THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DONATO BASCOS, defendant-appellant. Bengzon and Bengzon for appellant.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee. MALCOLM, J.: The accused Donato Bascos was charged in an information filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan with the murder of Victoriano Romero. On arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. The proof for the prosecution established that the accused was the one who had killed Victoriano Romero, while the latter was sleeping. The defense was that of insanity. Following the conclusion of the trial, the presiding judge rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the crime of homicide, and sentencing him to seventeen years, four months, and one day ofreclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of Victoriano Romero in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs, provided, however, that the execution of the sentence should be suspended in accordance with article 100 of the Penal Code, and the accused placed in a hospital for the insane, there to remain until such time as his mental condition shall be determined. The errors assigned in this court are to the effect that the trial court erred in making application to the present case of the provisions of article 100 of the Penal Code, and in not making application of article 8 of the Code. The Attorney-General reaches practically the same conclusion as counsel for the appellant. It is, therefore, for us to determine if the plea of insanity is sustainable under article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, or if the case falls under article 100 of the Code. The responsibility of the insane for criminal action has been the subject of discussion for centuries. Some criminologists, psychiatrists, and lawyers have contended with much earnestness that the defense of insanity should be done away with completely. Indeed, in at least one State of the American Union, that of the State of Washington, the Legislature has passed a statute abolishing insanity as a defense. In the Philippines, among the persons who are exempted from criminal liability by our Penal Code, is the following: An imbecile or lunatic, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. When the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law defines as a grave felony, the court shall order his confinement in one of the asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court. (Art. 8-1.) Article 100 of the Penal Code applies when the convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced. In reference to the burden of proof of insanity in criminal cases, where the defense of insanity is interposed, a conflict of authority exists. At least, all the authorities are in harmony with reference to two fundamental propositions: First, that the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime; and secondly, that the law presumes every man to be sane. The conflict in the decisions arises by reason of the fact that the courts differ in their opinion as to how much evidence is necessary to overthrow this original presumption of sanity, and as to what quantum of evidence is sufficient to enable the court to say that the burden of proving the crime beyond a reasonable doubt has been sufficiently borne. (14 R. C. L., 624.) The rather strict doctrine "that when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him," has been adopted in a series of decisions by this court. (U. S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305; U. S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona [1910], 18 Phil., 62.) The trial judge construed this to mean that the defense must prove that the accused was insane at the very moment the crime was committed. Not attempting, therefore, further elucidation of the authorities, we find it more practicable to dispose of this case on the facts. The wife of the accused and his cousin testified that the accused had been more or less continuously out of his mind for many years. Doctor Gonzalo Montemayor, assistant district health officer, who, by order of the judge, examined the accused and conducted an investigation, found that the accused is a violent maniac, and that from the information he had received from the neighbors of the accused, the latter had been insane for some time. The physician expressed the opinion that the accused was probably insane when Victoriano Romero was killed. The official declaration of Doctor Montemayor in his capacity as acting district health officer was "that this accused, according to a physical examination and investigation, is a violent maniac, and that this mental state has continued through many years, constituting a danger both for himself and for the community." The total lack of motive of Bascos to kill Romero bears out the assumption that the former was insane. We are convinced that the accused was a lunatic when he committed the grave felony described in the record and that consequently he is exempt from criminal liabity, and should be confined in an insane asylum. In conformity with the recommendation of the Attorney-General, judgment is reversed, and the defendant acquitted, with costs of both instances de officio; but the defendant shall be kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital, or such other hospital for the insane as the Director of Health may direct, and shall not be permitted to depart therefrom without the prior approval of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan. So ordered. Araullo, C. J., Street, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
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In Phils most of the time Court follows opinion of expert

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant. Paulino Sevilla, Fernando Arce and Gaudencio Garcia for appellant. Undersecretary of Justice for appellee. LAUREL, J.: On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed an information charging Celestino Bonoan, the defendant-appellant herein, with the crime of murder, committed as follows: That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any justifiable motive and with the decided purpose to kill one Carlos Guison, attack, assault and stab the said Carlos Guison on the different parts of his body with a knife, thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit: "One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one cm. into the superior surace of the right lobe of the liver; and three non-penetrating stab wounds located respectively at the posterior and lateral lumbar region, and left elbow", which directly caused the death of the said Carlos Guison three days afterwards. On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the accused. The defense counsel forthwith objected to the arraignment on the ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time confined in the Psychopatic Hospital. The court thereupon issued an order requiring the Director of the Hospital to render a report on the mental condition of the accused. Accordingly, Dr. Toribio Joson, assistant alientist, rendered his report,Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On March 23, 1935, the case was again called for the arraignment of the accused, but in view of the objection of the fiscal, the court issued another order requiring the doctor of the Psyhopatic Hospital who examined the defendant to appear and produce the complete record pertaining to the mental condition of the said defendant. Pursuant to this order, Dr. Toribio Joson appeared before the court on March 26, 1935 for the necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the prosecution and the defense asked the court to summon the other doctors of the hospital for questioning as to the mental condition of the accused, or to place the latter under a competent doctor for a closer observation. The trial court then issued an order directing that the accused be placed under the chief alienist or an assistant alienist of the Psychopatic Hospital for his personal observation and the subsequent submission of a report as to the true mental condition of the patient. Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, assistant alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital, rendered his report, Exhibit 5, on June 11, 1935. On June 28, 1935, the case was called again. Dr. Fernandez appeared before the court and ratified his report, Exhibit 5, stating that the accused was not in a condition to defend himself. In view thereof, the case was suspended indefinitely. On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the defendant could be discharged from the hospital and appear for trial, as he was "considered a recovered case." Summoned by the court, Dr. Fernandez, appeared and testified that the accused "had recovered from the disease." On February 27, 1936, the accused was arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and trial was had. After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the information above-quoted and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes the following assignment of errors: A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence establishes that the accused has had dementia only occasionally and intermittently and has not had it immediately prior to the commission of the defense. B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence in this case further shows that during and immediately after the commission of the offense, the accused did not show any kind of abnormality either in behavior, language and appearance, or any kind of action showing that he was mentally deranged. C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the circumstances that burden was on the defense to show hat the accused was mentally deranged at the time of the commission of the offense, and that the defense did not establish any evidence to this effect. D. The court a quo in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and in not acquitting him thereof. It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the defendant Celestino Bonoan met the now deceased Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a barbershop close to Tom's Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was at the time in the barbershop, heard the defendant say in Tagalog, "I will kill you." Beech turned around and saw the accused withdrawing his right hand, which held a knife, from the side of Guison who said, also in Tagalog, "I will pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him and then stabbed Guison thrice on the left side. The assaultt was witnessed by policeman Damaso Arnoco who rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan and took possession of the knife, Exhibit A. Guison was taken to the Philippine General Hospital where he died two days later. Exhibit C is the report of the autopsy performed on December 15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los Angeles. As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is admitted, it does not seem necessary to indulge in any extended analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. The defense set up being that of insanity, the only question to be determined in this appeal is whether or not the defendant-appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime charged. On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and the incidental corollaries as to the legal presumption and the kind and quantum of evidence required, theories abound and authorities are in sharp conflict. Stated generally, courts in the United States proceed upon three different theories. (See Herzog, Alfred W., Medical Jurisprudence [1931], sec. 655 et seq., p. 479 et seq.; also Lawson, Insanity in Criminal Cases, p. 11et seq.) The first view is that insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance and as must be proved beyond reasonable doubt when the commission of a crime is established, and the defense of insanity is not made out beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction follows. In other words, proof of insanity at the time of committing the criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit the accused on the ground of insanity (Hornblower, C. J., in State vs. Spencer, 21 N. J. L., 196). The second view is that an affirmative verdict of insanity is to be governed by a preponderance of evidence, and in this view, insanity is not to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. According to Wharton in his "Criminal Evidence" (10th ed.,vol. I, sec. 338), this is the rule in England (Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149; Reg. vs. Higginson, 1 Car. & K., 130), and in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. Thethird view is that the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt (Dais vs. United States, 160 U. S. 496; 40 Law. ed., 499; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 353; Hotema vs. United States, 186 U. S., 413; 46 Law. ed., 1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895; United States vs. Lancaster, 7 Biss., 440; Fed. Cas. No. 15,555; United States vs. Faulkner, 35 Fed., 730). This liberal view is premised on the proposition that while it is true that the presumption of sanity exists at the outset, the prosecution affirms every essential ingredients of the crime charged, and hence affirms sanity as one essential ingredients, and that a fortiori where the accused introduces evidence to prove insanity it becomes the duty of the State to prove the sanity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view (People vs. Bacos [1922], 44 Phil., 204). The burden, to be sure, is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime, but insanity is presumed, and ". . . when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him. . . ." (U. S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305, 308, 309; U. S. vs. Bascos, supra.) We affirm and reiterate this doctrine. In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the defendant was insane at the time he killed the deceased, the obligation of proving that affirmative allegation rests on the defense. Without indulging in fine distinctions as to the character and degree of evidence that must be presented sufficiently convincing evidence, direct or circumstantial, to a degree that satisfies the judicial mind that the

accused was insane at the time of the perpetration of the offense? In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony is not required (Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 684; State vs. Wright, 134 Mo., 404; 35 S. W., 1145; State vs. Simms, 68 Mo., 305; Rinkard vs. State, 157 Ind., 534; 62 N. E., 14; People vs. Tripler, I Wheeler, Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific acts of derangement essential (People vs. Tripler, supra) to established insanity as a defense. Mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby, we read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come to determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, therefore, cicumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffice (People vs. Bascos [1922], 44 Phil., 204). The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendantwas not insane at the time of the commission of the act for which he was prosecuted on the theory that the insanity was only occassional or intermittent and not permanentor continuous (32 C. J., sec. 561, p. 757). We are appraised of the danger of indulging in the preseumption ofcontinuity in cases of temporary or spasmodic insanity.We appreciate the reason forthe contrary rule. To be sure, courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity. In the case at bar, however, we are not cconcerned with connecting two or more attacks of insanity to show the continuance thereof during the intervening period or periods but with the continuity of a particular and isolated attack prior to the commission of the crime charged, and ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity immediately following the commission of the act complained of. Upon the other hand, there are facts and circumstances of record which can not be overlooked.The following considerations have weighed heavily upon the minds of the majority of this court in arriving at a conclusion different from that reached by the court below:. (a) From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by the prosecution, it appears that the herein defendant-appellant, during the periods from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and from January 6 to January 10, 1926, was confined in the insane department of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a disease diagnosed as dementia prcox. His confinement during these periods, it is true, was long before the commission of the offense on December 12, 1934, but this is a circumstance which tends to show that the recurrence of the ailment at the time of the occurence of the crime is not entirely lacking of any rational or scientific foundation. (b) All persons suffering from dementia prcox are clearly to be regarded as having mental disease to a degree that disqualifies them for legal responsibility for their actions (Mental Disorder in Medico-Legal Relations by Dr. Albert M. Barrett in Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology, vol. I, p. 613). According to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Insular Psychopathic Hospital, the symptoms ofdementia prcox, in certain peeriods of excitement, are similar to those of manic depresive psychosis (p. 19, t. s. n.) and, in either case, the mind appears "deteriorated" because, "when a person becomes affected by this kind of disease, either dementia prcox or manic depresive psychosis, during the period of excitement, he has no control whatever of his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.) Even if viewed under the general medico-legal classification of manic-depressive insanity, "it is largely in relation with the question of irrestible impulse that forensic relations of manic actions will have to be considered. There is in this disorder a pathologic lessening or normal inhibitions and the case with which impulses may lead to actions impairs deliberations and the use of normal checks to motor impulses" (Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology [2d ed., 1926], vol, I, p. 617). (c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, at one time an interne at San LazaroHospital, for four (4) days immediately preceding December 12, 1934 the date when the crime was committed the defendant and appellant had "an attack of insomnia", which is one of the symptoms of, and may lead to, dementia prcox (Exhibit 3, defense testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.). (d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and taken to the police station on the very same day of the perpetration of the crime, and although attempted were made by detectives to secure a statement from him (see Exhibit B and D and testimony of Charles Strabel, t. s. n. pp. 9, 10) he was sent by the police department to the Psychopathic Hospital the day following the commission of the crime. This is an indication that the police authorities themselves doubted the mental normalcy of the acused, which doubt found confirmation in the official reports submitted by the specialists of the San Lazaro Hospital. (e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in charge, Dr. Toribio Joson, which report was made within the first month of treatment, the defendant was suffering from a form of psychosis, called manic depressive psychosis.We quote the report in full: INSULAR PSYCHOPATIC HOSPITAL MANDALUYONG, RIZAL January 15, 1935. MEMORANDUM FOR: The chief Alienist, Insular Psychopatic Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal. Patient Celestino Bonoan, male, Filipino, 30 years old, sent by the Secret Service of the City of Manila for mental examinition.

SUBJECT:

1. MENTAL STATUS: (a) General behavior. The patient is undetective, staying most of the time in his bed with his eyes closed and practically totally motionless. At other times, however, but on very rare occassions and at short intervals he apparently wakes up and then he walks around, and makes signs and ritualistic movements with the extremities and other parts of the body. Ordinarily he takes his meal but at times he refuses to take even the food offered by his mother or sister, so that there have been days in the hospital when he did not take any nourishment. On several occassions he refused to have the bath, or to have his hair cut and beard shaved, and thus appear untidy. He would also sometimes refuse his medicine, and during some of the intervals he displayed impulsive acts, such as stricking his chest or other parts of the body with his fists and at one time after a short interview, he struck strongly with his fist the door of the nurse's office without apparent motivation. He also sometimes laughs, or smiles, or claps his hands strongly without provocation. (b) Stream of talk. Usually the patient is speechless, can't be persuaded to speak, and would not answer in any form the questions propounded to him. Very often he is seen with his eyes closed apparently praying as he was mumbling words but would not answer at all when talked to. At one time he was seen in this condition with a cross made of small pieces of strick in his hand. He at times during the interviews recited passages in the literature as for example the following. "La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera nobleza del hombre. (Truthfulness, honesty and loyalty are among the attributes of a dependable character.)" At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud voice in the hospital. (c) Mood. Patient is usually apathetic and indifferent but at times he looks anxious and rather irritable. He himself states that the often feels said in the hospital. (d) Orientation. During the periods that he was acccessible he was found oriented as to place and person but he did not know the day or the date. (e) Illusion and hallucination. The patient states that during the nights that he could not sleep he could hear voices telling him many things. Voices, for example, told that he should escape. That he was going to be killed because he was benevolet. That he could sometimes see the shadow of his former sweetheart in the hospital. There are times however when he could not hear or see at all anything. (f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. On one occassion he told the examiner that he could not talk in his first day in the hospital because of a mass he felt he had in his throat. He sometimes thinks that he is already dead and already buried in the La Loma Cemetery. (g) Compulsive phenomena. None. (h) Memory. The patient has a fairly good memory for remote events, but his memory for recent events or for example, for events that took place during his stay in the hospital he has no recollection at all. (i) Grasp of general informartion. He has a fairly good grasp of general information. He could not, however, do simple numerial tests as the 100-7 test. ( j) Insight and judgment. At his fairly clear periods he stated that he might have been insane during his first days in the hospital, but just during the interview on January 14, 1935, he felt fairly well. Insight and judgment were, of course, nil during his stuporous condition. During the last two days he has shown marked improvement in his behavior as to be cooperative, and coherent in his speech. 2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS: The patient during his confinement in the hospital has been found suffering from a form of physchosis, called Manic depressive psychosis. (Sgd.) TORIBIO JOSON, M. D. Assistant Alienist In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, another assistant alienist in the Insular Pshychopatic Hospital, the following conclusion was reached: I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. He is suffering from the Manic Depressive form of psychosis. It might be premature to state before the court has decided this case, but I believe it a duty to state, that this person is not safe to be at large. He has a peculiar personality make-up, a personality lacking in control, overtly serious in his dealings with the every day events of this earthly world, taking justice with his own hands and many times executing it in an impulsive manner as to make his action over proportionate beyond normal acceptance. He is sensitive, overtly religious, too idealistic has taste and desires as to make him queer before the average conception of an earthly man. He will always have troubles and difficulaties with this world of realities. (Sgd.) J. A. Fernandez, M. D. Assistant Alienist To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normlacy of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime, the prosecution called on policeman Damaso Arnoco. Arnoco testified that upon arresting the defendant-appellant he inquired from the latter for the reason for the assault and the defendant-appellant replied that the deceased Guison owed him P55 and would pay; that appellant bought the knife, Exhibit A, for 55 centavos in Tabora Street and that for two days he had been watching for Guison in order to kill him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.). Benjamin Cruz, a detective, was also called and corroborated the testimony of policeman Arnoco. That such kind of evidence is not necessarily proof of the sanity of the accused during the commission of the offense, is clear from what Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine, University of Edinburg, said in his work on Forensic Medicine (3d ed. [London], p. 382), that in the type of dementia prcox, "the crime is ussually preceded by much complaining and planning. In these people, homicidal attcks are common, because of delusions that they are being interfered with sexually or that their property is being taken." In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was demented at the time he perpetrated the serious offense charged in the information and that conseuently he is exempt from criminal liability. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio in both instances. In conforminty with paragraph 1 of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, the defendant shall kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or such other hospital for the insane as may be desiganted by the Director of the Philippine Health Service, there to remain confined until the Court of First Instance of Manila shall otherwise order or decree. So ordered. Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABELARDO FORMIGONES, defendant-appellant. Luis Contreras for appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for appellee. MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur finding the appellant guilty of parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2,000, and to pay the costs. The following facts are not disputed. In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao, Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five children. From there they went to live in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the barrio of Binahian of the same municipality of Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters of palay. After about a month's stay or rather on December 28, 1946, late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was found by the people who came in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father. Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a written statement, Exhibit D, wherein he admitted that he killed The motive was admittedly of jealousy because according to his statement he used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias; that he suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed that his had become indifferent to him (defendant). During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace of Sipocot, the accused pleaded guilty, as shown by Exhibit E. At the trial of the case in the Court of First Instance, the defendant entered a plea of not guilty, but did not testify. His counsel presented the testimony of two guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct there was rather strange and that he behaved like an insane person; that sometimes he would remove his clothes and go stark naked in the presence of his fellow prisoners; that at times he would remain silent and indifferent to his surroundings; that he would refused to take a bath and wash his clothes until forced by the prison authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus with his fellow prisoners, or even alone by himself without being asked; and that once when the door of his cell was opened, he suddenly darted from inside into the prison compound apparently in an attempt to regain his liberty. The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court rejected this same theory and we are inclined to agree with the lower court. According to the very witness of the defendant, Dr. Francisco Gomez, who e xamined him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong. In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. The provisions of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are copied from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are pertinent and applicable. We quote Judge Guillermo Guevara on his Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to 43: The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; 1 that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.2 The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to imbecility or insanity. The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved. As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife. From the case of United States vs. Vaquilar (27 Phil. 88), we quote the following syllabus: Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no further than to indicate that the accused was moved by a wayward or hysterical burst of anger or passion, and other testimony to the effect that, while in confinement awaiting trial, defendant acted absentmindedly at times, is not sufficient to establish the defense of insanity. The conduct of the defendant while in confinement appears to have been due to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse. After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According to the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless. But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was not a mere product of hallucination and aberrations of a disordered mind as that an imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence to the following effect. In addition to the observations made by appellant in his written statement Exhibit D, it is said that when he and his wife first went to live in the house of his half brother, Zacarias Formigones, the latter was living with his grandmother, and his house was vacant. However, after the family of Abelardo was settled in the house, Zacarias not only frequented said house but also used to sleep there nights. All this may have aroused and even partly confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his way of thinking. The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those unfortunate beings, simple, and even feebleminded, whose faculties have not been fully developed. His action in picking up the body of his wife after she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the floor, and lying beside her for hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one though he thought that she has betrayed him. Although he did not exactly surrender to the authorities, still he made no effort to flee and compel the police to hunt him down and arrest him. In his written statement he readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate said written statement, thus saving the government all the trouble and expense of catching him, and insuring his conviction. Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared to find that the aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime. It seems that the prosecution was not intent or proving it. At least said aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the complaint either in the justice of the peace court or in the Court of First Instance. We are inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt and we therefore declined to find the existence of this aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, the fact that the accused is feebleminded warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, namely that the accused is "suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communication with his fellow beings," or such illness "as would diminish the exercise of his will power." To this we may add the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article, that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. The accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy. With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance to offset them, at first we thought of the possible applicability of the provisions of article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code for the purpose of imposing the penalty next lower to that prescribed by article 246 for parricide, which is reclusion perpetua to death. It will be observed however, that article 64 refers to the application of penalties which contain three periods whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, which is not true in the present case where the penalty applicable for parricide is composed only of two indivisible penalties. On the other hand, article 63 of the same Code refers to the application of indivisible penalties whether it be a single divisible penalty, or two indivisible penalties like that of reclusion perpetua to death. It is therefore clear that article 63 is the one applicable in the present case. Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Interpreting a similar legal provision the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Guevara (10 Phil. 37), involving the crime of parricide, in applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the old Penal Code) which corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the present Revised Penal Code), thru Chief Justice Arellano said the following: And even though the court should take into consideration the presence of two mitigating circumstances of a qualifying nature, which it can not afford to overlook, without any aggravating one, the penalty could not be reduced to the next lower to that imposed by law, because, according to a ruling of the court of Spain, article 80 above-mentioned does not contain a precept similar to that contained in Rule 5 of article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of the Rev. Penal Code.) (Decision of September 30, 1879.) Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict application of which is inevitable and which, under the law, must be sustained, this court now resorts to the discretional power conferred by paragraph 2 of article 2 of the Penal Code; and. Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs, and hereby order that a proper petition be filed with the executive branch of the Government in order that the latter, if it be deemed proper in the exercise of the prerogative vested in it by the sovereign power, may reduce the penalty to that of the next lower. Then, in the case of People vs. Castaeda (60 Phil. 604), another parricide case, the Supreme Court in affirming the judgment of conviction sentencing defendant to reclusion perpetua, said that notwithstanding the numerous mitigating circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as the penalty for parricide as fixed by article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is composed of two indivisible penalties, namely, reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3 of article 63 of the said Code must be applied. The Court further observed: We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice nor has exhibited such moral turpitude as requires life imprisonment, and therefore under the provisions of article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, we respectfully invite the attention of the Chief Executive to the case with a view to executive clemency after appellant has served an appreciable amount of confinement. In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm the judgment of the lower court with the modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone. Appellant will pay costs. Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the two cases above cited, and believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he sees fit. Moran, Bengzon, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Reyes, and Jugo, JJ., concur.

Idiocy Feebleminded has discernment Imbecile deprived of discrnment except

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERNESTO PUNO y FILOMENO, Accused whose death sentence is under review. AQUINO, J.: This is a murder case where the accused interposed as a defense the exempting circumstance of insanity. There is no doubt that at about two o'clock in the afternoon of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno, 28, a jeepney driver, entered a bedroom in the house of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), 72, a widow. The house was located in the area known as Little Baguio, Barrio Tinajeros Malabon, Rizal On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by saying: "Mangkukulam ka mambabarang mayroon kang bubuyog". Then, he repeatedly slapped her and struck her several times on the head with a hammer until she was dead. The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, who was in the bedroom with the old woman, and by Lina Pajes, 27, a tenant of the adjoining room. They testified that Puno's eyes were reddish. His look was baleful and menacing. Puno was a neighbor of Aling Kikay.

After the killing, Puno went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria had taken refuge, and, according to Hilaria, he made the following confession and threat: "Huwag kayong magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin ninyo na umalis kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa matanda." Or, according to Lina, Puno said: "Pinatay ko na iyong matanda. Huwag kayong tumawag ng pulis. Pag tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang paghihigantihan ko. " After the killing, Puno fled to his parents' house at Barrio Tugatog, Malabon and then went to the house of his second cousin, Teotimo Puno, located at Barrio San Jose, Calumpit, Bulacan, reaching that place in the evening. How he was able to go to that place, which was then flooded, is not shown in the record. Disregarding Puno's threat, Lina, after noting that he had left, notified the Malabon police of the killing. Corporal Daniel B. Cruz answered the call. He found Aling Kikay sprawled on her bed already dead, Her head was bloody. Her blanket and pillows were bloodstained. He took down the statements of Lina and Hilaria at the police station. They pointed to Puno as the killer (pp. 15- 17, Record). A medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted an autopsy. He certified that the victim had lacerated wounds on her right eyebrow and contusions on the head caused by a hard instrument, On opening the skull, the doctor found extensive and generalized hemorrhage. The cause of death was intracranial, traumatic hemorrhage (Exh. A). Puno's father surrendered him to the police. Two Malabon policemen brought him to the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal on September 10, 1970 (p. 14, Record). He was charged with murder in the municipal court. He waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. On October 21, 1970, he was indicted for murder in the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal. Alleged in the information as aggravating circumstances were evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex. Puno, a native of Macabebe, Pampanga, who testified about five months after the killing, pretended that he did not remember having killed Aling Kikay- He believes that there are persons who are "mangkukulam," "mambabarang" and "mambubuyog and that when one is victimized by those persons, his feet might shrink or his hands might swan. Puno believes that a person harmed by a "mambabarang" might have a headache or a swelling nose and ears and can be cured only by a quack doctor ( herbolaryo). Consequently, it is necessary to kill the "mangkukulam" and "mambabarang". Puno is the third child in a family of twelve children. He is married with two children. He finished third year high school. His father is a welder. Among his friends are drivers. (Exh- B). Zenaida Gabriel, 30, Puno's wife, testified that on the night before the murder, Puno's eyes were reddish. He complained of a headache. The following day while he was feeding the pigs, he told Zenaida that a bumble bee was coming towards him and he warded it off with his hands. Zenaida did not see any bee. Puno then went upstairs and took the cord of the religious habit of his mother. He wanted to use that cord in tying his dog. He asked for another rope when Zenaida admonished him not to use that cord. Puno tied the dog to a tree by looping the rope through its mouth and over its head. He repeatedly boxed the dog. Aida Gabriel, Zenaida's elder sister, saw Puno while he was boxing that dog. Aida observed that Puno's eyes were bloodshot and his countenance had a ferocious expression. Teotimo Puno testified that on the night of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno came to their house in Barrio San Jose, Calumpit. Ernesto was soaking wet as there was a flood in that place. He was cuddling a puppy that he called "Diablo". He called for Teotimo's mother who invited him to eat. Ernesto did not eat. Instead, he fed the puppy. Ernesto introduced Teotimo to his puppy. Then, he sang an English song. When Teotimo asked him to change his wet clothes, Ernesto refused. Later, he tried on the clothes of Teotimo's father. When told that Teotimo's father had been dead for a couple of years already, Ernesto just looked at Teotimo. While he was lying down, Ernesto began singing again. Then he emitted a moaning sound until he fell asleep. Ernesto was awakened the next morning by the noise caused by persons wading in the flood. Ernesto thought they were his fellow cursillistas. The defense presented three psychiatrists. However, instead of proving that puno was insane when he killed Aling Kikay, the medical experts testified that Puno acted with discernment. Thus, Doctor Araceli Maravilla of the Psychiatry Section of the Dr. Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital, to whom Puno was referred for treatment ten times between September 8, 1966 and July 24, 1970, testified that Puno was an out-patient who could very well live with society, although he was afflicted with "schizophrenic reaction"; that Puno knew what he was doing and that he had psychosis, a slight destruction of the ego. Puno admitted to Doctor Maravilia that one cause of his restlessness, sleeplessness and irritability was his financial problem (7 tsn November 4, 1970). Doctor Maravilla observed that Puno on July 4, 1970 was already cured. Doctor Reynaldo Robles of the National Mental Hospital testified that Puno was first brought to that hospital on July 28, 1962 because his parents complained that he laughed alone and exhibited certain eccentricities such as kneeling, praying and making his body rigid. Doctor Robles observed that while Puno was suffering from "schizophrenic reaction", his symptoms were "not socially incapacitating" and that he could adjust himself to his environment (4 tsn January 20, 1971). He agreed with Doctor Maravilla's testimony. Doctor Carlos Vicente, a medical specialist of the National Mental Hospital, testified that from his examination of Puno, he gathered that Puno acted with discernment when he committed the killing and that Puno could distinguish between right and wrong (5 tsn January 1 1, 197 1). Doctor Vicente also concluded that Puno was not suffering from any delusion and that he was not mentally deficient; otherwise, he would not have reached third year high school (8-19 tsn January 1 1, 197 1). On December 14, 1970 or three months after the commission of the offense, Doctors Vicente, Robles and Victorina V. Manikan of the National Mental Hospital submitted the following report on Puno (Exh. B or 2): Records show that he had undergone psychiatric treatment at the Out-Patient Service of the National Mental Hospital for schizophrenia in 1962 from which he recovered; in 1964 a relapse of the same mental illness when he improved and in 1966 when his illness remained unimproved. His treatment was continued at the JRR Memorial Hospital at the San Lazaro Compound up to July, 1970. He was relieved of symptoms and did not come back anymore for medication. On September 8, 1970, according to information, he was able to kill an old woman. Particulars of the offense are not given. MENTAL CONDITION ... Presently, he is quiet and as usual manageable. He is fairly clean in person and without undue display of emotion. He talks to co-patients but becomes evasive when talking with the doctor and other personnel of the ward. He knows he is accused of murder but refuses to elaborate on it. xxx xxx xxx REMARKS In view of the foregoing findings, Ernesto Puno, who previously was suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia, is presently free from any social incapacitating psychotic symptoms. The seeming ignorance of very simple known facts and amnesia of several isolated accounts in his life do not fit the active pattern of a schizophrenic process. It may be found in an acutely disturbed and confused patient or a markedly, retarded individual of which he is not. However, persons who recover from an acute episode of mental illness like schizophrenia may retain some residual symptoms impairing their judgment but not necessarily their discernment of right from wrong of the offense committed. The foregoing report was submitted pusuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court and the order of the trial court dated November 16, 1970 for the mental examination of Puno in the National Mental Hospital to determine whether he could stand trial and whether he was sane when he committed the killing. The trial court concluded that Puno was sane or knew that the killing of Francisca Col was wrong and that he would be punished for it, as shown by the threats which he made to Hilaria de la Cruz and Lina Pajes, the old woman's companions who witnessed his dastardly deed. The trial court also concluded that if Puno was a homicidal maniac who had gone berserk, he would have killed also Hilaria and Lina. The fact that he singled out Aling Kikay signified that he really disposed of her because he thought that she was a witch. Judge Onofre A. Villaluz said that during the trial he "meticulously observed the conduct and behavior of the accused inside the court, most especially when he was presented on the witness stand" and he was convinced "that the accused is sane and has full grasp of what was happening" in his environment. The trial court convicted Puno of murder, sentenced him to death and ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim an indemnity of twenty-two thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. 509). His counsel de oficio in this review of the death sentence, contends that the trial court erred in not sustaining the defense of insanity and in appreciating evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex as aggravating circumstances. When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from responsibility, the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution (U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil. 547). Insanity should be proven by clear and positive evidence (People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204). The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed Francisca Col because he had chronic schizophrenia since 1962; he was suffering from schizophrenia on September 8, 1970, when he liquidated the victim, and schizophrenia is a form of psychosis which deprives a person of discernment and freedom of will. Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the accused must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime (People vsFormigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660). Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability." (People vs. Ambal, G.R. No. 52688, October 17, 1980; People vs. Renegade, L-27031, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 275, 286; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292. As to "el trastorno mental transitorio as an exempting circumstance, see I Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 15th Ed., 1974. pp. 498-504 and art. 8 of the Spanish Penal Code.) After evaluating counsel de oficio's contentions in the light of the strict rule just stated and the circumstances surrounding the killing, we are led to the conclusion that Puno was not legally insane when he killed the hapless and helpless victim. The facts and the findings of the psychiatrists reveal that on that tragic occasion he was not completely deprived of reason and freedom of will. In People vs. Fausto y Tomas, 113 Phil. 841, the accused was confined in the National Mental Hospital for thirteen days because he was suffering from schizophrenia of the paranoid type. His confinement was recommended by Doctor Antonio Casal of the San Miguel Brewery where the accused used to work as a laborer. About one year and two months later, he killed Doctor Casal because the latter refused to certify him for re-employment. His plea of insanity was rejected. He was convicted of murder. In the instant case, the trial court correctly characterized the killing as murder. The qualifying circumstance is abuse of superiority. In liquidating Francisco Col, Puno, who was armed with a hammer, took advantage of his superior natural strength over that of the unarmed septuagenarian female victim who was unable to offer any resistance and who could do nothing but exclaim " Diyos ko ". Thus, it was held that "an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which qqqs sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself" (People vs. Guzman, 107 Phil. 1122, 1127 citing U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; U.S. vs. Camiloy 36 Phil. 757 and People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil. 446). Evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) cannot be appreciated because the evidence does not show (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act (People vs. Ablates, L-33304, July 31, 1974, 58 SCRA 241, 247). The essence of premeditation "es la mayor perversidad del culpable juntamente con su serenidad o frialdad de animo." It is characterized (1) "por la concepcion del delito y la resolucion de ejecutarlo firme, fria, reflexival meditada y detenida" and (2) "por la persistencia en la resolucion de delinquir demostrada por el espacio de tiempo transcurrido entre dicha resolucion y la ejecucion del hecho Premeditation should be evident, meaning that it should be shown by "signos reiterados v externos, no de meras sospechas" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 1974 or 15th Ed., pp- 582-3). Dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of her old age should be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances. Disregard of sex is not aggravating because there is no evidence that the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim or showed manifest disrespect to her womanhood (People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548; People vs. Mori, L-23511-2, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 404, People vs, Jaula, 90 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. De Jesus, 14 Phil. 190). However, those two aggravating circumstances are off-set by the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender to the authorities and, as contended by counsel de oficio, the offender's mental illness (mild psychosis or schizophrenic reaction) which diminished his will-power without however depriving him of consciousness of his acts. (See People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, People vs. Amit, 82 Phil. 820 and People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658.) Thus, it was held that la equivocada creencia de los acusados de que el matar a un brujo es un bien al publico puede considerarse como una circunstancia atenuante pues los que tienen la obsession de que los brujos deben ser eliminados estan en la misma condicion que aquel que, atacado de enfermedad morbosa pero consciente aun de lo que hace, no tiene verdadero imperio de su voluntad" (People vs. Balneg 79 Phil. 805, 810). It results that the medium period of the penalty for murder should be imposed (Arts. 64[41 and 248, Revised Penal Code).

WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is sentenced to reclusion perpetua The indemnity imposed by the trial court is affirmed. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. Barredo, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL MORALES y ALAS, defendant-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Alfredo L. Nieva for defendant-appellant. PER CURIAM: The criminal perversity exhibited in these charges for Infanticide and Rape, which were jointly tried, argues strongly against the abolition of capital punishment from our statute books. In Criminal Case No. 906 filed on April 1, 1976 before the former Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro, Branch II, the accused was charged with the rape of his own daughter, with the Information alleging: That sometime in the month of December, 1974, at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, in the Barrio of Maluanluan, Municipality of Pola, Province of Oriental Mindoro, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, thru force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay and have carnal knowledge with his own 14 years old daughter Maria Morales against the will on consent of the latter. CONTRARY TO Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Pinamalayan, Or. Mindoro, April 1, 1976. 1 In another Information filed in Criminal Case No. 904 against the same accused on the same date and before the same Court, he was charged with Infanticide committed as follows: That on or about the 19th day of March, 1976, at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, in the barrio of Maluanluan, Municipality of Pola, Province of Oriental Mindoro, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, motivated with his diabolical desire to conceal the offense of rape he had committed against Maria Morales his very own daughter, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously bury alive a baby girl, christened Mary Morales y Morales, a child born out of his carnal relationship with Maria Morales, who then was only an hour old from birth, as a result of which caused the former her unexpected and untimely demise. CONTRARY TO Article 255 of the Revised Penal Code. Pinamalayan, Or. Mindoro, April 1, 1976. 2 The accused pleaded guilty to both charges upon arraignment. Notwithstanding, the lower Court followed the proper and prudent course and ordered the taking of the accused's testimony pursuant to the doctrines enunciated by this Court.

the lower court substituted pleas of not guilty in both cases and set them jointly for trial. At the trial, the accused again admitted the commission of the charges as alleged in the Information as well as the contents of his extrajudicial confession (Exhibit "E").
Considering that the accused then gave conflicting testimonies as to whether or not the baby was still alive when he buried her,
3

After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a joint Decision, with the following decretal portion: WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Manuel Morales y Alas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as defined and penalized in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in the information filed by the Provincial Fiscal under Criminal Case No. P-905 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify Maria Morales, the offended party in the amount of P10,000.00. Said accused is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of infanticide in Criminal Case No. P904, as defined and penalized in Article 255 of the Revised Penal Code, with evident premeditation and qualified by the use of superior strength of the accused and by nocturnity, with only one mitigating circumstance which is his plea of guilty, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the capital punishment of DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of the victim Mary Morales y Morales the sum of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in view of the nature of the principal penalty. The said accused is condemned likewise to pay the costs in both cases. xxx xxx xxx IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 The accused did not appeal from the conviction for Rape. It is the imposition of the death penalty in the Infanticide case that is now before us on automatic review. We quote the evidence for the prosecution from the People's Brief: Sometime in the month of December, 1974, at around midnight at Maluanluan, Pola, Oriental Mindoro, accused-appellant Manuel Morales, through force and intimidation, was able to have carnal knowledge of his unmarried daughter Maria Morales. Thereafter, the appellant repeated his misdeeds several times (p. 5, tsn, April 30, 1976; Answer to Question No. 3, Affidavit of Maria Morales, Record, p. 14). Consequently, Maria Morales got pregnant and on March 19, 1976, at around 7:00 o'clock P.M., with the help of the appellant, she gave birth to a live baby girl named Mary Morales inside their house in Barrio Maluanluan. About an hour later, the appellant took the baby from the mother, brought her out of the house, and buried her alive near their house (Answer to Questions Nos. 4, 5, 6, 8, and 11, Affidavit of Manuel Morales, Record, p. 13; pp. 3-4, 8, tsn, April 20, 1976; pp. 5-8, tsn, April 30, 1976). To cover the place where he buried the baby, the appellant built a fire over it (p. 14, tsn, April 21, 1976; Answer to Question No. 4, Affidavit of Delfin Dris, Record, p. 15). At about 7:00 P.M. of the following day, Jesus Aytona, an uncle of Maria Morales went to the office of Orlando Lara, the Station Commander of Pola, Oriental Mindoro and reported to him that as per information his niece delivered a baby but that the latter could not be found. Then Lara, together with some members of the police, proceeded to Barrio Maluanluan. A neighbor of the appellant, Delfin Dris, reported to Lara that in the night of March 19, 1976, he heard the crying of a baby but that later it stopped (pp. 12-13, tsn, April 21, 1976). In the morning of the next day, Lara invited the appellant to the station to which the latter agreed (p. 14, tsn, Ibid). Thereafter, Lara returned to the scene of the crime and investigated the matter. With the help of Dris, Lara found the baby buried a foot deep in a place about 15 meters from the appellant's house (pp. 14-16, tsn, Ibid). Lara then summoned the help of Dra. Alamar who conducted an autopsy on the body of the baby. He also ordered a sergeant to fetch the appellant so that the latter could Identify the body of the baby (p. 15, tsn, April 21, 1976). Appellant arrived and then Identified the body of the baby as his daughter by Maria Morales, his own daughter, whom he buried alive to cover the shame of his family because of what he did to the latter (pp. 17-18, tsn, Ibid). Pictures were also taken at the scene of the crime (pp. 13-21, tsn, April 21, 1976; Exhibits 'C' and 'D'). The 'Post Mortem Findings' on baby Mary Morales stated: I. EXTERNAL FINDINGS: a) A dead new born baby girl with the placenta still attached was dug up approximately 100 meters away from the residence of Manuel Morales under a banana tree. b) Purplish black cynosis of the face, neck and all parts of the body were clearly observed. c) At the early stage of decomposition, there is still the evidence of the caput succedanum and the baby is covered with vernix cascosa. The head is covered with fine lanuge hair and the nails projected from the fingers. d) CHEST-There is arching of the chest. II. INTERNAL FINDINGS: a) Lungs filled the thoracic cavity and overlaps the heart. Edges are rounded and vermillion red (pinkish mottled color) in color. It crepitates on pressure: On section it exudes froth. A piece of the lungs floated on water showing that air had probably entered in the lungs air sacs. It is spongy. It weighs more or less 900 gms. b) Stomach and intestines-contains mucus and air bubbles and saliva. III. CONCLUSION: MOST PROBABLY CARDIO RESPIRATORY FAILURE DUE TO ASPHYXIATION CAUSED THE DEATH OF THE CHILD. (Exhibit 'A', Record, p. 9). Thereafter, the appellant was brought back to the municipal building where he executed an affidavit admitting that he buried his baby daughter alive (pp. 19, 21-22, tsn, April 21, 1976; Exhibit 'E', Record, p. 13). On August 22 and 23, 1976, the affidavit of Maria Morales, declaring, among others, that on March 19, 1976 she gave birth to a live baby girl whom the appellant took away from her and whom she was not able to see thereafter, and that of Delfin Dris about the hearing of the crying of a newly born baby in the house of the appellant on the evening of March 19, 1976 were taken by the police, respectively (pp. 25-26, tsn, April 21, 1976; Exhibits 'F' and 'G', Record, pp. 14-15). 5 In this appeal, de officio counsel maintains: I. The Court erred in finding that the accused mercilessly killed the baby girl Mary Morales by burying her alive. II. The Court erred in giving credit to the testimony of Dr. Mercedes Alamar, that the baby girl when buried was still alive. III. The Court erred in not appreciating the unstable mind of the accused, which fact could have been favorably interpreted in his favor. IV. The Court erred in imposing the capital punishment of death. We are far from persuaded. That the accused had killed baby Mary Morales by burying her alive is admitted by him in his extrajudicial confession, given two days after the incident, or on March 21, 1976, as follows: 3. T Ikaw ay naririto ngayon sa aming Tanggapan at iniimbestigahan sa isang kaso na naganap sa Maluanluan, Pola, Silangang Mindoro, nalalaman mo ba kung ano ang nagawa mong kasalanan? S Opo, nabuntisan ko po iyong aking anak na si MARIA MORALES at noong ito'y umanak ay ibinaon ko iyong bata. 4. T Kailan naman nanganak itong si Maria? S Noon pong ika-19 ng Marso, 1976, humigit kumulang sa ika- 7:00 ng gabi. 5. T Kailan mo naman ibinaon ang nasabing bata? S Noon din pong gabing iyon, humigit kumulang sa ika-8:00 ng gabi. 6. T Noon bagang ibaon mo ang naging anak nitong si Maria ay patay na ito S Buhay pa po ang bata. 7. T Anong tauhin itong anak na ito ni Maria? S Babae po. 6 On the witness stand, the accused also admitted: Q Likewise, stated in that information is the allegation that after your daughter Maria Morales have delivered that baby daughter of whom you are the father and finding that she was delivered alive, you buried your own daughter to hide your wrongdoing, is that the true or untrue? A That is true, sir. 7

Orlando Lara, the Station Commander of Pola, Oriental Mindoro, who investigated the case, also testified that the accused admitted that he buried his child while still alive. Lara testified as follows: Q After Manuel Morales, the accused, had Identified the child as his, did you ask Manuel Morales in your capacity as investigator, who buried that child? A I asked him and he told me that he was the one who buried the child, sir. Q Did you ask him why he buried the child? A He told me that to evade the shame of his family, he does not like that the baby live, sir. Q Did you ask Manuel Morales if he buried the child already dead or still alive? A He told me that when he buried the child, the latter was still alive, sir. 8 In addition to Lara's foregoing corroborative testimony, Dr. Mercedes Alamar, the medico-legal officer, declared: Q In your autopsy findings, can you determine or were you able to determine that at the time of burial of the child she was still alive? A There were evidence that the baby was alive when she was buried. In the first place in the 'External Findings' there is one stated there that there is arching of the chest and arching of the chest means that respiration had been established. In the 'Internal Findings' 'Lungs filled the thoracic cavity and overlaps the heart'- showing also that respiration had been established. Edges are rounded and vermillon red (pinkish mottled color) in color. It shows again that the lungs had expanded. It crepitates on pressure, it shows again that there is presence of air in the lungs. On section it exudes froth. This is also an evidence that there had been a respiration. A piece of lung was floated on water showing that air had probably entered in the lungs air sacs. That the lungs when floated on water show that air entered the lungs. Stomach and intestines contains mucus and air bubbles and saliva. These are all evidence that respiration had been established before the baby's death and that the baby was still alive when she was buried. 9 The sworn statement of Maria Dolores further disclosed that the baby girl she delivered on that night of March 19, 1976, without her father calling a "hilot" despite her request, was "buhay po at mabilog at malakas ang uha na malusog ..."; that her father, the accused, took away said baby from her; and that, thereafter, she was not able to see her baby anymore. 10 There is not the shadow of a doubt, therefore, that the infant girl, who was subsequently called Mary Morales, was buried alive by the accused, her father, approximately one hour after her birth. With the exception of evident premeditation, the lower Court correctly appreciated, for having been proven at the trial although not alleged in the Information
11

, the aggravating

circumstances of advantage taken of superior strength and nocturnity.

Evident premeditation, however, has not been sufficiently established. There is no evidence of planning on the part of the accused to kill his infant daughter. It is not enough that premeditation be

There should be evidence of a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect on the result of his act. Such evidence is wanting herein. The baby was born about 7:00 o'clock in the evening and was buried alive about 8:00 o'clock that same night. Where the accused had only about an hour or half an hour for meditation and reflection, there is no evident premeditation.
surmised; the criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing the determination to commit the crime.
12 13 14

But the accused took advantage of his superior strength when he took the infant from her mother immediately after her birth, naked, placenta and all, and subsequently buried the baby alive. Nighttime was likewise properly appreciated for although, subjectively, it was not purposely sought, objectively, it was a circumstance that facilitated the commission of the crime and which the accused took

He could not have buried the infant with facility and with minimum fear of detection had it not been for the cover of night.
advantage of for purpose of impunity. 15 The accused's testimony that he had suffered a mental blackout and did not know what he was doing at the time he buried his daughter, which condition, it is alleged, should have impelled the lower Court to order his confinement in a hospital for treatment and for determination of whether or not he was insane, is untenable. The act of the accused in refusing to call a "hilot" to help his daughter deliver, and his insistence to act as such himself, betrays a conscious and deliberate intent to hide the fact of birth from other eyes. The act of the accused in building a fire over the grave where he buried his infant daughter in order to camouflage it and to deflect it from suspicion belies his protestations that he had suffered a mental blackout at the time. On the contrary, they show deliberateness and full possession of his mental faculties to prevent discovery of a dastardly crime. It is more likely that the accused was wavering between remorse of conscience and a lurking desire to disown the crime and go scot-free if

When a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him. With two aggravating circumstances and only one mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, the imposition of capital punishment is inescapable for this heinous, outrageous and cruel crime without parallel in Philippine jurisprudence.
it could be proven that the child had been born dead and lifeless. Besides, the law presumes every man to be sane.
16 17 18

WHEREFORE, except with respect to the finding by the lower Court of evident premeditation, the judgment in Criminal Case No. P-904 is hereby affirmed. Costs against the accused Manuel Morales y Alas. SO ORDERED. Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. Fernando, C.J., and Teehankee, J., took no part. Aquino, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting: I do not believe that nocturnity should be appreciated against the appellant. That the killing of the infant took place at night was merely incidental; night- time was not purposely chosen to facilitate the commission of the crime. For it must be remembered that the infant was born on March 19, 1976, at 7:00 o'clock in the evening and she was killed one hour later. With superiority cancelled by the plea of guilty, the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua.The crime committed by the appellant is repulsive but he should be punished according to law. Separate Opinions ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting: I do not believe that nocturnity should be appreciated against the appellant. That the killing of the infant took place at night was merely incidental; night- time was not purposely chosen to facilitate the commission of the crime. For it must be remembered that the infant was born on March 19, 1976, at 7:00 o'clock in the evening and she was killed one hour later. With superiority cancelled by the plea of guilty, the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua.The crime committed by the appellant is repulsive but he should be punished according to law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-apellee, vs. JUANITO Q. AQUINO, accused-appellant. REGALADO, J.: In the criminal justice systems of modem civilized nations, insanity is invariably recognized as a valid defense against punishment for crime. The proverbial bone of contention, however, is in the ascertainment of the veracity of the claimed affliction and the determination of the degree of mental aberration, as a ground for acquittal or a basis for extenuation of criminal liability. We have such a situation before us in the present appeal. Appellant Juanito Q. Aquino was charged with rape with homicide before the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 57 in San CARLOS City, Pangasinan, under the following information, to wit: That an or about the 13th day of February, 1987, in the evening in barangay Poblacion, * province of Pangasinan, New Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Carmelita Morado alias 'Carmen', against her will, and on the on thereof the said accused did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike her with the use of stone which directly cause (sic) the death of Carmelita Morado alias 'Carmen' to the damage and prejudice of her heirs. Contrary to Art. 335 in relation to Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code. 1

In its order dated July 1, 1987, the trial court granted the motion and held in abeyance the arraignment of the accused and the trial of the case. On January 26, 1988, the National Center for Mental Health submitted the clinical case report on the mental and physical condition of appellant. He was later returned to the custody of the court for trial and was arraigned on April 27, 1988.
In a motion dated June 26, 1987, counsel for appellant moved for the indefinite suspension of the trial and asked for the commitment of the accused to the National Mental Hospital.
2 3 4 5

The material and established facts of this case, as well as the points in dispute between the parties, having been succinctly but thoroughly summarized by the Solicitor General, we are minded to quote at length therefrom. On the night of February 13, 1987, Armando Frias, while on duty as member of the Integrated National Police of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, received a report that there was a victim of a crime in the clinic of Dr. Padlan in the poblacion. He proceeded to the clinic and found the victim lying down with her head bleeding. He asked her how she felt and when she replied that she was weak, he took her ante-mortem statement (TSN, November 4, 1988, pp. 3-5). The victim, Carmelita Morado, 18 years old, told Frias that she was raped and struck with a stone by Juanita Aquino, appellant herein. Frias took down her statement which was duly witnessed by attending physician Dr. Padlan and Capt. Eddie Ramos. The written statement was also thumbmarked by Carmelita Morado (TSN, pp. 3-5, 8, 10, November 4, 1988,

Armando Frias). Pat. Jaime Datuin and Pat. Renato Solomon were also among the people who were present when Frias took the statement of the victim. After the victim gave her statement she shouted that she be taken to the hospital because she was weak. (Id., p. 9). Carmelita Morado was taken to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center in San Carlos City and admitted at 11:35 p.m. of that same evening in serious condition. Dr. Saturnino Posadas, director of said Medical Center, testified that Carmelita Morado sustained the following injuries; 1. lacerated wound about 10 cm. at the front of the head; 2. skull fracture located on the front portion of the skull; 3. hemorrhage or bleeding on the left eye; 4. laceration of the brain; 5. laceration perineum; (sic) 6. laceration of the urethal (sic) (TSN pp. 2-3. November 18, 1988; Dr. Saturnino Posadas; Medico Legal Certificate, Exhibit 'C') She died the following morning before surgical operations could be performed (TSN, p. 4 November 18, 1988, Dr. Saturnino Posadas). A team of police officers was sent out to arrest Juanita Aquino. He was found and arrested inside the town auditorium at around 11:00 that same evening of February 13, 1987 attending a Valentine dance (TSN, pp. 7-8, September 15, 1988). Appellant was detained at the municipal jail in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. However, it was only on February 17, 1987 that the statement of appellant was taken as the police officers waited for the parents of appellant (TSN, pp. 3, 13-14, August 24, 1988). Before appellant's interrogation begun, he was asked if he had a lawyer. As he had none, Armando Frias and the Station Commander Captain Ramos fetched Atty. Liliosa Rosario of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office to assist appellant during the investigation. Atty. Rosario, upon arrival at the office of Frias where the investigation was to take place, interviewed appellant (supra at pp. 14-16). At the start of the investigation, Armando Frias informed appellant of his constitutional rights, of his right to remain silent and to counsel. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Rosario throughout the investigation (TSN, p. 10, August 23, 1988; p. 18, August 24, 1988). After appellant signed his statement, Frias took appellant and his counsel to the office of Judge Juan C. Austria, of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, who called the Interpreter and the Clerk of Court to read the statement and translate the same to appellant to ensure that appellant understood what was written. Judge Austria made appellant sign the statement in his presence (TSN, pp. 21-23, August 24, 1988). However, after the complaint was filed but before appellant could be arraigned, a Motion to Commit appellant to the National Center for Mental Health, as earlier mentioned, was filed by appellant's counsel as appellant was allegedly manifesting unstable behavior with fits of violence. Appellant was duly committed sometime in July, 1987. He was released in 1988 whereupon he was duly arraigned. Appellant pleaded 'not guilty' and put up the defense of insanity. To prove insanity, appellant presented Dr. Nicanor L. Echavez, a psychiatrist at the National Center for Mental Health who was in charge of the pavilion where appellant was committed. After Juanita Aquino was admitted to the mental hospital in July 1987, he conducted physical, mental and psychological examinations and found him to be suffering from mental disorder classified under organic mental disorder with psychosis (TSN, pp. 4-5, 7, May 23, 1988). Dr. Echavez was of the opinion that when appellant Juanita Aquino committed the heinous act, the latter was totally deprived of mind (supra at pp. 15-16). Patricio Aquino, appellant's father, also testified that his son was already mentally HI even when he was still young. Appellant was suspended from school because he was very playful, overactive and naughty especially with his classmates (TSN, p. 4, May 24, 1988); that appellant was cruel to his brothers and sisters, stole his mother's jewelry which he sold for a low sum, wandered sometimes naked, and oftentimes not coming home for extended periods of time (supra at pp. 5, 8). Appellant was previously confined at the Mental Hospital in 1985 when he was caught wandering around naked ( supra at p. 10). Sgt. Raymundo Lomboy, the police officer charged with appellant's custody and who transferred appellant for commitment to the National Center for Mental Health, recalled that while appellant was in his custody, appellant acted abnormally by singing, shouting, dancing and generally disturbing the other inmates (TSN, p. 7, July 21, 1988). After appellant was treated and released from the National Center for Mental Health, he acted queerly by singing and shouting whenever he failed to drink his medicine (supra at p. 15). Appellant himself was also presented as witness, the doctor having certified that he could withstand trial. However, the gist of appellants' testimony was to deny any knowledge of the crime, the persons, things and events connected with it. He admitted he knew that he has some mental illness and had undergone treatment like electric shock (TSN, pp. 5-7, 18-19, July 14, 1988). On the other hand, the prosecution presented an array of witnesses to prove that appellant was lucid before and after the crime was committed and that he acted with discernment. Armando Frias testified that from the time of appellant's arrest and during the investigation, appellant acted normally, and gave responsive answers to all the questions propounded to him (TSN, pp. 5, 9, 13-15 August 23, 1988). Frias knew appellant even prior to the incident because he worked as a laborer in the construction of the theatre in the town proper. He believed appellant to be normal. Angel Baysic, another member of the Integrated National Police in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan whose house is located near the theatre being constructed, also knew appellant who worked there as a laborer and sometimes cooked the laborer's meals. Baysic became closely acquainted with appellant and sometimes they drank together with other laborers after work. During these times, he observed appellant to act normally and was responsive to conversation (TSN, pp. 4-7, September 6, 1988). Carlos Sabangon, one of the police officers who arrested appellant at the town auditorium, testified that when appellant was arrested during the valentine dance, he was appropriately dressed and behaved normally and in fact was just about to sit down after dancing when they arrived to arrest him (TSN, pp. 8-9, 17 September 15, 1988). Eduardo Fernandez, a jail guard, was one on duty when appellant escaped from prison on May 3, 1987. While appellant was confined in the provincial jail, Fernandez did not observe any queer behavior from appellant (TSN, pp. 34- 35, 41, 43, September 15, 1988). 6 After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered its verdict convicting appellant of the crime of rape with homicide and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P35,000.00 as damages. 7

The case was, however, brought to us for review, with appellant taking the court below to task on the following assignment of errors:
Appellant, through counsel, manifested his intention to appeal the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals.
8

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE AC, CUSED-APPELLANT INSANE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME; 2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH AS TO THE INSANITY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT; 3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 9 The controversy boils down into one issue, that is, whether or not appellant, who has invoked insanity as his defense, has overcome the presumption of sanity. Sanity being the normal condition of the human mind, the prosecution may proceed in the first instance upon the presumption that the defendant was sane and responsible when the act

The basis for the presumption of sanity is well explained by the United States Supreme Court in the leading case of Davis vs, United States, in this wise: "If that presumption were not indulged, the government would always be under the necessity of adducing affirmative evidence of the sanity of an accused. But a requirement of that character would seriously delay and embarrass the enforcement of the laws against crime and in most cases be unnecessary. Consequently, the law presumes that everyone charged with crime is sane and thus, supplies in the first instance the required proof of capacity to commit crime."
was committed. The presumption is always in favor of sanity and the burden of proof of insanity is on the defense. 10
11

As we have done in a prior case, for purposes of disposing of appellant's defense it is well to restate and keep in mind certain basic principles in law, viz: that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him; that a felonious or criminal act ( delito doloso) is presumed to have been done with deliberate intent, that is, with freedom, intelligence and malice because the moral and legal presumption is that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person in the absence of evidence to the contrary; that one of the causes which will overthrow this presumption of voluntariness and intelligence is insanity in which event the actor is exempt from criminal liability as provided for in Article 12, Paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. 12 It will readily be observed that the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant clearly reveals how the crime charged against him was perpetrated. This confession is, however, being assailed as inadmissible in evidence on the ground that it was executed without the assistance of counsel engaged by appellant himself, and that he did not understand nor was he informed of his constitutional rights. 13 We do not agree with this submission. The extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence. Atty. Liliosa Rosario, a lawyer from the then Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), assisted

we strongly denounced the widespread misconception that the presence of a lawyer under the right to counsel provision of the Constitution is intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him. The right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Whether it is an extrajudicial statement or testimony in open court, the purpose is always the ascertainment of truth. As explained in Gamboa vs.Cruz, etc., the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of persons undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense.
appellant when he was placed under custodial investigation. The same lawyer represented him during the early part of the trial. In People vs. Layuso, 14
15

The presence and assistance of Atty. Liliosa Rosario adequately precluded the possibility of extracting from appellant any false or coerced confession or admission. Furthermore, it was shown that the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant was explained to him in his dialect when he was brought before Judge Juan C. Austria where such confession was subscribed

The records also show that the validity of the extrajudicial confession is not being questioned. Only the reliability of its contents is being placed in doubt, ostensibly because of the main submission of the defense that appellant was insane when the crime was committed. Moreover, the CLAO attorney would not have affixed her signature in the extrajudicial confession had she known of any legal infirmity in its execution.
and sworn to by appellant. 16
17

Coming now to his principal submission, appellant relies heavily on the clinical case report regarding his mental and physical condition. He stresses in his brief that the testimony of Dr. Nicanor L. Echavez, Physician-In-Charge, Male Court Case Pavilion of the National Center for Mental Health, has explicitly shown that appellant was supposedly insane immediately before,

He explains that the normal appearance and behavior of appellant while testifying in court is not surprising. He says that it is due to the fact that, during that time, he was undergoing medical treatment and his mental condition during the trial of the case where he had been regularly taking medicine should not be confused with his mental status at the time of the commission of the offense.
during and after the commission of the crime and that the evidence adduced explicate that the mental illness of appellant is incurable and that he has no lucid intervals.
18 19

Appellant is clutching at straws of argument, a clear indicium of a dearth in plausible explanations. Nor was the trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe and evaluate his demeanor on the witness stand, including his manner of testifying and the answers he also gave in his extrajudicial confession, the least bit impressed by appellant's defense of insanity as vividly explained in his decision. And well must it be so, for the rule is that insanity must be positively proven. The presumption, we repeat, is in favor of sanity. The rule has consistently been that when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him. 20 Now, it has long been settled that the period to which an inquiry into the mental state of the accused should be directed is that transpiring immediately before and/or at the very moment of

In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is complete absence of the power to discern, or there is total deprivation of the freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The onus probandi rests upon whoever invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance and must prove it by clear and positive evidence.
the act or acts under prosecution.
21 22

Insanity itself is a condition, not a thing. It is not susceptible of the usual means of proof and to this fact is due the unusual difficulty of making proof of its existence and measuring its effect, when once proven to exist. As no man can look into the mind of another, the state of such mind can only be measured as the same is reflected in the actions of the body it is created to govern. Thus, we have held that mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby we read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come to determine whether his acts

In interpreting these physical manifestations, scientific knowledge and experience have been resorted to by our judicial agencies.
conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
23

The records indubitably disclose that appellant sexually abused the victim. After consummating his lustful desire, he violently struck the victim on the head with a stone for fear that the

The victim did not immediately die. In the clinic of Dr. Serafin Padlan in the poblacion, Pat. Armando Friars saw the victim with her head bleeding. He took the statement of the victim in the local dialect. Thereafter, he translated the statement to English and reduced it into writing. The statement disclosed the Identity of appellant. That same evening, the victim was still brought to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center where she was treated. She was serious but still conscious, and was able to narrate to Dr. Saturnino Posadas what happened to her. She died the following morning.
victim would report him, and thereafter he left her in the belief that she was already dead. 24
25 26 27

The evidence adduced for appellant that he was insane immediately before or at the very moment the crime was committed is too nebulous and conjectural to be convincing. While Dr.

he admitted that a person suffering from insanity may know that what he is doing is wrong. The same witness also testified that there is no possibility of appellant having lucid intervals, but he, however, also observed that the mental illness of appellant came on and off.
Nicanor L. Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health described the mental illness of the accused as "organic mental disorder with psychosis"
29 28 30 31

The clinical case report also shows that appellant, when interviewed upon his admission to the mental institution, recalled having taken 120 cubic centimeters of cough syrup and

This admission substantially affirms his prior extrajudicial confession that he was under the influence of marijuana when he sexually abused the victim and, on the occasion thereof, killed her. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming appellant had some form of mental illness, it did not totally deprive him of intelligence. The presence of his reasoning faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound judgment and satisfactorily articulate the aforesaid matters, sufficiently discounts any intimation of insanity of appellant when he committed the dastardly felonies. The annals of crime are replete with documented records, and we are not without our share in this jurisdiction, where mental illness has been feigned and invoked to provide a defense for the accused in a criminal prosecution.
consumed about 3 sticks of marijuana before the commission of the crime.
32 33

One more thing. The trial court imposed the penalty of life imprisonment on appellant. In a judgment of conviction for a felony, the court should specify the appropriate name of the penalty, which in this case should be reclusion perpetua and not life imprisonment, since under the scheme of penalties in the Revised Penal Code the principal penalty for a felony has its own specific duration and corresponding accessory penalties, unlike those generally provided for crimes in special laws. WHEREFORE, with the modification that the principal penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, and the reduction of the civil indemnity to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. POLICARPIO RAFANAN, JR., defendant-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Causapin, Millar & Tutana Law Office for defendant-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:p Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan convicting him of the crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify complainant Estelita Ronaya in the amount of P10,000.00 by way of moral damages, and to pay the costs. The facts were summarized by the trial court in the following manner: The prosecution's evidence shows that on February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita Ronaya who was then only fourteen years old was hired as a househelper by the mother of the accused, Ines Rafananalias "Baket Ines" with a salary of P30.00 a month. The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same house at Barangay San Nicholas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was then married and had two children. On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother of the accused to help in their store which was located in front of their house about six (6) meters away. Attending to the store at the time was the accused. At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused called the complainant to help him close the door of the store and as the latter complied and went near him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the store and said, "Come, let us have sexual intercourse," to which Estelita replied, "I do not like," and struggled to free herself and cried. The accused held a bolo measuring 1-1/2 feet including the handle which he pointed to the throat of the complainant threatening her with said bolo should she resist. Then, he forced her to lie down on a bamboo bed, removed her pants and after unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went on top of complainant and succeeded having carnal knowledge of her inspite of her resistance and struggle. After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to report the matter to her mother or anybody in the house, otherwise he would kill her. Because of fear, the complainant did not immediately report the matter and did not leave the house of the accused that same evening. In fact, she slept in the house of the accused that evening and the following morning she scrubbed the floor and did her daily routine work in the house. She only left the house in the evening of March 17, 1976.

Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned what happened the night before in the store between Policarpio and Estelita and a quarrel ensued among them prompting Estelita Ronaya to go back to her house. When Estelita's mother confronted her and asked her why she went home that evening, the complainant could not answer but cried and cried. It was only the following morning on March 18, 1976 that the complainant told her mother that she was raped by the accused. Upon knowing what happened to her daughter, the mother Alejandra Ronaya, immediately accompanied her to the house of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina of the Villasis Police Force who lives in Barrio San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Patrolman Mairina is a cousin of the father of the complainant. He advised them to proceed to the municipal building while he went to fetch the accused. The accused was later brought to the police headquarter with the bolo, Exhibit "E", which the accused allegedly used in threatening the complainant. 1 At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial and in due course of time, the trial court, as already noted, convicted the appellant. The instant appeal is anchored on the following: Assignment of Errors 1. The lower court erred in basing its decision of conviction of appellant solely on the testimony of the complainant and her mother. 2. The lower court erred in considering the hearsay evidence for the prosecution, "Exhibits B and C". 3. The lower court erred in not believing the testimony of the expert witnesses, as to the mental condition of the accused-appellant at the time of the alleged commission of the crime of rape. 4. The lower court erred in convicting appellant who at the time of the alleged rape was suffering from insanity. 2 Appellant first assails the credibility of complainant as well as of her mother whose testimonies he contends are contradictory. It is claimed by appellant that the testimony of complainant on direct examination that she immediately went home after the rape incident, is at variance with her testimony on cross examination to the effect that she had stayed in the house of appellant until the following day. Complainant, in saying that she left the house of appellant by herself, is also alleged to have contradicted her mother who stated that she (the mother) went to the store in the evening of 17 March 1979 and brought Estelita home. The apparently inconsistent statements made by complainant were clarified by her on cross examination. In any case, the inconsistencies related to minor and inconsequential details which do not touch upon the manner in which the crime had been committed and therefore did not in any way impair the credibility of the complainant. 3 The commission of the came was not seriously disputed by appellant. The testimony of complainant in this respect is clear and convincing: Fiscal Guillermo: Q Now, we go back to that time when according to you the accused pulled you from the door and brought you inside the store after you helped him closed the store. Now, after the accused pulled you from the door and brought you inside the store what happened then? A "You come and we will have sexual intercourse," he said. Q And what did you say? A "I do not like," I said. Q And what did you do, if any, when you said you do not like to have sexual intercourse with him? A I struggled and cried. Q What did the accused do after that? A He got a knife and pointed it at my throat so I was frightened and he could do what he wanted to do. He was able to do what he wanted to do. Q This "kutsilyo" you were referring to or knife, how big is that knife? Will you please demonstrate, if any? A This length, sir. (Which parties agreed to be about one and one-half [1-1/2] feet long.) xxx xxx xxx Fiscal Guillermo: Q Now, you said that the accused was able to have sexual intercourse with you after he placed the bolo or that knife [at] your throat. Now, will you please tell the court what did the accused do immediately after placing that bolo your throat and before having sexual intercourse you? A He had sexual intercourse with me. Q What was your wearing apparel that evening? A I was wearing pants, sir. Q Aside from the pants, do you have any underwear? A Yes, sir, I have a panty. Q Now, before the accused have sexual intercourse with you what, if any, did he do with respect to your pants and your panty? A He removed them, sir. Q Now, while he was removing your pants and your panty what, if any, did you do? A I continued to struggle so that he could not remove my pants but he was stronger that's why he succeeded. Q Now, after he had removed your panty and your pants or pantsuit what else happened? A He went on top of me, sir. Q At the time what was the accused wearing by way of apparel? A He was wearing pants. Q When you said he went on top of you after he has removed your pantsuit and your panty, was he still wearing his pants? A He unbuttoned his pants and unfastened the zipper of his pants. Q And after he unbuttoned and unfastened his pants what did you see which he opened? A I saw his penis. Q Now, you said that after the accused has unzipped his pants and brought out his penis which you saw, he went on top of you. When he was already on top of you what did you do, if any? A I struggled. Q Now, you said that you struggled. What happened then when you struggled against the accused when he was on top of you? A Since he was stronger, he succeeded doing what he wanted to get. xxx xxx xxx COURT: Alright, what do you mean by he was able to succeed in what he wanted to get? Fiscal Guillermo: Considering the condition of the witness, your honor, with tears, may we just be allowed to ask a leading question which is a follow-up question? Witness: A He inserted his private part inside my vagina. Fiscal Guillermo: Q Now, when he inserted his private part inside your vagina what did you feel, if any? A I felt something that came out from his inside. Q Now, how long, if you remember, did the accused have his penis inside your vagina:? A Around five minutes maybe, sir. Q After that what happened then? A He removed it. Q After the accused has removed his penis from your vagina what else happened? A No more, sir, he sat down. Q What, if any, did he tell you? A There was, sir. He told me not to report the matter to my mother and to anybody in their house. Q What else did he tell you? A He told me that if I told anyone what happened, he will kill me. Q After that where did you go? A I went home already, sir. 4 The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal aberration characterized as schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. At the urging of his counsel, the trial court suspended the trial and ordered appellant confined at the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for observation and treatment. In the meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was admitted into the hospital on 29 December 1976 and stayed there until 26 June 1978. During his confinement, the hospital prepared four (4) clinical reports on the mental and physical condition of the appellant, all signed by Dr. Simplicio N. Masikip and Dr. Arturo E. Nerit, physician-incharge and chief, Forensic Psychiatry Service, respectively. In the first report dated 27 January 1977, the following observations concerning appellant's mental condition were set forth: On admission he was sluggish in movements, indifferent to interview, would just look up whenever questioned but refused to answer. On subsequent examinations and observations he was carelessly attired, with dishevelled hair, would stare vacuously through the window, or look at people around him. He was indifferent and when questioned, he would just smile inappropriately. He refused to verbalize, even when persuaded, and was emotionally dull and mentally inaccessible. He is generally seclusive, at times would pace the floor, seemingly in deep thought. Later on when questioned his frequent answers are "Aywan ko, hindi ko alam." His affect is dull, he claimed to hear strange voices "parang ibon, tinig ng ibon," but cannot elaborate. He is disoriented to 3 spheres and has no idea why he was brought here. The report then concluded: In view of the foregoing examinations and observations, Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is found suffering from a mental disorder called schizophrenia, manifested by carelessness in grooming, sluggishness in movements, staring vacuously, indifferen[ce], smiling inappropriately, refusal to verbalize, emotional dullness, mental inaccessibility, seclusiveness, preoccupation, disorientation, and perceptual aberrations of hearing strange sounds. He is psychotic or insane, hence cannot stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and treatment. 5 The second report, dated 21 June 1977, contained the following description of appellant's mental condition:

At present he is still seclusive, undertalkative and retarded in his reponses. There is dullness of his affect and he appeared preoccupied. He is observed to mumble alone by himself and would show periods of being irritable saying "oki naman" with nobody in particular. He claim he does not know whether or not he was placed in jail and does not know if he has a case in court. Said he does not remember having committed any wrong act and the following conclusions: In view of the foregoing examinations and observations Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is at present time still psychotic or insane, manifested by periods of irritability cursing nobody in particular, seclusive, underactive, undertalkative, retarded in his response, dullness of his affect, mumbles alone by himself, preoccupied and lack of insight. He is not yet in a condition to stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and treatment. 6 In the third report, dated 5 October 1977, appellant was described as having become "better behaved, responsive" and "neat in person," and "adequate in his emotional tone, in touch with his surroundings and . . . free from hallucinatory experiences." During the preceding period, appellant had been allowed to leave the hospital temporarily; he stayed with a relative in Manila while coming periodically to the hospital for check-ups. During this period, he was said to have been helpful in the doing of household chores, conversed and as freely with other members of the household and slept well, although, occasionally, appellant smiled while alone. Appellant complained that at times he heard voices of small children, talking in a language he could not understand. The report concluded by saying that while appellant had improved in his mental condition, he was not yet in a position to stand trial since he needed further treatment, medication and check-ups. 7 In the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as behaved, helpful in household chores and no longer talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly groomed" and "oriented" and as denying having hallucinations. The report concluded that he was in a "much improved condition" and "in a mental condition to stand court trial." 8 Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who suggested that appellant was sick one or two years before his admission into the hospital, in effect implying that appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia when he raped complainant. 9 The defense next presented Raquel Jovellano, a psychiatrist engaged in private practice, who testified

that she had examined and treated the appellant.

Appellant's plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which provides: Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt from criminal liability: 1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony ( delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court. xxx xxx xxx Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense, it was only in People vs. Formigones10 that the Court elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity,

quoting extensively from the Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the Revised Penal Code, thus:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that heacts without the least discernment; (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 21, 1891; 47 Jur. Crim. 413.) that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 29, 1916; 96 Jur. Crim. 239) or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 9, 1872; 6 Jur. Crim. 239) For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 20, 1911; 86 Jur. Crim. 94, 97.) The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be [equated with] imbecility or insanity. The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved. (Emphasis supplied.) The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases. 11 A linguistic or grammatical analysis of those standards suggests

that Formigones established two (2) distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act," and (b) the test of volition "or that there be a total deprivation freedom of the will." But our caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on a test relating to "freedom of the will;" examination of our caselaw has failed to turn up any case where this Court has exempted an accused on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of "freedom of the will," i.e., without an accompanying "complete deprivation of intelligence." This is perhaps to be expected since a person's volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is presented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. In any case, where the accused failed to show complete impairment or loss of intelligence, the Court has recognized at most a mitigating, not an exempting, circumstance in accord with Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code: "Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts." 12
Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly calleddementia praecox, it is said to be the most common form of psychosis an usually develops between the ages 15 and 30. 13 A standard textbook in psychiatry

describes some of the symptoms of schizophrenia in the following manner:

Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms of schizophrenia: a disturbance of association, a disturbance of affect, and a disturbance of activity. Bleuler also stressed the dereistic attitude of the schizophrenic that is, his detachment from reality and consequent autism and the ambivalence that expresses itself in his uncertain affectivity and initiative. Thus, Bleuler's system of schizophrenia is often referred to as the four A's: association, affect, autism, and ambivalence. xxx xxx xxx Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia that he considered in no way specific for the disease but of great pragmatic value in making a diagnosis. Schneider's first-rank symptoms include the hearing of one's thoughts spoken aloud, auditory hallucinations that comment on the patient's behavior, somatic hallucinations, the experience of having one's thoughts controlled, the spreading of one's thoughts to others, delusions, and the experience of having one's actions controlled or influenced from the outside. Schizophrenia, Schneider pointed out, also can be diagnosed exclusively on the basis of second-rank symptoms, along with an otherwise typical clinical appearances. Secondrank symptoms include other forms of hallucination, perplexity, depressive and euphoric disorders of affect, and emotional blunting. Perceptual Disorders Various perceptual disorders occur in schizophrenia . . . . Hallucinations. Sensory experiences or perceptions without corresponding external stimuli are common symptoms of schizophrenia. Most common are auditory hallucinations, or the hearing of voices. Most characteristically, two or more voices talk about the patient, discussing him in the third person. Frequently, the voices address the patient, comment on what he is doing and what is going on around him, or are threatening or obscene and very disturbing to the patient. Many schizophrenic patients experience the hearing of their own thoughts. When they are reading silently, for example, they may be quite disturbed by hearing every word they are reading clearly spoken to them. Visual hallucinations occur less frequently than auditory hallucinations in schizophrenic patients, but they are not rare. Patients suffering from organic of affective psychoses experience visual hallucinations primarily at night or during limited periods of the day, but schizophrenic patients hallucinate as much during the day as they do during the night, sometimes almost continuously. They get relief only in sleep. When visual occur in schizophrenia, they are usually seen nearby, clearly defined, in color, life size, in three dimensions, and moving. Visual hallucinations almost never in one of the other sensory modalities. xxx xxx xxx Cognitive Disorders Delusions. By definition, delusions are false ideas that cannot be corrected by reasoning, and that are idiosyncratic for the patient that is, not part of his cultural environment. They are among the common symptoms of schizophrenia. Most frequent are delusions of persecution, which are the key symptom in the paranoid type of schizophrenia. The conviction of being controlled by some unseen mysterious power that exercises its influence from a distance is almost pathognomonic for schizophrenia. It occurs in most, if not all, schizophrenics at one time or another, and for many it is a daily experience. The modern schizophrenic whose delusions have kept up with the scientific times may be preoccupied with atomic power, X-rays, or spaceships that take control over his mind and body. Also typical for many schizophrenics are delusional fantasies about the destruction of the world. 14 In previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting circumtance, 15 it has mostly been rejected by the Court. In each of these cases, the evidence presented

tended to show that if there was impairment of the mental faculties, such impairment was not so complete as to deprive the accused of intelligence or the consciousness of his acts.
The facts of the instant case exhibit much the same situation. Dr. Jovellano declared as follows: (Fiscal Guillermo:) Q Now, this condition of the accused schizophrenic as you found him, would you say doctor that he was completely devoid of any consciousness of whatever he did in connection with the incident in this case? A He is not completely devoid of consciousness. Q Would you say doctor, therefore, that he was conscious of threatening the victim at the time of the commission of the alleged rape? A Yes, he was conscious. Q And he was conscious of forcing the victim to lie down? A Yes. Q And he was also conscious of removing the panty of the victim at the time? A Yes. Q And he was also conscious and knows that the victim has a vagina upon which he will place his penis? A Yeah. Q And he was conscious enough to be competent and have an erection? A Yes. Q Would you say that those acts of a person no matter whether he is schizophrenic which you said, it deals (sic) some kind of intelligence and consciousness of some acts that is committed?

A Yes, it involves the consciousness because the consciousness there in relation to the act is what we call primitive acts of any individual. The difference only in the act of an insane and a normal individual, a normal individual will use the power of reasoning and consciousness within the standard of society while an insane causes ( sic) already devoid of the fact that he could no longer withstand himself in the ordinary environment, yet his acts are within the bound of insanity or psychosis. Q Now, Doctor, of course this person suffering that ailment which you said the accused here is suffering is capable of planning the commission of a rape? A Yes, they are also capable. Q He is capable of laying in wait in order to assault? A Yes. Q And would you say that condition that ability of a person to plan a rape and to perform all the acts preparatory to the actual intercourse could be done by an insane person? A Yes, it could be done. Q Now, you are talking of insanity in its broadest sense, is it not? A Yes, sir. Q Now, is this insane person also capable of knowing what is right and what is wrong? A Well, there is no weakness on that part of the individual. They may know what is wrong but yet there is no inhibition on the individual . Q Yes, but actually, they are mentally equipped with knowledge that an act they are going to commit is wrong? A Yeah, they are equipped but the difference is, there is what we call they lost the inhibition. The reasoning is weak and yet they understand but the volition is [not] there, the drive is [not] there. 16 (Emphasis supplied) The above testimony, in substance, negates complete destruction of intelligence at the time of commission of the act charged which, in the current state of our caselaw, is critical if the defense of insanity is to be sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with death should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault. The defense sought to suggest, through Dr. Jovellano's last two (2) answers above, that person suffering from schizophrenia sustains not only impairment of the mental faculties but also deprivation of there power self-control. We do not believe that Dr. Jovellano's testimony, by itself, sufficiently demonstrated the truth of that proposition. In any case, as already pointed out, it is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found. The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity. 17 Here, appellant failed to present clear and

convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act is committed. 18 Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of two (2) physicians (Dr. Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not purport to characterize his mental condition during that critical period of time. They did not specifically relate to circumtances occurring on or immediately before the day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad statements based on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia. Curiously, while it was Dr. Masikip who had actually observed and examined appellant during his confinement at the National Mental Hospital, the defense chose to present Dr. Nerit.
Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan. In People vs. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that schizo

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant. PARAS, J.:p This is an automatic review of the Decision *

of the Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region, Branch 54, Macabebe, Pampanga, convicting the accused of the

crime of murder.
The pertinent facts of the case are: On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Pampanga filed an information charging Rosalino Dungo, the defendant-appellant herein, with the felony of murder, committed as follows: That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of Apalit, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused ROSALINO DUNGO, armed with a knife, with deliberate intent to kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Mrs. Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife hitting her in the chest, stomach, throat and other parts of the body thereby inflicting upon her fatal wounds which directly caused the death of said Belen Macalino Sigua. All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, evident premeditation and the generic aggravating circumstance of disrespect towards her sex, the crime was committed inside the field office of the Department of Agrarian Reform where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, taking advantage of superior strength and cruelty. (Record, p. 2) On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established that on March 16, 1987 between the hours of 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a male person, identified as the accused, went to the place where Mrs. Sigua was holding office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. Accomplishing the morbid act, he went down the staircase and out of the DAR's office with blood stained clothes, carrying along a bloodied bladed weapon. (TSN, pp. 4-19, 33-46, April 13, 1987; TSN, pp. 5-21, 28-38, April 20, 1987). The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela Cruz Cabugawan reveals that the victim sustained fourteen (14) wounds, five (5) of which were fatal. Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that, sometime in the latter part of February, 1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him concerning the actuations of his wife (the victim) in requiring so many documents from the accused. Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused the procedure in the Department of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said "never mind, I could do it my own way." Rodolfo Sigua further testified that his wife's annual salary is P17,000.00, and he spent the amount of P75,000.00 for the funeral and related expenses due to the untimely death of his wife. (TSN, pp. 4-21, April 22, 1987). The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense. The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the accused. According to her, her husband had been engaged in farming up to 1982 when he went to Lebanon for six (6) months. Later, in December 1983, her husband again left for Saudi Arabia and worked as welder. Her husband did not finish his two-year contract because he got sick. Upon his arrival, he underwent medical treatment. He was confined for one week at the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter he had his monthly check-up. Because of his sickness, he was not able to resume his farming. The couple, instead, operated a small store which her husband used to tend. Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, she noticed her husband to be in deep thought always; maltreating their children when he was not used to it before; demanding another payment from his customers even if the latter had paid; chasing any child when their children quarrelled with other children. There were also times when her husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not. On the fateful day of March 16, 1987, at around noon time, her husband complained to her of stomach ache; however, they did not bother to buy medicine as he was immediately relieved of the pain therein. Thereafter, he went back to the store. When Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer there. She got worried as he was not in his proper mind. She looked for him. She returned home only when she was informed that her husband had arrived. While on her way home, she heard from people the words "mesaksak" and "menaksak" (translated as "stabbing" and "has stabbed"). She saw her husband in her parents-in-law's house with people milling around, including the barangay officials. She instinctively asked her husband why he did such act, but he replied, "that is the only cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my heart." Her husband further said that if he would not be able to kill the victim in a number of days, he would die, and that he chose to live longer even in jail. The testimony on the statements of her husband was corroborated by their neighbor Thelma Santos who heard their conversation. ( See TSN, pp. 12-16, July 10, 1987). Turning to the barangay official, her husband exclaimed, "here is my wallet, you surrender me." However, the barangay official did not bother to get the wallet from him. That same day the accused went to Manila. (TSN, pp. 6-39, June 10, 1981) Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that the accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated August 17, 1987, on August 25, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino Dungo was psychotic or insane long before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and that his insanity was classified under organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke. (TSN, pp. 4-33, June 17, 1988; TSN, pp. 5-27, August 2, 1988). Rosalino Dungo testified that he once worked in Saudi Arabia as welder. However, he was not able to finish his two-year contract when he got sick. He had undergone medical treatment at Macabali Clinic. However, he claimed that he was not aware of the stabbing incident nor of the death of Mrs. Belen Sigua. He only came to know that he was accused of the death of Mrs. Sigua when he was already in jail. (TSN, pp. 5-14, July 15, 1988) Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution. Dr. Vicente Balatbat testified that the accused was his patient. He treated the accused for ailments secondary to a stroke. While Dr. Ricardo Lim testified that the accused suffered from oclusive disease of the brain resulting in the left side weakness. Both attending physicians concluded that Rosalino Dungo was somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their clinic. Dr. Leonardo Bascara further testified that the accused is functioning at a low level of intelligence. (TSN, pp. 620, September 1, 1988; TSN, pp. 4-29, November 7, 1988). On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of murder, the Court hereby renders judgment sentencing the accused as follows: 1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessories of the law; 2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as actual damage, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages. SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo) The trial court was convinced that the accused was sane during the perpetration of the criminal act. The act of concealing a fatal weapon indicates a conscious adoption of a pattern to kill the victim. He was apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila which indicates that he embarked on a flight in order to evade arrest. This to the mind of the trial court is another indication that the accused was sane when he committed the crime. It is an exercise in futility to inquire into the killing itself as this is already admitted by the defendant-appellant. The only pivotal issue before us is whether or not the accused was insane during the commission of the crime changed. One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged cannot in a legal sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful act is the product of a mental disease or a mental defect. In order that insanity may relieve a person from criminal responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in

committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will. (People v. Puno, 105 SCRA 151) It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined border between sanity and insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major criteria in determining the existence of insanity, namely: delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and the right and wrong test. Insane delusion is manifested by a false belief for which there is no reasonable basis and which would be incredible under the given circumstances to the same person if he is of compos mentis. Under the delusion test, an insane person believes in a state of things, the existence of which no rational person would believe. A person acts under an irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or mental disease, he has lost the power to choose between right and wrong, to avoid the act in question, his free agency being at the time destroyed. Under the right and wrong test, a person is insane when he suffers from such perverted condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render him incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2) So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a definite test or criterion for insanity. However, We can apply as test or criterion the definition of insanity under Section 1039 of the Revised Administrative Code, which states that insanity is "a manifestation in language or conduct, of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition." Insanity as defined above is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in language or conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his act. Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct inconsistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his improvident bargains. Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the person whose sanity is in issue, at the very time of doing the act which is the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the act in question. Direct testimony is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts: thereby we read the thoughts, motives and emotions of a person; and through which we determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. (People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87) In the case at bar, defense's expert witnesses, who are doctors of the National Center for Mental Health, concluded that the accused was suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke before, during and after the commission of the crime charged. (Exhibit L, p. 4). Accordingly, the mental illness of the accused was characterized by perceptual disturbances manifested through impairment of judgment and impulse control, impairment of memory and disorientation, and hearing of strange voices. The accused allegedly suffered from psychosis which was organic. The defect of the brain, therefore, is permanent. Dr. Echavez, defense's expert witness, admitted that the insanity of the accused was permanent and did not have a period for normal thinking. To quote Q Is there such a lucid intervals? A In this case, considering the nature of the organic mental disorder, the lucid intervals unfortunately are not present, sir. (TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988) However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the manifestation or the symptoms of psychosis may be treated with medication. (TSN, p. 26, August 2, 1988). Thus, although the defect of the brain is permanent, the manifestation of insanity is curable. Dr. Echavez further testified that the accused was suffering from psychosis since January of 1987, thus: Q In your assessment of the patient, did you determine the length of time the patient has been mentally ill? A From his history, the patient started ( sic) or had a stroke abroad. If I may be allowed to scan my record, the record reveals that the patient had a stroke in Riyadh about seven (7) months before his contract expired and he was brought home. Sometime in January of 1987, the first manifestation is noted on the behavioral changes. He was noted to be in deep thought, pre-occupied self, complaining of severe headache, deferment of sleep and loss of appetite; and that was about January of 1987, Sir. (TSN, pp. 21-22, August 2, 1988) The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of the doctors of the National Center for Mental Health, specifically on Dr. Echavez's assessment that the accused has been insane since January of 1987 or three (3) months before the commission of the crime charged. The doctors arrived at this conclusion based on the testimonies of the accused's wife and relatives, and after a series of medical and psychological examinations on the accused when he was confined therein. However, We are still in quandary as to whether the accused was really insane or not during the commission of the offense. The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition, that the accused, though he may be insane, has no lucid intervals. It is an undisputed fact that a month or few weeks prior to the commission of the crime charged the accused confronted the husband of the victim concerning the actuations of the latter. He complained against the various requirements being asked by the DAR office, particularly against the victim. We quote hereunder the testimony of Atty. Rodolfo C. Sigua: Q In the latter part of February 1987 do you remember having met the accused Rosalino Dungo? A Yes, sir. Q Where? A At our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga. Q Could you tell us what transpired in the latter part of February 1987, when you met the accused at your residence? A Accused went to our residence. When I asked him what he wanted, accused told me that he wanted to know from my wife why she was asking so many documents: why she was requiring him to be interviewed and file the necessary documents at the Office of the DAR. Furthermore, he wanted to know why my wife did not want to transfer the Certificate of Land Transfer of the landholding of his deceased father in his name. xxx xxx xxx Q When the accused informed you in the latter part of February 1987 that your wife the late Belen Macalino Sigua was making hard for him the transfer of the right of his father, what did you tell him? A I asked the accused, "Have you talked or met my wife? Why are you asking this question of me?" Q What was his answer? A Accused told me that he never talked nor met my wife but sent somebody to her office to make a request for the transfer of the landholding in the name of his deceased father in his name. Q When you informed him about the procedure of the DAR, what was the comment of the accused? A The accused then said, "I now ascertained that she is making things difficult for the transfer of the landholding in the name of my father and my name." (TSN, pp. 5-7, April 22, 1987) If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was supposed to be mentally ill during this confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may have wronged him. Be it noted that the accused was supposed to be suffering from impairment of the memory, We infer from this confrontation that the accused was aware of his acts. This event proves that the accused was not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid intervals. The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the effect that the appellant could have been aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it. To quote: Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing trial, not necessarily the accused, when asked by the Court the whereabouts of his lawyer he answered that his lawyer is not yet in Court and that he is waiting for his counsel to appear and because his counsel did not appear, he asked for the postponement of the hearing of the case and to reset the same to another date. With those facts, do you consider him insane? A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir. Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be insane? A Yes, sir. COURT Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what will be your conclusion? A Having examined a particular patient, in this particular case, I made a laboratory examination, in short all the assessment necessary to test the behavior of the patient, like for example praying for postponement and fleeing from the scene of the crime is one situation to consider if the patient is really insane or not. If I may elaborate to explain the situation of the accused, the nature of the illness, the violent behavior, then he appears normal he can reason out and at the next moment he burst out into violence regardless motivated or unmotivated. This is one of the difficulties we have encountered in this case. When we deliberated because when we prepared this case we have really deliberation with all the members of the medical staff so those are the things we considered. Like for example he shouted out "Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!" at that particular moment he was aware of what he did, he knows the criminal case. COURT Q With that statement of yours that he was aware when he shouted that he killed the victim in this case, Mrs. Sigua, do we get it that he shouted those words because he was aware when he did the act? A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is there . (TSN, pp. 37-41, August 2, 1983; emphasis supplied) Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence. The statement of one of the expert witnesses presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez, that the accused knew the nature of what he had done makes it highly doubtful that accused was insane when he committed the act charged. As stated by the trial court: The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he perpetrated the act was sane. The evidence shows that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the act was carrying an envelope where the fatal weapon was hidden. This is an evidence that the accused consciously adopted a pattern to kill the victim. The suddenness of the attack classified the killing as treacherous and therefore murder. After the accused ran away from the scene of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, he was apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila, an indication that he took flight in order to evade arrest. This to the mind of the Court is another indicia that he was conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim ( Rollo, p. 63) There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the evidence presented. (People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646). The trial court had the privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor of the witnesses and therefore, it can discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not. Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused. However, in the defense of insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in fervor of sanity. The burden of proving the affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense. Thus: In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution for crime, the starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind. (Art. 800, Civil Code: U.S. v. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305) Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288). . . . Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its existence. (U.S. v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218) (People v. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451) The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense in a confession and avoidance and as such must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity must be clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the ground of insanity. Appellant has not successfully discharged the burden of overcoming the presumption that he committed the crime as charged freely, knowingly, and intelligently. Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity. (People v. Bonoan, supra) PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is hereby AFFIRMED without costs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO, accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.: What distinguishes man from beast is his intellect. Man's action is guided and controlled by his mind. Law is designed for rational beings as it is based on our inherent sense of right which is inseparable from reason. Thus, when man's reasoning is so distorted by disease that he is totally incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, he loses responsibility before the law. In the case at bar, we are asked to resolve whether or not the accused, invoking insanity, can claim exemption from liability for the crime he committed. Accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO was charged with parricide for killing his wife LILIA MADARANG in an Information 1 which reads: That on or about September 3, 1993, at Poblacion, municipality of Infante, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with evident premeditation and treachery, armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab LILIA M. MADARANG, his legitimate wife, inflicting upon her stab wound 4 1/2 inches by 1 1/2 inch(es) long and 3/16 of an inch wide, located just below the left clavicle 1 3/4 inch(es) lateral to the supra-sternal notch, and plowed along the interpace slightly coursing upward and posteriorly and stab wound 1 inch in length, gaping and 3 1/2 inch(es) deep, located at the right arm at its medial aspect, coursing upwards and medially towards the apex of the right axilla which caused her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Lilia M. Madarang. Contrary to Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code. At the arraignment, the accused refused to enter a plea. Pursuant to the Rules, the trial court entered a "not guilty" plea for him. At the initial hearing of the case on May 5, 1994, the accused's counsel manifested that his client had been observed behaving in an abnormal manner inside the provincial jail. Thus, the Court called the accused to the stand but he refused to answer any of the questions propounded by the court. Hence, on the same date, the Court issued an Order 2 directing the transfer of the accused to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for psychiatric evaluation to determine his fitness to stand trial. The initial examination of the accused at the NCMH revealed that he was suffering from a form of psychosis known as schizophrenia. The accused was detained at the hospital and was administered medication for his illness. On June 19, 1996, after more than two (2) years of confinement, the accused was discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to the provincial jail as he was already found fit to face the charges against him. 3 At the resumption of the hearing, a reverse trial was conducted. The accused proceeded to adduce evidence on his claim of insanity at the time he committed the offense. As culled from the testimonies of the accused, his mother-in-law AVELINA MIRADOR, and his daughter LILIFER MADARANG, the following facts were established: The accused and Lilia Mirador were legally married and their union was blessed with seven (7) children. The accused worked as a seaman for sixteen (16) years. He was employed in a United States ship until 1972. In 1973, he worked as a seaman in Germany and stayed there for nine (9) years, or until 1982. Thereafter, he returned to his family in Infanta, Pangasinan, and started a hardware store business. His venture however failed. Worse, he lost his entire fortune due to cockfighting. 4 In the latter part of July 1993, the accused, his wife Lilia and their children were forced to stay in the house of Avelina Mirador as the accused could no longer support his family. Moreover, Lilia was then already heavy with their eight child and was about to give birth. 5 On September 3, 1993, at about 5:00 p.m., the accused and Lilia had a squabble. The accused was jealous of another man and was accusing Lilia of infidelity. In the heat of the fight and in the presence of their children, the accused stabbed Lilia, resulting in her untimely demise. 6 AVELINA MIRADOR was then in the pigpen when she heard the children of the accused shouting and crying inside her house. She called out to them and asked what was wrong. She received no reply. Her nephew barged into the house and brought out the children one at a time, leaving the accused with Lilia. While passing by Avelina, her nephew warned her: "You better run." Avelina then saw the accused emerge from the house holding a bolo. She scampered for safety. 7 She declared that during the period that the accused and his family stayed in her house, she did not notice anything peculiar in accused's behavior that would suggest that he was suffering from any mental illness. Neither did she know of any reason why the accused killed his wife as she never saw the two engage in any argument while they were living with her. 8 The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident. He could not remember where he was on that fateful day. He did not know the whereabouts of his wife. It was only during one of the hearings when his mother-in-law showed him a picture of his wife in a coffin that he learned about her death. He, however, was not aware of the cause of her demise. He claimed that he did not know whether he suffered from any mental illness and did not remember being confined at the NCMH for treatment. 9 DR. WILSON S. TIBAYAN, a resident doctor of the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), declared that the accused was committed to the NCMH on July 4, 1994 upon order of the court. The NCMH conducted three (3) medical and psychiatric evaluations of the accused during his confinement therein. Based on the first medical report, dated August 2, 1994, 10 the accused was found to be suffering from insanity or psychosis, classified as schizophrenia. Dr. Tibayan explained that schizophrenia is a mental abnormality characterized by impaired fundamental reasoning, delusions, hallucinations, preoccupation with one's thoughts, poor self-care, insight and judgment, and impaired cognitive, social and occupational functions. The patient may be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong or know what he is doing. He may become destructive or have a propensity to attack any one if his hallucinations were violent. 11 A schizophrenic, however, may have lucid intervals during which he may be able to distinguish right from wrong. 12 Dr. Tibayan opined that the accused's mental illness may have begun even prior to his admission to the NCMH and it was highly possible that he was already suffering from schizophrenia prior to his commission of the crime. 1 By December 21, 1994, as per the second medical report, the accused was still suffering from schizophrenia. After one and a half years of confinement, the third psychiatric evaluation of the accused, dated May 27, 1996, 14showed that his mental condition considerably improved due to continuous medication. The accused was recommended to be discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to jail to stand trial. 15 The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to refute the presumption of sanity at the time he committed the offense. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts and circumstances of this case, this Court is of the view that accused Fernando Madarang is of sound mind at the time of the commission of the offense and that he failed to rebut by convincing proof the evidence on record against him to exempt him from criminal liablity. And since the death penalty was suspended or abolished at the time of the commission of the offense, this Court hereby sentences the accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos. SO ORDERED. 16 Hence this appeal. The appellant insists that at the time he stabbed his wife, he was completely deprived of intelligence, making his criminal act involuntary. His unstable state of mind could allegedly be deduced from the following: First. He had no recollection of the stabbing incident. Hence, he was completely unaware of his acts that fateful day and must have committed the crime without the least discernment. Second. His behavior at the time of the stabbing proved he was then afflicted with schizophrenia. He cited the testimony of Dr. Tibayan that a schizophrenic may go into extremes he may be violent and destructive, or very silent and self-focused. The appellant exhibited his violent tendencies on that fateful day. He killed his wife and Avelina and her nephew were so frightened that they ran away at the sight of him holding a bolo. He did not seem to recognize anybody and could have turned to anyone and inflicted further injury. He avers that this is peculiar only to persons who are mentally deranged for a sane person who just committed a crime would have appeared remorseful and repentant after realizing that what he did was wrong. Third. The appellant also relies on Dr. Tibayan's opinion that there was a high possibility that he was already suffering from insanity prior to his commission of the crime on September 3, 1993. 17 The defense posits that his mental illness may have been caused by his loss of fortune. His hardware business, which he started through 16 years of working as a seaman, went bankrupt. He ended up virtually dependent on his mother-in-law for his family's support and all these may have been beyond his capacity to handle. The appellant further contends that the fact that he and his wife never engaged in a fight prior to that fateful day should be considered. The marked change in his behavior when he uncharacteristically quarreled with his wife on that day and suddenly turned violent on her confirms that he was mentally disturbed when he committed the crime. Lastly, the appellant urges that he had no motive to kill Lilia who was scheduled to give birth to their eighth child three (3) days prior to the killing. Unless overpowered by something beyond his control, nobody in his right mind would kill his wife who was carrying his child. Jealousy, the appellant posits, is not a sufficient reason to kill a pregnant spouse. We find these arguments without merit. In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished as an offense. The insanity defense is rooted on the basic moral assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally endowed with the faculties of understanding and free will. The consent of the will is that which renders human actions laudable or culpable. Hence, where there is a defect of the understanding, there can be no free act of the will. An insane accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished. No purpose of criminal law is served by punishing an insane accused because by reason of his mental state, he would have no control over his behavior and cannot be deterred from similar behavior in the future. 18 A number of tests evolved to determine insanity under the law. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the traditional test is the M'Naghten rule of 1843 which states that "to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." The M'Naghten rule is a cognitive measure of insanity as the accused is required to know two things: the nature and quality of the act, and that the act was wrong. This rule has been criticized for its ambiguity. It was debated whether the word "wrong" referred to moral or legal wrong. The importance of the distinction was illustrated by Stephen 19 as follows: A kills B knowing that he is killing B and it is illegal to kill B but under an insane delusion that God has commanded him to kill B to obtain the salvation of the human race. A's act is a crime if the word "wrong" means illegal but it is not a crime if the word "wrong" means morally wrong. The word "know" was also assailed as it referred solely to intellectual reason and excluded affective or emotional knowledge. It was pointed out that the accused may know in his mind what he is doing but may have no grasp of the effect or consequences of his actions. 20 M'Naghten was condemned as based on an obsolete and misleading concept of the nature of insanity as insanity does not only affect the intellectual faculties but also affects the whole personality of the patient, including his will and emotions. It was argued that reason is only one of the elements of a personality and does not solely determine man's conduct. 21 Subsequently, M'Naghten was refined by the "irresistible impulse" test which means that "assuming defendant's knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable him to prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." Thus, even if the accused knew that what he was doing was wrong, he would be acquitted by reason of insanity if his mental illness kept him from controlling his conduct or resisting the impulse to commit the crime. This rule rests on the assumption that there are mental illnesses that impair volition or self-control, even while there is cognition or knowledge of what is right and wrong. 22 This test was likewise criticized on the following grounds: (1) the "impulse" requirement is too restrictive as it covers only impulsive acts; (2) the "irresistible" requirement is also restrictive as it requires absolute impairment of the freedom of the will which cases are very rare; (3) it will not serve the purpose of criminal law to deter criminals as the will to resist commission of the crime will not be encouraged, and; (4) it is difficult to prove whether the act was the result of an insane, irresistible impulse. 2 Then came the Durham "product" test in 1954 which postulated that "an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect." 24 Critics of this test argued that it gave too much protection to the accused. It placed the prosecution in a difficult position of proving accused's sanity beyond reasonable doubt as a mere testimony of a psychiatrist that accused's act was the result of a mental disease leaves the judge with no choice but to accept it as a fact. The case thus becomes completely dependent on the testimonies of experts. 25 Then came the ALI "substantial capacity" test, integrated by the American Law Institute (ALI) in its Model Penal Code Test, which improved on the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests. The new rule stated that a person is not responsible for his criminal act if, as a result of the mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his act or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. 26 Still, this test has been criticized for its use of ambiguous words like "substantial capacity" and "appreciate" as there would be differences in expert testimonies whether the accused's degree of awareness was sufficient. 27 Objections were also made to the exclusion of psychopaths or persons whose abnormalities are manifested only by repeated criminal conduct. Critics observed that psychopaths cannot be deterred and thus undeserving of punishment. 28

In 1984, however, the U.S. Congress repudiated this test in favor of the M'Naghten style statutory formulation. It enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act which made the appreciation test the law applicable in all federal courts. The test is similar to M'Naghten as it relies on the cognitive test. The accused is not required to prove lack of control as in the ALI test. The appreciation test shifted the burden of proof to the defense, limited the scope of expert testimony, eliminated the defense of diminished capacity and provided for commitment of accused found to be insane. 29 In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. 30 The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. 31 The testimony or proof of the accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged. 32 In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was committed to the NCMH months after he killed his wife. Medical books describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia pracecox, it is the most common form of psychosis. 3 Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently directed. The interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by delusions and hallucinations. In the most disorganized form of schizophrenic living, withdrawal into a fantasy life takes place and is associated with serious thought disorder and profound habit deterioration in which the usual social customs are disregarded. 34 During the initial stage, the common early symptom is aloofness, a withdrawal behind barriers of loneliness, hopelessness, hatred and fear. Frequently, the patient would seem preoccupied and dreamy and may appear "far away." He does not empathize with the feelings of others and manifests little concern about the realities of life situations. The schizophrenic suffers from a feeling of rejection and an intolerable lack of self-respect. He withdraws from emotional involvement with other people to protect himself from painful relationships. There is shallowness of affect, a paucity of emotional responsiveness and a loss of spontaneity. Frequently, he becomes neglectful of personal care and cleanliness. 35 A variety of subjective experiences, associated with or influenced by mounting anxiety and fears precede the earliest behavioral changes and oddities. He becomes aware of increasing tension and confusion and becomes distracted in conversation manifested by his inability to maintain a train of thought in his conversations. Outwardly, this will be noticed as blocks or breaks in conversations. The schizophrenic may not speak or respond appropriately to his companions. He may look fixedly away, or he may appear to stare, as he does not regularly blink his eyes in his attempt to hold his attention. 36 None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he exhibited any of the myriad symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident. To be sure, the record is bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant prior to that fateful day. Although Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a high possibility that the appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he also declared that schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are capable of distinguishing right from wrong. 37 Hence the importance of adducing proof to show that the appellant was not in his lucid interval at the time he committed the offense. Although the appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia a few months after the stabbing incident, the evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime. Evidence on the alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. 38 In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense insufficient to establish his claim of insanity at the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on record to show that the appellant was completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime. The arguments advanced by the appellant to prove his insanity are speculative and non-sequitur. For one, his claim that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident amounts to a mere general denial that can be made with facility. The fact that Avelina and her nephew were frightened at the sight of the appellant holding a bolo after he killed his wife does not, by any stretch of imagination, prove that the appellant has lost his grip on reality on that occasion. Neither is the appellant's seemingly nonrepentant attitude immediately after he stabbed his wife an indicium of his alleged insanity. Even criminals of stable mental condition take this non-remorseful stance. Similarly, that the appellant and his wife were never seen quarreling prior to that fateful day does not by itself prove the appellant's unstable mental condition. Neither can it be said that jealousy is not a sufficient reason to kill a pregnant spouse. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where lives had been terminated for the flimsiest reason. The appellant attributes his loss of sanity to the fact that he lost his business and became totally dependent on his mother-in-law for support. We find this, however, purely speculative and unsupported by record. To be sure, there was no showing of any odd or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant after he lost his fortune and prior to his commission of the crime that may be symptomatic of his mental illness. In fact, the appellant's mother-in-law declared that during the time that she knew the appellant and while he lived in her house, she did not notice anything irregular or abnormal in the appellant's behavior that could have suggested that he was suffering from any mental illness. An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason thereof. He admits committing the crime but claims that he is not guilty because he was insane at the time of its commission. Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt as he had already admitted committing the crime. 39 As the appellant, in the case at bar, failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed his wife, we are constrained to affirm his conviction. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court convicting the appellant of the crime of parricide is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.

CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 184063 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: January 24, 2011

- versus -

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESand PATRICIO E. YAMBAO, Respondents.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is yet another tale of marital woe.

Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao (petitioner) is assailing the Decision[1] dated April 16, 2008 and the Resolution[2] dated August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262. The CA affirmed the decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, which denied petitioners Petition[4]for the annulment of her marriage to respondent Patricio E. Yambao (respondent) on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner and respondent were married on December 21, 1968 at the Philamlife Church in Quezon City.[5] On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage, petitioner filed a Petition[6] before the RTC, Makati City, praying that the marriage be declared null and void by reason of respondents psychological incapacity, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.[7] In her petition before the RTC, petitioner narrated that, since the beginning, her and respondents married life had been marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the latters inability to comply with the essential obligations of married life.[8] Petitioner averred that through all the years of their married life, she was the only one who earned a living and took care of the children. Respondent, she alleged, did nothing but eat and sleep all day, and spend time with friends. When respondent would find a job, he would not be able to stay in it for long. Likewise, respondent went into several business ventures, which all failed. In addition, respondent loved to gamble and would gamble away whatever money would come his way. Petitioner also claimed that, when their children were babies, respondent did not even help to change their diapers or feed them, even while petitioner was recovering from her caesarean operation, proffering the excuse that he knew nothing about children.[9] Later, respondent became insecure and jealous and would get mad every time he would see petitioner talking to other people, even to her relatives. When respondent started threatening to kill petitioner, she decided to leave the conjugal abode and live separately from him. [10] She then consulted a psychiatrist who concluded that respondent was indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.[11] In his Answer, respondent denied that he has refused to work. He claimed that he had been trying to find a decent job, but was always unable to because of his old age and lack of qualifications. He also claimed that he did not stay long in the jobs he had because the same could not support the needs of his family, and yielded benefits that were not commensurate to the efforts he exerted. He had ventured into small businesses but they failed due to various economic crises. Respondent further claimed that he was not, in fact, contented with living with petitioners relatives since his every move was being watched with eagle eyes.[12] Respondent denied that he gambled, positing that since he had no income, he would not have the funds for such activity. He alleged that even without a steady source of income, he still shared in the payment of the amortization of their house in BF Homes, Paraaque City.

As to the care of their children, respondent countered that no fault should be attributed to him because that is the duty of the household help.[13] Respondent also denied that he threatened to kill petitioner, considering that there was never any evidence that he had ever harmed or inflicted physical injury on petitioner to justify the latter having a nervous breakdown.[14] He further alleged that he never consulted any psychiatrist, and denied that he was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.[15] On February 9, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision[16] dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that petitioners evidence failed to support her argument that respondent was totally unaware of and incapacitated to perform his marital obligations such that the marriage was void from the beginning. The court said that, even as petitioner claimed to be unhappy in the marriage, it is incontrovertible that the union lasted for over thirty years and the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood without suffering any major parenting problems. The court also noted that respondent was faithful to petitioner and never physically abused her. Likewise, when the parties lived with petitioners parents, respondent got along well enough with her family.[17] The RTC recognized that respondent did indeed have many faults, such as his indolence and utter irresponsibility. However, the RTC said, respondents failure to find decent work was due to his not having obtained a college degree and his lack of other qualifications. Likewise, respondents failure in business could not be entirely attributed to him, since petitioner was a business partner in some of these ventures.[18] The RTC also rejected the supposed negative effect of respondents Dependent Personality Disorder. The RTC said that, although the evidence tended to show that respondent would unduly rely upon petitioner to earn a living for the family, there was no evidence to show that the latter resented such imposition or suffered with the additional financial burdens passed to her by her husband. On the contrary, the RTC averred that, despite a supposedly horrible married life, petitioner was able to rise in the ranks in her company and buy properties with hardly any help from respondent.[19] The RTC concluded that while respondent might have been deficient in providing financial support, his presence, companionship, and love allowed petitioner to accomplish many things. Thus, respondent could be relied on for love, fidelity, and moral support, which are obligations expected of a spouse under Article 68 of the Family Code.[20] Lastly, the RTC rejected petitioners claim that she suffered through respondents overbearing jealousy. It found that respondent only became jealous when he thought that petitioner was cheating on him. The RTC determined that jealousy was not a character trait that contributed to respondents psychological dysfunction; much less did it amount to

psychological or mental torture on petitioner.[21] Thus, the RTC concluded that the parties might have indeed entered into a bad marriage, but this did not in itself prove that the marriage did not exist, given the 30 years they remained together through the various ups and downs of their volatile relationship.[22] Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on May 21, 2007.[23] Petitioner subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal,[24] which was given due course by the RTC in an Order dated June 8, 2007.[25] She then appealed to the CA. In a Decision[26] dated April 16, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision. The CA held that petitioner failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. It pointed out that respondent exerted efforts to find a source of income to support his family. However, his failure to find a suitable job and the failure of his business ventures were not mental but physical defects and, hence, could not be considered psychological incapacity as contemplated under the law. The CA also found that petitioners claims that she lived in misery during the marriage and that respondent failed to keep his promises to her were not duly established. The CA held that the fact that the parties lived together for 35 years and raised three children well, and the fact that respondent never physically abused petitioner belied the formers psychological incapacity. The CA also held that respondents refusal to care for the children was not psychological incapacity but merely constituted refusal to perform the task, which is not equivalent to an incapacity or inability.[27] The appellate court also rejected petitioners allegation of respondents unbearable jealousy. It said that the same must be shown as a manifestation of a disordered personality which would make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.[28] The CA averred that a jealous attitude simply evinced respondents love for his wife, whom he could not bear to lose to another man. Meanwhile, the CA construed the purported threats to kill petitioner as emotional immaturity and not p sychological incapacity.[29] Lastly, the CA found the report of expert witness Dr. Edgardo Juan Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino) to be unsupported by sufficient evidence since the findings therein were not corroborated by any other witness. Moreover, the CA said, neither the report nor petitioners testimony established that respondents psychological condition was grave enough to bring about the inability of the latter to assume the essential obligations of marriage, so that the same was medically permanent or incurable.[30] Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated August 4, 2008.[31] Petitioner is now before this Court in a last ditch effort to gain freedom from her marriage to respondent. In her petition for review, petitioner submits the following assignment of errors:

I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO SHOW THAT RESPONDENT WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE

II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS MERELY REFUSING TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE AND NOT DOWNRIGHT INCAPACITATED OR UNABLE

III THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS UNBEARABLE JEALOUSY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A CHARACTER TRAIT CONTRIBUTING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

IV THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION OF RESPONDENT WAS GRAVE ENOUGH, INCURABLE AND HAD NO ANTECEDENCE (sic)[32]

Petitioner argues that respondents Dependent Personality Disorder was sufficiently established by her testimony and that of her sister, which testimonies were both credible considering that they have personal knowledge of the circumstances prior to and during the parties marriage. On the other hand, respondents evidence consisted merely of his sole testimony, which were self-serving and full of inconsistencies.[33] Petitioner points out that what the CA characterized as respondents efforts in finding jobs were merely the result of short lived bursts of industry, failing to note that the jobs were few and very far between. [34] The rest of the time, respondent did nothing but eat, sleep, and party with his friends. [35] Petitioner also alleges that respondent was given the opportunity to finish his studies, first by his parents, and then by petitioner herself, but he never took up these offers.[36]

Petitioner also highlighted respondents failure to earn his keep, participate in household chores, or take care of their children. She argues that respondent had the obligation to help and contribute to all the needs of the family, whether the same be in the form of material or physical support.[37] Petitioner also refutes the CAs conclusion that respondent was merely refusing to attend to his familys needs. She insists that respondents inability is due to a psychological affliction, i.e., Dependent Personality Disorder, as attested to by the expert witness she presented during trial.[38] Part of this same disorder, according to petitioner, is respondents jealous tendencies, which the CA belittled and attributed to emotional immaturity. [39] Finally, petitioner argues against the CAs finding that respondents laziness and dependence could not be characterized as inability but just plain refusal. Petitioner contends that she has complied with the guidelines laid down by the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. She further contends that the framers of the Family Code never intended to give such a suppressed definition of psychological incapacity, and, in fact, declared that a restrictive definition would limit the applicability of the provision.[40] Moreover, she asserts that she has proven that respondents unbearable jealousy and Dependent Personality Disorder manifested themselves even before the marriage of the parties, although not in the same degree as when they were already married.[41] The petition has no merit and, perforce, must be denied. Article 36 of the Family Code states:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Preliminarily, the Court reiterates its recent pronouncement that each case for declaration of nullity under the foregoing provision must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.[42] Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience.[43] While the Court has not abandoned the standard set in Molina,[44] the Court has reiterated the tenet that the factual milieu of each case must be treated as distinct and, as such, each case must be decided based on its own set of facts.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[45] the Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. These guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically identified.[46] What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.[47] Hence, the issue in this case can be summed up, thus: Does the totality of petitioners evidence establish respondents psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage? The Court holds that it does not. The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[48] Thus, for a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants.[49] It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[50] In this case, there is no showing that respondent was suffering from a psychological condition so severe that he was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the contrary, respondents efforts, though few and far between they may be, showed an understanding of his duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with much success. Whether his failure was brought about by his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other external factors, is not relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in showing an awareness to provide for his family, even with his many failings, does not suffer from psychological incapacity. Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will.[51] This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.[52] It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.[53] That respondent, according to petitioner, lack[ed] effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility[54] does not mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal

to help care for the children, his neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have been shown to amount to a psychological abnormality. Moreover, even assuming that respondents faults amount to psychological incapacity, it has not been established that the same existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In his psychological report,[55] Dr. Tolentino merely said, [b]ecause ones personality or character is formed early in life, it has a clear ANTECEDENT and it has an enduring pattern of inner experience that deviates from the expectations of the individuals culture, [56] without explaining this antecedent. Even petitioner, in her allegations, never explained how the alleged psychological incapacity manifested itself prior to or at the time of the celebration of their marriage. Likewise militating against petitioners cause is the finding of the trial court, and the same was affirmed by the CA, that respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused petitioner or their children. In fact, considering that the children lived with both parents, it is safe to assume that both made an impact in the childrens upbringing. And still, as found by the RTC and the CA, the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood without any major parenting problems.[57] Such fact could hardly support a proposition that the parties marriage is a nullity. Respondent may not have turned out to be the ideal husband, or may have failed to meet petitioners exacting standards. Yet this Court finds it impossible to believe that, as petitioner alleges, there was nothing but heartache and strife in their over 35 years (prior to filing the petition for declaration of nullity) of marriage. To be sure, respondent, perhaps with a little more effort on his part, could have been more helpful and could have made life that much easier for his wife. The fact that he did not, however, does not mean that he is psychologically incapacitated to discharge his marital obligations, as to give the Court a reason to declare the marriage null and void. Certainly, the marriage was beset by difficulties, or as petitioner puts it, marred by bickerings, quarrels, and recrimination. It is a fact, however, that all marriages suffer through the same trials at one point or another, with some going through more rough patches than others. The Court concedes that petitioner and respondents marriage, as characterized by the former, may indeed be problematic, even tumultuous. However, that they had gone through 35 years together as husband and wife is an indication that the parties can, should they choose to do so, work through their problems. WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262 are AFFIRMED.