The Desarrollista State in Brazil and Mexico

-c I vf)Ologies run along diiiiensions of more oi less central state control let economy and the political system. As Chalmers Johnson and Linz cc, I ewever, developmental states and authoritarian regimes are not teti(lpoint.s on continuous scales but rather discrete and distinctive sys cc. fable 1 provides some pro1n1nnt examples ol the nine types of poll flhhoiflieS generate(1 by crossing these two typologies. k flee I In-ce cells along the diagonal from the top left to the bottom right len little tilost of the political economies of the twentieth c:erltury. ihese I elso contain the most stable and presumably compatible combina et of econormc and political systems. The concrete examples of coun liii e eeelside these tyj)es (save the authoritarianmarket cases) are short 1 111(1 seem to have tendencies that push them toward this diagonal. ii the diagonal, we still know more about the corner boxes of totali lot cc Hllmaml(l and democraticmarket systems than we do about au lies etc iandevelopmental states. I evelopmcntal has beeti applied to states such as those in Japan, kit. t, hiiwan, and titscist Italy, but this 1yp ol stat took a l)trti(ulLr etc. what I call the desarroilisia state, in Mexico, Brazil, all(l other (oun nnen 1 ii n- ccl I ,atin America. The terms developmentalism and develo i.iI -Ide are not new to the social science (lebate omi Latin America. In el lIce analysis of (levelopmentalism or national developmecitalisni wa-. dense in the iqGos. The concept of the (levelol)nlental state, as ci lee more generalized Weltanschauung of (levelol)mentalism, lirst teed in the late 1 gbos and early i qos. In the context of Latin Amer tey knowledge, Fernando I lenrique Cardoso an(l Lmizo Faletto I e lice first relerence to developmeritalist states. The Spanish vem ii eel llmeir 1)00k appeared in iq 1, though dralts of it were (irculating cc lv is 1q67. Even mor( explicitly, Soares used desenvolvimentjsta to de U iice teeany l)ostwitr states in Latin America and to distinguish them ana
-.

CIIA1Ti-1 NINI-.

The Desarrollista State in Brazil and Mexio

Ben Ross Schneider

er the knowle(1t,e ed hiseotic:eI ph eenotnert:e in elicit Concte Ii teess, ehe tnost ,,enetel laws, beeuse they ete the most de:vt del of content are: cisc) the: le:est eluible, The: more cotni ctehensi c lii eliditvot scopeoft tetttc, the more it leads its away frotce lee tichness of reality since in oider to incltide the conmmote neents of thi l;etgestpossible: number ofpleenotnen:e, ii micsh ieee ess:erily be es ebstrece es possible- end hence e Ievoiel of conIc, ii.

sx Wc:,ei-,ec 1 M

Over thirty years ago Juan Linz divided the worlds political syste e ten o three categories: totahtarian, authoritanan, and democratic. ( )te lo ri . nomic side, others have categorized economies by the extent ul stale vention in production: command, developmental, and market en )Ite no.
(,olhteen, \ttel kohli, Kathleen IIeehte, Kent \evl,ie,el, \I iiii*h Ii s, end the voleenee teitleots lot IttIftI iii conimeiltS, tied to the Intl! 4 Woo(,i,tnuni I It the Unneisc of None Dante end lee lnstenete for P011ev Rcseate:h ti Nortlecce,, ecs,te lot i(seeItIl seepport. tleleer is cited to Ro, ets BItLheker, Reehinknn (I i ci 4 (N cc on: Fhc- Soeioloi.pceI \ stoic of Ii im I,otttdittt, ihcoit ((ltd .Sl0N 14, tee, et)5): o. 114 1. Jetttl Lit,,, ,,,it ,tttIeoiiteiieii B.eiiuee: Specie, ice Eiik ,llerele eetd \rp t l,ete,,e e Cicavurc, !tholons, ((11(1 iac(t .cys(e,nc (1 Ielsietki: \c,edrre,c 1,ookstoee-, I (li.elneers Johnson, fUll (111(1 (lie Jn/mciecc Mount: Tin (o,w/i, 0/ lcicIt, sips,! / i ih oi!75 (Stenloiti: Stenfded Lniveesjt iress, ieSa). 5cc tn-tI Block, lIee RI Seth- in the Lconoccn, in Neil Smelsee tied Richard Soedhccg, eels., llandb,soi, u/Icc, oolu,y (Princeton: Iein(ete)n Unistisitv leess, Ie)_l), fore tisefolel (listitictiote .ttttcII I of states, as well es cc cete(fne of the eceIen enehsis of st,ete internention. lit eddie, ce I. hIs end iflecroeeonOncIC shehili,,ei iii 4 three tepee noted Beet, Illeeck inclodes social ti
loreest

IdIi el ,,Iete-le ccc less eeneril tee lee :eneksis of cle,elee eioene 1

eel

st,ete eneec,ecceteen in lice

I toe iratefnl to

iii.. ccci

pci, Leinen, end K,eue-;e, see Jcehnseen, lvii!! cotd (Its Jo/rn Uses fume/c Cleeliiieis cc, he elteicel liistitutioics mel 1,ceeiioneic lerfoi-ccttnc-e, in Fieehecic C. l)e-e o, ed,, Jltc ?Wih.ce/ 1, scsssssn, se/ (Ice lien 11000 iisdso(cm/oni (Ithaca: Cornell Uni,e-isit Piess I gS); and F SitS, I:cnheddec/ 11 slkssiuccc,: S/u/it aced ito/n s/csa/ Iraccc/orseealiuee (Pie nteIe ccc: Iei ncetoet c its Ire-sn, t ei): cell Itch, cci A. Jemis Ut-egoi, i/a/cuss laenisect acid Dccslohtceccflal Ditto ,,,?, it ineeceelc: ltine ehon Unisirsity Press, u)7g). ,lthteeep,hc ctttnhersoceee, the Sie;enishe I c eeigtcesc adjectives, decactollisia end dssecevo1icceecs/cs(a, c-tsleechc;el,, Is eeseftel lot chis 14 I,ettn .fineiicin \,oients leone tethet cases. i-l,iic H, c icr cxacee pIe, LeccI;eeeo Meet ins, icsdse,e(ea/ezamao, hit tgcSia (ea(totta/ I (/etflticslVt (lltti /0 Is- J.ceeenec: Se4e, t e)()S) cod foi a full hiisteen, Rie-ecelo lfielse:leceevsk,, lceesatcten/ss cues cc /s, so chits: () Cu/a sdsologsno (/0 (Ic-SIte vu/icc tttsfl (/s (tie) (Rio e It Jecie ne: II IA, I e5sS ) e n,seetlee If, C;tidoset end Knice heleteo, Ds,bcssthnsy (c,s(/ DevsIo/ncsstt/ tee l.a/,es rttscetu a -b Ilk 1, Ics: Ccci, tisle, of C;elifociiie Piess, ie7)), plc, 14;48.
In
-

276

277

u.N R )ss

S(

11 N111)ER
(COtl(titil( tj)ttl(ti,tItS

The l)esarrollista Stale in Brazil and Meieo

I/tb/u 1, Ittliin cl tlitl

I( III lnnnin
(1 nii

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151

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Itititi ( I
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fla ui IImd Mexico. In this usage, the desarrolhista state is an intensive, It IIimmge conceptualization ihit leaturesac omh)matinn of elements IN I dial to these political e onomies, though these four characteristics It I I isH iii iii l)I()L(ler compiLris(>flS. my formulation of the iii ti it tilista state (listinguishes Latin American and East Asiami versions in ttis I )I career lttei11s in the executive bureaucracy. ii lIter preuhise ofmy characterization is that the clevelopmnetital state ma i-i I te defined solely by trails of the state and its relations to society.

lc I

(ltiit,t? (1 )Sl)s)

nt-I 1-15) II (lIttle (I I-IS Laliti

,tlintit:t

its

Spain

( 1hl;S75)

lytically horn classic miiiirnal and welfare states. Developmentalisiii t t less central to arlier debates in Mexico and began to appear mote Ii in the Irndlq7os. DCSJ)ite the long (:urrency in Litiii America ul I

terms development ahsm and (leVelOpmefltal state, analyses

tended to locus on either the intellectual history of theorLes SUppi (levelopmelltalisln or on the (Ons((lUences of state promotion oF ii

ii
it

try. Largely neglected has been a full reconstruclion oh how (LeVel( 9 ni I tal states evolved historically as well asaluller appreciation of the inlet i tion between e(onomic intervention and political exclusion. In this chapter 1 abstract out of a comparison oh Bratil and Mcs i from the igis to tile iqSos four essential cliaractenstics of the stilIt iii its relations with the economy and the polity: (i) political capiLili where profits and investment de wnded on decisions made in time slil .; 1
(2) a (lOlilinailt develoj)mental discourse on the necessity of inchmst iii

tiofl afl(l of state intervention to promote it; () political exclusion ni ii majority of the adult population; arni (i.) a fluid, weakly iiistitiitiotiiIi, bureaucracy in which appointments structured power anti represri Il.m tmofl. These components of the model of the desarrollista slate illitmitittit (lie motivation l)elund the actions of state elites (developmentalisimt ) ii structure of power within the state (the appointive bureaucracy); Im n I i I pidotiiriarit forms of state interaction with the economy (politictI talism) and with political and civil society (political exclusii in). A m ii.t goal of this chapter is to examine these four characteristics in genem;iI. ii eluding an asseSsment of measurable indicators or thresholds, inn I
It. (;Itii(i() ti [)iIIi,it St)iItS () Nnto lstn1o lid \iit(tj(t Lahitid, tutu/at (1i?l/ It ij (jiitliosiitiiiliio I g75) :

I,

Ittt spcciuicallv, the desarrollista state is characterized by au eclusioii I cult ioriship to the polity (or political society, in Alt red Stepans hr itis) amid an interventi( mist strategy oh pu )mnotlng the economy. I-here I thIti with Johnsons formulation, which adds on several nonstate lea i including labor relations (though these are, of course, ultimately tic id by the state) and the si ructure of the private sector (the pronti ti of zathatsulike groups and the relative absence (>1 foreign capi I ( )diei nomistate factors such as geopolitics, culture, class relations, I I In nature of private firms should not enter julIo definitions of (hiler cut I,iil(Is of states, though they obviously affect their perbrmnance. its chapter has several potential contributions to make to the l)roa(lel ill I c on the developmental state. First, it ohfeis a HormA,siaml III IVII 1(11 given the exceptional 1)cr1orniLncc of the Asian developmen tins timakes Ihem less relevant tom- t lie study oh the Hmaj( rity of ot her -ii iii )ing countries. Second, in this chapter I alI(miil)l to 1 develo th- liii i meal criteria for iclenti1ing fratures (ii the (levelol)mncIllal state. tit us imalvses often (10 not proi1e clear empirical ref erents for the iitt tilt features of a developmental state, as in Johnsons original fir 11111: one historical case is defined as a developmental state, yet, to Ihr Ituisl ration of the comparativist, without using indicators thaI travel I IS lo other regions. Lastly, these fiiur characteristics are usefhl in hi to Iii (ompansnns between Fast Asia and Latin Amnet-ica aIl(l among I mnu \IIumicLlli anti developing countries genera11, IS I (hiscflss iuithei in ilte ii itll ision. Ihe first task, Iliough, is to analyze the four components )Ohiti(1l (;al)itahisni. In itt ,i,ii incl Mexico, begimmning with 1

7. liii i\iiiiI)I(, v1;iiI.t (ttuIaIuItt ttueilo tIe Silut, Crisis dcl cltsatiulltsittn v 1.111 Lpirii(t tscti,i1 Nl(Xi( I), I 7(t I i)7, I,uvista t vhua,,a itt (7u,u,au Is//I,,,,, its/cs 21, tnt. Sa (OctiutniDecttitltti Ig7 ): I 1
itlt(I(tli ut-I

I lit )ttc(I)t is tititltllt i:toi,c i Iii stsi that ii is in ititia;tti;l ,ttltut:tnsoii tinoti_4 tt Nlislti, tti;ititai in Coii, 1 piIaitIu littnttgtiuttits ettt,Itxis. St-i- (hto:ttiitt S,titt,, Cttiici to I,,Iiiits, tan, its,i Is/i/nat .S,,tnre Iton,z, (1 it. (1)ietniltii It)7o): 1t It l iIstI,titi(ttli_tlt)I)til, ittitltlli i,iiti_t, ,iuI Iotu ItselIits nlsun ii S,,rttiis I:nhler i, I Iiii,itauioiis, (iIol,,cI ilitoiit, (XItItti ,l itt tlttois it H,:tits ucllilirtts; tii,tklltltuI, I Ilti((pls iIItiittiittte nictic nhtuoiIiis ii, Ittvtt ccclintil(s, I Iis Ilitijntnal listintiitsis thus nit Stelctiis tluiteuuo tlisiiiit Intl ,,Iitcnii, tltt stilt ,Iitti t\t(tlint, lti,:tI, ,ittcl cotci\t Intiu:ttti ntcs); ailli il socteis (It:iiitu-s, thtioi,ul .sss t:iii, fle//iiiil:nig 11,/i 1 1.1,1 c,I I,iisIaint,): intl civil sot it-is (oig,,niittI /ioliI)s)_ Si-c ,lIiitI SIc l,I,h, t /i,n:/l aunt I/i, Stat//u,,,, (s,,e (Iiitn c-toil: Iiiin Iout Litlstis,It Itiss, iSSt, I It ,ts,ti I, loIiw cl Iissitttti tcctis ,,utd leoiioiii,c Ic-tInt itc:citc i,

278

279

BF,N Ross S(

1 [NI IDER

The
ci Ic ciiiies.
liis.

Desarrollista .Slatr en Brazil acid Mixuo

PoLurlcAc CrITALIsI

Pervasive, (liscr(tionarv control by the state over resource allo(it IC III In political capitalism, accumulation (public iii l)ritt() depends more on politics than markets. Political capitalisiti i WeIxrs term for wartime or booty capitalism, l)ut it can he broa(lein without being stretched, to include iiormnal peacetime conditions. Sci I worldwide Set rules for capitalist economies; in political CIl)italiSIIl, CI cials make rulings. Policvmakers in political capitalism have a grelI lt.i I of (liscret ion: ihe avar(l ifl(iiVidU1l contracts, make loans, gralit spe ii I tax exefliptions, approve import licenses, negotiate with multinatii corj)orations (MNCs) and J)ermit price increases on individual [tel is Creative officials can extend their discretion over (Veil nominal elititic )rogr;mls by reinterpreting the impleinentttion or manipulal II mnent 1 (lisl)ursenlents. For Brazil aml Mexico there is relative consensus that capitalism wi quite politicized or state controlled from the 1(405 (or much eaiIici I until the 1 ggos. 12 Raymond Vernon claimed that there were two disi five fratures of the Mexican economy: first, the relative pervasivelu and vigor of the governments regulatory measures; second, the cxl II (linac) (legree of particularit, and discrimination in the applicatiul I ccl those regulatory powers. A decade liter Susan Purcell concluded Mexico had a form of state capitalism. Jose Luis hon argues that tic state in Brazil promoted politi ized accumulation: politicized bcc;ii it responds to the delenninations ola state much more than to rules ccl the market. Michael Barzclay coined the term )ohlicizedl muarket dc cii 1 omy for his analysis of Brazil in the 1 70S and 1 gS()s. Despite the ap 1,11 emit (Onsensus, 11w analyses provided criteria for distinguishing .11 colitical forms of 1 1 I roin noim )italiSIiI. c1 Assessing the (legrdl of political iapitalism n(quir(s a qualitatni aiiil of resource flows through the narrows of the economy. In est [[HIll (r(clit and foreign exchange constitute crucial narrows in [host (LeVelO 1 HI I
politicizes capitalisni.
,

Particular economnics sufier as well from their own peculiar For example, in Mexico amid other arid regions, water flows, Ic ic ii y and economically, through a narrows. Where governments have 1 I, cccill 1 )[I over the distribution of water, hydraulic politics an intense and p -iii iiably salient in private decisions on agricultural investtnent. Be 4 1151 time overall extent and mix of discretion over scarce resource flows cu-S Iiomn country to country, no simple threshold can be applied, and it ci ccl i;ihly best to think of capitalism as mnorc or less politicized. liiis politicize capitalism through direct investment in infrastructure II cii state entcrpnses that ultimately trickles into the private sector as I 1111 .nts for goods and services. In Brazil and Mexico the state ac iii iii directly for arouml 40 l of total investment fl)r much of III cstwar period. Many businesses depended on the political dcci cs iii how to spend this money. In her introduction, Meredith Woo cccli i igs highlights the pivotal role of credit allocation by developmental I lics, iii the Brazilian and Mexican desarrollista states, through their de Ic cpiiieimt banks, controlled most longtermmm credit to in(lustry. Until the HI I os public bank resources in Mexico were greater than those in 1 i c Ic, Cl ivate sector. The national dlevi.lopmnent batik in Mexico, Nafinsa, ilc ilcounted for 20 perctlit of total Iliitn(1iig l1I(l 30) l)erctmil of all ii C ill In industry. From 1 C).f() to i go only 10 percent or less 0)1 :redit ccii nivate commercial bank.s went for nie(liUman(l longterni fimiatmc I? cli neover, as private hank.s grew, they lent proportionately less to in I c ii v Further subsidy and regulation influenced the allocation of 1 ccc, ii ui the remaining, nominally private resources. Urmtil the 1 gcSos, a Iii ccl lie major fiwms of indirect state control in both countries inclwled cli hId nontariff barriers to imports, tax incentives, controls on interest
-

icc bus ccllcis

u lcccidcI
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list

of

IiIi2s1i1i5 in ,:tuip liii Icl:ct,cc Illipoli:cuicl- of IiI.ickci

rpllsc t)ch.cVIOI Inc:tiIctio

411,1 lcIIc-,ccc nile lolloc-oc

I

ccli 1111

I) ihc

priciceiIci

stc:crc of

cc -icc
I

II

Ic I

cicc(lil( ticcic: (n) [in deipcc III dcci:cicccii (ci Ilcciiilstcu peecs licii IlitIIil:ciccco;cl ice (ic-i_tIle ccl Sc(Icci,cl Iooclictl,cmicco; ([i wileihcc iOiIIest I.itcs dcvi;cil luccni ills: mci (c) ti-ic Ills cci input ,nvciiiocI(s to inSIniccclls cci 111:11 lc1ct1c1 is, Set
I-(olcc,IIu( ccis Scsu.ems RlIccii,i in DccliopIi1i (ccIiIilrits, 10 Pcikiiis onci

I
%III

H. II. (Il-h 11(1 c. \ihIiI vliIl, its., 1mm tlux ()xhcid tiiic\cisii lrcss, cl_Ill), pp. lc(c(c7.
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2h1

BEN

Ross S(

1 lxii

Tin Desarroflisia Stale in Brazil and Mexica

oil ical capitalism has a prolomuieL illipact on
in

)Oit 1 lates, eX

and

wage

SU1)Si(lies, agricultural price supports, restrictions oi and price controls. In Mexico. 11w pul)hc sector I was in
.

tIme 1 )olitiCtI

strategies

of

sition

make or break any private firm. The Mexican an(l Brazilian ecOnomies were nonetheless stilt I III Propert wealth, and profit were mostly private, arni tlwrefi)re 1)11.11 I set the overall parameters for the slate afl(l its policymnakers. VI i I often private i .11 sector state provi(le(L mitch of total investment, the the harvest For instance, rates of return on state investment vii I I-I I II lower than on private investment, often because state enterplis(s States may account fur a large 1NI ip Ill 1 customers low prices. but not enough to sustain rapid growth iili )l II. II of total investment private they (lepen(l on investment to keep growth at a politiciIlv i capitalism al)le rate. Political thus involves heavy Fec ipr( )cal (011S1 II,, enorm( State clii es have ms discretion and power over particular t on .1 coflstraifle(l to )mTIs1e J)ohcies conducive to they are structurally ii investment, as order especially profit geiwrally in to increase total (.11 became more mobile over the 1 g705 and i q8os. Multinational corl)orations hirther constrain the slate. Their acc, iii nil tion strategies are global, and they may not therefhre invest in the doi economy despite generous sul)sidies. They lle also more likely to ni (il I investment elsewhere ill response to perceived political uncertainty. Iii In protected economies such as those of Brazil ami Mexico, liowevei iiii Ii iii tional firms caine to resemble domestic firms in that l)ro(Lu(tioli was Iii, I lie local market, managers were often nationals, and, espe(:ially, most invesl iii caine from local profitsH For example, over the decade of the 1 g IS. n ii vested profits accounted for ( percent of the 1-ecorde(L value of U.S. in %I 1 The far greater presence of MNCs distiiigiil a inent in Latin America.(I Litin Amenca from Northeast Asia. But MNCs do not change the essel In, I which the two regions, similar across though was political capilahsm, 1 appear to aflect greatly the effectiveness of elevelopuietital states.
to
.

d
V
i

nimic and state elites. Economic elites (lepeild heavily on the state I I ave good reasons to lobby officials and to (1(1 so individually rather iii coilectively. Moreovem-, state intervention increases political uncer lilt V (or investors at the same time it, reduces imiarkel uncertainty. For 0 elites, political capitalism provides a powerful array of sticks and car - Is 1(1 influence the political as well as the economic behavior of ceo iii ii elites. Unfortunately, most studies of the developimienlal state 1 iS on their econemlic coiiseeiuences to the iieglee:t of their usually last ilitical legacies.

Iii

Vi-1.opMENrAL DlscouRsi-:

\Vnlespread state intervention in the economy politieized capitalism; In lominant. (levelo)melltal (hiscourse gave that ulterventiomi direction ,ii,l legitimacy. Developmentalismmi is an ideology or world view that ac
i,iils industrialization a higher priority than other societal goals and mi-s lime state the leading role ill promoting it. Ihe criteiioii for evaluat 1 Pohi(vmnIkers rely omi straight ii iiicy is e1ftctiveness, miot efiie:iency. a iv,iid qitatit itative measul-es such as increases ill cultiflit or export.s to militate progress. In an exemplary display of developnientalisni, officials iii K iiea, infused with the c:olnpetitive spirit of the Olympic games in constructed an electronic scorel)e)ard in a central subway station listed the partici)ioting countries, their capitals, flags, and incomes i head. In contrast, olfie:ials iii liberal, socialist, or (orl)oratist states - militate polie:v in terms of overarching ideologies fdr which political lead ne often willing to suffer losses in proehiction or e:ompetitive.miess. 1 Iii Brazil and Mexico after the depression of the 1 qOs, the prevai1iii lt.iiiosis of the barriers to industrialization argued that the domestic: liii igeoisie was incapable of generating self sustailling industrialization. I hi- state should lead and tIie bourgeoisie ihIlow. This diagnosis spilled it into political (liscourse, and reduced the legitimnac:y (If sector I it at irIs and by extension active political participation by the hour ml iisie. For example, at his inaugural address in iq34, the new Mexican -siolent, LIzaro Cirdenas, stated: The state alone embodies the gell t ii ii lerest, 1n(l for this reason only the state Imas ii vision (II the whole. Iii, slate must e:onlinually broaden, ine:rease and deepen its interven

I i. 10.

\-iiinn,

it llia no of tin/li ,,alu,nal, Slate, a,,? / ,,e,,I (;a/nial Li lilaal (trinii-lnii: tIIIW(lI)fl tjiiiiisiti Ii,ss, Ig7), ti). 22225, ;nnl I ii Irl-lidI, InI)tiC FIiIrrplis( ii Ill-a/il nut Nlrxicii, in Ihotii;ts C. Itrnne:ni ,ii,l Iliili

Dilemma o/ il,xnos Ihvela/nnn/. p. Sir I r Or F ins, I) /,en thai Develo/anen?: i/n

l:mchr,, i-its., iInl/iotharmn (:a/ill alisin (Itnuhtrr, Coin.: \V,sl, eW, i Ii. Si-I (,.n-y (1-irlIi 111(1 P11,1 11. ta,tns, Io,nsn,non:il (o1]nli.uioIis, t)(j)(ii(IrIii I arij,hc-rv: t (omp;irison of lti;,tit and Nlixi,, / ii 1 otinilnI, till! Slat, Inti, in ill, Scn,i iinn,uan il,c,a,cl, l?eviea, i (, no. (i i) )0i.,IiOIl(S nai1sI1,lIinflIlrS V 1:,s nlIi,,I% iil;icioiws (IC \iiI Ii .1 1 22. SrIi_I0 Ititai, Ci)I 1.,,tin:t ((Ill t_stt,t,,s I_Jiil(lnS, lco,,,in,a Ie it ,, ,ua l.a/ma I I (I )i /: 1)1)i 2!, Is (it,,! ii, I 1 ,i.,islo X\IIII. lii, Oiiisiion (it I,i,,i,n Iii,,sln,,ni ,ti,I 1,, F,oi,oiiiit (lilsis iii iii Richard F. FiinIai,.t miii! Ricarlo Il,,nrhL)a, is. ,,k,. l)(ielii/Ofl(iil ,,i,/ iii, in la/i, .tn,,,,,a (\oII( DITTo: t,ii,iilm of iiic t)amc Pi,ss, l). p. i(i.1. Sii Iiiir F,:,i,s, CI: O, SIIk. mit Ih ih-iii ,- in l-,,si \,a: L,ssons or latin 1 c.lIiIsIs. in t)ivo. Cd., lSil,li,al lom,,a,,,t of lb, .Veii itcia,, f,,d,,,?,,a/a,,,
,

11(11 Ross S, hn,-i,!i,, Oit.t.,n,itil Ilnsiiuss tnI,iim

in I)i-ini,mi,,iii Hiazil, Jn,onal

i) I 27.

,,oneneai, S/,,,la:m amid tImid .1//ala I. 10, 4 (\Vnoi-i I i7S) : Iolnnim. till! and /1,, /a/ia,i, n- ,Ii,,,,,i,: pp. t

051, Rail Dal,riinl,irf, Ntuk,i miii! Itan: Imm,i lmpt-s iml R.,ij,ni:mIjI\, in I-mat, in /1gm ll,,,,,t mm/.Smmmn/ (St,miil,,l,I: Stanlni,! L nImlsiti Ii(,,s. I()(iS).

282

283

B1N

Ross S(:l INI11)l

The

Des.Lrrolli.sIa

Stale

in Brazil and Mexico

tion. Public defrnse of the states tUi(llng role was constant. Nearly p years later, Luis Echeverria stated that it was the states res )onsibilitv 1 set the (lirection and rhythm of development and to particij)ate diie I Is 1)0th in the J)roduction and distribution of iflCO1T1e. These argunlel lit preexisting, ( UasiRousseaUim discourses that accorde(l the state 1 role of Seeing it) the national interest while other societal actors pulsilil I their partu ulari.stic interests. The dominant discourses in Latin Amel had generall accorded the state pnmacy over soc;ial afl(L economic ii liii ests, though belore i go liberalism mounted a strong (ainpaign ((I (I i n Moreover, the state had been active, 2 lodge this (loinmailt discourse. J)eclally in Braiil, iii l)1omOtiI4 growth. Postig.o developrneiitalism mvshe(l with some preexisting tliscotii s iml practices, l)ut it arose in the specific crises in international trade (LIII itig World Wars I and II and the Great Depression, gaining theoretic a )rogritTmitic body in the aiiaiyses of Radl Prebisch and the United Ni tions Econontit Commission lbr Latin America (ECLA). [he growil consensus among elites was that Latin Amenca could ho longer rely ii industrial countries to provide manufiictured goods, nor could I al Ii America ever catch up to the rich countries without industrializing. The military in some countries added national se univ (oncelil. though these were not as strong and immediate as the were later in Ira Asia. Meredith WooCumings has argued that national security conc(i ii. decisively in! lueiiced the course of economic policy in l)Ostwitr Korea. .111
27. Lizaio Cdnkn:ts, iiicct in Nor:s tI:tmilion. Lije limits a! Slate tulonos,: Poslls,,,/, /ioIsahi svlpxsca (iiIn(sIsin: iiiiiciton Lnjpiisit II(ss, Il)ia), p. i ig; Lois E( hs<ii-i:i, in (.srlos s\rriol.i, 1os iIopos iii is, ties tints ii Esinlo (1g7;o)7,l, into lots,,, unpin! i i LiiJim I g;li): _a \efi, I/u (sn/in/,s/ i,adpf,osp of la/in l,ns,i,a (I,iisioii: iIiIIcston Liiiss PS. (:1mm sitv Pis.ss. 0)50): dlitpi Stc p,oi, i/u Slats and Soc,/ (Iiilscslr)n: Fri it lion Lnis(Isiis Ill, 1

lopik. Fin Lcoiioipiiu P.ole of ilit Slut iii i,iliii,ul i{eainp.: iiia,iI nid (onip:iied. I SsiHigio, 0 Josiph I i,ovs 01(1 \ils Jiioh,io, cds,. (uidio 1/, ls vol!,!, 11am! ( t,v ti ok: I rue-c i I is also kiioisii p IS S ciiuislu li;lOlitIII (Li\L. (In the Ipistois of 1itS(lOIiIii 1 ,lisni dliii Ihi .piiii.ul intiIIi,iuI hisioc 5 of lllV(iOl)lrIiIPI t(OluoIiIirs iii i_,IliII ,oltric 1, Slihil 0. FiilS(liIilaIi, i(il()iOL(itS of Li oiioiuuti DescIopiiiciil in Lain \I1IcIie:i, iii 1 Ii /01 110/21 (New iluven: YuIc Unissrsuis ISiss, I 7 I); Tlsonpa.s IZ. Skidlilon, I-oh/us Os Its,, 15,Oighf (Ntis Viiik: Oxford UnivlIsiO hiss, )f);), (Si). PP ii. 575)1); K:itlii Si kku ok, lds, 5 (i 11(1 Insist p/sails: I)svslo/nnsss 1(5/isis, in lisa:,! us iv! A scess/is,a (I hm; I: ( orne II I i virsit, inss, I I ) esp. pp. 1 77O IIIIIsehowsi.a, l,ss.casissssia ,rano)nsIo /nasdsjro; ?si;tii, if Loins Iis Ni:io,i ii 005. .1 /ala dos I,on,sss I ssals 5u do /55S? so inca/i, /as,n iliIu,,, i c(,j uS i (Si l;lullo: i,iisiiiiis,, ig5) itI:tli(l(Iil)suI54. (fs5/:515a/.(fis(/s)s, \I,ViiO Joss1li L Lu,,, RiiiI ii 1)15(11 111(1 liii Olk_plIs of tin 1)01 Irene of I otqo.iI lxi ll.iIlkc. iii June. Dish .iIlliJaIiIl. II S)iitI, ciis,, 1,a(,is 1 mci/rn c Lrassanssr 1)sss!o/nisssif (i,oiildit, Cob.: Li line Ruinpci, I) SISf); 10(1 Soil oril ,., Niosk, Issdusl,7al hiezss!ss(ia,s so lhsius (iScikeles: toi,etsit of (li).
Ste SIsis Nixno
OIl II)iS. 1

I 1111cm she further elaborates in the nhiro(luenos) to ibis volume.s Iii I atlit America, military and security worries were snore likely to be sec Lily and complementary to developmentalism emanating from other Is of the state and the l)rivimte sector. In Brazil, where the level of niili It V Ihtfluen(e ill economic policy was among the greatest in the develop u ilalist countries of Latin America, officers participated in economic ShIV I hrouglh two principal avenues. First, in the 19305 the military de l) 1l1(dl interest and expertise in weapons industries, and generals be 4 11111 l)o,\Clll,ll lobbyists for sectoral policies in steel, l)(trol(,mm1l, tLIlxl, ii i, computers and aircraft. A more general interest in industrializa 11)11 hlnong officers emerged later as the cold war intensified. By the 515 and i g(ios, generals in many countries had adopted the view that d vllllpment was one effective antidote to communism. These concerns WI-I e tiwcli wenker in Mexico than in Brazil, where after the 1 9%OS the ittlI any was not influential in economic policy and where security threats, t))IIhhllliSt oh otherwise, were less salient political issues. \l )st studies of l)0si(r industrialization in Mexico and Brazil highlight Ii. dstininame of developmentalism. In his study (11 econoimc policy Li hg in Brazil in the 19505, Nathaniel Lell examines the modernizing Ills italist ideology, which favored heavy industry, nnport substitution, ill accorded an ample role to the 1 )ublic sector. Ihis ideology cut lioll debate because its economic view,s have been virtually Ufl(oilteste(l stilce at least the early 1 gros and because the economic intelh 5 tlsia also pmsentd no critique or alternative. The turmoil and coup 1 II i( 1 c)bos temporarily unraveled the consensus. Beginning in the late os the military revived developnmentalism and silenced counterdis 5)11 5(5 from the left. in Mexico after the depression and World War II tcnkos (technically .01 ((1 officials) in the economic bureaucracy became increasingly ifl iii In imidustrialization, restrictions on trade and foreign (apital, and a ic stale intervention to overcome the (l(fi(:iencies of Mexican markets sill I ;tpitalists. For tecnicos, the word dimigisie has none of the invidi II. II litnotitions which it usually carries iii the French tongue. Frank
-

Sic

tims,

(bass, State, slId Depsisdenct.

ii I lion to I/u Swift: Stale assd l,,saitcs in korsass 1 \\ooCoioi s I, logan IS))) I Met (ditil 4 l,s,lsusi/l:ailoss (Ni, Yotk: Coiolnhi;i Uisi eisil, II)sS, 11)1)1), SIc hen Ross Si tifleidiI, IoI,l, s ,vsthsn list Slats: Idits l)so,aosrats and in (lsrsls,a! Io/sey isi ).,ils,,sfasasI [,ra:sf (tilIsinIlgtt: Unintsitv of titIsluuIs,h tIesS, igi ), and ltn,iotIei ,\,tii, Ilu I s,, of J,!s-olis,s: Im ()ucsl fot Ikr/,,suhsi,u a! I ulsssiaoli /0 -i ,.sst, ssa assd lii a:i! (its Ik( h-s ,,-uiis sf (iiifoitsii less. igS) a!upSIal,iiig and I)ezsfis/inssnI in lcra:s/, I))47I))04 (New 5 ,,stiinnei Ii, iaff, Lsonoss,ss I if lii \Sile, tiid Sons, IC)l)S), p 55) (o,ic, .1 /su(ut (!O.S /uasn,ns, 5, SPOOl), l)ihnssiia (5/ ,shxioi .i D,vsl)i/sistilsl, PI 1.114)) bInd,, p. i 41).
,

IL

285

BIN Russ Sc; INEII)rR

Branclenburg claims that it was not until the post Would War II years I.,, ifl(lUstry rnanage(l to acquire a l)reierential role in economic (level; ment.x Time two governments after 194() made industrialization tin iii tral policy objective: In i q46 Miguel Alemin took industrialization in; the campaign trail as one of his three Sl( gaTIs and the only one ielat i; economies. In his review of the literature, Edwar(l Williams conul in I; that the ideology of industrialization began to take root duriig ti; Cirdenas regime and later became full fledged revolutionary (I; i,i ii with tIme I(CeSSl()I1 to povoi of Miguel Aleiniii in 1q46. Brande; also notes tile primacy of the stato in economic liii but argues that I in is a centuriesold tradition. The host comprehensive study of Mcxi; iii busiiiess (o ;iuludes that most lcading entrepreneurs accept the [act t liii Mexico has a mixed economic system ....Even in the 1 q)s, most imim ;iessnieim still favor a substantial government role. Another way to assess the dominance of (lcelopmentalisni is from Ii l)ersPtive of the eclipse of competing discourses, especially oiiln ni economics and liberalism, which had ardent albeit isolated backeis ii; both countries. Iii Brazil one of the strong but ultimnateh unsuccessi ii candidates for the liresiclenhial elections of 1945 campaigned against iii velopmentalisin and the olesarrollista state Vmrgos had been (OflS(rtmot iIi and in favor of relying primarily on export agriculture. In Brazil genio Owlin and Octavio Bulhoes were the leading liberal economilisi They were 1)0th ministers in postwar governments but could do Iii ii more thaim stall developnmenialism md increasing state intervention. I Mexico time cleavage betwecii monetarists and stmucturalists doimimmaic ii struggles over discourse and policy. Howevem time ascendant Inonctal si in the period of stabilizing developmeiit, including Antonio OrtIz Mii,;
...

The
silivey

Dcsarrollista State in Brazil and Mexico

of elite opinion ill authoritarian Brazil (197273) revealed support for econonnc over social or l)olitieal developmnent. In its nf longterm priorities all groups (save e;liurch leaders and leaders iii; oppositio n pithy) Iavo>reol econo irnc olevclo)pment, including
ii.;

Ai

I,

, labor leaders (.[g percent, N l)nuitieiims (46 percent, N civil servants ((io l)erce11t, N .fo)) , business executives (66 per 84), ami(i mnaiiagers of public cumnpamimes (So percent, N= in).
= = =

hi; ;acler survey in tile I qbos in twelve Latin American countries in Iii ig Brazil and Mexico, most hlmanagers (N= 2.1) favored state inter ill;;;; to p1oile infrastructure, technical assistance ;uid research, Ii tariff protection, tax exemnptiomIs, and overall plamming. They were it itmibivalent about state enterprises and thought theni appropriate h when they elid not compete with private finns. They also) criticiZe(l in II;; icy anol Polities ill governmemit but generally opposed inept inter As late as 1982, a survey after iii; ii rather than intcrventiofl per Se. iii; i i;;ision by the Mexican goverrmnlent to) natiomialize l)riiLte banks re liii widespread support for the (heiSioul aiming all social groups: 72 lit of all respondents favored the nationalization, as IRL imearly two iii; Is oil business leaders and industrialists. s
tantitative indicator of tile dommane:e oti developii;entalisni ;nioL

a
14

ihr

inenty of political leaders who efl(lo)rSe it is the division of goverll tHrill spemldihig between economic pro111otin and other eX})ehl(lilures. t,bi I; i I he economic buolget exceeds the military, social, amiol administra 11%. iii; lget.s (singly, not iii total), it is one strong indicator that the state leveiopniemital orientation (see Table 2 below). In contrast, aeimmiiii liv; and military expenses are greatest in the classic state, while tile
.i

a major figure

among mnoimietarists and finance

mirlister Ironi

1955

1970, were still moderate (levelopmentalists.

0

s-

l; .in;t;-iil;;crii, 5Ia/:,ni 0/ lbn/;i,, lhs,,

Mc ;sk, ln;Iintisa/ ItnioIiit,in( ii; ilrwao, pp. 5; p) Si-;- .;tsn \;innii. 1);/in;tna o/ .tle.snn.; l)nr1a/;u,en/. I L;Iwn;tj. \\itti;ciw. Ntn;.;iinit in tin- Mnxinan i-ia-/nt;Ltinl;, .Sl:COLt.S rinnn/s (Mt; I. -i tg7i): :5 IPa)titcI/i)Iit , .i!a/,/;,L o/ ilodern iIesua, p 2;;: Rn liii; Si (mij;, En/u-/mn. i-. 4

ii hi nlget is highest in the wellimue state. Consistently high econonue; in lii ig, over time, and across various gomvernments and regimes, is a iii indicator of how enduring and widely shareel (levelopmentahSmn is. iiiIiII itative thnsholds require qualitative cenifirmation because Strong liii otmiental motivations can underlie apparently noneconomic spend

an,-/ lS/;fn;in las-n/u-1/l-(rn/ur) h am (\;-s; \i;ik: Oxtiioii t:nisi-rsii- ii-;-ss I ;) P- I [2 Si-;- Ji;tn; I-ri-itch, i/u lirwa/,a,; limo/u-ri .-tflC: C/nt.; (lam//lit nn/ .-illiaa mu in that,-,,, S Pan/n (Cttajn-t I tilt: t_niv;-tuas ni N;;rih (,irntitta P1(ss, l;)i)2), pp 14ti;. Bi;-t;;s; lciuvskt, Ieu;ann-umu ,rnnn;nlen /nnul,-,,n. Ntaxli;t;t, (li/ti/ni. Vi;in; tJiqui;ti, ini;-;sl;-w liv initini, Nni-;i;In-;- (i, n)i. 11w sot;-;-iia- titit<iistiii, ;iI 1.-S. ti;-ti-t;i;;ip nt;I tin- until wit- ;tsn n-ltn IS tin snuiii(iii at ;tl-s(-lnpimt;-ntit;siii. t;;lw, titil i(nii;iiiiic cli c-s aic;pi;-it ihi siitii itt )(4titiSd (OIlUflItiiiSit) mit i)tilIi 1111(1 Ii) sr;vi ;4 tIn- .c(;-nnipmtr/m/ 1 tu-itot at pinntniiiii Iii;- ;-tti;-r;;tisl-, Ittii at thu 511111- tan; itn- SSilii,,ili lath ;xpa;;;in;t tin- ic nt;nt;nc iith- at titi silt;-. M)Xi( it) tininnatisin, (lull i-il pilnittil ci4n;;st itu- t_Jnii;-;i Soiu;-s, iiiip;utc-;i 1)1(1) c-n;iniscini-nt at tn- i-alit war ilnis at ita till; 1
.,.

) 4

%.ii
III

\iilii-in I;n.,n;,. ;,p((l;iIl was 11(1 11)1; to; tin- ii;; ;iit;rpris;- tin-san- lint tln iii,ilil ii; pinji; I tI;;i si(;s n;ttin;;;IIo 1.51 ;,nnn;;;tiscii;tis;. tii I,11,,il. liii S(nt)i)ilii1 I....; a;iI;iii ii;; ;;IIn ii ((111)5 Svi-lii ;i;itt;st it; ;n(tnrsln1i till tilt p;aI..:i14;- itt inlil var at; liii lii ; iii.; an mills. tt;;I i-si-il shill; il iii;-,; j)lnnnn;ni ta-nun-is sari; is t.ii;;stn ct-S i-; \II,id Stmp.iit. 1?,, lu//mis /// Pa//f/i-.: (/ia;w I,, I in, ;;;-il aiim I;) In sLiiiSis n U7// (tiimt;;-inn: tr,ni;-inn ti;isi-tsiis Pins. n7, I Pt,n 15 I n-i \tnt)i ni;niih, ISii,i (nil! I//(Vh/75 i/i IJ,azi/ Piiiloii) it: rn;; ci;;;; t ttis c-is/is P;;ss, ,
.

I), iii. \IIn-rt t.;;lic-riuni), (.nsc-rnnn-tli aid fl;-sc-lnju;n-i;;: Nt_ui_up-i;.ii n,iiiii;s IllIi .1 /iiii/m/ a/ life; -t,neruan Sf u/n; 7, in. (init I g(;): N \lcin-l tiasati;-, nut Rn(i;-;i( 5. (.niip. La twa anal;i: ;;inn ii;- I.; I;,;m.i Ia p*tIh; ti-it \t sirn, I-i,ii lnf,n,au,anal;iS (O;nct);-rDoi-cmh;-i I p54): inS. p Snails, -o Nnvn Fsi:idn ui Smniic:; L:itn;a, p. (.i.

17

In

Lit;;;

npinaln

286

287

flIN

Ross S(.i INLII)1R

I 4

The Desarrollista Stat, in Brazil ((lid Mhx,co

ing on education (such as funding foreign graduate study in eiigiio ing) or military training aIi(l nsearch an(1 (levelol)IneHt in high ted ii ogy that has commercial applications. In Brazil, fur example, the no

uirements cati deny the fran 1 nv, gender, palty, or registration ree

government created social programs SUCh as ummployment instil ii in the fonTi of funds on which beneliciaries could draw. In prtct1c. t I I goerflrnent agencies Use(I Unclaime(1, aCCUIiiUlate(I lufl(IS to fmn;nn ii i(I to may prefer (1eelOpin(fltIli5tS V(h)pIfl(flt projects. Moreover, 1.1 cie(ln or protection such as trade ifl(IireCt h)IfliS of intervention, t 1 tioning, which (10 tiot show up as large items iii the government bimd
In the twentieth century most states were eXpecte(1 to facilitate gi
I IV,

.1 ari(I improve social well are. The developmental state is peculiar iii II )I III CC( transform thc policies to (conOmiC elites 5tate aIi(l other eXl)ect from a less to a more in(Lustrialize(1 stage and tolerate enormous state Ii cretion over resource allocation. Regulatory states may promote 111(105111 ahzation as a byproduct, but it is not the primary goal, nor is it legiiimii.ii fur ollicials to use state intervention to achieve it. We1fire states nmv Is quite interventionist in [lie distribution, rather than production, of gII IS. (lomflestiC product (CDI), and much if not most of the (1)P may through the government. Moreover, officials lack discretion (11(1 meast ii success with melicators of social welfare rather than CDP l)(T (i1l)itil.

the majority. Like (leveloprnemitahisrn in ecofloiiiic policy, exclu and mnotivates political activity on the part of state and politi 1 lijt(s. Political exclusion was often more a question of practice and (((liv contradicted lip service to democracy. The generals in Brazil, for tltille, always claimed that they were in power temporarily in order to site Brazil fur democracv,m Political haders, after first paving .tn.oge to classic democratic J)rCepts, often went on to quaIi1 the type h oh lii ii tcracy appropriate fur the times or the country. EcheverrIa, fur cx III, claimed that politics could not be left to the free play offorces. lit ioai exclusion in the desarrollista state was enduring. The majority 1 i hilts in both Brazil and Mexico had either no real choice or no vote Ill lie end of the twentieth century. In Brazil, literacy requirements . 4 b 4 1)10 heel a majority of adults during the (lemocratic period 1 945 Ill eligible electorate grew from 13 percent of the total (notjust adult) i Illiation in 1Qr to to percent in igGo, levels that were low coIn ill with other Latin American countries at similar levels of develop ni In Mexico, formal restrictions on voting were fewer, but political rh s iiiaintained exclusion by denying opposition canelulates any real di (Ill e of victory. Such other countries as Chile and Argentina alter
III

II)

ii I

ImientS

ii
4

I4. I lowever, exclusionary periods

(I .0

1 hetwemi exclusive authoritarian regimes amid inclusive demnocra were pr(sume(l to l)e temporary ali(L
lmolinary,

PoLrTIcu. EXCLUSION

Political exciusiomi (or limited pluralism) exists when the majolilv I adults are denied the right to free ami meaningful choices in regititi )e)sition candidates have a chamice ii 1 electionsmeaningful in that op limited sense of absence of direct COei(il II free in the power, coming to regim(s, which in mn exists in authoritarian conditions these Neither of wider the mnilitaiv, Ii in Brazil as they do, elections. When no cases hold ex(;Iusion is riot Iiiii Politu:iil of winning. has no chance still opposition inhibit, I democracies many however; regimes, authoritarian ite(l to Propei Il of adults. the majority of the participation informally, mally or
,0.

is an apt term to describe the exclusie political elite in and Brazil. Politicians in Brazil referred to themselves as mem of such a class with unique rights and privileges. The press helped I lit om(t this class. For instance, the Mexican daily La Jornada devoted

law /inlftioa

loll

II

lit

page section titleI Cl;ose Poiltica to political intrigue and elite

(1:115

&

Ii

1)11111)1 IllS

S/Iulii

(0u1/ianhins Iflhi(i)flhlO(I(I/

I)ii s/i/ni(iil

i( I, 11(1.

(\\ itlill

Sh): I5 tiI(rl)flIII 1115(1 (OllSi(tItS 11(11S (i(IIIO(ll(Ci(S ill 1.111(11 \Ii(IlidI lX(tIl sin;Inii. (Oh till/Il \tl\I(,0, 111(1 (osi:i Pill) as Ill ((Ills ((lllStltlltlOIIiIt (XClilSi,ISi II s Ill 1g75 (t 1)5, 1.11(11 ). RIlIlilIll (ISIS I):ItIls (11511111 11011 tOt(SllIt ClllttIS(dlrnIl
1141 0 (I(ibI;IIholl ill liIIlllIII4lllIlt0dII(( tO (111111 IlIbII(Iitali.lll 5(lS(lS (llllIUdl,ItII, 1 lWlI(tIlIllflSl(lIl,lt lt,lS.ill( :110(11 till

((I

Ii

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288

BI.N

Ross

S(I1NI1I1)1J{

The Desarro1liste Stale in Brazil and Mexico iiehites, flie elase pohtica usually iilarlage(l to stop threatening op ii ion but spent enormous energies recreating internal accomimlo(la iii while constantly cheeking over its shoulder.

inachinations, Tlie (liSe l)OlItica WdS successful iii controlling its ii iii bership iLII(l blunting nonelite challenges. Beyond crude devices sin Ii

limiting the electorate in Brazil or electord fraud in Mexico, pout ii iii 1)0th countries (levised more sophisticatmi techiiiques of rnimil)i IL I elections. Basing electoral coiflpetitiohI OIl clieiitelisin and pil(I( )iI,i shores UI) elite positions, l)e((USe it favors those Wit Ii access to reS( ii I I and (lelijes oIeis accountability, Polili(al lea(leiS cuopted iitl)ei I ii I represented. Iii 1)0th Brazil and Mexico, election was usually by iIpI ito ulent, which allowed elites to screen entr into the clase pu1itict iin I I (001)1 challengers. In Mexico iioinmation by the IflStjtUlioliLliZe(l Rn lutiunary Party (PRI) guaranteed electoral victory. Elections in hi ui 1 were inoi.e open, but the many politiciaiis who launclied their dccli liii careers from executive l)oSitiOlIs testify to the electoral value of app iiulu imient, The alHl)itious were more likely to enter [lie appointie l)LIIe,l Ii (racy thaii try to build griissroots support br a program. Civil society posed little threat to this political elite, Local associul iii such as squatter settlements, religious groups, professional organizimlit iii and labor Unions had little independent powel-. Depen(ling on the it ministration in power, the political elite attempkd to coopt their leIilti. ship, ITlaflipulate their finances, or intmudate ami repress 1)0th lenhei tfl(l members, In Brazil, government officials successftmlly nmanipmiliui I corporatist finmanciel controls and legal restrictions on labor unions. lii MeXic() PRI control of the Conficler;icin dc Trabajadores de Mcxii (Cl\I) is less tornial and legal hut more eliective, Iii sum. I)olitical competition in the developinemital state was restrich I to a small group. Of course, these polities were not hernietie and still ii several elefects kept them iii constant agitation (if not evolution), Tlni exclusive politics lacked solid legitimacy, institutional mechmnisms hr ii solving interelite conflict, and assurance of the continued acquiescel ii
111

till

:\mlOINTIVE BUR)AUCRA(\

htv I he 1 gSos the Brazilian and Mexican bureaueracies comprised Ii lisinds of agencies and employed millions of people. In iqSS public million (including 2.7 million in the iul)ll yment iii Mexico totaled II iii government, 6oo,ooo in state and local governmellt, tfleI I mil Ii Iii iii public enterprises) and accounted for onefilth ol total emnploy Ii, In Brazil ui 1q73, 9 percent of the ecOIlOflU(all) active popula though ill. iii 4 milliomi people, worked in the public sector, governrnent loe:al and (1,1 million I Iiirds of them worked in state all levels ei1 at agencies autonomous )li1)hic firms uid other ii Lil in 1
)

iiiiinent) ni by l

Municipal, state, and le(lcral emnploynment grew to 41 and the largest slate enlerprises employed o\er 1 niil

III

topl in addition) lii these mammoth bureaucracies, formal organizatiolls are fluid afl(l I II lId, stve for such wellknown eX(eptiOris as the Baneo de Mexico an(l Ii hiazihiati National Bank for Le:onomiean(l Social Developmncimt I I )lS) which prove the rule. Moreover, these bureaucracies similered Ii, i (lebilnating malige of conventional pathologies: overcentrahization, ii iniitatioil, low professional ethics, high turnover, eotTuptioll, low ii tiles, amL poor training. It is hardly surprising that hureaue:racy en ad so little public esteerfl in either country. )ointments gave this unwieldy mass dynamism and structure, hi the 1 I) 1. ii iohhjsta state positions of power in the bureaucracy were distributed
,

Fi (.i,ni,iln,, \llxl(ns 11,10 )))llIII.l intiit null nI lii Ri nIuiu1iiii.ii l,miiI. hui p.iliiiiinuiialiii cuuuitiil of ilic silk, intl In ilti i i Xn incluilitI nun Iiiani I,nlilins: nitli ii 1 lullS, luIulI;tlI( Iii, intl (icllIIn(iuli i Sin Jiinw (niizali, (,nil, [i lisi, itt Ii ti., j))IIi(i(I, \).VO) I (i ( \jnil I 55. l(iiijil(t)) II. (iitIiin. () ))lO(l)f( /(II)i)(() I)I(l)I11li(, (S.tii uiiIii I)iftis,tii liiil)I)Ii.I IL Iiiii, I )7), p. , iuuul Siiiiuii Si lisiit,iii,iii. ti 11(10) (10 (Ill/O)I/u)nu)l() lflfl.)i/)1)() (RI I JuiiIiil): Idjiiu,i ( :,nni,, i k, Sni Scluiiiidii, 15,1,/u. wi/Iuiii the S/al,, iii. 5 7. Stt Snsni Fcksiini, Ih, ISnerii a! Itevulniull: Ih, 5/0/) 0)1(1 (h) 1 (1)01) IStor ii 1 IC) ft (Ii iliciinn: lrinc 11011 tlitiiisiit Ins,, I S. Sit kuuuitli I I:I,lksnn, hi, 1?iaz,l,an (:a,/knale S/a/C and tlfti1,i1L (Jan IS/il,, (Iiiikilt: t iuiii:uis nI (:alilni,ui,i Pits,, nyj7). 111(1 ioiis.sI ( nlit,i, 1/i, .lIan/ulaim n/ (at,,,!: II,, S/al, (1,1(1 Ilnu/:Hlz(Jas (5,)l)r,,uuui,l)s 1)1 IJ)(1// (lIilSl)ulidIi tniti:ns (It Iiwili Pits,, I g Sic Rout kin,, ( ulluni, IL, (5ui/radu/ar t/liann S/a/elabn 1,5/a//an and li (.hauu, 1,, ,\l,,,,t, (lkikcliv: luiltiit,,i,i,i,;il unit Sit,) Siti(tIis, tlnisci,ii nI (,ililnritt,u, ill)
, .

11% i hi ed personal, political appoititflleflt. One thousand appointments to ml I p three to jour levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy is a rough Iii sliold to elefnie an appoifltive bureaucracy. Brazil, Mexico, most of I ii iii : .Ilieriea and other oleveloping countries, the Uniteel States and all 5
iiiiiimiiiSt
ii

systems thus have Lppoimmtive bureaucracies. About 50,00() p0

iii

us ime tilled by political appoifltuient

ii ig

Ii

Brazil and Mexico, The iii Collor administration estimateel the number of political, conli
(NlI

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Iii

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ll;ivin P. (Stsinlii lSi.ln ti, () tflIp liLi1 pululitit tlOilll lIlsilti iii Rtiindn ct ut ,ts/a/iu do /aeIutJmno (It) (OV))l)ll 110 10)1)kill I,untiit: IPt 5, i7Ii). lip \ul,i,uililln Nl,liiIill lie,isan. ()pii.l( It) (t(STIIIII1(t, (alga iiititti.tiia c as lsl.ui.lis, iinbii i jSS): 1 inuuim I)l(/)((l(l() 51) (St
n,titttn

I{titiuiti

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,,

290

291

r
B1:N Ross
SCI-INI11)ER

The Desarrollista State in Brazil and Mexico

(1(Iice positions at An estimate for Mexico from time i (i when the bureaucracy was smaller, l)tt the number at 25,000 (ii 1(11 S,ooo in the PRI bureaucracy) Later observers put the total (14 )(I i 50,000. ThOtLSalI(lS of th(Se itpl)OilltmentS may be pure patlI1;1i44 oils with little impact on policy, but all positions with any real ( )WI ii open to iippoifltiiieflt ati(l subject to inimnediate (liStfliSSLl. Even (1w Iku cle Mexico which by tradition has a meritocratic, career hureaucim v, u legally unprotected from the appointive powers of the president II extremely high number of appointments distinguishes Brazil and M\ from most (leVelOpe(l and many developing countries. Appoimitmnents structure power and incentives inside and 011151(14 I bureaucracy. Subordinates caii rise only through appointment, vl helps b)cuS their attention on those above them. The poer to ;ii ii I an(l dismiss reinforces the topdown How of power and gives superi( 41 I. more potential control over subordinates than they would have iii reaucracy where promotion (lepends on inipersonal criteria. Given iii (lominmce of the bureaucracy in the polity, appointment then hen
. .

is possible only in the former. The distinction between Weberian in Asia versus politicized, ;tp}nHlitive bureaucracies in I 11111 America is the crucial fcctor that differentiates developmental from ollisti states. I return to these and other comparisons alter exarnin .1 i I lie consohi(latiOn of desarroihista states in Brazil and Mexico and as
111111

I iii

i.iiicracies

ii ig

ftirther

the

interaction alm(l synergy among the four cOlflJR)neflts.

i50IIDATmON

the primary means for gaining representation. Factions in the pnhlIic .11 elite maneuver to get their representatives designated, while anlI)it i us bureaucrats seek outside support. The process often takes on the iiiii .4 an electoral campaign: the candidates for various positions (or any p i tion) seek visibility, make speeches, and give interviews. Newspapers III magazines endorse or reject candidates, propose names, and circul1lt I sumes. When the president has selected his subordinates (and they ii turn theirs) the basic lines of representation and access are set until Ill next ministerial shakeup or presidential succession. In a famous (JIll 44 the politician Hltimo de Carvalho distilled the essence of power in Ii
Brazilian political system into four verbs: appoint, dismiss, imprison. .n II releilse. The key variable in (histinguishing among bureaucracies is tenure.

h
(

iveial contributors to this olume have noted that elevelopmn<ntal bounded phenomenon. What indicators do we use lip sit beginmngarrdThndling bounds? Determining the beginning and a niulticomnponent conceptuahiz:iI ion (41 a t l)e: of state is at best I iiiilt, es >eciihiv when some components eIu(h j)recise quantitative 1 ,isIIIement. The political comp(ments preel:mt the full developmen 1 sI:Ite by decades if not c:enturies. The ee:nhioinic elements are harder I l.ite. At the turn of the century the Brazilian 1In(1 Mexican govern lislits intervened in their economies but generally limited ifltervefltiofl in .iceordance with the dominant econonhic liberalism. lroni iSq to ii) government revenues range(l from 6 to 12 l1 of GDP in Brazil 1 7 The midi qbos however iiiark a liii from 5 to 5 percent in Mexico. 11111 ig point in the goals and mtlmods of stale intervfllifln. On the one longer 1101(1 out hope that the 01(1 international Ii lilt, liberals could no II hug sstem would soon return. 0cm the other hand, Presichflts Getihio VII 1)S and L;i:cro C:irdenas were moving increasingly, sometimes a(hnit hr lv only in response to shortterm crises, toward muon systematic: state lii vention. This was a period throughout the world of political and eco Ililic iedelinition. Wat gradually emerge:el from it in Brazil and Mexico
Iiis :4cc hisk)ricallv
I
,

11

particular form of (levelopmental state. denas

reaucrats in appointive bureaucracies have no job security amid are ii constantly looking toward their nextjobs and their next boss. In comil io a key element of what Peter Evans calls Weberian bureaucracy is precis(l( 5 Meritocratic recruitment and promotion are 1 jol) security. )O5Sibl( iii both Weberian and appointive bureaucracies, but depoliticized adnn Ill
6;. /ai-nal do Thacil, March

.1 (
rI
e

htb1e

Ill 11(2

dramatically increased and medirected government s)efl(liflg He nearly doubled the total budget and eXpan(Ied the dedicated to econ()mic developinent from an average of 25 percent
2).

1 Alter C:mrdcnas, neither eco f34) to 8 perceIt for his teinh) nor total spendmg frll until the I q8os. The iqS nationalization .1 i 111 in Mexico marks qualitatively and certainly symbolically, if hot
lilic Ill.

_,

I l)gII, p.

KiiiiitiiiIiuii. I\iahiIIU (1/ l10deIll IIIVICO, p. 157. (is. (ahinI Zai(t, iiit(isl(w h atittilli, NI(XIcII (ts, jiih i lI). 66. ImpIoOI III (III IlilflcO (Ii Mexico, IiiI(ili(lV 1)1 iIitIi(ii, Noveintwr i, iIp. 67. Ste ScIiiidei, 1101601 W1//IllI tile S(at(, Chap. 4, 111(1 M(iilei Sci rut Urinetli, 1tl1,,U (ISIS, Jo/fliua,o, (illS! Iea,anI in Mex/in: A (Ass .SIudl III Iubln Poin 1 (Berkeley: Unis ci sill (AIiIoini:i 1i(Ss, 1)77), for till (liS(tiSSiOiiS Of IppOiiitiii(l11 i(IaiiOflS. 68. 14 iiis, 1,IflbIddl(l II/5l(0I115.
292

llii.

I:li6II11

t:eliii4 (II

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Ill

eciunitil,itioii iii

I(i4lit:iliI.Iil ltiitli\

II lilieS III

iucuiiiut;iiion is itsIl Sill prohleiliLiIc.

5mm D,msid M.

15111,,

Si liii lilies tui e:Iunmutllion: A Cinique niet tLeniturpretition, 1 (lulls II), no f (\\ 111(1 I gS7): nIl. 17:;.[. topik, lionoiiiic t{ole of he Slate, up. ;g i i .e.iI Jenies \litkw, Iiie WIlliS I1evoilIIIou(: [14150/ 1 V/hIIdlIIIIi I and ,Swiai (I, 1,1115: t._nieisn elf Cililonsit Press, i(l7), psi.
,

mu sIu(I:Lt Lont Wues unul SoRevuw (1/ I1adnwi loCacal

(Jians

Ill II

11)10

293

BJN Ross S i INI:I1)1:R

InL0.,-2,
(avcran(c-nI 0. tettchn 1 s

The Desarrollisia Stale in Brazil and Meico

in Iixjici,
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li2ili:t (1cclccijs ( l03:1o.jo) \vcla (cnu Iicc (t0IJl0-t() lcflhc() (t)I7tT2) Ruiz (HIccc(s (1:3l3) IA)J)(Z M(I(OS (lOcOlOOl) I)ic, ()njcj (106Io70) iIicwrr1, (I971lo7o) L ((1 I( ililic c ( I 0.77I 0.32)
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period.

Jantcs tilkic, 17u liivica I/lIll lion: I dcra/ Ex/linr/i/ciccs- and Sara_il Change s/nrc 1gb (ItcrkiIi; Litiicsi oh (alibc mmii, 1 Press, 11)117), p 3a; tg070. lIon) Jatias 0iIka, In revo/iuidn lfl(S/rUl(O (Misic a; FaaiIo I (Siitni.i hl(l1l)lltIC,(, 11)73). is cilid in S;nniicb Si hntldlt. I/n I)c/erii,,n/io,i n//lu lies-ic ii is i/roll (Ilk san: Lllmsirsilv (II \iiian;i Itss, iggi), p. 4a. Icr (:llcild SjiilaiiIlg it igha pcs 10111 t), Ii Star, lndia/y i/ic Sink and 1uh/n 10.11(1 in ktssro (.\ma_ljn; ticiii.ii cib l,-s 1 S, 11)31)), P I Ilis 111(1:1 iii- Iciilirlc(I II hkc-tcjr intiisals lislec! Iteti 1-, ito Iil(sl 11301,
dir iatit

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mdlilanisi lal 1011.

quantitatively, a watershed in state interventjon. 2 It created a Listing (:iItiorI betwee rittio1)ii1isrn iifl(i state intervention. Sonic prote(tive

II I

ift and tax eXefliptiOfls fi)r ifl(LUStry predate Cirdenas, but tile lluriv legislation creating stateled ifliJ)ortSubstituIing industrialization (lSii

CaIne- niostly in die late

i 9305

itfl(l

In Brazil, president Getiilio Vargas promoted a qualitative shift i government speridrng and intervention, though a recogllizal)ie and (ic

liberate developmental state emerged only during the Lstado N 71 (i From i 93() I)) igri various Vargas governments with stri ciii _)
miliIar encouragement stea(IiIy created new ministries (for example,

Ministry o Labor, Industry, and Conimerce in i 930), departments, cuiiii cils (such as the National Petroleum Council 111 1935), and state coo I
Sic lS)((I(lI\ fLLIllilkcfl,

.Sc c Sior. Iiidus/i 3 7 \ I)! III;IjclI Ii (as. 7-I- Skiiliiiiiic- iiiici lIlaC \Il4aS usid ill O(( asian 0) (Icc (sar (0(1(1 Iii ulilciiiiioIi indiistc au allan, 1 .31)11! tcia,nd Wilici) hi hall ucla maiic 0. sinci l;7, LItIaRfth as hi, l.[() lii hid 51(11 1)1)3 c ommillid hi asilf an(illIisocaIh Ia slstimalii itidjistijal 1 dcvcl nc-nt Sce Skidmaic )ain,r.s 11? I3ra:d, p. Ii Satigan claims dcat hem 11)31) stall mOO ((II) h<i ,tic (IcIlllil({c teonvacnhci cicci irajv Sl(Iiiji) (011(110. itt, I-l,ida \0(a Src \\ihs,, Satj0iii, s inlprcsas cia mcinii (1) plIjal cia II;idii 1:1 cii)flOlflill Itc;isiliira, Ill ct ii., IS/lickS (In /SflhiUi/(aCnn (1(1 galS-ella (((I 1c000)nia. p. 35.
294

Ii?flhlc )/S1flict((/cflflflfl PP a 1071) Ill, S/ak. and I,ibhc Pa/ic S c S, Ocr a ( liIl)IIIIIO

In symbolic terms the creation of National Steel Company (CSN) and the su(cessIul (onStru(tion of I he mammoth St eel works epit (111/1(1 tue (lawn of a new era o statele(l industrialization. In Iriumpli of (levelol)mental discourse is difilcult to (late with preci ii. Some subcomponents such as the primacy of the- state over iii a loaf interest had (le-e-j) historical roots. Equating autonomous in(lus iii tliiation with national security ail(l welfare, however, is a osttr )eflod l)etweefl the eclipse of liberalism ill time lilt, imenon. Overall, the 1 )Iflefltalisiil backed 1 ii Ii I 9305 aIi(l the emergence- of a colic-rent develo by 11111 Ii the-oretical elaboration and by state amL so(:ietal actors iii the os is best characterized as one of contendmg (liscourses. But, the core 1 is uhat woul(l later flourish in the rq50S mostly daW hack to the 1930S. - cl itsuhi, the foremost Latin American theorist of developinentalism, was iltiiientnig policies in the 1 930S for whi(h lie woul(l develop thteoreti ii iistification only later, out of power, in the 1940.5 and tgrios. I Iii- I)cginnings of the desarrollista state are thus visil)le in the 1930s. iatI of a fully functioning development mo(lel, the core years date i iit,iilv from 1950 to iqSo. LCotIomic ali(L iiuLustrial growth were rapid III tile iq4os, which was more- the result of mternatioiial factors (in that It ii Iii War II forced ISI in Brazil imn(i Mexico) than (lirecteel state inter Iii 1111. Mexicos default ill August 1952 was the death knell for the de iii illista state, but inertia carried it on for several more years. By ig5 Ill oal leaders in both Brazil and Mexico were embarking on policies to diii iantle Out (.)r more conipone-nts of then desarrollista states. In M(-x lie first changes came iii state intervention and lie-flee political capi H lisiii. In Brazil, lift transitioti IC) civilian rule- iii 1985 led quickly to full --III icill inclusion. Largely unreft)rmne-d ap)ointive 1)ureaucracies sum a -d intact in both countries through the iggos, but by the-n the- other el iiIlls weie either weakened or on their way out. 0111 countries moved closer to an ide-al typical desarrolltsta State front I 1) fOS through the 19705 uul then retreated in the- igSos. Systematic I Ilervenlion iii the eConomy began in the I 930S and 9405. The state Ii ((Creased iii the- igos and ighos through extensive protection and lhc-l ISI policies, and governmne-nls in the [970s in both countries vastly c lilt-cl the number and scope of state enterprise. On the political side-, -ill-I He pier! icipation expanded through the 19405 in Me-xico and the os in Brazil but then (ontract(-(l until the 19705, especially in Brazil. In tin- 1951)5 both systems experienced e-xpaiuling but suill limited pluralism.
-c-s ci
.
-

II

di Olisiti Nina-s. Ituii;itti i_Oil InsttI;itIaIt 1111! (Santchsiit in (Sdlitciilpar;ac 1 lb 1.11(11110. oh .\Iiatirlal\, Ilt.I). (1155. I))lailincttl II) Pa Slitl-I,aililln0. itO 0- IlmpiS;is dii I,, ii 5, lila_i, t_ i(iSi(sIl a) (:lImkdrllta, Ii(rkih\. lgtI, iu 73_Sf; Sutg_nt. -lIla, pp 3537 In i I1;i4! Irclnsi h li 3-u Sb>,
lOan

uI; I

molt

295

BIN

Ross

ScIINrIlwR

I
1(11)1) 3. lb I )isii-iollisti stat

The Desarrollista State in Brazil and Mexico

SsTrIc INTFR&CTION

Table provides a summary of the developmental state in Mexicu ui Brazil. Political capitalism and developmentalism affect the en ii ii iiII whereas political exclusion and appointments are nmre p0111 ical. Ii terms of (lifierentiating structures and goals, political capitalism iin I i appointment bureaucracies are the structures through which eliws pu sued deveh)pment and limited pluralism. Exclusion and developitunil ism shaped the Pr irences or ambitions, to borrow Michael Loii;i is term, especially of state and political elites, whereas the appoint iV( I reaucracy arid J)olitical capitalism influenced the strategies economil iii I state elites adopted to further their preferences. The four components of the desarrollista state aliect and often i cii three one another; they are parts of a system. In the introduction In Ii volume, WooCumings writes that the developmental state is a short liii ii for the seamless web of political, bureaucratic, and money influcimi c Less a seamless web than a dense set of interrelationships, my concci liii of the desarrollista state tries to break out the analytically discrete cnni ilents better to understand their interaction. This kind of systemic lII.iI\ sis is largely absent from research on developmental states in Latin Am ii ica, which tends to focus much more on the bases of support and pill 1(111 of intervention in the economy. The interactions iunong the four components are complex and un I plc. Suflice it here to oiler some examples arnl note that 1101 all the ii actions are equally significant. For instance, the effect of appOint n (i I on political capitalism is less than vice versa. It is the executives (on Ii 1 over resources that moves politics into the bureaucracy, amid the exc(IIl o bureaucracy dominates 1)0th politics and economics. The various en I I of this bureaucracy run state enterprises and banks, lix tarifhs Sul)si( Ill credit, and otherwme budget and plan government intervention jilt)) I ii economy. The legislature and judiciary are marginal in economic an(l this exclusion dilutes their political relevance. The political (11 therefore flocks to the executive that then dominates politics mc1 hut lii marginalizes the other branches. Politics becomes an essential p;mi ii doing business. In her study of Mexican industrialists, Flavia Derossi eluded that when success and failure depend on political action as iii II as (>11 productivity, entrepreneurs will remain poweroriented more t lii
productionoriented.

lolitiis
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loliiiiat (apIt,llIsnt Ihcloptittlti.LlIsIit

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)ointmcnls and through them 1 walil direct influence in ap Political capitalism there resources. state of distribution the liii)! over An innocuous bureaucracy. untive rethrrn app( an to ham-der it. i nakes radical rehirni a fact in is service civil career a create proposal to 11111mg pressures are contemiding and hculties dii These 5 power. distribute I ii pill (;u)t to hear iii mind when analyzing possil)ilities for administrative liii iii. Most analyses of developmental states in Asia emphasize Weber By extral)OlatiOfl the recommendation thr Latin Amer lii Ililreaucra(y. interventionist states require reforms to make them (VI that itild be Ii .i iii \\eberiam. Yet, once states mterent extensively in the economy, liv make such administrative reforms more politically costly and less II iIV. I iveum that the politicization of capitalisni focuses pnhiti(;al activity oil )J)oiutfllents that structure access 1 (\ecutive bureaucracy, it is themi a 1111 lej)resclitation ibr societal grou)s attemn)tiflg to tleleiitL their interalso distribute power iii this pohticiznl bureaucracy )Ointers) with a sometimes difficult 1 mower holders (the ap III I uesent 1 IllilIma: how to balance representation and central control. This nn II .111(1 effective bureaucratic performances are crucial to elites with dc )poilltlnents that lop (levelol)men 1 lii ulmental goals. And, it is through a li,l communicate iflcefltives to subordinates to make decisions that )resentalon is 1 Lastly, to the extent that re 8 I I Rely promote industry. sit ite only through appointment the appointive bureaucracy impedes participation, because appointment politics are opaque audi rt to elites. In this sense the appointive bureaucracy ac,ts to exclude
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The causal relations also operate in the reverse direction, thougi i I strongly. The stakes in political capitalism are very high, so capitalists iii i
0011

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296

297

BI.N Ross S( lIEN El 1)11k

The Desarrollista SIaIe in Brazil and Mexico

rionelites politically aII(l to inhil)it ill a SifllJ)1( logistic Wily the ex El I si of pluralism. The association l)elween authoritarianism afl(1 ifl(hlstrializati( iii lii long, HflreSOh((l history in social Science theoi. As suggested in Lii the associatioll betWeen the developmental state and authoritiriiii in seems historically to be a stable, if not necessary, combination. Of (1 ii )elldently of the type 1 economic perftwinance clearly varies in(1e i liii cal regime. Yet there are mutually reinforcing tendencies 1)(tlvc 5 rnieiitalism, as ainbitioii not oUtcofll(, lH(l political excliisi ii 1 develo Johnson thinks so when he characterizes (leiflocratic Japan as a s if I iii )aIl apears to wi iil I 1 Ihoritarian regime. flie developmental state inJa cause the system is 1101 lulh democratic. The two seem niore closeR ii fated aI1(I mutually sul)l)ortlve in (liscourse than they may be in piii II Developmentalists regularly bemoan the messiness anol sluggishness ii (lemocracy. Apologists br dictatorships just as regularly justify autlioiir.ii 1 iall means to promote (IeVeloj)lllerlt. The reinforcing pressures also in the opposite direction. Dictators in(:reasingly lost the means to Ieii I mate their rule as the democratizing twentieth century progressed iii 5 Maria Covre conducte I were naturally drawn to developinentalism. 5 extensive analysis of the discourse of the military rulers in Brazil. l)egan their rule by saying the were there to restore democracy. After si eral years they could no longer claim to be restonng democracy, iii their discourse clearly shifted to extol the virtues of development and iii advantages (If inilitar rule to achieve it. Political capitalism also contributes to, or is ftuictional ft)I politic;iI clusion. Political capitalism was in large part the result of the seclimenIit iii of myriad shortterm decisions designed to meet particular economic pi lerns. The result, a.s politicians are quick to realize, is that the state ends iii with (liscretionary control throughout the economy that can easily be iii nil)ulateol to stern Political challenges. For those outside the elite, f)oI ii B ii capitalism also gives state actors resources ft)r strengthening exclusioi iii clientelisin. These fmids (10 not usually promote real distribution but go local elites who can effectively silence nonelites in theirareas. Among business 1)0101)101 or the bourgeoisie, political capitalism can aR blunt democratic impulses. Economic elites realize that they proixil )I should not create trouble for a government that is reviewing their aplili
I,.,iiiii I.
I R(I11IlltI, 1)(IIIU(I,IUV 111(1 l_(OIlOhl!I( (iisii,

ill (5

for subsidies. Political capitalisni disaggregates business elites and them to work through ad how bureaucratic rings. Ecomoimc 1,115 are thus poorly equipped to) nioulit a collective challenge to author ii in rule. Moreover, political capitalism makes busiiiess especially wor )Oliti ill I 1ll)out the possibility that democracy would allow ailtiI)usiness 1 i.iiis to oversee vast an(l deeply interventionist controls oer the priVate 11111 nny. Big business in Mexico quickly retreated from active opposition I I lie PRI when the left emerged as the leaoLing alternative to the PRI in Ill late iq$os. 5 There are limits, though, to the extent political capital iii shores hf) exclusion. At the limit, if business feels excluded, then ceo
it 11)115
I

5 inc elites heco)me a l)o(1r1ul force for democracy.

are some illustrative interactions among the four compo of the (lesarrollista state. ihe analysis 50) far has emnphasize(l similar 111)5 between Brazil anol Mexico. In the following section 1 consider sonic I,I nctions between the empirical evolutions of the political economies I I ti izil all(l Mexico.
Iliese, then,
ii

Ills

Sir

l,VlIONS 0)N -im:

Ti mi:rvn:

arid Mexico haol (lesarrollista states for most of the 1)oStV1r 1W each otlmeran(l from o)ther developmental III ls. The PRI sharply olistingiiishes Mexico Iroumi Brazil. As a niass eleo II il force, the PRI appears 10) challenge the ideas 0)1 political exclusion 11111 lepr(sentatiorl through the bureaucracy. Moreover, by cliamnielmiig le demands and representation, the PR! ease(1 prtssrIre on appoint i ii t.s and shielded appointees lrom populir pressure, enabling them to Yet, 5 ii v nut unpopular programs, particularly antiinflation policies. II, 5(1> success of the PR! from the igos to the 19805 tenoled to move S I x in i closet to) the ideal typical desarrollista state. The PRIs quest. for (II If lfete electoral dominance (el carro completo) strippeol elections of ii .iiiimg anol thereby meduceol the utility (If politicians 1(1 other elites. Iii
ti izil III, but they differed from
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299

BiN Ross Set INEII)F.R

eliminating elections as a source of uncertainty, politicians (li(l 1t( )i SIC ICC a Commensurate reward for their efforts l)ut committed politiclI 5tH o I In this sense, PRI dornmance shifted political attention away in III CI tiOnS to the bureaucracy. Moreover, in coopting or capturing I pu Lii sector organizations, the PRI preerripted nonelite challenges iii( I i forced Ix)litical txclusiori. At the Same time, PRI dominance titti RI the revolutionary legitimacy of the political elite and encouraged lieni I rely more on nationalism, clientelism, and developmentahsni. The revolutionary ideology would seem to give Mexican po1itictl h IC ers a solid alternative legitimacy nornmlly lacking in the developi 11111 C state, but paradoxically, it may have driven them to embrace develo 1 ml Ii talisni. To the extent that political leaders could not claim that lEtsi ICC CII des had advanced the revolutionary promise of social justice, they hiii IC I it expedient to embrace developmentahsm. From another persplCi II the revolutioiiarv ideology embodied in the 117 constitution is eII(( I C precisely because it embodies all the major isms of that era and Ciii IC be invoked in the service of communal, patrimonialist, socialist, and Iii C eral projects. In any event, the revolutionary ideology (in all its Ii )Ii ii I filled Mexican ideological space. It could and (lid accommodate devell 9 C inentalismn hut never allowed it the dominance achieved in Brazil. Mexicos porous twothousandmile border with the United States Ci I hmces the structural power of business and thereby circumscribes sill intervention and makes Mexican capitalism less politictl. The border liii C its the potential for state control of the economy, especially of the cxii flon for mobile resources; reduces the range of effrctive interveimi CCI C and hence predisposes state elites to niore marketoriented policies ii some areas. For example, exchange controls are costly to enforce 11111 high inflation is more disruptive because of easier currency convert 1111 ity.Su Policymakers had an in(lication of the significance of the 1)1 loll C from the very beginning of the desarrollista state. Between iri 11CC 1 1939 capitalists exported close to a l)illiOn pesos, more than twice I ICC total deposits in the banking system.ih In tIme explanation of (lillerelli i
.

Tue Des;trrollista State in Brazil and Mexico

II Ills l
C C,

between business ari(l government after 194() in Brazil and Mcx

lIt is border looms 5 large. I

II he Brazilian military has been a more visible protagonist in the desar

than has its counterpalt in Mexico. Brazilian military ofticers the 1920s propagated developmeritalism, restricted political [CIII (ipation even in civilian reginws. and sought and a(hieved represen III 1)11 througli appointment.z Overall, the military helped make Brazil CIII (levelopmentalism more potent than the Mexican version.
11111 slim state Ii
51

since

Iii the democratic period 191 ,64 Brazil appears to deviate from a case. I)evelopnientalisni and state intervention gained ground, but III without interruption. In fact, from the viewpoint of ig6, the p\ni IllS twenty years seemed to he a merrygoround in economic policy from ii 111111 to (Ievelopmental, to populist, and back. Formal literacy require Cillills and informal electoral coercion limited participation hut not con , sIlIlion, and the political system and exclusion were unstable. Before IC (i , one can imagine se eral plausible alternative scenarios for Brazil; 1 11111 Quadros not resigned, had Goulart riot poltriil politics, had the iiiIiIiry not intervened. Yet in the period Iromn 1930 to igo as a whole,

ICvtlopmentahsm and exclusion were (lomniamit, though there were detours, fluctuations, and instability than in Mexico. Iii lerms of the appointive bureaucracy, state elites in Mexico maIl eLtl 10 insulate the bureaucracy more from outside pressures and to in Illi lie more meritocratic promotion criteria, though more l)y custom 111111 law. Lateral entry into high levels of the economic bureaucracy be lille rart, and outside economic anti political elites could not pressure I I;Ive one of their own tppointed to a top bureaucratic position. Merito Cli 1 advancement became the informal norm in public banking and ii
CIII CIC 11(111

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(11515 (11 III (IICSC l)CCIIIi(C, 1. 11CC hlICCICt of uI1i4IIl to liii ([(CHILI iS 11CC CC

had a fuller desarrollista state than (lid Mexico. Brazil Led a strong party (which could deflect some political attention from I III I )tireaucracy) had greater control over its borders, an(l could there CII I iianipulate markets more to developmental and political ends. The I i 1/ilian military invested a lot in discourse an(l helped create a III iger strain of developnientalism. Lastly, the ilppointive bureaucracy III Ibazil was more open to outside infiltration amid pressure and ntiore
I )verall, Brazil
ICC
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301

Bix Ross Sm INFI1)1R

The Dc,srrroI1ista Slate

IN

in

Brazil aiid Mexico

Tin: l)I:SARR0JLISTA Srvii:

(k rpAit,viivi: PERSIEclIVE
-

1 1 io lleXil)ie advantages it iLls iii less antagonistic eIovirolmnlents. In milirr voiois, authoritarianisni aiiol the (leSorI0lhmsto state micv hae an
imli

The desarrolli.sta state is an intense (1 )n(ept iii ( i )ViLflfli S;iit tellils, (IeSigfled to generate rich, (liffcrentiate(1 theory applicable small range of cases. lxclwliiig one of the four cotnl)onents of I hr
,

affinity because olemo)cra() so upsets the mntemaction amno)ng the

I sarrolhsta state W(>Ul(1 leave t (0flC(j)t l)iOL(l(r ifl (OV(Tii( l)Ut we;ilcri iii analyti( leveiage. 1or instance, (lrop)ing the elenieiit of political (iii )iI,II
IS

V01Il(1 alIov the ifl(lusiOli of pre(lOnhiflafltlv market (conomi(s si a Ii sitiall or OlWfl ((0IiOIlli(5 that are constaiitlv subject to interiiit a ii ii I market ssures as iii Cm muntries of Central America, ilit Ciribbeati a the (iilr(pOl ((OflOIIil(S mu Asia. But 11w (lOmninailt (Iis(ourse in tin
iSlfl I ii II

countries is unlikely to lx (lev(lopmemltal, afl(I hence the whole econm a Si(le of the (ksarrollista Stat( is left out, an(l the general literature oi th( rilarianisni is adequate to the task of analyzing the many governhlme With appointiVe bureaucracies that limit l)lnlnhlism. 1)ropping the condition of j)olitical exclusion allows the extensioii

the concept to include countries with strong parties and organi/iht 1 such as labor unions in a vibrant (lvii society. In Argentina and Chile 1)1 fore the military coups of the 1 7OS, appointment relations struct iii el time bureaucracies, capitalism was largely political, and devel( pmnenthl si efljoye(1 wide though not lmegemomc support. I Strong l)i1rtics unions, however, made elections more important and gave nonel greater power, in turn encouraging time bourgeoisie to organize in )l iii
(hllV. In these mstances, nonelite power, democracy, arid time elements ol (lesarrollista state created a volatile mix. Political capitalism contril)I i el to polarization because economic elites had rmiore reason to fear a let si (or Peronist) electoral victory in that the (lepenideci so heavily oim ii state. Political (:apitahsm cami also exacerbate polarization by politiciui t lie labor mnovenlent. Because the state is so heavily involved in the em a onivwhich means it also controls such variables as wages immm(l prices most affect workersworkers have strong incentives to organize to 1)1 sure the state, rather thami employers. Unions target the state, and stiilr become political weapons. Omice p larization has taken imohi, (leVel( p

nientalism becomes increasingly difficult because one or another flict

nil

will oppose almost an industrial policy on the grounds that it Livors opposition. Polarization also tends to strip the appointment l)ureauclhm
SIIInII
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(Omfl ) 1 oml(ntS (l(1mJ()cmItj( (onfhct nmakcs develo uniemitalismu con 1 lit ions, politicil capitalism exa(erl)ates polarization iii a demnocr;cc, and lit ical (omupetitiomi cripples the ap)oiiitive lmreaucra I )uvelopmental discourse omi(Ilts the (lesaroollista state. Without it (but muCh m he other three components) the state would i)e inure parasitic amid mm ill seekitig and less (oimStrailmed b capitalismn. Such p1e(1atoe, kiepto i il a slates have appeared with greater lrequeno in Central America, lii ( ;oribbeami, and Africa than in the larger countries of Latin Anierica. II nurse, the constammt temJ)tatiolI ftr illicit gaul exists for all officials mm itti (liScretion over direct or indirect resource allocation, lfl(I some ofli iii, succumb. Officials iii successful (levelopmnental states oltemi have -ii mmiig ethical, ideological (discomirse) career, or legal groun(ls fur resist mm t lie tehliptatiomi, yet even here corruptiomm has beemi endemic ii not de I militating. Without air alternative discourse, leaders have the limitation of liii lhlliSm aml(l retention of tuolvm as their only goals, amrd iti such agrarian (mm ic ties as Zaire, Ghana, I lait i, Paraguay, or prtSutm u linista Nicaragua, ii imV hurid political curpitalisni and h)ureaucratu( aj) )ouitnlehmts useful iii 1 lose pursuits. \lmlmough the deelopmneutaIist discourse is, omi the Lice of it, one of the ii miii imion leatnires of developmental States ill l)Otil Asia amid latin Aiiiermua, lii iiatiomiahism underlying the discourse, as emn )hasiz((l b SnoCumings 1 iii I lie introduction, (idlers. Iii Asia, miationalismn a)peLrs to) have both (mi ogu amid deeper root,s as vell as nmore urgemil an(Immine(liote stimnula urn Fhat is, Asian mocieties, especially Kii amidjapan, are Lii more ho mm m)4(imeous and have far longer histories as discrete cultural units thaii (1(1 mimi oil tIme societies of Latin America. What constitutes the essence of the \ tm\i(ami flatio m has beemi a contested (lelSote for much (If this century, lii ulv l)ucause of the unequal status of indigenous amid mesuzo cultures. )rcially earlier in 1 ,i,il has 11(1 (omi1paroble indigenous groups but was, (s iii is ientury, a patchwork of immigrant (orflmflummit irs, tire African the Iii ist among them. Primary loyalties in both countries, ;os in others iii il ill America, have often hot iwen to shared vision of the nation. Ill terms of imnicthote stimulus, Japanese colonialism and th cold war I (VI been Lir nmore dramatic influences iii Asia than Aniericami imperial iii hii(1 ecouloniic dependency in Latin America. Irue, the Utrited States liii lake half of Mexicos territory iii the nineteenth century and sent 1 is into Mexico during the Mexicami revolnmtion. Still, this is a Lrr cry iImmmi iii nearly half a century (ml hrtmtalJapanese colonial nih of Koiea. Siimri
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larly, the Cuban revolution sent adrenaline through the veins of COl(I WI I riors and developmentalists in Latin America, hut neither the fear wi as enduring nor the threat as close as it was in divided Korea and Iii wan/China. In sum, despite moments of intense nationalist inobilizati ii in Mexico and Brazilthe nationalization of the oil industries in I os and iqos, respectively, is the best examplena tionalism was fl(vi I consensual enough amongjic)xI_eltte groups or urgenLenpugh Iin(Iti elites toprovith9he same impetus to developrnentalism. Creiii aWeberian bureaucracy and insulating officials from appi iii melt politics can give greater imj)etus to developmentalism, as in ilii cases of Taiwan and Korea, which otherwise resemble much more tile sarrollista states discussed here. The absence of extensive appointinel I in these bureaucracies helped create a professional, committed, and us overtly politicized cadre of (levelopmentalist officials (who in addition III more attuned to market concerns because of the vulnerability of i iii economies to international markets). In his comparative study of Pia,i I. Korea, an(l India, Evans argued that the embedded autonomy of K rean officials accounts for the greater effectiveness of the Korean dcvii opmental state. Officials are embedded when they have enduring lies ii dense networks of industrialists; they have autonomy whemi they have \Vih erian careers within the bureaucracy. The appointive l)ureaucracy, in II trast, undermines bureaucratic autonomy and generates high levels circulation, which preclude embeddedness. Officials in an appointive hi reaucracy rarely have the time to develop the longterm relations of ii and reciprocity with business that characterize developmental stales ii Asia because officials move to another job in another area of the stale iii the private sector whenever ministers or presidents change. My first goal in this essay was to understand fully afrw causal reiaiii in ships within a limited range of variation, rather than generate coluel I with broad coverage but, as Weber warned, devoid of content. Nonci lii less, the niodel of the desarrollista state can be useful iii approaelm broader comparative analysis by generating hypotheses and ident ih I irinuiiy causal variables. The comparison of East Asia an(l Latin Anni ii has attracted much attention, and explanations lbr their differing ci nomic performance range from international factors to authorilari;iiiisni and to culture. 7 Fred Block has concluded that there is reason to beliii that most stales aspire to be developmental states; the real issue ale iii ferences in capacities and effectiveness in their policies. . My appi 5
gh. 11)1(1. g7. S (it (iilfi ili(t Donihi \tsniili, <us., ho /mtUrii .h!,,adr: lnll,s i/ l,,,l,,iii,,, i:ution in Lamni Anurnu ((nil/nit Awn (trinittnn: irln((n)n Unimrsiiv Jiss, i gun) g. illock, kni<s of thi Stati in titi Fconom. f . 705. t
304

T
si

Tin Desarrollista Slate in Brazil and Mexico

v.

Iighlights the role of the bureaucracy (and a fuller appreciation of the iength of developmentalism). Explanations for the fiuilure of 1ST in Ar iiitina and Chile also include econonlic constraints, policy fivilures, and bureaucratic dysfunctions. Comparisons with the imdel of the desarrol I isla state would recommen(l closer analysis of the greater political uncer i,iiiilies due to political inclusion and political polarization, which in turn I ustilted in part from conflicts over developnientalism and political capi ilism.

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