INSTITUTION OF HEIRS Ureta v Ureta, Sept.

14, 2011 Institution based on a false cause Austria v Reyes (reviewer) Kinds of Institution Vda de Kilayko v Tengco VDA. DE KILAYKO v TENGCO NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition and/or mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. FACTS - Maria Lizares y Alunan died and left her "testamento" in the possession and custody of her niece, Eustaquia Lizares, who later filed a petition for the settlement of her estate. The probate court declared the will probated and appointed Eustaquia as the executrix of the estate of Maria Lizares. - Eustaquia filed a project of partition, which was granted by the probate court. Simultaneously, said court declared the heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries mentioned in the project of partition as the only heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries of the estate; adjudicated to them the properties repectively assigned to them, and ordered the Register of Deeds to effect the corresponding transfer of properties. - Eustaquia filed an urgent motion to reopen the testate proceedings in order that some properties of Maria Lizares which had been omitted in the partition be adjudicated to her. The Court granted the motion and adjudicated to Eustaquia certain shares of stocks, a revolving fund certificate, plantation credits and sugar quota allocations, and real or personal properties of Maria Lizares which were not given by her to any other person in her last will and testament. The heirs executed an agreement of partition and subdivision, thereby terminating their co-ownership over the inherited land. - Eustaquia Lizares died single without any descendant. Rodolfo and Amelo Lizareswere appointed joint administrators of her intestate estate. - On the strength of the testamentary provisions contained in pars. 10 and 11 of the will of Maria Lizares, which were allegedly in the nature of a simple substitution, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a motion to reopen once again the testate

estateproceedings of Maria Lizares. They prayed amo ng others that a substituteadministrator be appointed. - The intestate heirs of Eustaquia opposed the motion, alleging that the court had no more jurisdiction to reopen the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares as the order of closure had long become final and that the testamentary provisions sought to be enforced are null and void. - The Court denied the motion to reopen the testate proceedings. - Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of real property against the joining administrators of the estate of Eustaquia Lizares. - The joint administrators filed the present petition. Petitioners contend, among others, that the claim of petitioners over the properties left by their niece Eustaquia and which the latter had inherited by will from Maria Lizares, was groundless because paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria's will on which Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. base their claim, conceived of a fideicommissary substitution of heirs. Petitioners claim that said provisions of the will are not valid because under Article 863 of the Civil Code, they constitute an invalid fideicommissary substitution of heirs. ISSUES 1. WON the independent action for reconveyance should prosper 2. WON petitioners are the conditional substitute heirs of Eustaquia in the testate estate of Maria Lizares HELD 1. NO Ratio A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it should be corrected by opportune appeal, for once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Reasoning - Any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir, legatee or party interested in a testate or intestate succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution and adjudication of the property to the interested parties.-

The facts show that the petitioners recognized the decree of partition sanctioned by the probate court and in fact reaped the fruits thereof. Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any part of it in the guise of a complaint for reconveyance. A party cannot, in law and in good conscience be allowed to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit him. Thus, where a piece of land has been included in a partition and there is no allegation that the inclusion was affected through improper means or without petitioner's knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for its proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition.Moreover, when petitioners. moved for the reopening of the testate estateproceedings of Maria Lizares, the judicial decree of partition and order of closure of such proceedings was already final and executory, then reglementary period of thirty days having elapsed from the time of its issuance, with no timely appeal having been filed by them.- The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is the opening of the same by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action, the effect of which if successful, would be for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. 2. NO Ratio When a testator merely names an heir and provides that if such heir should diea second heir also designated shall succeed, there is no fideicommissary substitution. The substitution should then be construed as a vulgar or simple substitution under Art.859 of the Civil Code but it shall be effective only if the first heir dies before the testator. Reasoning - Although the testatrix intended a fideicommissary substitution in paragraphs 10 and11 of her will, the substitution can have no effect because the requisites for it to bevalid, had not been satisfied. The allegation of the j oint administrators thatparagraphs 10 and 11 of Maria Lizares' last will and testament conceives of a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 of the Civil Code is baseless as said paragraphs do not impose upon Eustaquia a clear obligation to preserve the estate in favor of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., neither may said paragraphs be considered as

providing for a vulgar or simple substitution.- In this case, the instituted heir, Eustaquia, survived the testatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence, there can be no substitution of heirs for, upon Maria Lizares' death, theproperties involved unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia. Under thecircumstances, the sisters of Maria Lizares could only inherit the estate of Eustaquia by operation of the law of intestacy SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS Fideicommisary Palacios v Ramirez (reviewer) Crisologo v Singson (book, p. 231) LEGACIES AND DEVISES Fernandez v Dimagiba FACTS Isamela Dimagiba submitted to the CFI of Iloilo a petition to probate the 1930 will of the late Benedicta delos Reyes instituting her as the sole heir of the decedents estate. Petitioners, Fernandez et al opposed the probated and claimed to be the intestate heirs of the decedent. OPPOSITION to probate were based on: forgery, vice of consent, estoppel by laches of Dimagiba and implied revocation of the will. The implied revocation was alleged because according to Petitioners, majority of the estate was sold in 1943-1944, thus revoking the 1930 will instituting Dimagiba as sole heir. Note however that the SC set aside these conveyances in an unpublished case already. (Also, mejo stupid yun ground kasi yun

1940s sale, si Dimagiba din yun buyer/reciepient nung properties sold, so paano magkakaroon ng implied revocation?!)

CFI: allowed the probate of the will and deferred resolving the issues of estoppel and revocation until such time that the proceeding involves determination of the intrinsic validity of the will. Petitioners insist that the issue of estoppel and revocation should have been resolved during the probate of the will, thus after receiving further evidence, the CFI decided that the will unaffected and unrevoked by the subsequent sales. Both decisions were (admission for probate of the will and absence of implied revoc/estoppel) separately appealable because the latter is independent of the former, but Petitioners belatedly filed their appeal to the allowance for probate, thus the order became final and unappealable. Petitioners appealed to the CA (re: denial of revocation and estoppel); CA affirmed CFI decision since no legal revocation resulted from the sales,

since the sale was made in favor of the legatee Dimagiba. Hence, this petition for review. ISSUE: whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944 RULING: The last issue, that of revocation, is predicated on paragraph 2 of Article 957 of the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of the Code of 1889), which recites: Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect: (1) . . . . (2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase; If the annulment was due to undue influence, as the quoted passage implies, then the transferor was not expressing her own free will and intent in making the conveyances. Hence, it can not be concluded, either, that such conveyances established a decision on her part to abandon the original legacy. True it is that the legal provision quoted prescribes that the recovery of the alienated property "even if it be by reason of the nullity of the contract" does not revive the legacy; but as pointed out by Scaevola (Codigo Civil, Vol. XV, 4th Ed., pp. 324-325) the "nullity of the contract" can not be taken in an absolute sense.2 Certainly, it could not be maintained, for example, that if a testator's subsequent alienation were avoided because the testator was mentally deranged at the time, the revocatory effect ordained by the article should still ensue. And the same thing could be said if the alienation (posterior to the will) were avoided on account of physical or mental duress. Yet, an alienation through undue influence in no way differs from one made through violence or intimidation. In either case, the transferor is not expressing his real intent,3 and it can not be held that there was in fact an alienation that could produce a revocation of the anterior bequest. In view of the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellants Reyes and Fernandez. So ordered. ***NO. The existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor

of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba.- But even if Art 957 were applicable, the annulment of the conveyances would not necessarily result in the revocation of the legacies, if we bear in mind that the findings made in the decision decreeing the annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944deeds of sale were also that it was the moral influence, originating from their confidential relationship, which was the only cause for the execution BELEN v BPI NATURE Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila denying appellant's petition FACTSBenigno Diaz (DIAZ) executed a codicil on September 29, 1944. On November 7, 1944, he died and the aforesaid codicil, together with the will, was admitted to probate in Special Proceedings No. 894 of the same Court of First Instance of Manila.The proceedings for the administration of the estate of DIAZ were closed in1950 and the estate was thereafter put under the administration of BPI, as trustee for the benefit of the legatees. Filomena Diaz (FILOMENA) then died in 1954, leaving two legitimate children, MILAGROS, married, with 7 legitimate children, and ONESIMA, single. On March 19, 1958, ONESIMA fil ed a petition in Special ProceedingsNo.9 2 2 6 , c o n t e n d i n g t h a t t h e amount that would have appertained t o FILOMENA under the codicil should now be divided equally between herself and MILAGROS, as the surviving children, to the exclusion of the 7 legitimate children of MILAGROS. The court denied this petition. It said that after due consideration of the petition filed by ONESIMA. The share of FILOMENA from the codicil does not and should not form part of her estate. The aforesaid share of should be distributed not only between her childr e n b u t a l s o a m o n g h e r o t h e r legitimate descendants which also includes her grandchildren, etc., and in this connection. it is not amiss to observe that one may be a descendant andnot yet not be an heir, and vice versa, one may be an heir and yet not be a descendant. -From this order ONESIMA appealed t o this Court. She contends that the

t e r m " sus descendeintes legitimos, " a s u sed in the codicil, s h o u l d b e interpreted to mean descendants nearest in the degree to the original legatee FILOMENA, which are the two daughters. ISSUE WON the words "sus descendientes legitimos" refer conjointly to all the living descendant (children and grandchildren) of the legatee as a class or only to the descendants nearest in degree HELD NO- In her argument, FILOMENA invokes Art. 959 of the CC, which says: A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree. However, the argument fails to note that this article is specifically limited in its application in cases where the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not those of the legatee. In such an event, the law assumes that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit the relatives closest to him based on the ratio legis that among a testator's relative the closest are dearest. - Obviously, this does not apply where the beneficiaries are relatives of another person (the legatee) and not of the testator . There is no logicalreason in this case to presume that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, for he precisely mad e a t e s t a m e n t a n d p r o v i d e d substitutes for each legatee; nor can it be said that his affections would prefer the nearest relatives of the legatee to those more distant, since hee n v i s a g e s a l l o f t h e m i n a group, and only as mere substitutes f o r a preferred beneficiary. - The result of applying the "nearest relatives" rule of Article 959 is that the inheritance would be limited to her children excludi ng the grandchildren altogether. This could hardly be the intention of the testator who in the same clause 10 of his codicil speaks of his grandchildren indicating clearly that he understood well that hijos and descendientes are not synonymous terms. - We conclude that in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the proper rule to apply in the instant case is that the testator, by designating a class or group of legatees, intended all members thereof to succeed per capita. So that the original legacy to FILOMENA should be

equally divided among her surviving children and grandchidren. Disposition The order appealed from is affirmed, w i t h c o s t s t o t h e appellant. VILLANUEVA vs. BRANOCO FACTS: Gonzalo Villanueva, represented by his heirs, sued Spouses Branoco to recover a parcel of land. The former claimed ownership over the property thru purchase from Vere, who in turn, bought the property from Rodrigo. Gonzalo declared the property in his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring it. In their answer, the Spouses Baranoco similarly claimed ownership over the property thru purchase from Rodriguez, who in turn, acquired the property from Rodrigo byway of donation. The Spouses entered the property and paid taxes afterwards. The trial court ruled in favor of Gonzalo and declared him owner of the property, and ordered the Spouses Branoco to surrender possession to Gonzalo. The trial court rejected Spouses Branocos claim of ownership after treating the Deed as a donation mortis causa Which Rodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the Property to Vere. Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold the property to the Spouses, she had no title to transfer. On appeal, the CA granted the Spouses appeal and set aside the trial court's ruling. it held that the deed of donation is one of inter vivos. In his petition, Gonzalo seeks the reinstatement of the trial court's ruling. Alternatively, petitioner claims ownership over the Property through acquisitive prescription,having allegedly occupied it for more than 10 years. ISSUE: Whether or not the contract between Rodrigo and Rodriguez is a donation or a devise? RULING; It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez," signaling their revocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez's estate, waiving Rodrigo's right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez's acceptance of the disposition which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3May 1965. Rodrigo's acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient.

Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could have easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that "the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity the properties here donated x x x" or used words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her. Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property, evident from Rodriguez's undertaking to "give one [half] x x x of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime." Thus, the Deed's stipulation that "the ownership shall be vested on[Rodriguez] upon my demise," taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to Rodrigo's beneficial title. Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it was unnecessary for her to reserve partial usufructuary right over it. Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor's death, such as the donor's love and affection to the donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless "corroborates the express irrevocability of x x x [ inter vivos] transfers." Thus, the CA committed no error in giving weight to Rodrigo's statement of "love and affection" for Rodriguez, her niece, as consideration for the gift, to underscore its finding. Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo's postdonation transfer of the Property to Vere as proof of her retention of ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting deeds of donation, not only will great legal uncertainty be visited on gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to rogue property owners to set at naught perfected transfers of titles, which, while founded on liberality, is a valid mode of passing ownership. The interest of settled property dispositions counsels against licensing such practice. Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to Rodriguez in1965, Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of another." Thus, Rodrigo's post-donation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. AsVere's successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right than him. On the other hand, respondents bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter's title which they may invoke against all adverse claimants, including petitioner

LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION Who are the intestate heirs Rosales v Rosales (inulit) Order and share in the intestate succession De Los SANTOS vs. De La CRUZ FACTS: Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue. She had a niece named Marciana who is the mother of herein defendant, Maximo. Gertrudes, who is Pelagias grandniece, and several co-heirs including Maximo, entered into an Extrajudicial Partition Agreement purposely for the distribution of Pelagias estate. They agreed to adjudicate three (3) lots to Maximo, in addition to his share, on condition that the latter would undertake the development and subdivision of the estate which was the subject matter of the agreement. Due to Maximos failure to comply with his obligation, Gertrudes filed a complaint for specific performance. In Maximos answer, he stated that Gertrudes had no cause of action against him because the said agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that she was not an heir of Pelagia and was included in the agreement by mistake. The lower court held that Maximo, being a party to the extrajudicial partition agreement, was estopped from raising in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from Pelagia, hence, he must abide by the terms of the agreement. Maximo filed a Motion for New Trial but was denied. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not, Gertrudes de los Santos, a grandniece of the decedent, is an heir of the latter. RULING: Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, could not inherit from the latter by right of representation.

Article 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending. In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood.
Much less could plaintiff-appelle inherit in her own right.

Article 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.

In the present case, the relatives nearest in degree to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance. BAGUNU vs. PIEDAD Facts: Ofelia Hernando Bagunu (collateral relative of the fifth civil degree) moved to intervene in a special

proceeding for the interstate proceeding of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad. Ofelia assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad (collateral relative of the third civil degree) contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities including an incomplete publications of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. Issues: Can petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree? Does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application among collateral relatives? Held: The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. (see art. 962) In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts. Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding an intestato to the estate of the decedent. Petition denied. Heirs of Pascasio Uriarte v. Court of Appeals Facts: Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica Arreza, whose parents were Pedro Arreza an Ursula tubil. Upon the death of Pedro, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had another daughter, the decedent Justa. Benedicto is thus the nephew of Justa byher half sister Agatonica. Petitioners, the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, are the widow anddaughters of Pascasio Uriarte. Pascasio was one of the sons of Primitiva Arnaldo and Conrado Uriarte.Primitiva was the daughter of Domingo Arnaldo and Catalina Azarcon.Domingo andJustas father, Arnaldo, were brothers. Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of

consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnalso Uriarte. The other petitioners are grandchildren and relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousin Gregorio Arnaldo, the brother of Primitiva. Bendicto brought this action for partition of a 2.7 hectare land left by Justa. The land had been acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her parents and 2.2 hectares by purchase. Benedicto claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He contended that Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could only claim one-half of the 0.5 hectare land, which Justa had inherited from her parents.On the other hand, the heirs of Pascasio, who substituted Pascasio upon his death during the pendency of the case, denied that they were mere tenants of Justa and claimed that the entire land was originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo, their great grand uncle. Twothirds of the land was allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and the remaining one-third to Juan. The heirs claimed that the land had always been in their possession and that, in her lifetime, Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property but only received her share of the harvest from it. They alleged that Benedicto did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, the original owner of the property. Issue: Who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to Justas estate as her nearest relatives within the meaning of Art. 962, CC? Held: Given the fact that 0.5 hectare of the land belonged to the conjugal partnership of Justas parents, Justa was entitled to 0.125 hectare of the 0.5 hectare land as her father Juans share in the conjugal property, while petitioners are entitled to the other 0.125 hectare. In addition, Justa inherited her mother Ursulas share consisting of 0.25 hectare. Plus the 2.2 hectares, which belonged to her in her own right, Justa owned a total of 2.575 hectares of the 2.7-hectare land. This 2.575-hectare land was inherited by Benedicto as Justas nearest surviving relative. Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and Benedicto. Bendicto is the son of Justas half-sister Agatonica. Therefore, he is Justas nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survives thedecedent. That Benedicto is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunts heir. The determination of whether the relationship is of the full of half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors. Right of representation Teotico v Del Val (inulit)

Diaz v. IAC Nature: Petition for Review Doctrine: Right of Representation is admitted only within the legitimate family Facts: Felisa is a niece of Simona who together with Felisas mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of spouses Felipe and Petronilla; Juliana married Simon and out of their union were born Felisa and another child who died during infancy; Simona is the widow of Pascual and mother of Pablo; Pablo was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual and Simona; Pascual died in 1970; Pablo in 1973 and Simona in 1976; Pablo at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona and six minor natural children: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felix berta. 1976 Judge Jose Raval declared Felisa as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Petitioners Anselma and Felix berta as guardians of their minor children file for opposition and motion to exclude Felisa from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona 1980 Judge Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa from further taking part or intervening and declared her to be not an heir of Simona Felisas motion for recon was denied, and she filed her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court declaring her as the sole heir of Simona Issue: Who are the legal heirs of Simona, her niece Felisa or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo)? Felisa Ruling: The 6 minor children cannot represent their father Pablo in the successionof the latter to the intestate estate of his le

gitimate mother Simonabecause of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the Civil Code o Art 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. Pablo is a legitimate child. However, his 6 minor children are illegitimate. Art 992 provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestate between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992. JBL Reyes reflections on this which also finds full support from other civilists: o In the Spanish Civil Code of 1989, the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate family. o An illegitimate child cannot inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. ABELLANA DE BACAYO vs. FERRARIS FACTS: Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City consisting of 1/3 share in the estate of her aunt Rosa Ferraris. Ten years have elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distribute her estate among heirs. Hence, a petition for the summary settlement of her estate was filed. Melodia left no surviving descendant, ascendant or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives: 1) an aunt and half-sister of decedents father; and 2) her nieces and nephews who were children of Melodias only brother of full blood who predeceased her. In the settlement proceeding, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, who is the decedents half-sister, was excluded as an heir pursuant to a resolution issued by the lower court. A motion for reconsideration was denied hence this action. ISSUE: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him? Or will the aunt concur with the children of the decedents brother or will the former be excluded by the latter. RULING:

As an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong, degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and descending to the heir (Art. 966, Civil Code). Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Art. 975. Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code. CORPUS v CORPUS NATURE Appeal from a judgment of the CFI FACTS -Teodoro R. Yangco, the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles (the widow of Tomas Corpus) died in Manila on April 20, 1939 -Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) hishalf brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A.V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died inOctober, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales. -His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the CFI of Manila, and the decree of probate was affirmed by the SC-Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will-Said project of partition was approved by the probate court -Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the estate of LuisR. Yangco appealed to the SC, but these were dismissed after the legatees and the appellants entered into compromise agreements-Herein appellant Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. -On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court approved that agreement and noted that the 1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified.

-On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in his Yangcos will imposing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy. -The trial court dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata and laches. -Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which certified the appeal to this Court because it involves real property valued at more than fifty thousand pesos ISSUE WON Juanita Corpus, the mother of appellant Tomas Corpus, was a legal heir of Yangco, thus giving Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate HELD -The trial court found that Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child andnot a legitimate child through the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and his three other children were his acknowledged natural children. -On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus arepresumed to be legitimate.-Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. - Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.-Article 943 of the old Civil code "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" -The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child".

-That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. -The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further grounds of resentment -Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters." -Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy. DELGADO vs. RUSTIA FACTS: Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died without a will. The claimants of their estates may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampunampunan. During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. ISSUES: Who are the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado? Whether or not the grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado can inherit by right of representation? Who are the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia? RULING:

The Lawful Heirs of Josefa Delgado

The Alleged Heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado.

It was found out that Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children. The above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado. However, the petitioners in this case are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:

The Marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted.

Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half. The Lawful Heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. She failed to present authentic proof of recognition. Together with Guillermina Rustia Rustia, they were held legal strangers to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato.

The Alleged Heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children but they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These

Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, nieces and nephews. Therefore, the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. The trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates. ORDER OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION Descending Direct Line Estate of a legitimate decedent Illegitimate descendants Corpus v Corpus (inulit) LEONARDO v CA FACTS -Francisca Reyes died intestate. She was survived by 2 daughters, Maria and Silvestra,and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo (Sotero), the son of her daughter, Pascuala, who predeceased her. Sotero and Silvestra both died. -Cresenciano Leonardo (Cresenciano), claiming to be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties seeking judgment, among others, to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to onehalf share in the estate of said deceased jointly with the other remaining heir Maria -Maria asserted exclusive ownership saying that Cresenciano is an illegitimate child who CANT succeed by right of representation. TC ruled in his favor. CA reversed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE WON Cresenciano is an heir in the inheritance in question HELD NO. Other than his bare allegation, Cresenciano did not submit any durable evidences howing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself. SC safely concluded that Cresenciano failed to prove his filiation which is a fundamental requisite in this action where he is claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in question. EVEN IF its true that Cresenciano is the child of Sotero, Still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the CA, he was born outside wedlock and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, Cresenciano would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code) Diaz v IAC (inulit) MANUEL vs. FERRER FACTS: Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extramarital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land was registered in his name. He would later buy two parcels and register the same under his name. The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter". On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land covered by TCTNo. 41134. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self- Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the

unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by TCT No. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners sought thedeclaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are intestate heirs of the decedent RULING: The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions. Under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks of "brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters. Where the illegitimate child had halfbrothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right t o theformer's inheritance; that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole. The order of preference and concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through Article1014 Bolonos vs. Bernarte

Considering that Roman died on August 9, 1976, the provisions of the Civil Code on succession, then the law in force, should apply, particularly Articles 979 and 980, viz. Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages. x x x. Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

Thus, the RTC correctly ruled that Lot No. 1P rightfully belongs to the 11 children of Roman, seven (7) from his first marriage with Flavia and four (4) from his second marriage with Ceferina, in equal shares. As there was no partition among Romans children, the lot was owned by them in common. And inasmuch as Flavia did not successfully repudiate her sale of her aliquot share to Cresencia, the transfer stands as valid and effective. Consequently, what Cresencia sold to petitioner spouses was her own share and Flavias share in the property that she acquired by virtue of the notarized deed of sale, which is only 2/11 of Lot No. 1P. Therefore, the restitution of the property in excess of that portion by petitioner spouses is clearly warranted.

Indeed, the findings of the trial court, with respect to the operative facts and the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of deference and respect by this Court, except when: (1) the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) a lower courts inference

from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the court go beyond the issues of the case or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (5) there is misapprehension of facts; and (6) the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record.[24] Notably, none of these exceptions is attendant in this case.

On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta. After hearing, the petition was 5 granted. However, the decision was appealed by Isabel to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, Vicente died, prompting her to move for 6 the dismissal of the case On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in the probate proceedings, filed a motion for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural child of 7 Vicente de la Puerta. At the hearing on her motion, Carmelita presented evidence to prove her claimed status to which Isabel was allowed to submit counterevidence. On November 12,1982, the probate court granted the motion, declaring that it was satisfied from the evidence at hand that Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta and was entitled to the amounts claimed for her support. The court added that "the evidence presented by the petitioner against it (was) 8 too weak to discredit the same. On appeal, the order of the lower court was affirmed 9 by the respondent court, which is now in turn being challenged in this petition before us. The petitioner's main argument is that Carmelita was not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and remained his wife until his death in 1978. Carmelita's real parents are Juanita Austrial and Gloria Jordan. Invoking the presumption of legitimacy, she argues that Carmelita was the legitimate child of Juanita Austrial and Gloria Jordan, who were legally or presumably married. Moreover, Carmelita could not have been a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta because he was already married at the time of her birth in 1962. To prove her point, Isabel presented Amado Magpantay, who testified that he was a neighbor of Austrial and Jordan. According to him, the two were living as husband and wife and had three children, including a girl named "Puti," presumably Carmelita. He said though that he was not sure if the couple was 10 legally married. Another witness, Genoveva de la Puerta, Identified herself as Vicente de la Puerta's wife but said they separated two years after their marriage in 1938 and were never reconciled. In 1962, Gloria Jordan started living with Vicente de la Puerta in his house, which was only five or six houses away from where she herself was staying. Genoveva said that the relationship between her husband and Gloria was well 11 known in the community.

WHEREFORE,

the

petition

is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 30, 2007 and the Resolution dated November 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 84452 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

Estate of an illegitimate decedent Illegitimate children and descendants Diaz v IAC (inulit)

DE LA PUERTA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS The basic issue involved in this case is the filiation of private respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, who claims successional lights to the estate of her alleged grandmother. Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with a will leaving her properties to her three surviving children, namely, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all surnamed de la Puerta. Isabel was given the free portion in addition to her legitime and was 1 appointed executrix of the will. The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was opposed by her brothers, who averred that their mother was already senile at the time of the execution of the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning. Moreover, some of the properties listed in the 2 inventory of her estate belonged to them exclusively. Meantime, Isabel was appointed special administratrix 3 by the probate court. Alfredo subsequently died, 4 leaving Vicente the lone oppositor.

In finding for Carmelita, the lower court declared that: . . . By her evidence, it was shown to the satisfaction of the Court that she was born on December 18, 1962 per her birth certificate (Exh. A); that her father was Vicente de la Puerta and her mother is Gloria Jordan who were living as common law husband and wife until his death on June 14, 1978; that Vicente de la Puerta was married to, but was separated from, his legal wife Genoveva de la Puerta; that upon the death of Vicente de la Puerta on June 14, 1978 without leaving a last will and testament, she was the only child who survived him together with his spouse Genoveva de la Puerta with whom he did not beget any child; that she was treated by Vicente de la Puerta as a true child from the time of her birth until his father died; that the fact that she was treated as a child of Vicente de la Puerta is shown by the family pictures showing movant with Vicente de la Puerta (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2) and school records wherein he signed the report cards as her parent (Exh. E and E-1); that during the hearing of her adoption case in Special Proceeding No. 0041 in Branch V of this Court at Mauban, Quezon, Vicente de la Puerta categorically stated in court that Carmelita de la Puerta is his daughter with Gloria Jordan (Exhs. B and B-1); that it was Vicente de la Puerta during his lifetime who spent for her subsistence, support and 12 education; . . . This is a factual finding that we do not see fit to disturb, absent any of those circumstances we have laid down in a long line of decisions that will justify 13 reversal. Among these circumstances are: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10)

the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. The petitioner insists on the application of the following provisions of the Civil Code to support her thesis that Carmelita is not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta but the legitimate child of Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan: Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused: (1) By the impotence of the husband; (2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible; (3) By the serious illness of the husband. Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. These rules are in turn based on the presumption that Juanito and Gloria were married at the time of Carmelita's birth in 1962, pursuant to Rule 131, Sec. 5(bb) of the Rules of Court, providing that: Sec. 5. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: xxx xxx xxx

(bb) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; But this last-quoted presumption is merely disputable and may be refuted with evidence to the contrary. As the Court sees it, such evidence has been sufficiently established in the case at bar. The cases cited by the petitioner are not exactly in point because they involve situations where the couples lived continuously as husband and wife and so could be reasonably presumed to be married. In the case before us, there was testimony from Vicente's own wife that her husband and Gloria lived together as a married couple, thereby rebutting the presumption that Gloria was herself the lawful wife of Juanita Austrial. Such testimony would for one thing show that Juanito and Gloria did not continuously live together as a married couple. Moreover, it is not explained why, if he was really married to her, Juanito did not object when Gloria left the conjugal home and started openly consorting with Vicente, and in the same neighborhood at that. That was unnatural, to say the least. It was different with Genoveva for she herself swore that she had separated from Vicente two years after their marriage and had long lost interest in her husband. In fact, she even renounced in open court 15 any claim to Vicente's estate. The presumption of marriage between Juanito and Gloria having been destroyed, it became necessary for the petitioner to submit additional proof to show that the two were legally married. She did not. Turning now to the evidence required to prove the private respondent's filiation, we reject the petitioner's contention that Article 278 of the Civil Code is not available to Carmelita. It is error to contend that as she is not a natural child but a spurious child (if at all) she cannot prove her status by the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or any authentic writing. On the contrary, it has long been settled that: The so-called spurious children or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonly known as bastards, include adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights
14

(Art. 287, CC). But their filiation must be duly proven.(Ibid, Art. 887) How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity of spurious children under the circumstances specified in Articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children. Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the rule on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious 16 children. This being so, we need not rule now on the admissibility of the private respondent's certificate of birth as proof of her filiation. That status was sufficiently established by the sworn testimony of Vicente de la Puerta at the hearing of the petition for adoption on September 6, 1976, where he categorically declared as follows: Q What relation if any do you have with Carmelita de la Puerta? A She is my 17 daughter. Finally, we move to the most crucial question, to wit: May Carmelita de la Puerta claim support and successional rights to the estate of Dominga Revuelta? According to Article 970 of the Civil Code: Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited. The answer to the question posed must be in the negative. The first reason is that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother; and the second is that Carmelita is a spurious child.

It is settled that In testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place only in the following cases: first, when the person represented dies before the testator; second, when the person represented is incapable of succeeding the testator; and third, when the person represented is disinherited by the testator. In all of these cases, since there is a vacancy in the inheritance, the law calls the children or descendants of the person represented to succeed by 18 right of representation. xxx xxx xxx The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives of a deceased person try to succeed him in his rights which he would have had if still living. In the present case, however, said deceased had already succeeded his aunt, the testatrix herein. . . . It is a fact that at the time of the death of the testatrix, Reynaldo Cuison was still alive. He died two months after her (testatrix's) death. And upon his death, he transmitted to his heirs, the petitioners herein Elisa Cuison et al., the legacy or the right to succeed to the legacy. . . . In other words, the herein petitioners-appellants are not trying to succeed to the right to the property of the testatrix, but rather to the right of the legatee Reynaldo 19 Cuison in said property. Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right to inherit from her directly or in his own right. No right of representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita upon her father's death, which came after his own mother's death. It would have been different if Vicente was already dead when Dominga Revuelta died. Carmelita could then have inherited from her in representation of her father Vicente, assuming the private respondent was a lawful heir. But herein lies the crux, for she is not. As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families. This article provides quite clearly:

Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. Applying this rule in Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared:
20

. . . even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. The reason for this rule was explained in the recent 21 case of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, thus: Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former in turn sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than

recognize this truth, by avoiding 22 further ground of resentment. Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from inheriting from Dominga Revuelta for there would be no natural kindred ties between them and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either. As aptly pointed out by Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino: If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the latter cannot represent the former in the inheritance from the parents or ascendants of the adopter. The adopted child is not related to the deceased in that case, because the filiation created by fiction of law is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted. "By adoption, the adopters can make for themselves an heir, but they cannot thus make 23 one for their kindred. The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta, has successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but not to the estate of Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance should therefore be filed in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father's 24 estate and cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga Revuelta's Will. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered. Suntay vs Suntay G.R. No. 132524. December 29, 1998 Facts: Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao on July 9, 1958. Out of this marriage, three children were born. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel filed a criminal case against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the custody and care of their children who were living with their mother. From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans Memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8,

1967) the patient was already out of the hospital he continued to be under observation and treatment. It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuropsychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong. Issues: Is there ground for annulment? Are the children borne within a valid marriage prior to annulment legitimate? Held: There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage: That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife. A voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that: Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. Note: Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent

marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.

Surviving Spouse IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON CLAROSANTILLON, PETITIONERSV.PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA AND ROSARIO CORRALES, RESPONDENTSG.R. No. L-19281 30 June 1965 FACTS: Pedro Santillon died without testament, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Mir anda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; and (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario. Claro filed a motion to declare share of heirs to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.The trial court held that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit 1/2 share and the remaining 1/2 share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. ISSUE: What provision of the Civil Code must properly apply? RULING: Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas Art.996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of children intestate succession. While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the pertinent provision on intestate succession shall apply,i.e., Art. 996.The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions: (a) Art. 996speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply when there is only

one "child"; consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of judicial construction and analogy; (b) Art. 996 is unjust orunfair because, whereas in testate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would get in intestate .It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. So Art. 996 could orshould be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on theground that "child" is not included in "children," the consequences would be tremendous. Unfairness of Art. 996 . Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate succession, where there is only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower onefourth. But in intestate , if Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-half . Unfair orinequitable, they insist. On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower "gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half if the testator so wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each of thespouses to decide (by testament, whether his or her only child shall get more than his or her survivor) BICOMONG v. ALMANZA FACTS: Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859. Of this marriage there wereborn three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic, Igmedia Bagsic, and Ignacio Bagsic. Sisenanda Barcenas diedahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic. On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso. Of this second marriage were born two children, Felipa Bagsic and Maura Bagsic. Simeon Bagsic diedsometime in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died.Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19, 1944 survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino andPetra Tolentino.Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945. Surviving her are her heirs, the plaintiffs GaudencioBicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong. Of the children of thesecond marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on April 14, 1952 leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before the present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza diedleaving behind her husband, the defendant herein Engracio Manese and her father Geronimo Almanza.The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the one-half undividedshare of Maura Bagsic which she inherited from her mother. Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint onDecember 1, 1959, namely:

(a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for therecovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic. ISSUE: Whether or not Articles 995, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are applicable in this case. RULING: Yes. The said provisions are applicable to the admitted facts of the case. In the absence of descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Article 1003of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood, in accordance with the provision of Article 975 of the same Code. By virtue of said decision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in theirown right. In Abellana-Bacayo v. Ferraris-Borromeo, the Supreme Court held that nephews and niecesalone do not inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased. Under the same provision, Article 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half-blood, the sole niece of whole blood does not exclude the ten nephews and nieces of half-blood. The only difference in their right of succession is provided in Article 1008 NCCP, in relation to Article 1006 of the same Code, which provisions in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half-blood. Abellana v Borromeo (inulit) Partition Legasto vs. Verzosa A testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his property, but he must first make a will with all the formalities provided for by law. And it could not be otherwise, for without a will there can be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of the partition inter vivos made by a testator of his property, it necessarily refers to that property which he has devised to his heirs. A person who disposes of his property gratis inter vivos is not called a testator, but a donor. In employing the word "testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish between one who freely donates his property in life and

one who disposes of it by will to take effect after his death. Fajardo vs. Fajardo There are only two ways in which said partition could have been made: By an act inter vivos, or by will. In either case there were formalities which must be followed. If the partition was made by an act inter vivos, it should have been reduced in writing in a public instrument, because it was a conveyance of real estate. If by last will and testament, the legal requisites should have been observed. Tuason vs. Tuason Jr. Where heirs contracted with a third person to develop their co-owned lot, with the stipulation that the coownership shall subsist until all the lots have been sold, is not a violation of Art. 400, and is only a mere incident to the main object of the partnership, which is to dissolve the co-ownership. Chavez vs. IAC Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in making a partition of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by will. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs. (RFB: This ruling should not be used as it raises eyebrows very high. It gives a partition an irrevocable character and allows a conveyance of the compulsory heirs of their legitimes even during their lifetimes.) ALSUA-BETTS v CA NATURE Appeal by certiorari FACTS - On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doa Florentina Rella, both of Ligao, Albay, together with all their living children, Francisca AlsuaBetts, Pablo Alsua,Fernando Alsua thru this judicial guardian Cl otilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua deB u e n v i a j e , e n t e r e d i n t o a d u l y n o t a r i zed agreement, Escritura de ParticionExtrajudicial , over the then present and existing properties of the spouses Don Jesusand Doa Florentina. - On Jan. 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doa Florentina, also known as Doa Tinay separatelyexecuted their respective holographic wills, the provisions of which

were in conformityand in implementation of the extrajudicial partition of Nov. 25, 1949. - On Aug.14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doa Tinay executed their mutual and reciprocal codicils amending and supplementing their respective holographic wills. On Feb. 19, 1957, their respective holographic wins and the codicils thereto were duly admitted to probate. - Doa Tinay died in October 1959. In early Nov. 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic and instructed his attorney to draft a new will. This subsequent last Will a n d Testament of Don Jesus executed on Nov. 14, 1959 contained an express revocation of his holographic wig of Jan. 5, 1955 and the codicil of Aug.14, 1956; a statement requiring that all of his properties donated to his children in the Deed of 1949 be collated and taken into account in the partition of his estate; the institution of all his children as devisees and legatees to certain specific properties; a statement bequeathing the rest of his properties and all that may be acquired in the future, before his death, to Pablo and Francesca; and a statement naming Francesca as executrix without bond. - Don Jesus Alsua died in 1964. Petitioner Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrixnamed in the will of Nov. 14, 1959, filed a petition for the probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua before the CFI Albay and was docketed as. Oppositions thereto werefiled by respondents Pablo, Amparo and Fernando. CFI allowed the the probate of thewill of Don Jesus Alsua. CA reversed: denied the probate of the will, declared null andvoid the two sales subject of the complaint and ordered the defendantspetitioners, topay damages to the plaintiffs-private respondents. Hence, this petition. ISSUE WON CA erred in denying the probate of the will HELD YES- CA erred in denying probate to the will of Don Jesus dated November 14, 1959; iterred in holding that Don Jesus being a party to the extrajudicial partition of 1949 was contractually bound by the provisions t hereof and hence could not revoke hisp articipation therein by the simple expedience of making a new will with contrary provisions or dispositions. It is an error because the so-called extrajudicial partition of 1949 is void and inoperative as a partition; neither is it a valid or enforceable contract because it involved future inheritance; it may only be given effect as a donation intervivos of specific properties to the heirs made by the parents.

- Upon careful examination of the provisions of the holographic will and codicil of Doa Tinay, there was no indication whatsoever that Doa Tinay expressly or impliedly instituted both the husband and her children as heirs to her free portion of her sharein the conjugal assets. - Respondents insist that Don Jesus was bound by the extrajudicial partition of N o v e m b e r 2 5 , 1 9 4 9 a n d had in fact conformed to said Partition b y m a k i n g a holographic will and codicil with exactly the same provisions as those of Doa Tinay, which CA sustained. However SC ruled that Don Jesus was not forever bound therebyfor his previous holographic will and codicil as such, would remain revokable at his discretion. Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is clear: "A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void." There can be no restriction that may be made on his absolute freedom to revoke his holographic will and codicil previously made. This would still hold true even if such previous will had as in the case at bar already been probated -The legitimes of the forced heirs were left unimpaired, as in fact, not one of said forced heirs claimed or intimated otherwise. The properties that were disposed of inthe contested will belonged wholly to Don Jesus Alsua's free portion and may be diamond of by him to whomsoever he may choose. - If he now favored Francesca more, as claimed by private respondents, or Pablo as infact he was, We cannot and may not sit in judgment upon the motives and sentimentsof Don Jesus in doing so. DOROMAL V. CA FACTS: A parcel of land in Iloilo were co-owned by 7 siblings all surnamed Horilleno. 5 of the siblings gave a SPA to their niece Mary Jimenez, who succeeded her father as a co-owner, for the sale of the land to father and son Doromal. One of the co-owner, herein petitioner, Filomena Javellana however did not gave her consent to the sale even though her siblings executed a SPA for her signature. The co-owners went on with the sale of 6/7 part of the land and a new title for the Doromals were issued. Respondent offered to repurchase the land for 30K as stated in the deed of sale but petitioners

declined invoking lapse in time for the right of repurchase. Petitioner also contend that the 30K price was only placed in the deed of sale to minimize payment of fees and taxes and as such, respondent should pay the real price paid which was P115, 250. ISSUE: WON the period to repurchase of petitioner has already lapsed. HELD: Period of repurchase has not yet lapsed because the respondent was not notified of the sale. The 30-day period for the right of repurchase starts only after actual notice not only of a perfected sale but of actual execution and delivery of the deed of sale. The letter sent to the respondent by the other coowners cannot be considered as actual notice because the letter was only to inform her of the intention to sell the property but not its actual sale. As such, the 30-day period has not yet commenced and the respondent can still exercise his right to repurchase. The respondent should also pay only the 30K stipulated in the deed of sale because a redemptioners right is to be subrogated by the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract. CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents. Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners. Luis R. Reyes for private respondent. Ponente: CRUZ FACTS: Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their deceased parents. One of them transferred his undivided share by way of absolute sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a Con Pacto de Retro Sale. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after

the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area. One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption of her brother. Trial court dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial Court. ISSUE: Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code. HELD: YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated. RATIO: The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception. While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts] nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not to the letter that killeth but to the spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to the law makers will. BAUTISTA v GRIO-AQUINO FACTS Petitioners instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to declare the deed of extrajudicial partition, deed of absolute sale, Transfer Certificates Title Nos.14182, 14186 and 15665 all of Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and Tax Declaration No. 5147, null and void. Based on the parties stipulation of facts: The land in question was registered in the name of petitioner Manuel Bautista under TCT No. 2210, and the latter inherited this land from his father, Mariano Bautista. On Dec. 22, 1966, a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was executed. Private respondents were signatories to the deed, and the signature of petitioner Manuel Bautista was supposed to appear in that document, although petitioner Manuel Bautista deniedh a v i n g s i g n e d t h a t E x t r a j u d i c i a l P artition. U p o n r e g i s t r a t i o n o f t h e D e e d o f Extraju dicial Partition, T.C.T. No. 2210 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T.T. 14182 was issued. The private respondents, with the exception of Manolito Bautista, executed a Deed of

Absolute Sale in favor of Manolito Bautista of that property. Upon registration of the Deed of Sale, T.C.T. T-14182 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T. No. T-14186 was issued to Manolito Bautista.On August 7, 1969, Manolito Bauti sta executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the other private respondents and upon registration of said Deed of Sale, T. C.T. Nos. T-1 5665, T-15666, T15667, T-15668, T-15669, T- 15670, T15671, were issued to privaterespondents. Petitioner Manuel Bautista married his second wife Emiliana Tamayo.Manuel Bautista and his second wife, Emiliana Tamayo, had only a child, Evangeline Bautista, born on April 29,1949. the property in question was the subject matter of extrajudicial partition of property on December 22,1966, among the heirs of the late J u l i a n a N o j a d e r a , t h e f i r s t w i f e o f M anuel Bautista. M a n u e l B a u t i s t a d e n i e d participation in the Extrajudicial Partition of Property. On August 1, 1974, all theparties agreed to submit to the NBI the questioned signature of Manuel Bautista. TheNBI concluded that the questioned document was authentic. The trial court dismissed the complaint with costs against plaintiffs. CA affirmed ISSUE WON the property of the surviving husband be the subject of an extrajudicial partitionof the estate of the deceased wife HELD NO RATIO Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement of the Estate applies only to the estate left by the decedent who died without a will, and with no creditors, and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives. If the property does not belong to the estate of the decedent certainly it cannot be the subject matter of an extrajudicial partition. As the subject property does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, is void ab initio being contrary to law. To include in an extrajudicial partition property which does not pertain to the estate of the deceased would be to deprive the lawful owner thereof of his property without due process of law. Only property of the estate of the decedent which is transmitted by succession can be the lawful subject matter of an extrajudicial partition. In this case, the said partition obviously prejudices the right of Manuel Bautista as exclusive owner of the property. The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of Evangeline Bautista as a compulsory heir of Manuel Bautista, daughter of the

latter by his second marriage. It is difficult to believe that Manuel Bautista would wittingly overlook and ignore the right of her daughter Evangeline to share in the said property. It is not surprising that he denied signing the said document. Moreover, private respondents knew Evangeline Bautista who is their half-sister to be a compulsory heir. The court finds that her preterition was attended with bad faith hence the said partition must be rescinded. The Court observes that after the execution of said extrajudicial partition and issuance of the title in their names, private respondents except Manolito Bautista in turn executed a deed of absolute sale of the property in favor of the latter in whose namethe title was also issued. And yet soon thereafter another deed of sale was executed this time by Manolito Bautista selling back the same property to private respondents in whose names the respective titles were thus subsequently issued. This series of transactions between and among private respondents is an indication of a clever scheme to place the property beyond the reach of those lawfully entitled thereto. Moreover, such extrajudicial partition cannot constitute a partition of the property during the lifetime of its owner, Manuel Bautista. Partition of future inheritance is prohibited by law. As said Extrajudicial Parti tion dated December 22, 1966, of property belonging exclusively to petitioner Manuel Bautista, is null and void ab initio it follows that all subsequent transactions involving the same property between and among the private respondents are also null and void. Prescription cannot be invoked in this case as the petitioners' right to sue their co-owners for partition of the property is imprescriptible. 4 And even assuming that the present action may prescribe a s r u l e d b y t h e respondent court, petitioners Emiliana Bautista and Evangeline Bautista who are notparties to the said instrument asserted that they discovered the same only soon before they filed the complaint in court. Certainly the action has not prescribed. De los Santos v De la Cruz (inulit) Ureta v Ureta

NOTARTE vs.NOTARTE Partition; oral partition. Under Article 1082 of the Civil Code, every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be a partition even though it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, or any other transaction. Partition may thus be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the

presumption. The validity of an oral partition is already well-settled. It is not required that the partition agreement be registered or annotated in the OCT of the land to be valid. After exercising acts of ownership over their respective portions of the contested estate, petitioners are estopped from denying the existence of an oral partition. Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions setoff to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Leonardo Notarte et al. v. Godofredo Notarte, Neri vs Uy (inulit) Casilang v. Casilang-Dizon FACTS: Spouses Liborio and Francisca owns three parcels of land: (1) Lot No. 4676; (2)Lot No. 4618; (3) Lot No. 4704.

Among the documents sought to be annulled was the 1997 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed by Ireneos children over lot no. 4618.

RTC affirmed Joses ownership and possession of Lot No. 4618.

CA reversed the RTC ruling mainly on the factual findings and conclusions of the MTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim executed bythe heirs of Ireneo is valid? HELD: No. It grossly violated the substantive right of Jose Casilang Sr. as direct compulsory heir. Petition is granted and CA decision is reversed and set aside. RATIO: From the conclusion of the RTC is well-supported that there was indeed a verbal partition among the heirs of Liborio, pursuant to which each of his eight children received his or her share of his estate, and that Joses share was Lot No. 4618.

8 children: Felicidad, Ireneo (deceased), Marcelina, Jacinta, Bonifacio(deceased), Leonara, Jose (petitioner), Flora.

Respondents: heirs of Ireneo: Rosario Casilang-Dizon, Mario, Angelo, RodolfoCasilang. The parties verbal partition is valid, and has been ratified by their taking possession of their respective shares. "An agreement of partition may be made orally or in writing. An oral agreement for the partition of the property owned in common is valid and enforceable upon the parties. The Statute of Frauds has no operation in this kind of agreements, for partition is not a conveyance of property but simply a segregation and designation of the part of the property which belong to the co-owners."

Rosario filed with the MTC a complaint for unlawful detainer against her uncle Jose Casilang for the lot hes cu rrently occupying, Lot No. 4618.

In his answer he stated that hes the lawful, absolute, exclusive owner and in actual possession of said lot, which he acquired through intestate succession from his late father.

MTC: in favor of Rosario and ordering Jose to remove his house and vacate the said lot. That the lot was owned by Ireneo through extrajudicial partition and his heirs are entitled to the land.

Joses possession of Lot No. 4618 under a claim of ownership is well borne out by the records. It is also consistent with the claimed verbal partition with his siblings, and fully corroborated by his sisters Felicidad, Jacinta, Leonora, and Flora, who further testified that they each had taken possession of their own shares and built their houses thereon. A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the adverse claimant establishes a better right.

Petitioners (children of Liborio and Francisca), filed with the RTC a complaint for Annulment of Documents, Ownership and Peaceful Possession with Damages against respondents. They also moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order which was denied by the RTC.

Tax declarations and tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership