COURSE CONTENTS

School of Chemical Engineering

EKC 367/3 Keselamatan Loji ( Plant Safety )

Sem. II - 2013/2014 DR. I R V A N D A H L A N
(chirvan@eng.usm.my)

DR. LOW SIEW CHUN

(chsclow@eng.usm.my )

REFERENCES
1. Crowl, D.A and Louvar, J.F, Chemical Process Safety, Fundamentals with Applications, Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 2. Frank, P.L, Loss and Prevention in the process industries, Volume 1&2, London, Butterworth. 3. Coulson, J.M and Richardson, J.F, Chemical Engineering, Volume 6, Pergamon Press, Oxford.

INTRODUCTION TO PLANT SAFETY

Plant Safety Chemical Process Safety

"Process" means any activity involving a highly hazardous chemical including any use, storage, manufacturing, handling, or the on-site movement of such chemicals, or combination of these activities
(US OSHA 1910.119 Process Safety Management Rule, definitions)

Process Safety ?

Definition
Process safety is Process safety is . is the absence of loss and harm resulting from fires, explosions and hazardous material releases at process facilities.
(Event-focused definition)

is the absence of loss and harm at process facilities by: (a) identifying process hazards, (b) containing and controlling them, (c) countering abnormal situations with effective safeguards.
(Activity-focused definition)

Terms:
Safety Loss Prevention The prevention of accidents through the use of appropriate techniques/technologies to identify the hazards and reduce/eliminate them before the occurrence of an accident Hazard A chemical or physical condition that has the potential to cause damage to people, property, or the environment. Risk A measure of human injury, environmental damage, or economic loss in terms of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the loss or injury.

Chemical Engineering Area/Fundamental

Plant Safety
(Chemical Processes)

Safety & Health Concept

How to avoid loss? .

Why safety is important ?

How to avoid loss? Hazard identification Technical evaluation Design of new engineering features A GOOD safety program identifies and eliminates existing safety hazards An OUTSTANDING safety program is embedded with management systems that prevent the existence of safety hazards

Successful safety program

System Attitude Fundamentals Experience Time You!

SAFETY vs PROFIT
Which one is more important?

SAFETY vs HEALTH
Example:
Different ? Acute effect Chronic effect

SAFETY hazard vs HEALTH hazard Example of Chemical agent both Safety & Health hazards

Occur rapidly as a result of Short Term exposure and are of short duration
usually more obvious than a health hazard

Occur as a result of Long Term exposure and are of long duration

Example of Physical agent both Safety & Health hazards

usually more delicate than a safety hazard

Category of hazards feasibility of correction So, which type of hazard appears to be more grave, (1) Hazards that are physically infeasible to correct. (2) Hazards that are physically feasible, but are economically infeasible to correct. (3) Hazards that are physically feasible and economically feasible to correct.

SAFETY or HEALTH ?

Opposite of process safety ?

Engineering Ethics (Safety) AIChE

Major incidents
(Table 1-1 Crowl, D.A and Louvar, J.F, Chemical Process Safety, Fundamentals with Applications)

When major chemical incidents is mentioned, what come first to your mind?

Types of Chemical Plant Accidents

Analysis of the largest chemical plant accidents

(Data from The 100 Largest Losses, 19722001)

Causes of Losses/Accident ? Other Analysis/Statistic of chemical plant accident/loss

(Chap. 1 Crowl, D.A and Louvar, J.F, Chemical Process Safety, Fundamentals with Applications)

How are the risks controlled?

Eliminate the hazard Substitute process materials Engineering controls Administrative controls/operational practices Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Accidents How We Describe?

Accidents (step sequence) 1. Initiation

Example: A worker smoked cigarette in the prohibited area. The burned cigarette bud was thrown into an opened waste bin, consist of dry paper waste. A portion of the wastes ignited. Fire starts to progress, releasing thick smoke and hot flame. All combustible materials in process has been consumed

Step sequence (3-step) 1. Initiation 2. Propagation 3. Termination 2. Propagation

3. Termination
Use of fire extinguisher

Safety engineering:
involves eliminating the initiating step and replacing the propagation steps with termination events.

Example

Table: Defeating the Accident Process

Table presents a few ways to accomplish this step sequence of accident

Exercise Solution Identify the initiation, propagation, and termination steps for the following accident reports. (A) A contractor accidentally cut into a 10-in propane line operating at 800 psi at a natural gas liquids terminal. The large vapor cloud estimated to cover an area of 44 acres was ignited about 4-5 min later by an unknown source. Liquid products from 5 of 26 salt dome caverns fed the fire with an estimated 18,000-30,000 gal of LPGs for almost 6 hr before being blocked in and the fires extinguished. Both engine-driven fire pumps failed, one because intense radiated heat damaged its ignition wires and the other because the explosion broke a sight glass fuel gauge, spilling diesel fuel, which ignited, destroying the fire pump engine.

(B) An alkylation unit was being started up after shutdown because of an electrical outage. When adequate circulation could not be maintained in a deisobutanizer heater circuit, it was decided to clean the strainer. Workers had depressurized the pipe and removed all but three of the flange bolts when a pressure release blew a black material from the flange, followed by butane vapors. These vapors were carried to a furnace 100 ft away, where they ignited, flashing back to the flange. The ensuing fire exposed a fractionation tower and horizontal receiver drums. These drums exploded, rupturing pipelines, which added more fuel. The explosions and heat caused loss of insulation from the 8-ft x 122-ft fractionator tower, causing it to weaken and fall across two major pipe-lines, breaking piping -which added more fuel to the fire. Extinguishment, achieved basically by isolating the fuel sources, took 2.5 hours. The fault was traced to a 10-in valve that had been prevented from closing the last 3/4-inch by a fine powder of carbon and iron oxide. When the flange was opened, this powder blew out, allowing liquid butane to be released.

Appendixes

Flanges

Strainers

Solution (A) Initiation: Cutting into a 10 propane line Propagation: Leakage of propane Formation of vapour cloud Ignition of vapour cloud by unknown source Destruction of fire pump equipment Termination: Blocking in of the propane (B) Initiation: Improper closing of valve Cleaning of strainer with escape of butane Propagation: Ignition of vapour cloud Falling of fractionation tower,& explosion of horizontal receiver drums Rupturing of pipeline Termination: Isolation of fuel source

Acceptable Risk & Public Perceptions

We cannot eliminate risk entirely In a single Chemical Process plant the risk becomes too high because of multiple exposure to several processes Modern site layout requires sufficient separation of plants within site to minimize multiple exposure Public perception about hazards of chemicals can be confusing and may not reflect the real situation

Case study
The study of case histories provides valuable information to chemical engineers involved with safety. The four most cited accidents Flixborough, England Bhopal, India Seveso, Italy Pasadena, Texas

Case study: Flixborough (June 1974)

Chemical plant produce 70k tons/y caprolactam (raw material for nylon) Process: material (cyclohexane); depressurization (6 reactors in series) Accident: Vapor cloud explosion - fueled by release of 30 tons of cyclohexane in 30 s Loss: Largest single loss by fire or explosion in the United Kingdom killed 28 people injured 89 others $63 million in property damage Investigation: A failure of a temporary pipe section

Before accident : Temporary modification A failure of a temporary pipe section replacing reactor 5 caused the Flixborough accident.

Why did the bypass piping fail ?

No safety review and inadequate supervision Job was beyond professional capabilities of the workers No one understood the forces that would be imposed on the pressurized piping

Other Case studies

Chap. 1 - Crowl, D.A and Louvar, J.F, Chemical Process Safety, Fundamentals with Applications)

Other sources

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