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efcedf38d3175d3aa3dc5ff8b6fdcfdf76163ea7f063ed6770c20e3fe5b4a1dbef35754fe586ad41 99949b3167e7ff8f6997d6c6f8cc67df19b7c4b767cf9a3b9e7c9ec2fa72e4eb812de7ff7cccf49c b3453b632dc15fac5cc7d67f12bf7947bffb9ae9b38ec6510fffe196cdcbfcf776c0e00d3c549a34 de5ef3ebd60e4fb94f76fbe3aefde93fa4f1ff3eb1dac3a96bc6d91afec8c4dcbf62de08cb8f8f65 95154ea4f86bffcb378a630fefc732cf2c674068b1ad675d3755245affe071ac7a0b1f5d01186af1 62577775c559338eb20bf37fba9e4b4036b3a6ae51edd3eb5a780e3fc5d0fd588fab5ea978318645 6dc3c75fb8bc86d0686f7ed2b0e04293cb0d9df59fee5c45bd5363115a309e5071800dbb45cde95f 0d3420000000049454e44ae426082}} {\f0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs20 \cf17 \i0 \u169\'3f 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. } }\f0 \li0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \ql \sb0 \fs20 \ri0 \cf17 \i0 \intbl \cell \int bl {\li0 \f0 \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf17 \qr \i0 {\b0 \i0 \ul0 \fs20 \f0 \chpgn } }\f0 \li0 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \fs20 \ri0 \cf17 \i0 \qr \intbl \cell \row }}\par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \par}\sect\sbknone\pgncont\cols1{ \cf1 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_document_1}{\*\bkmkend co_document_1} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb95be672_wmKLnW}{\*\bkmkend I8b68bc4d94c7 11d9bc61beebb95be672_wmKLnW} \par } {\li0 \f3 \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \qc \i0 {\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 783 F.2d 716 \par } } {\li0 \f3 \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \qc \i0 {\li0 \f3 \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \qc \i0 {\li0 \f3 \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \qc \i0 {\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 United States Court of Appeals, \par } } {\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Seventh Circuit. \par } } } {\li130 \f3 \b0 \ri130 \fs26 \cf19 \qc \i0 {\li130 \f3 \b0 \ri130 \fs26 \cf19 \qc \i0 {\li130 \f3 \b0 \ri130 \fs26 \cf19 \qc \i0 {\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 AMERICAN NURSES\rquote ASSOCIATION, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, \par } } {\li130 \f3 \b0 \ri130 \fs26 \cf19 \qc \i0 {\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 v. \par } } {\li130 \f3 \b0 \ri130 \fs26 \cf19 \qc \i0 {\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa260 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 STATE OF ILLINOIS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

\par } } } } {\li0 \f2 \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \qc \i0 {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f3 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 No. 85\u8211\'3f1766. } } } {\f3 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f3 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 | } } {\f3 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Argued Jan. 24, 1986. } } {\f3 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 | } } {\f3 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Decided Feb. 18, 1986. } } {\f3 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 | } } {\f3 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f3 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa260 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied April 4, 1986. \par } } } } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Nurses associations brought sex discrimination action against State, charging th at State paid workers in predominantly male job classifications higher wage not justified by any difference in relative worth. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Charles P. Kocoras, J., } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1985121124&pubNum=345&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0

606 F.Supp. 1313, }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 dismissed complaint, and associations appealed. The Court of Appeals, Posner, C ircuit Judge, held that, although associations had no cause of action against St ate based strictly on \u8220\'3fcomparable worth\u8221\'3f study, associations f urther alleged intentional discrimination sufficient to state sex discrimination cause of action. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Reversed and remanded. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_attorneysAndLawFirms_1}{\*\bkmkend co_attorneysAndLawFirms_1} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa260 \sb260 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 Attorneys and Law Firms \par } } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 } {\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_718_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_718_1} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 *718 } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Edith Barnett, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs-appellants. \par } } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 James I. Rubin, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees. \par } } } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Before POSNER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judg e. \par } } } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_opinion_1}{\*\bkmkend co_opinion_1} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 Opinion \par } } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa260 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 POSNER, Circuit Judge. \par } } } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_Ifa188eb1845011e38578f7ccc38dc}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_Ifa 188eb1845011e38578f7ccc38dc} \par {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 This class action charges the State of Illinois with sex discrimination in emplo yment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=42USCAS2000E&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61bee bb95be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionTyp e=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 42 U.S.C. \u167\'3f 2000e }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 , and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The named plainti ffs are two associations of nurses plus 21 individuals, mostly but not entirely female, who work for the state in jobs such as nursing and typing that are fille d primarily by women. The suit is on behalf of all state employees in these job classifications. The precise allegations of the complaint will require our caref ul attention later, but for now it is enough to note that they include as an ess ential element the charge that the state pays workers in predominantly male job classifications a higher wage not justified by any difference in the relative wo rth of the predominantly male and the predominantly female jobs in the state\rqu ote s roster. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f

\par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 } {\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_719_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_719_1} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 *719 } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 The complaint was filed in May 1984, and before the state answered, an amended complaint was filed early in July. Less than a month later the state moved to di smiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. In November th e plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to the state\rquote s motion, to w hich they attached exhibits not obtained in the course of pretrial discovery\u82 12\'3ffor there had been no discovery. In April 1985 the district judge dismisse d the complaint under } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=L&pubNum=1004365&cite=USFRCPR12&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb9 5be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=D ocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 but without ruling on the state\rquote s alternative request for summary judgme nt, } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1985121124&pubNum=345&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 606 F.Supp. 1313. }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 The ground for dismissal was that the complaint pleaded a comparable worth case and that a failure to pay employees in accordance with comparable worth does no t violate federal antidiscrimination law. The plaintiffs appeal. They argue that their case is not (or perhaps not just) a comparable worth case and that in cha racterizing the complaint as he did the district judge terminated the lawsuit by a semantic manipulation. The state both defends the judge\rquote s ground for d ismissal and argues that we can equally well affirm on the ground that the state \rquote s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Comparable worth is not a legal concept, but a shorthand expression for the move ment to raise the ratio of wages in traditionally women\rquote s jobs to wages i

n traditionally men\rquote s jobs. Its premises are both historical and cognitiv e. } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 The historical premise is that a society politically and culturally dominated b y men steered women into certain jobs and kept the wages in those jobs below wha t the jobs were worth, precisely because most of the holders were women. The cog nitive premise is that analytical techniques exist for determining the relative worth of jobs that involve different levels of skill, effort, risk, responsibili ty, etc. These premises are vigorously disputed on both theoretical and empirica l grounds. Economists point out that unless employers forbid women to compete fo r the higher-paying, traditionally men\rquote s jobs\u8212\'3fwhich would violat e federal law\u8212\'3fwomen will switch into those jobs until the only differen ce in wages between traditionally women\rquote s jobs and traditionally men\rquo te s jobs will be that necessary to equate the supply of workers in each type of job to the demand. Economists have conducted studies which show that virtually the entire difference in the average hourly wage of men and women, including tha t due to the fact that men and women tend to be concentrated in different types of job, can be explained by the fact that most women take considerable time out of the labor force in order to take care of their children. As a result they ten d to invest less in their \u8220\'3fhuman capital\u8221\'3f (earning capacity); and since part of any wage is a return on human capital, they tend therefore to be found in jobs that pay less. Consistently with this hypothesis, the studies f ind that women who have never married earn as much as men who have never married . To all this the advocates of comparable worth reply that although there are no longer explicit barriers to women\rquote s entering traditionally men\rquote s jobs, cultural and psychological barriers remain as a result of which many thoug h not all women internalize men\rquote s expectations regarding jobs appropriate for women and therefore invest less in their human capital. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 On the cognitive question economists point out that the ratio of wages in differ ent jobs is determined by the market rather than by any a priori conception of r elative merit, in just the same way that the ratio of the price of caviar to the price of cabbage is determined by relative scarcity rather than relative import ance to human welfare. Upsetting the market equilibrium by imposing such a conce ption would have costly consequences, some of which might undercut the ultimate goals of the comparable worth movement. If the movement should cause wages in tr aditionally men\rquote s jobs to be depressed below their market level and wages in traditionally women\rquote s jobs to be jacked above their market level, wom en will have less incentive to enter traditionally men\rquote s fields and more to enter traditionally women\rquote s fields. Analysis cannot stop there, becaus e the change in relative } {\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_720_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_720_1} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 *720 } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

wages will send men in the same direction: fewer men will enter the traditional ly men\rquote s jobs, more the traditionally women\rquote s jobs. As a result th ere will be more room for women in traditionally men\rquote s jobs and at the sa me time fewer opportunities for women in traditionally women\rquote s jobs\u8212 \'3fespecially since the number of those jobs will shrink as employers are induc ed by the higher wage to substitute capital for labor inputs (e.g., more word pr ocessors, fewer secretaries). Labor will be allocated less efficiently; men and women alike may be made worse off. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Against this the advocates of comparable worth urge that collective bargaining, public regulation of wages and hours, and the lack of information and mobility o f some workers make the market model an inaccurate description of how relative w ages are determined and how they influence the choice of jobs. } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 The point has particular force when applied to a public employer such as the St ate of Illinois, which does not have the same incentives that a private firm wou ld have to use labor efficiently. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F11986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [1] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B11986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B11986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 It should be clear from this brief summary that the issue of comparable worth ( on which see the discussion and references in Paul Weiler, The Uses and Limits o f Comparable Worth in the Pursuit of Pay Equity for Women, Discussion Paper No. 15, Program in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School, November 1985) is not of t he sort that judges are well equipped to resolve intelligently or that we should lightly assume has been given to us to resolve by Title VII or the Constitution . An employer (private or public) that simply pays the going wage in each of the different types of job in its establishment, and makes no effort to discourage women from applying for particular jobs or to steer them toward particular jobs, would be justifiably surprised to discover that it may be violating federal law because each wage rate and therefore the ratio between them have been found to be determined by cultural or psychological factors attributable to the history o f male domination of society; that it has to hire a consultant to find out how i t must, regardless of market conditions, change the wages it pays, in order to a

chieve equity between traditionally male and traditionally female jobs; and that it must pay backpay, to boot. We need not tarry over the question of law presen ted by this example because as we understand the plaintiffs\rquote position it is not that a mere failure to rectify traditional wage disparities between predo minantly male and predominantly female jobs violates federal law. The circuits t hat have considered this contention have rejected it, see } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1984132597&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_706" }{\fld rslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Spaulding v. University of Washington, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 740 F.2d 686, 706\u8211\'3f07 (9th Cir.1984) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ; } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1980113034&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Lemons v. City & County of Denver, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.1980) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ; } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1977123951&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Christensen v. Iowa, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir.1977) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 , and the } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 AFSCME } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 case discussed below; we shall see shortly that this rejection may be compelled by the Supreme Court\rquote s decisions in the } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1

{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 Davis } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 and } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 Feeney } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 cases. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 The next question is whether a failure to achieve comparable worth\u8212\'3fgran ted that it would not itself be a violation of law\u8212\'3fmight permit an infe rence of deliberate and therefore unlawful discrimination, as distinct from pass ive acceptance of a market-determined disparity in wages. The starting point for analyzing this question must be } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1981125303&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 County of Washington v. Gunther, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 452 U.S. 161, 101 S.Ct. 2242, 68 L.Ed.2d 751 (1981) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 . Women employed to guard female prisoners were paid less than men employed to g uard male prisoners. Since male prison inmates are more dangerous than female on es and since each male guard on average guarded ten times as many prisoners as e ach female guard, the jobs were not the same. Therefore, paying the male guards more could not violate the Equal Pay Act of 1963, } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=29USCAS206&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cbl t1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_5ba1000067d06" } {\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 29 U.S.C. \u167\'3f 206(d) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 , which requires equal pay only for equal work. The issue was whether it could v iolate Title VII, and the Court held that it could. A comparable worth study fig ured in this conclusion. The plaintiffs had alleged (and the allegation had to b

e taken as true for purposes of appeal, because the complaint had been dismissed , as in this case, for failure to state a claim) that the county had conducted a comparable worth } {\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_721_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_721_1} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 *721 } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 study and had determined that female guards should be paid 95 percent of what m ale guards were paid; that it had then decided to pay them only 70 percent; } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u8220\'3fand that the failure of the county to pay [the plaintiffs] the full ev aluated worth of their jobs can be proved to be attributable to intentional sex discrimination. Thus, [the plaintiffs\rquote ] suit does not require a court to make its own subjective assessment of the value of the male and female guard job s, or to attempt by statistical technique or other method to quantify the effect s of sex discrimination on the wage rates.\u8221\'3f } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1981125303&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_2253" }{\fl drslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 452 U.S. at 181, 101 S.Ct. at 2253\u8211\'3f54 }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 (footnote omitted). \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F21986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [2] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B21986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B21986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 All that this seems to mean, as the dissenting Justices pointed out, is \u8220\ '3fthat even absent a showing of equal work, there is a cause of action under Ti tle VII when there is direct evidence that an employer has } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 intentionally } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 depressed a woman\rquote s salary because she is a woman. The decision today do

es not approve a cause of action based on a } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 comparison } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 of the wage rates of dissimilar jobs.\u8221\'3f } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 Id. } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 at 204, } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1981125303&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_2265" }{\fl drslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 101 S.Ct. at 2265 }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 (emphasis in original). The relevance of a comparable worth study in proving se x discrimination is that it may provide the occasion on which the employer is fo rced to declare his intentions toward his female employees. In } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 Gunther } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 the county accepted (it was alleged) the recommendation of its comparable worth consultant regarding the male guards\u8212\'3fdecided to pay them \u8220\'3fthe full evaluated worth of their jobs\u8221\'3f\u8212\'3fbut then rejected the rec ommendation regarding the female guards and did so because of \u8220\'3fintentio nal sex discrimination,\u8221\'3f that is, because they were female, not because they had easier jobs or jobs that, for any reason, the market valued below the guarding of male prisoners (however a comparable worth consultant might value th em). \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F31986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [3] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B31986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B31986108520_1}

} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 The State of Illinois asks us to limit the teaching of } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 Gunther } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 to cases where the employer has accepted the recommendation of the comparable w orth consultant with respect to the male job classifications. But that would be to take undue liberties with the Supreme Court\rquote s decision. The dissenting Justices pointed out that in limiting the Equal Pay Act to cases of equal work Congress had deliberately rejected liability based on the concept of comparable worth, and they argued that Congress had not intended to reverse field on the is sue when it enacted Title VII a year later. The majority rejected this argument but left open \u8220\'3fthe precise contours of lawsuits challenging sex discrim ination in compensation under Title VII.\u8221\'3f } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1981125303&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_2254" }{\fl drslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 452 U.S. at 181, 101 S.Ct. at 2254. }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 It used the facts alleged in the case to argue that the dissenting Justices wer e exaggerating the impact of the decision on employers, but did not suggest that its holding was limited to cases with the same facts. So limited, its only effe ct would be to discourage employers from commissioning comparable worth studies. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 Gunther } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 suggests the type of evidence that is sufficient but perhaps not necessary to e stablish sex discrimination in wages for different work. A more recent case out of the } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1985144265&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 State of Washington, } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1

American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees (AFSCME) v. Washingto n, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir.1985) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 , suggests the type of evidence that is insufficient. The state\rquote s traditi onal policy had been to pay state employees the prevailing market rates of pay. Beginning in 1974, however, the state commissioned a series of comparable worth studies, each of which found that employees in predominantly female job classifi cations were paid about 20 percent less than employees in predominantly male job classifications judged to be of comparable worth. Eventually the state passed l egislation providing for the phasing in over a decade of a wage system based on comparable worth. } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 The suit charged that the state\rquote s failure to act sooner was a form of di scrimination. The case was tried and the plaintiffs won in the district court, b ut the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that a decision to pay market wages is no t discriminatory, that \u8220\'3fcomparable worth statistics alone are insuffici ent to establish the requisite inference of discriminatory motive,\u8221\'3f } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1985144265&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transiti onType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 id. } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 at 1407, }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 and that \u8220\'3fisolated incidents\u8221\'3f ( } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 id. } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ) of intentional } {\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_722_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_722_1} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 *722 } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 discrimination in the form of help-wanted ads specifying the sex of the applica nt were not enough to convert the case into one of wage discrimination across di fferent jobs. \par } } }

{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F41986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [4] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B41986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B41986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 The } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 AFSCME } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 case resembles our hypothetical case of the firm accused of sex discrimination merely because it pays market wages. } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 AFSCME } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 shows that such a case is not actionable under Title VII even if the employer i s made aware that its pattern of wages departs from the principle of comparable worth to the disadvantage of women (plus the occasional male occupant of a tradi tionally woman\rquote s job) and even if the employer is not so much a prisoner of the market that it cannot alter its wages in the direction of comparable wort h, as eventually the State of Washington did. The critical thing lacking in } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 AFSCME } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 was evidence that the state decided not to raise the wages of particular worker s } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 because } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 most of those workers were female. Without such evidence, to infer a violation of Title VII from the fact that the state had conducted a comparable worth study would, again, just discourage such studies. \par } } }

{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F51986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [5] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B51986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B51986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 The plaintiffs can get no mileage out of casting a comparable worth case as an equal protection case. The Supreme Court held in } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1976142392&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Washington v. Davis, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 , that the equal protection clause is violated only by intentional discriminatio n; the fact that a law or official practice adopted for a lawful purpose has a r acially differential impact is not enough. The Court applied this principle to s ex discrimination in } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1979135134&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 . Massachusetts had a law giving preference in state employment to veterans. The preference was applicable to female as well as male veterans but of course most veterans are male. But as the purpose of the law was to benefit veterans of eit her sex rather than to favor men over women, the plaintiff\rquote s constitution al challenge failed. \u8220\'3f \u8216\'3f[D]iscriminatory purpose\u8217\'3f ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course o f action at least in part \u8216\'3fbecause of,\u8217\'3f not merely \u8216\'3fi n spite of,\u8217\'3f its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.\u8221\'3f } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1979135134&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_2296" }{\fl drslt

{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Id. } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 at 279, 99 S.Ct. at 2296 }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 (citation and footnotes omitted). \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F61986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [6] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B61986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B61986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 These holdings cast additional light on the contention that intentional discrim ination can be inferred from the state\rquote s failure to eliminate wage dispar ities shown by the comparable worth report. Knowledge of a disparity is not the same thing as an intent to cause or maintain it; if for example the state\rquote s intention was to pay market wages, its knowledge that the consequence would b e that men got higher wages on average than women and that the difference might exceed any premium attributable to a difference in relative worth would not make it guilty of intentionally discriminating against women. Similarly, even if the failure to act on the comparable worth study could be regarded as \u8220\'3frea ffirming\u8221\'3f the state\rquote s commitment to pay market wages, this would not be enough to demonstrate discriminatory purpose. } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 To demonstrate such a purpose the failure to act would have to be motivated at least in part by a desire to benefit men at the expense of women. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F71986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [7] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B71986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B71986108520_1} }

{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Neither } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 Davis } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 nor } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 Feeney } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 were Title VII cases, a point emphasized in } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1976142392&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_2046" }{\fl drslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Davis. } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 See 426 U.S. at 238\u8211\'3f39, 96 S.Ct. at 2046\u8211\'3f47. }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 But when intentional discrimination is charged under Title VII the inquiry is t he same as in an equal protection case. The difference between the statutory and constitutional prohibitions becomes important only when a practice is challenge d not because it is intended to hurt women (say), but because it hurts them inad vertently and is not justified by the employer\rquote s needs\u8212\'3fwhen, in short, the challenge is based on a theory of \u8220\'3fdisparate impact,\u8221\' 3f as distinct from \u8220\'3fdisparate treatment\u8221\'3f (= intentional discr imination). The plaintiffs in this case, however, have said that they are procee ding on the basis of disparate treatment rather than disparate impact. Their dec ision is understandable. In the usual disparate-impact case the plaintiff challe nges } {\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_723_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_723_1} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 *723 } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 some job qualification\u8212\'3ffor example, that the applicant have a high-sch ool diploma, or pass an entrance exam\u8212\'3fas disproportionately excluding b lacks or some other protected group, and the issue is whether the qualification is reasonably necessary for the job, in which event it is lawful notwithstanding its exclusionary effect. See, e.g., } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1985122151&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_846" }{\fld

rslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Aguilera v. Cook County Police & Corrections Merit Bd., } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 760 F.2d 844, 846\u8211\'3f47 (7th Cir.1985) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 , and cases cited there. It is not apparent what the analogy to an exclusionary job qualification would be in this case. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Another point is that the Bennett Amendment to Title VII (the last sentence in } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=42USCAS2000E-2&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs =cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_f383000077b3 5" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 42 U.S.C. \u167\'3f 2000e\u8211\'3f2(h) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ) authorizes employers to pay different wages to men and women provided that the difference would be lawful under the Equal Pay Act, which allows unequal pay fo r equal work if the inequality results from \u8220\'3fany ... factor other than sex,\u8221\'3f } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=29USCAS206&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cbl t1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_e07e0000a9f57" } {\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 29 U.S.C. \u167\'3f 206(d)(1)(iv) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 . The Supreme Court in } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 Gunther } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 assumed without quite deciding that the Bennett Amendment allows an employer ch arged (necessarily under Title VII rather than the Equal Pay Act) with paying un equal wages for unequal work to defend by showing that the inequality is based o n something other than sex, even if the result is a disparate impact. See } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin

dType=Y&serNum=1981125303&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_2249" }{\fl drslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 452 U.S. at 171, 101 S.Ct. at 2249. }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 This reading would confine the scope of Title VII in a case such as the present to intentional discrimination. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F81986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [8] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B81986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B81986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F91986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [9] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B91986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B91986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 So if all that the plaintiffs in this case are complaining about is the State o f Illinois\rquote failure to implement a comparable worth study, they have no c ase and it was properly dismissed. We must therefore consider what precisely the y are complaining about. Our task would be easier if the complaint had been draf ted with the brevity that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure envisage though d o not require. Before the era of modern pleading ushered in by the promulgation of the rules in 1938, a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss the complaint h ad to plead facts which if true showed that his legal rights had been invaded. T he problem was that without pretrial discovery, which ordinarily could not be co nducted before the complaint was filed, the plaintiff might not know enough fact s to be able to make the required showing. For fact pleading the federal rules s ubstituted notice pleading. The complaint would have to indicate the nature of t he plaintiff\rquote s claim with only enough specificity to enable the parties t o determine the preclusive effect of a judgment disposing of the claim ( } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u8220\'3fa short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is e ntitled to relief,\u8221\'3f } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=L&pubNum=1004365&cite=USFRCPR8&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb95 be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=Do cumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt

{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 Rule 8(a)(2) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ). The Appendix of Forms to the federal rules illustrates with a complaint for n egligence that, so far as the invasion of the plaintiff\rquote s legal rights ar e concerned, says only: \u8220\'3fOn June 1, 1936, in a public highway called Bo ylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehi cle against plaintiff who was then crossing said highway.\u8221\'3f Form 9, \u18 2\'3f 2; and see Rule 84 (\u8220\'3fthe forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient under the rules and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate\u8221\'3f). The plaintiff was e xpected to use pretrial discovery to gather the facts showing the defendant\rquo te s negligence and the defendant could serve contention interrogatories on the plaintiff to learn the theory behind the claim. See } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=L&pubNum=1004365&cite=USFRCPR33&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb9 5be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=D ocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 Rule 33(b) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 , and Note of Advisory Committee to the 1970 amendment thereto. When discovery w as complete, a pretrial order would be issued formulating the issues for trial; this order would perform many of the functions of the complaint in a system of f act pleading. See } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=L&pubNum=1004365&cite=USFRCPR16&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb9 5be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=D ocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 Rule 16 }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 . See generally Wright, The Law of Federal Courts \u167\'3f 68 (4th ed. 1983). \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 The idea of \u8220\'3fa plain and short statement of the claim\u8221\'3f has not caught on. Few complaints follow the models in the Appendix of Forms. Plaintiff s\rquote lawyers, knowing that some judges read a complaint as soon as it is fi led in order to get a sense of the suit, hope by pleading facts to \u8220\'3fedu cate\u8221\'3f (that is to say, influence) the judge with regard to the nature a nd probable merits of the case, and also hope to set the stage for an advantageo us settlement by showing the defendant what a powerful case they } {\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_724_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_724_1} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

*724 } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 intend to prove. The pleading of facts is well illustrated by the present case. The complaint is twenty pages long and has a hundred page appendix (the compara ble worth study). \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F101986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [10] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B101986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B101986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 A plaintiff who files a long and detailed complaint may plead himself out of co urt by including factual allegations which if true show that his legal rights we re not invaded. } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1982122600&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_1050" }{\fl drslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir.1982) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ; } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1974112494&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_100" }{\fld rslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Associated Builders, Inc. v. Alabama Power Co., } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 505 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir.1974) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ; } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin

dType=Y&serNum=1985114695&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_915" }{\fld rslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc., } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 757 F.2d 909, 915 (7th Cir.1985) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 (dictum); } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=0299701639&pubNum=0102228&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=c blt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure \u167\'3f 1357 }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 , at p. 604 (1969). The district judge thought the plaintiffs had done that here . Let us see. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 The key paragraph of the complaint is paragraph 9, which reads as follows: \par } } {\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Defendants State of Illinois, its Departments and other Agencies subject to the State Personnel Code, and State Officials, have intentionally discriminated and continue to intentionally discriminate against female state employees in the ter ms and conditions of their employment because of their sex and because of their employment in historically female-dominated sex-segregated job classifications. Defendants have intentionally discriminated and continue to discriminate against male state employees because of their employment in historically female-dominat ed sex-segregated job classifications. The acts, practices and policies of discr imination for which defendants are responsible include, but are not limited to, the following: \par } } } {\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 (a) Use of a sex-biased system of pay and classification which results in and pe rpetuates discrimination in compensation against women employed in historically

female-dominated sex-segregated job classifications; \par } } } {\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 (b) Use of a sex-biased system of pay and classification which, because it resul ts in and perpetuates discrimination in compensation against women employed in h istorically female-dominated sex-segregated job classifications, adversely affec ts males employed in such historically female-dominated sex-segregated job class ifications; \par } } } {\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 (c) Compensation at lower rates of pay of female employees in historically femal e-dominated sex-segregated job classifications which are or have been evaluated as being of comparable, equal, or greater worth than historically male-dominated sex-segregated job classifications which receive higher rates of pay; \par } } } {\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 (d) Compensation at lower rates of pay of male employees in historically femaledominated sex-segregated job classifications which are or have been evaluated as being of comparable, equal, or greater worth than historically male sex-segrega ted job classifications which receive higher rates of pay; \par } } } {\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 (e) Compensation at lower rates of pay of female employees than male employees p erforming work of equal skill, effort and responsibility under similar working c onditions; \par } } } {\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 (f) More favorable treatment in compensation of male state employees than of sim ilarly situated female employees; \par } } } {\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li260 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb260 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 (g) Discrimination in classification. \par } } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F111986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [11] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B111986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B111986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 If this were the entire charging part of the complaint, there would be no quest ion of dismissing it for failure to state a claim. The paragraph initially charg es the state with intentional discrimination against its female employees, becau se of their sex; and this, standing alone, would be quite enough to state a clai m under Title VII. It continues, \u8220\'3fand because of their employment in hi storically female-dominated sex-segregated job classifications,\u8221\'3f and th en adds a claim on behalf of male employees in those classifications. The contin uation could be interpreted as an allegation that the state\rquote s failure to adopt a wage scale based on the principle of comparable worth violates Title VII , and if so fails to state a claim. But the mention of \u8220\'3fsex-segregated\ u8221\'3f blurs the picture. If the state has deliberately segregated jobs by se x, it has violated Title VII. Anyway a complaint } {\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_725_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_725_1} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 *725 } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 cannot be dismissed merely because it includes invalid claims along with a vali d one. Nothing is more common. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Subparagraphs (a) through (g) present a list of particular discriminatory practi ces; and since they are merely illustrative (\u8220\'3fnot limited to\u8221\'3f) , the complaint would not fail even if none of them were actionable. Some are, s ome aren\rquote t. If (a), the \u8220\'3fuse of a sex-biased system for pay and classification which results in and perpetuates discrimination in compensation a gainst women employed in historically female-dominated sex-segregated job classi

fications,\u8221\'3f just means that the state is paying wages determined by the market rather than by the principle of comparable worth, it states no claim. Bu t if it means to allege that the state has departed from the market measure on g rounds of sex\u8212\'3fnot only paying higher than market wages in predominantly male job classifications and only market wages in predominantly female classifi cations, but keeping women from entering the predominantly male jobs (\u8220\'3f sex-segregated\u8221\'3f)\u8212\'3fit states a claim. Subparagraph (b) adds noth ing. If the state is discriminating against women by maintaining unwarranted wag e differentials between predominantly male and predominantly female jobs, any me n who happen to find themselves in predominantly female jobs will be, as it were , dragged down with the women\u8212\'3fwill be incidental victims of a discrimin ation targeted against others. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Subparagraph (c) is an effort to fit the case to the mold of } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 Gunther. } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 The critical difference, however, is that here the } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 state } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 is not alleged to have \u8220\'3fevaluated\u8221\'3f any of the predominantly f emale job classifications as being of comparable worth to predominantly male cla ssifications. The Illinois Commission on the Status of Women, a public body, com missioned a comparable worth study which found the same sort of disparities that other comparable worth studies have found. The state itself\u8212\'3fmeaning th e officials responsible for setting wage rates\u8212\'3fhas yet to reconfigure i ts wage system in accordance with the findings of the study, which is attached a s an appendix to the complaint and is the evaluation to which paragraph 9(c) ref ers. But as we said earlier, the failure to accept the recommendations in a comp arable worth study is not actionable. Paragraph 9(c) thus fails to state a claim \u8212\'3fas does (d), which is the same as (c) except that it, like subparagrap h (b), complains on behalf of male occupants of predominantly female jobs. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F121986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [12] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B121986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B121986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Subparagraphs (e) and (f) are inscrutable. If they complained about payment of unequal pay for the same work they would state a claim under the Equal Pay Act. But that Act is not cited in the complaint, perhaps deliberately, and the substi tution of \u8220\'3fwork of equal skill\u8221\'3f etc. for \u8220\'3fequal work ... of equal skill\u8221\'3f etc. may also be deliberate. The intention may be t o claim that different pay for different } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 but comparable } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 work violates Title VII\u8212\'3fand if so this is a comparable worth claim by a different name, and fails. However, when a defendant is unclear about the mean ing of a particular allegation in the complaint, the proper course is not to mov e to dismiss but to move for a more definite statement. See } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=L&pubNum=1004365&cite=USFRCPR12&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb9 5be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=D ocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ; } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1954120832&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_454" }{\fld rslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass\rquote n, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 347 U.S. 186, 189, 74 S.Ct. 452, 454, 98 L.Ed. 618 (1954) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 . \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0

{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 That leaves subparagraph (g)\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fDiscrimination in classification .\u8221\'3f This could be a reprise of the comparable worth allegations or it co uld mean that in classifying jobs for pay purposes the responsible state officia ls had used the fraction of men in each job as a factor in deciding how high a w age to pay\u8212\'3fwhich would be intentional discrimination. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Maybe the allegations in paragraph 9 are illuminated by subsequent paragraphs of the complaint. Paragraph 10, after summarizing the comparable worth study, says , \u8220\'3fDefendants knew or should have known of the historical and continuin g existence of patterns and practices of discrimination in compensation and clas sification, as documented at least in part by the State of Illinois Study.\u8221 \'3f All that the study \u8220\'3fdocuments,\u8221\'3f however, is that 28 perce nt of the } {\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_726_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_726_1} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 *726 } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 employees subject to the state\rquote s personnel code are employed in 24 job c lassifications, in each of which at least 80 percent of the employees are of the same sex, and that based on the principles of comparable worth the 12 predomina ntly female job classifications are underpaid by between 29 and 56 percent. For example, an electrician whose job is rated in the study at only 274 points in sk ill, responsibility, etc. has an average monthly salary of $2,826, compared to $ 2,104 for a nurse whose job is rated at 480 points. These disparities are consis tent, however, with the state\rquote s paying market wages, and of course the fa ct that the state knew that market wages do not always comport with the principl es of comparable worth would not make a refusal to abandon the market actionable under Title VII. But at the very end of paragraph 10 we read, } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u8220\'3fMoreover, defendants have knowingly and } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 willfully } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 failed to take any action to correct such discrimination\u8221\'3f (emphasis ad ded), and in the word \u8220\'3fwillfully\u8221\'3f can perhaps be seen the glim merings of another theory of violation that could survive a motion to dismiss. S uppose the state has declined to act on the results of the comparable worth stud y not because it prefers to pay (perhaps is forced by labor-market or fiscal con straints to pay) market wages but because it thinks men deserve to be paid more

than women. Cf. } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1982129340&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_3218" }{\fl drslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Crawford v. Board of Education, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 458 U.S. 527, 539 n. 21, 102 S.Ct. 3211, 3218 n. 21, 73 L.Ed.2d 948 (1982) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 . This would be the kind of deliberate sex discrimination that Title VII forbids , once the statute is understood to allow wage disparities between dissimilar jo bs to be challenged ( } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 Gunther } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ). \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u8220\'3fWillfully\u8221\'3f is, however, a classic legal weasel word. Sometime s it means with wrongful intent but often it just means with knowledge of someth ing or other. Willful evasion of taxes means not paying when you know you owe ta x. After reading the comparable worth study the responsible state officials knew that the state\rquote s compensation system might not be consistent with the pr inciples of comparable worth (\u8220\'3fmight\u8221\'3f because there has been n o determination that the comparable worth study is valid even on its own terms\u 8212\'3fmaybe it\rquote s a lousy comparable worth study). But it would not foll ow that their failure to implement the study was willful in a sense relevant to liability under Title VII. They may have decided not to implement it because imp lementation would cost too much or lead to excess demand for some jobs and insuf ficient demand for others. The only thing that would make the failure a form of intentional and therefore actionable sex discrimination would be if the motivati on for not implementing the study was the sex of the employees\u8212\'3fif for e xample the officials thought that men ought to be paid more than women even if t here is no difference in skill or effort or in the conditions of work. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par

} {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Paragraphs 11 through 31 of the complaint present the specific claims of each of the 21 named individual plaintiffs. In materially identical language each parag raph complains that the wage rate in the plaintiff\rquote s \u8220\'3fjob classi fication is discriminatorily depressed because it is historically female-dominat ed and because of defendants\rquote continuing use of a sex-biased system of pa y and classification,\u8221\'3f and that the \u8220\'3fDefendants continue to pa y discriminatorily low wages to plaintiff [name] because she [in one case he] wo rks in a historically female-dominated job classification.\u8221\'3f Standing al one these allegations would appear to state merely a comparable worth claim. But they do not stand alone. In light of paragraphs 9 and 10, each of paragraphs 12 through 31 may conceivably (if somewhat improbably) be intended merely to ident ify each of the named plaintiffs as a victim of the discriminations alleged in t he earlier paragraphs. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F131986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [13] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B131986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B131986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F141986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [14] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B141986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B141986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F151986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [15] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B151986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B151986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F161986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [16]

}}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B161986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B161986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 We have said that a plaintiff can plead himself right out of court. But the cou rt is not to pounce on the plaintiff and by a crabbed and literal reading of the complaint strain to find that he has pleaded facts which show that his claim is not actionable, and then dismiss the complaint on the merits so that the plaint iff cannot replead. (The dismissal would preclude another suit based on any theo ry that the } {\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_727_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_727_1} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 *727 } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 plaintiff could have advanced on the basis of the facts giving rise to the firs t suit. } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1985147192&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_854" }{\fld rslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Alexander v. Chicago Park District, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 773 F.2d 850, 854 (7th Cir.1985) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ; } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1983135335&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_1277" }{\fl drslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 713 F.2d 1272, 1277 (7th Cir.1983) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 .) The district judge did not quite do that here, because this complaint can eas ily be read to allege a departure from the principles of comparable worth, and n o more. But that reading is not inevitable, and the fact that it is logical and unstrained is not enough to warrant dismissal. In the system created by the Fede ral Rules of Civil Procedure a complaint \u8220\'3fshould not be dismissed for f ailure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can pr ove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.\u 8221\'3f } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin

dType=Y&serNum=1957120403&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_102" }{\fld rslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Conley v. Gibson, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 355 U.S. 41, 45\u8211\'3f46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 . This language, repeated though it has been in countless later cases (see, e.g. , } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1984124905&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_2233" }{\fl drslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Hishon v. King & Spaulding, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 467 U.S. 69, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2233, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ), should not be taken literally; for taken literally it would permit dismissal only in frivolous cases. As we said earlier, if the plaintiff, though not requir ed to do so, pleads facts, and the facts show that he is entitled to no relief, the complaint should be dismissed. There would be no point in allowing such a la wsuit to go any further; its doom is foretold. But this is not such a case. Alth ough the complaint tries to make too much out of a comparable worth study that, standing alone, cannot provide a basis for a claim under Title VII\u8212\'3falth ough the complaint appears to include the theory of violation that the Ninth Cir cuit later and rightly rejected\u8212\'3fa complaint cannot be dismissed merely because one of the theories on which it proceeds, and the facts alleged in suppo rt of that theory, do not make out a claim for relief. A complaint that alleges intentional sex discrimination, which } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 Gunther } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 makes actionable even though the discrimination is between different job classi fications rather than within the same classification, cannot be dismissed just b ecause one of the practices, indeed the principal practice, instanced as intenti onal sex discrimination\u8212\'3fthe employer\rquote s failure to implement comp arable worth\u8212\'3fis lawful. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par }

{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F171986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [17] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B171986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B171986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Furthermore, a complaint is not required to allege all, or any, of the facts lo gically entailed by the claim. If Illinois is overpaying men relative to women, this must mean\u8212\'3funless the market model is entirely inapplicable to labo r markets\u8212\'3fthat it is paying women at least their market wage (and there fore men more), for women wouldn\rquote t work for less than they could get in t he market; and if so the state must also be refusing to hire women in the men\rq uote s jobs, for above-market wages in those jobs would be a magnet drawing the women from their lower-paying jobs. Maybe the references in the complaint to the segregation of jobs by sex are meant to allege such refusals but if not this pl eading omission would not be critical. A plaintiff does not have to plead eviden ce. If these plaintiffs admitted or the defendants proved that there was no stee ring or other method of segregating jobs by sex, the plaintiffs\rquote theory o f discrimination might be incoherent, and fail. But a complaint does not fail to state a claim merely because it does not set forth a complete and convincing pi cture of the alleged wrongdoing. So the plaintiffs do not have to allege steerin g even if it is in some sense implicit in their claim. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Before concluding that the district court should not have dismissed the complain t we must consider whether anything happened between the filing of the complaint and the district court\rquote s decision to show that the plaintiffs really wer e pleading just a comparable worth case. } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 The first thing that happened was that the state filed its motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. Attached to the motion were two affida vits, one from a state official attesting that the Illinois Nurses\rquote Assoc iation had not pressed for comparable worth in collective bargaining negotiation s involving some of the job classifications to which the named plaintiffs belong , the other from an economist attacking the concept of comparable worth. In resp onse the plaintiffs argued that their case was not a comparable worth case but a n intentional } {\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_728_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_728_1} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 *728 } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 discrimination case. This response is less decisive on the meaning of the compl

aint than our summary might suggest. The plaintiffs seem to understand by a comp arable worth case one in which the only evidence of discrimination is that wages depart from the principle of comparable worth to the prejudice (mostly) of fema le employees. They seem to think\u8212\'3fwrongly in our view\u8212\'3fthat the state\rquote s refusal to accept the recommendations of a comparable worth study that a state agency had commissioned takes the case out of the category of comp arable worth and puts it into that of intentional discrimination. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 But there was more to the plaintiffs\rquote memorandum in opposition. Several p ages were devoted to arguing that there was additional evidence of discriminatio n besides the results of the comparable worth study and the refusal to take corr ective measures in accordance with the study. If these pages had been submitted in the form of a motion to amend the complaint, then, even though the judge\rquo te s leave to amend would have been required (the plaintiffs had amended the com plaint once, and that was the only amendment they were permitted to make without the judge\rquote s permission or the written consent of the defendants), he wou ld have had to grant it. Leave to amend the complaint \u8220\'3fshall be freely given when justice so requires,\u8221\'3f } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=L&pubNum=1004365&cite=USFRCPR15&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb9 5be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=D ocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 , and there could have been no prejudice to the defendants here, when the motion would have come so soon after the filing of the original complaint and before d iscovery had begun. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F181986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [18] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B181986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B181986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 }

{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F191986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [19] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B191986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B191986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 The plaintiffs attached to their memorandum more than 200 pages of exhibits. Mu ch of this documentation is devoted to showing that the fraction of women varies across jobs and that the higher the fraction the lower the wage, and thus dupli cates the comparable worth study. But some of it is relevant to showing delibera te discrimination. Some of it indicates or asserts that women are not classified in accordance with the work they actually do and as a result are paid less than the state\rquote s own rules entitle them to; that appointing \u8220\'3fhand pi cked\u8221\'3f successors when jobs become vacant and disseminating news of job openings by word of mouth rather than by public notice prevent women from compet ing for the higher-paid, predominantly male jobs; that women have been excluded from some job categories altogether, even though they are capable of performing the jobs; that predominantly female jobs have sometimes been abolished when layo ffs were necessary, in order to spare men from being laid off; and that sometime s the same jobs have been given two classifications (e.g., Prison Clerk and Cler k Typist), one for men and one for women, with the former being paid more even t hough the work is identical. Much of this \u8220\'3fevidence\u8221\'3f would not be admissible at trial; some is outside the statute of limitations (and hence \ u8220\'3fmerely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal conse quences,\u8221\'3f } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1977118787&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_1889" }{\fl drslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 1889, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ); some is from before 1972, when Title VII was made applicable to state employe es\u8212\'3fand there is no legal duty to undo the effects of previous discrimin ation (see } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1977118842&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_708_2742" }{\fl drslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Hazelwood School District v. United States, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 433 U.S. 299, 309, 97 S.Ct. 2736, 2742, 53 L.Ed.2d 768 (1977) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ). But we are not at the moment interested in whether the plaintiffs have produc ed any evidence of unlawful discrimination. That is the issue with regard to the

propriety of summary judgment. The present issue is whether, even though the ju dge could not properly dismiss the complaint because it did not state a claim on its face, the plaintiffs may have put themselves out of court by their subseque nt filing\u8212\'3fa filing that might be compared to a response to a motion for a more definite statement under } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=L&pubNum=1004365&cite=USFRCPR12&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb9 5be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=D ocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 Rule 12(e) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u8212\'3fwhich showed that the complaint was narrower than it might have seemed . Our answer is \u8220\'3fno.\u8221\'3f The exhibits, treated not as evidence bu t as an elaboration of the complaint (as in a } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=L&pubNum=1004365&cite=USFRCPR12&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb9 5be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=D ocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 Rule 12(e) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 filing), confirm, what the language of the complaint suggests, that the complai nt charges intentional discrimination of the sort made actionable by the } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 Gunther } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 case, as well as a mere failure to } {\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_729_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_729_1} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 *729 } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 pay comparable wages for comparable work. Compare } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1985114695&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_914" }{\fld rslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc., supra, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 757 F.2d at 914\u8211\'3f15. }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 It should not have been dismissed under

} {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=L&pubNum=1004365&cite=USFRCPR12&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb9 5be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=D ocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 Rule 12(b)(6) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 . \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F201986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [20] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B201986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B201986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F211986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [21] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B211986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B211986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 The next question is whether the dismissal can be upheld on the alternative gro und urged by the state, that its motion for summary judgment should have been gr anted. Although we are reluctant, without having the benefit of the district cou rt\rquote s view on the matter, to uphold the dismissal of a complaint on the gr ound that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment, } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1985145430&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_353" }{\fld rslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Martinez v. United Automobile Workers, Local No. 1373, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 772 F.2d 348, 353 (7th Cir.1985) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 , we would do so if it were quite clear that the plaintiff had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on an essential element of its claim. See }

{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=L&pubNum=1004365&cite=USFRCPR56&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb9 5be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=D ocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ; } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1985142327&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_945" }{\fld rslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Hooks v. Hooks, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 771 F.2d 935, 945 (6th Cir.1985) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ; } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1980102489&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_1247" }{\fl drslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Experimental Engineering, Inc. v. United Technologies Corp., } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 614 F.2d 1244, 1247 (9th Cir.1980) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ; cf. } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1984141939&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_1564" }{\fl drslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 741 F.2d 1555, 1564\u8211\'3f65 (9th Cir.1984) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 . The fact that discovery is not complete\u8212\'3findeed, has not begun\u8212\' 3fneed not defeat the motion. A defendant may move for summary judgment at any t ime. } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=L&pubNum=1004365&cite=USFRCPR56&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb9 5be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=D

ocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 Rule 56(b) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 . If the plaintiff has not had time to do enough discovery to respond to the mot ion, his proper course is to ask for a postponement of the hearing on the motion . See, e.g., } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1985134211&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_397" }{\fld rslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 United States v. Light, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 766 F.2d 394, 397\u8211\'3f98 (8th Cir.1985) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 . \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F221986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [22] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B221986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B221986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F231986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [23] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B231986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B231986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F241986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [24] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B241986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B241986108520_1} }

{\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 Since the plaintiffs made no request for additional time, the defendants are en titled to summary judgment if as the record now stands the plaintiffs have faile d to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding intentional discrimination. See, e. g., } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1986105372&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_696" }{\fld rslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Powers v. Dole, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 782 F.2d 689, 696\u8211\'3f97 (7th Cir.1986) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ; } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1985129949&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_495" }{\fld rslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Bryson v. Royal Business Group, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 763 F.2d 491, 495 (1st Cir.1985) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ; } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1980149971&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_820" }{\fld rslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Over the Road Drivers, Inc. v. Transport Ins. Co., } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 637 F.2d 816, 820\u8211\'3f21 (1st Cir.1980) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ; } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1979139995&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_504" }{\fld rslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Brown v. Chaffee, } }

{\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 612 F.2d 497, 504\u8211\'3f05 (10th Cir.1979) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 . That might well be the situation had the defendants submitted affidavits or ot her evidence denying that they had engaged in intentional sex discrimination, bu t they did not. Their affidavits, being directed exclusively to the comparable w orth theory of the complaint\u8212\'3fbeing designed to show that the theory was not sound, either in general or in the circumstances of this case\u8212\'3fdid not address any other form of discrimination. } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 This doesn\rquote t mean that the state was asleep at the switch; for when the state filed its motion it was not clear that the plaintiffs were seeking to pres s any other theory of discrimination besides comparable worth. Anyway, motions f or partial summary judgment are permitted. See } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=L&pubNum=1004365&cite=USFRCPR56&originatingDoc=I8b68bc4d94c711d9bc61beebb9 5be672&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=D ocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (b) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 . Nor will there by anything to prevent the state from filing a further motion f or summary judgment supported by sworn denials of any intentional discrimination within the scope of the complaint. } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1979102015&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_1121" }{\fl drslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 592 F.2d 1118, 1121 (10th Cir.1979) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ; } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1979117487&pubNum=345&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_345_292" }{\fld rslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Weit v. Continental Illinois Nat\rquote l Bank & Trust Co., } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 478 F.Supp. 285, 292 n. 4 (N.D.Ill.1979) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 , aff\rquote d, } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin

dType=Y&serNum=1981106446&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 641 F.2d 457 (7th Cir.1981) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 ; } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1981135897&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Jones v. Wike, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 654 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir.1981) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 (per curiam). But normally a motion for summary judgment unsupported by affidav its or materials of equivalent evidentiary standing that negate an essential ele ment of the plaintiff\rquote s case cannot be granted with the effect of dismiss ing the entire complaint. } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1986106686&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_79" }{\fldr slt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Backes v. Valspar Corp., } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 783 F.2d 77, 79 (7th Cir.1986) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 . \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F251986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [25] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B251986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B251986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F261986108520_1" }{\fldrslt

{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [26] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B261986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B261986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 There is a conflict between the circuits over the question whether a defendant can ever get summary judgment without submitting evidence. Compare } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1985112009&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 756 F.2d 181 (D.C.Cir.) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 , cert. granted under the name of } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1985254376&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 474 U.S. 944, 106 S.Ct. 342, 88 L.Ed.2d 285 (1985) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 , with } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1986102862&pubNum=350&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 780 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir.1986) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 . We agree with Judge Bork, dissenting in } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 Catrett, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 and with Judge Rubin, who wrote the opinion in }

{\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 Fontenot, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 that if the plaintiff fails to obtain admissible evidence with regard to an ess ential issue that the plaintiff has the burden of proving, the defendant can obt ain summary } {\f2 \b1 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_pp_sp_350_730_1}{\*\bkmkend co_pp_sp_350_730_1} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 *730 } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 judgment without putting in his own evidence. For it is clear in such a case th at the plaintiff can\rquote t win at trial, and the purpose of summary judgment is to head off trials the outcome of which is foreordained. In } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 Catrett } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 the plaintiff had had two years to conduct discovery and had come up with no ad missible evidence on an essential element of her claim. The plaintiffs in this c ase conducted no discovery. Granted, a plaintiff cannot stave off summary judgme nt just by sitting on its hands for months and years, reluctant to begin discove ry proceedings unlikely to produce any admissible evidence of the defendant\rquo te s liability. That was } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 Fontenot, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 where the plaintiff\rquote s answers to the defendant\rquote s interrogatories\ u8212\'3fanswers filed ten months after the suit had been filed\u8212\'3freveale d that she had no factual evidence to support her claim. Later filings reinforce d this impression. This case is different. The defendants did not attempt to smo ke out the evidentiary basis if any for the full range of claims in the complain t. The defendants\rquote motion to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgmen t seemed to have a dual purpose: to show that all that the plaintiffs were tryin g to prove was a comparable worth case and to establish the factual and legal in adequacy of such a case. The exhibits that the plaintiffs attached to their memo randum in opposition to the motion also had a dual purpose\u8212\'3fto defend th e comparable worth aspect of the complaint and (if this tack failed) to show tha t there was more to the complaint than comparable worth. They failed in their fi rst purpose but succeeded in their second. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par

} {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_anchor_F271986108520_1" }{\fldrslt {\super \f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 [27] }}} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_B271986108520_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_B271986108520_1} } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 The state asks us, finally, to uphold dismissal on the ground that the difficul ties of remedying wage discrimination between different jobs are insuperable. It points out that the district court would have to decide what the wages in the d ifferent jobs would have been but for discrimination in order to know how much b ackpay to award. } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 But if difficulties of remedy, unless completely insurmountable, were a proper reason for throwing out a complaint at the pleading stage, } {\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin dType=Y&serNum=1954121869&pubNum=708&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1 .0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i1 Brown v. Board of Education, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul1 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf5 \i0 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) }}} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 , would have been decided in favor of allowing public schools to continue to seg regate the races. Even if, as the state argues, a court could not reasonably imp ose comparable worth on an employer even as a remedy for blatant discrimination, except in a case such as } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 Gunther } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 (or indeed } {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 AFSCME, } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 had the plaintiffs there prevailed) where the employer has in some sense approv ed a plan for comparable worth, this would just mean that some other, though per haps less effective, remedy would have to be substituted. Maybe the plaintiffs w ould have to be content with an injunction that would knock down any barriers to women\rquote s being hired in the traditionally men\rquote s jobs, thus allowin g the market to eliminate any sex-linked wage differential not justified by a di fference in demand and supply, as women gravitated into the higher-paying men\rq uote s jobs. It is premature to conclude that there is

} {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i1 no } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 worthwhile remedy for the intentional discrimination that consists of overpayin g workers in predominantly male jobs because most of those workers are male. We emphasize, however, that proof of this causality is essential and is not to be i nferred merely from the results of a comparable worth study and from the refusal of the employer to implement the study\rquote s recommendations. We do not want to arouse false hopes; the plaintiffs have a tough row to hoe. They may lose ev entually on summary judgment if discovery yields no more evidence than is contai ned in the unsupported assertions and stale and seemingly isolated incidents in the plaintiffs\rquote exhibits. But the plaintiffs are entitled to make additio nal efforts to prove a case of intentional discrimination within the boundaries sketched in this opinion. \par } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \b0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 REVERSED AND REMANDED. \par } } } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 \u160\'3f \par } } } } } } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 {\li0 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 {\*\bkmkstart co_parallelCitations_1}{\*\bkmkend co_parallelCitations_1} {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa260 \sb520 \fs26 \cf19 \i0 Parallel Citations \par } } {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 40 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 244, 39 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,902, 54 USLW 2448 \par } } {\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs26 \cf1 \i0 { {\trowd \lastrow \trleft0

\clpadt24 \clpadft3 \clpadl100 \clpadfl3 \clpadr24 \clpadfr3 \clbrdrt \brdrw10 \ brdrcf20 \brdrs \clbrdrb \clbrdrl \trql \clwWidth4320 \cellx4320 \clpadt24 \clpadft3 \clpadl100 \clpadfl3 \clpadr24 \clpadfr3 \clbrdrt \brdrw10 \ brdrcf20 \brdrs \clbrdrb \clbrdrr \trql \clwWidth5760 \cellx10080 \intbl {\li24 \ri24 {\li24 \f2 \b1 \ql \ri24 \fs16 \cf20 \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \sb0 \fs16 \cf20 \i0 End of Document \par } } }\f2 \li24 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \ql \sb0 \fs16 \ri24 \cf20 \i0 \intbl \cell \i ntbl {\li24 \ri24 {\li24 \f2 \b0 \ri24 \fs16 \cf20 \qr \i0 {\f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs16 \cf20 \i0 \u169\'3f 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. \par } } }\f2 \li24 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs16 \ri24 \cf20 \i0 \qr \intbl \cell \r ow }}\par } }\sect }