FIRST DIVISION [ G.R. No. 56627, August 17, 1981 ] CEBU STEVEDORING COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE R. RAMOLETE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, MULTIFARMS AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ASSISTANT CLERK OF COURT NICOLAS F. JOMUAD, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CEBU AND/OR HER LAWFUL DEPUTY SHERIFF FELIPE V. BELANDRES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION TEEHANKEE, Acting C.J.: The Court sets aside the order of respondent judge dated March 16, 1981, denying the appeal of herein petitioner in Civil Case No. R-17440 of that court, and instead ordering the issuance of a writ of execution, on the alleged ground that at the time lawyer Francisco M. Malilong, Jr. filed on behalf of petitioner (therein defendant) the record on appeal, notice of appeal and appeal bond and perfected petitioner's appeal (admittedly five days before the lapse of the 30-day reglementary period), he "had no authority yet from the defendant to appear as its collaborating counsel," said lawyer having filed his formal notice of appearance as such counsel only nine days afterwards. The petition for mandamus is therefore granted and the court is hereby ordered to give due course to the appeal. The entry of appearance of an attorney under section 21 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is merely to enable the officers concerned to effectively serve processes on the attorney of record. The lack of such formal notice or entry of appearance does not render pleadings filed by a new collaborating counsel to be of no legal effect.
On October 11, 1978, herein private respondent Multifarms Agro-Industrial Development Corporation filed a complaint (as plaintiff) for consignation against herein petitioner (as defendant) in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided by respondent judge. After issues had been joined, wherein only a question of law was involved - the proper interpretation of Customs Administrative Order No. 8, series 1974, dated May 27, 1973 - so that respondent court simply required the parties to submit affidavit and counter-affidavit together with their documentary evidence in support thereof, judgment was rendered in favor of herein respondent, to wit: "1. Declaring (a) the liability of the plaintiff to the defendant to be in the sum of P9,783.33; (b) defendant's Invoice No. 4917 dated July 14, 1978 as CANCELLED; (c) the amount of P4,743.33 as validly consignated with the office of the Clerk of Court to be added to the advance payment of P5,000.00 and applied as full payment of plaintiff's liability to the defendant under par. (c) above; 2. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff damages by way of attorney's fees in the sum of P1,000.00; and dismissing defendant's counterclaim for lack of merit. On December 10, 1980, well within the reglementary period to perfect the appeal, petitioner, thru counsel Malilong, filed with the trial court a notice of appeal, stating its intention to elevate the case to the Supreme Court on questions of law. The petitioner thru same counsel also filed on the same date the record on appeal and paid the appeal bond, thereby seasonably perfecting the appeal. On December 13, 1980, respondent filed its opposition to the appeal alleging that the notice of appeal as well as the record on appeal were not signed by Atty. Valentin Zozobrado, the counsel of record and that there was no showing that the appeal bond had been paid. To show that the appeal bond had in fact been paid timely on December 10, 1980, petitioner, on December 19, 1980 filed its notice of filing cash appeal bond, attaching thereto the confirmatory receipt[1] dated December 10, 1980 as issued by the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in lieu of Official Receipt No. 3677371 for P120.00 issued by the Provincial Treasurer's Office to whom the appeal bond was paid, as said official receipt had to be retained by the Clerk of Court. On the same day, lawyer Francisco Malilong, Jr. filed a formal notice of appearance as counsel for the defendant in collaboration with Atty. Valentin A. Zozobrado, the first counsel of record.

After a period of more than two months, or on February 26, 1981, respondent Multifarms filed a motion for execution alleging that judgment had already become final and executory on the alleged ground that ''the defendant was not able to file a notice of appeal and record on appeal within the 30-day reglementary period to perfect the appeal." On March 3, 1981, herein petitioner filed an Opposition to the motion for execution contending, as above stated, that it had timely perfected the appeal on December 10, 1980, well within the prescribed period. On March 16, 1981, respondent judge issued his challenged order denying the appeal and ordering the issuance of a writ of execution on the ground that "while indeed the notice of appeal and the record on appeal were filed on time and the appeal bond was also paid on time, the same were of no force and effect since the lawyer who signed the same was not the attorney of record." Failing in his motion for the reconsideration of said order, petitioner instituted this action of mandamus, praying that respondent judge be ordered to immediately reinstate the appeal, approve the record on appeal and thence forward the records of the case to this Court for review and for the payment of costs by private respondent. As urgently prayed for, a temporary restraining order against enforcement of the challenged order was issued on April 14, 1981 by this Court, and upon receipt of the required comment of respondents, the Court declared the case submitted for decision. The question for determination is whether the lack of a formal written notice of appearance by the collaborating lawyer for herein petitioner, Atty. Malilong, Jr., would affect adversely the validity of the appeal timely perfected by such counsel. Section 2 of Rule 13 provides: "SEC. 2. Papers to be filed and served. -Every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the complaint, every written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment or similar papers shall be filed with the court, and served upon the parties affected thereby. If any of such parties has appeared by an attorney or attorneys, service upon him shall be made upon his attorneys or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one attorney appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side." While the context of the above-quoted provision of the Rules that the formal appearance of an attorney shall be filed with the court and served upon the parties affected thereby clearly indicate that the appearance of such an attorney shall be in writing, the underlying reason for such requirement is that to enable the officers concerned to effectively serve processes on the attorney of record.[2] Accordingly, the fact that no formal written entry of appearance has been filed by a new collaborating counsel or that the same was filed only after he had filed certain pleadings could not seriously affect, much less nullify, the validity of the acts and the pleadings filed by the appearing attorney as wrongly held by respondent judge. (At most, the judge could compel the attorney to file a formal written notice of appearance, in addition to his appearance through the pleadings filed by him.) It has thus been categorically ruled in Ong Ching vs. Ramolete, etc., et al.[3] that "while it may be desirable in the interest of an orderly conduct of judicial proceedings that a counsel for a party should file with the court his formal written appearance in the case, before filing a pleading therein, or mention in said pleading that he is submitting the same in collaboration with the counsel of record, the mere circumstance that such acts were not done does not warrant the conclusion that the pleading filed by such counsel has no legal effect whatsoever." As to Atty. Malilong's authority to appear as collaborating counsel, the following provision of section 21 of Rule 138 reads: "Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. -An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is

required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. x x x." It has been held that as a logical corollary of the presumption that a lawyer is authorized to appear for the party he represents, it is also presumed that the lawyer is authorized by, and has conferred with, his client regarding the case before he files an important responsive pleading for and on behalf of the latter. If respondent judge entertained any serious doubt on the authority of Atty. Malilong even after the latter had formally entered his appearance in writing as collaborating counsel for the therein petitioner, nine days after the perfection of the appeal, respondent judge should have required the said attorney to produce or prove his authority, in accordance with the above-quoted Rule. Respondent judge in ruling that the appeal seasonably perfected by Atty. Malilong on behalf of petitioner was "of no force and effect" notwithstanding that petitioner indubitably proved at the reconsideration hearing that Atty. Malilong had been duly employed as petitioner's legal counsel since February 16, 1980 at P2,500.00 per month, and in dismissing the appeal, manifestly erred and acted with grave abuse of discretion. Respondent judge clearly ignored the oft-repeated principles laid down by the Court that ''(A) rigid adherence to the technical rules of procedure disregards the fundamental aim of procedure to serve as an aid to justice, not as a means for its frustration, and the objective of the Rules of Court to afford litigants just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their controversy. Thus, excusable imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure or lapses in the literal or rigid observance of a procedural rule or non-jurisdictional deadline provided therein should be overlooked and brushed aside as trivial and indecisive in the interest of fair play and justice when public policy is not involved, no prejudice has been caused the adverse party and the court has not been deprived of its authority or jurisdiction."[4] The Court does not look with favor on such disregard of basic rules and principles by the lower courts which needlessly compel the aggrieved parties to resort to the higher courts for redress and take up the time which they could well devote to more meritorious cases, and it will administratively call judges to account therefor in appropriate cases which manifest gross ignorance of the law or incompetence. While the Court has held that it would not hold judges administratively liable for honest errors of judgment, this case can hardly be said to fall within such a category. The Court has noted a common error of trial courts and lawyers in cases of appeals from the Courts of First Instance to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law, of the appellant still filing a record on appeal which is in due course approved and elevated to the Supreme Court, as in this case. Such mode of appeal of filing a Record on Appeal together with the appeal bond and notice of appeal in the Court of First Instance is good only for regular appeals from the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals, and is governed by Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Appeals directly from the Court of First Instance to the Supreme Court as in this case have been governed since September 9, 1968 by Republic Act No. 5440 whereunder the appellant is required to file a petition for review oncertiorari (as in appeals from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, specifically sections 1, 2 and 3 thereof[5]) with payment of the docketing fees and service of copy of the petition on the Court of First Instance - which petition the Supreme Court may forthwith dismiss as "without merit" or "prosecuted manifestly for delay" or raising questions "too unsubstantial to require consideration."[6] Following this Court's established practice where the trial court has nevertheless forwarded to this Court the appellant's Record on Appeal (which is not necessary in direct appeals from the Court of First Instance to this Court on questions of law) and so as to expedite the matter, the Court instead of waiting for the Record on Appeal to be elevated upon respondent judge's giving

of due course to the appeal as herein required, will now require petitioner to file directly with this Court the corresponding petition for review on certiorari of respondent court's judgment of October 27, 1980, and pay the docket and legal research fund fees in the total amount of P53.00 within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof, as hereinabove indicated. ACCORDINGLY, the order complained of is set aside and the respondent court is hereby ordered to give due course to the appeal. As stated in the preceding paragraph, petitioner is granted a period of fifteen (15) days from notice hereof within which to file directly with this Court the corresponding petition for review on certiorari of respondent court's judgment of October 27, 1980 and pay the docket and legal research fund fees. With costs against private respondent. SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION [ G.R. No. L-35830, July 24, 1990 ] FORTUNATA MERCADO, BASILIA CUEVAS MERCADO, SOTERA MERCADO AND TRINIDAD MERCADO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ALBERTO Q. UBAY, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH XXXII, LUCINA SAMONTE AND TRINIDAD M. SAMONTE, RESPONDENTS. MEDIALDEA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners seek to enjoin and restrain respondent judge from further proceeding with Civil Case No. C-2442 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Regional Trial Court) on the ground of lack of jurisdiction to annul a final and executory judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance ofCavite (now Regional Trial Court) in Civil Case No. TM-223. The antecedent facts are as follows: On May 18, 1966, petitioners filed an action for partition with the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch I, docketed as Civil Case No. TM-223, against Antonio, Ely and respondents Lucina and Trinidad, all surnamedSamonte and who are brothers and sisters. On June 27, 1966, the defendants were served with a copy of the complaint and summons thru their co-defendant Antonio Samonte who acknowledged receipt thereof. On July 11, 1966, all the defendants in the above-numbered case, thru counsel, Atty. Danilo Pine, filed their answer to the complaint. Later, on January 4, 1967, the said defendants, thru the same counsel, filed their amended answer. On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Cavite (now RTC) rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and against all the defendants in the civil case, including private respondents. Since no appeal was made by any of the defendants from the decision of the trial court, the same became final and executory and the court issued the corresponding writ of execution. However, before the writ could be carried out by the provincial sheriff, all the defendants, thru the same counsel, Atty. Danilo Pine, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the writ of execution issued by the trial court in Cavite in Case No. TM-223. On July 9, 1971, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On May 27, 1972, respondents Lucina Samonte and Trinidad Samonte brought an action before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC) docketed as Case No. C-2442, for the annulment of the final judgment rendered by the trial court in Cavite in Case No. TM-223, alleging the following matters: that they did not authorize anyone including Atty. Danilo Pine to file an answer in their behalf as defendants in Case No. TM-223, and that the filing of the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the writ of execution in the same case was without theirknowledge and participation. Petitioners motion to dismiss the action was denied by the CFI of Rizal. Thus, the instant petition was filed. The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC) committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in denying the petitioners motion to dismiss the action for annulment of the final and executory judgment rendered by the CFI of Cavite. The applicable law is Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as The Judiciary Act of 1948, which was the law in force when the disputed action for annulment was filed on May 27, 1972 in the CFI of Rizal. This is based on the principle that the facts alleged in the

complaint and the law in force at the time of commencement of action determine the jurisdiction of a court (Lum Bing v. Ibaez, 92 Phil. 799; Rodriguez v. Pecson, 92 Phil. 172;Salao v. Crisostomo, No. L-29146, August 5, 1985, 138 SCRA 17; Tolentino v. Social Security Commission, No. L-28870, September 6, 1985, 138 SCRA 428; Philippine Overseas Drilling, etc. v. Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 55703, November 27, 1986, 146 SCRA 79). Section 44(a) of the Revised Judiciary Act of 1948 then vested original jurisdiction in the Courts of First Instance over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation and an action for the annulment of a judgment and an order of a court of justice belongs to this category (Vda. de Ursua v. Pelayo, 107 Phil. 622). A court of first instance or a branch thereof has the authority and the jurisdiction as provided for by law to annul a final and executory judgment rendered by another court of first instance or by another branch of the same court. This was the ruling laid down in the cases of Dulap v. Court of Appeals, No. L-28306, December 18, 1971, 42 SCRA 537; Gianan v. Imperial, No. L37963, February 28, 1974, 55 SCRA 755 and Francisco v. Aquino, Nos. L-33235-36, July 29, 1976, 72 SCRA 149 which overturned the contrary rulings in Mas v. Dumara-og, No. L16252, September 29, 1964, 12 SCRA 34; J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Torres, et al., No. L24717, December 4, 1967, 21 SCRA 1169; and Sterling Investment Corporation, et al. v. Ruiz, etc., et al., No. L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318). Thus, in an action to annul a final judgment or order, the choice of which court the action should be filed is not left to the parties; by legal mandate the action should be filed with the Court of First Instance. The question is in what place (with what particular court of first instance) the action should be commenced and tried (Dulap, supra). The issue therefore to be resolved in the instant case is not one of jurisdiction but of venue--whether it was properly laid in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the annulment of the judgment rendered by the CFI of Cavite. Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court fixes the venue in Courts of First Instance, as follows: SEC. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance-- (a) Real actions. -- Actions affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies. (b) Personal actions. -- All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. x x x. The complaint filed by respondents with the CFI of Rizal for the annulment of judgment states that they reside atCaloocan City and that petitioners, as defendants, reside at Cavite (p. 48, Rollo). Since the action for annulment of judgment is a personal one, the venue of the action in this case should be either CFI of Caloocan or CFI ofCavite at the election of the plaintiff. Clearly, venue was improperly laid in the CFI of Rizal and respondent judge should have dismissed the action for annulment of judgment on the ground of improper venue. It is significant to state at this point that although the prevailing rule before B.P. 129 was that courts of first instance and their branches have jurisdiction to annul each others final judgments and orders as ruled in Dulap and subsequent cases, fundamental principles still dictate that the better policy, as a matter of comity or courteous interaction between courts of first instance and the branches thereof, is for the annulment cases to be tried by the same court or branch which heard the main action sought to be annulled (Gianan v. Imperial, supra). Moreover, despite the re-examination by this Court of the old ruling in Mas v. Dumara-og, supra, recent decisions still uphold its rationale that pursuant to judicial stability, the doctrine of non-interference should be regarded as highly important in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction (Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, No. L-45825, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 237; Republic v. Reyes, Nos. L-30263-65, October 30, 1987; Parco v. Court of Appeals, No. L-33152, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA).

DECISION

While the foregoing discussion may no longer find any application at this time with the effectivity of BatasPambansa, Blg. 129, enacted on August 10, 1981, which transferred the jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgment to the Court of Appeals, it was deemed necessary if only to bring light and settle the existing confusion and chaos among judges of the different courts of first instance and their branches concerning the application of the old laws on jurisdiction and venue over this kind of action. Probably, this confusion was the underlying reason of the Legislature behind the transfer of jurisdiction over annulment of judgments from the trial courts to the Court of Appeals under B.P. 129. Even if We were to disregard, for the sake of argument, the issue on jurisdiction of and venue in the Court of First Instance of Rizal in the annulment suit, We found, upon perusal of the records, that no sufficient grounds exist to justify the annulment of the final judgment of the Cavite court. Certain requisites must be established before a judgment can be the subject of an action for annulment. A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) it has been obtained by fraud (Santiago v. Ceniza, No. L-17322, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 494). None of the aforementioned grounds was shown to exist to support the annulment action. The contention of private respondents that they were not served with summons in Case No. TM-223 in the Cavite court is untenable. In their memorandum filed with this Court, they admit that they were served with summons thru their co-defendant Antonio Samonte who acknowledged receipt thereof. The receipt of summons is shown by the return submitted by the sheriff to the Court of First Instance of Cavite. Apart from the presumption that the sheriff had regularly performed his functions, records amply show that all the defendants, including private respondents had filed their answer in Case No.TM-223 thru counsel, Atty. Danilo Pine. And when final judgment had been rendered by the CFI of Cavite against respondents and a writ of execution issued by the trial court, the private respondents, thru the same counsel, Atty. Pine even instituted a petition for certiorari and mandamus to enjoin the execution of the judgment of the Cavite court. Respondents now allege that they have not authorized Atty. DaniloPine to appear in their behalf as defendants in Case No. TM-223 or to file the petition for certiorari with the appellate court. Such allegation is devoid of merit. An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client (Sec. 21, Rule 138, Rules of Court). The fact that private respondents had not personally appeared in the hearings of Case TM-223 in the trial court is immaterial. The filing of the answer by and appearance of Atty. Danilo Pine in their behalf are sufficient to give private respondents standing in court. It is hard to believe that a counsel who has no personal interest in the case would fight for and defend a case with persistence and vigor if he had not been authorized or employed by the party concerned. It is obvious that since the appellate court had decided adversely against private respondents in their petition for certiorari, the latter filed the annulment suit for a second chance at preventing petitioners from enforcing the decision rendered by the Cavite court in favor of the latter. It is an important fundamental principle in Our judicial system that every litigation must come to an end. Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be a limit thereto. Once a litigants rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to come back for another try. The prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigations were to be encouraged, unscrupulous litigants will multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of justice (Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, supra; Pacquing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 52498, July 19, 1982, 115 SCRA 117). ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Regional Trial Court) is ORDERED to dismiss Civil Case No. C-2442. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION [ G.R. No. 106094, December 28, 1992 ] PSCFC FINANCIAL CORPORATION (NEW PSCFC BUSINESS CORPORATION), PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. HERMINIO I. BENITO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 132, MAKATI, METRO MANILA, NOTARY PUBLIC ENRIQUE I. QUIASON, AND BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS & MORTGAGE BANK, RESPONDENTS.

respondent denied that petitioner availed itself of the Home Financing Plan including the agreement that the maturity of the debt would depend on the resale of the mortgaged subdivision lots. On 8 August 1988, petitioner made a second request for admission on respondent Banco Filipino impliedly objecting to the first reply having been made by its lawyer, Atty. Fortun, who was not even an attorney yet when Banco Filipino inaugurated its financing plan in February 1968 and therefore did not have personal knowledge of the financing scheme. The second request called on Banco Filipino to admit that it did not send a formal notice of its intention to foreclose the mortgage and that there was no publication of the notice of foreclosure in a newspaper of general circulation. By way of response made 26 August and 4 November 1988, respondent Banco Filipino objected to the matters requested on the ground of irrelevancy and ?????ied all the rest. In its motion of 7 November 1988 petitioner asked the trial court for a ruling that the matters sought to be admitted in its second bid for admission should be considered as impliedly admitted when the answer was made by a lawyer who was not qualified to do so as he had no direct and personal knowledge of the matters sought to be admitted. In insisting that only a client could make a binding admission in discovery proceedings, petitioner cites Koh v. IAC.[2] It even went to the extent of quoting in its petition, found on pages 15-16, certain paragraphs supposedly taken therefrom which are not actually found therein, except the last paragraph which states: "x x x x All the parties are required to lay their cards on the table so that justice can be rendered on the merits of the case." In any case, the lower court was not persuaded, so that petitioner went to the Court of Appeals maintaining that there was a tacit admission of the matters included in its second request for admission as the answer thereto was signed only by Atty. Fortun who had no personality to do so. The appellate court sustained the trial court; hence, this instant recourse. Petitioner submits that the answer to the request for admission under Rule 26 should be made by the party himself and nobody else, not even his lawyer. Consequently, failure of respondent Banco Filipino, upon whom the call for admission was served, to render the required sworn statement would constitute an implied admission of the facts sought to be admitted. Thus, it must be the party itself who must respond to the request for admission and that a mere reply made and verified by its counsel alone is insufficient and contrary to the Rules and the intent behind recourse to modes of discovery. The argument is untenable. Section 21 of Rule 138 states"SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. - An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client x x x x[3] Petitioner has not shown that the case at bar falls under any of the recognized exceptions as found in Art. 1878 of the Civil Code which enumerates the instances when special powers of attorney are necessary, or in Rule 20 of the Rules of Court on pre-trial where the parties and their attorneys are both directed to appear before the court for a conference; so that for counsel to appear at the pre-trial in behalf of his client, he must clothe the former with an adequate authority in the form of a special power of attorney or corporate resolution. Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that "(a)ttorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure x x x x" Thus, when Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the request for admission, it should not be restrictively construed to mean that a party may ????? engage the services of counsel to make the response in his behalf. Indeed, the theory of petitioner must not be taken seriously; otherwise, it will negate the principles on agency in the Civil Code,[4] as well as Sec. 23, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court.[5]

RESOLUTION BELLOSILLO, J.: At issue in this petition for review is whether a request for admission directed to an adverse party under Sec. 1, Rule 26, of the Rules of Court may be answered only by his counsel. On 17 March 1988, petitioner PSC Financial Corporation (PSCFC) filed a complaint against private respondent Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino) for annulment of foreclosure proceedings and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 88-368.
Petitioner PSCFC alleges that as land developer it availed itself of the Home Financing Plan of Banco Filipino and borrowed from the latter the amount of P6,630,690.00 as "developer loan". As security, petitioner constituted a mortgage over several lots in Pasay City which properties were not yet sold at that time to third parties. It was agreed that under the Home Financing Plan, the "developer loan" would mature only after the lots shall have been subdivided and improved and then sold to third persons who would then be substituted as mortgagors to the extent of the loan value of the lots and houses bought by them. However, on 25 September 1987, without the loan having matured as none of the lots have been convey to buyers, such that the latter could now take the place of petitioner as mortgagors, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and a certificate of sale was executed in favor of private respondent Banco Filipino. In their answer of 10 June 1988, private respondents admitted the loan of P6,630,690.00 for which petitioner had executed a promissory note secured by a real estate mortgage on the properties described in the complaint. However, they denied that petitioner had availed itself of Banco Filipino's Home Financing Plan, averring instead that under the promissory note and the contract of mortgage, the subject loan would fall due "1 year from date" or on 5 January 1986 and that upon default of petitioner, Banco Filipino could immediately foreclose the mortgage under Act No. 3135 as in fact it did, upon compliance with the legal requirements with respect to extrajudicial foreclosures. On 21 June 1988, petitioner served upon Banco Filipino a written request for admission of the truth of certain matters set forth as follows: "1. The plaintiff (PSCFC) x x x was x x x granted by you under your BF Home Financing Plan, on the security of mortgages constituted on the lands acquired, under the terms of which the developer loans, despite the contents of the covering promissory notes and security instruments, would mature only after the development of the acquired lands into residential subdivision and the resale of the x x x lots x x x to interested third parties who would then be substituted as mortgagors x x x x "2. x x x in 1984, availing itself of your said Home Financing Plan, the plaintiff obtained from you a loan x x x of P6,630,690.00 for which it signed in your favor a promissory note on the security of a mortgage constituted on x x x lots, which were not then yet sold to any third person x x x x "3. x x x on September ??, 1987, without the said loan having yet matured for the reason that none of the x x x lots had yet been the subject of sale to third persons such that substitution of the latter as mortgagors in your favor could not yet be had, a certificate of sale was executed by the Notary Public over the x x x lands in your favor."[1] On 27 June 1988, petitioner received Banco Filipino's answer to its request for admission signed by its counsel, Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun. Counsel admitted, inter alia, petitioner's mortgage loan as well as the fact that Banco Filipino was engaged in land development loans. However,

Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun overstepped his authority, it is only his client, respondent Banco Filipino, which has the prerogative to impugn his acts and not petitioner, the adverse party. Interestingly, Banco Filipino has not objected to the response made by its counsel in its behalf. ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolves to: (a) DENY the instant petition for utter lack of merit; and, (b) REQUIREcounsel for petitioner, ATTY. LUTGARDA C. BAQUIRAN-PERALTA, of the BALGOS & PEREZ LAW OFFICE, 5th Floor, Corinthian Plaza, Paseo de Roxas, Makati, Metro Manila, to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice hereof why she should not be administratively dealt with for misquoting the text of the decision in Koh v. IAC, supra, to support her position and attain a favorable judgment for her client. SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Padilla, and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION [ G.R. No. 128646, March 14, 2003 ] CRISELDA F. JOSE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND DANILO OMEGA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before us is a petition erroneously entitled as a Petition for Review on Certiorari which should be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The factual background of the case is as follows: On November 14, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 22) rendered a decision in Civil Case No. CEO-15709, entitled Danilo Omega, Plaintiff, versus, Criselda F. Jose, Defendant., the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, based on the evidence thus presented, this Court finds for the plaintiff. Judgment is hereby rendered declaring the March 3, 1981 marriage between plaintiff Danilo Omega and Criselda F. Jose, null and void ab initio. Custody over the three children Joselyn, Danilo, Jr. and Jordan, all surnamed Omega shall be entrusted to plaintiff Danilo Omega. Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Manila with a copy of this judgment. No costs. SO ORDERED.[1] The ground for declaring the marriage null and void is psychological incapacity on the part of defendant Criselda under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. During the trial, the counsel on record of defendant Criselda was Atty. Margarito D. Yap of the Cebu City District Office of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO). However, defendant Criselda filed a Notice of Appeal, dated December 7, 1994, on her own, without the assistance of Atty. Yap.[2] The Judicial Records Division (JRD) of the Court of Appeals sent a notice to pay docket fee, dated August 3, 1995 to Atty. Yap which was received by him.[3] On October 24, 1995, the appellate court, through the Former Sixteenth Division,[4] promulgated a Resolution which reads as follows: For failure of the defendant-appellant to pay the docketing fee in this case within the reglementary period which expired on August 25, 1995, despite receipt by his counsel on August 10, 1995 of this Courts notice dated August 3, 1995, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Section 1(d), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. SO ORDERED.[5] On May 9, 1996, the Division Clerk of Court issued the Entry of Judgment certifying that the above-quoted Resolution had become final and executory as of December 1, 1995.[6] It is indicated at the bottom of said Entry of Judgment that Atty. Yap and the Special and Appealed Cases Division of the PAO were sent copies of the Entry of Judgment. On May 13, 1996, the appellate court received a letter of even date from defendant-appellant Criselda addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals inquiring about the status of her appeal and claiming that she has not received any notice from the appellate court.[7] The appellate court noted the explanation of the clerk in the Civil Cases Section of the Judicial Records Division (JRD) of said court that Atty. Yap was sent the notice to pay docket fee because Criselda had sent a copy of her Notice of Appeal to Atty. Yap and that per the records of the case, Atty. Yap was earlier sent a copy of the formal offer of exhibits and duly received in his behalf, he filed the comments and objections to the exhibits for the plaintiff; he appeared at the hearings conducted by the trial court.[8]

On October 28, 1996, Criselda through counsel filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal.[9] On December 16, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued the following Resolution: Considering that the Resolution dismissing this appeal has become final on December 1, 1995 and an Entry of Judgment has in fact been made on May 9, 1996, the Motion for Leave of Court to File Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal and the Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal are hereby denied. SO ORDERED.[10] Criseldas motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the present petition on the following ground: The public respondent Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave error in denying the petitioners Motion for Leave of Court to file Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal and the Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal which if not corrected, would deprive petitioner of her constitutional right to due process and injustice would be done to her.[11] on which basis, petitioner Criselda raises the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO APPEALED HER CASE BY HERSELF WITHOUT COUNSEL WAS VALIDLY SERVED WITH NOTICE TO PAY THE DOCKETING FEE AND NOTICE OF THE RESOLUTION DISMISSING HER APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE DOCKETING FEE. II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITIONERS MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE OMNIBUS MOTIONS/MOTION TO REINSTATE APPEAL AND THE OMNIBUS MOTIONS/MOTION TO REINSTATE APPEAL.[12] After private respondent filed his Comment, parties filed their respective Memoranda in compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated December 14, 1998. We find the petition devoid of merit. Based on the records, it appears that the PAO, through Atty. Victor C. Laborte and Atty. Yap, represented petitioner during the trial of the case. Although petitioner herself personally filed the Notice of Appeal, the fact remains that Atty. Yap or the PAO has not filed any formal notice of withdrawal of appearance in the trial court. Therefore, insofar as the appellate court is concerned, Atty. Yap is the counsel of record. As such, the appellate court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion for leave of court to file omnibus motions or motion to reinstate appeal. Section 22, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, provides: Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. An attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court. Payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional, and failure of the appellant to conform with the rules on appeal renders the judgment final and executory.[13] Indeed, the Court, in some instances, had allowed liberal construction of the Rules of Court with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals on equitable consideration.[14] In Buenaflor vs. Court of Appeals, the Court has enunciated the following: The established rule is that the payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory. Nevertheless, this rule must be qualified, to wit: First, the failure to pay appellate court docket fee within the reglementary period allows only discretionary dismissal, not

automatic dismissal, of the appeal; Second, such power should be used in the exercise of the Courts sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play and with great deal of circumspection considering all attendant circumstances. Admittedly, this Court has allowed the filing of an appeal in some cases where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, only when to do so would serve the demands of justice and in the exercise of the Courts equity jurisdiction. This is based on the rule of liberality in the interpretation of the Rules to achieve substantial justice. It may be recalled that the general rule is that the Rules of Court are rules of procedure and whenever called for they should be so construed as to give effect rather than defeat their essence. Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: SEC. 6. Construction These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and, therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that, while the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice, and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The underlying consideration in this petition is that the act of dismissing the notice of appeal, if done in excess of the trial courts jurisdiction, amounts to an undue denial of the petitioners right to appeal. The importance and real purpose of the remedy of appeal has been emphasized in Castro v. Court of Appeals where this Court ruled that an appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and trial courts are advised to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal and instructed that every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.[15] However, the Court finds no cogent reason to be liberal in the present case for the following reasons: Petitioners counsel, Atty. Margarito Yap of the PAO was properly sent by the appellate court a notice to pay the docket fees. Atty. Yap or the PAO did not file any formal withdrawal of appearance and therefore, for all intents and purposes, the appellate court correctly sent the notice to Atty. Yap. It is settled that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel.[16] Moreover, under Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears. Under Section 22 of the same Rule, an attorney who appears de partein a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court. Petitioner failed to pursue her appeal for almost two years. She herself filed the notice of appeal on December 4, 1994 but thought of inquiring from the Court of Appeals about her appeal only on May 13, 1996 (or after the lapse of one year and five months) as to the status of her appeal. Petitioner failed to show that her appeal is extremely meritorious that to deprive her of an appeal would unduly affect her substantial rights. In other words, petitioner failed to show any compelling reason to warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying

petitioners Motion for Leave of Court to File Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal. Its Resolution dated October 24, 1995 dismissing petitioners appeal had become final and executory as of December 1, 1995. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

EN BANC [ G.R. No. 176530, June 16, 2009 ] SPOUSES CONSTANTE AGBULOS AND ZENAIDA PADILLA AGBULOS, PETITIONERS, VS. NICASIO GUTIERREZ, JOSEFA GUTIERREZ AND ELENA G. GARCIA, RESPONDENTS.

because one of the plaintiffs was still in America.[7] On February 6, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Order dated October 24, 2002 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 87, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the subject complaint is reinstated and the records of the case is (sic) hereby remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.[8] The CA concluded that the dispute between the parties was purely civil, not agrarian, in nature. According to the CA, the allegations in the complaint revealed that the principal relief sought was the nullification of the purported deed of sale and reconveyance of the subject property. It also noted that there was no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relations between the parties. Thus, this petition, raising the following issues for the resolution of this Court: 1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the appeal despite the undisputed fact that Atty. Magbitang filed the notice of appeal without respondents' knowledge and consent; 2. Whether or not the CA erred in giving due course to the appeal despite the fact that Atty. Magbitang's appellants' brief failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court regarding the contents of an appellants' brief; and 3. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC (Regional Trial Court), not the DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board) or the PARAD/RARAD (Provincial/Regional Agrarian Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator), has jurisdiction over respondents' complaint.[9] The CA did not err in giving due course to the appeal, on both procedural and substantive grounds. A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court is presumed to represent such client before the appellate court. Section 22 of Rule 138 creates this presumption, thus: SEC. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. An attorney who appearsde parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court. A reading of respondent Elena Garcia's letter to the RTC would show that she did not actually withdraw Atty. Magbitang's authority to represent respondents in the case. The letter merely stated that there was, as yet, no agreement that they would pursue an appeal. In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client either expressly or impliedly. Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyer's first appearance and validates the action taken by him.[10] Implied ratification may take various forms, such as by silence or acquiescence, or by acceptance and retention of benefits flowing therefrom.[11] Respondents' silence or lack of remonstration when the case was finally elevated to the CA means that they have acquiesced to the filing of the appeal. Moreover, a lawyer is mandated to "serve his client with competence and diligence."[12] Consequently, a lawyer is entreated not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him;

RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari seeks the review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 6, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 83994 which set aside the dismissal of a complaint for declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages. The case stems from the following antecedents: On October 16, 1997, respondents, Dr. Nicasio G. Gutierrez, Josefa Gutierrez de Mendoza and Elena G. Garcia, through their counsel, Atty. Adriano B. Magbitang, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, a complaint against petitioners, spouses Constante Agbulos and Zenaida Padilla Agbulos, for declaration of nullity of contract, cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages. The complaint alleged that respondents inherited from their father, Maximo Gutierrez, an eight-hectare parcel of land located in Callos, Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-123790 in the name of Maximo Gutierrez. Through fraud and deceit, petitioners succeeded in making it appear that Maximo Gutierrez executed a Deed of Sale on July 21, 1978 when, in truth, he died on April 25, 1977. As a result, TCT No. NT-123790 was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. NT-188664, was issued in the name of petitioners. Based on the notation at the back of the certificate of title, portions of the property were brought under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and awarded to Lorna Padilla, Elenita Nuega and Suzette Nuega who were issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs). In their defense, petitioners averred that respondents were not the real parties in interest, that the Deed of Sale was regularly executed before a notary public, that they were possessors in good faith, and that the action had prescribed. On the day set for the presentation of the respondents' (plaintiffs') evidence, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case. Petitioners contended that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), not the RTC, had jurisdiction since the subject land was covered by the CARP, and CLOAs had been awarded to tenants. Respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the motion had been filed beyond the period for filing an Answer, that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case based on the allegations in the complaint, and that the DARAB had no jurisdiction since the parties had no tenancy relationship. In an Order[2] dated October 24, 2002, the RTC granted the petitioners' motion and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC held that the DARAB had jurisdiction, since the subject property was under the CARP, some portions of it were covered by registered CLOAs, and there was prima facie showing of tenancy. [3] Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. On November 13, 2003, the RTC denied the motion.[4] Atty. Magbitang filed a Notice of Appeal[5] with the RTC, which gave due course to the same.[6] The records reveal that on December 15, 2003, respondent Elena G. Garcia wrote a letter to Judge Arturo M. Bernardo, Acting Judge of RTC Gapan, Branch 87, stating that they were surprised to receive a communication from the court informing them that their notice of appeal was ready for disposition. She also stated in the letter that there was no formal agreement with Atty. Magbitang as to whether they would pursue an appeal with the CA,

otherwise, his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.[13] In light of such mandate, Atty. Magbitang's act of filing the notice of appeal without waiting for her clients to direct him to do so was understandable, if not commendable. The CA was likewise correct in holding that the case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, not the DARAB. For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties. It is, therefore, essential to establish all the indispensable elements of a tenancy relationship, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.[14] Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint.[15] Respondents' complaint did not contain any allegation that would, even in the slightest, imply that there was a tenancy relation between them and the petitioners. We are in full agreement with the following findings of the CA on this point: x x x A reading of the material averments of the complaint reveals that the principal relief sought by plaintiffs-appellants is for the nullification of the supposedly forged deed of sale which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. NT-188664 covering their 8-hectare property as well as its reconveyance, and not for the cancellation of CLOAs as claimed by defendants-appellees. Moreover, the parties herein have no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws. Neither were the CLOA awardees impleaded as parties in this case nor the latter's entitlement thereto questioned. Hence, contrary to the findings of the RTC, the herein dispute is purely civil and not agrarian in nature falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial courts. On the alleged deficiency of the appellants' brief filed before the CA by the respondents, suffice it to state that the requirements in Section 13, Rule 44 are intended to aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and proper resolution of the case. Obviously, the CA found the appellants' brief sufficient in form and substance as the appellate court was able to arrive at a just decision. We have repeatedly held that technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not to suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the rules may, thus, be allowed in order to attain this prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts.[16] WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated February 6, 2007 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, and Peralta, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION [ G.R. No. 54681, May 31, 1982 ] LILIA B. BARRERA, REPRESENTED BY MIGUEL R. LOGARTA, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE FRANCIS J. MILITANTE, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, BRANCH XII, AND CARMEN BELLEZA, ELEUTERIA CABRERA, BALDOMERO HERNANI, BENJAMIN SEVILLA, AND LUCAS DE LA CALZADA, RESPONDENTS.

Hence, the present recourse, petitioner claiming that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing her complaint as well as in denying her motion for reconsideration. From a casual perusal of the order of dismissal of June 11, 1980, We can readily understand the considerations which prompted the respondent Judge in dismissing petitioner's complaint, especially considering that since the filing of the complaint on December 13, 1978 up to the issuance of the order of dismissal on June 11, 1980, or a lapsed period of about eighteen months, the pre-trial stage of the case has not yet been terminated, showing that its progress was abnormally very slow. Moreover, unrefuted by petitioner is private respondent's claim that in all the pre-trial conferences scheduled by the lower court, petitioner has never appeared nor does the record show that she had executed a special power of attorney in favor of either her attorney-in-fact Miguel R. Logarta or her counsel of record to serve as the written authority to represent her in said pre-trial conferences, with power to compromise the case.[5] This is a measure conducive to the early and expeditious termination of the case, which is consistent with the purpose of a pre-trial as provided under Section 1 of Rule 20, which petitioner could have easily availed of but did not. For failure of the petitioner and her counsel to appear at the last scheduled pre-trial of June 11, 1980, the lower court is given the discretion to dismiss the case, said failure to appear being a ground to authorize dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute.[6] We find no reversible error committed by the respondent Judge in dismissing the case on this ground. The explanation given in petitioner's motion for reconsideration regarding her counsel's alleged late arrival in court at the pre-trial conference of June 11, 1980, is far from being satisfactory. While an affidavit supposedly executed by the secretary of counsel's law office was attached to the motion for reconsideration, the same was not even supported by a medical certificate, authenticated or otherwise, to substantiate the official's claim of illness which is her supposed reason of failing to report for work early. Besides, as correctly pointed out by private respondents, the allegation of the office secretary that she arrived in the law office at almost 9:00 in the morning of June 11, 1980 does not jibe with the allegation of counsel for the petitioner that he arrived in court some ten minutes after 8:15 A.M. of said day when the case was called for pre-trial. Counsel for the petitioner would, likewise, have Us believe that he was armed with a special power of attorney, without, however, showing the scope, extent and limits of the authority granted him. Worse still, said special power of attorney was only allegedly executed by petitioner's attorney-in-fact, one Miguel R. Logarta, the scope, extent and limits of whose authority was, likewise, not shown. As earlier indicated, the record does not show that petitioner had executed a special power of attorney in favor of either her attorney-in-fact or her counsel of record. We are thus left without any idea as to the nature and extent of said alleged authority, which have to be proven, because Section 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires, for attorneys to compromise the litigation of their clients, a "special authority." And while the same does not state that the special authority be in writing, the court has every reason to expect that, if not in writing, the same be duly established by evidence other than the self-serving assertion of counsel himself that such authority was given him. The respondent Judge, therefore, did not act erroneously, much less abuse his discretion gravely, in denying the motion for reconsideration in spite of such manifestation of petitioner's counsel because the authority to compromise cannot lightly be presumed.7 And if, with good reason, the judge is not satisfied that said authority exists, as in this case, dismissal of the case for non-appearance of petitioner in pre-trial is sanctioned by the Rules. We take this opportunity to remind the lower courts once more that the issuance of minute orders, like the one denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner, is not sanctioned by our jurisprudence. As categorically stated by this Court in Continental Bank v. Tiangco, 94 SCRA 715:

DECISION DE CASTRO, J.: Special civil action of certiorari to annul and set aside the Orders of respondent Francis J. Militante, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XII, issued on June 11 and 20, 1980, in Civil Case No. R-17617 entitled "Lilia B. Barrera, etc., Plaintiff, versus, Carmen Belleza, et al., Defendants," respectively dismissing petitioner's complaint and denying the motion for reconsideration of the said order of dismissal. The foregoing Orders of respondent Judge read as follows:
"When this case was called for hearing today, the defendants (private respondents herein) and their counsel appeared. Neither the plaintiff (petitioner herein) nor her counsel appeared. In view of the failure of the plaintiff to appear despite the fact that she was duly notified, this case is hereby dismissed. "IT IS SO ORDERED. "Given in open court, Cebu City, this 11th day of June 1980."[1] "Finding the motion for reconsideration to be without merit, the same is hereby DENIED. "IT IS SO ORDERED. "Given in open court, Cebu City, this 20th day of June, 1980."[2] It appears that on December 13, 1978, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. R-17617, against private respondents for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land designated as Lot 4356 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate, and damages. Private respondents were accordingly summoned to answer said complaint and to enter into pre-trial and trial. The case was set for pre-trial conferences at various dates, the last two of which, were on May 18, 1980 and on June 11, 1980 at 8:30 A.M. The scheduled pre-trial conference of May 18, 1980 was postponed to June 11, 1980 because of the unreadiness of petitioner's counsel to go on with the pre-trial conference. When the case was called for pre-trial conference on June 11, 1980 at 8:30 A.M., neither petitioner nor her counsel appeared, thus prompting respondent Judge to issue the dismissal order of even date as quoted above. On June 17, 1980, petitioner filed a motion[3] to reconsider said dismissal order, stating that on the scheduled pre-trial conference of June 11, 1980, her counsel, who was allegedly armed with "a special power of attorney to appear at the pre-trial and to enter into a compromise was a little late," because "the secretary of the law office did not arrive early in the said office where counsel could pick up the records of the case on his way to Court."[4]Attached to said motion for reconsideration is an affidavit of the supposed secretary of the above-referred law office, stating that she was feverish sometime last June 11, 1980, and was thus unable to report for work early. Petitioner's above-stated motion was however denied by the respondent Judge for lack of merit in the order of June 20, 1980, also as above-quoted.

"We have admonished the trial courts not to issue a minute order like the one under appeal. A trial court should specify in its order the reasons for the dismissal of the complaint so that when the order is appealed, this Court can readily determine from a casual perusal thereof whether there is a prima facie justification for the dismissal." But notwithstanding the foregoing omission of respondent Judge, We cannot however grant the instant petition for reasons already explained earlier. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Aquino, Guerrero, and Escolin, JJ., concur. Barredo, J., (Chairman), reserve his view as to the observation made by J. Abad Santos which needs further study of the correlation between the 2 of Rule 20, on the one hand, and Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 17. Abad Santos, J., concur. He takes it that the petition can file a new complaint provided that her action has not prescribed. Concepcion, J., on leave.

THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 137785, September 04, 2000 ] NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. VINE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY VICENTE C. PONCE; AND ROMONAFE CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY OSCAR F. TIRONA, RESPONDENTS. PANGANIBAN, J.: Although not authorized to handle cases pending in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, lawyers of the National Power Corporation may nonetheless file notices of appeal of adverse decisions rendered by trial courts. They cannot, however, enter into compromise agreements without any specific authority to do so. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the January 19, 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 57710,[1] which is quoted here in full: "At the hearing of this case on December 10, 1998, the Honorable Ricardo P. Galvez, Solicitor General, appeared personally and moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the authority of the lawyers of the National Power Corporation to appear as Special Attorneys of the Solicitor General is limited to cases before the lower courts (RTCs and MTCs). He also invokes the provisions of the Administrative Code (Section 35(1) Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV) that said lawyers have no authority to appear before this Court. "WHEREFORE, without objection on the part of all the parties in this case, the instant appeal is DISMISSED."[2] Also challenged by petitioner is the March 8, 1999 CA Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration, pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder: "xxx (W)hether or not the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the appeal, the foregoing copious notes show beyond cavil the courts' resolve to dismiss cases appealed to this Court by NAPOCOR's house lawyers without coursing the appeal to the Solicitor General. "That the Solicitor General did not ask for the dismissal of the appeal is irrelevant; his belated Manifestation giving the NAPOCOR counsels putative authority to appeal to us cannot cure the basic legal defect which is a violation of the Administrative Code (Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV). We have said so in all the many cases brought to us by NAPOCOR's counsel. We iterate the same rulings. "Motion DENIED."[3] The Facts The undisputed facts of the case are summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as follows: "1. On July 12, 1995, petitioner instituted a complaint for expropriation of several parcels of land located at San Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite, with an area of 96,963.38 and 48,103.12 square meters, respectively owned by respondents Vine Development Corporation (Vine hereafter) and Romonafe Corporation (Romonafe for brevity). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 114095 and was raffled to Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite. "2. On January 26, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of possession authorizing petitioner to enter and take possession of the property after a showing that it ha[d] deposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount of P4,616,223.37 representing the assessed value of the property for taxation purposes pursuant to the provisions of P.D. 42 and the Supreme Court

ruling in National Power Corporation versus Jocson, 206 SCRA 520 (1992). "3. By Order dated December 3, 1996, the trial court constituted a panel of commissioners for purposes of determining the just compensation of subject property. The panel conducted an ocular inspection of the property on January 10, 1997. "4. In an undated Commissioner's Valuation Report, the panel recommended just compensation at the rate of P3,500.00 per square meter. "5. Earlier, however, the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) issued Resolution No. 08-95 dated October 25, 1995 placing the fair market value of Romonafe and Vine's subject property at P1,500.00 and P2,000.00 per square meter, respectively. "6. One (1) year and eight (8) months later, the PAC amended its aforesaid resolution under PAC Resolution No. 07-97 dated June 25, 1997 by increasing the valuation of the Romonafe's property from P1,500.00 to P3,500.00 per square meter, or an increase of P2,000.00 per square meter. The amendment was made in response to the letter of reconsideration dated June 9, 1997 filed by Romonafe. "7. While the case was pending, petitioner negotiated with Romonafe for the acquisition of an additional area of 27,293.88 square meters of its adjacent land. "8. After due trial, the lower court rendered its Decision on September 5, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads: 'WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the parcels of land of the defendants hereinabove described consisting of 146,066.5 square meters to have been lawfully expropriated and now belong to the plaintiff to be used for public purpose. 'The plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to the defendants, through the Branch Clerk of Court, the fair market value of the property at P3,500.00 per square meter, that is, for defendant Vine Development Corporation, the total sum ofP339,371,830.00 and for defendant Romonafe Corporation, the total sum of P168,360,920.00 plus legal rate of interest - i.e., 6% per annum starting from the time the plaintiff took possession of the property up to the time the full amount shall have been paid. ......... 'The Branch Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby ordered to have a certified copy of this decision be registered in the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite. ......... 'SO ORDERED.' (Underscoring ours) "9. Petitioner directly appealed the foregoing decision to the Court of Appeals on the ground that it is contrary to law, jurisprudence and evidence on record. The case was docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 57710. "10. During the pendency of the appeal, petitioner and Romonafe entered into a Compromise Agreement (copy attached as Annex B-1) under which petitioner would acquire seventy five thousand three hundred ninety seven (75,397) square meters of land comprising the 48,103.12 square meters subject of the appeal and 27,293.88 square meters at P3,500 per square meter. Romonafe would give petitioner a total discount of P6,542,810.40 so much so that the net principal amount representing the total purchase price of the land amounts to two hundred

DECISION

eighty million pesos (P280,000,000.00)" The Petition is meritorious. "11. By Resolution dated June 2, 1998, the Court of Appeals gave the OSG a period of ten (10) days to comment on said compromise agreement. "12. In its Comment dated August 18, 1998, the OSG prayed that the compromise agreement be disapproved and that the appeal be instead resolved on the merits. A copy of said comment is hereto attached as Annex C. "13. On September 30, 1998, the OSG filed a motion to admit its supplemental comment whereby it brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals the fact that the Compromise Agreement was signed by the deputized counsels of the petitioner in flagrant violation [of] the terms and conditions of their deputation. A copy of said supplemental comment is hereto attached as Annex D. "14. By Resolution dated November 25, 1998, the Court of Appeals set the case for hearing/oral argument on December 10, 1998. "15. During the December 10, 1998 hearing, the Solicitor General personally appeared and argued that subject compromise agreement suffers from two (2) fatal infirmities, namely: (1) it is grossly disadvantageous to the government; and (2) the deputized lawyers of the petitioner have no legal authority to bind the Solicitor General [to] the same agreement. "16. The following day, or on December 11, 1998, the OSG filed a Manifestation dated December 11, 1998 (copy attached as Annex E), the full text of which reads: 'THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG), to this Honorable Court, respectfully manifests that the OSG[-]deputized counsel of the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) have the authority to file notices of appeal in cases being handled by them such as the subject case pursuant to their deputation letters. However, such authority does not extend to withdrawal of said appeal, execution of compromise agreements and filing of pleadings before the appellate courts without the review and approval of the Solicitor General. "17. In a Resolution dated January 19, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal, thus: xxxxxxxxx "18. Petitioner, through counsel, immediately filed its motion for reconsideration on February 5, 1999 (copy attached as Annex F) which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated March 8, 1999 x x x."[4] Hence, this Petition.[5] The Issues Petitioner raises the following issues: "A The Honorable Court of Appeals patently erred in declaring that the Solicitor General personally moved for the dismissal of the appeal during the hearing conducted on December 10, 1998. "B The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal for lack of legal or factual basis." Since the two issues are interrelated, we shall take them up jointly as follows: Did the NPC lawyers have the authority to (a) file the appeal from the trial court and (b) enter into the Compromise Agreement? The Court's Ruling Main Issue: Authority of the NPC Lawyers On the grounds that (1) the NPC lawyers had no authority to file the appeal, and (2) Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez had personally moved for its dismissal during the Oral Argument on December 10, 1998, the CA dismissed the said appeal. On the other hand, the state lawyer contends that he did not ask for a dismissal, but only objected to the Compromise Agreement entered into by and between Romonafe Corporation and petitioner. According to him, the Agreement suffers from two fatal infirmities: (1) it is grossly disadvantageous to the government, and (2) the OSG-deputized lawyers of petitioner had no legal authority to bind the solicitor general. We agree with the solicitor general. There is nothing in the records of the Oral Argument showing that he had moved for the dismissal of the appeal. Rather, his ardent prayer, even in his Comment dated August 18, 1998, had been to disapprove the Compromise Agreement and to resolve the appeal on its merits.

No Legal Basis for Dismissal of Appeal

It is undisputed that the OSG has "supervision in the handling" of NPC court cases as provided for in Section 15-A of Republic Act No. 6395, which states as follows: "Sec. 15-A. The corporation shall be under the direct supervision of the Office of the President and all legal matters shall be handled by the Chief Legal Counsel of the corporation, provided that the Solicitor General's Office shall have supervision in the handling of court cases only of the corporation." Furthermore, the authority of the OSG to represent NPC is specified in Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of EO 292, which provides: "SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. -- The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: (1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party." To assist it in representing the government, the OSG is empowered to deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices. Paragraph 8 of the same section reads as follows: "(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the courts and exercise supervision and control over such legal officers with respect to such cases." In pursuance of such power, the OSG issued to the NPC lawyers a letter of deputization[6] worded as follows:

"As Special Attorneys, you are authorized to appear as counsel in all civil cases in the lower courts (RTCs and MTCs) involving the NPC, subject to the same conditions stipulated in our letters."[7] The CA ruled that the deputization of the NPC lawyers excluded the authority to file appeals in the higher courts. We disagree. Under Section 2 (a) , Rule 41[8] of the Revised Rules of Court which pertains to ordinary appeals, the notice of appeal is filed in the very same court which rendered the assailed decision, which in this case was the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite. Since the notice was filed before the RTC, the NPC lawyers acted clearly within their authority. Indeed, their action ensured that the appeal was filed within the reglementary period. Regardless of which mode of appeal is used, the appeal itself is presumed beneficial to the government; hence, it should be allowed. After all, the OSG may withdraw it, if it believes that the appeal will not advance the government's cause. The reason for the continuous dismissal of NPC appeals in the CA is not the absence of authority of the lawyers per se, but the failure of these lawyers to inform the OSG of the lower court's adverse decision, resulting in the OSG's lack of participation in the appellate proceeding. Granting arguendo that the NPC lawyers had no authority to file the appeal, this defect was cured by the OSG's subsequent Manifestation, the full text of which reads: "THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG) to this Honorable Court, respectfully manifests that the OSG[-] deputized counsels of the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) have the authority to file notices of appeal in cases being handled by them such as the subject case pursuant to their deputation letters. However, such authority does not extend to withdrawal of said appeal, execution of compromise agreements and filing of pleadings before the appellate courts without the review and approval of the Solicitor General."

Authority to Compromise
"A compromise is an agreement between two or more persons who, to avoid a lawsuit, amicably settle their differences on such terms as they can agree on."[9] A compromise may be effected by persons who, as expressed or implied from their relations, are representing and acting under the authority of the parties to a controversy. In the absence of such authority, no compromise by a third person is binding,[10] as Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that an agent, such as the counsel for the case, needs a special power to compromise. Hence, in Monte de Piedad v. Rodrigo,[11] the Court ruled that "if an attorney is not authorized by the client, he cannot compromise his client's claim." Furthermore, Section 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires "special authority" for attorneys to bind their clients: "Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. - Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash." If, as already ruled, NPC lawyers cannot even handle Napocor cases in the CA, how indeed can they be allowed to bind Napocor to compromises? Definitely then, their signatures on the instant Compromise Agreement are invalid. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the appealed Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for disposition on the merits as prayed for by the Office of the Solicitor General. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY GABRIEL H. ABAD, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. RICHARD V. FUNK, RESPONDENT. ABAD, J.:
This is a disbarment case against a lawyer who sued a former client in representation of a new one.

Atty. Funk claims that in 1985 when Hocorma Foundation refused to pay his attorneys fees, he severed his professional relationship with it. On November 9, 1989, four years later, he filed a complaint against the foundation for collection of his attorneys fees. The trial court, the Court of Appeals (CA), and the Supreme Court decided the claim in his favor.[11] After hearing, the Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Funk to have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03[12] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) with the aggravating circumstance of a pattern of misconduct consisting of four court appearances against his former client, the Hocorma Foundation. The CBD recommended Atty. Funks suspension from the practice of law for one year.[13] On April 16, 2010 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the CBDs report and recommendation.[14] Atty. Funk moved for reconsideration but the IBP Board of Governors denied it on June 26, 2011. The Issue Presented The issue here is whether or not Atty. Funk betrayed the trust and confidence of a former client in violation of the CPR when he filed several actions against such client on behalf of a new one. The Courts Ruling Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Here, it is undeniable that Atty. Funk was formerly the legal counsel of Hocorma Foundation. Years after terminating his relationship with the foundation, he filed a complaint against it on behalf of another client, the Mabalacat Institute, without the foundations written consent. An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship, sound public policy dictates that he be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. An attorney may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. This rule is so absolute that good faith and honest intention on the erring lawyers part does not make it inoperative.[15] The reason for this is that a lawyer acquires knowledge of his former clients doings, whether documented or not, that he would ordinarily not have acquired were it not for the trust and confidence that his client placed on him in the light of their relationship. It would simply be impossible for the lawyer to identify and erase such entrusted knowledge with faultless precision or lock the same into an iron box when suing the former client on behalf of a new one. Here, the evidence shows that Hocorma Foundation availed itself of the legal services of Atty. Funk in connection with, among others, the transfer of one of the properties subject of the several suits that the lawyer subsequently filed against the foundation. Indeed, Atty. Funk collected attorneys fees from the foundation for such services. Thus, he had an obligation not to use any knowledge he acquired during that relationship, including the fact that the property under litigation existed at all, when he sued the foundation. The Court tinds it fitting to adopt the CBD's recommendation as well as the IBP Board of Governors' resolution respecting the case. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolution of the Board or Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated April 16, 201 0 and June 26, 2011 and SUSPENDS Atty. Richard Funk from the practice of lmv for one year effective immediately. Serve copies of this decision upon the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination, the Integrated Bar or the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant so the latter may attach its copy to his record. SO ORDERED. Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Perarta, Mendoza, and Reyes,* JJ., concur.

The Facts and the Case Complainant Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. (Hocorma Foundation) filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Richard Funk. It alleged that Atty. Funk used to work as corporate secretary, counsel, chief executive officer, and trustee of the foundation from 1983 to 1985.[1] He also served as its counsel in several criminal and civil cases. Hocorma Foundation further alleged that on November 25, 2006 Atty. Funk filed an action for quieting of title and damages against Hocorma Foundation on behalf of Mabalacat Institute, Inc. (Mabalacat Institute). Atty. Funk did so, according to the foundation, using information that he acquired while serving as its counsel in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and in breach of attorney-client relationship.[2] In his answer, Atty. Funk averred that Don Teodoro V. Santos (Santos) organized Mabalacat Institute in 1950 and Hocorma Foundation in 1979. Santos hired him in January 1982 to assist Santos and the organizations he established, including the Mabalacat Institute, in its legal problems. In 1983 the Mabalacat Institute made Atty. Funk serve as a director and legal counsel.[3] Subsequently, according to Atty. Funk, when Santos got involved in various litigations, he sold or donated substantial portions of his real and personal properties to the Hocorma Foundation. Santos hired Atty. Funk for this purpose. The latter emphasized that, in all these, the attorneyclient relationship was always between Santos and him. He was more of Santos personal lawyer than the lawyer of Hocorma Foundation.[4] Atty. Funk claimed that before Santos left for America in August 1983 for medical treatment, he entered into a retainer agreement with him. They agreed that Atty. Funk would be paid for his legal services out of the properties that he donated or sold to the Hocorma Foundation. The foundation approved that compensation agreement on December 13, 1983. But it reneged and would not pay Atty. Funks legal fees.[5] Atty. Funk also claimed that Santos executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in his favor on August 13, 1983. The SPA authorized him to advise Hocorma Foundation and follow up with it Santos sale or donation of a 5-hectare land in Pampanga to Mabalacat Institute, covered by TCT 19989-R. Out of these, two hectares already comprised its school site. The remaining three hectares were for campus expansion. Atty. Funk was to collect all expenses for the property transfer from Hocorma Foundation out of funds that Santos provided. It was Santos intention since 1950 to give the land to Mabalacat Institute free of rent and expenses. The SPA also authorized Atty. Funk to register the 5-hectare land in the name of Mabalacat Institute so a new title could be issued to it, separate from the properties of Hocorma Foundation.[6] When Santos issued the SPA, Atty. Funk was Mabalacat Institutes director and counsel. He was not yet Hocorma Foundations counsel.[7] When Santos executed the deeds of conveyances, Atty. Funks clients were only Santos and Mabalacat Institute.[8] According to Atty. Funk, on August 15, 1983 Santos suggested to Hocorma Foundations Board of Trustees the inclusion of Atty. Funk in that board, a suggestion that the foundation followed.[9] After Santos died on September 14, 1983, Atty. Funk was elected President of Mabalacat Institute, a position he had since held.[10]

SECOND DIVISION [ A.C. No. 5098, April 11, 2012 ] JOSEFINA M. ANION, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, JR., RESPONDENT. The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Sabitsana be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.[4] The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully supported by the evidence on record, the applicable laws and rules.[5] The IBP Board of Governors agreed with the IBP Commissioners recommended penalty. Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion in a resolution dated July 30, 2004. The Issue The issue in this case is whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests. The Courts Ruling After a careful study of the records, we agree with the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors. The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the clients most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client.[6] Part of the lawyers duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility quoted below: Rule 15.03. -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action.[7] The prohibition also applies even if the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated.[8] To be held accountable under this rule, it is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.[9] Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the above rule is present in a given case. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyers argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.

DECISION BRION, J.: We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. who is charged of: (1) violating the lawyers duty to preserve confidential information received from his client;[1] and (2) violating the prohibition on representing conflicting interests.[2]
In her complaint, Josefina M. Anion (complainant) related that she previously engaged the legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband, Brigido Caneja, Jr. Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated her confidence when he subsequently filed a civil case against her for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L. Caete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainant accused Atty. Sabitsana of using the confidential information he obtained from her in filing the civil case. Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation and execution of the Deed of Sale. However, he denied having received any confidential information. Atty. Sabitsana asserted that the present disbarment complaint was instigated by one Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the disbarment complaint who lost a court case against him (Atty. Sabitsana) and had instigated the complaint for this reason. The Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner In our Resolution dated November 22, 1999, we referred the disbarment complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation dated November 28, 2003, IBP Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo Jr. found Atty. Sabitsana administratively liable for representing conflicting interests. The IBP Commissioner opined: In Bautista vs. Barrios, it was held that a lawyer may not handle a case to nullify a contract which he prepared and thereby take up inconsistent positions. Granting that Zenaida L. Caete, respondents present client in Civil Case No. B-1060 did not initially learn about the sale executed by Bontes in favor of complainant thru the confidences and information divulged by complainant to respondent in the course of the preparation of the said deed of sale, respondent nonetheless has a duty to decline his current employment as counsel of Zenaida Caete in view of the rule prohibiting representation of conflicting interests. In re De la Rosa clearly suggests that a lawyer may not represent conflicting interests in the absence of the written consent of all parties concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. In the present case, no such written consent was secured by respondent before accepting employment as Mrs. Caetes counsel-of-record. x x x x x x

Complainant and respondents present client, being contending claimants to the same property, the conflict of interest is obviously present. There is said to be inconsistency of interest when on behalf of one client, it is the attorneys duty to contend for that which his duty to another client requires him to oppose. In brief, if he argues for one client this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. Such is the case with which we are now confronted, respondent being asked by one client to nullify what he had formerly notarized as a true and valid sale between Bontes and the complainant. (footnotes omitted)[3]

Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.[10] [emphasis ours] On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find substantial evidence to support Atty. Sabitsanas violation of the above rule, as established by the following circumstances on record: One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect her interest over a certain property. The records show that upon the legal advice of Atty. Sabitsana, the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and executed in the complainants favor. Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Caete to discuss the latters legal interest over the property subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty. Sabitsana already had knowledge that Zenaida Caetes interest clashed with the complainants interests. Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty. Sabitsana accepted the engagement from Zenaida Caete. Four, Atty. Sabitsanas actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients was demonstrated by his own actions: first, he filed a case against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida Caete; second, he impleaded the complainant as the defendant in the case; and third, the case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale that he had previously prepared and executed for the complainant. By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another client in the same action; he also accepted a new engagement that entailed him to contend and oppose the interest of his other client in a property in which his legal services had been previously retained. To be sure, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides an exception to the above prohibition. However, we find no reason to apply the exception due to Atty. Sabitsanas failure to comply with the requirements set forth under the rule. Atty. Sabitsana did not make a full disclosure of facts to the complainant and to Zenaida Caete before he accepted the new engagement with Zenaida Caete. The records likewise show that although Atty. Sabitsana wrote a letter to the complainant informing her of Zenaida Caetes adverse claim to the property covered by the Deed of Sale and, urging her to settle the adverse claim; Atty. Sabitsana however did not disclose to the complainant that he was also being engaged as counsel by Zenaida Caete.[11] Moreover, the records show that Atty. Sabitsana failed to obtain the written consent of his two clients, as required by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we find as the IBP Board of Governors did Atty. Sabitsana guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests. We likewise agree with the penalty of suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. This penalty is consistent with existing jurisprudence on the administrative offense of representing conflicting interests.[12] We note that Atty. Sabitsana takes exception to the IBP recommendation on the ground that the charge in the complaint was only for his alleged disclosure of confidential information, not for representation of conflicting interests. To Atty. Sabitsana, finding him liable for the latter offense is a violation of his due process rights since he only answered the designated charge.

We find no violation of Atty. Sabitsanas due process rights. Although there was indeed a specific charge in the complaint, we are not unmindful that the complaint itself contained allegations of acts sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule on the prohibition against representing conflicting interests. As stated in paragraph 8 of the complaint: Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. accepted the commission as a Lawyer of ZENAIDA CANEJA, now Zenaida Caete, to recover lands from Complainant, including this land where lawyer Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. has advised his client [complainant] to execute the second sale[.] Interestingly, Atty. Sabitsana even admitted these allegations in his answer.[13] He also averred in his Answer that: 6b. Because the defendant-to-be in the complaint (Civil Case No. B-1060) that he would file on behalf of Zenaida Caneja-Caete was his former client (herein complainant), respondent asked [the] permission of Mrs. Caete (which she granted) that he would first write a letter (Annex 4) to the complainant proposing to settle the case amicably between them but complainant ignored it. Neither did she object to respondents handling the case in behalf of Mrs. Caete on the ground she is now invoking in her instant complaint. So respondent felt free to file the complaint against her.[14] We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be informed of the charge against oneself and to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[15] These opportunities were all afforded to Atty. Sabitsana, as shown by the above circumstances. All told, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.[16] In the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession. We likewise aim to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.[17] This is all that we did in this case. Significantly, we did this to a degree very much lesser than what the powers of this Court allows it to do in terms of the imposable penalty. In this sense, we have already been lenient towards respondent lawyer. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is foundGUILTY of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law. Atty. Sabitsana is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so that we can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect. SO ORDERED.

Peralta,* Perez, Sereno, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

EN BANC [ A.C. No. 9074, August 14, 2012 ] GRACE M. ANACTA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EDUARDO D. RESURRECCION, RESPONDENT. DEL CASTILLO, J.: "[T]he purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence."[1] In a Complaint for disbarment filed on August 22, 2007 with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), complainant Grace M. Anacta (complainant) prays for the disbarment of respondent Atty. Eduardo D. Resurreccion (respondent) for gross misconduct, deceit and malpractice.[3] Records show that on November 15, 2004, complainant engaged the services of respondent to file on her behalf a petition for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, for which she paid respondent P42,000.00.[4] In December 2004, respondent presented to the complainant a supposed copy of a Petition for Annulment of Marriage[5] which bore the stamped receipt dated December 8, 2004 of the RTC, as well as its docket number, Civil Case No. 04-25141. From then on, complainant did not hear from respondent or receive any notice from the trial court relative to the said petition. This prompted her to make inquiries with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Quezon City (OCCRTC). To her surprise and dismay, she discovered that no petition for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 04-25141 was ever filed before the said court.[6] Thus, complainant terminated the services of respondent for loss of trust and confidence[7] and requested the OCC-RTC to refuse any belated attempt on the part of respondent to file a petition for annulment of marriage on her behalf.[8] On July 30, 2007, complainant, through her new counsel, wrote a letter[9] to the respondent demanding for an explanation as to how respondent intended to indemnify the complainant for damages she had suffered due to respondents deceitful acts. Respondent has not replied thereto. Hence, complainant filed before the IBP a verified complaint praying that respondent be disbarred. In an Order[10] dated August 22, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, required the respondent to submit his answer to the complaint within 15 days from notice. However, respondent did not heed said directive. Hence, complainant filed Motions to Declare Respondent in Default and Hear the Case Ex-Parte.[11] The Investigating Commissioner, Romualdo A. Din, Jr., held in abeyance the resolution of the above motions and instead set the complaint for Mandatory Conference on October 6, 2008.[12] On the said date, however, only the complainant and her counsel appeared. Accordingly, in an Order[13] dated October 6, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner deemed respondent to have waived the filing of an answer; noted complainants motion to declare respondent in default; and gave the complainant 10 days from notice within which to file her verified position paper, after which the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution. Complainant filed her verified Position Paper[14] on October 15, 2008. In his Report and Recommendation[15] dated December 8, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner found clear and convincing evidence that respondent is guilty of deceit and dishonesty when he misrepresented having filed the petition for annulment of marriage after receipt of P42,000.00
[2]

when in fact no such petition was filed. He thus recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years and to reimburse/return to the complainant the amount of P42,000.00. In a Resolution[16] dated August 28, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but modified the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law from two years to four years and ordered respondent to return to the complainant the amount of P42,000.00, otherwise his suspension will continue until he returns the sum involved. Our Ruling We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP. In Narag v. Atty. Narag[17] this Court held that [t]he burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. In this case, complainant submitted the following documents to prove her allegations: (1) the Service Agreement dated November 15, 2004 to prove the existence of attorney-client relationship between the parties; (2) the Petition for Annulment of Marriage[18] supposedly filed by respondent on December 8, 2004 with the RTC of Quezon City and docketed as Civil Case No. 04-25141; (3) the Certification issued by the Assistant Clerk of Court of the RTC of Quezon City showing that no Petition for Annulment of Marriage with Civil Case No. Q-0425141 was filed on December 8, 2004; (4) the letter dated March 6, 2005 of the complainant to the respondent informing the latter that she is terminating his legal services effective immediately; (5) the letter of complainant to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Quezon City wherein she requested that any belated attempt by my former lawyer Atty. Resurreccion to file any Petition for Annulment x x x be refused acceptance; and, (6) the letter dated July 30, 2007 of complainants new counsel demanding for an explanation as to how respondent intended to indemnify the complainant for damages she had suffered by reason of respondents fraudulent misrepresentations.[19] In the face of such a serious charge, the respondent has chosen to remain silent. Thus, we find the confluence of the evidence submitted by the complainant to have clearly, convincingly and satisfactorily shown that indeed the respondent has authored this reprehensible act. Respondent committed deceitful and dishonest acts by misrepresenting that he had already filed a petition for annulment on behalf of the complainant and pocketing the amount of P42,000.00. He even went to the extent of presenting to the complainant a supposed copy of the petition duly filed with the court. After he was found out, he made himself scarce. He ignored all communications sent to him by the complainant. After the disbarment complaint was filed, he failed to file his answer despite due notice. He totally disregarded the proceedings before the IBP despite receipt of summons. The act of respondent in not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings set by the Investigating Commission, despite due notice, emphasized his contempt for legal proceedings.[20] We thus agree with the observation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner that [s]uch action of the respondent is patently deceitful and dishonest, considering further that he received an amount of money from the complainant.[21] The natural instinct of man impels him to resist an unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It is totally against our human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false accusations. Hence, silence in such cases is almost always construed as implied admission of the truth thereof.[22] As early as In Re: Sotto,[23] this Court held that:

DECISION

One of the qualifications required of a candidate for admission to the bar is the possession of good moral character, and, when one who has already been admitted to the bar clearly shows, by a series of acts, that he does not follow such moral principles as should govern the conduct of an upright person, and that, in his dealings with his clients and with the courts, he disregards the rule of professional ethics required to be observed by every attorney, it is the duty of the court, as guardian of the interests of society, as well as of the preservation of the ideal standard of professional conduct, to make use of its powers to deprive him of his professional attributes which he so unworthily abused. In addition, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship.[24] Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, respondent may either be disbarred or suspended for committing deceitful and dishonest acts. Thus: SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar maybe disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. [Emphasis supplied.] It is thus clear from the foregoing provision that in any of the following circumstances, to wit: (1) deceit; (2)malpractice; (3) gross misconduct; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer's oath; (7) wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; or (8) corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so; the Court is vested with the authority and discretion to impose either the extreme penalty of disbarment or mere suspension. Certainly, the Court is not placed in a straitjacket as regards the penalty to be imposed. There is no ironclad rule that disbarment must immediately follow upon a finding of deceit or gross misconduct. The Court is not mandated to automatically impose the extreme penalty of disbarment. It is allowed by law to exercise its discretion either to disbar or just suspend the erring lawyer based on its appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case. We examined the records of the case and assessed the evidence presented by the complainant. After such examination and assessment, we are convinced beyond doubt that respondent should only be meted the penalty of four-year suspension as properly recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. In the exercise of our discretion, we are unquestionably certain that the four-year suspension suffices and commensurable to the infractions he committed. As will be pointed out later, there have been cases with more or less the same factual setting as in the instant case where the Court also imposed the penalty of suspension and not disbarment. We have gone over jurisprudential rulings where the respondents were found guilty of grave misconduct and/or dishonesty and we observe that the Court either disbars or suspends them based on its collective appreciation of attendant circumstances and in the exercise of its sound discretion. In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel,[25] the Court found respondent therein to have committed dishonesty and abused the confidence[26] of his client for failing to file the ejectment suit despite asking for

and receiving from the complainant the money intended as filing fees. In his bid for exoneration, therein respondent attempted to mislead the Court by claiming that he has not yet received the registry return card of the notice to vacate hence his failure to file the ejectment suit. However, the records indubitably showed that he had already received the same. Moreover, therein respondent likewise refused to return the monies he received from the complainant despite repeated demands.[27] The Court thus concluded that therein respondent's actions constitute gross misconduct. Nevertheless, based on its appreciation of the evidence, the Court refrained from imposing the penalty of disbarment. Instead, it imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months, ratiocinating thus: Complainant asks that respondent be disbarred. However, we find that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. In this case, we find suspension to be sufficient sanction against respondent. Suspension, we may add, is not primarily intended as punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession.[28] In Ceniza v. Rubia,[29] respondent therein was alleged to have misrepresented having already filed in court the necessary complaint by showing the copy of the complaint stamped received with a docket number thereon.[30]However, upon verification with the appropriate court, it was discovered that none was filed.[31] It was also noted that respondent therein prompted the complainant to borrow money from a third party just to be able to pay her attorney's fees. When the case reached this Court, it imposed the penalty of suspension and not disbarment. In so doing, the Court lent more credence to the explanation of the respondent that the case was withdrawn after it had been stamped received by the court. In Roa v. Moreno,[32] the Court found respondent therein guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty. He issued a bogus Certificate of Land Occupancy to the complainant[33] and refused to return the amount paid by the complainant.[34] For said infractions, the Court meted him with the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years.[35] In Barcenas v. Alvero,[36] respondent failed to deposit in court the amount of P300,000.00 which he received from his client supposedly as redemption price. He also failed to return the amount despite repeated demands. He was suspended for two years. In Small v. Banares[37] respondent received P80,000.00 from complainant for his legal services and as filing fees. He however failed to file the necessary complaint and was never heard from again. He was thus suspended from the practice of law for two years. In Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr.,[38] therein respondent failed to promptly report that he received money on behalf of his client. However, for lack of evidence of misappropriation, he was only suspended and not disbarred. In Gonato v. Atty. Adaza,[39] Atty. Adaza asked money from his client supposedly as filing fees when in fact no such filing fees are needed or due. Worse, he issued a falsified official receipt as proof of payment. Finally, when he was discovered, he failed to heed his client's demand to return the amount. For such infractions, Atty. Adaza was suspended for a period of six months. In Aquino v. Atty. Barcelona,[40] Atty. Barcelona deliberately misrepresented to his client that he was able to successfully facilitate the restructuring of his clients loan with a bank through his connection. On the basis of said false pretenses, he collected P60,000.00 from his client. His client eventually became aware of such misrepresentations when his property was foreclosed by

the bank. Atty. Barcelona was thus charged with misconduct and for which he was suspended by the Court for a period of six months. The foregoing cases illustrate that the Court is not bound to impose the penalty of disbarment in cases of gross misconduct and/or dishonesty, if in its appreciation of facts and in the exercise of its sound discretion, the penalty of suspension would be more commensurate.[41] Disbarment, jurisprudence teaches, should not be decreed where any punishment less severe, such as reprimand, suspension, or fine, would accomplish the end desired. This is as it should be considering the consequence of disbarment on the economic life and honor of the erring person.[42] In this case, we believe that the penalty of suspension of four years will provide Atty. Resurreccion with enough time to ponder on and cleanse himself of his misconduct.[43] While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.[44] We note that there is no mention in the records of any previous or similar administrative case filed against herein respondent. Anent the issue of whether respondent should be directed to return the amount of P42,000.00 he received from the complainant, we note that the rulings of this Court in this matter have been diverse. On one hand, there are cases where this Court directed respondents to return the money they received from the complainants. On the other hand, there are also cases where this Court refrained from venturing into this matter on the ground that the same is not within the ambit of its disciplinary authority as the only issue in administrative cases is the fitness of the lawyer to remain a member of the bar. Now is the most opportune time to harmonize the Court's ruling on this matter. Thus, it is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary authority of the Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. If the matter involves violations of the lawyers oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the Courts disciplinary authority. However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liability, and which do not directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably outside the purview of the Courts disciplinary authority. Thus, we hold that when the matter subject of the inquiry pertains to the mental and moral fitness of the respondent to remain as member of the legal fraternity, the issue of whether the respondent be directed to return the amount received from his client shall be deemed within the Courts disciplinary authority. In this case, respondent received the amount of P42,000.00 supposedly as payment for his legal services and as filing fees. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. xxxx Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x In this case, it is thus clear that respondent violated his lawyers oath and code of conduct when he withheld the amount of P42,000.00 despite his failure to render the necessary legal services and after complainant demanded its return. He must therefore be directed to return the same. Finally, we emphasize that "[t]he object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish

the individual attorney himself as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office [has] proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar."[45] WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo D. Resurreccion is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for four years. He is also DIRECTED to return to the complainant the amount of P42,000.00 within thirty (30) days from the promulgation of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this Decision to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, andReyes, JJ., concur. Sereno, J., on official leave. Perlas-Bernabe, J., on leave.

THIRD DIVISION [ A.C.No. 9154 (Formerly CBD No. 07-1965), March 19, 2012 ] AURORA D. CERDAN, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. CARLO GOMEZ, RESPONDENT. With respect to the uncollected amounts, Atty. Gomez denied the same and said that all the documents relating to the indebtedness were in the name of Rufino and that he could not do anything if the legitimate heirs of Rufino collected the same from the debtors. As to the savings account in FCB-Quezon branch, Atty. Gomez explained that said account was in the name of Rufino; that he negotiated with the legitimate heirs of Rufino for the share of the complainant; and that the proceeds thereof, in the amount of P442,547.88, were properly turned over to complainant as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt. Thereafter, the Commission of Bar Discipline through Commissioner Jose Dela Rama, Jr. (Commissioner Dela Rama) conducted a mandatory conference and thereafter required the parties to submit their verified position papers. Upon filing of their respective position papers, the case was submitted for resolution. In his Report and Recommendation,[5] Commissioner Dela Rama wrote his findings as follows: That it appears on record that complainant granted the respondent a Special Power of Attorney the specific powers of which are as follows: 1. 2. To enter into amicable settlement of my account with the First Consolidated Bank, Quezon Branch with Savings Account No. 30-0201-01020-0. (Underlining supplied) To agree to such matters as they may deem fit and proper to be done in connection with the said savings account To withdraw the said amount as agreed on the settlement, receive and sign for and in my behalf.

DECISION MENDOZA, J.: Before the Court is the undated Resolution[1] of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) finding Atty. Carlo Gomez (Atty. Gomez) liable for violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending that he be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
The case stemmed from the affidavit-complaint of Aurora D. Cerdan (complainant), filed before the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP on April 16, 2007. The complaint alleged that complainant and widower Benjamin Rufino (Rufino) lived together as husband and wife; that during their cohabitation, they purchased several real properties; that they maintained savings accounts at First Consolidated Bank (FCB), at the Quezon and Narra branches in Palawan, all of which were in the name of Rufino; that when Rufino died on December 28, 2004, complainant sought the legal advice of Atty. Gomez as to what to do with the properties left by Rufino; and that she paid Atty. Gomez attorney's fees in the amount of P152,000.00 but only the amount of P100,000.00 was reflected in the receipt. Complainant claimed that she authorized Atty. Gomez, thru a special power of attorney (SPA), to settle Rufino's savings account in FCB-Quezon branch; that the original agreement of a 50-50 sharing between complainant and the children of Rufino, as proposed by the FCB counsel, was replaced by the Compromise Agreement entered into by Atty. Gomez, wherein the heirs of Rufino got 60% of the share while she only received 40%; that Atty. Gomez included in the Compromise Agreement the savings account in FCB-Narra Branch when the scope of the SPA was only the account in FCB-Quezon branch; that Atty. Gomez took her bank book for the FCB account in Narra Branch containing deposits in the amount of more or less P165,000.00 and never returned it to her; and that Atty. Gomez withdrew from her FCB accounts and thereafter gave the amount of P290,000.00 and uttered, "ITO NA LAHATANG PERA MO ATANG SA AKIN NAKUHA KO NA." Complainant also narrated that sometime in 2000, Atty. Gomez was her counsel in a case against a certain Romeo Necio (Necio) and paid him attorney's fees and judicial fee in the amount of PI 5,000.00, and P8,000.00, respectively; that the parties agreed to settle amicably and decided that Atty. Gomez would collect from Necio the amount agreed upon; and that as of the filing of the complaint, Atty. Gomez has yet to remit to complainant the amount of P12,000.00. On April 16, 2007, the IBP required Atty. Gomez to file his answer.[3] In his Answer,[4] Atty. Gomez admitted that Rufino engaged his legal services in various cases. He, however, denied the accusations stated in the complaint-affidavit filed by complainant. Atty. Gomez averred that he was not aware that Rufino and complainant were not legally married because they represented themselves as husband and wife so the cases filed in court were under the names of spouses Benjamin and Aurora Rufino and that he only learned of said fact upon the death of Rufino in December 2004. Atty. Gomez claimed that when he had learned that complainant was not the legal wife, he exerted earnest effort to locate the surviving heirs of Rufino and substitute them in the cases filed in court; that he informed complainant of the consequences of her status and relationship with the late Rufino including her possible denial of any share from his estate; and that he advised complainant that he would make extra effort to persuade the legitimate heirs of Rufino to discuss a possible settlement and share in the estate or ask for compassion if she would be denied her share in the estate.
[2]

3.

The Special Power of Attorney appears to have been signed and notarized on February 28, 2008 at Puerto Princesa City. It appears further that as alleged, the complainant maintains two accounts at First Consolidated Bank. One is in Quezon, Palawan Branch in the amount of P442,547.88. The other account being maintained at FBC Narra Branch contains an amount equivalent to P165,000.00, more or less. According to the complainant, she did not authorize the respondent to enter into a settlement with respect to the properties left by Benjamin Rufino. Xxxx To begin with, respondent was given a Special Power of Attorney with respect to FCB Quezon account. That as far as the respondent can recall the account with FCB Quezon Branch had Pi million, more or less. COMM. DE LA RAMA: At that time, how much is the amount of deposit in FCB Quezon? Atty. Gomez: I believe, Your Honor, its Php 1million. COMM. DE LA RAMA: How much is the Narra Branch? Atty. Gomez: I am not aware, Your Honor. In fact, I have not even seen the bank account passbook. (TSN pages 30-31, September 7, 2007)

Based on the Compromise Agreement marked as Annex "F," with respect to Quezon Branch with account No. 3030-0201-0102-o, the same shall be divided as follows: 60 percent goes to the heirs of Benjamin Rufino, Jr. and 40 percent goes to Aurora Cerdan who was then presented by the respondent. This time, it was Atty. Gomez who signed the said agreement by virtue of the Special Power of Attorney dated February 28, 2005. While it is clear that in the Compromise Agreement where the complainant was supposed to receive 40% refers to FCB Quezon Branch, it cannot also be denied that in the same Compromise Agreement it speaks of FCB Narra Branch which, as admitted by the respondent, he has no authority to bind the complainant. But in the said Compromise Agreement, it cannot be denied that the respondent entered into an agreement with respect to FCB Narra Branch. Portion of the agreement reads as follows: Xxxx The first question is, when the respondent entered into a Compromise Agreement on March 1, 2005, was he acting within the powers granted to him in the Special Power of Attorney. The undersigned Commissioner believes that the respondent acted beyond the powers granted to him by virtue of the Special Power of Attorney. It is very specific that the respondent was only authorized to enter into an amicable settlement with respect to FCB Quezon Branch and not with the account in FCB Narra Branch. Xxxx The respondent, despite the fact that he was not armed with a particular document authorizing him to enter into an agreement with respect to Narra account, entered and signed a compromise agreement to the prejudice and surprise of his client. In effect, he forfeited the lawful share of his client with respect to FCB Narra Branch. Xxxx According to the complainant, the amount of cash that was given to the respondent amounted to P152,000.00 as attorney's fees. The respondent got the money at her house in Quezon, Palawan and the following week, the complainant went to the office of the respondent at Puerto Princesa to get receipt of the P152,000.00. It was at this point when the respondent allegedly stated that he only received P100,000.00 and for this reason, an Acknowledgement Receipt (annex "C") was issued by the law office of the respondent. Respondent on the other hand, during the preliminary conference stated the following: COMM. DE LA RAMA, JR.: What I am asking you is did you receive Php100,000.00 from the sendees rendered from Mrs. Cerdan? Atty. Gomez: Your Honor, please. That is the reason why I likewise fired out my secretary. COMM. DE LA RAMA, JR.: Why, did you not receive Php 100,000.00? Atty. Gomez: I deny that I received Php100,000.00, Your Honor. COMM. DE LA RAMA, JR.: So you are telling us that it was your secretary who received the P100,000.00.

Atty. Gomez: Probably, Your Honor. COMM. DE LA RAMA, JR.: Did you file any action against your secretary? Atty. Gomez: I cannot locate her anymore. COMM. DE LA RAMA, JR.: You know what to do, you are a lawyer. And did you file any civil case? Atty. Gomez: None, Your Honor because the family went to my office asking for compassion. (TSN pages 107-109, October 5, 2007) What puzzles the undersigned Commissioner is the complainant even stated that she did not give P100,000.00 to the secretary. COMM. DE LA RAMA, JR.: Ma'am Cerdan, when you went to the office of Atty. Gomez, did you give P100,000.00 to the secretary? Mrs. Cerdan: No. (TSN Page 110, October 5, 2007) Further, Mrs. Cerdan did not promise anything to Atty. Gomez by of way of compensation. The complaint stated the following: COMM. DE LA RAMA, JR.: Okay. Liliwanagin ko lang para sa kapakanan ng lahat, meron po ba kayong ipinangako naman kay Atty. Gomez na kung maiaayos niya ang usaping ito ay magkakaroon siya ng attorney's fees? Mrs. Cerdan: Wala po. Likewise, on the part of the respondent, he claims that he has no agreement with respect to his professional fees. COMM. DE LA RAMA, JR.: How about you Atty. Gomez, any agreement with complainant? Atty. Gomez: None, Your Honor. I volunteer myself to assist Mrs. Cerdan. COMM. DE LA RAMA, JR.: Without expecting anything? Atty. Gomez: Yes, Your Honor, in fact, I spent money to assist her. (TSN Page 111, October 5, 2007) Xxxx Although the respondent is denying that he received a compensation for the services rendered, we cannot deny the fact that his own law office issued an acknowledgement receipt on March 9, 2005 in the amount of P 100,000.00. Although the respondent is blaming the secretary, the undersigned is not convinced that his law office did not receive certain consideration for the services rendered. Unless this case is really under the IBP Legal Aid Program. There is nothing wrong with a lawyer receiving reasonable compensation for the services rendered. In fact, under

Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. Whether the lawyer's sendees were solicited or they were offered to the client for his assistance, in as much as these services were accepted and made use of the latter, there is a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of the services, which gives rise to the obligation upon the person benefited by the services to make compensation therefore. Lawyers are thus as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice on the part of their clients as the clients are against abuses on the part of the counsel. The duty of the court is not only to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner, and also see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees (Camacho vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. G.R. No. 127520, February 9, 2007, 515 SCRA 242)."[6]

CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Xxxx

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client.[12] He is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property and money he has collected for his client.[13] Lawyers should always live up to the ethical standards of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Public confidence in law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[14] The penalty for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility usually ranges from suspension for six months, 5 to suspension for one year,[16] or two years[17] and even disbarment[18] depending on the amount involved and the severity of the lawyer's misconduct. Considering that this is Atty. Gomez's first offense, the penalty of suspension for one (1) year is a sufficient sanction. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carlo Gomez is hereby declared GUILTY of violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon receipt of this Resolution, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with severely. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Court Administrator for distribution to all courts of the land, the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and entered into the personal records of Atty. Gomez as an attorney and as a member of the Philippine Bar. SO ORDERED.

Commissioner Dela Rama found that Atty. Gomez violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. On June 5, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors passed its Resolution[7] adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Atty. Gomez moved for reconsideration,[8] but in its Resolution No. XIX-2011-415 dated June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion for reconsideration. The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP. A lawyer-client relationship is highly fiduciary in nature and it requires a high standard of conduct and demands utmost fidelity, candor, fairness, and good faith. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, he is required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion.[10] In the case at bench, Atty. Gomez failed to observe the utmost good faith, loyalty, candor, and fidelity required of an attorney in his dealings with complainant. Atty. Gomez exceeded his authority when he entered into a compromise agreement with regard to the FCB account in Quezon Branch, where he agreed that complainant shall receive 40 percent of the proceeds while the heirs of Rufino shall get the 60 percent, which was contrary to the original agreement of 50-50 sharing. Atty. Gomez likewise acted beyond the scope of the SPA when he included in the compromise agreement the FCB account in Narra branch when it was issued only with respect to the FCB account, Quezon branch. Moreover, Atty. Gomez entered into a compromise agreement with respect to the other properties of Rufino without authority from complainant. Furthermore, Atty. Gomez failed to account for the money he received for complainant as a result of the compromise agreement. Worse, he remitted the amount of P290,000.00 only, an amount substantially less than the share of complainant. Records reveal that complainant's share from the FCB savings accounts amounted to P442,547.88 but only P290,000.00 was remitted by Atty. Gomez after deducting his share. This Court will not tolerate such acts. Atty. Gomez has no right to unilaterally retain his lawyer's lien.[11] Having obtained the funds in the course of his professional employment, Atty. Gomez had the obligation to account and deliver such funds to his client when they became due, or upon demand. Moreover, there was no agreement between him and complainant that he could deduct therefrom his claimed attorney's fees. The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically Section 16, provides:

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur

SECOND DIVISION [ A.C. No. 6733, October 10, 2012 ] HERMINIA P. VOLUNTAD-RAMIREZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ROSARIO B. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.: The Case This administrative case arose from a complaint filed by Herminia P. Voluntad-Ramirez (complainant) against Atty. Rosario B. Bautista (respondent) for violation of Canon 18,[1] Rule 18.02,[2] and Rule 22.02[3] of the Code of Professional Responsibility, violation of the lawyers oath, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the public. The Facts In her Affidavit-Complaint[4] dated 29 March 2005, complainant alleged that on 25 November 2002, she engaged the legal services of respondent to file a complaint against complainants siblings for encroachment of her right of way. For his legal services, respondent demanded P15,000 as acceptance fee, plus P1,000 per court appearance. Complainant then paid respondent the P15,000 acceptance fee. On 29 May 2003, or six months after she hired respondent, complainant severed the legal services of respondent because respondent failed to file a complaint within a reasonable period of time as requested by complainant. Complainant then retrieved from respondent the folder containing the documents and letters pertaining to her case which complainant had entrusted to respondent. Complainant claimed that she was dissatisfied with the way respondent handled her complaint considering that during the six months that elapsed, respondent only sent a letter to the City Engineers Office in Navotas City concerning her complaint. On 8 March 2004, complainant sent a letter to respondent, reiterating that she was terminating the services of respondent and that she was asking for the refund of P14,000 out of the P15,000 acceptance fee. Complainant stated in her letter that due to respondents failure to institute the desired complaint on time against complainants brothers and sisters, complainant was compelled to hire the services of another counsel to file the complaint. Respondent failed to refund the P14,000, prompting complainant to file on 10 May 2005 her complaint dated 29 March 2005 with the Office of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court. Complainant charged respondent with violation of Canon 18, Rule 18.02, and Rule 22.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, violation of the lawyers oath, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the public. In his defense, respondent alleges that complainant initially wanted him to file an injunction case against her siblings but later changed her mind when she was apprised of the expenses involved. Respondent then advised complainant that since her case involves family members, earnest efforts toward a compromise should be made in accordance with Article 222 of the Civil Code[5] and that since the parties reside in the same barangay, the case must be referred to the barangay in accordance with the Local Government Code. Respondent also suggested filing a criminal action instead of an injunction case. The day after he was hired by complainant, respondent wrote a letter to the City Engineer of Navotas City pertaining to complainants case. Respondent made several follow ups with the City Engineers Office and even filed a case[6] against the City Engineer for nonfeasance under Republic Act No. 6713.[7] When complainant voluntarily withdrew her case from respondent on 29 May 2003, complainant also retrieved the folder containing the documents relevant to her case. It was only after almost ten months from severing respondents legal services that complainant sent a letter dated 8 March 2004 demanding the refund of P14,000 out of the P15,000 acceptance fee. Respondent explains that the acceptance fee is non-refundable because it covers the time and cost of research made immediately before and after acceptance of the case. The acceptance fee also pays for the

office supplies used for the case. Nevertheless, respondent alleges that he did not ignore complainants request for a refund. Respondent claims that he sent a letter dated 17 March 2004, which stated that although it is their law firms policy not to entertain requests for refund of acceptance fee, they were willing to grant her a fifty percent (50%) discount and for complainant to contact them for her refund.[8] In fact, respondent stated that he sent text messages to complainants lawyer, Atty. Bartolome, signifying respondents willingness to refund the amount of P9,000.[9] In her Reply-Affidavit, complainant stated that even before she engaged respondents legal services, her case was already referred to the barangay for conciliation proceedings. However, complainants siblings failed to appear which resulted in the issuance on 1 July 2002 of a Certification to File Action by the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, Office of the Barangay Council, Barangay Daanghari, Navotas.[10] Respondent countered in his Position Paper that complainant did not inform him of the existence of the alleged Certification to File Action and that the said certification was not part of the case folder which respondent turned over to complainant when his services was severed. The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision. Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of the lawyers oath, Canon 18, Rule[s] 18.03 and 22.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, grave misconduct and thereby recommend that he be suspended for a period of one (1) year with a stern warning that similar acts in the future will be severely dealt with.[11] Respondent was also ordered to refund to complainant the sum of P14,000. The Investigating Commissioner held that respondent has the moral duty to restitute P14,000 out of the P15,000 acceptance fee considering that, apart from sending a letter to the City Engineer of Navotas City, respondent did nothing more to advance his clients cause during the six months that complainant engaged his legal services. Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines On 31 May 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2007-230, adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation, with modification, thus: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents dishonesty, negligence in [his] mandated duty to file a case to protect [his] clients cause, Atty. Rosario Bautista is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months, and Restitution of the amount of P14,000 to complainant is likewise ordered.[12] In his Motion for Reconsideration, respondent alleged that even before complainant officially engaged his legal services on 25 November 2002, complainant already consulted him for several days regarding her case for which no consultation fee was charged. A day after receiving the P15,000 acceptance fee, respondent sent a letter-complaint to the City Engineer of Navotas City for a possible case of violation of the National Building Code. Respondent reiterated that

complainant failed to disclose to him that a Certification to File Action was already issued by the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa. In its 28 October 2011 Resolution No. XX-2011-143, the Board of Governors of the IBP partially granted respondents Motion for Reconsideration: RESOLVED to unanimously GRANT partially, the Respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, Resolution No. XVIII-2007-230 dated 31 May 2007 is hereby Amended, by lowering the recommended penalty of Suspension against respondent Atty. Rosario Bautista from six (6) months to ADMONITION. The Issue The issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of negligence in handling the case of complainant. The Ruling of the Court The Court affirms the 28 October 2011 Resolution No. XX-2011-143 of the Board of Governors of the IBP, reducing the recommended penalty from six months to admonition. We agree with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent breached his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence. Respondent is also guilty of violating Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. However, we do not find respondent guilty of violating Rule 22.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility[13] since respondent immediately turned over to complainant the folder containing the documents and letters pertaining to her case upon the severance of respondents legal services. Once a lawyer receives the acceptance fee for his legal services, he is expected to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his clients cause with diligence, care and devotion.[14] As held in Santiago v. Fojas:[15] It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of [his] client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of the law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client bu also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[16] In this case, respondent attributes his delay in filing the appropriate criminal case to the absence of conciliation proceedings between complainant and her siblings before the barangay as required under Article 222 of the Civil Code and the Local Government Code. However, this excuse is belied by the Certification to File Action by the Office of the Lupong

Tagapamayapa, Office of the Barangay Council, Barangay Daanghari, Navotas. The Certification to File Action was issued on 1 July 2002, which was more than four months before complainant engaged respondents legal services on 25 November 2002. Respondents allegation that complainant failed to inform him about the existence of the Certification to File Action is hard to believe considering complainants determination to file the case against her siblings. Clearly, respondent has been negligent in handling complainants case.
In Cario v. Atty. De Los Reyes,[17] the respondent lawyer who failed to file a complaint-affidavit before the prosecutors office, restituted the P10,000 acceptance fee paid to him. The respondent lawyer in Cario was reprimanded by the Court with a warning that he should be more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients. In this case, complainant is asking for the refund of P14,000 out of the P15,000 acceptance fee considering that, apart from sending a letter to the City Engineer of Navotas City, respondent did nothing more to advance his clients cause during the six months that complainant engaged his legal services. We agree with the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors that a refund is in order. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the 28 October 2011 Resolution No. XX-2011-143 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, reducing the recommended penalty from six months to admonition. The Court finds Atty. Rosario B. Bautista GUILTY of violating Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he is ADMONISHED to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duty to his clients. Atty. Bautista is ordered to RESTITUTE to complainant P14,000 out of the P15,000 acceptance fee. SO ORDERED.

Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION [ A.C. No. 9387 (Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562), June 20, 2012 ] EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA, RESPONDENT. After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing, respondent never saw or heard from him again and thus assumed that the husband heeded his advice and settled the case. When respondent received an Order from the CA requiring him to file a comment on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Duigan, he "instructed his office staff to contact Mr. Hernandez thru available means of communication, but to no avail."[11]Thus, when complainant's husband went to the office of respondent to tell the latter that the Sheriff of the RTC had informed complainant of the CA's Resolution dismissing the case, respondent was just as surprised. The lawyer exclaimed, "KALA KO BA NAKIPAG AREGLO NA KAYO."[12] In his 5 January 2009 Report,[13] IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. found that respondent violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code). He recommended that respondent be suspended from practicing law from 3 to 6 months. The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XIX-2010-452 on 28 August 2010. Therein, they resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six months. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[14] He prayed for the relaxation of the application of the Canons of the Code. On 14 January 2012, the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-17[15] partly granting his Motion and reducing the penalty imposed to one-month suspension from the practice of law. Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting Director for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa, through, a letter[16] addressed to then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against respondent. We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This Court, however, disagrees with its Decision to reduce the penalty to one-month suspension. We thus affirm the six-month suspension the Board originally imposed in its 28 August 2010 Resolution. Respondent insists that he had never met complainant prior to the mandatory conference set for the disbarment Complaint she filed against him. However, a perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the appellate court revealed that he had signed as counsel for the defendantappellants therein, including complainant and her husband.[17] The pleading starts with the following sentence: "DEFENDANT[S]-APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto this Honorable Court submit the Memorandum and further allege that: x x x."[18 ]Nowhere does the document say that it was filed only on behalf of complainant's husband. It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between him and complainant's husband cannot be treated as a "client-lawyer" relationship, viz: It is no more than a client needing a legal document and had it prepared by a lawyer for a fee. Under the factual milieu and circumstances, it could not be said that a client entrusted to a lawyer handling and prosecution of his case that calls for the strict application of the Code; x x x[19] As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into a lawyer-client relationship, he also alleges that complainant's husband never contacted him after the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal. According to respondent, this behavior was "very unusual if he really believed that he engaged" the former's services.[20]

RESOLUTION SERENO, J.: This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her lawyer, Atty. Venancio B. Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law Offices, for his alleged negligence in the handling of her case.
The records disclose that complainant and her husband were the respondents in an ejectment case filed against them with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC). In a Decision[1] dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge Carandang), the RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of complainant be cancelled; and that the latter pay the complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan), attorney's fees and moral damages. Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals (CA) ordered them to file their Appellants' Brief. They chose respondent to represent them in the case. On their behalf, he filed a Memorandum on Appeal instead of an Appellants' Brief. Thus, Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a Resolution[2] dated 16 December 2003. No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the appeal was filed by the couple. Complainant claims that because respondent ignored the Resolution, he acted with "deceit, unfaithfulness amounting to malpractice of law."[3] Complainant and her husband failed to file an appeal, because respondent never informed them of the adverse decision. Complainant further claims that she asked respondent "several times" about the status of the appeal, but "despite inquiries he deliberately withheld response [sic]," to the damage and prejudice of the spouses.[4] The Resolution became final and executory on 8 January 2004. Complainant was informed of the Resolution sometime in July 2005, when the Sheriff of the RTC came to her house and informed her of the Resolution. On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), seeking the disbarment of respondent on the following grounds: deceit, malpractice, and grave misconduct. Complainant prays for moral damages in the amount of P350,000. Through an Order[6] dated 12 September 2005, Director of Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ordered respondent to submit an answer to the Complaint. In his CounterAffidavit/Answer,[7] respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the Complaint. Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant. He averred that prior to the mandatory conference set by the IBP on 13 December 2005, he had never met complainant, because it was her husband who had personally transacted with him. According to respondent, the husband "despondently pleaded to me to prepare a Memorandum on Appeal because according to him the period given by the CA was to lapse within two or three days."[8] Thus, respondent claims that he filed a Memorandum on Appeal because he honestly believed that "it is this pleading which was required."[9] Before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised complainant's husband to settle the case. The latter allegedly "gestured approval of the advice."[10]
[5]

Complainant pointed out in her Reply[21] that respondent was her lawyer, because he accepted her case and an acceptance fee in the amount of P7,000. According to respondent, however, "[C]ontrary to the complainant's claim that he charged P7,000 as acceptance fee," "the fee was only for the preparation of the pleading which is even low for a Memorandum of Appeal: xxx."[22] Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause.[23] Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyer's duty to serve the client with competence and diligence.[24] Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty. According to respondent, he merely drafted the pleading that complainant's husband asked from him. Respondent also claims that he filed a Memorandum of Appeal, because he "honestly believed" that this was the pleading required, based on what complainant's husband said. The IBP Investigating Commissioner's observation on this matter, in the 5 January 2009 Report, is correct. Regardless of the particular pleading his client may have believed to be necessary, it was respondent's duty to know the proper pleading to be filed in appeals from RTC decisions, viz: Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the trial court, respondent should have known that the mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals for said Decision is by ordinary appeal under Section 2(a) Ru]e 41 of thel997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In all such cases. Rule 44 of the said Rules applies.[25] When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal. Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellant's brief be filed after the records of the case have been elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know this procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads: CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence. The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty have been expounded in Dularia, Jr. v. Cruz,[26] to wit: It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not. be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes. In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of the IBP, claiming that the reason for his failure to file the proper pleading was that he "did not have enough time to acquaint himself thoroughly with the factual milieu of the case." The IBP reconsidered and thereafter significantly reduced the penalty originally imposed.

Respondent's plea for leniency should not have been granted. The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the case does not excuse his negligence. Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. While it is true that respondent was not complainant's lawyer from the trial to the appellate court stage, this fact did not excuse him from his duty to diligently study a case he had agreed to handle. If he felt he did not have enough time to study the pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by complainant's husband only two days before the expiration of the period for filing the Appellant's Brief, respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time to file the proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he could come up with, just to "beat the deadline set by the Court of Appeals."[27] Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that he filed the wrong pleading. However, instead of explaining his side by filing a comment, as ordered by the appellate court, he chose to ignore the CA's Order. He claims that he was under the presumption that complainant and her husband had already settled the case, because he had not heard from the husband since the filing of the latter's Memorandum of Appeal. This explanation does not excuse respondent's actions. First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have availed himself of, from the moment he received the Notice from the CA to the moment he received the disbarment Complaint filed against him. But because of his negligence, He chose to sit on the case and do nothing. Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their case. His failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which reads: 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information. If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent could have done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus explained why he was no longer the counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and informed the court that he could no longer contact them.[28] His failure to take this measure proves his negligence. Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigan's Motion to Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the client's case, viz: Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence in fulfilling their duty would render them liable for disciplinary action.[29 ] Respondent has failed to live up' to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to his client, he engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct for which he should be held accountable. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of violating Rules 18.02, 18.03, 18.04, as well as Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, he

is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member of the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country for their information and guidance. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION [ A.C. No. 6903, April 16, 2012 ] SUZETTE DEL MUNDO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ARNEL C. CAPISTRANO, RESPONDENT.

Malabon and discovered that while the case of Tuparan had been filed on January 27, 2005, no petition has yet been filed for her. Hence, Suzette called for a conference, which was set on July 28, 2005, where she demanded the refund of the total amount of PhP78,500.00, but Atty. Capistrano instead offered to return the amount of PhP63,000.00 on staggered basis claiming to have incurred expenses in the filing of Tuparans case, to which she agreed. On the same occasion, Atty. Capistrano handed to her copies of her unfiled petition,[3] Tuparans petition[4] and his Withdrawal of Appearance[5] in Tuparans case with instructions to file them in court, as well as a list[6] containing the expenses he incurred and the schedule of payment of the amount of PhP63,000.00, as follows: PhP20,000.00 August 15, 2005 PhP20,000.00 PhP23,000.00 August 29, 2005 September 15, 2005

DECISION PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Before the Court is an administrative complaint[1] for disbarment filed by complainant Suzette Del Mundo (Suzette) charging respondent Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano (Atty. Capistrano) of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Facts On January 8, 2005, Suzette and her friend Ricky S. Tuparan (Tuparan) engaged the legal services of Atty. Capistrano to handle the judicial declaration of nullity of their respective marriages allegedly for a fee of PhP140,000.00 each. On the same date, a Special Retainer Agreement[2] was entered into by and between Suzette and Atty. Capistrano which required an acceptance fee of PhP30,000.00, appearance fee of PhP2,500.00 per hearing and another PhP2,500.00 per pleading. In addition, Atty. Capistrano allegedly advised her to prepare amounts for the following expenses: PhP11,000.00 PhP5,000.00 PhP15,000.00 PhP30,000.00 PhP15,000.00 Filing fee Summons Fiscal Psychiatrist Commissioner

However, Atty. Capistrano only returned the amount of PhP5,000.00 on August 15, 2005 and thereafter, refused to communicate with her, prompting the institution of this administrative complaint on September 7, 2005. In his Comment/Answer[7] dated November 14, 2005, Atty. Capistrano acknowledged receipt of the amount of PhP78,500.00 from Suzette and his undertaking to return the agreed sum of PhP63,000.00. He also admitted responsibility for his failure to file Suzettes petition and cited as justification his heavy workload and busy schedule as then City Legal Officer of Manila and lack of available funds to immediately refund the money received. In the Resolution[8] dated January 18, 2006, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The Action and Recommendation of the IBP For failure of respondent Atty. Capistrano to appear at the mandatory conference set by Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), the conference was terminated without any admissions and stipulations of facts and the parties were ordered to file their respective position papers to which only Atty. Capistrano complied. In the Report and Recommendation[9] dated April 11, 2007, the IBP-CBD, through Commissioner Quisumbing, found that Atty. Capistrano had neglected his clients interest by his failure to inform Suzette of the status of her case and to file the agreed petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It also concluded that his inability to refund the amount he had promised Suzette showed deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. Hence, he was held guilty of violating Rule 18.03, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension for two years from the practice of law. On September 19, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Quisumbing through Resolution No. XVIII-2007-98[10] with modification ordering the return of the sum of PhP140,000.00 attorneys fees to Suzette. However, upon Atty. Capistranos timely motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-263[11] on May 14, 2011 reducing the penalty of suspension from two years to one year, to wit:

In accordance with their agreement, Suzette gave Atty. Capistrano the total amount of PhP78,500.00, to wit: January 8, 2005 January 15, 2005 February 3, 2005 May 4, 2005 June 8, 2005 PhP30,000.00 PhP11,000.00 PhP5,000.00 PhP2,500.00 PhP30,000.00 Acceptance fee Filing fee Filing fee Filing fee Filing fee

For every payment that Suzette made, she would inquire from Atty. Capistrano on the status of her case. In response, the latter made her believe that the two cases were already filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon City and awaiting notice of hearing. Sometime in July 2005, when she could hardly reach Atty. Capistrano, she verified her case from the Clerk of Court of

RESOLVED to PARTIALLY GRANT Respondents Motion for Reconsideration, and unanimously MODIFY as it is hereby MODIFIED Resolution No. XVIII-2007-98 dated 19 September 2007 and REDUCED the penalty against Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano to SUSPENSION from the practice of law for one (1) year and Ordered to Return the amount of One Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (P140,000.00) to complainant with thirty (30) days from receipt of notice.
The Issue The sole issue before the Court is whether Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Ruling of the Court After a careful perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD but takes exception to the amount of PhP140,000.00 recommended to be returned to Suzette. Indisputably, Atty. Capistrano committed acts in violation of his sworn duty as a member of the bar. In his Manifestation and Petition for Review,[12] he himself admitted liability for his failure to act on Suzettes case as well as to account and return the funds she entrusted to him. He only pleaded for the mitigation of his penalty citing the lack of intention to breach his lawyers oath; that this is his first offense; and that his profession is the only means of his and his familys livelihood. He also prayed that the adjudged amount of PhP140,000.00 be reduced to PhP73,500.00 representing the amount of PhP78,500.00 he received less his payment of the sum of PhP5,000.00. Consequently, Commissioner Quisumbing and the IBP-CBD Board of Governors correctly recommended the appropriate penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law for violating the pertinent provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, thus: CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. RULE 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. RULE 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. xxx CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. xxx RULE 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. RULE 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. Indeed, when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latters rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society.[13] His workload does not justify neglect in handling ones case because it is settled that

a lawyer must only accept cases as much as he can efficiently handle.[14] Moreover, a lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his possession. As trustee of such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the filing and processing of a case if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. Failure to return gives rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. And the conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.[15] To stress, the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[16] Falling short of this standard, the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer by imposing an appropriate penalty based on the exercise of sound judicial discretion in consideration of the surrounding facts.[17] With the foregoing disquisition and Atty. Capistranos admission of his fault and negligence, the Court finds the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP-CBD, sufficient sanction for his violation. However, the Court finds proper to modify the amount to be returned to Suzette from PhP140,000.00 to PhP73,500.00. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano, having clearly violated Canons 16 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is ORDERED to return to Suzette Del Mundo the full amount of PhP73,500.00 within 30 days from notice hereof and DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of such payment. Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Abad, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION [ A.C. No. 3283, July 13, 1995 ] RODOLFO MILLARE, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, RESPONDENT. In a resolution dated February 12, 1988, the CA denied the Motion for Oral Argument and in a resolution dated October 18, 1988, denied the motion for reconsideration of the February 12 Resolution. Respondent then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court (G.R. No. 86084) questioning the decisions of the MTC and the RTC in favor of petitioner's mother. In a Resolution dated January 4, 1989, we denied the petition for having been filed and paid late on December 12, 1988 and November 12, 1988, respectively. A motion for reconsideration from such resolution was likewise denied with finality. Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Prohibitory or Restraining Order (dated July 6, 1988) in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690. On April 12, 1988, the mother of complainant filed a Motion for Execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 844. Respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion for Execution on the ground that the case was still pending review by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 and therefore the motion for execution was premature. On August 23, 1988, the MTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The RTC affirmed the order for the issuance of the writ of execution. Thus, a writ of execution was issued on October 18, 1988. On October 26, 1988, respondent filed a special civil action (SP CV No. 624) with the RTC, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against the MTC, Provincial Sheriff and complainant's mother, seeking to annul the writ of execution issued in MTC Civil Case No. 844 and RTC Civil Case No. 344. Respondent alleged that the order granting the writ of execution was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since a petition to annul the decisions (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690) was still pending with the CA. On October 28, 1988, the provincial sheriff, Romulo V. Paredes, deferred the implementation of the writ of execution until the petition filed in SP CV No. 624 for certiorari was resolved. The CA denied in SP CV No. 624 respondent's Urgent Motion to Set Aside and Declare Null and Void the Writ of Execution. From the decision of the RTC, Branch l, Abra in SP CV No. 624 denying the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order, respondent again filed an Appeal and/or Review byCertiorari; Etc. with the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 17040). II We have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent his client "within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use any arguable construction of the law or rules which is favorable to his client. But the lawyer is not allowed to knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law. He cannot prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions (Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility 310 [1979]). Professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and qualifications (Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 579-

DECISION QUIASON, J.: This is a complaint for disbarment. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court resolved to refer it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors rendered a decision, finding respondent guilty of malpractice and recommending that he be suspended from the practice of law. I Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment from the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra (MTC) which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 844). Co, through respondent as counsel, appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Bangued, Abra (RTC). She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor paid the rentals adjudged by the MTC. The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to comply with Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines (CA-G.R. CV No. 11404). According to the CA, Co should have filed a petition for review and not an ordinary appeal (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 22). The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on November 19, 1986. On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by respondent as counsel for Co in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404, arguing that the decisions of the MTC and the RTC were null and void for being contrary to law, justice and equity for allowing the lessor to increase by 300% the rentals for an old house. Respondent, admitting his mistake in filing an ordinary appeal instead of a petition for review, prayed that he be allowed to file an action for annulment. On February 23, 1987, the CA gave due course to respondent's Manifestation and Motion and let the records remain with it. However, on November 10, 1987, the said court ordered the records in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 to be remanded to the court a quo. On March 9, 1987, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Decisions and/or Reformation or Novation of Decisions of the MTC and the RTC (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690), insisting that the decisions were not in accordance with existing laws and policies. On December 17, 1987, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment or novation explaining that "xxx, aside from the reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38), there is no other means whereby the defeated party may procure final and executory judgment to be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation, unless (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, or (b) it has been obtained by fraud, x x x. There is no allegation in the present complaint to the effect that the judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud" (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 35; Underscoring supplied). On January 15, 1988, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Set Motion for Reconsideration for Oral Arguments of the CA decision. The CA denied the motion. Again, respondent requested the CA to set his Motion For Oral Arguments on April 14, 1988.

582 [1986]). Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Implementing said Canon are the following rules: "Rule 12.02. - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause. xxx xxx xxx

(2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 - Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Abra; (3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 - An Action For the Annulment of Decisions And/Or Reformation or Novation of Decisions filed with the Court of Appeals; (4) G.R. No. 86084 - Petition For Review On Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court; (5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 - Appeal And/Or Review By Certiorari, Etc. filed also with the Court of Appeals; and, (6) SP Civil Action No. 624 - Petition For Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Bangued, Abra. Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the same judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping. In Villanueva v. Adre 172 SCRA 876 (1989), the Court explained that forum shopping exists when, by reason of an adverse decision in one forum, defendant ventures to another for a more favorable resolution of his case. In the case of Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 272 (1976), this Court explained that: <BLOCKQUOTE>"Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court's processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to add, the lawyer who filed such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor" (at p. 275).</BLOCKQUOTE> By having willfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a favorable judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses as he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws (Garcia v. Francisco, 220 SCRA 512 [1993]). As correctly noted by the Committee on Bar Discipline "in filing a number of pleadings, actions and petitions, respondent `has made a mockery of the judicial processes' and disregarded canons of professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered, thus, `abused procedural rules to defeat ends of substantial justice'" (Report and Recommendation, IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, p. 2). WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year. SO ORDERED.

"Rule 12.04. - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes." It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment (Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motions Practice: Time for Change, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1069 [1976]; Overmeyer v. Fidelista and Deposit Co., 554 F. 2d 539, 543 [2d Cir. 1971]). The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC were fully protected and her defenses were properly ventilated when he filed the appeal from the MTC to the RTC. But respondent thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded means to delay the execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his client. The said decision became executory even pending its appeal with the RTC because of the failure of Co to file a supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly rentals as they fell due. Furthermore, his petition for annulment of the decisions of the MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690) was defective and dilatory. According to the CA, there was no allegation therein that the courts had no jurisdiction, that his client was denied due process, or "that the judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud." As ruled in Regidor v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 530 (1993): "A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) that it has been obtained by fraud. x x x" (at p. 534). Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the case be remanded, respondent knew very well that the decision of the MTC was already ripe for execution. This Court, in People of Paombong, Bulacan v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 423 (1993), ruled: <BLOCKQUOTE>"xxx [w]hen the judgement of a superior court is remanded to the trial court for execution, the function of the trial court is ministerial only; the trial court is merely obliged with becoming modesty to enforce that judgment and has no jurisdiction either to modify in any way or to reverse the same. xxx" (at p. 430).</BLOCKQUOTE> (See also Valenzona v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 306 [1993] and Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250 [1993]). Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the execution of the MTC judgment in Civil Case No. 844, to wit: (1) Civil Case No. 344 - Appeal from the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 844 of the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra, with the Regional Trial Court, Abra;

Padilla, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.