A Natural History of Diplomacy

Chapter 3 of the book manuscript in progress When Diplomacy Works Shuhei Kurizaki

Preliminary draft Comments welcome October 6, 2011

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University. E-mail: kurizaki@polisci.tamu.edu.

Contents
1 Evolution of Diplomatic Institutions: A Historical Sketch 2 2 First Documented Diplomatic Practice: Amarna Diplomacy in Ancient Near East 3 3 Beginning of Diplomacy: Ancient Greece 4 Stasis of Diplomacy: Ancient Rome 5 Byzantine Diplomacy: Middle Ages 6 The Italian System: Renaissance Diplomacy 7 The French System: 17th & 18th Centuries 8 Spread and Institutionalization: 19th Century 9 Decline of Diplomacy? 20th Century and Beyond 10 Back to the Future? The 21st Century & Beyond 11 Conclusion 5 8 11 15 20 28 32 37 38

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This chapter lays the groundwork by establishing facts about the origins and characteristics of diplomatic practices and institutions, which allows us to draw some descriptive inference about how diplomacy works in international disputes. To do so, this chapter reconstructs a natural history of diplomacy through the discussion of pivotal historical events and turning points in the evolution of its institutions and practice.1 A brief narrative of the historical and strategic context of the development of diplomacy serves a couple of purposes. First, it provides us common ground and vocabulary to explore the phenomena in a simplied and scientic way. In particular, it helps us establish the fact that the diplomatic institution has been developed as a consequence of political leaders reaction to the strategic and political environment. It also illustrates that norms and patterns are self-enforcing as political leaders and rulers have maintained and reproduced them for quite a long time. This will be especially helpful for those who are not familiar with the variations of the institutions and functions of diplomacy throughout history. Second, the reconstruction of a natural history of diplomacy also provides a set of stylized facts of diplomacy. Stylization helps us identify general ways in which diplomacy is commonly pursued in most international disputes. While natural history exhibits enormous complexity, stylization is the process of transforming this complexity into simplicity. I call this exercise a natural history because this chapter attempts to (i) document some direct observations of diplomatic activities and its institutions without any specic theoretical conceptions and then (ii) searches for some structure in the stylized facts to see how main diplomatic mechanisms can be summarized according to several types of functional forms observed in the historical experience.2 Only through this process, can we understand how to begin to ask empirical questions that must be explained. As Sherlock Holmes advices a young inspector from Scotland Yard at the crime scene, It is a capital mistake to theorize in advance of the facts.3 King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 43) elaborate on this point: Where possible, analysts should simplify their descriptions only after they attain an understanding of the richness of history and
The term natural history refers to the scientic study of things in the natural world, which can encompass the broad range of natural-scientic disciplines depending on the context and the historical period. Its methodology primarily involves direct observation and collection as well as classication of species into the taxonomic schema. Its lesser emphasis on theoretical foundations or analytical rigor is distinctive from natural philosophy which corresponds to the modern-day mainstream natural sciences. 2 This latter task is taken up in the next chapter on Diplomacy Games. 3 A. Conan Doyle. 1904. The Adventure of the Second Stain. Strand Magazine 28 (December): 1-16.
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culture. . . . [R]ich, unstructured knowledge of the historical and cultural context of the phenomena with which they want to deal in a simplied and scientic way is usually a requisite for avoiding simplications that are simply wrong. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is not to provide a comprehensive review on the historical evolution of diplomatic institutions. There are other excellent works with more comprehensive treatments of the history of diplomacy.4 Rather, I draw heavily on the empirical literature on the history of diplomacy as well as the English school and other related European IR scholarship. My description of the natural history here omits many important aspects of diplomacy that are not directly relevant to international disputes or conict resolution. In what follows in this chapter, I disaggregate the historical evolution of diplomatic institutions into several historical periods. Each account of the historical period identies some signicant inherited institutional feature(s) of modern diplomacy. It also describes a strategic problem international, domestic or bothbehind the emergence of each function.

Evolution of Diplomatic Institutions: A Historical Sketch

The style and functions of diplomacy have evolved over the course of history. The changes in political order, economic environments, technological advancements have all had profound impacts on the way political leaders conducted diplomacy. For example, modern telecommunication techniques and the improved jetliners have drastically improved the mobility and altered the way actors behave in international politics. Reecting on the experience of secret alliances in the nineteenth century and their roles in the expansion of World War I, the importance of transparency in diplomatic processes in the collective decision making among states has been recognized since the end of the War. These two examples illustrate how political, economic, and technological changes may create the need for a particular institutional arrangement or function of diplomacy, which in turn may constitute the strategic logic for the creation of a given set of diplomatic institutions. Hence, it is important to consider how and why the existing diplomatic intuition and practice came forth in international relations.
For the excellent overview of historical evolution of diplomacy, see Anderson (1993), Hamilton and Langhorne (1995), Nicolson (1954), and Nicolson (1963). For more detailed account of a specic historical stage in history, see the works cited in the relevant subsections below.
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While the history of diplomacy exhibits a great deal of variability, the basic functions of diplomacy and their machinery have not changed. Indeed, the central features of diplomatic institutions have survived the fundamental shifts in the order and structure of international politics such as the surge of nationalism and democracy and the incorporation of non-European countries in the international system. They also survived catastrophic events such as the Great Wars and the wane and wax of hegemons. Writings by diplomatic theorists such as Richelieu, Calli` eres, Wicquefort, Nicolson, and others, reveal that virtually nothing has changed over the last several centuries with regard to the basic functions of diplomacythe maintenance of communication channels, the conduct of negotiation, the provision of political intelligence, and political manipulations behind the scene. Two decades ago, Hedley Bull (1977, 171) wrote: The remarkable willingness of states of all regions, cultures, . . . and stages of development to embrace often strange and archaic diplomatic procedures that arose in Europe in another age is today one of the few visible indications of the enduring relevance of diplomatic institutions. Because of its remarkable stability, the diplomatic system is sometimes referred to as the master-institution of international relations (Wight 1978, 113).

First Documented Diplomatic Practice: Amarna Diplomacy in Ancient Near East

While the norms and practice of modern diplomacy have taken shape between the period of Renaissance Italy (in the 15th century) and the creation of the Westphalian system (in the 17th century), the rudimentary form of what we know today as diplomacy existed ever since the rst social communities and political collectives emerged and interacted with each other. As Nicolson (1963, 2) notes, The origins of diplomacy lie buried in the darkness preceding what we call the dawn of history, the available evidence suggests that the earliest recorded diplomatic activity took place about 3400 years ago between the Eighteenth Dynasty of Egypt (New Kingdom) and other great powers in the ancient Near East.5 A series of cuneiform clay tables, collectively called Amarna Letters, were rst discovered and unearthed by a local farmer in 1887 (and successively by archaeologists) at Tell el-Amarna, the ruin of the palace of King Amenhotep IV located in the dynastic capital of the Ancient Egyptian New
5 Great powers in the Late Bronze Age (the 16th to 12th centuries BC) include Mittani, Babylonia, Hatti, Assyria, and Mittani.

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Kingdom.6 The archive contains more than 350 letters. About 50 of the letters are diplomatic correspondences between the Egyptian dynastic power and the neighboring Great powers in the ancient Near East for the thirty-year period beginning from nal regnal years of Amenhotep III to the rst regnal year of Tutankhamun in the 14th century BC. The correspondences discussed a variety of issues such as inter-dynastic marriage, trade issues, alliance questions, and legal problems, among other (Cohen and Westbrook 2000).7 These diplomatic documents on cuneiform tables indicate that diplomatic negotiations were going on some 3400 years ago between the Egyptian kingdom and the Hittite kingdom where they had severe conict of interests and they were competing for the control in the Near East region. The nineteenth dynasty of Egypt and the Hittite Kingdom of Anatolia engaged in intermittent armed conict for about fty years. The military rivalry culminated in the the direct clash of two rival kingdoms in 1274 BC in Kadesh (also Qadesh), a city on the frontier between the two kingdoms. The Battle of Kadesh took place when Pharaoh Ramesses II attempted to seize control of the colonial territory of modern-day Syria in order to remove the military inuence of Hittite. His imperial army clashed with Hittite King Muwatallis. No decisive victory was achieved by either side. This is one of the best documented battle in the Ancient Near East, although historical accounts vary on which side had the upper hand in this battle. Ramesses II and Muwatallis concluded a peace treaty afterwards in which they agreed on the exchange of political refugees and asylum seekers, mutual military assistant, the mutual territorial inviolability, and the inter-dynastic marriage of a daughter of Muwatallis and Ramesses II. This treaty is said to be the oldest recorded treaty in history. What the Amarna letters signify is that what we today call diplomatic missions were deployed by political leaders to conduct diplomatic negotiations from the very beginning of the recorded history of international relations. Hence, as Berridge, Keens-Soper and Otte (2001, 108) note, the practice of sending agents abroad for specic purposes, sometimes for lengthy periods, is as old as commerce, suspicion, rivalry and war, reaching back thousands of years to ancient Mesopotamia. Yet, the fact that this treaty was concluded about sixteen years after the Battle indicates the diculty in reaching an agreement. It may also suggest Great powers in the ancient Near East also experienced the great diculty
For the detailed discussion of the diplomatic activities between the great powers in the ancient Near East (known as Amarna diplomacy ), see Cohen and Westbrook (2000) and essays therein as well as Cohen (2001), Lafont (2001), . 7 Other than diplomatic correspondence, the letters also included intelligence document sent to the Egyptian dynasty from Egypts Canaanite empire.
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of communication that more recent diplomatic missions experienced in the absence of jetliners or telecommunication. Not only does it take time for diplomatic envoys to travel, but also exchanging missions would have involved a great deal of uncertainty as to the safe reception of diplomatic messages. This inherent diculty and risk involved in diplomatic exchange many centuries later leads to the institutionalization of diplomatic agents and embassies as well as their special status such as diplomatic immunity. Sir. Harold Nicolson (1963, 6) wrote From the very rst, . . . , it must have become apparent that such negotiations would be severely hampered if the emissary from one side were killed and eaten by other side before he had had time to deliver his message. The practice must therefore have become established even in the remotest times that it would be better to grant to such negotiators certain privileges and immunities which were denied to warriors. The question still remains as to how rigorous the Amarna diplomatic system was. Some scholars argue that the Amarna letters indicate evidence of a fully edged diplomatic system (Cohen 1995, 264), particularly because the laws of hospitality provided protection immunity for diplomatic envoys at the time. Other scholars, however, are skeptical about this view, arguing that the Amarna diplomacy was rudimentary and it did not carry a full-edged system (e.g., Wight 1977). Berridge (2000), for example, argues that the Amarna letters provides the evidence that the Amarna system lacked the adequate immunity system. First, the laws of hospitality was an exclusive privilege rather than diplomatic immunity. Second, the letters also indicate that the attempt to grant immunity to envoys of hostile powers failed. The ruler of Byblos complained to Pharaoh that when he sent a messenger to the mayor of Beirut, who had seized his property, he bound him (EA 116) (Berridge 2000, 214). Third, although diplomatic envoys were allowed to return home without the permission of their hosts in the modern system, this was not the case in Amarna diplomacy (Berridge 2000). In particular, the Egyptian dynasty was notorious for the frequent denial of such permissions during the Amarna period (Holmes 1975). A recent study corroborates the non-existence of legal diplomatic immunity in the ancient Near East, although there existed some degree of the inviolability of diplomatic envoys (Cohen 2001; Elgavish 2000). Nevertheless, Amarna diplomacy had a system in its own right, and its system was adequate to the strategic needs faced by political leaders of the times.

Beginning of Diplomacy: Ancient Greece

The origin of diplomacy: Another root of modern-day diplomacy can be traced back to the ancient Greek city-states. In particular, the English word 5

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diplomacy is derived from the Greek verb diploun which means fold in English and also from diplomas which means folded documents (Inoguchi 1989).8 This is because what we would now call diplomacy in the age of ancient Greece was the city-states practice of mutually recognizing the safety of passage of their own citizens outside of the sphere of their inuence. In the age of ancient Greece, travel documents, passes, and carriage bills were sealed on a metal plate, folded, and sewed up together in a peculiar way. Such a document on a metal plate was called diplomas and this term over time has become also to mean ocial documents. Nicolson notes that res diplomatica, which initially meant the vocation that examines and interprets ocial documents, came to indicate what we now know as diplomacy, the management of intergovernmental aairs.9 This indicates that one of the fundamental functions of diplomacy at the time is the medium of communication between government authorities via diplomas. Diplomatic practice: Diplomatic practice in ancient Greece departed from the norms and customs commonly observed in the history of diplomacy. The rst and foremost notable deviation is the system of public oratory. Greek city states frequently exchanged oral messages rather than written documents like the cuneiform clay tables utilized in Amarna diplomacy of the ancient Near East. This practice is said to reect their democratic norms and traditions. The Greeks also emphasized the importance of publicity and transparency in the conduct of diplomacy. Therefore, the primary task of diplomatic envoys in the Greek city-states was not just to convey the message but to make an oral argument on behalf of their own city either in front of the walls of a foreign city-state or in a public debate at a public assembly to justify the home citys position (Adcock and Mosley 1975; J onsson and Hall 2003; Nicolson 1963). Therefore, they were not expected to get her information regarding the city-states which they visited or to write any reports on their return; instead, all that was expected of them was that they should make a magnicent speech (Nicolson 1963, 8). This practice of public oratory in ancient Greece war rather as if the principal skill expected of a British ambassador to the United States was to produce a ne forensic performance before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Hamilton
Other studies that discuss the origins and uses of the term diplomacy include Constantinou (1996), Sharp (1999). Adcock and Mosley (1975) provides a more detailed treatment of practice, methods, institutions, and instruments of diplomacy in ancient Greece. See also Cohen (2001), Hamilton and Langhorne (1995, Ch.1), Mosley (1971), Mosley (1973), Nicolson (1963), and Wolpert (2001). 9 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term diplomacy was rst used to mean the management of international relations in 1796.
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and Langhorne 1995, 9-10). Therefore, the public assembly selected envoys from those who had dignied attitude and appearance as well as loud voice, in addition to the ability to engage in logical and inventive argumentation. Most agreements reached by diplomatic envoys were signed only after consultation with, and ratication by, public assemblies on their return. Herodotus describes the Persian king Cyrus the Great scong the Greek practice of public oratory (Cohen 2001, 31). Thucydides, too, implies the ineectiveness of public over private diplomacy (Thucydides IV, 22). Perhaps the most famous episode of envoys in ancient Greece pleading the cause of their city before the popular assemblies was Thucydides account of The Melian Dialogue (Thucydides 1972). This is the story where the hegemonic city-state Athens demanded Melos (a colony of Sparta) to surrender. The Athenian envoys argued that Melos should submit to the demand because Melos is weaker not only than Athens who controls the sea but also weaker than other islanders. In response to a Realpolitik argument, the Melian commissioners, appealing to the justice and moral that are embodied in the Laws of Nations, argued that they should not be forced to surrender just because they are weak.10 Thucydides documented many other episodes and provided crucial information concerning the diplomatic practice in ancient Greece. Thucydides story-telling indicates that diplomatic missions, such as the Athenian envoys to Melos, were dispatched so frequently that their exchange of missions were fairly institutionalized. The second departure from the common historical pattern is the role played by the proxenos. A proxenos is a local citizen who voluntarily functioned as a consul of other city states, rather than a diplomatic mission sent by other cities. If the need for consular business arose in a foreign city-state, then a resident of that local city was given the title of proxenos by the city-state which it represented. This system was developed because the Greeks did not regard diplomacy as a distinct function of government and hence lacked formal institutions of diplomacy such as resident envoys or permanent embassies (Mosley 1971, 320; Wolpert 2001, 74). The third anomaly is a prohibition of the exchange of elaborate gifts by diplomatic envoys to prevent bribery or the appearance of bribery. Adcock and Mosley (1975, 164-5) report two instances involving Athenian diplomatic envoys to Persia receiving gifts. In one instance, the matter was raised in the public assembly on their return home. In another, the envoy was accused of accepting imprudently lavish gifts and was condemned to death after his reNote that this dialogue actually took place at the closed-door meeting of the Council of the Melians despite the fact that diplomatic negotiation among Greek city-states were normally conducted publicly through the debate.
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turn home as diplomatic missions were expected to observe certain procedures and etiquette at court. Finally, diplomatic immunity or safe conduct was not guaranteed in ancient Greek diplomacy. While in the ancient Near East the inviolability, if not legal immunity, was guaranteed to some extent, this was not the case with ancient Greece. The safe conduct was not an automatic or general right of the diplomatic envoys, despite the fact that heralds were regarded as agents of the gods and were sacrosanct (Adcock and Mosley 1975, 229). Moreover, safe passage and physical security may not be guaranteed during wartime. Athenian and Spartan diplomatic envoys were executed during the Peloponnesian War (Adcock and Mosley 1975, 153-4). Both Athens and Sparta executed envoys sent by Darius I of Persian (Cohen 2001, 32). Although the Greek diplomatic practice witnessed anomalies in various aspects and may not contribute to the liner progress of the institutional development of diplomacy, some of the Greek features are commonly observed in diplomatic activities across time and space. For instance, while the public conduct of diplomacy may constitute a deviation from the historical norm, Nicolson (1963, 7) notes that the Athenian practice of choosing as their diplomatic envoys the nest orators, the most plausible forensic advocates seems to still remain intact today. Moreover, the tradition of public oratory also indicates that diplomatic communication and negotiation were carried out with the power of reason and language rather than naked force in the ancient Near East and ancient Greek diplomacy. This creates a stark dierence with what we witness with the Roman empire.

Stasis of Diplomacy: Ancient Rome

The ancient Roman civilization stands out in many respects in the history of international politics. The most notable is its extended sphere of inuence and its longevity in the hegemonic status. Ancient Rome also marks a turning point in the history of diplomacy in that it contributed very little to the development of diplomatic institutions and practice during its millenarian history (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 12; Nicolson 1954). The lack of advancement made by the Romans is remarkable given the fact that the Romans contributed so much to the social and political systems. This includes Roman law, the institutions of Christianity, standing professional military and each one of them has profoundly aected European civilization.11
For a more comprehensive treatment of diplomacy in the Roman world, see Campbell (2001), Hamilton and Langhorne (1995, 1), Nicolson (1954) and Nicolson (1963).
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This is not to say, however, that Rome did not use diplomacy at all. Rather, the Romans did not regard diplomacy as an important instrument of statecraft and maintaining its supremacy; they used it as a means of transacting daily business and this may be why it was the methods of managing legal or commercial business primarily between its provinces. As for the management of its international relations, however, the Romans barely relied on diplomacy. In fact, ancient Rome is one of the few leading states with the hegemonic status which did not utilize diplomacy in the establishment or the maintenance its supremacy. The most important leverage that the Romans used in foreign policy was a strong military and their superiority in war. This was noted by the ancient Greek historian Polybius, who said The Romans rely on force in all their undertakings, and consider that having set themselves a task they are bound to carry it through (Campbell 2001). Romes rise to primacy in Italy was mainly due to its military strength and war-ghting ability, rather than diplomacy (Campbell 2001, 4).12 Hence, it is natural that the Romans recognized that overwhelming military strength could be an instrument in preserving peaceful conditions (Campbell 2001, 2). It is within this context that Flavius Vegetius Renatus, a military scientist in ancient Roman, said in his textbook on military science that, Those who seek peace must prepare for war. During the autocratic rule of the Roman Empire, with the standing, professional army stationed in various provinces, it was able to use the threat of force for the purpose of coercive diplomacy (Campbell 6). Harold Nicolson notes that owing to the fault of masterfulness . . . they [the Romans] sought to impose their will, rather than to negotiate on a basis of reciprocity (Nicolson 1954, 14). To be sure, the manner in which the Romans utilized diplomacy varied depending on the system of government (Campbell 2001). During the Roman Republic, the Senate was in charge of foreign aairs, and the power of the Senate includes the power to conduct war as well as to send and receive diplomatic representatives.13 The Roman Republic adopted diplomatic procedures and practices that resembled those developed in ancient Greece. Envoys, or legatus, also reported to the Senate on their return, where the result of diplomatic agreements were either sanctioned or declined. This sort of ratication procedure was necessary because the instruction given to envoys by the Senate was not detailed, and, consequently, some degree of latitude and discretion
However, Campbell (2001) claims that this does not mean that Rome ruled Italy only through conquest and fear. Rather, instead of destruction and annexation, Rome often induced communities to become allies 13 A diplomatic agent appointed and accredited to the Senate is called Legatus. The terms used for the diplomatic missions of the Pope, Papal Legate, has its root in legatus.
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was granted to envoys themselves. Despite the latitude granted to envoys, unlike the Greek practice of selecting public oratory on the basis of its forensic ability, the Senate did not consider the relevant experience or qualication of envoys. This was partly because the Senate often chose its own members as a diplomatic envoy. Diplomatic contact therefore remained a non-specialist, part-time pursuit by men who had no training, no proven aptitude for diplomacy, and often perhaps little time to prepare (Campbell 2001, 8). In fact, the Romans did little to create an expert body of trained diplomats. And there is little evidence that the Romans improved on the Greek system (Nicolson 1954). To add to the ad hoc nature of Roman diplomacy, most of diplomatic activities were in response to contingent situations which spontaneously arose within or beyond the provinces. Hence, problems were dealt with, and everything was seemingly negotiated, on the spot often by provincial governors or military commanders, even though their sta lacked no training in diplomacy. Further, it was not unusual that the provincial governors sta was limited mainly to his family and friends. This became more common during the Roman Empire when a crisis developed in the East as the Sassanid Empire of Persia was expanding its inuence (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 13). The importance of diplomacy further declined after the Republic was overthrown and replaced by the Empire after the 50-year period of civil wars. As the Roman Republic transformed into the Roman Empire, the Senate, too, metamorphosed from the primary governing authority with the decisionmaking power to an advisory council. While the Senators continued enjoying their privileged status, the Senate was deprived of its power in the dictatorial decision making and marginalized to a mere symbolic role. Since the Roman Empire did not establish the alternative procedures of diplomacy, the incapacity of the Senate meant that the Roman Empire was not equipped with any central institutions to manage its foreign aairs other than the emperor himself. Nevertheless, the dierence between two regimesthe Republic and the Empireseems to be a matter of degree. There were no designated institutions for the conduct of foreign policy either in the Roman Republic or the Roman Empire. And yet, as Nicolson (1954, 19-22) writes, even during the Republican regime, the Romans were too dictatorial to appreciate diplomatic niceties, and diplomatic envoys from abroad were treated with varying degrees of contumely reecting the self-condence and its military superiority. There is no shortage of episodes corroborating these claims. For one, the Romans often issued a peculiar form of ultimatumthey set a time limit to negotiations with a threat. When Macedonian envoys arrived at Rome in 197 b.c., they 10

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were informed on arrival that, unless the negotiations resulted in agreement within sixty days, they would be regarded as spies and deprived of diplomatic status (Nicolson 1954, 21). For another, the Romans developed the practice of including the hostage clause in treaties as a commitment device. The Romans demanded that hostages be delivered from conquered tribes and nations at the conclusion of surrender agreements. If the terms were violated, the hostages were immediately arrested and treated as prisoners of war (Nicolson 1954, 21-2). Besides the decline of the Senate, the fundamental factor that contributed to the Romans overwhelming reliance on the military in the conduct of foreign policy was its colonial approach. According to Nicolson, once ancient Rome achieved its supremacy, its foreign relations with neighboring countries were conducted from a colonial and administrative, rather than diplomatic, point of view. As noted above, diplomatic transactions were dealt with by military authorities. Hence, it is natural that the Romans approaches were those of the legionary and the road-maker rather than those of the diplomatists (Nicolson 1963, 9-10). These approaches reected the Romanss belief that it is their duty to impose the Pax Romana by crushing the opposition and by sparing only those who surrendered to their dominance (Nicolson 1954, 17). The second potential reason for the underdevelopment of diplomacy is the lack of equal powers (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 13). The immediate cause of the fall of the Roman Empire has been a great source of scholarly interests, and the consensus on this issue is that the heavy reliance on its military capability in managing its international relations had left the Empire overstretched, undermining its governing eectiveness. It is ironic that one of the main reasons for the inactiveness of diplomacy was also the decisive driving force behind the decline of its supremacy and eventually its fall. Inheriting the successors declined military capability, the East Roman Empire could not aord to rely on its military and hence had to rely on diplomacy in order to maintain its territorial integrity. Because of its constant eort to supplement its weakened military with the engagement in diplomacy, the East Roman Empire made a marked contribution to the development of diplomacy. Its practice and institutional characteristics are known as Byzantine diplomacy.

Byzantine Diplomacy: Middle Ages

The next turning point in the development of diplomacy occurred with the fall of the Roman Empire. While Byzantine diplomacy is known for its ceremonial 11

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and sublime aspect as well as its manipulative and cunning conduct of foreign policy, these traits are products of Byzantiums rational response to its unfavorable strategic setting. Specically, because the East Roman (or Byzantine) Empire was not able to rely on the overwhelming military capabilities, the Empire had to resort to diplomacy to achieve two goals. One is to maintain its security by mitigating the risk of war with neighboring powers.14 Another was to maintain its imperial status inherited from the Roman Empire. The primary challenge to the Byzantine Empire was to maintain the status quo relations between itself and an array of surrounding countries that were posing the threat of invasion from almost all quarters. However, the only resource that the Byzantine empire possessed was the legitimacy inherited from the late Roman Empire as the imperial status.15 Diplomatic Manipulation: In order to supplement the deciency of the strong military, Byzantium devised several strategies in the conduct of diplomacy. The key strategy behind such diplomatic eorts that the rulers of Byzantium adopted involved (1) awe and sublime rather than terror or fear, (2) attery and bribery, and (3) intelligence. These strategies were generally designed to manipulate the international security environment by adjusting the incentive structures of the relevant players and by acquiring relevant information. The most evident example of the rst strategy of awe and sublime is the conversion of the Empire to Christianity, which rendered the Roman Emperor a conjugation of divine power (religious) and secular (political) power. With this arrangement, the Byzantine Empire became not only the center of the world (due to its inherited hegemonic status) but also the representative of God. As a consequence, all other political leaders and rulers were forced to be positioned inferior to the Empire, and those who attack the Empire must expect the wrath of God because it was superior to every authority on earth, the only one on earth which the Emperor of all has established (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 15). This tactic can be thought of as a peculiar form of deterrence. It utilized the hierarchical or authoritative structure embedded in Christianity to disincentivize foreign countries from challenging Byzantium. To enhance the eectiveness of this disincentive strategy, the Byzantine rulers expanded their constituents by converting the pagans to the Christian
14 The neighboring rivals included the Slavs, the Turks, the Arabs, and the Germans among others. 15 For a more comprehensive treatment of Byzantine diplomacy, see essays in Shepard and Franklin (1992). See also Hamilton and Langhorne (1995), Neumann (2005), and Nicolson (1963).

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faith (Nicolson 1963, 10). While this concentricity tactic also had the side-eect of providing the religious basis to the diplomatic method, it was essentially part of the larger diplomatic strategynamely, to overwhelm visiting envoys with ashy displays. Hence, the overarching theme of the procedure and practice of Byzantine diplomacy was to impress foreign visitors by displaying the physical appearance of absolute superiority, luxury, and wealth. This included the Byzantine practice of conning foreign envoys on their mission to Constantinople in fortresses where they could not learn anything but to be impressed with displays of military might (Bull 1977, 164). Other aspects of the Byzantian rulers careful attempt to maintain the physical signs of their unique superiority in evidence include sumptuous imperial architecture, the luxurious feast, and acrobatic entertainment (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 15).16 It is in this context that the luxurious ceremonial protocol arose as the standard of diplomatic practice and that Byzantine diplomacy became primarily known for its sublime aspect. The Byzantine inuence on ceremonial procedure of diplomacy was passed on to Venice and Genoa (who were Byzantiums friendly allies due to their commercial connections), which in turn spread the tradition as the Italian System of diplomacy to the rest of Europe beyond the Alps (see the following section for these dissemination processes). A record of diplomatic protocol, the Libro Ceremoniale, was kept by Renaissance Venice, which detailed the exact ceremonies performed for each visiting dignity. This served as a manual for the ritual treatment of future guests. The second diplomatic tactics involved attery and bribery. Bribery and attery played a crucial role in the Empires diplomatic eorts in alliance formation and power balancing, as they allowed the Byzantine empire to directly inuence the incentive structure of the frontier tribes and nations. In particular, this type of strategy involved the purchase of the support of neighboring powers, and the provocation of rivalry among neighboring despots by playing
Another reason why sublime, pompous practices were largely shaped by the Byzantians and Venetians is that diplomatic envoys at the time were self-funded. This left merchants as being sole viable candidates for diplomatic envoys, because they were able to nance their missions from trade (Nicolson 1954, 25) and because they had experience of foreign travels from long-distance Mediterranean trade. However, there are several problems in employing merchants as diplomatic representatives. First, because merchants generally traveled in caravans, they were also too slow for the transmission of urgent messages. Second, no merchants were willing to take a dangerous and lengthy mission; while they could conduct trading business instead. Hence, making money was likely to be too much of a distraction (Nicolson 1954; Wicquefort 1997). Third, the employment of merchants was likely to be regarded as an insult by the prince to whom they were sent (Wicquefort 1997, 50). As a solution to these problems, the Byzantine diplomacy associated honor and symbolic values to diplomatic missions.
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them o each other in order to weaken them (Nicolson 1963, 10). A related strategy involved hostage-taking. Members of the ruling families would routinely be requested to stay on in Constantinople. The Byzantians inherited this practice from the Romans use of hostages as a treaty-enforcement device.17 The third diplomatic tactics was intelligence. The rst two strategies of adjusting rival powers incentive structure were possible only if the Byzantine emperors were fully informed about the preferences, intention, and capabilities of the targeted neighboring countries. This elevated the collection and organization of information to the utmost importance. Importance of Intelligence: Considering the serious deciency of military capability, the diplomats were not expected to play the role of messengers or orators; rather their primary task was to collect and report relevant information on the political situation of neighboring countries as well as the strategic and power relations among them. That is, Byzantine diplomacy primarily functioned as the acquisition and assessment of intelligence information. Recall that in the ancient Near East, the primary role of diplomats was conveyance of messages between political leaders as they were conducting diplomatic negotiation, and that diplomats of Greek city-states were primarily public debaters. Hence, it is worth emphasizing that diplomacy had not fully developed its informational function until the Byzantine Empire systematically assigned intelligence activities to their diplomats. The informational role of diplomats at this stage of the development of diplomacy was not completely separated from the role of espionage or spy. Because the primary task expected of diplomats was to discover the secrets of the courts where he resides, a French diplomatic theorist Abraham de Wicquefort, who witnessed the Congress of Westphalia (Keens-Soper 2001b, 88), once referred to an ambassador as an honorable spy (Wicquefort 1997).18 Until the Modern Age an ambassador simultaneously played the roles of both a diplomat and a spy. These aspects are reected in the governmental agency for Byzantine diplomacy, Skrinion Barbaron (Bureau of Barbarians), which is a ministry in charge of foreign aairs. While Skrinion Barbaron managed both diplomatic aairs and intelligence activity, since its primary task eectively assimilated that of intelligence agencies, it is considered as the rst intelligence agency in history
The similar practice of taking family members of the nobles as hostages was instituted by some of historys notable dictators including the Tokugawa shogunate, the feudal military dictatorship of Japan during the Edo period (1603-1868), and King Louis XIV of France. 18 This phrase also appear in the work of another a French diplomatic theorist Fran cois de Calli` eres, who served Louis VIX as his courtier (Calli` eres 1983, 80).
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(Antonucci 1993).19 The informational role of diplomacy is occasionally emphasized throughout history, as it helps political leaders avoid the expenses of unwarranted wars. Intelligence gathering and assessment concerning the preferences, intentions, and military capabilities of potential enemies were the principle tools of the Byzantine diplomacy, and it saved Byzantium from the cost of war. The Byzantine Empire hardly won a military victory in the last 150 years before the fall of Constantinople in 1453 as it became increasingly decient in ghting capabilities. As theorists recently put it, diplomacy functioned as a way to determine whether the issue at hand was critical enough to ght for (Guisinger and Smith 2002, 176), and this characterization of the informational function of diplomacy was exactly the Byzantine Empires answer to its strategic environment. After all, unlike its predecessors, diplomacy, not military, was Byzantiums greatest strength.

The Italian System: Renaissance Diplomacy

Perhaps the most documented period in the development of diplomacy is Renaissance Italy, in which the rudiments of what we today know as diplomacy rst began to take shape. In particular, the most important innovation in the development of diplomatic institution took place in the Italian city-states during this period. That is, the practice of exchanging resident ambassadors emerged and widely spread among northern Italian city-states in the rst half of the fteenth century, and the practice was institutionalized and became normal across the peninsula in the second half of the century. Harold Nicolson refers to this system of resident ambassadors as the Italian System, which later diused throughout the rest of Europe over the following centuries.20 Strategic Environment and the Treaty of Lodi: The Renaissance was underway in Italy roughly from the 14th century. During about the same period, Italy was constantly menaced by persistent military conict, with Italian city-states engaging in power struggles for the hegemonic control of the
The modern-day equivalent of a ministry of foreign aairs was rst established by Cardinal Richellieu in the eighteenth century. 20 The history of Renaissance diplomacy is still dominated by a single book published over a half century agoGarrett Mattinglys (1955) Renaissance Diplomacy. Mattinglys accounts of Renaissance diplomacy are taken to be standard, or even conventional wisdom. Yet, essays in Frigo (2000) challenges many of Mattinglys theses. For example, the development of resident permanent embassies did not emerge as an assertion of sovereignty as Mattingly claims; rather, they emerged from concerns over sovereignty and legitimation (Fubini 2000).
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peninsula. After an extended period of antagonism and constant warfare in a precarious society, the city-states were awakened by the fall of Byzantine Empire in 1453 to the external threats.21 While the fall of the Byzantine Empire strongly signaled the imminent risk of the expanding inuence of the Ottoman Empire, the Italian city-states were poorly equipped for war against the Turks. The size and capacity of Italian city-states were nothing comparable to those of the Ottoman Empire. In particular, because the source of power and prosperity of most of the city states was derived from commercial activities rather than traditional political authority, they typically lacked the standing army and had to turn to the precarious support of mercenaries. The stark military deciency facing the Ottoman Empires standing army was exactly the same challenge that the Byzantine Empire was confronted with. Hence, in addition to mercenaries, they sought to supplement their weak military with diplomacy (Nicolson 1963, 31). The long years of incessant rivalry and power struggle among the northern Italian city-states during the rst half of the fteenth century also contributed to their vulnerability to external threats. Italy was also harassed by France, as the House of Valois had developed its territorial ambitions towards Italy after successfully unifying the territory of France. Under the threats posed by the Turks and the French, it is natural that Italian city-states then sought out for a system of mutual defense or collective security as their strategy to fend o the external threats and thus turned to diplomatic eorts to manage their alliances. A year after the collapse of the Byzantine Empire, ve great powers in Renaissance Italyincluding Venice, Milan, Papacy, Naples, and Florencecame to peace and concluded the Treaty of Lodi in 1454. This Italian League is a series of treaties eectively agreed on non-aggression and mutual defense between them.22 With the initiatives of Cosimo de Medici of Florence and Francesco Sforza of Milan, this treaty put an end to the period of uctuating realignments and warfare between city-states, including the wars of Lombardy between Milan and Venice.23
For a more detailed description of the politics and international relations in the background of the emergence of Renaissance Diplomacy, see Hale (1957), Mallett (1994), and Mattingly (1955). For a brief overview, see Anderson (1993, Ch.1) and Hamilton and Langhorne (1995, Ch.2). 22 The Treaty of Lodi was primarily concluded between Venice and Milan to compromise peace after the thirty-year period of wars of Lombardy started in 1425. The treaty allowed other Italian states to join the Italian League of peace. Florence, a Milanese ally, was the rst to enter the league, followed by Aragonese Naples and the Papal states. By the end of 1455, all ve Italian great powers, along with other smaller powers such as Lucca, Mantua, Bolona, and Ferrara, formed the so-called Italian League. See Fubini (1995) and Ilardi (1959) for the discussion of the Italian League. 23 Niccol` o Machiavelli, who was born in Florence soon after the the Lodi treaty was signed,
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This treaty ushered in forty years of peace on the Italian peninsula, forming a new but unstable equilibrium, without any major ghting among these great powers, signicant territorial changes, or large alternations in the relative positions among them (Mattingly 1937, 432). This peace was built on the delicate balance of power maintained through constant adjustment of diplomacy. The Renaissance blossomed under the peace and stability brought about by the Treaty. It was under this peace equilibrium that Italian city-states established the system of resident ambassadors to maintain their non-aggression principles. Resident Ambassadors as a Stable Communication System: There were two challenges faced by Italian city-states to establish this system of balance of power.24 First, because the Italian city-states had been in the prolonged warring period prior to the Peace of Lodi, they had to begin with overcoming the mistrust and security dilemma that hindered any cooperation and coordination among them. Some sort of assurance arrangements was needed to accomplish this. Second, this unstable equilibrium of peace among former enemies hinged on the delicate balance of power between them. The city-states, consequently, put a great premium on accurate information, or what Mattingly (1937, 432) refers to as diplomatic alertness on the changing strategic outlook. The survival and prosperity of the Italian city-states hinged on astute calculation of risks and strategic behavior, accurate intelligence on the foreign political events was crucial. That is, they needed a re-alarm that would transmit the alarm when any power threatened to upset the balance (Mattingly 1937, 432). It is against this strategic background that city-states in Renaissance Italy came to institute a stable and ecient network of communication and information transmission. The diplomatic machinery that they devised to do this job was the system of resident ambassadors at permanent embassies in foreign city-states. It is natural that a system of resident embassies were established to meet the demand for stable and ecient communication because the practice of dispatching resident envoys had become very common during the rst half of the fteenth century. Soon after the Treaty of Lodi was concluded, Francesco Sforza dispatched his rst resident ambassador in 1454, followed by
refers to Francesco Sforza, the duke of Milan, in his book, The Prince, as an example of good governance and use of mercenary. 24 For more detailed discussions on the practice of diplomacy beyond the resident ambassadors during the Renaissance, see Bull (1977, Ch.7), Frigo (2000), Fubini (1995), Ilardi (1959), Mallett (2001), Mattingly (1955), and Nicolson (1954, Ch.2).

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other Italian city-states one after another exchanging resident envoys.25 In a nutshell, resident ambassadors were expected to be re-alarms. For the forty years following the Treaty of Lodi, the Italian League utilized the communication system consisting of the network of resident ambassadors and successfully maintain the balance of power among them. Therefore, the role played by ambassadors residing in the capital of foreign countries was as essential as the standing army in the management of the international system of Northern Italy. And it was through this process that the resident ambassador and permanent embassies were established as a key component of diplomatic machinery. Because this type of diplomatic machinery was established by Italian city-states, Harold Nicolson calls it the Italian system of diplomacy. Resident ambassadors and permanent embassies were unprecedented in character. Indeed, the system of diplomatic envoys in ancient Greece were on an ad hoc basis and dispatched to carry out a particular mission with a specic issue. Similarly, the diplomatic messengers carrying the Amarna letters in the ancient Near East were also selected on a temporary basis.26 Sporadic exchanges of diplomatic missions on the ad hoc basis were inadequate among great powers in Renaissance Italy.27 As the frequency and duration of ad hoc embassies intensied, it became clear that it is more practical and more cost-ecient to appoint a resident ambassador to remain at a frequented foreign court. As the external aairs of great powers became increasingly enmeshed in their alliance network with shifting preferences and changing military tensions among them (along with the changing security outlook), the conduct of occasional diplomacy on the ad hoc basis became increasingly dicult (Berridge, Keens-Soper and Otte 2001, 108). As the duration of embassies became longer, the opportunities for gathering valuable information became much greater (Queller 1967, 88). Although information acquisition by resident ambassadors was a very imperfectly developed process, its importance
It is tempting to conclude that the unstable equilibrium of peace among the Italian city-states after the Treaty of Lodi caused the rst exchange of resident ambassadors. In fact, there exist an alternative account of the rst resident ambassador, which claims that Francesco Sforza was the rst to send a resident ambassador to Genova in 1455, following the conclusion of the Treaty. Yet, according to Mattingly (1937), the available document indicates that the rst documented resident ambassador was actually dispatched in 1375 by Mantua to Milan. By the time the Treaty of Lodi was concluded a half-century later, the exchange of resident ambassadors was already considered as normal, or at least desirable, between city-states with alliance ties (Mattingly 1937, 432). 26 However, there is evidence that a same person tended to be selected as a diplomatic messenger in the ancient Near East because of the language necessity. 27 For the circumstance in which the resident embassy was invented and spread, see Queller (1967, 82-83).
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was great in the absence of more technologically advanced means such as jetliners, telecommunication, and news-networks (Queller 1967, 82-8).28 The employment of occasional missions had given way to permanent missions. The Italian system of diplomacy was gradually adopted in other parts of Europe, and over time constituted a foundation for the modern diplomatic system. The irony is that one of the documented catalyst in the spread of this diplomatic machinery to the north of the Alps came when the peace of Lodi collapsed as the Italian city-states were once again thrown into the menace of warfare by the invasion of Charles VIII of France in 1494.29 When Charles VIII invaded Italy, Pope Alexander VI opposed it by forming the Holy League (or, the League of Venice) with the help of the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I, Ferdinand of Aragon (Spain), and his Italian allied states, Venice and Milan, and subsequently repelled the French invasion. The formation of the Holy League was successful partly due to the outstanding performance of Spanish resident ambassadors representing Ferdinand at various European courts (including Rome, Venice, London, Brussels, and Vienna). Impressed with this success, European monarchs came to realize the utility of resident ambassadors and permanent embassies, spreading the Italian system of diplomacy throughout the rest of Europe in the 16th century (Elliott 2002). By the onset of the Thirty Years War in 1618, the spread and formation of resident ambassadors and permanent diplomacy was largely complete, and nearly all European powers maintained permanent diplomatic representatives with all other powers in the sphere of their interests (Mattingly 1955; see also KeensSoper 1973).30 It was the Byzantines who taught the diplomatic practice to Venice, and the Venetians in turn set the pattern for other city-states in Italy (Nicolson 1963, 24). Byzantians utilized intelligence in its diplomatic manipulation. Italians then perfected the system of the acquisition and transmission of political information in coping with the changing security outlook. Over centuries, the Italian system spread throughout Europe in the sixteenth century, and as Wiseman (2005, 411) puts it, resident ambassadors and permanent embassies gave the modern diplomacy its signature. The Thirty Years War had the disastrous eect upon European diplomacy because ambassadors were prone to forget that their function was to make peace, which was envisioned in the
For example, it took one French ambassador two and a half months to travel from Paris to Stockholm in the early 18th century (Nicolson 1954, 59). 29 Charles VIIIs excuse of invasion was that he inherited Naples from the House of Anjou (Angi` o in Italian). 30 Note, however, that because the European courts during this age were not stationary but mobile, resident ambassadors who were sent to a court did not reside at a permanent embassy but they traveled along with the court to which that they was accredited.
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Italian System. Many of them instead ended up engaging in espionage and subversion.

The French System: 17th & 18th Centuries

If Renaissance Italy gave birth to the modern diplomatic system, France in the 17th and 18th centuries perfected it. Absorbing the Italian system of resident ambassadors, a distinctively French approach to diplomacy emerged around the conclusion of the treaty of Westphalia which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648 (Keens-Soper 1973, 490). While the Italian system is chiey characterized as a mechanism for information acquisition and transmission, what Harold Nicolson (1954) refers to as the French System puts emphasis on the art of negotiation and the principles of raison d etat. To be sure, French diplomacy in these centuries diered little from its predecessors of Renaissance Italy and Byzantine Empire in that the responsibility for political and military information as well as diplomatic manipulation through bribery and ceremonial rituals still played a signicant role (Roosen 1970, 316). Nevertheless, the French system carried the evolution of diplomatic institution into a new phase where the art of negotiation was established as one of the diplomatic mechanisms (Keens-Soper 1973, 490; see also Keens-Soper 2001a, 109-113). The French system of diplomacy was rst formulated by Cardinal Richelieu, who served Louis XIII during the Thirty Years War and wrote Testament Politique (Nicolson 1954, 52).31 Richelieus inuence on diplomatic thought and practice was pivotal in the emergence of the French system, which was then later analyzed and stylized by Fran cois de Calli` eres, who served as a diplomat during the reign of Louis XIV and published The Art of Diplomacy in 1716 (Keens-Soper 2001a, 107; see also Keens-Soper 1973, 486-487).32 As French power reached its culmination during the reign of Louis XIV in the secondhalf of the seventeenth century, its language and culture also had profound inuence on the European courts. With the help of French supremacy, its
Richelieus Testament Politique is based on notes and dictations, and considered to be complied after his death (1642). The st publication of the work was by a press in Amsterdam in 1688. The English translation along with the commentary is furnished by Hill (1961), which I relied on for this study. Henry Bertram Hill. 1961. The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu: the Signicant Chapters and Supporting Selections. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. According to Keens-Soper (2001a, 106), Calli` eres The Art of Diplomacy enjoyed a European reputation throughout the 18th century and was considered essential reading in the training of diplomats for a substantial period of time until the 19th century, along with Wicquefort (1997)s The Embassador and His Functions. 32 For a more complete treatment of diplomatic theory advanced by Calli` eres, see KeensSoper (2001a, 1973).
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inuence on diplomatic practice and institution became so predominant that it became the model for all European countries for three centuries until 1919 (Nicolson 1954, 53). Strategic Environment: What did motivate Richelieu to devise distinctively unique approach to diplomacy? What did elevate the French system to the model of modern diplomatic system? The 17th century was a period when fully sovereign states were emerging in the midst of other types of political capacities with substantial, albeit declining, inuence; yet the authority of the older universalist institutions and ideas, such as the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire, were called into question (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 67-8). The Papacys inuence had been declining ever since the end of the medieval period, and so had the medieval principles of the universalitythe principles for the world order, which was sustained by the authority that unied the legitimacy of the Roman Empire (secular, political authority) and the authority of the Christian faith (Catholic, in particular as the divine authority). The Holy Roman Empire never achieved this principle of universality, as it had separated control of the church from control of the government (Kissinger 1994, 57). This imperial failure led to fragmentation of both the Empire and Europe. On the one hand, this failure led to a fractionated Europe, where France, Great Britain, and Spain did not accept the imperial authority. On the other hand, the Empires inability to unify the secular and religious authority eventually led to the Protestant Reformation, which invokes a series of religious conicts and the initiation of the Counter-Reformation. Along with the Counter-Reformation movement, the Holy Empire Emperor Ferdinand II of Habsburg also initiated an oppression campaign against Protestants to revive Catholic universality. This was partly a religious act and partly a political maneuver to establish the imperial dominance in Central Europe, which eventually triggered the Thirty Years War (Zeller 1961, 59). The Habsburgs initiative in this religious campaign also posed a geographical threat to France.33 For Richelieu (in the rst-half of the 17th century), the preeminance of Habsburg Austria was a threat to Frances national security, since it was encircled by the Habsburg inuence on all quarters (Kissinger 1994, 59-60). In the south, there is Habsburg Spain. In the north, the Netherlands was dominated by Spain. In the east, both Alsace and Lorraine were under the inuence of the Holy Roman Empire. Most of the city-states in Northern Italy were also under the inuence of Spain. For Louis XIV (in the second-half of the 17th century), however, the emergence of the Holy Roman
33 For the details of French diplomacy and its relationship to religious warfare in the sixteenth century, see Jensen (1974, 1985).

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Empire as the dominant power on the European Continent was a threat for his aspiration for glories, since the fate of the Holy Roman Empire would determine Frances capability of the eastward expansion (Kissinger 1994, 58; Zeller 1961, 207). Richelieu therefore sought to prevent Habsburg domination of Europe by exploiting the religious conict generated by the Reformation in order to weaken the inuence of the Holy Roman Empire. French System and the Art of Negotiation: What we know today as the French system is a rational response to the strategic environment that French rulers, Richelieu in particular, faced in the midst of the turbulence in the rsthalf of the seventeenth century. The rst distinctive feature of the French system is the art of negotiation. Richelieu was the rst to establish that the art of negotiation constitutes a permanent feature of diplomatic mechanisms. He argues that diplomacy (based on the system of a broad and comprehensive network of resident ambassadors) must do more than the collection and transmission of information, political manipulations, and the conduct of ceremonial ritualsthese were standard diplomatic practices in Renaissance Italy and the Byzantine Empire. In his Testament Politique, Richelieu opens the chapter on the continuous negotiation in diplomacy by noting that States receive so much benet from uninterrupted foreign negotiations . . . it is absolutely necessary to the well-being of the state to negotiate ceaselessly, either openly or secretly, and in all places, even in those from which no present fruits seem likely (Hill 1961, 94). Richelieus emphasis on the use of diplomacy in the management of international relations seems to stem from his beliefs in reason. He writes that reason ought to be the torch which lights the conduct of both princes and their states (Hill 1961, 72). His adherence to reason also echoes his preference for diplomacy over the use of force or coercion, and in Testament Politique he argues that It is much more expedient to lead men by means by which imperceptibly win their wills than, as is more the practice, by those which coerce him (Hill 1961, 72). Although his explanation of the utility of negotiations is extensive, its essence can be stated in a quite simple way: through negotiations one can obtain a better outcome (Hill 1961, 99-101). That is, the rationality of negotiation is such that states are more likely to secure an agreement that all the parties to an issue are better o than unilaterally imposed settlements through military coercion. In the language of bargaining theory, negotiation outcomes are Pareto-superior to any imposed settlement through coercion or warfare. Hence, the rationality is derived not from the mere desirability of negotiated settlements or their normative value, but from the ineciency of military instruments as reliance on force is a costly and risky business. Calli` eres 22

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is more blunt on this point, as he considers war as an expensive and wasteful instrument, or a de esse bien hideuse [hideous goddess] (Keens-Soper 1973, 497). He claims that a small number of [diplomats] with a small expense do frequently as much service as standing armies would be able to do (Calli` eres 1983, 73), while force begets more conict rather than appeases (Keens-Soper 1973, 503).34 Although the origin of Richelieus preference is beyond the scope of this chapter, his adherence to reason and prudence developed in the crucible of the tragic consequence of the Thirty Years War. The series of religious wars expanded to Continent-wide power struggles, entangling European major powers. In its aftermath, the War devastated Central Europe and Germany lost almost one third of its population (Kissinger 1994, 59).35 There are two machineries of diplomatic negotiation that Richelieu spelled out in his argument for its utility. First, the most obvious fact about a negotiation is that it is about the art of concession and counter-concession, or trading of concessions (Kissinger 1994, 744). Calli` eres chapter on negotiation, therefore, reects this view of Richelieu: if diplomacy is to work, compromise is essential, and hence it is a political necessity that states must act by persuasion and by appeal to other states true value of moderation (Keens-Soper 1973, 503). This principle implies that if a concession oer is divulged to the public, the negotiation may have to be abandoned to avoid a domestic repercussion (Nicolson 1954, 76). Furthermore, if negotiations remain private, negotiators could remain both rational and courteous and, thus, it is much easier to make concessions in private than in the presence of watchful eyes. This gives a rise to the rationale for secrecy in diplomatic negotiation, and it seems that this rationale was well recognized by Louis XIV whose abiding principle was that negotiation must remain as condential as possible (Nicolson 1954, 61). Nicolson (1954, 76) also notes that M. Jules Cambon, perhaps the best professional diplomatist of this century, wrote, The day secrecy is abolished, negotiation of any kind will become impossible. Second, observe that what is distinct about Richelieus calls for diplomatic negotiation is its emphasis on the continuation of conducting negotiations with foreign countries. He notes that diplomacy should be ceaselessly pursuing achievement of agreement on all outstanding questions (Berridge 2001, 74).
Richelieu also writes that The payos from continuous diplomacy are very uncertain, but they must not be ignored (Hill 1961, 100). As I shall demonstrate in Chapter 5, diplomatic negotiation does not carry much information compared to military coercion. Yet, as Richelieu claims, uncertainty surrounding diplomatic negotiation should not encourage bargainers to forego the agreement that diplomacy can produce, which often is Pareto improvement of imposed settlement through coercion. 35 Bueno de Mesquita (2006, 31) notes that the War killed about half of the German population.
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That is, at the most fundamental level, the art of negotiation also involves ne adjustment of conicting interests and frictions. An important implication of Richelieus call for continuous negotiations is that it marks the advent of peacetime diplomacy. Diplomacy of predecessors by its nature was the ex post management of problems in foreign relations. On the other hand, Richelieus diplomatic strategy behind continuous negotiations is the ex ante measures for the prevention of those problems from emerging. Hence, success of such continuous negotiations in peacetime diplomacy may not be readily visible.36 Yet, Richelieu once again resorts to the ineciency of coercion in justifying his emphasis on continuous negotiations: Even if [negotiation] does no other good on some occasions that gain time, which often is the sole outcome, its employment would be commendable and useful to states, since it frequently takes only an instant to divert a storm (Hill 1961, 99). For this reason, he continues, it is absolutely necessary to the well-being of the state to negotiate ceaselessly, either openly or secretly, and in all places, even in those from which no present fruits seem likely (Hill 1961, 94). Hence, state leaders sometimes buy time and continue negotiation at the expense of costly delay in order to divert a dramatic confrontation. Such a maneuver was evident in Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixons handling of a crisis that could have been a second Cuban crisis (Kissinger 1979, 651). : The second distinctive feature of the Rationalism and Raison dEtat French system is raison d etat, or the national interest, which replaced the medieval tradition of universal moral values as a guiding principle of foreign policy. After the collapse of the medieval doctrine for governance, the emerging sovereign states needed an alternative justication or legitimacy in European politics. Against this historical background, Richelieu promulgated that raison d etat, or national interest, would take precedence over any other ideologies or prejudices (Nicolson 1954, 51). Hence, he notes, If national interest demanded an alliance with an obnoxious, even with a heretic, State, then no feelings of what one liked or what one disliked, should be permitted to blur that necessity . . . . In moments of danger one should choose ones allies, not for their integrity or charm, but for their physical or even geographical value (Nicolson 1954, 51). In fact, in the menace of religious conict, Richelieu allied with the
This also implies that continuous negotiations and peacetime diplomacy, therefore, contains the elements of patience. In his words, Dierent nations have dierent characters, some quickly carry out what they have in mind, while others walk with fee of lead. . . . it is necessary to be content with little in the hope of getting more later. For this reason it is wise to negotiate painstakingly with them in order to give them time, and to press them only when they are ready for it (Hill 1961, 97).
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Ottoman Empire. The policy of balance of power is a natural choice of a grand strategy for Richelieu, given the principles of raison d etat along with his desire of maintaining an equilibrium within Christendom (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995). This explains why France did not intervene in the Thirty Years War until the last decade of the War when Spain invaded French provinces of Champagne and Burgundy and threatened Paris in 1636. Instead, Richelieu resorted to diplomacy to manage the crisis situation after the War erupted in order to seek a balance of power within Christendom. Richelieus emphasis on prudence given the raison de etat was most evident in forming an alliance not only with Catholic states but also Protestant states in order to counter-balance against the Habsburgs of Spain and Austria. In particular, he was actively involved in the diplomacy behind the Danish and Swedish intervention into the War against the Habsburgs. (see also Berridge 2001, 72).37 Richelieus pursuit of the balance of power is a natural corollary of his emphasis on continuous negotiations rather than hasty sanctions. In this regard, he writes that It is prudent to hold down the external threat and opponents force with your allies, by putting your hand in your pocket and not on your sword (quoted by Kissinger 1994, 62-3). The balance of power rst was a fact of political practice; later it became a principle or system of Europe for three centuries with several interruptions by warfare.38 The primary machinery of raison d etat and the balance of power was rationalism or his belief in the power of reason. The success of the balance of power requires the ability to calculate power relationships with mathematical precision and constant adjustment to the changing circumstances (Kissinger 1994, 63). While theoretically possible, these theoretical requirements for successful balance of power is dicult to attain realistically. Moreover, a more challenging requirement for the secrets of successful balance of power strategy is the requirement of common knowledge among powers, where ones strategic assessment of the nature of the equilibrium must harmonize with that of other powers. Without common knowledge, the equilibrium may not be achieved. Yet, Richelieu regarded it possible to construct a logic that requires that the things that is to be supported and the force that is to support it should stand in geometrical proposition to each other (quoted by Kissinger 1994, 63).
37 I should add that some argue that the poor economic condition and his problematic relationship with its own military were also responsible for Richelieus reliance on diplomacy, as he could not rely on French military strength alone to attain the raison de etat that he perceived. See for example, Berridge (2001, 72). 38 Major warfare in Europe in this time period include the War of the Grand Alliance in the late 17th century, the French Revolutionary Wars in the late 18th century and the Napoleonic Wars in the early 18th century.

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This conviction is based on his rm beliefs in the power of reason. Richelieu begins the chapter on the importance of reason by the declaration that human behavior is a rational process: Common sense leads each one of us to understand that man, having been endowed with reason, should do nothing except that which is reasonable, since otherwise he would be acting contrary to his nature, [. . . ] It further teaches us that the more a man is great and conspicuous, [. . . ] the less he ought to abuse the rational process which constitutes his being. (Hill 1961, 71) Richelieu was acutely sensitive to the posssibilities of language as an instrument of power (Elliott 1991, 30). His belief in the power of reason led him to establish the Acad emie Fran caise, which was an explicit recognition of the power of language, of the superiority of eloquence and reason over naked force (Elliott 1991, 134). Calli` eres also notes that the pursuit of state interests habitually came to rely on force in the absence of intelligence or prudence (Keens-Soper 1973, 499; Keens-Soper 2001a, 113). Kissinger (1994, 63) notes that Richelieus conviction in reason puts him in the intellectual company of rationalists like Descartes and Spinoza, who thought that human action could be scientically charted. Professionalism and the Ministry of Foreign Aairs: The third distinctive feature of the Fench system of diplomacy was professionalization. By the time the Westphalia Treaty was concluded in 1648, court diplomacy declined and professional diplomats gradually took over the business of diplomacy, which led to the emergence of an autonomous profession of diplomacy, or diplomatic corps. By the 18th century, the extraterritoriality of diplomats had been legally recognized. Like the military and judiciary, diplomats gradually acquired their own distinct characteristics and methods of work (KeensSoper 2001a, 109). With the emergence of professional diplomats, by the time Calli` eres published The Art of Diplomacy in 1716, roughly between the end of the Thirty Years War and the French Revolution, diplomacy emerged as a principle and institution of order, something comparable to a national standing army (Keens-Soper 2001a, 122). As Calli` eres insisted, diplomacy is a necessary, unavoidable, activity essential to the well-being of a state and deserving of recognition as a separate profession (Keens-Soper 1973, 499; Keens-Soper 2001a, 113). The professionalization of diplomatic services was facilitated by the establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Aairs (MOFA) by Richelieu in 1626. Although the rst minister of foreign aairs was appointed in 1589 when Henry 26

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III of France assigned Louis de Revol, one of his four cabinet members, the responsibility of managing his relationships with foreign countries, foreign-policy decision-making and the management of diplomatic services were disoriented as the task of diplomacy had been allocated between dierent bureaucratic organizations (Nicolson 1954, 52).39 The establishment of MOFA concentrated the responsibility of diplomacy such as formulation of policy and the control of diplomatic agents. This was also Richelieus rational response to the problem of moral-hazard arising from the latitude and discretionary power granted to diplomatic missions. Since in the absence of the electric telegraphy diplomatic correspondence traveled no faster than a good rider and a eet of horse, it was not practical to deliver and receive diplomatic messages back and forth between two capitals every time an oer and a counter-oer was made in a negotiation.40 Before the communication revolution with the construction of railways, steamships, and telegraphy in the mid 19th century, therefore, diplomatic missions typically were given a large, if not full, degree of discretionary power representing its government, which is reected in the title of extraordinary or plenipotentiary (Anderson 1993, 118; Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 132).41 The greater the latitude and discretion granted to diplomatic missions, the grater was likely to be discrepancies between their sanction in foreign negotiation and their home governments will and instructions. Richelieu insisted that diplomatic missions should never exceed their instructions, since doing so would give a rise to uncertainty about whether an agreement signed would be ratied and implemented. To enhance the eectiveness of diplomacy, Richelieu concentrated diplomacy to a single ministry, so that each party to a diplomatic negotiation would know if the other party really presented sovereign authority of the sending country (Nicolson 1954, 52).
The post (i.e., the secretary of state for foreign aairs) was succeeded later by Richelieu and Colbert (under Louis XIV) among others. 40 According to Hamilton and Langhorne (1995, 131-2), in the nineteenth century, the average travel time between the United States to Paris was two months; a month between London and St. Petersburg; at least three weeks between London and Constantinople; the best record of travel time from Vienna to London was one week. Furthermore, on its inaugural run in 1883 the Orient Express traveled between Paris and Constantinople in 81 hours (3.5 days). The improvement of the network of railroad improved its travel time to 67 1 2 hours in 1889. 41 Hamilton and Langhorne (1995, 131) provide the following historical anecdote to illustrate the discretion granted to envoys in that age. An American mission dispatched to Paris to negotiate the purchase of New Orleans and the adjacent territory was authorized to spend 10 million dollars. When France oered the whole Louisiana territory for 15 million dollars, the American mission did not feel it necessary to request a further instruction from Washington.
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The past glories of Louis XIVs reign and the successes of French diplomacy during the 18th century gave the French foreign ministry great prestige (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 74). By the beginning of the 18th century, the major powers all had such ocials, who came to be known as foreign ministers or secretaries of state for foreign aairs. As part of his Westernization of the Russian government, Peter the Great also established a MOFA on the French model(Craig and George 1995, 11). Towards the end of the 17th century, as Louis XIV of France replaced the Habsburg of Spain as the leading power, French power reached its culmination along with its diplomatic system. The impact of the French system on the method and practice of European diplomacy was so profound that French gradually replaced Latin as the language of diplomacy during these two centuries (Roosen 1970, 206). While French diplomats used French on their treaties in the 17th century, it was at the negotiations at Utrecht in 1714 following the War of the Spanish Succession that the Imperial diplomats rst employed French in the agreements which they concluded with France. Thereafter, the French language, along with the French system, was adopted by European powers as the standard diplomatic procedure (Zeller 1961, 206).

Spread and Institutionalization: 19th Century

If the modern diplomatic institution was molded by Renaissance Italy and completed in the 17th and 18th centuries as the France system, it was consolidated by the 19th century diplomacy. On the European continent, the Concert of Europe was the manifestation of the French system of peacetime diplomacy. Beyond Europe, the spread of the system of sovereign-state (established by the Westphalia Treaty) was the catalyst of the promulgation of the European diplomatic system in non-European states. The diplomatic system was recognized to be the foundational mechanism for international relations by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The Congress of Vienna was a turning point not only because the diplomatic system was formalized, but also it also set out the Concert of Europe which induced a long peace of the 19th century. Consolidation and The Concert of Europe. Towards the end of the Napoleonic Wars in the early nineteenth century, European powers in the allied coalition against Napoleon were seeking a new system for international order. The coalition began to extend their collective eort beyond the victory of the Napoleonic wars and design the balance of power system because, in 28

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the aftermath of devastation of the wars in the 18th and 19th centuries, they believed that the collision in the war would not produce the peace that would last (Kissinger 1994, 74-9). Consequently, European powers used a series of great power congresses at Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), Troppau (1820), Laiback (1821) and Verona (1822) following the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to achieve (1) the containment of revolution, (2) the maintenance of stability of the European equilibrium of power, and (3) re-establishment of the ancient regime (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 90-2). The resulting system of the balance of power lasted until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 with several interruptions with warfare such as the Crimean War (185-1856). Hence, the Concert of Europe emerged as the wartime allied coalition against Napoleon and it was extended to the peacetime diplomatic system. Above all, the Concert of Europe was a clear manifestation of what Richelieu envisioned as continuous negotiations in the pursuit of stability of an equilibrium between the Europe powers (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 71; Berridge, Keens-Soper and Otte 2001, 72) As one of the earliest successful examples, the Concert of Europe helped to consolidate the French system of diplomacy. Under this equilibrium, the nineteenth century witnessed the continuation of the trend in the evolution of diplomatic institutiona consolidation of the network of diplomatic representation between European countries (Anderson 1993, 103). Spread and New Challenges. The nineteenth century also witnessed the expansion of the geographical scope of European diplomacy not only within but also beyond the European continent. The growth of European colonial inuence in Africa and Asia as well as the grow of international trade began to bring non-European countries into the European diplomatic system (Anderson 1993, 106). Since the commercial origin of the expansion of European system, European relationship to the rest of the world (including the United States) was still largely an economic one based on the increasing volume of international trade. Consequently, the diplomatic representation in non-European countries was born out of the demand for promotion and protection of trade. As a result, the establishment of diplomatic relations did not necessarily lead to an exchange of governmental representatives, as political relations were very much subordinate to commercial one Anderson (1993, 107-9). For example, France tried to save money by accrediting the consul-general in Japan also as charg es aaires in the mid nineteenth century, and Great Britain also hesitant to establish full diplomatic representation for the trading purpose and so the British consuls in Greece, Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria also functioned as diplomatic representation (Anderson 1993, 107-9; Hamilton and Langhorne 29

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1995, 110). This practice was quite common at that time, and there was a sharp growth of European consular representation in non-European, especially Asian, countries. The expansion of the European colonial inuence and commercial trade also led to the expansion of the European system of territory-based sovereignty. This movement from a (semi-)feudal society to a sovereign state was typically accompanied by the accreditation and recognition of the diplomatic representatives of European countries. This was because the creation of diplomatic relations was a conventional procedure to commence the formal recognition and integration in the international society (Strang 1991, 152). 42 The most striking aspect of the expansion of the European diploamtic system is that in the process of transition, no countries formally repudiated the system; they all accepted its rules and practice, although the process may not have been smooth with some tensions in some instances.43 However, some diculty arose in the establishment of diplomatic relations with non-European countries. One of such diculties faced by political leaders is that those newly incorporated countries often did not share the customs or culture of European countries.44 Since European countries generally enjoyed the homogeneity of their historical and cultural background, the European diplomatic system functioned well with the implicit reliance on such unwritten shared norms. Yet, newly integrated non-European countries do not share aristocratic ethos and culture, on which European diplomatic system, the ceremonial procedures and precedence protocols in particular, was based. Rules of games are generally implicit but common knowledge in a society with homogenous cultural, historical, and political background; in a heterogenous society, however, rules are not common knowledge unless they are explicitly codied.
42 For a more detailed analysis of the spread of diplomacy to the non-Western world, see Bull and Watson (1984, esp. 1-9), Nicolson (1954, Ch.4), Sofer (1988), Strang (1991), and Watson (1982, Ch.11). 43 The noticeable exceptions to this rule was the rejection of the European system of diplomacy by the two superpowers in the post-WWII era: the United States and the Soviet Union. Their animosity towards diplomacy eventually led to the equilibrium of fear as the new world order induced by overwhelming military capabilities and to the decline of diplomacy in the twentieth century. 44 Other diculties concerned the legitimacy of the local governments and the political instability of the region. In Asia, for example, the local political powers were reluctant to open their countries to foreign inuences. Moreover, political structures and social values in China was not easily be reconciled with the sovereignty principle which emphasizes the concept of the equality of sovereign powers along with clearly dened territorial boundaries (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 110).

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Institutionalization and standardization. To cope with the problem of non-European countries not being accustomed to the implicit rules and norms, diplomatic leaders moved on to formally codifying the practices and procedures of diplomacy. These gave rise to the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and, over a century later, Vienna Conventions in 1961 and 1963 that codied the rules of the diplomatic game in the face of a massive entry of new states into the diplomatic system. These treaties formalized the rule of the diplomatic game that we can observe today (Stearns 1996, 12). First, the European countries at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 agreed on r` eglements of Vienna (1815), which determined the regulations specic diplomatic rules and practices, such as diplomatic privileges and immunities and the seating order and arrangements for diplomatic representatives (B atora 45 2003; Stearns 1996). Along with supplementary agreement Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, it also determined the rules regarding precedence among diplomatic envoys in accordance with the doctrine of the equality of sovereign powers, which regulates the ranks and title of diplomatic representatives. Formally recognized diplomatic ranks are (1) Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, (2) envoys and minister (both with the title of extraordinary or plenipotentiary) or other agents accredited to a sovereign, and (3) Charg e dAaires or other agents accredited to ministers of foreign aairs. Consular ocials (such as consuls-general and consuls-resident) are not political representation. Second, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations in 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in 1963 both codied the modern (European) bilateral diplomatic practices for the whole international society including new states that recently gained independence from European colonial controls. These treaties were signed by countries from all political blocs, which helped to clear any doubts and uncertainty about the acceptances of the traditional rules of the diplomatic game in the age of the Cold War.
The rules regarding the seating arrangements were actually formalized in the supplemented agreement three years later. Although this issue might seem trivial and inconsequential, it actually has had an impact on the success and failure of diplomatic negotiations. A notable example is the Potsdam Conference in 1945. They were not able to begin diplomatic negotiation because they failed to agree on who should enter the conference room rst among Stalin, Churchill and Truman. This dispute was settled with the agreement that these three gures enter simultaneously from three dierent doors (Morgenthau 1973, 82).
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Decline of Diplomacy? 20th Century and Beyond

Both critics and practitioners note that the role of diplomacy in international politics has declined in the twenties century (e.g., Bull 1977; Hook 2003; Morgenthau 1973; Nicolson 1954; Nicolson 1963; Watson 1982; Wiseman 2005). In the years following the Second World War, Morgenthau (1973, 525) observed that diplomacy no longer performs the role, often spectacular and brilliant and always important, that it performed from the end of the Thirty Years War to the beginning of the First Word War. There are two momentums in the decline of modern diplomatic system: (1) the ideological turn in the international order after the First World War; and (2) the superpower rivalry and their distrust and militarization of diplomacy after the Second World War.46 Ideological Turn and New Diplomacy after WWI: Towards the end of World War I, two rising powers has emerged into the center stage of international politics as new great powers. While these two new great powersthe United States and the Soviet Unionwill inuence the course of world politics in the second-half of the twentieth century in a signicant way, their emergence also profoundly inuenced the system of diplomatic institutions in the wake of World War I. In particular, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union simultaneously promulgated the principles for New Diplomacy, which denied the old European diplomatic practice and institution, while introducing ideology as one of the primary guiding principles of statecraft. After the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917, the new Soviet government (the Council of Peoples Commissars, or Sovnarkom ) issued a decree on peace, which proclaimed a new diplomacy even before Wilsons fourteen points. The decree demanded, among others, a just and democratic peace, the end of secret diplomacy, transparency in the conduct of all future negotiations, and publication of the secret treaties in the Russian archives. This in fact was the Soviets vision for the post-WWI world order, addressed rstly to all belligerent peoples and only secondly totheir governments (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 150). In particular, it was meant to serve to reinforce Bolshevism in Russia and to ignite revolution in other countries.
Morgenthau (1973, 525-540) lists ve factors responsible for the decline of diplomacy: (1) the advancement of communication technology; (2) depreciation of diplomacythe belief that the diplomatic services not only contribute nothing to the cause of peace, but actually endanger it; (3) conference diplomacy; (4) the nature of the power relations between the superpowersthe United States and the Soviet Unionduring the Cold War; and (5) the publicity of diplomacy.
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About a few months after Bolsheviks decree on peace, another emerging great power, the United States, also advanced its vision for the postWWI world order. President Woodrow Wilson delivered a speech before the Congress, in which he listed the fourteen points of his vision for how the First World War is to be ended and how the post-war world order will be designed. The signicance of the fourteen points in terms of the evolution of diplomatic institution is that this calls for democratization of diplomacy. In particular, there were two aspects to it: Open diplomacy and conference diplomacy. Among the fourteen points, the rst proclaimed Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. Along with Bolshviks call for transparent diplomacy, this point demands the end of secrecy in the conduct of diplomacy. Wilson saw secret alliances as being a primary cause of the catastrophe of WWI. In fact, secret oensive alliance networks on the eve of World War I and some secret clauses in alliance treaties more or less functioned as paths of the expansion of a regional tension (between Austria-Hungary and Serbia) into a world war. Another relevant point was the last point which demanded the creation of a general association of nations among great and small states alike. This of course would soon be materialized as the League of Nations, it also meant the conduct of diplomacy by parliamentary procedures, or conference diplomacy.47 Also reecting his another principle on self-determination of nations, the call for conference diplomacy implies every powersmall or great has an equal power and right in the decision-making in the new world order, putting an end to the monopoly of world politics by bilateral diplomacy among great powers. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919-1920 gave New Diplomacy an instant recognition and applaud around the world. Coupled with strong reaction against the aristocratic culture of pre-war European diplomacy and the advent of the mass democracy after the war, the principles for New Diplomacy, in particular Wilsons fourteen points, have gained the popularity especially among the world public opinion. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919-1920 was the rst international conference adopted New Diplomacy as the organizational principle. The emergence of new diplomacy also marked the shift of the diplomatic language from French to English (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995, 157). Although New diplomacy was envisioned to replace old diplomacy, its failGilbert (1951) claims that a call for open and democratic diplomacy did not rst emerge after the First World war, but the so-called New Diplomacy can be traced back to the 18th century.
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ure became immediately obvious at the Conference, and there were substantial skepticism about the eectiveness of its mechanisms among delegates and critics alike. Even Woodrow Wilson was not an exception to this rule. While Wilsons rst point called for open covenants, openly arrived at, the reality of the Conference was such that Open covenants, secretly arrived atnamely, the bulk of the negotiations at the Conference was conducted among the great powers behind the closed door; it was open only in terms of the result. So, the process of diplomatic negotiations remained private, although the outcome of the negotiations were open to the public and subject to political accountability. Not only the diplomatic procedures and mechanisms advocated by New Diplomacy proved ineective at the Paris Peace Conference, but also the new world order and peace envisioned by New Diplomacy failed as the security regime arranged by the League of Nations proved to be dysfunctional and collapsed in 1930s. The irony is that because even though New Diplomacy, which was born out of the criticism and denial of Old Diplomacy, collapsed without establishing an alternative diplomatic system, diplomatic system itself was undermined. Hence, the decline of diplomacy in the rst-half of the twentieth century is primarily associated not so much with the decline of Old Diplomacy as with the failure of New Diplomacy. This led any authors to blame the decline of diplomacy on the criticism against old diplomatic system (Morgenthau 1973; Nicolson 1963; Watson 1982). Yet, even though the practice of modern diplomacy was heavily damaged, its central institutions survived the rst momentum of the decline of diplomacy in the twentieth century. In fact, while the post-WWI international system witnessed the dramatic increase of the number of states partially due to Wilsons 5th point on the right of every nations (including colonies) to self-determination, none has formally repudiated the system (Bull 1977, 171). Hedley Bull notes that The remarkable willingness of states of all regions, cultures, persuasions and stages of development to embrace often strange and archaic diplomatic procedures that arose in Europe in another age is today one of the few visible indications of relevance of diplomatic institutions (1995, 171). Superpowers Distrust in Diplomacy: The role of diplomacy in statecraft has been seriously marginalized in the second-half of the 20th century primarily because two superpowers, who has provided the framework for the world order in the post-WWII era, distrusts the diplomatic mechanisms. Hans Morgenthau (1973, 525-31) points out the eclipse of diplomacy during the Soviet-American Cold War. 34

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After the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, L eon Trotsky was named the rst Peoples Commissar for Foreign Aairs, and Soviet diplomacy began with Trotsky; and Trotsky began by abolishing diplomacy since for him diplomacy was part of the capitalist superstructure, like the national state (von Laue 1994, 235). While the Russian diplomatic service has a long tradition and numerous brilliant achievements, the Bolsheviks destroyed the traditional Russian diplomatic service during the 1917 Revolution Morgenthau (1973, 529). In particular, because of the manner in which Bolshevik seized power and its revolutionary nature, the Soviet Union nd it dicult to maintain the adequate instruments for diplomatic services. Moreover, the sta of the former Russian ministry of foreign aairs resisted the Bolshevik takeover and its rst Commissar Trotsky, who denied their expertise and experience, and did not stay with Commissariat for Foreign Aairs. As Hamilton and Langhorne (1995, 149) observe, only ten of the former Russian diplomatic representatives were prepared to take instructions from Trotsky and several of them worked actively against the Bolshevik regime. The hostility with other countries and its own isolationism prevented the Soviet Union from maintaining normal diplomatic relations Morgenthau (1973, 529). The other superpower during the Cold War, the United States, also witnessed its leaders fundamental distrust of diplomacy. Historically, American disregard for diplomacy appears to have deep roots in its political culture, for early leaders dismissed the practice of diplomacy as a collusive game played by monarchs, priests, and feudal despots (Hook 2003). George Washington, for example, at his farewell speech as the president, criticized the European style of diplomacy. Likewise, Thomas Jeerson, the rst secretary of state, also dismissed eighteenth-century diplomacy as the pest of the peace of the world, as the workshop in which nearly all the wars of Europe are manufactured (Rubin 1985, 3). Hamilton and Langhorne (1995, 114) note that despite the considerable achievements made by the American diplomatic representatives, including successful negotiations of trade treaties and alliances as well as the purchase of Lousiana, diplomacy was widely perceived by Americans as being of little relevance because of its distance from European politics. This skepticism among Americans is rooted in the historical American principle of isolationism and concern about diplomacys aristocratic European connotations (Wiseman 2005, 415). The Monroe Doctrine formalized Americas minimalist approach to diplomacy, which essentially reected George Washingtons strategy to exploit the detached and distant geographical position of the United States (Hook 2003, 24; see also Kissinger 1979, 58-59). In Hans Morgenthaus (1973, 529) words, From the Jacksonian era on, the eminent qualities of American diplomacy disappeared as the need for them seemed dis35

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appear, and specially since when Roosevelt left the government, there was no man or group of men capable of creating and operating that intricate and subtle machinery by which traditional diplomacy had given peaceful protection and furtherance to the national interests. The American distrust and skepticism of diplomacy has surfaced American strategies for national security at least on two dimensions. The rst manifestation of the skepticism toward diplomacy is the American practice of the no-talks-with-enemies principle. One of the key norms of modern diplomatic system is that diplomatic representation and communication is maintained even if states a in a hostile relationship (Wiseman 2008). At least since the 17th century when the modern diplomacy was established, resident ambassadors were forced to leave only when war broke out (Roosen 1970, 317). The United States historically tended to reject this talk-to-theenemy norm (Wiseman 2008). To be sure, the U.S. maintained a diplomatic talk with the Soviet Union as is evident by George Kennans report. Yet, the U.S. also has refused to established diplomatic relations with some of its major adversaries: after the Bolshevik Revolution, the U.S. did not recognize the the Soviet government until 1933 because of their ideology; refused to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China after 1949 until the Nixon visit because of the ideology; Cuba under Castro due to ideology; Vietnam after 1975 until 2000; Libya under Qadda until 2003 due to his revolutionary behavior and WMD program; Iran after the 1979 Revolution and the hostage incident;, and North Korea ever since its inception. According to Berridge (2004), Dean Acheson did not believe in talking: Faced with what [Acheson] regarded as a menacing threat he had little or not time for talks with the adversary and John F. Dulles used diplomatic recognition (or the lack thereof) as a political instrument to isolate its enemies from diplomatic contact, diminish their prestige, bolster the moral of their local rivals. The second manifestation of the American distrust in diplomacy is its reliance on coercive instruments and militarization of diplomacy. The mechanism for the international stability during the Cold War was the equilibrium of fear, induced by overwhelming military capabilities. As I discussed in Chapter 1, the advent of nuclear weapons profoundly aected both the strategic thought and the national security strategy and coercive diplomacy, or what Thomas Schelling (1966) refers to as The Diplomacy of Violence because the primary idiom of American foreign policy. That is, as Kissinger notes, diplomacy has become coercive diplomacy, which signies the fact that diplomacy had become the complement to war rather than remaining an alternative to it (Kissinger 1956, 352-4). The reliance on military establishment for the conduct of foreign aairs is well documented by contemporary critics. American diplo36

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matic representation has functionally been shifting away from ambassadors and embassies, relying on its military generals to carry out foreign policy (e.g., Bacevich 2002; Johnson 2004; Johnson and Caruson 2003; Priest 2003; and Wiseman 2005). The disproportionate weight on military instruments and the substitution of military generals and soldiers for diplomatic missions remind us of the Roman Empires practice of diplomacy, as I discussed earlier in this chapter. On one evening at the reception celebrating his departure from his ambassadorial position for the president of the United Nation Assembly, Jan Eliasson, a Swedish ambassador to the United States, made the following remarks : We love this city, its enormous vibrancy and excitement. You have here, modern-day Rome. Washington, the capital of the superpower of the world. This city has volcanoes under it hat sometimes explode (Shaw 2006, 3) Ambassador Eliassons remark, albeit unintentionally, testies the remarkable similarity between the United States and the Roman Empire, which is made starkly clear by another U.N. ocial. That is, a former UN general Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1999, 198) says, The Roman Empire had no need for diplomacy. Nor does the United States. The irony here is that Eliasson himself is a diplomat. It is ironic because he was drawing attention how marginalized his profession, diplomacy, is in the conduct of foreign policies of the superpower of the world.

10

Back to the Future? The 21st Century & Beyond

In lieu of a conclusion to this chapter, I close this chapter with an attempt to place recent American diplomacy in the historical perspective. George W. Bush kicked o the twentieth rst century, and his foreign policy especially after the 9/11 is often criticized for the neo-conservative bent, his approach to diplomacy (or the lack thereof) is hardly a recent phenomenon or unique to his presidency. Rather, the Bush approach is, in a sense, very American since it subscribes to the American tradition of the no-talk-to-enemy and the militarization of diplomacy. This makes George W. Bush a true heir of orthodox American diplomacy. It is just that American tradition of diplomacy took a more ideological turn under George W. Bush after 2001 (Wiseman 2005, 415).

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The presidential race in 2008 for the succession of the Bush administration witnessed each of the three contenders taking a very representative view on diplomacy. The Republication candidate, John McCains foreign policy position emerged, through a series of Presidential debates with the Democratic candidate Barak Obama, as a stylized version of Bushs foreign policy tradition. Hilary Cliton, Obamas Democratic Primary rival, argue, during the presidential campaign, that I believe in coercive diplomacy. I think that you try to gure our how to move bad actors in a direction that you prefer in order to avoid more dire consequences. . . . We have used the threat of force to try to make somebody change their behavior.48 Clearly, Clintons approach to diplomacy echoes the Cold War style of coercive diplomacy. Lastly, Barak Obamas foreign policy emphasizes the use of diplomacy, including diplomatic talks with adversaries, which John McCain criticizes as dangerous and naive. It is true that Obamas approach is new to American diplomacy and hence raised received various criticisms. But at the same time, his approach is very consistent with European Old diplomatic system that has been developed over the course of the history of modernization and enlightenment. In this sense, Barak Obamas presidency might bring American diplomacy into the new future of the Back to the Future.

11

Conclusion

Diplomacy has evolved through multiple paths as political leaders responded to particular strategic problems at various historical junctures. The natural history in this chapter shows that the meaning and function of diplomacy, therefore, takes many dierent forms. The multifaceted nature of diplomatic institution is a natural consequence of its development that traverses the history of (mostly) European inter-state politics. What emerges out of this natural history is a clear pattern in the origin and the evolution of diplomatic institutions: diplomacy has developed as institutional solution to political and strategic problems. Throughout history, state leaders have responded to various political and security challenges with some success and some failures. At times, those responses involved institutional innovations. In historical hindsight, diplomacy can be seen as having evolved as a set of norms and institutions to address various strategic issues at various historical turning points. My analysis in the rest of the book will show
The Democratic presidential primary debate between Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama in Los Angenes, on January 31, 2008. The text retrieved at www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/01/31/dem.debate.transcript. Accessed on February 4, 2008.
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that for the most part the logic of diplomacy is embedded in enduring features of these diplomatic institutions and norms. The analysis therefore provides a more analytical landscape to the otherwise seemingly irrational aspects of diplomatic institutions that we reviewed in this chapter.

References
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Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order In World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Bull, Hedly and Adam Watson. 1984. The Expansion of International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Calli` eres, Fran cois de. [1716] 1983. The Art of Diplomacy [De la Mani` ere de N egocier avec les Souverains]. Trans. H.M.A. Keens-Soper and Karl W. Schweizer. New York: Holmes & Meier. Campbell, Brian. 2001. Diplomacy in the Roman World (c.500 BC-AD 235). Diplomacy & Statecraft 12 (March): 122. Cohen, Raymon. 2001. The Great Tradition: The Spread of Diplomacy in the Ancient World. Diplomacy & Statecraft 12 (March): 2338. Cohen, Raymond. 1995. On Diplomacy in the Ancient Near East: The Amarna Letters. Diplomacy & Statecraft 2 (February). Cohen, Raymond and Raymond Westbrook. 2000. Amarna Diplomacy: the Beginnings of International Relations. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Constantinou, Costas M. 1996. On the Way to Diplomacy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Craig, Gordon A. and Alexander L. George. 1995. Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems for Our Time. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press. Doyle, Arthur Conan. 1904. The Adventure of the Second Stain. Strand Magazine 28 (December): 116. Elgavish, David. 2000. Did Diplomatic Immunity Exist in the Ancient Near East? Journal of the History of International Law 2 (July): 7390. Elliott, John. H. 1991. Richelieu and Olivares. Canto ed. New York: Cambridge University Press. Elliott, John. H. [1963] 2002. Imperial Spain 1469-1716. 2nd ed. London: Penguin. Frigo, Daniela, ed. 2000. Politics and Diplomacy in Early Modern Italy: The Structure of Diplomatic Practice, 1450-1800. New York: Cambridge University Press. 40

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