Introduction The concept of force is a crucially important concept in physics or at least it was seen as such until the end

d of the dominion of classical modern physics, early in the 20th century. Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) writes: Force is: the great conception which, developed in the early part of the seventeenthcentury from the rude idea of a cause, and constantly improved upon since, has shown us how to explain all changes of motion which bodies experience, and how to think about physical phenomena. (Peirce, Collected Papers, Hartshorne and Weiss, 1934. Vol 5 P 262) It would be anachronistic to speak of the concept of force in ancient Greek science, if by force we mean the concept as we understand it today, after Newton. But it is possible to interrogate ancient Greek science concerning more general concepts: for example, the concept of the power or capacity to bring about change in the world, or a concept employed to explain such change. That is my topic today. All of you have studied ancient philosophy previously. Probably most of what I say today will be merely a kind of review for you, of our past studies. I do not expect to offer any new or deep insights into Greek philosophy today. I just want to point to some particular aspects of Greek philosophy which provide important elements of the context of the modern concept of force. In the first part of todays session, Ill provide a selective chronological survey as aspects of Greek science relevant to the question of force. In the second part, Ill develop some related philosophical issues. As we think about ancient Greek science, we need to keep in mind how different it is from modern science, as it is understood and practiced today. Its a mistake to think of Greek science as being like modern science, but less advanced that is, as pursuing mainly the same questions, but just not as far along. Some question to consider: Primary goals of modern science are prediction and explantion of phenomena. Are those also primary goals of ancient Greek science? If so, do prediction and explanation mean the same thing to an ancient Greek scientist as to a modern scientist or do they mean something different? Force in Ancient Science The earliest record show that movement and change in the world were understood on analogy with how an animal or person moves its own body. That is, the world was seen as being or as being analogical to an organism. The force or power or capacity to bring about change in the world was often personified in ancient religions. For example: Enlil, the god of the storm, was the Babylonian personification of force or power. Enlil represents force not only in the sense of brutality and might but also as an ordering element in universe, a regulative norm over against chaos.

The biblical God is frequently assigned attributes of force and power. He is seen as a personification not only of raw power but also as a force for good will and justice, reconciling force with righteousness and morality. The Greek pantheon included Zeus as the personification of force and power. But Zeus was subject to Moira, destiny. School of Miletus Lets discuss briefly Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes. Aristotle calls them monists because they seek a single arche, a single principle to which development of world can be traced. Not a supernatural explanation, but a natural explanation. For Thales it is water, for Anaximander it is the Boundless, and for Anaximenes it is air. Thales question is: What is the origin, what came first? He proposes that it is water. But he doesnt enter into the question of how what came first persisted, or how it was transformed into the diversity of phenomena which we perceive. Anaximander at least addresses the question of the origin of diversity. He sees the cosmos as being a living thing. Therefore the original Boundless grows and diversifies in the manner of a living thing from a seed. This is not so much an explanation of how diversity comes about. It is rather an implicit claim that no explantion is needed. In living things, growth and diversification happen naturally they are not in need of explanation. Anaximenes attempts to explain how the diversity which we see arises from the original matter, air. According to him, this happens by a cosmic cycle of rarefaction and condensation, which is akin to a kind of cosmic respiration. Something new is Anaximenes attempt to explain diversity (in general) as a result of one particular physical process (rarefaction and condensation) a process which is ongoing and visible. Since the Milesians tend to see the cosmos as being a kind of living being, motion and change do not constitute a problem or difficulty for them. Motion and change are characteristic, natural activities of living beings. Since they are natural, they do not need to be explained. For them, it is stasis and absence of motion that would pose a difficulty it is stasis and the absence of motion that would need to be explained. School of Elea Parmenides carries the search for a unique arche to its logical conclusion. According to him, nothing can come from non-being. Therefore the motions and changes of the world cannot be real. The world of motions and changes that we perceive is illusory and does not correspond to reality. According to Parmenides, the arche or first principle is the One, which is completely without qualities or differentiation. The One is a plenum which is continuous, indivisible, and immovable. The One cannot initiate any motion or change. Therefore according to Parmenides reality is nothing more or less than the One, which is immutable. But our senses deceive us, leading us to think that there is a diversity of things in the world. It follows that we should trust reason alone, and not our senses. The world of motion and change which we perceive is illusory.

Zeno of Elea and Melissus of Samos accept Parmenides position and develop additional arguments against the reality of plurality, motion and change. For all of them, no explanation is provided for change and motion. There is no need to explain that which is not real. The Problem of Change After Parmenides it is no longer possible to presume that motion and change are real. That is, after Parmenides it is impossible to avoid the question of the reality or non-reality of motion and change. Heraclitus does not accept Parmenides point of departure. He asserts that everything is subject to change, and that change is pervasive. Even an apparent state of stasis involves dynamic opposing tensions, The concord of the universe, like that of a lyre or bow, is resilient if disturbed. Heraclitus doctrine is one of opposing tensions. All things are battlefields of antagonistic forces and tensions. Heraclitus does not reject evidence of senses, but treats it with caution. Empedocles of Acragas and Anaxagoras of Clazomenae accept the basic point of departure of Parmenides, which is that nothing can come to be from not-being. But they want to accept the reality of motion and change in the world. The problem is how to explain the nature and reality of motion and chance. They do this by relinquishing Parmenides commitment to the Oneness of existence. They adopt a position of pluralism. According to Empedocles and Anaxagors, the universe contains a multitude of entities or elements. They seek to explain change in terms of the motions and combinations of those entities or elements. So finally, motion and change become the object of philosophical analysis. Empedocles relies on both reason and the senses. He says that, though both are feeble and weak, they are the only instruments that are available to us (Fragments 2, 3). He agrees with Parmenides that nothing can come to be from not-being. But he says that reality is not One. A diversity of elements has always existed. Earth, water, air, fire all exist and have always existed. Change is explained as the mixing and separating of these elements, one from another, under the influence of two opposing forces, Love and Strife (Fragments 12-14). Therefore change can and does occur, and it is understood in terns of the mixing and separation of already-existing substances. The cycle of Love and Strife which is proposed by Empedocles is an adaptation of the idea of world as a living organism. The cycle of Love and Strife is akin to the cycle of respiration of that organism. Empedocles sees no need for any other explanation of motion and change. Love and Strife, like respiration, are sources of motion which are natural and immanent and which do not need further explanation. For Empedocles (as for Aristotle), an organism seems simpler and more intelligible than a machine, which is artificial and man-made. Accordingly man-made machines are understood and explained in organic terms. This will be reversed in the mechanical philosophy of the 17th century. For mechanical philosophers, like Descartes, machines

will seem simpler and more intelligible than organisms. Therefore Descartes will seek to explain animal organisms in mechanistic terms. According to Anaxagoras, although the senses are weak and unreliable, the phenomena that we perceive at least provide a vision of things that are obscure. In other words, the evidence of the senses provides a basis for inferences concerning what cannot be directly or clearly observed (Fragment 21). Like Empedocles, Anaxagoras retains Parmenides principle that nothing can come to be from not-being, and denies the Oneness of what exists. Bothing comes to be or perishes, but existing things are mixed and separated. For Empedocles it is the four elements which are mixed and separated. But for Anaxagoras, it is not just four elements it is every kind of natural substance. For Anaxagoras, everything is in everything: all substances existed from the beginning, intermixed, and no natural substance is more elemental than any other. According to Anaxagoras, the moving force, which orders the mixing and separating, is Mind. Atomists According to Leucippus of Miletus and Democritus of Abdera, the only things that are real are atoms and the void. All differences between objects are explained in terms of modifications in the shape, arrangement, and position of tiny atoms. Atoms are infinite in number, they are dispersed through the infinite void, and they are in continuous motion and collision. The atoms of Leucippus and Democritus have a character which is in some ways rather similar to the One unchanging Being of Parmenides. Each atom is ungenerated, indestructible, unalterable, homogeneous, solid, indivisible. It is as if Leucippus postulates an infinite plurality of Parmenides Ones. For Leucippus, both being (atoms) and not-being (void) are real. This allows him to account for both plurality and change. Change is understood in terms of the combination and separation of atoms, which remain unaltered. The idea of change as generation is replaced by a mechanical and geometrical understanding of change, in terms of the shapes and arrangements of atoms. Aristotle has this to say about the atomists: For they say there is always movement. But why and what this movement is they do not say, nor, if the world moves in this way or that, do they tell us the cause of its doing so. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, lib XII cap 6 1071 b 33) The pluralists seek to render change and movement intelligible. They do not seek to explain why change happens, or to explain what causes change to happen, or to predict what changes will happen in the future. According to them, change is natural, and it is not really in need of explanation. One presumes that change will happen in ways that are roughly predictable but there is no effort (or perceived need) to make precise

predictions. Nor is there any effort to explain how to intervene in the process of nature that is, to explain how to bring about or to forestall change. They seek to understand what change is, and nothing more. So really there is no role for the modern notion of force as yet. Hippocratic Tradition Itinerant doctors did need to make predictions; that was part of what they needed to be able to do, to get hired: If he is able to tell his patients when he visits them not only about their past and present symptoms, but also to tell them what is going to happen, as well as to fill in the details they have omitted, he will increase his reputation as a medical practitioner and people will have no qualms about putting themselves under his care. From Treatise Prognostic, Ch 1. Medical Works of Hippocrates, Chadwick & Mann Also itinerant doctors sought to intervene, via methods such as surgery, cautery, bloodletting, purgative drugs, regimen of diet & exercise. The intervention in a particular persons life might be very disruptive. But it was not seen an intervention in the regular course of nature. Health was perceived as a state of balance or mean, between opposites. Illness was an imbalance. Medicine was a defensive effort to assist nature, on its own, to restore that balance. Like the Milesians, the Hippocratic physicians sought explanations that were natural rather than super-natural. They rejected divine interference as the sole cause of disease: I do not believe that the sacred disease is any more divine or sacred than any other disease but, on the contrary, has specific characteristics and a definite cause. Nevertheless, because it is so completely different from other diseases, it has been regarded as a divine visitation by those who, being only human, view it with ignorance and astonishment. From On the Sacred Disease. On the Sacred Disease, The Medical Works of Hippocrates. Chadwick and Mann. The sacred disease is thought to have been epilepsy. The attempted explanation was in terms of the flow of fluid in the brain. Hippocratic tradition provides some account of growth, change, diversification: In On the Nature of the Child, growth is explained on the principle of like attracts like: each of the constituents substances of the body draws to itself the same substance from the food and drink which we consume.

Plato

According to Plato, physical reality is endowed with motion because nature has an immortal living soul. There are many kinds of motion, but thy all reduce to spontaneous motion, self-moving, the principle of life and soul. For Plato (as for Empedocles), the four elements have no source of motion in themselves. But according to Plato: My notion would be, that anything which possesses any sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by another, if only for single moment, however trifling the cause and however slight the effect, has real existence; and I hold that the definition of being is simply power. Sophist 247e. The soul through all her being is immortal, for that which is ever in motion is immortal; but that which moves another and is moved by another, in ceasing to move ceases to live. Only the self-moving, never leaving itself, never ceases to move, and is the fountain and beginning of motion in all that moves beside. Phaedrus 245 c So being is endowed with motion. Motion or force is intrinsic in matter. In the Timaeus, Plato provides an ingenious geometrical explanation of the nature of the elements and of how they combine. But he never applies his metaphysical notion of force to explain specific motions in the world. Plato explains heaviness by two assumptions: Like attracts to like; and each element has an appointed region in space. Aristotle Aristotle recognizes two kinds of cause of movement and change and therefore two kinds of movement and change: First, the Platonic conception of the natural force inherent in matter: the self-moving principle of life and soul which is immanent in things. Second, motion imposed from without, by a non-natural external force, like a push or pull. Nature is a cause of movement in the thing itself, force a cause in something else, or in the thing itself regarded as something else. All movement is either natural or enforced, and force accelerates natural motion (e.g., that of a stone downwards), and is the sole cause of unnatural. Aristotle On the Heavens 301 b 18 So for Aristotle there is a fundamental distinction between motions which are natural (self-moving, due to and in accord with a things intrinsic nature) and those which are forced (imposed from without). An external force may act in conjunction with nature, accelerating or retarding natural motion. But any motion which does not happen by nature is forced it is due to the action of some external agent or force. Generally we speak of enforced action and necessity even in the case of inanimate things; for we say that a stone moves upwards and fire downwards on compulsion and by force; but when they move according to their natural internal tendency, we do not call the act one due to force; nor do we call it voluntary

either; there is no name for this antithesis; but when they move contrary to this tendency, we say that they move by force. Ethica Eudemeia, lib 2, cap 8, 1224 a 15 For it is only when something external moves a thing, or brings it to rest against its own internal tendency, that we say this happens by force; otherwise we do not say that it happens by force. Ibid. 1224 b 6 It is this notion of force as agent of compulsory motion that Aristotle subjects to quantitative investigation; it is the core of his mechanics. The distinction between natural and forced motions is very important its a deeply held assumption which Descartes and Newton and their followers will try with difficulty to overcome. Descartes and Newton will want to dismantle the distinction between natural and forced motions. They will want to see all motions as forced motions, to be explained in the same manner. Note that for Aristotle, force can only be push or pull (contact force). The mover, as subject of the force, must always be in contact with the thing moved: It is clear, then, that in all cases of local movement there will be nothing between the mover and the moved, if it can be shown that the pushing or pulling agent must be in direct contact with the load. But this follows directly from our definitions, for pushing things away (either from the agent or from something else) to some other place, and pulling moves things from some other place either to the agent or to something else. Aristotle, Physics, lib VII cap 1 243b. Aristotle proposes quantitative laws of motion. For forced motion: If the mover is A, the moved object B, the distance C, and the time D: then AD/BC = constant. (Physics lib VII cap 5, 249 b 26-250 a 20) For natural motion: The crucial factor is the resistance of medium. That is what impedes natural motion from happening. According to Aristotle, speed V = A/B, where A is the motive power or force, which is determined by the density of the moving object, and B is the retarding force, which is determined by the density of the medium. Note that there must be a retarding medium otherwise the speed would be infinite. For Aristotle, there cannot be a vacuum. For Aristotle, natural motion is a special case of natural change, which is understood as realization of potential accomplishing of telos acting in accord with nature. For heavy objects (with preponderance of heavy earth, water), natural motion is in a straight line down, toward the center of the universe, which is their natural place being there is their telos. For light objects (with preponderance of air, fire), the natural motion is in a straight line up, away from the center of the universe and towards the periphery, which is their natural place being there is their telos. Aristotle geometrizes gravity and heaviness.

The above holds true for terrestrial matter, made of earth, water, air, and fire. But there is a fifth kind of matter, the quintessence or aether. This is what the stars and planets are made of. Their natural motion is circular and eternal. So theres a different physics for the heavens. The spheres of the heavens are self-moving: it is their nature to move. That motion is transmitted inwards from the outer-most sphere, which is the first mover. Force is transmitted inward from sphere to sphere, by contact (always by contact). To summarize: Everything moved is moved by something, hence the irregularity of the movement must proceed either from the mover or from the object moved or from both. If the mover does not act with constant force, or if the object changes instead of remaining constant, or if both alter, then there is nothing to prevent the movement of the object from being irregular. But none of these hypotheses can be applied to the heavens; for the object of the movement has been demonstrated to be primary, simple, ungenerated, indestructible, and altogether changeless, and we may take it that the mover has far better reason to be so: only what is primary can move the primary, what is simple the simple, what is indestructible and ungenerated the indestructible and ungenerated. Aristotle On the Heavens

Some epistemological issues 1. Natural vs Super-natural Explanations. It is a characteristic feature of ancient Greek science to offer explanations that are natural, not super-natural. No supernatural forces or deities are invoked to explain phenomena. Though the meaning of force changes in the modern period, the same stricture applies: scientific explanations should not make reference to supernatural forces or deities. 2. Scientific Discovery and Scientific Explanation. One could ask: The Greek scientists had the concept of atoms, small indestructible identical parts of matter which combine to create various substances. At least some of them understood that mathematics should play an important role in science. With these factors, why did their science not move forward why was their science not progressive? For the Greeks, atomism was interesting as an explanation of the nature of reality, one which was intelligible and self-consistent. But atomism was not of interest as an instrument of prediction and discovery, in the sense of modern science. This is a characteristic feature of ancient Greek science: It is not concerned with prediction or discovery. In Greek science, the goal and objective is to explain things which are already known. It is not to make predictions, or to discover new phenomena. One makes the tacit assumption that all important phenomena are already known.

This is one aspect of what was revolutionary about the scientific revolution, in which a new focus on the concept of force played a central role. The new science was concerned with a new goal and objective, one which had not played an important role in science previously: the goal of predicting and discovering new natural phenomena. It is a common error, in the modern period, to assume that ancient science had the same goal and objective as modern science, but accomplished it poorly. No. It is not that ancient science was trying to do the same thing as modern science, but did it poorly. The very goal and objective of ancient science was different. The goal was to explain natural phenomena not to predict, not to discover, and not to intervene. 3. Causality and Scientific Knowledge. Although modern science is concerned with prediction and discovery, it has not lost interest in explanation. But what does it mean, in modern science, to explain? For Descartes, providing a scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon entailed providing a mechanical model. The visible motions of the hands of a clock are explained in terms of the interlocking motions small invisible parts inside. Descartes attempted to explain all phenomena on a similar model as if everything in the universe was essentially a kind of mechanism, like a highly complex mechanical clock. In particular he sought to explain in this fashion the phenomena of light, gravity, the motions of the stars and planets, and the functions and movements of the human body. For Descartes, a mechanical explanation served as the criterion of intelligibility. To provide a mechanical model of a phenomenon is to explain it that is, to render it intelligible. For Newton, providing a scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon entailed providing a mathematical model both of the forces that were acting and of how objects responded to those forces for example, the force of gravity. Newton remained agnostic on the question of the actual cause or mechanism of gravity; he did not provide a mechanical model of gravity, in the manner of Descartes. But he did propose a mathematical model of gravity, from which could be derived both the motions of planets and the motions of objects near the surface of the earth. For Newton, a mathematical model served as a criterion of sufficient intelligibility. The concept of force played an important role for both Descartes and Newton. For Descartes, the only possible force was the force of constraint the force of one thing pressing on another thing adjacent to it. For Newton, it was possible to speak of a mathematical model of force acting at a distance, across seemingly empty space. Contemporary science has many branches: physics, biology, chemistry, sociology, etc. What will be considered a valid and intelligible explanation varies from one branch to the next. But usually explanation involves some kind of unification: bringing seemingly diverse phenomena together somehow, as similar exemplars of the a more general underlying process or reality. This is most often accomplished by an explanation in terms of small hidden parts (like Descartes) or in terms of a mathematical model (like Newton). In ancient science, unification was of value, but it was not the primary goal. The form of explanation that remained dominant in physics for nearly 2000 years, up until the

scientific revolution, was explanation in terms of the four causes which were identified by Aristotle: final, formal, efficient/moving, and material. In the modern era, the word cause is used in a sense which is much narrower than Aristotles usage. Aristotles four causes should be understood primarily as being four kinds of explanation. For Aristotle, to specify the four causes of a thing or process is to give a complete and full explanation of it; there is nothing more to be said, nothing more to be known about it. To specify one of the four causes is to give a partial explanation. Thus Aristotles four causes are essentially four criteria of intelligibility. They are the four ways that we can know or understand a thing or process. The modern scientific usage of the word cause is closely associated with, but not identical to, Aristotles efficient or moving cause. In the modern scientific usage, causality is a relation between two events or configurations of matter which are separated in time: A is a cause of B, if B would not have existed or occurred in the absence of A. Aristotle would agree that this is an aspect of efficient causality. But it is not the important aspect. For Aristotle an efficient cause is not merely a condition for the existence of a phenomenon or process. It is more importantly a criterion of intelligibility: identifying the efficient cause of a phenomenon or process means specifying not only a condition of its existence, but also (in part) what it is. Knowing the efficient cause of a thing is part of what it means to know that thing. 4. Natural vs Forced Motion Aristotle was a biologist, and he understood the world on analogy with an organism. Usually and for the most part, unless there is an external impediment, plants and animals grow and mature to realize the potential of their full adult form. For Aristotle, the tendency to grow to the adult form to realize the full potential is basic, intrinsic and immanent. It is natural it is not in need of explanation. An explanation is needed when something fails to achieve adult form when it fails to realize its immanent potential. In that case, the explanation consists in specifying the impediment which prevented nature from taking its usual course. Aristotle applies this same way of thinking to the motions of non-living objects: he understands the motions of non-living objects in terms of, or on analogy with, the growth and development of an organism. The natural place of an object which is heavy (that is, one consisting primarily of the elements earth and water) is the center of the universe. Thus a heavy object will move naturally towards the center of the universe, unless something impedes it. And a light object (that is, one consisting primarily of the elements air and fire) will move away from the center and towards the periphery, unless something impedes it. The consequence is that, for Aristotle, there is a fundamental distinction between motions that are natural and those that are forced. Natural motions of an object are those which occur spontaneously, due to the intrinsic or immanent tendency to realize potential. No explanation is needed for a natural motion. But explanation is needed in the case of a forced motion, one which does not occur naturally. Forced motion of an object is explained by an external push or pull from another object or medium which is in

immediate contact with it. 5. Terrestrial vs Celestial motion. As mentioned above, the motion of the stars and planets is circular and eternal, whereas the natural motion of terrestrial things is in a straight line. According to Aristotle, theres a different physics operative in the celestial realm than in the terrestrial realm. 6. The limits and nature of empiricism. The proponents of the new science criticized Aristotle and his followers for being insufficiently empirical. These criticisms were misdirected. It is not that Aristotle was not empirical. It is rather that the new science valued a different kind of empiricism. The new science placed a high value on making empirical observations under conditions that were highly controlled or contrived. For example, Robert Boyle (1627-1691) investigated various phenomena related to the vacuum. To make these observations, Boyle made use of a vacuum pump which was at the cutting edge of technology in his day. It should be noted first that the vacuum which was created was a state of affairs which was highly contrived a vacuum is not found on earth, in the normal course of nature. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) goes so far as to use the metaphor that, in scientific investigation, Nature must be tortured, to compel her to reveal secrets that would otherwise remain hidden. Second, Bacon also touts the value of a crucial experiment a single empirical observation which would be diagnostic concerning the truth or falsity of a proposed theoretical explanation. Third, it should be noted that the phenomena of Boyles vacuum pump could be observed by only a relatively few people there werent many vacuum pumps, and not many people were sufficiently rich and privileged to have access to one. For Aristotle, the sort of observations made by Boyle would be of no empirical value. First, Aristotle would object to observing Nature under contrived conditions, out of her usual course. For Aristotle, science is concerned with what happens naturally, in the normal course of nature not under conditions that are contrived or forced. For Aristotle, Nature out of the normal course is of no relevance, scientifically. Second, Aristotle would object to the modern notion of a crucial experiment. A crucial experiment would be efficacious and diagnostic only if it were the case that Nature is utterly inexorable and regular in her behavior, in the manner of a machine. But for Aristotle, Nature is not like a machine it is a like living organism. The behavior of living organisms is somewhat regular, but there is a certain built-in variability. So a single observation, one which is supposedly crucial, would not really reveal anything important. After all, on any one occasion, Nature can behave strangely. What matters for Aristotle is how Nature behaves usually or for the most part which is what everyone knows. Finally, Aristotle would object to making use of empirical observations to which only a small number of people have access. In his view, the kind of empirical observation that is relevant to science is that which is shared widely by all, as common experience things that everyone knows. It is common experience of this sort which can serve as the starting point for a scientific demonstration, according to Aristotle.