MALAGA v PENACHOS FACTS: Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF), thru its Pre-qual, Bids & Awards Committee,

caused to be published an Invitation to Bid for the construction of their Micro Lab Bldg. The notice announced that the last day for submission of pre-qual requirements was Dec 2, 1988 and that the bids would be received & opened on Dec 12, 1988 at 3pm. Petitioners are doing business under the name of BE Construction & Best Built Construction. They submitted their pre-qual documents at 2pm on Dec 2, but they were marked late, having been submitted after the cut-off time of 10am. This resulted in their disqualification to participate in the said bidding. Petitioners filed a complaint w/ the RTC against the respondents with a prayer for TRO and claiming that the latter refused to receive their documents despite having been submitted on time for the reason that no time was specified in the notice, therefore the refusal was without just cause. Respondents on the other hand posited that the court was prohibited by PD 1818 from issuing TROs on infrastructure projects (among others) of the govt. In their opposition, petitioners argued against the applicability of PD 1818, pointing out that while ISCOF was a state college, it had its own charter and was not part of the national govt and even if PD 1818 were applicable, the prohibition does not cover anomalous govt projects like the case at bar. ISSUE #1: w/n ISCOF, as a chartered institution is a govt instrumentality and if in the affirmative, w/n it is covered by the prohibition in PD 1818 RULING: 1987 Administrative Code defines GOVT INSTRUMENTALITY as any agency of the National Govt, not integrated w/in the dept framework, vested w/ special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed w/ some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds & enjoying operational autonomy, usually thru a charter; and CHARTERED INSTITUTION as any agency organized or operating under a special charter, & vested by law w/ functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes univs, & colleges & the monetary authority of the State. It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution & is therefore covered by PD1818. There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a govt instrumentality: 1. 2. 3. 4. It is created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries devt policy of the state; The treasurer of the Ph is its ex-officio Treasuer w/ its accounts & expenses audited by COA; Heads of bureaus & offices of the National Govt are authorized to loan or transfer to it, such apparatus/equipment/supplie/servies of ees; An additional amt of 1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National treasury & it is decreed in its charter that the funds & maintenance of the state college would be included in the Gen Appropriations Law.

In the instant case, it is apparent that the controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the admin body nor does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved here is non-compliance w/ the procedural rules on bidding w/c requires strict compliance. PBAC did not sufficiently give notice to the petitioners by omitting the cut-off time from their announcement and even changing the schedule by only posting it at the ISCOF bulletin board. It has been held that where the law requires a previous advertisement before govt contracts can be awarded, non-compliance w/ the requirement will, as a general rule, render the same void & of no effect. Therefore, the controversy not being covered by the prohibition provided by PD 1818 is within the jurisdiction of the court to act upon and over which it has power to restrain/prohibit.

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree. The court cited the case of Datiles v Sucaldito where it was declared that the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies involving FACTS or the EXERCISE of DISCRETION in TECHNICAL cases. And that the courts cannot be prevented from exercising their power to restrain/prohibit admin acts on issues outside of this dimension and involving questions of law.

DE LA LLANA v ALBA FACTS Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of BP 129 entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor & for other Purposes the same being: 1. Contrary to the security of tenure provision of the constitution as it separates from the judiciary, Justices & jusdges of inferior courts from the CA to Mun circuit courts except occupants of Sandiganbayan & Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act; An undue delegation of legislative power to the President of the authority to fix the compensation & allowances of the Justices & judges thereafter appointed & the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed.

TIO v VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD FACTS Petitioner, doing business under OMI Enterprises is assailing the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board w/ broad powers to regulate & supervise the videogram industry, specifically Section 11 thereof for being an undue delegation of legislative power. Section 11 grants authority to the Board to solicit the direct assistance of other agencies & units of the govt & deputize, for a fixed & limited period, the heads of personnel of such agencies & units to perform enforcement of authority/discretion as to its execution, enforcement & implementation. ISSUE: w/n there is undue delegation of legislative power RULING: NO The grant in Sect 11 of the decree is NOT a delegation of power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority/discretion as to its EXECUTION, ENFORCEMENT & IMPLEMENTATION. The true distinction is bet the delegation of power to MAKE the law, w/c necessarily involves a discretion as to WHAT it shall be, and conferring authority/discretion as to its execution to be exercised under & in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a fixed & limited period w/ the deputized agencies concerned being subject to the direction & control of the Board. That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft & corruption would not stigmatize the decree as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.

2.

ISSUE: the constitutionality of BP 129 RULING: Constitutional 1. The enactment of BP 129 is an answer to a pressing & urgent need for more efficiency in the disposal of cases. It aims to ease the courts dockets that would result to the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the courts. The abolition was in good faith. It does not amount to an illegal removal of the incumbent. The provision granting the President authority to fix the compensation & allowances of Justices & judges survives the test of undue delegation of legislative power, a STANDARD having been clearly adopted therefor: that the reorganization provided by the Act will be carried out in accordance w/ the Presidents constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed & the Judiciarys commitment to guard Constitutional Rs. It reads: Intermediate Appellate Justices, RTC Judges, & Mun Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such compensation & allowances as may be authorized by the President along w/ the guidelines set forth in letter of Implementation #93 pursuant to PD 985 as amended by PD 1597.

2.

The standard may be express/implied. Express stated clearly in the law. But the standard does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the POLICY & PURPOSE of the act considered as a whole.

US. vs. ANG TANG HO FACTS: On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG issued EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General. HELD: There is undue delegation in Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the GovernorGeneral, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council of State," is authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.

YNOT v IAC FACTS: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. Being assailed in this case is the constitutionality of EO 626 issued by President Marcos, 1. 2. prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos & the slaughtering of carabaos not complying w the requirements of said EO; providing for the disposition of the carabaos & carabeef subject of the violation. The carabao/carabeef transported in violation of the EO as amended shall be subject to confiscation & forfeiture of the govt, to be distributed to charitable institutions & other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, & to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

ISSUE: w/n there is undue delegation of legislative power in the disposition of carabaos & carabeef. RULING: Yes. The court said the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the order is questionable. . It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

MARCOS v MANGLAPUS FACTS President Cory Aquino issued an order barring the return of the Marcos family and the remains of Ferdinand Marcos himself to the country in the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely & passionately conflicting ways and for the tranquility of the state & order of the society, until such time as the govt, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide. Petitioners raised arguments, one of which avering that the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country this act by President Aquino was arbitrary. ISSUE: w/n President Aquino had the power to issue the assailed order RULING: Yes. it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. The court said: neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's implied or residual powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained analogy, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6 which provides: Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land, There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of the specific power of legislation.

act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the nonpolitical demands of the MPSTA. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged and preventively suspended by order of the Sec of DECS. In the meantime, respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to CHR. CHR in turn subpoenaed Sec Carino and Erlinda Lolarga (school superintended of Manila & principal of Ramon Magsaysay HS) to appear before it for its resolution of the complaint on the merits. Sec Carino, thru the office of the Sol Gen filed a motion to dismiss the case questioning CHRs jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE: whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights. RULING: no. The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. Moreover, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions. These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

CARINO v CHR FACTS On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to

LLDA vs. CA Facts: On March 8, 1981, the Task Force Camarin Dumsite of our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Caloocan City filed a complaint with the Laaguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6 hectare open garbage dumpsite in tala Estate due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents. On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the leachate (liquid that has percolated through soil or other medium). The LLDA found that the city government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR, as required under PD 1586 and clearance from LLDA. On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a CEASE and DESIST ORDER. However, sometime in Aug. 1992, the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting among the city government of Caloocan and LLDA failed to settle the problem. ISSUE: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under RA No. 4850 HELD: Yes, the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of RA no. 4850 and other relevant environmental laws cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of its injunctive powers. As an administrative agency, it has powers that are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. The issuance of the Cease and Desist Order by the LLDA is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amending law. The charter of LLDA as stated in RA 4850 Section 4(d) is the power to institute necessary legal proceedings against any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program with the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA

plus allowances and other benefits. On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner.sappeal on a technicality. Held: Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides: SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. . Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof. SECTION 6. No extension of period. . No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained. The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on April 1,1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time. The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]).Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal. Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all be demanded. WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED

RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP v SERGIO CORPUS Facts: In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without change in his position-designation, he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450.00 a month. In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00