GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs. CITY TREASURER and CITY ASSESSOR of the CITY OF MANILA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 186242 December 23, 2009 FACTS: Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) owns or used to own two parcels of land located at Katigbak, Manila (Katigbak property), and at Concepcion cor. Arroceros Sts., Manila (Concepcion-Arroceros property). Both the GSIS and the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila occupy the ConcepcionArroceros property, while the Katigbak property was under lease. On September 13, 2002, the City Treasurer of Manila Informed the GSIS President and General Manager Garcia of the unpaid real property taxes due on the aforementioned properties for years 1992 to 2002, broken down as follows: (a) PhP 54,826,599.37 for the Katigbak property; and (b) PhP 48,498,917.01 for the Concepcion-Arroceros property. The letter warned of the inclusion of the subject properties in the scheduled October 30, 2002 public auction of all delinquent properties in Manila should the unpaid taxes remain unsettled before that date. On September 16, 2002, the City Treasurer of Manila issued separate Notices of Realty Tax Delinquency for the subject properties, with the usual warning of seizure and/or sale. On October 8, 2002, GSIS, through its legal counsel, wrote back emphasizing the GSIS exemption from all kinds of taxes, including realty taxes, under Republic Act No. (RA) 8291. GSIS claimed that the Katigbak property, been leased to and occupied by the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC), which has contractually bound itself to pay any realty taxes that may be imposed on the subject property; and the Concepcion-Arroceros property is partly occupied by GSIS and partly occupied by the MeTC of Manila. ISSUE: Whether petitioner is exempt from the payment of real property taxes on the property it leased to a taxable entity? HELD: YES. GSIS is an instrumentality of the National Government and not a GOCC, since its capital is not divided into unit shares and it has no members to speak

of. Its management is entrusted to a Board of Trustees whose members are appointed by the President. The leased Katigbak property shall be taxable pursuant to the beneficial use principle under Sec. 234(a) of the LGC. The tax exemption on the property of the Republic or its instrumentality carries ceases only if, as stated in Sec. 234(a), beneficial use thereof has been granted, for a consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person. GSIS, as a government instrumentality, is not a taxable juridical person. GSIS, however, lost in a sense that status with respect to the Katigbak property when it contracted its beneficial use to MHC, doubtless a taxable person. Thus, the real estate tax assessment over the subject Katigbak property is valid but the taxable entity having beneficial use of leased property is liable for real property taxes. Being in possession and having actual use of the Katigbak property, MHC is liable for the realty taxes assessed over the Katigbak property. Moreover, MHC has obligated itself under the GSIS-MHC Contract of Lease to shoulder such assessment. As a matter of law and contract, therefore, MHC stands liable to pay the realty taxes due on the Katigbak property. Considering, however, that MHC has not been impleaded in the instant case, the remedy of the City of Manila is to serve the realty tax assessment covering the subject Katigbak property to MHC.

JAIME C. LOPEZ, Petitioner, vs. CITY OF MANILA and HON. BENJAMIN A.G. VEGA, Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Branch 39, Respondents. G.R. No. 127139 February 19, 1999 FACTS: The City Assessor of Manila, after obtaining the necessary funds from the City Council, began the process of general revision based on the updated fair market values of the real properties. In the year 1995, the increase in valuation of real properties compared to the year-1979 market values ranges from 600% to 3,330%, but the City Assessors office initially fixed the general average of increase to 1,020%. In September 1995, the City Assessors Office submitted the proposed schedule of fair market values to the City Council for its appropriate action. The Council acting on the proposed schedule, conducted public hearings as required by law. The proposed ordinance was subjected to the regular process in the enactment of ordinances pursuant to the City Charter of Manila. With the implementation of Manila Ordinance No. 7894, the tax on the land owned by the petitioner was increased by five hundred eighty percent (580%). With respect to the improvement on petitioners property, the tax increased by two hundred fifty percent (250%). As a consequence of these increases, petitioner Jaime C. Lopez, filed on March 18, 1996, a special proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the City of Manila Ordinance No. 7894 with preliminary injunction and prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO). The petition alleged that Manila Ordinance No. 7894 appears to be unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Manila Ordinance No. 7905 took effect, reducing by fifty percent (50%) the assessment levels for the computation of tax due. Petitioner contends that the respondent court failed to apply correctly Sections 212 and 221 of R.A. 7160. ISSUE Whether or not the respondent court failed to apply Sections 212 and 221 of R.A. 7160? HELD NO.

The preparation of fair market values as a preliminary step in the conduct of general revision was set forth in Section 212 of R.A. 7160, to wit: (1) The city or municipal assessor shall prepare a schedule of fair market values for the different classes of real property situated in their respective Local Government Units for the enactment of an ordinance by the sanggunian concerned. (2) The schedule of fair market values shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, city or municipality concerned or the posting in the provincial capitol or other places as required by law. It was clear from the records the City Assessor, prepared the fair market values of real properties and in preparation thereof, she considered the fair market values prepared in the calendar year 1992. Upon that basis, the City Assessor's Office updated the schedule for the year 1995. In fact, the initial schedule of fair market values of real properties showed an increase in real estate costs, which ranges from 600% 3,330 % over the values determined in the year 1979. Thereafter, the proposed ordinance with the schedule of the fair market values of real properties was published in the Manila Standard on October 28, 1995 and Balita on November 1, 1995. Under the circumstances of this case, was compliance with the requirement provided under Sec. 212 of R.A. 7160.

ANTONIO P. CALLANTA, GILBERTO M. DELOS REYES, CESAR Q. CONCON, ALMICAR EDIRA, JACINTO PAHAMTANG, ANTONIO V. ABELLANA, APOLINARIO SALARES, JR. and SHIRLEY PALMERO, Petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and CITY GOVERNMENT OF CEBU, Respondents. G.R. Nos. 115253-74 January 30, 1998 FACTS: On December 19, 1991, the City of Cebu simultaneously filed criminal and administrative charges against the Petitioner, officers and staff of the City Assessors Office for violations of Section 106 of the Real Property Tax Code, for gross negligence or willful under-assessment of real properties within the citys taxing jurisdiction and for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for the act of causing undue injury to the City Government by giving private persons unwarranted benefits, advantages or preferences in the discharge of their official and administrative functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence by reassessing the real properties of taxpayers without any authority whatsoever, thereby resulting in the reduction of tax assessments to the prejudice of the city government. Petitioners, denied the charges filed against them. They explained that the acts complained of were done within the bounds of their official duties and functions, citing as their legal basis, Sec. 22 of P.D. 464. That Sec. 30 of P.D. 464 which is the basis of the complaints does not prohibit the Assessor from either correcting from whatever error or flaw he and his deputies may have made. Respondents further alleged that they have not derived any benefit from the adjustments nor caused injury to any party particularly the City Government of Cebu. They explained that the general revision of real property assessments for the City of Cebu has not been completed nor has the City Assessor certified its completion to the Secretary of Justice, thus taxes under these revised tax declarations are not yet due, has not yet accrued, are not yet collectible and therefore, cannot serve as basis for alleged injury. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners acts complained of were done within the bounds of their official duties and functions? HELD:

NO. The act of petitioners in providing the corresponding notices of assessment the chance for the property owners concerned to file a motion for reconsideration and for acting on the motions filed is not in accordance with law and in excess of their authority and therefore constitutes ultra vires acts. Sec. 22 clearly provides three (3) occasions when assessments of real properties may be made by the local assessor. In the case at bar, the second instance gave rise to the revised assessed values for which the property owners subsequently sought reconsideration. Sec. 30 of the same Code is equally clear that the aggrieved owners should have brought their appeals before the LBAA. Unfortunately, despite the advice to this effect contained in their respective notices of assessment, the owners chose to bring their requests for a review/readjustment before the city assessor, a remedy not sanctioned by the law. To allow this procedure would indeed invite corruption in the system of appraisal and assessment. Indeed, the long-standing practice adverted to by petitioners does not justify a continuance of their acts. Whenever the local assessor sends a notice to the owner or lawful possessor of real property of its revised assessed value, the former shall thereafter no longer have any jurisdiction to entertain any request for a review or readjustment. The appropriate forum where the aggrieved party may bring his appeal is the LBAA, as provided by law.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. NELIA A. BARLIS, in her capacity as Officer-in-Charge/Acting Municipal Treasurer of Muntinlupa, substituting EDUARDO A. ALON, former Municipal Treasurer of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Respondent. G.R. No. 114231. February 1, 2002 FACTS: In 1985, the Municipal Assessor and Municipal Treasurer of Muntinlupa, discovered, that Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), misdeclared and/or failed to declare number of real properties, for the period 1976 to 1978. The Municipal Assessor then declared and assessed the subject real properties for taxation purposes and on November 19, 1985 furnished MERALCO their corresponding tax declarations. On September 3, 1986, the Municipal Treasurer issued several collection notices to MERALCO, ordering it to pay the deficiency in the real property taxes. Still, MERALCO did not pay the tax assessed. The Municipality of Muntinlupa sought the assistance of the Bureau of Local Government Finance-Department of Finance (BLGF-DOF), and a number of hearings were conducted with both MERALCO and the Municipality of Muntinlupa participated. On August 14, 1989, the BLGF-DOF issued a LetterEndorsement declaring MERALCO liable to pay the deficiency or delinquent real property taxes claimed by the Municipality of Muntinlupa on the grounds that the properties were not declared for taxation purposes by MERALCO, and that they were not used in a new and preferred industry. On the basis thereof, Municipal Treasurer forwarded a supplemental collection notice to MERALCO, dated October 31,1989, demanding the immediate payment of P36,000,000.00 of unpaid real property taxes. Petitioner alleged that the September 3, 1986 and October 31, 1989 notices were actually tax collection notices and not tax assessment notices. ISSUE: Whether or not the notices were actually tax collection notices and not tax assessment notices? HELD: YES. A notice of assessment as provided for in the Real Property Tax Code should effectively inform the taxpayer of the value of a specific property, or

proportion thereof subject to tax, including the discovery, listing, classification, and appraisal of properties. The September 3, 1986 and October 31, 1989 notices do not contain the essential information that a notice of assessment must specify, namely, the value of a specific property or proportion thereof which is being taxed, nor does it state the discovery, listing, classification and appraisal of the property subject to taxation. In fact, the tenor of the notices bespeaks an intention to collect unpaid taxes, thus the reminder to the taxpayer that the failure to pay the taxes shall authorize the government to auction off the properties subject to taxes or, in the words of the notice. The petitioner is also correct in pointing out that the last paragraph of the said notices that inform the taxpayer that in case payment has already been made, the notices may be disregarded is an indication that it is in fact a notice of collection. The September 3, 1986 and October 31, 1989 notices were actually notices of collection only as contended by petitioner.

ANTONIO TALUSAN and CELIA TALUSAN, Petitioners, vs. HERMINIGILDO TAYAG and JUAN HERNANDEZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 133698 April 4, 2001 FACTS: In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that on December 7, 1981, they had acquired the condominium from Elias Imperial, the original registered owner, for P100,000. The sale was purportedly evidenced by a Deed of Sale which, however, had not and thenceforth never been registered with the Register of Deeds. On October 15, 1985, Juan D. Hernandez, as City Treasurer of Baguio City, wrote a letter to the former owner Elias Imperial informing him that the above described property would be sold at public auction on December 9, 1985, to satisfy the delinquent real estate taxes, penalties and cost of sale, and demanded payment of the sum of P4,039.80, representing total taxes due and penalties thereon. On December 9, 1985, Baguio City Treasurer Juan Hernandez sold the property at a public auction due to nonpayment of delinquent real estate taxes thereon. The property was sold to Respondent Herminigildo Tayag for P4,400 which represented the unpaid taxes. Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint seeking the annulment of the auction sale. Petitioners assert that the tax sale should be annulled because of noncompliance with the requirement of publication prescribed in Section 65 of PD 464 Dismissing the Complaint, the trial court of Baguio City cited judgment that ownership of the condominium unit has been consolidated in favor of Tayag. ISSUE: Whether or not the tax sale should be annulled because of noncompliance with the requirement of publication prescribed by law? HELD: NO. Unlike land registration proceedings which are in rem, cases involving an auction sale of land for the collection of delinquent taxes are in personam. Thus, notice by publication, though sufficient in proceedings in rem, does not as a rule satisfy the requirement of proceedings in personam. As

such, mere publication of the notice of delinquency would not suffice, considering that the procedure in tax sales is in personam. It was, therefore, still incumbent upon the city treasurer to send the notice of tax delinquency directly to the taxpayer in order to protect the interests of the latter. In the present case, the notice of delinquency was sent by registered mail to the permanent address of the registered owner in Manila. In that notice, the city treasurer of Baguio City directed him to settle the charges immediately and to protect his interest in the property. Under the circumstances, we hold that the notice sent by registered mail adequately protected the rights of the taxpayer, who was the registered owner of the condominium unit. For purposes of the real property tax, the registered owner of the property is deemed the taxpayer. Hence, only the registered owner is entitled to a notice of tax delinquency and other proceedings relative to the tax sale. Not being registered owners of the property, petitioners cannot claim to have been deprived of such notice. In fact, they were not entitled to it.

HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF MANILA, respondents. G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994 FACTS The Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance of Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. The City of Manila filed a petition for certiorari and the trial court revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. ISSUE Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is valid as it authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance? HELD YES. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon

did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision. The Secretary of Justice is only permitted to ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to wit, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.

ANTONIO Z. REYES, ELISEO P. OCAMPO and EDITHA ARCIAGASANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE FRANKLIN DRILON and MAYOR JINGGOY ESTRADA (JOSE EJERCITO) OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, respondents. G.R. No. 118233 December 10, 1999 FACTS The Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan, Metro Manila implemented several tax ordinances.On May 21, 1993, petitioners filed an appeal with the Department of Justice assailing the constitutionality of these tax ordinances allegedly because they were promulgated without previous public hearings thereby constituting deprivation of property without due process of law. On June 10, 1993, respondent Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time and reasoned that the tax ordinances in question took effect on September 24, 1992, in the case of Tax Ordinance No. 87, until October 22, 1992, in the case of Tax Ordinance Nos. 91 and 95, and until October 29, 1992, in the case of Tax Ordinance Nos. 100 and 101, or more than thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof when the appeal was filed and received by this Department on May 21, 1993 and therefore not in accordance with the requirements provided for under Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991. According to petitioners, respondent Secretary erred in declaring that they failed to file their appeal on time. Also, they assail Municipal Ordinance Nos. 87, 91, 95, 100 and 101, for alleged failure of the Municipal Council of San Juan to conduct mandatory public hearings. Because of this, they claim the ordinances are inoperative, as though they were never passed. Consequently, no prescriptive thirty-day period to question the validity of the ordinance could toll to bar their appeal to the Department of Justice. ISSUE Whether or not the Secretary of Justice correctly dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time? HELD Section 187 of the Local Government requires that the dissatisfied taxpayer who questions the validity or legality of a tax ordinance must file his appeal to the Secretary of Justice, within 30 days from effectivity thereof. In

case the Secretary decides the appeal, a period also of 30 days is allowed for an aggrieved party to go to court But if the Secretary does not act thereon, after the lapse of 60 days, a party could already proceed to seek relief in court. These three separate periods are clearly given for compliance as a prerequisite before seeking redress in a competent court. Such statutory periods are set to prevent delays as well as enhance the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial functions. For this reason the courts construe these provisions of statutes as mandatory. A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose taxes. The power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support the myriad activities of local government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. Consequently, any delay in implementing tax measures would be to the detriment of the public. It is for this reason that protests over tax ordinances are required to be done within certain time frames. In the instant case, it is our view that the failure of petitioners to appeal to the Secretary of Justice within 30 days as required by Sec. 187 of R.A. 7160 is fatal to their cause.

HAGONOY MARKET VENDOR ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, Respondent. G.R. No. 137621 February 6, 2002 FACTS: On October 1, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, Bulacan, enacted an ordinance, Kautusan Blg. 28, which increased the stall rentals of the market vendors in Hagonoy. Article 3 provided that it shall take effect upon approval. The subject ordinance was posted from November 4-25, 1996. In the last week of November, 1997, the petitioners members were personally given copies of the approved Ordinance and were informed that it shall be enforced in January, 1998. On December 8, 1997, the petitioners President filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice assailing the constitutionality of the tax ordinance. Petitioner claimed it was unaware of the posting of the ordinance. Respondent opposed the appeal. It contended that the ordinance took effect on October 6, 1996 and that the ordinance, as approved, was posted as required by law. Hence, it was pointed out that petitioners appeal, made over a year later, was already time-barred. The Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time, i.e., beyond thirty (30) days from the effectivity of the Ordinance on October 1, 1996, as prescribed under Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal was filed out of time as prescribed under the law? HELD: YES. The appeal of the petitioner with the Secretary of Justice is already timebarred. Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code requires that an appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measure should be made to the Secretary of Justice within thirty (30) days from effectivity of the ordinance and even during its pendency, the effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be suspended. In the case at bar, Municipal Ordinance No. 28 took effect in October 1996. Petitioner filed its appeal only in December 1997, more than a year after the effectivity of the ordinance in 1996. Clearly, the Secretary of

Justice correctly dismissed it for being time-barred. At this point, it is apropos to state that the timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of their legal remedies before competent courts is not a mere technicality that can be easily brushed aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are mandatory. Ordinance No. 28 is a revenue measure adopted by the municipality of Hagonoy to fix and collect public market stall rentals. Being its lifeblood, collection of revenues by the government is of paramount importance. The funds for the operation of its agencies and provision of basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived from its revenues and collections. Thus, it is essential that the validity of revenue measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length of time. Hence, the law provided a time limit for an aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenue measures and tax ordinances.

ALEJANDRO B. TY AND MVR PICTURE TUBE, INC., petitioners, vs. THE HON. AURELIO C. TRAMPE, in his capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, THE HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF PASIG AND THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF PASIG, respondents. G.R. No. 117577 December 1, 1995 FACTS Petitioner Alejandro B. Ty is a resident of and registered owner of lands and buildings in the Municipality (now City) of Pasig, while petitioner MVR Picture Tube, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws and is likewise a registered owner of lands and buildings in said Municipality. On January 6, 1994, respondent Assessor sent a notice of assessment respecting certain real properties of petitioners located in Pasig, Metro Manila. Petitioners through counsel requested the Municipal Assessor to reconsider the subject assessments. Not satisfied, petitioners filed with the trial court, a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to declare null and void the new tax assessments and to enjoin the collection of real estate taxes based on said assessments but it was denied. Respondents argue that this case is premature because petitioners neither appealed the questioned assessments on their properties to the Board of Assessment Appeal, pursuant to Sec. 226, nor paid the taxes under protest, per Sec. 252. ISSUE Whether or not the case is premature because petitioners neither appealed the questioned assessments on their properties to the Board of Assessment Appeal? HELD Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to judicial action can prosper, there is a well-settled exception in cases where the controversy does not involve questions of fact but only of law. In the present case, the parties, even during the proceedings in the lower court on 11 April 1994, already agreed "that the issues in the petition are legal, and thus, no evidence was presented in said court. In laying down the powers of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, R.A. 7160 provides in Sec. 229 (b) that "the proceedings of the Board shall be

conducted solely for the purpose of ascertaining the facts . . . ." It follows that appeals to this Board may be fruitful only where questions of fact are involved. Again, the protest contemplated under Sec. 252 of R.A. 7160 is needed where there is a question as to the reasonableness of the amount assessed. Hence, if a taxpayer disputes the reasonableness of an increase in a real estate tax assessment, he is required to "first pay the tax" under protest. Otherwise, the city or municipal treasurer will not act on his protest. In the case at bench however, the petitioners are questioning the very authority and power of the assessor, acting solely and independently, to impose the assessment and of the treasurer to collect the tax. These are not questions merely of amounts of the increase in the tax but attacks on the very validity of any increase. Finally, it will be noted that in the consolidated cases of Mathay/Javier/Puyat-Reyes cited earlier, the Court gave due course to the petitions therein in spite of the fact that the petitioners had not, apriori, exhausted administrative remedies by filing an appeal before said Board. Because there were factual issues raised in the Mathay, et al. cases, the Supreme Court constituted the Central Board of Assessment Appeals as a factfinding body to assist the Court in resolving said factual issues. But in the instant proceedings, there are no such factual issues. Therefore, there is no reason to require petitioners to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in R.A. 7160, nor to mandate a referral by this Court to said Board.

SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE OF CALOOCAN CITY, Petitioner, vs. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN CITY, MAMERTO MANAHAN, ATTY. NESTOR D. FRANCISCO, as City Assessor and City Legal Officer of Caloocan City, and ADORACION ANGELES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121. Respondents. G.R. No. 146382. August 7, 2003 FACTS: Petitioner Systems Plus Computer College is a non-stock and non-profit educational institution and enjoys property tax exemption from the local government on its buildings but not on the parcels of land which petitioner is renting for P5,000 monthly from its sister companies, Consolidated Assembly, Inc. and Pair Management and Development Corporation. Petitioner requested respondent city government of Caloocan, through City Assessor and Administrator, to extend tax exemption to the parcels of land claiming that the same were being used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes pursuant to the 1987 Constitution and other applicable provisions of the Local Government Code. The city government denied the request on the ground that the subject parcels of land were owned by Consolidated Assembly and Pair Management which derived income therefrom in the form of rentals and other local taxes assumed by the petitioner. The petitioner and the Consolidated Assembly and Pair Management, entered into contracts of donations of the beneficial use thereof. The petitioner wrote respondent City Assessor informing the latter of the new agreements and seeking a reconsideration of respondents earlier denial of the application for tax exemption. Nevertheless, respondent city government again denied the application for tax exemption. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the trial court which was dismissed it for being premature. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for mandamus was premature? HELD: YES.

Under Section 226 of RA 7160, the remedy of appeal to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals is available from an adverse ruling or action of the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the assessment of property. The authority to receive evidence, as basis for classification of properties for taxation, is legally vested on the respondent City Assessor whose action is appealable to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, if necessary. The petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative agencies and directly seek redress from the courts even on the pretext of raising a supposedly pure question of law without violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Hence, when the law provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as in the case at bar, relief to the courts can be made only after exhausting all remedies provided therein. Besides, mandamus does not lie against the respondent City Assessor in the exercise of his function of assessing properties for taxation purposes. While its duty to conduct assessments is a ministerial function, the actual exercise thereof is necessarily discretionary. Well-settled is the rule that mandamus may not be availed of to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way, or to retract or reverse an action already taken in the exercise of either.