning device-A is shipped off to the repair place. 5. A week later the repair place sends us a working replacement device. 6. We test the replacement to make sure it is in fact working satisfactorily, then we stick it in the spare parts room, designated as hardware backup-B.
Personal Suggestions
For organizations and ordinary people, who want to be better prepared, but are not yet ready for a full scale disaster recovery plan, I suggest you review:
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The section of my main CI Boom Analysis document on what I think everyone should know, and general financial survival Tips.20 My Cyber Security, and real life, survival tip notes, which try to focus on what anyone can do with minimum effort and minimum expense. 21 If you have children, check out my notes on risks to children, and how parents can be pro-active to mitigate those risks.22 The above include pointers to many resources more knowledgeable than me, which people should peruse, in the areas they wish to protect themselves. Any time you test something to verify it is working correctly, and find from your testing that something needs to be fixed, after you think it is fixed, then test again. Any time you receive something, which is critical to your successful operations, test to verify that it is in fact working as expected. Get a directory of all the hardware and software at your facility, with its replacement costs. Maybe take photos of the hardware, and get a printout listing the software. o Take this info to your insurance company. You want to be covered such that in a disaster, this list can help you be fully funded to reconstruct your essential framework of what your backups will need to access. On a regular basis, rotate one of your backup media sets to a location other than that of the computer hardware, so that you never have a disaster which wipes out both computer and its backups. Have two sets off-site. When you are planning another rotation, you can bring in one of the two sets, then leave with a more recent backup. This way, you do not have all backups with the computer at one time, just in case a disaster strikes while you are conducting this process. When transporting backups, remember this data may have PII, company secrets. Treat it like a bag of gold, do not get careless with it. Keep it at room temperature, regardless of the weather outside your vehicle. If you plan personal errands, like groceries, restaurant, etc. do them on a separate trip than the transport of backup, to reduce the risk of misplacing the backup, or leaving it unattended. o On an annual basis do an audit of this info. Have you made any changes, such that this list needs to be updated? Is all this equipment still available on the market place, or is it considered obsolete. If not available, you need to consider whether you want to buy spare parts, and store them off-site, or upgrade to that which is in fact available.
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I started this section early in 2014, as I realized many disasters were triggered or caused by having a large number of people in the general public who do not in fact know, what I think everyone should know. 21 http://www.scribd.com/doc/149569351/Cyber-Security-PC-Tips-Al-Mac 22 http://www.scribd.com/doc/117284229/School-Scandals-and-Abductions
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o This info should also be stored off-site, like in a safety deposit box, at a friend or relatives home, or another office, in case of serious disaster at your main location, such as natural disaster, or criminal break-in which steals everything. After any major disaster in the news, and reports of what went wrong, with organization(s) similar to your own, reach out to the staff of the place which suffered the disaster, through professional networks, to ask what lessons they have learned from this, that the rest of us need to know. What worked great, thanks to good DR planning, and what problems did they have which they did not anticipate, which need better DR planning?
Remember Katrina? The city of New Orleans had a disaster plan. It was on a computer system. The disaster took down all the computers, because now there was no electric power. City leaders had no access to their disaster plan. Do not copy that inadequate planning. Have a way to access your disaster plan, when you have no public utility service. This probably means both a copy of the plan on paper, and backup for critical public utility services.
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Earths surface! This rock is roughly 10 meters acrosshalf the diameter of the Chelyabinsk asteroid.25
Mar 8 Duke Energy dumped coal ash and passes the buck
Duke Energy plans to have their customers pay $ billion costs of Dukes negligence. 27
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http://blog.seattlepi.com/bigscience/2014/03/05/asteroid-came-close-today-and-missed-but-theresanother-tonight/ 26 http://www.newsnet5.com/news/local-news/cleveland-metro/explosion-homes-evacuated-at-e-112thstreet-and-sandusky-avenue-in-cleveland 27 http://www.newsobserver.com/2014/03/08/3682139/duke-energys-1-billion-cleanup.html 28 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysia_Airlines_Flight_370 http://www.nst.com.my/mh370?ModPagespeed=noscript http://www.nst.com.my/latest/font-color-red-missing-mh370-font-indonesia-helps-in-search-for-airliner1.504168?ModPagespeed=noscript http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/08/malaysia-airlines-experts-surprised-at-disappearance-ofvery-safe-boeing-777 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/08/malaysia-airlines-flight-239-dead http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/08/malaysia-airlines-plane-mh370-kuala-lumpur-beijingboeing-777 http://www.nst.com.my/nation/general/font-color-red-missing-mh370-font-pilot-i-established-contact-withplane-1.503464?ModPagespeed=noscript https://www.google.com/search?q=boeing+777+missing&client=firefox-a&hs=ZzB&rls=org.mozilla:enUS:official&channel=sb&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ei=dugbU6q_O6HayAH3roCYAQ&ved =0CHkQsAQ&biw=1274&bih=694 29 http://www.scribd.com/collections/4108500/Critical-Infrastructure
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March 10, 2014 The 2012 rupture of a Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation natural gas pipeline in West Virginia was caused by external corrosion that could have been discovered by the pipeline operator, the National Transportation Safety Board said in a report released today. On December 11, 2012, a 20-inch high-pressure natural gas pipeline running through Sissonville, W.V., ruptured with so much force that a 20-foot-long segment of pipe was thrown more than 40 feet from where it had been buried. The released natural gas ignited and burned so hot that it heavily damaged the asphalt road surface on an interstate highway, destroyed three homes, and melted the siding on houses hundreds of feet from the rupture site.
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http://www.salon.com/2014/03/21/another_coal_ash_disaster_duke_energy_cited_for_intentionally_dumpi ng_millions_of_gallons_of_toxic_waste/
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It took the pipeline controller more than 10 minutes to recognize that a rupture had occurred despite the series of alerts he was receiving that indicated that the pressure in the pipeline had begun to decay. The shutdown was only initiated after a controller from another pipeline company reported a possible rupture to the CGTC control center. Following the rupture, more than an hour passed before the pipeline operators field personnel were able to shut down the supply of natural gas to the broken pipe. More than 76 million cubic feet of natural gas was released and burned, which exacerbated the property damage caused by the accident. The NTSB said that had the pipeline been equipped with automatic shutoff valves, they would have shortened the duration of the gas-fed fire. A 30-square-foot area of the ruptured pipeline was found to have suffered from severe external corrosion that reduced the thickness of the pipeline wall to only about 30 percent of what the pipe originally had when it was installed in 1967. The ruptured pipe was the smallest diameter of a group of three CGTC pipelines, all of similar age, which traversed the immediate area. The two larger pipelines were in a high consequence area, which required more stringent inspections. Both of those pipes were periodically examined with an inline inspection tool. The accident pipeline, however, had not been inspected or tested since 1988. The NTSB said that if it had been inspected with an inline tool, the rupture would likely have been prevented. Remarkably, no lives were lost in this accident but the potential for tragedy was clearly there, said NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman. Inspection and testing improve the chances of locating defects early, and reduce the probability of a catastrophic failure which can have devastating results. As a result of this accident investigation, the NTSB issued three safety recommendations to the Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation and one to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. The full 38-page accident report, including a one-page executive summary of investigation, is available at http://go.usa.gov/KDKx.
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3 dead, 64 injured, several missing, two five-story buildings collapse.31 As crews search for survivors, they find more victims.32 NYC is most fortunate. Only two buildings destroyed. In other cities 50+ buildings have been destroyed in gas explosions. But as usual, each stunned community needs an explanation of the physics of how this can happen.33 Some officials were quoted as saying there was no advance warning about this disaster, that no one could have done anything to prevent it. Obviously they are either ignorant of the national epidemic of many sources I have been quoting in my Critical Infrastructure research, that many large cities are collections of disasters waiting to happen, or they dont want to admit they know. It they admitted they knew truths about risks to American Infrastructure, then they would have to answer questions why the government is doing nothing significant to get it fixed. It seems reasonable to expect that we will have to have dozens of incidents like this in any one city, before that city recognizes that reality, and does in fact so something to prevent them.
A number of witnesses said they smelled gas for several days before the blast, and just 18 minutes before the explosion a resident called the utility and complained of a strong gas smell. We have yet to learn whether any of these other alleged witnesses contacted the utility about the smell before the day of the explosion. If you truly smell gas, you should get out of the building, then call either the utility or 911, and block entrance warning other people to evacuate, then all of you stay out in the street blocking traffic until it is fixed, warning drivers that they will be killed in the explosion, unless the utility fixes the problem. They need to back their vehicles up and stay away from the explosion about to happen. Ask the police to string their yellow tape up to keep people a safe distance away. To claim after the explosion that you smelled gas for days before it, without explaining what you did to help save the neighborhood, is to imply criminal negligence on your part.
Although this is not yet official, due to continuing investigations, it is now believed that a water main failed, and that in turn ruptured the 127 year old gas line.34 Construction, in immediate proximity, is an obvious suspect,35 because one of the biggest causes of gas explosions is construction work which punctures utility lines.
A day before the explosion, the New York-based Center for an Urban Future said in a report that New Yorks aging infrastructure could wreak havoc on the citys economy and quality of life. An estimated $47.3 billion would have to be devoted for repairs to maintain safety.
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Current Situation:
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At approximately 10:00 am EDT, March 12, an explosion, possibly caused by a gas leak, caused a partial building collapse at 116th Street and Park Avenue in Upper Manhattan, NY The two attached buildings housed a piano shop, local church and apartments Media reporting 6 fatalities (unconfirmed), 63 injuries, and 9 people unaccounted for Social media reports a gas odor in area before the explosion occurred One shelter open with 70 occupants State/Local Response: FDNY, FDNY bomb squad, NYPD, and FBI Crisis Management Team responded; NYPD conducted crowd control Metro-North suspended service into and out of Grand Central Terminal; service was restored that evening MTA buses re-routed and/or experiencing service delays in Manhattan Rescue and recovery work continue at the local level FEMA Response: Region II RRCC not activated; RWC remains at Watch/Steady State NRCC not activated; NWC remains at Watch/Steady State No requests for FEMA assistance
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iYhn0eoCF0Q25DEiM2uHkpv7GHDQ?docId=47 c45cb8-ce1e-483d-98f4-3c48599ba6b1
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contaminated a large area in the Oak Glen Nature Preserve, including a mile of creek, and an acre-sized marshy area.41 According to US Department of Transportation records, the pipeline has had 39 incidents since 2006. In those incidents, more than 31,000 gallons of oil were lost. The incidents caused more than $7.5 million in damage. The worst incident happened in 2008 in Burlington, which caused $1.3 million in damage.42
Mar 26 update
The spill is twice as large as originally estimated.43 It is not 10,000 gallons but 20,000.
Mar 22 WA mudslide
Here is an explanation of mudslides.46 This one was caused by ground made unstable by heavy rainfall, plus the river has been undercutting the hill side. Perhaps vegetation on
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the hill sides was also insufficient to hold the ground stable, which sometimes comes about thru logging, and fires.
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20140323 FEMA Daily Ops Briefing_0830.pdf http://www.fema.gov/disaster/3370 20140326 FEMA Daily Ops Briefing_0830.pptxa.pdf
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16 (+2) confirmed fatalities, but national media is reporting 8 additional unconfirmed fatalities for a total of 24; 13 injured State EOC is reporting 108 people are potentially missing; number is expected to go down Unconfirmed media reports of up to 176 people missing Voluntary evacuations have been lifted 49 structures impacted; estimated 16 homes destroyed; 7 homes outside mudslide area have flooded 2 shelters open with 17 occupants (ARC, 5:00 a.m. EDT Mar 26) State/Local Response Governor declared a State of Emergency on March 22 WA State EOC fully activated; Snohomish County EOC activated US&R WA TF-1 is deployed as a State asset; will not participate in the 2014 Capstone Federal Response Emergency Declaration FEMA-3370-EM-WA approved March 24 US&R IST White deployed to WA; CA-TF7 on alert Region X: RRCC at Level III; IMAT at Incident Command Post; LNO at WA EOC National IMAT West, Bothell MERS personnel and MEOV deployed to WA NRCC is not activated; NWC at Enhanced Watch (day shift 8 to 8; night shift on call)
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The fact that this train jumped the tracks, may have saved lives, 53 compared to what would have happened if the front end stopped, and the back end kept moving, crushing the in between. Thus the survivors can be thankful that there was an escalator for the train to go up. NTSB investigators had not drawn any conclusions about the cause of the accident right after it, but were looking into whether faulty brakes, signals or human error were factors. Questions asked early on: Did the train operator doze off to sleep?54 The operator told Amalgamated Transit Union Local 308 President Robert Kelly that she had worked a lot of overtime recently and was "extremely tired" at the time of the derailment, he said at a news conference. o The train is designed so that if an operator becomes incapacitated and his or her hand slips off the controls, it should come to a stop. Kelly speculated that, upon impact, inertia may have thrown the operator against the hand switch, accelerating it enough to send it catapulting onto the escalator.55 Will the cost of repairs exceed savings from postponing safety upgrades? What would the casualties have been, had this occurred at the peak of commuter traffic?
Lawsuits
The Chicago Tribune reports two airport workers have already filed lawsuits against the CTA, claiming negligence on the part of the agency. 56
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Mar 26 updates
There were about 50 people on this train. Six people were seriously injured in the crash and 26 others suffered non-life threatening injuries, Chicago Fire Department Spokesman Larry Langford told ABC News. The train operator told NTSB investigators that she fell asleep at the controls of the train and did not wake up until she felt the impact of the crash. NTSB officials have said the eight-car train was going 25 or 26 miles per hour when it pulled into the station around 2:55 a.m. Monday. 57
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One-alarm, two-alarm, three-alarm fires, or higher, are categories of fires indicating the level of response by local authorities, with an elevated number of alarms indicating increased commitment of resources.59 The USA today story, labeling this event as a nine alarm fire, is not in sync with the system used in other US communities.
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Critical Infrastructure Disasters 2014 March CI Boom 2013 Jan-Mar67 CI Boom 2013 Apr68 CI Boom 2013 May-Dec69 Boeing 777 SF 2013 Jul 0570 CI Boom 2014 Jan W Va Water71 CI Boom 2014 Jan72 CI Boom 2014 Feb73 Boeing 777 Asia 2014 Mar 0874 CI Boom 2014 Mar
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These time line history segments to be uploaded to same SCRIBD Critical Infrastructure collection.75 Revision history maintained in main parent analysis document, but at some point may get split into a separate doc.
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/204042682/CI-Boom-2012 http://www.scribd.com/doc/204889417/CI-Boom-2013-Jan-to-March 68 http://www.scribd.com/doc/204575461/CI-Boom-2013-April 69 http://www.scribd.com/doc/207356334/CI-Boom-2013-Mar-to-Dec 70 http://www.scribd.com/doc/152562460/Boeing-777-crash-San-Francisco-2013-July 71 http://www.scribd.com/doc/203973261/CI-Boom-2014-Jan-9-W-Va-Water 72 http://www.scribd.com/doc/207503705/CI-Boom-2014-Jan 73 http://www.scribd.com/doc/208253102/CI-Boom-2014-Feb 74 http://www.scribd.com/doc/211761342/Boeing-777-Asia-2014-Mar-08 75 http://www.scribd.com/collections/4108500/Critical-Infrastructure
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