A Critical Rethinking of US Hegemony

International Studies Review (2009) 11, 253276
American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism: A Critical Rethinking of US Hegemony

Meghana V. Nayak and Christopher Malone Pace University
In this essay, we argue that critical International Relations (IR) scholars must consider American Orientalism in tandem with American Exceptionalism in order to better understand US identity, foreign policymaking, and hegemony. We claim that American Exceptionalism is a particular type of American Orientalism, a style of thought about the distinctions between the West and the East that gives grounding to the foundational narrative of America. While Exceptionalism and Orientalism both deploy similar discursive, ontological, and epistemological claims about the West and its non-western Others, Exceptionalism is also rooted specically in American political thought that developed in contradistinction to Europe. As such, we demonstrate that different logics of othering are at work between the West and the nonWest, and among Western powers. We implore critical IR scholars to interrogate how the United States and Europe alternatively collude and clash in wielding normative power over their non-Western Others. We claim such research is important for exploring the staying power of American hegemony and understanding the implications of European challenges to American foreign policy, particularly given recent concerns about a so-called transatlantic divide.
America did not change on September 11. It only became more itself. (Robert Kagan [2003])
Samuel Huntingtons (1993) Clash of Civilizations thesis argued that cultural and religious identities would be the primary source of conict in the post-Cold War world.1 His claim that Islam has bloody borders resonated strongly with many US intellectuals and policymakers. About a decade later, the events of September 11 (9 11) and the divisions resulting from the US war on terror offered seemingly infallible proof to these same pundits of supposedly intractable differences between the West and the East. In October 2001, Edward Said responded with The Clash of Ignorance (Said 2001). He lambasted Huntingtons rigid categories of difference and promoted instead a critical analysis of power and justice. In many ways, his comments echoed his much earlier scholarship found in his seminal 1979 treatise on Orientalism, an ideology based on alleged ontological and epistemological distinctions between the invented collective identities of the West and the Orient East (Said 1979:2,7). Scholars in
1 We would like to thank the editors of the International Studies Review as well as three anonymous reviewers for their thorough and insightful comments.
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American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism
feminist studies, critical race theory, cultural studies, postcolonial theory, and most recently in the discipline of International Relations (IR) have built on Saids decades of scholarship to critically examine US identity politics, namely in its attempt to propagate its hegemony. We acknowledge the contribution of these scholars and heed the call in a recent 2007 issue of Millennium2 to more rigorously engage with Saids work to invigorate critical IR.3 However, we argue that critical IR scholars, in order to better grapple with US hegemony, identitymaking, and foreign policy, must explore American Orientalism in tandem with critical understandings of American Exceptionalism.4 Although American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism have some commonalities, there are noteworthy differences that warrant an exploration of the relationship between and unique signicance of American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism. We claim that American Orientalism is a style of thought that gets grounding through American Exceptionalism, a particular and specic form of Orientalism intended to produce America. Exceptionalism, as Americas foundational narrative, holds that the United States has a unique place in history, differing fundamentally and qualitatively from all other countries; it also emphasizes a God-given destiny to guide the rest of the world according to the mainstream US political, social, and economic worldview (Lipset 1996). Orientalism and Exceptionalism share in common the discursive deployment of ontological difference and epistemological claims underlying the American providential mission to provide order to the world, the justications for conquering and occupying territories, and the racial hierarchy that prioritizes Anglo-Saxons. However, we argue that American Exceptionalism differs from American Orientalism because it is rooted in American political thought about the development and articulation of the American nation in contradistinction to Europe. Accordingly, while critical IR analysis of Orientalism can help to critique and understand the positional superiority of Western countries in relation to the Othering of the non-West, both inside and outside of Western borders, it needs to interrogate American Exceptionalism so as to better explain and interpret American othering of Europe and the concomitant historical and contemporary clashes within the socalled Western world.5 Critical IR should be better equipped to challenge the clash of civilizations thesis not simply because it smacks of overly polemic and divisive rhetoric, but, as we argue, it obscures the signicance, implications, and timing of perceived clashes between Western powers. In particular, we note there are contentious differences between the United States and Europe, as well as within Europe, regarding intra-European relationships and Europes relationship with the United States. Examples include the relative roles of the US and various European powers in the world; differences on who or what constitutes Europe; the distinction between the policies of old and new Europe; immigration; secularism; whether to admit Turkey to the European Union; appropriate responses to terrorism; policy positions on situations regarding, among others, Russia, Iran, Israel, Venezuela, Cuba, and North Korea; relationships with
2 See the forum on Edward Said and International Relations in volume 36, no. 1, 2007 issue of Millennium: Journal of International Studies. 3 Critical IR aims to reveal the myopic disciplinary limits of mainstream IR and to rethink concepts such as security and power through integration of critical theories in historical materialism, feminism, postcolonialism, cultural studies, and postpositivism (George 1994; Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, and Duvall 1999; Chowdhry and Nair 2002; Roach 2007). 4 The American qualier of Orientalism and Exceptionalism refers to the United States. This is not to neglect the other countries in the Americas but to use the common terminology deployed in the disciplines discussed. 5 We are acutely aware of the difculties in discussing Western countries. Indeed, we could bring Australia, Canada, Israel, and Russia into, or leave parts of Europe out of, a conversation about the West, colonialism, and or hegemony, for various reasons. However, we are exploring the West in the specic context of American Exceptionalism and its concern with (certain) European countries.
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emergent powers such as China and India; the role of the state vis-a ` -vis corporations and regional organizations; and how to participate in neoliberal global governance via the United Nations, international nancial institutions, trade agreements and zones, and nuclear non-proliferation agreements. Further, scholars and political pundits alike have accused the Bush administration of not only exerting violence against the Muslim and or Arab Other, but also of creating conict with the United States key allies in Europe. Critical discussion of these tensions would help to challenge the ction of a coherent Western civilization. In other words, we contest that there is a monolithic, hermetically sealed West that posits itself against the rest of the world. While the United States and Europe seem all too similar in their Orientalism, we must understand such othering practices in the context of the aforementioned transatlantic and European conicts. At stake is a deeper examination of how and when the United States and Europe may both invoke Orientalism but contend differently with the realities of US hegemony. What are the implications, for example, of the increasingly voiced opinion that Europe, specically through the European Union, is potentially creating a collective, non-violent sovereignty that is markedly different from the US statecraft?6 We also wish to challenge the perception that Europe, while confronting its own forms of state and border violence and disagreeing over the future of the European Union, can and should cohesively counter US hegemony. In order to address this issue and the multiple questions it implies, we critically rethink the assumptions of and the literatures on American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism. In the rst section, we trace the explanatory power of American Orientalism posited by Said and expanded upon by other scholars. This sets the stage for the second section, which aims to explain why American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism should be explored concurrently. As such, we point out that US unilateral behavior after 9 11 and the consequential transatlantic divide is not specic to the Bush administration but is indicative of the staying power of American Exceptionalismthe foundational narrative of America. We also claim that American Exceptionalisms fundamental distinction between America and Europe can help us to better and more critically understand transatlantic relations. In addition, we explore how the American logic of othering non-western countries, via Orientalism, is different from the logic of othering Western countries, via Exceptionalism. The third section further illustrates by rst clarifying the elements of Exceptionalism that leverage Orientalism, such as the providential mission, racial superiority, and conquest encompassed in the doctrine of Manifest Destiny. We simultaneously demonstrate that American Exceptionalism is as much about a distinction among civilized countries, particularly with European countries, as it is about a difference between the civilized and non-civilized world. Through a critical genealogy of the becoming of America, ranging from John Winthrops City on a Hill speech with the arrival of the Puritans, to Manifest Destiny, to the Monroe Doctrine and its corollaries, to Wilsonian and postwar liberal internationalism, to the Cold War, and to the so-called post-9 11 era, we show the enduring role of American Exceptionalism in ensuring that it is the United States and not Europe that will wield normative power over the rest of the world, the non-Western Others. We use discursive analysis of speeches, political thought, and
6 Certainly, the uncertainty surrounding what exactly the European Union is and whether it really represents Europe, has opened conversations about whether European identity-formation will be substantially different and thus more appealing than US or other state formations. Derrida notes, What if Europe was nothing but the opening, the beginning of history, for which the change of course, the change of the heading, the relation to the other heading or to the other of the heading, would become a continuously existing possibility? Could Europe in some sense carry the responsibility for this opening, which is the opposite of exclusion? Could Europe in a constitutive way be the responsibility for this opening? (Derrida 1992:1718 quoted in and translated by Diez 2004:324).
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articulations of various canons of American diplomatic practice to compare and contrast the different relevance of American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism for understanding US foreign policy, state identity, and hegemony. We conclude with a call to explore the staying power of American hegemony and to understand the implications of European challenges to US foreign policy. American Orientalism: The Discourse on The West and the Rest Edward Said (1979) shatters the taken-for-granted status of colonial and postcolonial knowledge about the developing world with his analysis of Orientalism. As he notes, European intellectual, artistic, archeological, and literary examinations ofand claims aboutthe bodies and borders conquered and mapped, justied the necessity and endurance of colonial European empires. Further, there is an internal consistency of the Orientalist discourse, despite any lack of correspondence with a real Orient, in order to confer an objective and innocent status to the knowledge production that both prompted and rationalized the brutality of imperialism (Said 1979:57). However, this does not mean that Orientalism is just a play of meanings and ideas, for, as constructivist IR scholars argue, the more we act toward an entity as if it has a particular representation or meaning, the more that entity can take on that representation (Wendt 1992; Doty 1996). For example, the more European colonialists perceived colonized territories as incapable of self-governing, the more Europeans treated the territories as in need of governing. Indeed, Orientalism is a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient (Said 1979:3), acting dynamically along with brute political, economic, and military rationales (Said 1979:12). Said (1979:12) also claims that Orientalism has much less to do with the Orient and much more to do with the making of our world. Knowledge claims about the Other (the Orient the East) actually cement the way the Self (Europe the West) sees and constructs itself. The Orienta mysterious, erotic, dark, dangerous mass of Muslim, Hindu, Jewish, Arab, South Asian, East Asian nativesis a deep and recurring image in Western identitymaking. The impact of Saids work, particularly Orientalism, on critical IR is threefold. First, it creates space for critical IR scholars to examine representational practices and international hierarchy in international politics, in dialogue with scholars in other elds, such as literary criticism, anthropology, postcolonial thought, feminist studies, political geography, and others. Saids contrapuntal analyses of culture, colonial discourses, nationalism, power, and representational practices in his body of work opens the way to explore the nuances, contradictions, and shifting and hybrid contexts of Othering (Chowdhry 2007). The Other is that through which the subject is represented as privileged and superior, with the Other being devalued, feared, reviled, even desired, in some way. The Other stands as a potential disruption of the Self, but at the same time, as critical IR theorist Campbell (1998b) points out, the Self cannot fully contain or resolve the anxiety over the difference from or the encounter with the Other; without the production of this anxiety, insecurity, and danger, statecraft and nationmaking would have nothing against which to assert themselves. Indeed, for the West, the encounters of slavery, colonialism, and genocide have to be represented as trysts with danger, backwardness, and ever-threatening barbarismanything but illegitimate violencein order to naturalize Western superiority. Second, the various debates about Saids work have inspired and fortied critiques of rationalist methodology of mainstream IR scholars and of how their ontological presumptions about and methodological studies of the West and the rest obscure more than they explain (Allain 2004; Chowdhry 2007). Third, the American variant of Orientalism allows for an analysis of the discursive
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deployments in which (1) the United States assumes and relies upon an ontological distinction between the United States and Others (Weldes et al. 1999; Richter-Montpetit 2007); (2) the United States employs authoritative epistemological claims and representations about Others bodies, habits, beliefs, feelings, and political sensibilities, thereby justifying interventions, sanctions, and other actions within, across, and outside of its borders (Persaud 2002); and (3) US foreign policy relies on a rationalist methodology consisting of nding evidence, such as reports and fact-nding missions, of foregone conclusions about the Other and the United States need to assert its position (Tetreault 2006). Research in this vein, both within and in conversation with critical IR, has examined both the US relationship with the Middle East since the 1940s7 as well as American aggressions since the nineteenth century (Sadowski 1993; Ngai 2000; Little 2002; Mamdani 2004; Khalidi 2005). Orientalism, or at least the controversies over its conclusions, has featured prominently in the debates since 9 11 over whether Huntington was right about Islam (Fox 2001; Abrahamian 2002; Elshtain 2004; Lewis 2004), and in claims that the United States is Othering Islam Arabs with disastrous results (Little 2002; Khalidi 2005; Alam 2007). Further, many nd that an understanding of Orientalism within the United States, particularly toward Arab Muslim and South Asian Americans, after 9 11, is crucial (Hagopian 2004). Agathangelou and Lings (2005) stinging critique of the 9 11 Commission Reports treatment of the Muslim Other demonstrates the overwhelming reasons why we should understand the reasons for and consequences of constructing the quintessential Muslim Arab Middle Eastern Other both within the United States and elsewhere. With Huntingtons (2004) recent claims about the alleged threat of Mexican immigration to the indubitably Christian and Anglo-Saxon America, it also seems worthy to rethink how Othering works and against whom in various historical periods. Some scholars trace American Orientalism to the SpanishAmerican War, or use different regional examples such as China, Japan, the Philippines, and Hawaii (Doty 1996; Klein 2003; Leong 2005). Campbell (1998a) points to the impoverishment of Western political analysis of heterogeneous communities, particularly in the international responses to and representations of violence in Bosnia. He specically notes that Europe and the United States intervened not to save Bosnia but rather to articulate Western nationalist imaginaries to discipline and contain the ideal of multiculturalism.8 Dotys (2003) recent work explores how the United States, the UK, and France use immigrants as a site of Western statecraft and race-based order and security. Not all of these authors explicitly reference Orientalism, but they t within scholarship that asks the same kind of questions Said rst posed in Orientalism and both expanded upon and critiqued in his later work. We assert that a critical interrogation of American Exceptionalism can enhance the extremely rich eld of inquiry discussed above. We turn next to an examination of the relationship between American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism. Who Is the Other? The Bush administrations response to 9 11 has been characterized alternatively as aggressively Orientalist and as blunt resurgence of American Exceptionalism.
7 With Saids political subjectivity as a Christian Palestinian, it makes sense that for him, American Orientalism is an extension and expansion of European Orientalism that emerged not only with the end of World War II in popular culture, the academy, and the government, but also with the emergence of the state of Israel. However, many scholars have pointed to the pervasiveness of Orientalist representations prior to the 1940s. 8 Similarly, Wendy Brown (2006) explores how liberal values such as tolerance are used by the United States, particularly through the war on terror, to produce subjects that are demarcated as civilized (those who tolerate) and barbaric (those who must be tolerated or are not capable of the same values).
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To understand whether one or both are apt descriptions, we also need to know the distinction and relationship between the Orientalism and Exceptionalism. Certainly, American Orientalism is a lens through which to make sense of the speech acts of George W. Bush and his administrations war on terror (Said 2003; Nayak 2006; Russo 2006; Shepherd 2006). On September 20, 2001, George W. Bush addressed the topic of Islam in his address to the Joint Session of Congress and the American People:
I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect your faith. Its practiced freely by many millions of Americans, and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. (Bush 2001)
He peppered several speeches thereafter with appeals that Islam is peaceful and good. A few years later, during an April 2004 press conference about the future of Iraq, he announced:
Some of the debate really center[s][sic] around the fact that people dont believe Iraq can be free; that if youre Muslim, or perhaps brown-skinned, you cant be self-governing and free. I strongly disagree with that. I reject that, because I believe that freedom is the deepest need of every human soul, and, if given a chance, the Iraqi people will be not only self-governing, but a stable and free society.(Bush 2004a)
This need to continually assert that Muslims, Arabs, and brown people in general are actually good and full of the same human needs and desires as us reected Bushs Orientalist belief (via his epistemological claims) that he knew not only what they think and want but also that they have to be qualied and indeed legitimized as similar to us. The assumed ontological differences requires the qualier that Islam, although not a part of us, is actually good. More recently, Bush spoke again for Muslims and Arabs amid the publicity for the Petraeus Report, which is controversial for masquerading as an objective account of successes and failures in Iraq when it in facts reiterates and upholds key tenets of Bushs presumptions about Iraq, even before 9 11:
The changes in Anbar show all Iraqis what becomes possible when extremists are driven out. They show al Qaeda that it cannot count on popular support, even in a province its leaders once declared their home base. And they show the world that ordinary people in the Middle East want the same things for their children that we want for oursa decent life and a peaceful future.9
At the same time, neorealist, neoliberal, and international law scholars, interested as they are in the creation, endurance, and maintenance of regimes, are increasingly focusing on why the Bush administration was exceptionalist, as it did not comply with the international human rights law regime (particularly regarding military invasions and the use of torture), thus focusing on US perceptions of its special role in the world, and the primacy of US constitutional law and national security imperatives over the international community (Ralph 2006). Ignatieff (2005:3) notes that American Exceptionalism affects the international legal human rights regime in three ways: (1) exemptionalism, wherein the United States signs on to international human rights and humanitarian law
9
Transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/09/13/bush.text/index.html.
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treaties and then exempts itself from their provisions by explicit reservation, nonratication, or non-compliance; (2) double standards, or judging enemies more harshly than oneself or ones allies; and (3) legal isolationism, or denying the international jurisdiction of human rights law within its domestic law. Some point to Bushs divine political interpretations as the cause of his administrations exceptionalist stance (Mertus 2003). Bush noted before his election as president: I feel like God wants me to run for President. I cant explain it, but I sense my country is going to need me. Something is going to happen... I know it wont be easy on me or my family, but God wants me to do it (quoted in Klengor 2004:62). 9 11 afrmed Bushs premonitions, thus validating the strategic moves in his foreign policy since. From the axis of evil insertion into his State of the Union speech, to his comment on the eve of the Iraq invasion that he consulted a higher Father than Bush Senior, Bush acted out of what he perceived to be his Manifest Duty. Bush once noted that spreading hope and liberty and prosperity as the great alternatives to terror [is not] American strategy, or European strategy, or Western strategy. Spreading liberty for the sake of peace is the cause of all mankind (Bush 2005). He expressed this sentiment in the context of a series of speeches calling for a new era in transatlantic cooperation so as to paper over the sharp criticism and outright mockery by European leaders of his policies and claims about science and religion, climate change, the US war in Iraq, and the role of NATO, among other issues.10 Bush certainly deployed Orientalism in his mission to distinguish between good and evil, to articulate who shall be saved, and to extrapolate American visions as universal. But, at the same time, Bushs providential mission, his notion of American uniqueness, and, most importantly, his ambivalent relationship with Europe stemmed from an established narrative of American Exceptionalism explicated throughout the history of American political thought. We contend that we must situate the discussion thus far in the context of the relationship between American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism. We posit three specic reasons to understand this relationship. First, American Exceptionalism provides the cultural and historical specicity of why America came into being as it did, thereby showing that the Bush regime was not necessarily that different from its predecessors, but rather more bluntly expressing an understanding of America that can be dated to the 1600sthat has certainly surfaced before the Bush administration (Spiro 2000). Second, American Exceptionalism can also explain the contemporary distinctions and outright clashes between the United States and Europe, whereas Orientalism tends to explore identity relations between the West and various other parts of the world; as such, critical IR must make an intervention in the mainstream analysis of the so-called transatlantic divide so as to create more nuanced understandings of the reasons for and implications of the tensions. Finally, an examination of both Orientalism and Exceptionalism can demonstrate the different logics of othering at work in US relationships with non-Western and Western Others. Before turning to the third section, an analysis of American Exceptionalism in full, we will explore these reasons in depth. First, the views of American political leaders from Alexander Hamilton to George W. Bush t within a discursive history of the United States, which lies at the ideological core of American Exceptionalism. American Exceptionalism does
10 Certainly, Donald Rumsfeld antagonized European leaders with various comments about European hesitation about the US invasion of Iraq. For example, on January 22, 2003, as a response to a journalists question about the US allies disagreement about the impending US invasion of Iraq, then-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld disparaged the Germans and French as old Europe. The transcript of Rumsfelds comment can be found on the website of the US Defense Department: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1330. Rumsfeld later contributed to increased diplomatic tension when he grouped Germany with Libya and Cuba when discussing opposition to the war.
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not consist of one unied body of thought; it spans many different academic disciplines and has been used by various scholars to explain everything from the uniqueness of American political thought to the peculiar motivations behind US foreign policy. But scholars in the elds of US History, European History, American Studies, American Politics and Public Policy, and IR (specically diplomatic history) accord with what Adas (2001) identies as the essence of American Exceptionalism: an unwavering belief in the uniqueness of the United States and a commitment to a providential mission to transform the rest of the world in the image of the United States (Hietala 1985; Lipset 1996; McEvoy-Levy 2001; Streeby 2001; Glaser and Wellenreuther 2002; Henry 2003; Ignatieff 2005). As Anatol Lieven notes, anyone can be American, but America is simultaneously unattainable. Thus, one can adopt the allegedly unique qualities, including liberty, constitutionalism, law, democracy, individualism, and separation of church and state that are ostensibly dened and possessed by Americans, but America must also be bounded and protected from encroachment, danger, and oppositional values that could destroy its Anglo-Saxon core (Lieven 2005). The United States, on account of its special values, has a superiority that is selfevident and beyond reproach; at the same time, the United States is divinely ordained to serve as the only political, cultural, and economic model for the rest of the world. A critical genealogy of Exceptionalism, provided below, reveals the interplay of the providential mission, justication for expansionism based on the superiority of American values and the inability of others to govern themselves, and a racial hierarchy with Anglo-Saxons on top (McDougall 1997; Hoff 2007). As noted in the Introduction, herein is our claim that American Exceptionalism provides a specic context to the Orientalist ideology in the making of America. All nations have a myth of origin, but there is a
particular ambivalence that haunts the idea of the nationit is an ambivalence that emerges from a growing awareness that, despite the certainty with which historians speak of the origin of nation as a sign of the modernity of society, the cultural temporality of the nation inscribes a much more transitional social reality. (Bhabha 1990:1)
Thus, the nations coming into being taps into and relies upon particular narratives that must be constantly and creatively naturalized. The we-ness of the nation is predicated upon the Other against which the we is constituted. American Exceptionalism is a foundational ction of Americas coming into being, involving a disavowal, displacement, exclusion, and cultural contestation in the colonial encounters between America and its Others (whether indigenous Americans, Filipinos, Latinos, Arabs, African slaves, etc.) (Bhabha 1990:5). But, and as American political thought demonstrates, this myth of origin is also decidedly about a distinction from European (particularly British) nationstates. A few critical IR scholars have examined the issue of Exceptionalism, thus providing a point of departure to integrate studies of Othering, nationalism, and imperialism, with studies of how the American nation distinguished itself from Europe in order to surpass it (Campbell 1998b; Cox 2005). Campbell points out the irony of the American revolutionaries insistence that they were not like the Europeans, given the fundamental assumption that they possessed the qualities of European civilization in contrast to the barbarity of the Indian way of life (Campbell 1998b:123). Thus, America came into being with an ever present fragility; how could the United States establish itself as more humane and more successfully liberal than Europe yet subdue and conquer Amerindians and eventually others in the name of Western civilization? This anxious desire to be both a beneciary of centuries of Western civilization but to set a separate, unique
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course in the world has continued since the American Revolution and explains the endurance of the need of the United States, even recently with the Bush administration, to continuously assert Exceptionalism and Orientalism. Accordingly, the second reason for understanding Exceptionalism and Orientalism is in order to make sense of the differences and distinctions between the United States and Europe pointed out by political leaders and scholars. In effect, if critical IR scholars are more attentive to Exceptionalism, they will nd that, the similarities to Orientalism notwithstanding, there are key insights about the relationship between the United States and Europe that are worth exploring. This is particularly important given that mainstream analysis of Exceptionalism is committed to a particular political agenda that ultimately supports American hegemony or, at least, fails to be sufciently critical of pre-9 11 American belligerence or post-9 11 American military actions. For instance, Kagan (2003) argues that the United States must forge ahead with its own course; with Europe moving toward the changes the European Union engenders, the United States is the only country to provide the military force, order, and stability the world needs. As Kagan warns, [i]t is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world (3). And, Charles Kupchan notes: [t]he next clash of civilizations will not be between the West and the rest but between the United States and Europeand Americans remain largely oblivious. (Kupchan 2002). Kupchan predicts an intense transatlantic rivalry between the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank over the control of the international monetary system, sturdy competition in terms of internet communications technological advances, corporate international acquisitions and investments, and the strength of the euro vis-a ` -vis the dollar, as well as tension over EU plans for increasing military capabilities to support European security, which would challenge NATOs relevance and create competition for diplomatic inuence in the Middle East. Mainstream IR scholars and commentators have attempted to wrap their minds around the so-called crisis of the transatlantic divide (Reid 2004; McCormick 2005). Are Europe and the United States strong allies in counterterrorism intelligence, or do European countries and publics really view, as per sporadic polls, the United States as the biggest threat to world peace (Guitta 2006)? Are European attitudes toward the United States still open and friendly or increasingly punctuated with ambivalence, apprehension, and even hostility, particularly regarding the US claims to promote democracy (Kopstein 2006)? Has US hegemony reached its limit in the face of the way the European Union has stitched together various nation states to marshal collective and unied strength, to respond adequately to the new digital age, and to carefully address thorny issues of trade integration and collective security? (Kupchan 2003). Do Europe and the United States still need or even want to be a part of the same collective security agreement, given European resentment of its heavy reliance on the United States during the intervention in Kosovo, divisiveness as to how to address terrorism after 9 11, Europes resistance to the US desire to provide military aid to Turkey on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, and European criticism over the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Croci and Verdun 2006)? Or, are the fears that developing countries are sponsoring Islamic fundamentalism, proliferating nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons for their security, or offering erce economic competition substantial enough to warrant continued yet apprehensive transatlantic cooperation? While Europeans are said to view international law as a primary tool of diplomacy, the United States has defended its sovereign right to put forth a national security strategy without consulting with others. The 2005 EU Counterterrorism Strategy focused on political responses inclusive of prevention, understanding, and justice; the White House
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2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism emphasized defeat of the enemy and an offensive militaristic approach. Some scholars even make distinctions between old terrorism in Europe, or political violence exercising some measure of restraint with clear political goals, versus the new terrorism the United States primarily faces by unseen enemies who are decentralized and without clear political goals (Stevenson 2003). Interestingly, Judt (2005:11) discusses Europes direct experience of the worstcivil war, genocide, anarchy, whereas the United States supposedly had no direct experience of the worst of the twentieth century-and is thus regrettably immune to its lessons. George W. Bush noted soon after 9 11:
On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known warsbut for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of warbut not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacksbut never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single dayand night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack. (Bush 2001)
These contemporary tensions and questions should be understood in the context of American Exceptionalism, which reveals a long-standing ambivalence by the United States about Europe. Orientalism does not make these distinctions between Western countries, and we implore critical IR to think through the implications of the aforementioned questions. We argue that the tension within the so-called Atlantic Alliance is not simply about changes rendered by globalization or by the Bush Doctrine, or even a potential rethinking about transatlantic values, as mainstream scholars might maintain. Rather, it is indicative of how and why Western powers differ in the way they perform sovereignty. A critical analysis of the clashes would bring to light how European power is not necessarily better than or more inclusive than American hegemony but is perhaps taking advantage of the backlash against American Exceptionalism in its most recent form. This brings us to the next point. Our third reason for examining Exceptionalism in tandem with Orientalism is to understand the different logics at work in US foreign policy and the creation of its identity. If identity is fundamentally understood through other identities, who are the others and what kinds of others are there? As Diez (2004:4) notes in the context of understanding whether the European Union offers a different type of identity formation in international politics, there are different kinds of difference with different kinds of purposes and implications. The othering of Europe that has been continuously crucial to the narrative of American nationalism is different from the othering of the non-West. As explained above, the Wests non-Western Other is an existential threat yet also inferior and disposable (Buzan, Wver, and deWilde 1998; Campbell 1998b). The identity differentiation of the West and non-West, or, alternatively, North and South, developed and developing, is the creation of two mutually exclusive entities, privileging one over the other (Ashley 1989). As critical IR scholars have eloquently discussed, the very creation of the West and something that is not the West indicates an oppositional thinking about identity. The non-Western Other embodies that which is disavowed, the over there to the Western Selfs here, but the Western Other is familiar to and recognizable to the Western Self even in moments of erce disagreement and rivalry (Schick 1999). SelfOther relationships do not always signify difference as fear or as danger but rather as distinction or rivalry. This second type of othering delegitimizes the need or possibility for aggressive interference (Rumelili 2004).
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There is nothing unintelligible or incomprehensible about the Western Other; so the differentiation is about distinctness. Western powers collude in hegemonic practices not only because of Orientalist representations of non-Western powers that are not seen to be capable of power, but also because they see themselves as distinct from but similar enough to each other. But, the potential similarities to the non-Western Other are beyond the realm of imagination. Orientalism, by producing knowledge about the Other as something to be feared, targeted, or even saved, underlies the complicity of Western powers in governing the non-western world. Inherent within Orientalism is the assumption that only a Western power could be civilized and serve as a global hegemony. The non-West serves as danger that justies Western imperialism. As Said (1979:56) notes, the Orient is orientalized as the object to be (and that could be) represented and controlled, the foil against which the West can understand and make itself. While most mainstream political science texts discuss the rivalry between the United States and Europe as a competition over distribution of power capabilities and resources, as well as whether to govern through unilateralism or multilateralism, through state sovereignty or collective sovereignty, we argue that, as American Exceptionalism shows us, it is actually about a distinction being made as to who will set the standards of civilization and normative power, and how. There is no doubt that both the United States and Europe in this scenario are considered civilized. As discussed in the next section, while nineteenth and early twentieth century political leaders explicitly claimed that the United States was setting new standards for Anglo-Saxons, mid to late twentieth century and early twenty-rst century political thinkers have also articulated the same conceptalbeit in less racially explicit ways. Said (2002) is interestingly among those who have called upon Europe to serve as a countervailing force against US unilateralism. He explains that Europeans see the United States as simultaneously a previous savior and protector but also increasingly frustrating and hostile with which to deal. Allegedly, whereas Europe used to accumulate bodies and territories but is now moving toward humanistic universalism and a reliance on international law, the United States by contrast has since 1945 integrated the Orientalist apparatus and increasingly and aggressively aims to impose world order. Did the United States and Europe simply switch places? Kagans (2003) imagery of Europe as a paradise that needs American power (in the realist sense) is one that both European and American leaders agree is the source of much conict (Diez 2004). But, othering between Western powersthese differencesdo allow a mutual complicity in violence against non-western Others. As Bowman (2003) points out, discussions about the power struggle between the United States and Europe, mainly in their attempts to deal with the Middle East, participate in collective essentialization of Arabs, Jews, and others who are not representative of Europe or the United Statesi.e., white, Christian, middle or upper class (Bowman 2003:7). Furthermore, even though the United States and Europe are vastly different in terms of their general views of the appropriateness of military intervention, they both wield normative power (Diez 2005). The concept of Europes allegedly new normative power stems from Europes attempt, after World War II, to imagine itself not only as against cultural others but specically as against the temporal other of Europes past. Certainly, the very notion of what constitutes Europe (or the European Union for that matter) is negotiated through a search for the imagined Europe. While Europe historically imagined itself as against an Orient, particularly in its debates over Turkey, it also imagined itself, particularly after World War II, against its own past which should not be allowed to become its future
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(Waever 1998:90). Europe is attempting to overcome the menaces of its past via a normative power, as the force for peace and human rights, as against the United States normative power often secured through force (Manners 2002). To mainstream scholars, there is a real difference in the two ways of exercising power, but critical IR scholars might argue that the difference is quite nuanced and complex and that normative power is nothing new. We should recognize that non-military normative power can still be violent and emphasize how US non-military normative power works, particularly when one considers the legacy in both the United States and Europe of slavery and colonialism and the contemporary securitization of migration and interference in non-western countries affairs via the discourse of human rights. But, the distinction between the United States and Europe does matter and has mattered to both entities. Discursive constructions of subjectivities are contained and stabilized through narrative, or the stories that give existence meaning (Schick 1999:12). And, the United States wants Europe as its ally but perhaps only if it does not disturb the narrative, myth, and story of American Exceptionalism. The next section explores the pervasiveness and stabilization of this myth, with attention as to why the United States needs and constructs both its Western and non-western others. American Exceptionalism: The Discourse of Distinctness
The world may politically, as well as geographically, be divided into four parts, each having a distinct set of interests. Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms and by her negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees, extended her dominion over them all. Africa, Asia, and America, have successively felt her domination. The superiority she has long maintained has tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of the World, and to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benetit belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderationLet Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! (Hamilton 1961:9091)
The myth that the United States is the greatest country in the world can be and has been effected through framing itself, its policies, its actions, and its values as somehow more timeless, civilized, universally appealing, liberal, and complete than European civilizations, even though it is part of Western civilization. Indeed, while searching for religious freedom, white settlers found that God in fact was on their side, the side of liberty. On board the Arbella in 1630, Puritan leader John Winthrop admonished his brethren: For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us (Winthrop 1630). The statement is extraordinary in that it assumes the rest of the world isor should bewatching and listening to what a very small group of Puritans traversing the Atlantic Ocean on the way to the New World do. But Winthrops imagery is no less important: the city on a hill is separate from the rest of the world, above the rest of the world, closer to God than the rest of the world. In the very next sentence Winthrop proposes the Covenant between his people and his God: So that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken, and so cause Him to withdraw His present help from us, we shall be made a story and a by-word through the world (Winthrop 1630). He has put both his followers and the rest of the world on notice. As long as they do Gods work and Gods will, they shall remain the city on a hill, the eyes of all people upon them. If not, they shall be made an example by God. As Ruland and Bradbury (1992) note, Winthrop denes the American utopia in relation to

one source above all, the Bible, and especially its opening chapters, Genesis and Exodus, the tale of the Chosen People and the Promised Land. For the Puritans ... the essential tale was a religious one of travail and wandering, with the Lords guidance, in quest of a high purpose and a millennial history. (p. 9)
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By the 1760s, as resentment grew among the elite in the colonies over British policies, American colonists began to argue that the People of the Colonies were no longer English. The colonists came to see themselves as a distinct People, a people charged in fact with bringing about the divine mission of Anglo-Saxonisma Protestant millennium designed to overcome Papist tyranny. In Edmund Morgans (1975) words, the golden age of Anglo-Saxon purity and freedom was upon the men of the American Revolutionary Era; they acted as if they had a distinct aptness for liberty that was denitive of their race. Indeed, according to these men, God had in fact ordained it. In 1765, John Adams remarked that the settlement of America [is] the opening of a grand scene and design in Providence for the illumination of the ignorant and the emancipation of the slavish part of mankind all over the earth (Adams 1856:66). The Americans had becomein the phrase of historian Gordon Wood (1998)more English than the English. That the golden age was upon the men of this generation is made clear in Jeffersons 1774 pamphlet A Summary View of the Rights of British America, in which the author argued the Saxon ancestors of the colonists gave them the right to free government and trade (Jefferson 2000). The American Revolution ostensibly marked the beginning of a new civilization and the apex of world history. In the 1780s, the French American writer J. Hector St. John Crevecoeur introduced all of Europe to the concept of the American Dream in his Letters from an American Farmer (1904) by describing in detail this new man, the American who was indeed very different from the European in mores and customs, and was destined to be a beacon of freedom for the rest of the world. By the end of the Revolutionary Era, a consensus had emerged in the new republic that America was unique when compared to its European rivals. And yet, while that uniqueness was at rst couched in a universalist Enlightenment discourse centered around universal freedom, equality, and natural rights, as the nineteenth century unfolded, its uniqueness would increasingly be seen as having derived from the special character of those who settled its shores. Even after he left the presidency, Thomas Jefferson consistently explained America to Americans as the ultimate bearer of Anglo-Saxon principles and ideals. Yet, foreign observers would also note the special character of the American, albeit in less providential terms. In the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville (1948) gave more credence to this essentialist view in his monumental work Democracy in America. He traveled across the United States in search of its peculiar distinctness; his reections on the United States centered on democracy more as a condition in American society than a specic form of government. In other words, Tocqueville proposed a sociocultural argument about what he called the equality of social conditions that Americans enjoyed but were unknown in the monarchies of the Old World. He wrote in detail of the pros and cons of a very particular form of American equality, articulating the dangers such as tyranny of the majority which could potentially derail the future of the nation. Contrasting the customs of the European powers to the United States, he argued that the American people want equality in freedom, and if they cannot have that, they still want equality in slavery. They will put up with poverty, servitude, and barbarism, but they will not endure aristocracy (p. 506). At about the same time that Tocqueville maintained that the exceptionalist basis of the United States rested in an uncritical commitment to equality, a nationalist discourse emerged that also presumed that the United States had a
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providential mission to transform the world, particularly those uncivilized peoples whom the nation encountered both within and outside of the United States, in its image. Not surprisingly, these seeds are found in Winthrop and the Puritans. If his City on a Hill imagery embodies the distinctness of the American colonists, the New Covenant he articulates connects this aspect of American Exceptionalism to another important oneManifest Destiny. Democratic Party politician John L. Sullivan coined the phrase in the 1840s during the debate over the annexation of Texas. He used Manifest Destiny as a way of criticizing other countries for interfering with the natural process of westward expansion by the United States. Sullivan wrote that others had intruded for the avowed object of thwarting our policy and hampering our power, limiting our greatness and checking the fulllment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions (Horsman 1981:219). The United States had already annexed Texas from Mexico; California was soon to follow, since [t] he AngloSaxon foot is already on its borders. Already the advance guard of the irresistible army of Anglo-Saxon emigration has begun to pour down upon [California]. In December 1845, Sullivan used the term Manifest Destiny again to argue for the annexation of the Oregon territory from the British. This time writing in his own newspaper, the New York Morning News, Sullivan claimed Oregon by the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty and federated self-government entrusted to us (Horsman 1981:220). Alas, the experiment of America had replaced the British as the great progenitor of liberty (Haynes and Morris 1997). For the rest of the nineteenth century, US leaders and journalists used Manifest Destiny to justify and continue expansionist policies against indigenous Americans and Mexicans. Manifest Destiny, in tandem with the Monroe Doctrine, proved a powerful justication for keeping the European powers out of the affairs of the newly created nation-states of the Western hemisphere. By the close of the nineteenth century, the United States had settled Western lands right up to the Pacic Ocean. The 1890 census declared the American frontier closed; in 1893 Frederick Jackson Turner used both the reality and symbolism of the census to formulate his well-known frontier thesis, which argued that the meeting point between savagery and civilization on the American continent had both resulted in and required the development of a distinctly American character (Turner 1997). For Turner, the American character was forged in the cauldron of the frontier experience and cultivated those core American values: individualism, equality, self-reliance, democracy and independence. We note that, not surprisingly, both Tocqueville and Crevecoeur described these traits in very similar terms over the century. Moreover, Turners triumphalist story contrasted harshly with the conditions of the European nation-state, which many Europeans had escaped. While he lamented the closing of the American frontier, Turners thesis nonetheless came at a critical moment of vigorous European immigration to American shores. The old promise of American Exceptionalism experienced a revival as a specic response to white European immigration: the farther west the colonists traveled (or, the more they conquered and civilized the savages they found), the less European they became, embracing democracy rather than tyrannyand thereby embracing America rather than Europe. As such, while Manifest Destiny turned on Orientalist ontologies and epistemologies against non-European others, its proponents vehemently and continually advocated this destiny in opposition to Europe. Theodore Roosevelt reformulated and expanded the Monroe Doctrine to argue that the United States should intervene to stabilize the economies of small
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nations in the Caribbean and Central America if they were unable to pay their international debts. It was unacceptable to Roosevelt that the European powers to which these countries owed the debt would take action if the United States did not. But he went further to argue that the United States also played a providential role in this new world. In his four volume historical account Winning of the West published between 1889 and 1896, Roosevelt (2004:20) wrote that during the past three centuries the spread of the English-speaking peoples over the worlds waste spaces (emphasis added) has been not only the most striking feature in the worlds history, but also the event of all others most far-reaching in its effects and its importance. This was as it should be for Roosevelt, and he exhorted Americans to embrace the struggles it would bring in places like Hawaii, Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico. Roosevelts The Winning of the West placed a more explicit emphasis on conquest and subjugation than Turners frontier thesis. Not coincidently, the very moment at which Turners national frontier closed also signaled the opening of an international frontier which Roosevelt identied. In The Strenuous Life written in 1899, Roosevelt stated boldly,
the twentieth century looms before us big with the fate of many nations. If we stand idly by, if we seek merely swollen, slothful ease and ignoble peace, if we shrink from the hard contests where men must win at hazard of their lives and at the risk of all they hold dear, then the bolder and stronger peoples will pass us by, and will win for themselves the domination of the world. (quoted in Sare 1997:518)
Roosevelt specically shifted the emphasis from preventing European colonialism and expansionism in the Americas to justifying American aggression outside of its borders to protect economic interests (Hoff 2007). Senator Albert Beveridge went further but merely echoed what most political leaders believed at the time when he declared on the Senate oor in 1899:
God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-admiration. No! He has made us the master organizers of the world to establish system where chaos reignsHe has made us adepts [sic] in government that we may administer government among savages and senile peoples. (quoted in Harrell 2005:743)
By the end of the nineteenth century, then, the US government had subdued the entire North American continent and turned its sights overseas. The United States had redrawn and settled its borders with Mexico; it had removed indigenous Americans to reservations. The border disputes over the Oregon territory and Canada with Great Britain were long in the past; other European powers had been restrained throughout the Western hemisphere. The United States had successfully redened itself as a great power and stabilized the narrative of American Exceptionalism (Ruggie 2006). Yet, internally another symptom of the ills of Europesocialismhad allegedly inltrated the United States as it entered the Industrial Age and transitioned from an agrarian society to an urban-based, industrial economy. As farmers and laborers struggled to organize for their rights, capitalists pushed back with a distinctly American ideology. William Graham Sumner (1952) espoused the virtues of Social Darwinism during this period in his important work What Social Classes Owe to Each Other. Andrew Carnegie (1889) justied and praised the social benets of wealthy captains of industry in his inuential article Wealth. When ideology did not work, the capitalist class turned to force in suppressing workers attempting to unionize or strike.
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While the advent of the twentieth century witnessed stiffened competition between the Untied States and the European colonial powers in the affairs of the developing world, political leaders and commentators nonetheless turned to the issue of socialism in the United States as a point of comparison to Europe. In 1906, the German political theorist Werner Sombart posed the question in his essay Why is There No Socialism in the United States? Sombart (1976:109 110) compared the United States to Germany and concluded famously that all socialist utopias come to grief with roast beef and apple pie. In other words, in Sombarts view American workers were much more afuent than their German counterparts and hence saw no need for an economy based on socialist principles. In addition, what made the United States exceptional was its bourgeois nature. Sombarts conclusions can be summed up as: No feudalism, no socialism. Workers had been integrated in American society to an extent the European laborer never had; they had not faced the depths of immiseration Karl Marx believed necessary for the socialist revolution. The white working classes also had been granted the franchise regardless of property qualications by the middle decades of the nineteenth century, and thus could potentially express their economic and political frustrations through the political process rather than by overturning it. Though Eugene Debs would run for president for the rst of ve times on the Socialist Party ticket in 1900, the movement of workers and farmers that had gained steam in the early 1890s abruptly came to an end with the loss of Democrat William Jennings Bryan in the 1896 election. The upshot is that the United States entered the twentieth century as a burgeoning international capitalist power fueled by notions of manifest destinyand distinct in fundamental ways from the monarchies or socialist revolutions of Europe. It should be noted that this distinctness was not predicated upon Europe being uncivilized, or savage and senile. Europeans were and are not disposable as is the non-western world. Rather, Europe was simply not as egalitarian as the United States and not as successful as the United States in its experiment with liberty (Lipset 1996). To European socialists, the United States was indeed exceptionalist in the negative sense that it had not experienced socialism, much to the consternation of Lenin and Trotsky. In the end, according to both the American Exceptionalist myth and European politicians, Europes distant and near past (including feudalism, socialist revolutions, and wars) would hamper its ability to govern the world. Though it would take four decades before the twentieth century would ofcially be called the American Century, the likes of Roosevelt and Beveridge had already concluded that at its dawn. It was Life Magazines editor Henry Luce who coined the phrase American Century in an essay which appeared on February 17, 1941, 10 months before the United States entered World War II. Luce predicted that not only the United States would enter World War II, but also that it would win it. He then urged a course of action once the war was completed successfully: We must undertake to be the Good Samaritan of the entire World. It is the Manifest Duty of this country to undertake to feed all the people of the world (Luce 2004). After the United States sent its military to subdue the chaos, Luce believed the country was destined to send its humanitarian army to give the rest of the world its idealsthe Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, a love of liberty, and so on. It has become the mainstay in the playbook of American military strategy since: Shock and Awe followed by what are perceived by American leaders as the armies of humanitarian compassion. But also important to note here is that the American Century was about liberal internationalism, whether in the guise of the Wilsonian discourse on exporting democracy or the postwar new global order hammered out through the creation of the United Nations and at the Bretton Woods Conference. The United States helped to created international institutions that would civilize
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international politics but that it would ignore at its whim, despite criticisms by Europeans invested in multilateralism. During and after the Cold War, both the United States and Europe voiced normative commitments to a neoliberal world order, but the United States distinguished itself by strengthening the role of the military (Manners 2002). As mentioned earlier, the Cold War did indeed bring the United States into a necessary alliance with Western Europe against the Soviet Union and its Eastern Block satellites. But, despite the Orientalism exemplied in the subduing and containment of indigenous revolutions and the proxy wars that systematically dehumanized non-western Others, scholars in American political thought were once again comparing and contrasting the exceptional character of the United States to its European counterparts. Louis Hartzs (1955) The Liberal Tradition in America is the most notable case in point. Hartz proposed a consensus thesis which drew upon the likes of Tocqueville and Sombart to argue that the United States was uncriticallyand unconsciouslywedded to a liberal ethos that derived directly from the Lockean, natural rights tradition. Americans were unable to think in class terms the way Europeans did simply because the United States did not develop out of a feudal society. Unlike the Old World, the United States possessed no revolutionary tradition meant to overturn the social order: men began to be held together, not by the knowledge that they were different parts of a corporate whole, but by the knowledge that they were similar participants in a uniform way of life (Hartz 1955:55). Where Tocqueville had witnessed the dangers of tyranny of the majority in the United States, Hartz postulated that the real danger of American society lay in a tyranny of unanimity. Hartz was deeply worried about the consequences of American exceptionalism on both the domestic and international fronts. Domestically, the liberal tradition would be unyielding in the face of internal ideological challengeshence, the destructive nature of McCarthyism to which his work was partly a response. Internationally, the liberal tradition would fail in seeking to impose liberal values everywhere because of what he describes as the limits of its own cultural pattern (p. 14). Despite Hartzs pessimism as well as scholars unrelenting critique of his ideas, his premise, that Americas indubitably liberal nature can best be explained in comparison with the European past, has endured (Kloppenberg 2001). As the Cold War dragged on, the mass media and political leaders continued to cast it as a protection of the American Way of Lifea bulwark against the threat of communism. While directed against the Soviet Union and socialistleaning regimes, Reagan and his supporters articulated the United States as the leader among and in distinction among advanced industrialized capitalist democracies, particularly in Europe, much to the chagrin of European protestors of his policies.11 Reagans speeches about the duties of the United States (as against those of Europe) carried the sentimental weight of John Winthrops preachings.12 Indeed, only the United States had remained immune to the totalitarianism that had ravaged Europe in the early-to-mid twentieth century and the Soviet Union in the postwar era. With the end of the Cold War in the 1990s and as the American Century drew to a close, the United States stood at its military,
11 European leaders and public opinion voiced critique of Reagan, particularly after his March 1983 speech that called the Soviet Union the evil empire, and that explicitly drew upon ideas of American Exceptionalism to articulate the US role (and the United States alone) in battling this evil. At the same time, European leaders did realize that their security in many ways depended on US action, particularly regarding fears of medium-range missile attacks from the then-Soviet Union. 12 Former President Reagan quoted Winthrop throughout his political career, starting with his governorship of California and ending with his farewell speech at the end of his presidency. Further, Sandra Day OConnor quoted Winthrop at Ronald Reagans funeral at the National Cathedral in Washington, DC, on June 12, 2004. The text is available at this site: http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/sandradayoconnorreadswinthrop.htm.
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political, economic, and cultural apex. It was at this moment that Huntington argued that the ideological clashes of the previous half-century were about to be replaced with the clash between civilizations. And to prepare for this new war, a group of conservatives assembled in the summer of 1997 to assert their inuence in post-Cold War foreign policy; they called their collective effort the Project for a New American Century. Importantly, the Projects website is replete with articles about how Europe is part of the old establishment, incapable of understanding the burden the United States holds as a hegemony confronting terrorism and corrupt states, while beneting from the order and security the United States provides. This neo-conservative position, put forth most prominently by Bill Kristol and his writing partner Robert Kagan (Kristol and Kagan 1996), simply sought to bring the benets of democracy to the rest of the world through what they term Benevolent Hegemony.13 The concept of Benevolent Hegemony sounds rather innocuous, particularly in mainstream IR debates; but, the similarities between the architects of the New American Century and those who argued for US supremacy in the late nineteenth century are striking and point to the pervasiveness and staying power of Americas foundational narrative. Kristol and Kagan write in Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy:
American hegemony is the only reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order. The appropriate goal of American foreign policy, therefore, is to preserve that hegemony as far into the future as possible. To achieve this goal, the United States needs a neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military supremacy and moral condence. (Kristol and Kagan 1996)
Kristol and Kagan, to be sure, drop the language of savage and senile peoples found a century earlier. The effect is nonetheless the same: there is chaos in the world and the United States has to impose moral order on it. American Exceptionalism, then, works through the hard contests of military conquest and might as well as the importance of American values and beliefs in providing government among savages and senile peoples. Here in fact are the origins of the terms hard power and soft power, coined by Joseph Nye (2004), a prominent contributor to the IR neoliberalism theoretical tradition. Nye is referring to something ingrained much deeper in the American consciousness, something more primal. American involvement in world affairsbe it military intervention or humanitarian interventionis tied to a moral imperative derived from a providential mission. This explains why, for instance, Luce used the Good Samaritan as a metaphor in his The American Century essay in 1941. But it should also be noted that the supporters of the benevolent hegemony theory are sure to mention the specic role of the United States in providing stability and security to Europe, going as far as to claim that the principal concern of Americas allies [such as the Europeans and the Japanese] these days is not that it will be too dominant but that it will withdraw (Kristol and Kagan 1996). Since then, Europeans have become decidedly less sure about the US role in the world. Americans and scholars alike are increasingly critical of the post 9 11 neoconservative movement, particularly given its unabashed commitment to American Exceptionalism (Fukuyama 2006). As such, will the United States continue to use the myth of American Exceptionalism to draw distinctions with
13 Neorealist and neoliberal IR theorists, building on regime theory and hegemonic stability theory, have long debated benevolent hegemony to explain the benets, such as the spreading of liberal internationalism, of a single hegemonic power in structuring the international system after the end of World War II and after the Soviet Union fell. However, Francis Fukuyama, like many political writers, attributes the concept of benevolent hegemony to neoconservative policymakers and scholars who do not necessarily subscribe to any particular IR school of thought (Fukuyama 2006).
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the Europe, and what are the implications? And, will the US and European collaboration, particularly on the issue of terrorism, continue to rely on Orientalist discourse? Conclusions
9 11 has taught us that terrorism against American interests over there should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against America over here. In this sense, the American homeland is the planet. (9 11 Commission Report)
We conclude that a discourse analysis that probes both Orientalism and Exceptionalism to critically rethink US identity and policy can engender two major research agendas: rst, we can better understand the continuity and endurance of American hegemony; and, second, we can better analyze the implications of European challenges to American hegemony. As to the rst point, we have attempted to show that, while an analysis of Orientalism is instructive in identifying and analyzing the fallacies of Huntingtons class of civilization thesis, understanding the knowledge power nexus, exploring the dynamics of the othering of the non-Western world by the Western world, and, serving as a lens to link critical IR to various disciplines informed by and engaged with Saids work, it is less successful in explaining why and how the rivalries between the United States and Europe have persisted for the past two centuries and more. Certainly, the United States and Europe have colluded to other the rest of the non-western world. Yet, we believe that the historical rivalry between the United States and Europe and the subsequent attempt of the United States to distinguish itself cannot be overlooked in seeking explanations for US foreign policy decisionsespecially in the post 9 11 world. The 9 11 Commission Report provides a clear example of the logic of the American foundational narrative. At the end of the 400+ page document, the 9 11 Commission provides for dozens of recommendations to combat the new threat of global terrorism. Strategic alliances and potential threats alike are conated; the globe is broken down into two regionsover here and over there. In laying out the US response, an incredible conuence takes place: the whole world becomes the Other (including Europe) at the same time the entire planet becomes the American Homeland. In the post 9 11 world, what the United States does and says is an exceptional example for all over there; it warrants the attention of the world, if not its outright emulation. Our contention here has been that this is not newthat the United States in the post-9 11 period has displayed more continuity with the past than any signicant rupture with it. Indeed, the 9 11 Commission Report displays echoes of the words of Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 11, in which he shares a dream of an America that vindicates the human raceWestern and non-Western alike. At its founding, American Revolutionaries articulated an America that would not be corrupted by the violence of class conict, border conict, and social decadence that supposedly plagued Europe. More than a century later, American leaders from Teddy Roosevelt to Woodrow Wilson to FDR tapped into dormant elements of Exceptionalism to put in place the institutional arrangements that would eventually allow the Good Samaritan to claim that it saved the world from totalitarianism after the World War II and the Cold War. And now, it can claim to save the world from terrorism. In order to fully appreciate the staying power of American Exceptionalism, we encourage further research on the similarities and differences between past and current iterations of this narrative, particularly in the specic contexts of religiosity, global capitalism, and American military, economic, and diplomatic abilities to carry out its providential
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mission. But, this is not to say that the US hegemony is incessant and unrelenting and thus cannot be resisted. Rather, we have attempted to indicate that the United States nds it necessary to continuously invoke both American Exceptionalism and American Orientalism during very different political circumstances because of the very fragility of this hegemony. Our second point speaks to implications of the reactions of Europe, Americas Western Other. While advocates of benevolent hegemony believe that Europe and emerging powers give their consent to American hegemony, the members of the European Union are proposing a Europe that veers far from the unilateralism that the United States has exerted as its unique right. In the face of this, the United States today is locked in a struggle not only with its allies and other states, but also with the results of its own creationand in that sense, with its own self as a nation (Ruggie 2006:1). Indeed, the United States is at a crossroads because it has increasingly exempted itself from the very postwar institutions of global governance intended to fundamentally make the rest of the world, including Europe, in the image of the United States. But while Ruggie, among countless others, has faith in the ability of transnational civil politics and global governance to put a brake on US doctrinal unilateralism, we believe that it is potentially problematic if it is indeed Europe that is at the helm of this countervailing force.14 If the rest of the world, including Europe, is both Americas Other but also the American homeland and thus fundamentally linked to the very existence of the United States, then American hegemony is always potentially under threat. Orientalism is a representational practice about the lurking gure that always threatens to destroy the United Statesread as not only the country but the world; Exceptionalism identies the United States as the only possible (Western) power to seek out and eliminate this threat. If the European Union is to seriously vie for power and if scholars and pundits continue to lament the possible end of the American era, the United States could do as it has done in the past: discursively deploy Orientalism and Exceptionalism to secure its positional superiority and to overcome the fragility of its hegemony. Perhaps Europe can reference international law, collective security, multilateralism, and other elements of global governance, but this does not mean that Americas perceived need for hegemony will end. We also wonder about what epistemic violence is involved and who is dispossessed when both the European Union and United States exercise normative power, albeit in different ways. Certainly, there are real alternatives to EUUS dominance as well as to normatively prescribed global governance, but how will either pole of power react to and engage with emerging powers and regional security collectives? What would be the role and salience of American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism in a possibly multipolar world? In effect, our intention with our claims about the relationship between Orientalism and Exceptionalism is to draw critical attention to the implications of EuropeUS clashes in the wider context of international hierarchy, power relationships, and multiple logics of othering.
14 Part of the problem with seeing Europe as serving as a potential brake on American hegemony is the exceptionalist and othering representations practices in which Europe itself participatesbetween European countries, of the so-called developing world, and increasingly of the United States. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the exceptionalist practices of European and other countries, or how exceptional American Exceptionalism is. We do encourage further research on how American Exceptionalism ts into a larger, historical understanding of various countries practices of exceptionalism and othering. Possible questions include: Is US hegemony different from other hegemonies, both historically and currently? In what ways does US hegemony endure or fail in different contexts? How have Exceptionalism and Orientalism overlapped and interacted in the construction of state hegemony and identity?
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International Studies Review (2009) 11, 253276

American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism: A Critical Rethinking of US Hegemony

2009 International Studies Association

American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism

Meghana V. Nayak and Christopher Malone

American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism

Meghana V. Nayak and Christopher Malone

American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism

Transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/09/13/bush.text/index.html.

Meghana V. Nayak and Christopher Malone

American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism

Meghana V. Nayak and Christopher Malone

American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism

Meghana V. Nayak and Christopher Malone

American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism

Meghana V. Nayak and Christopher Malone

American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism

Meghana V. Nayak and Christopher Malone

American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism

Meghana V. Nayak and Christopher Malone

American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism

Meghana V. Nayak and Christopher Malone

American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism

Meghana V. Nayak and Christopher Malone

American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism

Meghana V. Nayak and Christopher Malone

American Orientalism and American Exceptionalism

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