Explaining Norm Enforcement

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Explaining Norm Enforcement

Christine Horne Rationality and Society 2007 19: 139 DOI: 10.1177/1043463107077386 The online version of this article can be found at: http://rss.sagepub.com/content/19/2/139
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EXPLAINING NORM ENFORCEMENT

Christine Horne
ABSTRACT
esse artigo apresenta a teoria da norma de coao. This article presents a theory of norm enforcement. Dominant accounts explain norms by referring to their consequences. On this view, norms are enforced when doing so increases the welfare of group members. While useful, such approaches do not explain much of what we observe. The theory developed here argues that while sanctioning consequences are part of the explanation, characteristics of social relations in particular, interdependence have significant effects. Hypotheses are tested using unique data that include quantitative behavioral measures of norm and metanorm enforcement. The results show that the effects of sanctioning benefits and costs vary depending on the level of interdependence between group members. Further, concern with social relations, not sanctioning benefits and costs, explains metanorm enforcement. The research therefore suggests that explanations that focus on the direct consequences of sanctioning, and that fail to incorporate characteristics of social relations, may produce inaccurate predictions. Accordingly, understanding the role of social relations is essential for explaining norm enforcement.
KEY WORDS norm metanorm sanction norm enforcement
1. Introduction Norms are a foundational concept. They matter because they provide a potential solution to the problem of social order. Our understanding of norms, however, is arguably underdeveloped. Sociologists, of course, have long been interested in social norms. But sociological research has tended to emphasize the effects of norms rather than their cause. Recently scholars across a range of disciplines, including not only sociology (Hechter and Opp 2001) but also economics (Eggertson 2001: 7778; Henrich et al. 2001), law (Ellickson 1991; Posner 2002), psychology (Lehman, Chiu, and Schaller 2004), political science (Finnemore
Rationality and Society Copyright 2007 Sage Publications. Vol. 19(2): 139170. http://rss.sagepub.com DOI: 10.1177/1043463107077386
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and Sikkink 1998; Raymond 1997), and others, are paying increasing attention to explaining norms themselves. Despite this surge of research, however, we still have a long way to go in answering fundamental questions. In this article, I address one of these core issues norm enforcement. Norms are most widely viewed as rules accompanied by social sanctions (Blake and Davis 1964; Horne 2001a). Accordingly, if we want to understand norms, we must explain enforcement (Bendor and Swistak 2001: 1494; Coleman 1990; Ellickson 1991; Homans 1950: 123; Scott 1971; Yamagishi 1995: 327). This is no easy task, however. Enforcement is costly. It may take time, emotional energy, and even result in personal harm. It is not obvious why people sanction given these costs. Why then are norms enforced? Dominant approaches suggest that people enforce norms because of the positive consequences of doing so. In other words, when the enforcement of rules leads to positive outcomes, people are more likely to sanction; when the enforcement of rules has negative consequences, people are less likely to sanction. The logic suggests that the benefits and costs associated with enforcing a rule affect sanctioning activity. The problem with this explanation is that the enforcement of norms is not always associated with positive consequences it may increase group welfare, have little effect, or even be harmful. Thus sanctioning costs and benefits alone are unlikely to provide a complete explanation of norm enforcement. In this article I provide an explanation of how interdependence (a particular characteristic of social relations) operates in conjunction with sanctioning benefits and costs to affect norm enforcement. I also explore the utility of these factors for explaining metanorm enforcement. I then test the theoretical predictions using experimental methods. The results suggest that concerns with social relations, rather than with sanctioning costs and benefits, motivate metanorm enforcement. The research highlights the importance of social relations for understanding norm enforcement demonstrating that explanations that focus only on sanctioning benefits and costs, and that fail to take social relations into account, may produce faulty predictions.
2. Existing Explanations of Norm Enforcement The dominant theoretical approach what I refer to in this article as the group welfare approach focuses on the consequences of norms and their enforcement (Horne 2001a). Early functional versions suggest that merely
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defining a behavior as deviant contributes to group welfare (Dentler and Erikson 1959; Durkheim 1953). Later developments emphasize how behaviors affect group members. Ullmann-Margalit (1977), for example, suggests that certain kinds of problematic interactions (such as those that have the structure of a prisoners dilemma game) are likely to generate norms. In such situations, if each individual acts according to their own self-interest, the group suffers. Everyone would be better off if this outcome could be avoided. Rules backed by sanctions can solve the problem. Therefore, such situations call for norms a norm solving the problem inherent in a situation of this type is generated by it (UllmannMargalit 1977: 22). Ullmann-Margalit does not, however, identify a mechanism that might actually bring about norm enforcement (see Bendor and Swistak 2001 for a critique of functionalist explanations). Ellickson (1991) similarly suggests that people will enforce norms that contribute to group welfare. His explanation rests on the assumption that people have a preference for doing things that are good for the group (Ellickson 2001). In other words, people are inherently prosocial; they enforce norms because they want to. Whereas Ellickson stops short of identifying the source of this prosocial motivation, other research suggests some possibilities. Experimental evidence, for example, supports the view that human beings may be hardwired to experience negative emotions when they see people take advantage of others (Fehr and Gchter 2002). These emotions, in turn, may motivate sanctioning. Other research suggests that people may find sanctioning intrinsically enjoyable (Knutson 2004). While some scholars emphasize the importance of internal motivations, others focus on external incentives. Rather than assuming that individuals are prosocial, they assume that actors are self-interested. Accordingly, people enforce norms because they desire a share of the benefit that sanctioning will produce (Coleman 1990). More specifically, people are concerned with the externalities associated with others behaviors. Individual actions affect not only the individual, but also other group members. These externalities create a demand for norms (Coleman 1990; Demsetz 1967; Opp 2002). Further, they create an interest in regulating the externality-producing behaviors (Heckathorn 1988, 1989). This line of reasoning suggests that individuals weigh the costs and benefits of enforcement (see also Decker, Stiehler, and Strobel 2003; Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1992: 411; for a related argument regarding the production of collective goods, see Oliver and Marwell 1988). If the benefits to the individual of sanctioning a behavior are large enough relative to the costs, then that individual will sanction.
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All of these scholars emphasize in some way the negative effects of a behavior for the group and/or the positive consequences of that behavior being punished. The approach is problematic, however. On the one hand, theories that assume that individuals are prosocial overpredict both compliance and enforcement (Wrong 1961). Observation suggests that norms that might benefit the group are not always enforced (Elster 1989). On the other hand, theories that assume self-interest tend to underpredict punishment. In many situations individual benefits do not outweigh costs yet sanctioning occurs (Yamagishi 1995; see also Elster 1990). Thus, while group welfare approaches may be useful in that they provide a potential explanation for some norm enforcement, they do not fully account for the variation in enforcement that we observe. I argue that recognition of the role of social relations will improve our understanding and our predictions. At least since Durkheim (1951) sociologists have thought social relations to be important in the context of norms. Research in a range of substantive areas reflects this insight. Social capital networks in conjunction with norms for example, has become popular as a proposed source of many facets of group well-being (Putnam 1993, 2000). In criminology, collective efficacy a concept that incorporates elements of relations among group members as well as their propensity to exercise control is thought to be important for explaining variation in crime across neighborhoods (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997). But such work often assumes a connection between social relations and norms, rather than explains it. Scholars in other areas have also paid attention to the issue. Social psychologists, for example, suggest that cohesion (the extent to which group members reward each other) strengthens norms (Homans 1950, 1961). When groups are cohesive, individuals are more likely to engage in enforcement activity. Homans explanation has been criticized, however. Flache and Macy (1996) argue that people would rather use their resources to engage in profitable exchange than in contributing to the collective good. The more interdependent people become, therefore, the more likely it is that they will want to exchange rather than punish. This argument gives reason to think that strong social ties actually reduce, rather than increase, norm enforcement efforts. Consistent with this view, Flache (1996) finds that when people are able to exchange rewards with others, their reactions to anti-social behavior may have less to do with the deviant behavior and more to do with their interest in profitable exchange. In contrast, my (Horne 2001b) experimental research finds that cohesive groups have higher levels of sanctioning. In a later study, I explore an explanation for these divergent findings clarifying the
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conditions under which we should expect cohesion to strengthen or weaken norm enforcement (Horne 2004). A variant of the view that social relations matter focuses on metanorms. Metanorms are a particular kind of norm that regulate enforcement (Axelrod 1986; Ellickson 1991; Horne 2001a). When metanorms are effective, individuals who fail to punish deviance will themselves be punished or those who sanction will be rewarded for doing so. Literature suggests that in such situations norms will be maintained (Axelrod 1986; Bendor and Swistak 2001). But this solution raises the question of why metanorms themselves are enforced. Some suggest that (like those who enforce norms) those who enforce metanorms are motivated by the benefits associated with sanctioning. Coleman (1990) argues that if non-deviant group members have ties with each other, then they can coordinate to compensate the individual who sanctions. Their motivation to do so is driven by an interest in the benefits that accompany sanctioning. That is, people reward the sanctioner in order to receive a share of the benefit that results from norm enforcement. Because any one individual absorbs only a part of the sanctioning cost, the benefits that each receives are likely to be sufficient to motivate compensation of the sanctioner. This explanation relies on the logic of the group welfare approach described above. Other work on metanorms finds evidence that relations between group members affect the extent to which those members support sanctioning efforts. Specifically, when group members are dependent on each other, metanorms encouraging sanctioning are stronger (Horne 2001b, 2004). In addition, research shows that the costs of sanctioning affect metanorm enforcement though the reasons for this are not clear (Horne and Cutlip 2002). That is, existing research does not tell us whether concern with group welfare and/or with social relations accounts for the effect of sanctioning costs on metanorms. In summary, the dominant approach to explaining norm enforcement emphasizes the consequences of sanctioning for group welfare. It provides a partial account, but not a fully satisfactory explanation. Other research demonstrates that social relations matter and begins to explore the causes and consequences of metanorms.
3. A Theory of Norm Enforcement In this article I draw on both approaches in order to more fully explain both metanorm and norm enforcement. I develop an explanation that
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integrates the dominant approach with sociological insights regarding social relations. I focus in particular on the role of interdependence the extent to which people value their relations with group members. Rather than simply assuming the importance of social relations, the article explores the mechanisms linking interdependence, sanctioning benefits, and sanctioning costs to both metanorm and norm enforcement. Norms may either encourage or discourage behavior. They are enforced through social sanctioning. Sanctioning typically refers to both positive and negative reactions to those behaviors. Here, however, I seek specifically to explain punishment. Scholars suggest that it is more difficult to explain punishing than rewarding (Coleman 1990). I examine this arguably harder case explaining why people punish others for antisocial activity. Throughout the article therefore I use the term sanctioning as synonymous with punishing. The theory thus identifies factors and mechanisms that lead people to punish deviance. The theory relies on a simplifying assumption regarding human actors. That is, I assume that actors are purposive they try to get more of what they want and less of what they do not want. Consistent with social psychological research on exchange, this assumption is deliberately broad in that it does not distinguish between the many variants of rationality discussed by scholars (Molm 1997). I do not attempt to make predictions with the level of specificity that a more precise assumption might produce (see, for example, Flache 1996 and Macy 1993 for distinctions between forward- and backward-looking rationality). Rather, the goal here is simply to explore the potential importance of incorporating characteristics of social structure in particular, interdependence along with sanctioning costs and benefits, into explanations of norms. The theory presented here is meant to apply to groups in which people are homogeneous in terms of their interests, resources and network ties, and in which every individual in the group is able to interact with each other person. It thus does not address the possible effects of variations in interaction structures, such as whether networks have closure or not (Coleman 1990). Social life obviously has many more complications, but when developing theory it can be very useful to begin by considering simpler settings. I expect that the factors and mechanisms identified are not necessarily relevant only in groups that meet these conditions. For example, even in large groups in which every member does not interact with every other individual, as long as some subset of the group is aware of a deviant behavior and/or reactions to that behavior, the factors and processes described here are expected to operate. However, the theory is developed with the simpler setting in mind.
HORNE: EXPLAINING NORM ENFORCEMENT Sanctioning benefits Sanctioning costs Interdependence + + + + + +
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Norm enforcement
Metanorm enforcement Group welfare Social relations
Figure 1. Summary of the Theory
The theory is summarized in Figure 1. In the discussion below I describe it more fully. 3.1. Group Welfare Dominant approaches propose that one important factor in the enforcement of norms regulating a particular behavior is the consequence for group members (Horne 2001a: 911). When an individual acts, that action has consequences for them. But it may also affect people around them. That is, an individuals behavior may create externalities. These externalities produce a regulatory interest in the underlying behavior (Coleman 1990; Heckathorn 1988, 1989). In other words, people have an interest in sanctioning occurring. The greater the benefit associated with sanctioning, the stronger their interest. This approach predicts that, in general, larger sanctioning benefits will be associated with higher rates of norm enforcement.
fundamental comportamento
H1a: Sanctioning benefits have a positive effect on norm enforcement. Just as individuals take into account the potential benefits of punishing a behavior, they also consider the costs of doing so. As described above, sanctioning can take time, energy, and money, as well as create the risk of physical injury. The larger these costs, the less willing people will be to impose a punishment. As costs increase, therefore, the likelihood that a norm will be enforced declines (Decker, Stiehler, and Strobel 2003; Horne and Cutlip 2002; Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1992: 411). H1b: Sanctioning costs have a negative effect on norm enforcement.
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Of course, sanctioners are not the only ones who benefit from norm enforcement. Others in the group also gain when externality-producing behavior is punished. Even those who are not in a position to impose a punishment themselves still have an interest in other people doing so. Coleman (1990) argues that if group members are able to interact with a potential sanctioner, they will be able to encourage that person to punish deviance. This is because they want to receive a share of the benefit that sanctioning will produce. They therefore will enforce metanorms a special kind of norm that regulates the punishment of norm violators (Axelrod 1986, 1997; Coleman 1990). As the externalities produced by a behavior increase, and the benefits associated with punishing that behavior vary accordingly, metanorms encouraging such punishment will be stronger. H1c: Sanctioning benefits have a positive effect on metanorm enforcement. 3.2. Metanorms and Social Relations Scholars have looked at various attributes of social relations that might be relevant for understanding norms (see, for example, Buskens 2002; Lindenberg 1997). I focus on a particular characteristic of social relations interdependence. My conceptualization of interdependence is drawn from sociological work on social exchange. Accordingly, I define interdependence as the extent to which people value their relations and the goods they can receive through those relations (Emerson 1962, 1972; see also Molm 1997). Earlier research finds that sanctioning rates are higher in groups in which members are interdependent (Horne 2004). Consistent with this work, I predict that interdependence will have a positive effect on sanctioning. H2a: Interdependence has a positive effect on sanctioning. In addition to affecting norms directly, social relations also affect metanorms. Experimental research finds that groups with high levels of interdependence provide stronger incentives to sanction (Horne 2001b, 2004). That is, interdependence has a positive effect metanorm enforcement. H2b: Interdependence has a positive effect on metanorm enforcement. Existing research finds that increases in sanctioning costs strengthen metanorms (Horne and Cutlip 2002). The reasons for this finding are
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unclear, however. Horne and Cutlip (2002) make two arguments. First, we make a group welfare argument, suggesting that people want others to sanction because they want to receive the resulting benefit. As sanctioning costs increase, individuals will give larger rewards to sanctioners in order to increase the likelihood that sanctioning occurs. Second, we make a social relations argument, suggesting that people enforce metanorms because they care about their social relations. In order to maintain relations, people need to give not only when the other has something to return, but also when the other experiences costs and has few resources left for exchange. In other words, if people want to maintain a relationship over the long run, they cannot be just fair weather friends. When people with whom they interact experience costs, they will respond accordingly. The larger the cost, the more the individual will give in support.1 Accordingly, when sanctioners experience greater costs, we would expect them to receive larger rewards from others. In essence, Horne and Cutlip (2002) argue that both the group welfare and the social relations approach predict that sanctioning costs will strengthen metanorms. The data and analyses do not distinguish which mechanism is operating. Here I attempt to distinguish between the two. According to the social relations approach, people give to those who experience costs because, in order to maintain their relationship, they want to appear to be a good exchange partner. This argument implies that it is relative cost sizes that matter because people compare one cost to another to determine when one is larger or smaller, and whether they should give more or less. Therefore, if social relations matter, we would expect the effects of cost to be more pronounced when there is another cost for comparison. In contrast, according to the group welfare approach, people give more to those whose action produces a greater sanctioning benefit because they have an interest in receiving a share of that larger benefit (Coleman 1990). They will give more to sanctioners who experience greater costs (at least, up to a point) in order to increase the likelihood that sanctioning will occur. In other words, when making a decision about how to respond to sanctioners, individuals will compare sanctioning costs and benefits. Thus, if social relations do not matter, if people only pay attention to the direct costs and benefits associated with sanctioning, then they will compare costs with benefits to make their decision. It will not matter whether there is another cost for comparison. If they care about social relations, however, costs will affect metanorms in situations in which people are able to compare one sanctioning cost with another.2
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H2c: Sanctioning cost has a positive effect on metanorm enforcement when there is another cost for comparison. Metanorms, in turn, have a positive effect on norm enforcement. People want others to think well of them. They want to show that they are a good type worth interacting with (Posner 2000). And they want others to respond to their behavior positively rather than negatively (Horne 2001b). In other words, when an individual is making a decision about sanctioning, they will consider the reactions of others. The stronger and more favorable the reactions to sanctioning, the more likely people are to enforce norms. Thus metanorms encourage norm enforcement. H2d: Metanorms have a positive effect on norm enforcement. In summary, factors associated with the group welfare approach costs and benefits are useful for understanding norm enforcement. But costs and benefits alone are likely not sufficient. Social relations and metanorms are also important. 4. Methods Quantitative, empirical tests of norms theories are notably lacking. Prominent theoretical work relies on formal mathematical theory and computer simulations unaccompanied by data (see, for example, Bendor and Swistak 2001; Centola, Willer, and Macy 2005; Heckathorn 1988, 1989; Macy and Skvoretz 1998). This lack of empirical evidence is not surprising. Theoretical testing requires the measurement of norms and metanorms, as well as the ability to disentangle causal relations. This is difficult to do in natural settings. I therefore chose to test the theoretical predictions using experimental methods. Some social scientists are skeptical of laboratory experiments. In large part this is due to concerns with external validity. It is true that experimental methods do not tell us how useful a theory might be when applied to a particular naturally occurring setting. Nevertheless, they can give us greater confidence in a theory and its predictions. For something as little understood as norm enforcement, it makes sense to focus first on gaining theoretical understanding of the relevant causal factors and mechanisms, and then to seek to ascertain the substantive areas in which the theory is most useful. Some might argue that experimental methods are inappropriate for studying norms, because norms are context dependent and historically
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contingent. To the extent that norms are so context dependent that a general, abstract explanation cannot be developed, then artificial laboratory experiments may have little to tell us (Cohen 2003). But, if norms can be explained theoretically, then resulting predictions can, in principle, be tested experimentally (Zelditch 1969). The advantage of studying norms in the laboratory is that experiments provide the ability to overcome many of the challenges present in naturally occurring settings. The researcher can create experimental frameworks that provide behavioral measures of relevant theoretical concepts in this case, norm and metanorm enforcement. And because subjects are randomly assigned to conditions that the researcher manipulates, causal relations are much clearer. For these reasons, I test the theoretical predictions described here in an experimental setting. The setting produces quantitative behavioral measures of both metanorm and norm enforcement. Such data are highly unusual in norms research. To the best of my knowledge, the experimental framework described here is the only setting that has produced quantitative measures of metanorm enforcement. In order to focus on the roles of sanctioning benefits, sanctioning costs, and social relations in producing norms and metanorms, I use an experimental framework that holds rates of deviance constant. I manipulate sanctioning benefits, sanctioning costs, and interdependence. All enforcement activity is recorded, thereby providing measures of both norm and metanorm enforcement. I conducted three experiments. Experiment 1 focuses on the effects of sanctioning benefits and interdependence. It has a 2 2 betweensubjects design, crossing size of benefits (high versus low) by interdependence (high versus low). Subjects participated in 25 rounds. Experiment 2 focuses on sanctioning cost and interdependence. Cost has two levels (medium versus low) and interdependence two levels (high versus low). Interdependence is a between-subjects variable and cost a within-subjects variable. In this experiment, in the medium cost condition the individual benefit is smaller than the cost to the sanctioner; the aggregate benefit to the group outweighs the sanctioning cost. In other words, the group is better off if sanctioning occurs. Experiment 3 also examines cost and interdependence.3 But this experiment includes a condition in which aggregate benefits do not outweigh costs. It crosses two levels of cost (high versus low) by interdependence (high versus low). Again, sanctioning cost is larger than the individual benefit. But in the high cost conditions, sanctioning cost is also greater than the aggregate benefit. The group is better off if sanctioning does not occur.
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Experiments 2 and 3 both had 50 rounds. Subjects experienced low sanctioning costs during one half of the experiment and medium or high costs in the other half. The order in which subjects experienced those costs varied so that half the subjects experienced the low cost first and the others experienced the low cost last. All three experiments followed the same procedures and had the same basic framework. They were conducted at a large university. Participants were recruited from undergraduate classes on the basis of wanting to make money. They were randomly assigned to an experimental condition. They were telephoned the night before the experiment to schedule their participation and were asked to come to the sociology laboratory. Subjects participated in the experiment in groups of four (W, X, Y, and Z). When they arrived at the lab they were individually escorted to separate rooms, each equipped with a computer connected to the lab network. Thus subjects never saw each other face to face; their only interaction occurred over the computer network. Subjects read instructions on their computer screens and participated in practice trials. They were able to ask questions of the experimenter over an intercom. Once the five practice trials were completed, the experiment began. Subjects participated in either 25 or 50 rounds. They did not know the exact number of rounds beforehand. At the end of the experiment they were paid the money they had earned. Earnings varied depending on the conditions to which subjects were randomly assigned, as well as on their decisions and those of other participants in their experimental group. After receiving their earnings, participants were individually escorted from the lab. They thus had no contact with each other either before or after the experiment. 4.1. The Experimental Setting Subjects were told that they were participating in an experiment on social interaction. Each group had five members V, W, X, Y, and Z. W, X, Y, and Z could exchange points with each other. The fifth member, V, could steal points from any of the other four. In actuality, V was a computer simulated actor. If V decided to steal from someone, that person was able to impose a punishment. Participants were given information about the gains that could be made from exchange as well as the consequences of punishing the thief. They knew that their earnings would be affected by the decisions that they and other group members made regarding exchange and punishment.
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Income. At the beginning of each round, every subject received 30 points of income. These points were placed in the Personal Income box on their computer screen. All participants received the same number of points. Norm violation. Next, the computer simulated actor (V) had the opportunity to steal 10 points from one of the participants. Vs behavior thus created externalities. On any particular round, V could steal from one person, or nobody. The decision was randomly generated by the computer. On each round, there was a 7/8 chance that the thief would steal. After V acted, everyone was told what it had done. Much sociological experimental work relies on the use of computer simulated actors. Here I rely on a computer simulated thief. This allows me to control for levels of deviance. The ability to hold levels of deviance constant is particularly important when, as here, subjects participate not only in sanctioning but in metanorm enforcement as well. Subjects were told that the thief was another student like themselves who had been given a different set of instructions. Because the lab included five identical rooms, it was believable that five people were participating in the experiment. People appeared to treat the thief as a real person. Conversations during debriefing suggest that people thought about the thiefs possible reactions if they punished and viewed the thief as a human actor. Norm enforcement. After the theft, the victim was able to decide how to respond. They could decide to punish the thief or to do nothing. If the victim decided to punish the thief, it cost them a certain number of points. All group members were told what the victims decision was. In addition, if the victim punished, each person in the group received a benefit in the form of points added to their personal incomes. Metanorm enforcement. After everyone had been told about the victims decision and received the appropriate number of benefit points, all subjects (including the victim) were able to engage in exchange. Subjects could give any number of points from their personal income to any other person. And they could keep any number of points that they wished. The only rule was that the number of points that people gave away and kept for themselves could not be greater than what they had in their personal income. Of course, when deciding how many points to give, one thing people could consider was whether or not an individual had sanctioned the thief. Thus the decision to react to a sanctioner was made in conjunction with choices about giving to other participants and about keeping points. Everyone made their decisions at the same time. After each participant had made their decision and entered it, they learned how many points each other person had given to them. There
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Table 1. Summary of Experimental Manipulations

Interdependence Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 1:1 or 1:3 1:1 or 1:3 1:1 or 1:3 Sanctioning benefit 3 or 9 3 3 Sanctioning cost 20 4 or 10 4 or 20
was no artificially imposed time limit for this decision. The points they gave away were taken from their personal incomes; the points they received were added. End of round. Then all the points in each subjects personal income were moved into their Total Savings box on their computer screen and 30 points were added to their personal income. The points in savings could not be used. They accumulated throughout the experiment. Subjects earnings were determined by the number of points they had in their savings at the end of the experiment. 4.2. Manipulation of the Experimental Conditions Table 1 summarizes the manipulations of interdependence, sanctioning benefits, and sanctioning costs across the three experiments. Below I describe these manipulations more fully. As indicated in Table 1, the manipulation of interdependence was the same in all three experiments. Interdependence is defined as the value of relations and the goods people can receive from those relations. I created different levels of this variable by altering the value of points that subjects received from others relative to the value of their own points. In the high interdependence condition, points from others were worth three times ones own points. Accordingly, in this condition, if X gave Y 10 points, Y would receive 30 points. If X and Y gave each other 10 points, then both would make a profit of 20. People were highly dependent on each other in this condition. In the low interdependence condition, points received from others were worth the same amount as ones own. If X gave Y 10 points, Y would receive 10 points. If X and Y gave each other 10 points, then they would both break even. Each of them would do just as well if they did not interact. (In fact, they could potentially do even worse if they interacted for example, if they gave points to another subject and that person did not
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reciprocate.) Subjects were not dependent on each other. This operationalization of interdependence was consistent with the theoretical definition. I manipulated sanctioning benefit by varying the number of points that each group member received if the thief was punished. The idea here is that everyone benefits when a norm is enforced that is, everyone has a regulatory interest in externality producing behavior. In the experiment, this benefit took the form of points. In Experiment 1, in the low benefit condition, every participant (including the sanctioner) received 3 points if the thief was punished (for a group total of 12). In the high benefit condition each person received 9 points of benefit (for an aggregate of 36 points). In Experiments 2 and 3, across all conditions, each subject received 3 points of sanctioning benefit (for a total of 12 points). Note that sanctioning benefit was not operationalized as variation in rates of deviance. Such an approach would build into the experiment the same problems that arise in natural settings. Social scientists have lots of data from such settings where it is difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the relations between sanctioning benefits and norm enforcement and between benefits and metanorm enforcement. The experimental setting used here avoids, to a large degree, the problems present in existing studies of informal control conducted outside the laboratory. Sanctioning cost was manipulated by varying the number of points that the victim lost if they decided to punish the thief. In the low cost conditions in both Experiments 2 and 3, the victim lost 4 points if they chose to sanction. In the medium cost condition (Experiment 2), sanctioning cost 10 points. In the high cost condition (Experiment 3), sanctioning cost the victim 20 points. In each experiment, cost was a within-subjects variable. Half the groups experienced the low cost during the first 25 rounds and then the other cost; half experienced the medium or the high cost first and then the low cost. 4.3. Measurement of the Dependent Variables Norm and metanorm enforcement were measured the same way in the three experiments. I measured norm enforcement by counting the number of times in each experimental group that people punished, and dividing that sum by the number of times that the thief stole. This calculation produced a sanctioning rate for each experimental group. Thus the measure is behavioral. I measured metanorm enforcement by determining the mean difference between the number of points people gave to victims who punished
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and the number they gave to victims who did not punish. The larger the gap between points given to victims who punished and those who did not, the greater the metanorm enforcement. This approach produced a measure of mean metanorm enforcement for each experimental group. Importantly, these calculations were based on the number of points that people gave to the sanctioner rather than the number of points the sanctioner actually received. In other words, suppose the metanorm for a group was 5. In order to determine how many points sanctioners in that group would receive in the high interdependence condition, we would have to multiply 5 (the mean metanorm) 3 (the number of people who could reward the sanctioner) 3 (the exchange ratio in the high interdependence condition). In the low interdependence condition, we would need to multiply 5 3 (the number of people) 1 (the exchange ratio in that condition). Thus the metanorm measure reflects how people react to sanctioners, not what the sanctioner experiences. Metanorm enforcement is even more difficult to identify and measure than norm enforcement. But again, the experimental framework described here provides a clear behavioral indicator.
5. Results As described above, norm and metanorm enforcement are group level measures. I create group level data sets and use these group level data for all analyses. 5.1. Experiment 1: Sanctioning Benefits and Interdependence Experiment 1 tests the predictions regarding the effects of sanctioning benefits and interdependence on metanorm enforcement as well as the predictions regarding the effects of sanctioning benefits, interdependence, and metanorms on norm enforcement. Explaining Metanorm Enforcement The theory predicts that sanctioning benefits and the interdependence of group members will each have a positive effect on metanorm enforcement (Hypotheses 1c and 2b). Table 2 reports the mean metanorms across the four experimental conditions. In this table, it appears that metanorms are larger in high than in low interdependence conditions, and larger in high than in low benefit conditions.
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Table 2. Mean Norm and Metanorm Enforcement across Benefit and Interdependence Conditions
Low benefit Mean Low Interdependence High Interdependence Norm enforcement Metanorm enforcement Norm enforcement Metanorm enforcement .405 1.92 .736 3.32 SD (.141) (1.53) (.179) (2.47) High benefit Mean .641 2.46 .809 4.98 a SD (.212) (1.25) (.133) (2.82)
Notes: N = 10 unless noted; aN = 9.
Table 3. OLS Regression for the Effect of Benefits and Interdependence on Metanorm and Norm Enforcement
Metanorm enforcement Model 1a Coefficient SE Interdependence Benefits Interdependence Benefits* Interdependence Metanorms Exchange Level R-Square 1.10 (.816) .181 (.112) 1.95* (.669) .23 Model 2a Coefficient SE Norm enforcement Model 3b Coefficient SE Model 4a Coefficient SE
.217** (.0750) .915 (.782) .286*** (.0846) *** .108 (.113) .0394 (.0126) .0356*** (.0109) .0728 (1.34) .414**** (.120) .388**** (.103) .0273 (.0178) .0387* (.0157) .524* (.0243) .32 .47 .0422**** (.0117) .61
Notes: aN = 39; bN = 40. * p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .005; ****p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
I conduct two analyses to see if these apparent correlations are statistically significant (see Models 1 and 2, Table 3). The first analysis (Model 1) includes only benefits and interdependence.4 In this analysis interdependence has a statistically significant effect on metanorms. This result is consistent with the social relations hypothesis that interdependence strengthens metanorms (Hypothesis 2b). Benefits, however, have only a marginally significant effect (p = .11). This result provides,
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at best, only weak support for the group welfare hypothesis that the benefits associated with sanctioning increase support for sanctioners (Hypothesis 1c). To explore these results further, I conduct a second analysis (Model 2, Table 3) in which I include benefits and interdependence, and also add a control for the general level of exchange in the group (the mean number of points given to group members other than the sanctioner). In this new analysis, interdependence no longer has a statistically significant effect. Horne (2001b) argues that interdependence affects metanorms both because it increases the size of exchanges in general within a group and because it motivates people to give larger rewards to sanctioners specifically. The results here suggest support for the first argument, but not the second. That is, it appears that interdependence increases the general level of exchange in a group and that it is this increase that accounts for the strengthening of metanorms. Further, when exchange level is controlled for, the effect of benefits is no longer even marginally significant (p = .3). Thus, if benefits matter for metanorm enforcement, they do so because they increase the size of exchanges generally, not because they directly motivate people to reward sanctioners. In other words, when group members receive benefits resulting from an individuals sanctioning effort, they give more points to others and others give more points to them. This increased overall level of rewarding accounts for the increase in the size of the metanorms. Metanorm enforcers do not appear to be giving larger rewards to sanctioners specifically in order to encourage high benefit sanctioning. These results suggest that the group welfare mechanisms are not operating as expected. Accordingly, the findings for Experiment 1 regarding metanorms support the social relations hypothesis that interdependence has a positive effect on metanorms (Hypothesis 2b). They do not support the group welfare logic regarding the relation between sanctioning benefit and metanorms (Hypothesis 1c). Explaining Norm Enforcement The theory predicts that sanctioning benefits, interdependence, and metanorms will each have a positive effect on norm enforcement (Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 2d). Table 2 reports the mean sanctioning rates across the benefit and interdependence conditions. Mean sanctioning rates appear to be larger in high benefit than low benefit conditions, and also larger in high interdependence than low interdependence conditions.
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I conduct three analyses to investigate these correlations (see Table 3). In the first, I look at the effects of benefits, interdependence, and the interaction of benefits and interdependence on sanctioning (Model 3, Table 3). The results show that both benefits and interdependence have a statistically significant, positive effect on norm enforcement. The interaction is not statistically significant. In the second analysis, I add metanorms to the equation (Model 4, Table 3). The correlation between metanorms and norms is statistically significant. These results are consistent with the social relations prediction that metanorms have a positive effect on norm enforcement (Hypothesis 2d). In this second analysis, benefits and interdependence continue to have statistically significant effects. Further, the interaction between benefits and interdependence becomes statistically significant. Thus, in Model 3, benefits affect norm enforcement when interdependence is low. In Model 4, we see that when metanorms are controlled for, benefits have an effect on norms, but this effect is smaller in interdependent groups. This result suggests two things. First, when enforcement is an all or nothing choice (as is the case in this experimental setting), the effects of increasing incentives may decline. That is, once incentives (from whatever source) reach a certain point, additional incentives are simply overkill. If subjects had the option of varying the size of sanctions (instead of simply the decision to punish or not), this interaction effect therefore might disappear. (Note, however, that even when incentives seem to be so large as to be overkill, groups do not always sanction.) Second, the results suggest that social relations encourage enforcement even when sanctioning benefits are too small to do so. The mean sanctioning rate in the high interdependence/low benefit condition is .736. In the high interdependence/high benefit condition, it is .809. Thus, where group members are interdependent, sanctioning benefits have little relation to norm enforcement. In such groups, norms are enforced even when the cost of sanctioning is 20 points and the aggregate benefit to the group is only 12. I conduct a third analysis in which I include a control for the general level of exchange in the group, as I did in the metanorms analyses. General exchange level is not statistically significant and does not change the findings for the other variables. Therefore, I do not report the results here. These findings support the group welfare predictions that sanctioning benefits have a positive effect on norm enforcement (Hypothesis 1a). They support the social relations hypotheses that interdependence and metanorms have positive effects on norm enforcement (Hypotheses 2a
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and 2d). Further, they show that the same sanction, with the same benefits, may be imposed more or less frequently depending on the interdependence of group members. The effect of sanctioning benefits is different depending on the social context. 5.2. Experiments 2 and 3: Sanctioning Costs and Interdependence Experiments 2 and 3 test the hypotheses that interdependence and metanorms will have a positive effect on norm enforcement and that sanctioning cost will have a negative effect. They also test the hypotheses that interdependence and sanctioning cost will each have positive effects on metanorm enforcement. To analyze the data from the two experiments, I combine them into one data set. Explaining Metanorm Enforcement The theory makes social relations-based predictions about the effects of interdependence and cost (Hypothesis 2b and 2c). The cost hypothesis predicts that sanctioning cost will have an effect only if subjects have another cost with which to compare it. In the first half of the experiment, subjects have only experienced one cost. In the second half of the experiment, they have experienced both the earlier cost and the present cost. Therefore, the hypothesis would predict that cost will have a positive effect on metanorms in the second half of the experiment, but not in the first. In order to test this prediction, I conduct separate analyses for each half of the experiment. Table 4 reports the mean metanorms across the cost and interdependence conditions for both time periods in the experiment. In general, metanorms appear to be larger in high than in low interdependence conditions. They also appear to be larger in the high cost than in the low cost conditions but only in the second half of the experiment. To investigate these apparent effects, I conduct separate analyses for the two halves of the experiment. Model 1 in Table 5 reports results for the first half. This model looks at the effects of interdependence, cost, and the interaction of cost and interdependence on metanorms. Interdependence has a statistically significant positive effect on metanorms. As in the results for Experiment 1, this finding is consistent with the hypothesis regarding the effect of interdependence on metanorms (Hypothesis 2b). Cost has no effect. This lack of effect is consistent with the social relations reasoning that suggests that cost is unlikely to have an effect when there is no other cost for comparison.
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Table 4. Mean Norm and Metanorm Enforcement across Cost and Interdependence Conditions
Low cost Mean Time 1 Low Interdependence High Interdependence Time 2 Low Interdependence High Interdependence SD Medium cost Mean SD High cost Mean SD
Norm Metanorm Norm Metanorm Norm Metanorm Norm Metanorm
.770a 1.25a .800a 3.63a .798a 1.23b .889a 2.54
(1.25) (1.06) (.119) (2.48) (.135) (2.04) (.166) (1.88)
.668 1.70 .750 2.70 .550 1.92c .745 4.35d
(.177) (1.01) (.165) (2.57) (1.90) (.586) (.216) (2.75)
.405 1.92 .736 3.32 .564 3.88 .636 3.64
(1.41) (1.53) (.179) (2.47) (.280) (3.09) (1.81) (2.41)
Notes: N = 10 unless noted; aN = 20; bN = 18; cN = 9; dN = 8.
Table 5. OLS Regression for the Effect of Cost and Interdependence on Metanorm Enforcement
Time 1 Model 1a Intercept Cost Interdependence Cost * Interdependence Exchange R-square 1.13* (.543) .0422 (.0471) 2.40*** (.768) .0637 (.0666) .19 Model 2a .810 (.586) .0427 (.0468) 1.31 (1.09) .0356 (.0692) .210 (.151) .21 Model 3b .500 (.703) .165** (.0594) 2.31* (1.13) .109 (.0893) .18 Time 2 Model 4b .0659 (.730) .167** (.0583) 1.11 (1.29) .113 (.0877) .326 (.178) .22
Note: aN = 80; bN = 65. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .005 (two-tailed tests)
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I also do an additional analysis controlling for the general level of exchange in the group. These results are reported in Model 2 (Table 5). When the general level of exchange is included, it is not statistically significant. Consistent with the metanorms analysis for Experiment 1, interdependence ceases to be statistically significant. Cost still has no effect. Models 3 and 4 report the results of these analyses for the second half of the experiment (Table 5).5 When interdependence, cost, and the interaction of cost and interdependence are included in the analysis, interdependence again has a statistically significant positive effect on metanorm enforcement (Model 3, Table 5). But this time, sanctioning cost has a statistically significant positive effect. This finding is consistent with the social relations theoretical reasoning that people compare costs to other costs in deciding how much to reward a sanctioner (Hypothesis 2c). When a control for the general level of exchange is included, the effect of interdependence again becomes statistically insignificant (Model 4, Table 5). The level of exchange is marginally significant ( p = .07). The effects of sanctioning costs remain. Thus increased sanctioning costs produce larger metanorms. These results are consistent with the view that subjects care about how they look to their interaction partners. They want to look good. They therefore seek to demonstrate their loyalty giving more support when a sanctioner experiences higher costs and less support when the sanctioner experiences lower costs. In order to make decisions about giving more or less support, people have to be able to compare more costs with fewer costs. If they cannot make this comparison, they have no reason to give more or less (as long as they give something). The fact that cost has an effect in the second half of the experiment when subjects have a comparison cost, but not in the first half when they do not, supports the argument that concerns with social relations affect sanctioning decisions. Thus the findings regarding metanorms are consistent with the social relations hypotheses that interdependence has a positive effect on metanorms (Hypothesis 2b) and that cost has a positive effect in the context of a comparison cost (Hypothesis 2c). Explaining Norm Enforcement Because cost is a within subjects condition varying across two time periods in the experiment I analyze the norm enforcement data using repeated measures models. This approach accounts for the lack of independence of observations across time periods. In the norm enforcement analyses, I initially controlled for the sequence in which subjects experienced the two costs and the interactions of
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sequence with cost and interdependence. Sequence and its interactions do not have statistically significant effects on norm enforcement and including them does not change the results of the analysis. I therefore report the results without controls for sequence.6 Table 4 reports the mean sanctioning rates across the cost and interdependence conditions for both halves of the experiment. In low cost conditions (sanctioners lose 4 points), there is more norm enforcement than in higher cost conditions (in which the cost of sanctioning is 10 or 20 points). Similarly, norm enforcement is generally higher in the medium cost (sanctioners lose 10 points) than in the high cost (sanctioners lose 20 points) conditions. Mean enforcement rates are also higher in high interdependence than in low interdependence conditions. I conduct three analyses to look at the effects of interdependence, sanctioning cost, and metanorms on norm enforcement (Hypotheses 2a, 1b, and 2d). These analyses confirm that sanctioning cost has a statistically significant negative effect on enforcement (see Table 6). The more points that subjects lose when they sanction deviance, the less likely they are to sanction. Model 1 looks at the effects of sanctioning cost, interdependence, and the interaction of cost and interdependence (Table 6). As predicted, cost has a statistically significant negative effect on sanctioning (Hypothesis 1b). The interaction effect of cost and interdependence is also statistically
Table 6. Repeated Measures Analyses for the Effects of Cost and Interdependence on Norm Enforcement
Model 1ta Coefficient Intercept Cost Interdependence Cost * Interdependence Metanorms 2 Res log likelihood AIC BIC .858*** .0202*** .0276 .00910* 102.5 90.5 76.2 SE (.0265) (.00255) (.0374) (.00361) Model 2tb Coefficient .820*** .0204*** .0452 .0124** .0158* 85.0 80.9 76.3 SE (.0321) (.00255) (.0498) (.00363) (.00645)
Notes: aN = 80; bN = 65. * p < .05; **p < .005; ***p < .0001 (two-tailed tests)
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significant. Interdependence alone has no effect. Thus, increases in cost discourage sanctioning. But that negative effect is weaker in interdependent groups. In other words, in high interdependence groups, costs are less discouraging of norm enforcement than they are in low interdependence groups. Further, in low cost conditions, interdependence is associated with little variation in sanctioning rates. This may be because when costs are low, benefits alone are sufficient to motivate sanctioning although the findings show that enforcement still does not reach 100%. In medium and high cost conditions, interdependence has a larger effect. When costs are 10 (in the medium cost condition), we might expect the aggregate sanctioning benefit of 12 to be enough to motivate enforcement on its own. We see, however, that interdependence makes a difference; higher dependence leads to more enforcement. When costs are 20, we would not expect the aggregate sanctioning benefit to produce sanctioning. In fact, the group is objectively better off if sanctioning does not occur. But here again, interdependence encourages enforcement. In Model 2, I add metanorms to the original equation (Table 6). The correlation between metanorms and sanctioning is positive and statistically significant. This finding (as with the results for Experiment 1) is consistent with the social relations hypothesis that metanorms have a positive effect on norm enforcement (Hypothesis 2d). I conduct a third analysis controlling for the general level of exchange in the group. This variable is not statistically significant and including it does not change the results. I therefore do not report the results for this analysis. These findings are consistent with the social relations hypothesis that metanorms have a positive effect on norm enforcement (Hypothesis 2d). They are partially consistent with the social relations hypothesis that interdependence affects norm enforcement it does so in high cost conditions (Hypothesis 2a). Finally, they support the group welfare hypothesis that sanctioning costs reduce norm enforcement (Hypothesis 1b). But the effects of costs on norm enforcement are different for groups with varying levels of interdependence. In summary, the results of the three experiments are consistent with the social relations hypotheses that interdependence and metanorms increase norm enforcement, as well as with the social relations hypothesis that sanctioning cost (in the context of another cost) strengthens metanorms. The research also provides support for the group welfare predictions that sanctioning costs reduce and sanctioning benefits increase norm enforcement. These effects, however, vary with the interdependence of
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group members. The group welfare hypothesis that sanctioning benefits have a positive effect on metanorms is not supported. Thus while group welfare and social relations approaches together explain norm enforcement, social relations appear to provide the best explanation of metanorm enforcement.
6. Discussion In this article I examine the effects of causal factors and mechanisms identified by the group welfare and social relations approaches. I find that both help to explain norm enforcement. Only the social relations approach, however, explains metanorm enforcement. Further, the effects of sanctioning costs and benefits on norm enforcement (predicted by the group welfare approach) change depending on the interdependence of group members. The same sanction associated with the same costs and benefits is more or less likely to be imposed depending on the interdependence of group members. These results point to the importance of incorporating social relations and metanorms into explanations of norm enforcement. Because regulatory interests alone do not determine enforcement activity, and because they do not determine the metanorms that affect sanctioning, groups with different kinds of social relations will have different patterns of norm enforcement. These findings have implications both for those specifically interested in norms and also for those whose substantive interests involve, in some way, the enforcement of norms. Altruistic Sanctioning The most visible recent norms research explains sanctioning in ways that are consistent with the group welfare approach. For example, Fehr and Gchter (2002) find evidence that people will engage in costly sanctioning. They explain this by saying that people get angry when others free-ride. Their anger leads them to sanction free-riding behavior. The implication is that people are hard-wired to sanction anti-social behavior behavior that is harmful to the group. In the context of economists traditional assumption that human beings are self-interested, this insight into human motivation is important. In the context of understanding social norms, it is also important to highlight that such research focuses on peoples responses to certain kinds of behavior. The response is based on internal states rather than on external costs and benefits, but it nonetheless is a reaction to behavior that reduces group
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welfare. Because social relations matter, however, the extent to which sanctioning occurs will vary depending on the social context. Thus while people may be hard-wired to react negatively to certain behaviors, they also react to their social situation. Research without social context provides insight into why people sanction at all. But when explaining why norms are enforced in some situations and not others, social context matters. The Problem of Infinite Regress I find that social relations explain metanorm enforcement, but that sanctioning costs and benefits in conjunction with interdependence explain norm enforcement. These results show that the factors that contribute to metanorm enforcement are not the same as those that contribute to norm enforcement. That is, the solution for the third order dilemma (metanorm enforcement) is not the same as for the second order dilemma (norm enforcement). Scholars have suggested that turning to metanorms as a solution for producing norm enforcement creates a problem of infinite regress. Once metanorms solve the problem of norm enforcement, the problem of metanorm enforcement still remains. And once the problem of producing metanorm enforcement is solved, the problem of producing that solution remains, and so forth. But if the solutions to the problems of norm and metanorm enforcement are different, there may be no infinite regress problem. What is different about norm and metanorm enforcement? In the present article, norm enforcement involves punishing. People take points away from a deviant. But metanorm enforcement involves rewarding. People can give more points to a sanctioner than a non-sanctioner. This distinction was created by the experimental design. But it provides theoretical insight. That is, support for punishers is not going to come from the person who is punished. Thus support from third parties (metanorms) is necessary to encourage norm enforcement. But, encouragement for rewarders can come from the person who is rewarded in the form of future positive exchanges. Thus, in order to produce metanorm enforcement, it is not necessary to move to a fourth level in which bystanders must provide incentives to potential metanorm enforcers. Instead, to the extent that metanorms involve giving increased rewards, the metanorm enforcer can anticipate future positive responses that may compensate them. Thus the potential infinite regress stops at metanorm enforcement. It could also potentially stop at the norm enforcement level if norm enforcement involves rewarding good behavior rather than punishing bad behavior.
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Social Capital In research on social capital, scholars typically assume a connection between networks and norms. They often, though not always (see Portes 1998), argue that increases in social capital produce positive outcomes. The research here articulates some of the reasons for a connection between networks and norms and, in the process, shows how social relations lead to outcomes that may or may not contribute to group welfare. In particular, the finding that sanctioning costs and benefits produce different patterns of norm enforcement depending on the strength of social relations shows that networks need not always increase group welfare. Strong network ties (here, interdependence) can interact with sanctioning costs and benefits to lead to unproductive enforcement behavior. Thus the present article supports the call made by some social capital scholars for understanding, rather than simply assuming, the relation between network ties and norms, and their further effects on group welfare. New Institutionalism New institutionalists attempt to explain homogeneity in organizational forms (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997). The group welfare approach in norms research has its parallel in organizations work that paints a picture of organizations as rational and efficient. New institutionalists argue against this view. They suggest that organizations seek legitimacy in other words, they comply with norms that may or may not produce rational outcomes. Consistent with the new institutionalist perspective, the present research shows that norm enforcement may lead to outcomes that appear neither individually nor collectively rational. In my experiments, however, this is not because people abandon rationality. Rather, individuals make norm and metanorm enforcement decisions that are irrational given direct costs and benefits, but rational given their interest in maintaining valuable relationships. Social relations, not sanctioning costs and benefits, affect metanorm decisions. And while costs and benefits affect norm enforcement, they do so in conjunction with social relations. Thus the research presented here suggests an alternative explanation for findings in the institutionalist literature. Consider, for example, the institutionalist prediction that a country is more likely to enter into human rights agreements or commit to international sanctioning mechanisms when other countries have done so (see, for example, Cole 2005). The present article suggests that a country does this not because entering the agreement has suddenly become more legitimate or more taken-for-granted, but because it depends on other
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countries and cares about how those other countries might react. It is its dependence on other nations that leads it to enter into international agreements and to commit to international sanctioning mechanisms not just the direct costs and benefits of those international agreements. In other words, the variables used by institutionalists may be capturing interdependence. And the mechanisms producing what appears to be non-rational behavior may have more to do with rational concerns with social relations than they do with taken-for-grantedness. Policy In addition to addressing issues of interest to researchers, the work presented here has policy implications. Scholars argue that if norms contribute to group welfare, law may be improved by incorporating them (Cooter 1996; see also Bernsteins 1996 discussion of the logic underlying the Uniform Commercial Code). If groups are able to informally enforce rules, the costs of law enforcement might be reduced by taking advantage of these informal sanctions. In recent years, for example, legal scholars and practitioners have turned to shaming as a form of punishment (Kahan 1996). Instead of (or in addition to) putting someone in jail, a judge may order placement of a sign on their house identifying them as a dangerous felon, publication of their name in the town newspaper, or some other publicizing of their offense. The idea is that the law can incorporate less expensive informal controls to supplement legal punishments. The research presented here suggests a problem with this approach. It shows that the same sanction with the same costs and benefits may be imposed differently depending on the social context. Publicity regarding offenses may incite negative reactions from community members. But the findings reported here suggest that these reactions may have little to do with the offense and much more to do with the nature of peoples relationships in that community. Offenders, therefore, might be subject to informal sanctioning greatly exceeding what the offense merits. The present research suggests that we ought to be cautious about relying on norms to address dissatisfaction with law, as norm enforcement may reflect characteristics of social relations more than the particularities of an offense.
7. Conclusion The present article explains why people punish rule violations thus contributing to our understanding of a key component of social norms. Its contributions are both theoretical (describing important factors and
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mechanisms that lead to sanctioning) and empirical (providing unique behavioral data evaluating the theoretical predictions). By exploring how interdependence operates in conjunction with sanctioning benefits and costs to affect metanorm and norm enforcement, the research highlights the sociological insight that social relations matter. It implies that theories that fail to consider the social relational context may produce faulty predictions. Accordingly, understanding the role of social relations is essential for explaining metanorm and norm enforcement.
NOTES 1. We would not expect this to continue indefinitely, of course. If someone is always a drain and never has anything to offer, interaction is likely to decline. 2. If costs are so high that no sanctioning occurs, then sanctioning cannot be rewarded. Thus at very high costs we might expect to see neither norm nor metanorm enforcement. 3. The results of Experiment 3 were originally reported in Horne and Cutlip (2002). Here I combine the data from Experiments 2 and 3 and conduct a new analysis. 4. I also conducted an analysis including the interaction of benefit and interdependence. The interaction did not have a statistically significant effect. 5. I conducted an additional analysis to check for a possible curvilinear relationship between cost and metanorms. There was no such relation. 6. In the initial analyses I controlled for the semester in which the experiments were conducted, thinking it possible that behavior might vary across semesters for idiosyncratic reasons. The semester variable did not have an effect and its inclusion did not change the results of the analysis. (It had a marginally significant effect at the .1 level only in one analysis (predicting sanctioning) that looked at the effects of cost, interdependence, metanorms, sequence, and the interaction of sequence with the experimental conditions. In other analyses it did not have even a marginally significant effect.) I therefore report the results without controlling for semester.
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CHRISTINE HORNE is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology at Washington State University. She is interested in the emergence and enforcement of social norms. Her work develops theoretical understanding of norms, tests theoretical predictions in experimental settings, and applies theoretical insights to explain naturally occurring norms. Her work has appeared in a variety of outlets including Social Forces, European Sociological Review, and Social Psychology Quarterly. ADDRESS: Department of Sociology, 204 Wilson Hall, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164, USA [email: chorne@wsu.edu].

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Explaining Norm Enforcement

>> Version of Record - Jun 1, 2007 What is This?

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EXPLAINING NORM ENFORCEMENT

KEY WORDS norm metanorm sanction norm enforcement

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RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 19(2)

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HORNE: EXPLAINING NORM ENFORCEMENT

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RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 19(2)

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HORNE: EXPLAINING NORM ENFORCEMENT

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RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 19(2)

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HORNE: EXPLAINING NORM ENFORCEMENT Sanctioning benefits Sanctioning costs Interdependence + + + + + +

Metanorm enforcement Group welfare Social relations

Figure 1. Summary of the Theory

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RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 19(2)

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HORNE: EXPLAINING NORM ENFORCEMENT

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RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 19(2)

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HORNE: EXPLAINING NORM ENFORCEMENT

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RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 19(2)

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HORNE: EXPLAINING NORM ENFORCEMENT

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RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 19(2)

Table 1. Summary of Experimental Manipulations

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HORNE: EXPLAINING NORM ENFORCEMENT

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RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 19(2)

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HORNE: EXPLAINING NORM ENFORCEMENT

Notes: N = 10 unless noted; aN = 9.

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RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 19(2)

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HORNE: EXPLAINING NORM ENFORCEMENT

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RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 19(2)

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HORNE: EXPLAINING NORM ENFORCEMENT

Norm Metanorm Norm Metanorm Norm Metanorm Norm Metanorm

.770a 1.25a .800a 3.63a .798a 1.23b .889a 2.54

(1.25) (1.06) (.119) (2.48) (.135) (2.04) (.166) (1.88)

.668 1.70 .750 2.70 .550 1.92c .745 4.35d

(.177) (1.01) (.165) (2.57) (1.90) (.586) (.216) (2.75)

.405 1.92 .736 3.32 .564 3.88 .636 3.64

(1.41) (1.53) (.179) (2.47) (.280) (3.09) (1.81) (2.41)

Notes: N = 10 unless noted; aN = 20; bN = 18; cN = 9; dN = 8.

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RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 19(2)

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HORNE: EXPLAINING NORM ENFORCEMENT

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