Globalizations September 2004, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.

82 101

Civilization: A Pathway to Peace?

MAJID TEHRANIAN
University of Hawaii at Manoa

ABSTRACT The concept of civilization has been employed in contradictory waysas an ideological tool, as an analytical category and in reference to a long historical journey. In light of its ideological abuses, is civilization as an analytical category capable of salvation? This paper takes a fresh look at an old problem. If civilization is still a useful category of analysis, are such partitions as the East and the West valid in the context of an emerging global civilization? If not, how can we reconceptualize the common journey toward a more civilized world order? The paper argues that human civilization is an imaginary fuelled by changing technologies, mythologies and communication carriers. The transitions from nomadic to agrarian, commercial, industrial and informatic civilizations may be considered as higher orders of differentiation, complexity and integration. If so viewed, the journey appears as a single but uneven and self-contradictory movement. In our own epoch, the global reach of informatic technologies necessitates an integrating myth such as the Gaia Hypothesis, viewing the Planet Earth as a single living organism transcending all boundaries. That myth would teach us to value human unity in diversity. However, the current pathologies of commodity and identity fetishism, expressed in state and opposition terrorism, are obstructing peaceful globalization.
We are the nest race in the world, and the more of the world we inhabit, the better it is for the human race Cecil John Rhodes (1853-1902), quoted by Bentley and Ziegler (2003, p. 933) Today backward and deprived, we face an economic and military giant with the moral and spiritual scruples of a ea. It is not a pleasant encounter. Sadeq al-Mahdi, Prime Minister of Sudan (19661967) Civilization as we know it, is a movement not a condition, a voyage and not a harbor. Arnold Toynbee (1889 1975), 1948

The Problem In the post-Cold War international discourse, two concepts have found great currency: globalization and civilization. Both concepts have been often employed in the singular rather than
Correspondence Address: Majid Tehranian, Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2500 Campus Road, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA. Email: majid@hawaii.edu 1474-7731 Print=1474-774X Online=04=010082 20 # 2004 Majid Tehranian DOI: 10.1080/1474773042000252174

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plural.1 However, both concepts may be better understood in the plural. The two concepts generally refer to the material and cultural achievements by humanity through international exchanges in science, technology and culture. In successive trials and errors at war or peace throughout human history, technological and cultural exchanges have advanced human civilization (Bentley, 1993; Frank and Gills, 1993). Five major types of globalization can be easily discerned in written history, including (1) nomadic conquests of sedentary population exemplied by the Aryan, Arab, Mongol, Teutonic and Turkik tribes, (2) agrarian empires such as the Sumerian, Egyptian, Chinese, Indian, Persian, Greek and Roman, (3) commercial trade routes such as those of the Silk, Incense and Spice Roads, (4) European, Russian, American and Japanese industrial empires, and (5) the current round of an expanding informatic empire, encompassing nearly all parts of the world through its global market and communication networks. In the current round, globalization also has come to mean the promotion of a neoliberal economic and political agenda2 promoted by an ideology of civilization. Civilization has a longer history of discourse. Felipe Fernandez-Armesto (2002, p. 12) has gone through this history with gusty commentary. It is difcult to disagree with him that Like most terms calculated to evoke approval, such as democracy, equality, freedom, and peace, the word civilization has been much abused. However, it is necessary to make a distinction between its ideological abuses by politicians to legitimate certain hegemonic policies, its use by noted historians to designate certain types of society, and its more general use as a common human journey. I use the term differently from most other commentators to designate a normative aspiration to achieve a society in which rule of law and other methods of non-violent dispute management are dominant. From this perspective, civilization is an unnished journey. Ideological discourses often see the world in self-righteous black and white terms. They employ dichotomous categories in order to mobilize resources for the ensuing struggles. Civilization has been often employed as an ideological weapon to legitimate most globalization policies in the past and present. By making dichotomous distinctions between the so-called civilized and barbarian, a presumed Axis of Virtue against an Axis of Evil,3 hegemonic ambitions have tried to gain moral legitimacy. In the current round, opposition to the dominant globalization policies has similarly employed civilization as its ideological weapon of choice. Witness the frequent use of civilization in speeches by President George W. Bush as well as by Osama Ben Laden. The challenge is to understand the complex patterns of an emerging world civilization, particularly its globalizing and civilizing forces. Employing normative concepts without falling prey to their ideological abuses is part of that challenge. Some may argue that civilization is analytically beyond salvation. However, the option to abandon normative concepts is not a realistic one. Human societies are normative social constructions. In competition or in concert, norms such as salvation, order, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice or civilization frame the unwritten, and sometimes written, constitutions of society. Without such normative glues, human societies would fall apart. Norms and values are in turn symbolically revealed in foundation myths. As the Biblical myth of creation reveals, once Adam and Eve ate the Apple from the Tree of Knowledge, they were permanently thrown out of their conditions of ignorance and bliss in paradise. They attained the status of free agents who must choose, enjoy or suffer the consequences of their choices. First, they became aware of their nakedness, i.e. they gained consciousness. Second, they were faced with the struggles of living, such as labor in child bearing and toil in the sweat of their brow. Third, they gained the freedom to choose between good and evil.

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According to this Abrahamic foundation myth, the human condition entails struggle, learning and freedom. Modern natural science also seems to conrm this nding. We seem to be hardwired for struggle, love, learning and creativity (Lewis et al., 2000). But we are also genetically programmed for identity, territoriality and aggression (Ardrey, 1966). In the Biblical myth of creation, God created man in his own image. That myth posits a profound truth about consciousness in the human condition. The Gospel according to St. John starkly states, In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. If we interpret the Word as communicative competence in its broadest possible terms or, better yet, consciousness or enlightenment, we can better understand the profound meaning of the statement. As Seyyed Hossein Nasr (2003, p. 14) aptly put it
Consciousness, for traditional civilizations, for religions and traditional philosophies, is not only a state. It is a substance and not a process. It is something that is, like Being itself, which at its highest level of reality is at once luminous and numinous. Consciousness at its elevated levels is at once knowing and knowing that it knows, knowledgeable of its own knowledge. It is at once the source of all sentience, of all experience, and beyond all experience of the knowledge that something is being experienced. That is why even the more skeptical philosophers have had a great deal of trouble negating it, even those who have been skeptics from a religious point of view.

The Purpose This essay engages in a politics of discourse imposed by our historical circumstances. It begins with a focus on the current conceptual quagmire. It offers seven propositions on the interactions among three major historical forces, including technologies, mythologies and communication carriers. By globalization, I simply mean an intensication of human interactions across territorial boundaries. By civilization, I mean the unnished journey that humanity has undertaken to tame its aggressive impulses in order to achieve a peaceful management of conicts through dialogue, negotiation, law, diplomacy, mediation, arbitration and Satyagraha. By technology, I mean the hardware and software know-how of solving human problems. By mythology, I mean the narratives that try to explain the unexplainable (Campbell, 1997).4 By communications, I am referring to those carriers of human messages that we commonly know as verbal and non-verbal signs, transportation and the media. The Argument The essay argues that technologies, mythologies and communications are the perennial forces that have shaped global history in the past and will probably continue to do so in the future. Civilization clearly begins with the ingenious human uses of natural environment. Available natural resources, their discovery through science and technology, and the ensuing struggles to control them are the perennial saga of human history. But technology by itself cannot sustain human societies. It takes shared foundation myths to build human societies. Human civilization has been built through scientic, technological and cultural exchanges, achieved by means of expanding global communication. Civilization may be thus viewed as a normative social construction to manage human problems, drawing on technologies, mythologies, and communications. Human civilization has evolved toward greater differentiation, complexity and integration (Figure 1). Technological developments impose greater differentiation in social structures and functions. Greater differentiation brings about more complexity and contradiction. Complexity and contradiction necessitate higher orders of social integration. Social integration, in turn, calls

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Figure 1. Modes of globalization and civilization: technological, institutional, and cosmological perspectives

for new foundation myths relevant to the new material and cultural conditions. As technological advances and cultural lags bring about greater complexity and contradiction between the old and new paradigms, the crises of transition inevitably surface. In this respect, the movement of human civilization is fundamentally no different from the revolutionary processes in scientic progress (Kuhn, 1962). The revolutions from nomadic to agrarian, commercial, industrial and informatic civilizations have been accompanied by great cultural transformations. However, each revolutionary change has been followed by a long period of normalization of the values of the new civilizations modes of production, legitimation and communication.

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The Conceptual Quagmire The Manichean dichotomies between civilized versus barbarian, or more generally us versus them, seem to be a propensity of the human mind.5 Ideology as a modern discourse and tool of political struggle often resorts to such dichotomies. In the modern world, with the mass media playing a critical role, such dichotomies have become a common currency. State and commercial media alike often engage in dichotomizing political struggles, demonizing the perceived enemy, and dramatizing their own narratives to capture, manipulate and entertain their audiences. For the commercial media, this strategy also maximizes audiences and prots. The exploding scholarly literature on globalization has been trapped in this ideological quagmire. In a moment of enthusiasm, for example, Francis Fukuyama (1989) declared that the twentieth century has witnessed the triumph of liberal capitalism over communism and fascism. The rest of human history, he argued, will be spent on the boring details of implementing the capitalist democratic regimes.6 A more pessimistic voice was aired by Samuel Huntington (1993a, b, 1996) during the 1990s. The wars in the Persian Gulf, Somalia and former Yugoslavia suggested no easy victories. In his Clash of Civilizations, Huntington argued that the wars of the future will be conicts among civilizations, most notably between the West and the rest. He also singled out an Islamic Confucian alliance as the Wests main enemy. In a more critical vein, Benjamin Barber (1995) identied the central problem of globalization as the ensuing conict between capitalist consumerism and tribalist militancy. However, by employing the metaphors of McWorld vs. Jihad, he regionalized a global problem. The New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman (2000) used the metaphor of The Lexus and the Olive Tree. That metaphor may be more relevant to upwardly mobile upper middle classes rather than Barbers lower middle classes! As Robert Cox (1997, p. 251) aptly put it, conceptual dualisms reveal a culture of contentment challenging a culture of discontent. The ardent globalizers and the reluctant globalized approach the same problems from different perspectives based on contradictory interests. Those interests and perspectives are the dialectically interacting aspects of the same historical dilemma.7 The dominant and dissenting views reect different constructions of reality. From the center perspective, the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US seemed to bear out Huntingtons dark prophecy and Barbers fearsome forebodings. It was ironic that 2001 was also declared by the United Nations General Assembly as the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations. The terrorist attacks demonstrated that we live in a truly globalized world. Historys greatest superpower was no longer protected by the two vast Atlantic and Pacic Oceans. The language of violence subsequently assumed a prominent position in international discourse. The US invasions of Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003 were the expressions of a dual project: (a) to stem oppositional terrorism in its bud, and (b) to establish a New American Century (NAC). In 1997, the Project for a NAC had been initiated by the future leaders of the Bush Administration. It was to promote a few fundamental propositions: that American leadership is good both for America and for the world; that such leadership requires military strength, diplomatic energy and commitment to moral principle; and that too few political leaders today are making the case for global leadership.8 The NAC project pooled two American historical traditions into one ideological basket. The Bushists have argued that, to promote democracy in the world, the US must be ready to employ pre-emptive strikes.9

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Seven Propositions in Search of Civilization Proposition 1. There is one single human civilization, but there are numerous cultures We may speak of many civilizations in human history, some dead, others living. But human civilization also may be viewed as a grand old tree with many branches, owers and fruits. The different branches, owers and fruits each have their own shapes, colors, aromas and tastes. But they are all nurtured by the same earth, water, air and human ingenuity. There is a clear unity in diversity. Although isolated for centuries from their Eurasian varieties, the American civilizations (including the Native Americans, Aztecs, Incas and Mayas) also were based on technological advances and mythological foundations. Cultivation of edible crops, domestication of animals, development of media of communication and exchange, and the myth of sacrice as a foundation for political unity seem to be common to all human civilizations (Diamond, 1999). Whether we speak of one singular human civilization or its many branches, history shows that every new civilization has borrowed heavily from the past to build up its own achievements. The invention of re, wheel, compass, print, automobile, satellites and computers have been contributed by different nations. Comparable with the great technological breakthroughs in history, new moral heights also have been envisioned by many peoples and traditions. No nation or combination of nations can claim a monopoly of civilization. Hammurabi (1792 1750 BCE ) offered us the rst legal code. Moses gave us the Ten Commandments (thirteenth century BCE ). Cyrus (fth century BCE ) liberated the Jews and established a policy of cultural tolerance in his empire. Buddha (563 483 BCE ) and Jesus (rst century CE ) advocated a world ruled by love and compassion. Lao-tze (604 BCE ) and Confucius (551 479 BCE ) laid the moral and legal foundations for the Chinese civilization. In accordance with Buddhist Dharma (principles of right life), Emperor Ashoka (ruled 265 238 BCE ) of the Mauryan dynasty in India renounced all violence. Mahatma Gandhi struggled for Indian independence by non-violent means. In his campaign for civil rights, Martin Luther King followed non-violent resistance strategies. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1945) combined the wisdom of European civilizations with those inherited from others to establish a new and higher standard of ethical conduct by states. The list can go on and on. All civilizations are, to employ Benedict Andersons felicitous phrase (1983), imaginaries. Since all civilizations in history have borrowed heavily from others, it would be inaccurate to speak of them as disconnected imaginaries. Jared Diamond (1999) has argued that the Eurasian East West Axis allowed material and cultural exchanges greater than those in the North South axis of the Americas. But the propensity to travel, conquer, and exchange has been a perennial force in history on the East West as well as North South axes. Native Americans, for instance, are believed to have come mainly from Asia via Alaska (Diamond, 1999, pp. 36ff.). In Eurasian history, the mythologies, sciences and technologies of the ancient Sumerian, Egyptian, Persian, Greek and Roman civilizations were passed on to modern Europe via the medieval Islamic civilization. The same can be said of the Japanese and Korean civilizations that heavily borrowed from China. Proposition 2. Civilization may be considered as the increasing technological, mythological and communicative capacity of human societies to manage human problems In the Mediterranean world, civilization has been traditionally identied with city dwelling. In the European languages as well as Arabic and Persian (madaniyya, tammadon), the word for civilization suggests city life. Civitas, civility, civil and citizen are its derivations. By contrast,

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in East Asian languages, the term for civilization (Wen Ming in Chinese; Bun Mei in Japanese) suggests learning and enlightenment. The urban bias of the Mediterranean is historically understandable. To arrive at a global understanding, we need to emphasize what is common to all historical experiences. Ecological diversity and technological change provide the most solid footing for such an understanding. All human civilizations are founded on certain institutional arrangements, including the organization of family, tribes, states and businesses. Moreover, all civilizations are based on certain cosmologies or mythologies, focusing their attention on perennial truths and changing historical challenges. The Biblical myths relate to nomadic and agrarian societies, while the myths of Nationalism or Globalism concern industrial and informatic civilization. As a result of uneven developments in the world, we are currently witnessing a clash of mythologies. The myth of Divine sovereignty is encountering the myth of popular sovereignty. The two myths have been reconciled in the doctrine of separation of church and state, to wit Give to Caesar what is Caesars, and give to God that what is Gods. In theocratic regimes, however, the issue remains unresolved. As Joseph Campbell (1997) has argued, certain archetypical myths keep repeating themselves under various guises in different cultures. The myth of sacrice, for instance, runs through the so-called primitive as well as advanced cultures. To pacify the angry Gods who presumably caused natural catastrophes, many societies engaged in a variety of sacricial rites. To satisfy the male gods, in some societies, they even sacriced their virgins. As an expression of his faith in Yahweh in the story of Abraham, the myth of sacrice is embedded in his willingness to sacrice his son Isaac.10 However, Angel Gabriel brought him a lamb to sacrice instead. Millions of Muslims today sacrice a lamb on the last day of their pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca as a memorial to that day. In the Christian mythology, Jesus offered himself as the Lamb of God to be sacriced to redeem humanity from its sinfulness. In the modern nationalist states, young men and women are called upon on times of war to sacrice their lives at the altar of another God, namely the State. Myths are neither true nor false. They are relevant or irrelevant to changing historical circumstances, functional or dysfunctional in the management of certain social systems. The practice of human sacrices to appease gods took place in many ancient societies, but modern discoveries of the causes of natural disasters have rendered that kind of myth highly irrelevant and dysfunctional. Proposed by James Lovelock (1988), the Gaia Hypothesis, for instance, may be considered an appropriate myth for our own times. As a biologist, Lovelock has found considerable evidence to suggest that the Planet Earth could be considered a living organism. It breathes in and out, it can thrive in health or fall sick to pollutant toxins, it sustains life but it also can kill, it is responding to the human impact on its environment (such as global warming), and it may be considered to have a nite life. This intriguing hypothesis cannot be proved or disproved beyond doubt. But it can constitute a mythological belief or scientic postulate on the basis of which environmental policies are formulated to achieve greater sustainability. Proposition 3. Human civilization has been driven by four major forces in history, including ecologies, technologies, mythologies and communications Jared Diamond (1999) has shown how diverse ecologies have led to differences among human settlements and their respective advances in the military, economic and social elds. He also has demonstrated how technological advances by certain nations have led to domination of other nations. If we look carefully at human civilization as a whole, three other critical factors

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stand out. Modes of production, legitimation and communication are driven by technological innovations to homogenize the world. However, ecologies and mythologies are unique to particular times and spaces and can perhaps best explain the diversities in human civilization. Technologies such as the invention of re, wheel, compass, gunpowder, animal domestication, steam engine, assembly line or nuclear ssion have always privileged those rst acquiring them. The desire to dominate and exploit seems to be a recurrent phenomenon in history. Such desires are often supported by technologies, mythologies and communication carriers at hand. Technologies and mythologies of domination, however, have to be relevant to particular projects. The myth of racial purity and superiority, for instance, served the purpose of Western and Japanese colonialism. The myths of civilization and democracy are currently fuelling the American imperial ambitions.11 To be diffused worldwide, technologies and mythologies depend on communication carriers (Denemark, 2000; McNeil, 1998; Fernandez-Armesto, 2002). From messenger pigeons to postal systems, mass media and the Internet, the communication media have served such a function. Camels, horses, automobiles, trains and planes also have served the same function. The growing global communication networks are proliferating old and new technologies and mythologies. For centuries, the Chinese attempted to keep the production of silk a secret. In an act of piety during the thirteenth century, two Nestorian Christian priests traveled from Beijing to Constantinople, the Byzantine Imperial Court, and revealed the secret of silk production to the Europeans. Atomic weapons are currently in the exclusive possession of several countries. As a young Swedish scientist has demonstrated, knowledge of production of atomic weapons can be easily obtained in any good library. If libraries are not adequate, the black markets for weapons of mass destruction have proved their efcacy. Witness Pakistans complicity in selling nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea.12 Following the massive air attacks on the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, smaller countries have a great incentive to develop nuclear weapons in the belief that they would provide deterrence against similar invasions. A proliferation regime that privileges some states with nuclear weapons while denying others is thus founded on delusion. Proposition 4. Human civilization has gone through ve major, overlapping technological transformations, including nomadic, agrarian, commercial, industrial and informatic Stage theories of history such as those of Marx and Engels (1848), Rostow (1960) or Bell (1973) have one aw in common. They more or less assume a universal and progressive evolution from lower to higher levels of social and economic development. Cyclical views of history such as those of Ibn Khaldun (1958), Toynbee (1962), or Sarkar (Galtung and Inayatullah, 1997, Chap. 2.18) have another common aw. They assume a universal repetition of similar cyclical patterns. Much can be learned from the great scholars who have tackled universal history. But historical evidence and current world conditions do not justify inevitable universal progress or cyclical patterns. In the postwar period, certain countries (notably in West Asia and Africa) have been economically destroyed. In contrast, in some parts of the world, we have witnessed rapid economic progress. In still others, civil wars or political instability have produced economic stagnation or regression, and increases in poverty (UNDP, 2003). Layering of history, however, seems to be universally the case. An Israeli archeologist once showed me 27 layers of human settlement in one of the archeological sites near Jerusalem. A layering of global history thus seems closer to empirical realities than stages or cycles. Table 1 presents such a view. However, a few caveats are in order. First, the table provides a

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Table 1. Overlapping modes of civilization, globalization and empires: technological, institutional and cosmological perspectives
Nomadic civilization and empires (7 million years ago to present) Hunting, gathering, herding Shamanistic

Modes of imperial civilizations: globalization processes Mode of production: economy and technology Mode of legitimation: state and mythology Mode of communication: culture and carriers Technology Identity Community Institutions leadership

Agrarian civilization and empires (8000 BCE present) Agriculture, mining Metaphysical

Commercial civilization and empires (500 BCE present) Trade, money, banking Material

Industrial civilization and empires (1750present) Manufacturing, services Empirical

Informatic civilization and empires (1971 present) Information and knowledge industries Ecological

Orality

Literacy

Print

Mass media

Digital

Ancestral Nomadic Chiefdom Chief and shamans

Religious Territorial Temple Kings and prophets

Imperial Mobile Universities Emperors and priesthoods

Secular National Mass organizations PMs, presidents and ideologues

Cosmopolitan Global Networks CEOs and technologues, communologues jestologues

global view of long stretches of time and space. It should be taken seriously but not too seriously! In other words, it should be considered heuristic rather than denitive. Second, the dates should be considered suggestive. They mark historical watersheds that can be legitimately debated. Third, because we witness today the presence of all ve layers of human civilization, all dates continue into the present. Fourth, the emergence of leading sectors such as agriculture or commerce or manufacturing occurs in sequential historical epochs. Fifth, the table provides a matrix of civilization layers and globalization processes, including modes of production (economy and technology), legitimation (mythology and ideology), and communication (culture and its carriers). Proposition 5. Each historical layer can be characterized by its leading modes of production, legitimation, and communication The transitions in the mode of production from hunting and gathering to agriculture, commerce, manufacturing and informatics are rather well known. Each transition has involved major transformations in the economy, polity and culture. The following account cannot be but a birds-eye view of a complex history. Changing modes of production. The nomadic layer in human civilization constituted some 99% of the history of Homo sapiens. The major river basins pioneered the transition to

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agriculture only some 10 000 years ago. Agricultural surpluses made commerce possible and desirable. Without political security, however, commerce could not have ourished. The advent of multinational agrarian empires created common currencies, customs, laws and commerce. Whenever the Eurasian landmass was ruled by three contiguous imperial systems in the East, West and Center, international trade ourished. The discovery of the New World in the fteenth to sixteenth centuries by the Europeans inaugurated a new mode of production which we may call industrial. It also radically changed the trade routes from land to ocean. Monetization of the European economies through import of gold and silver from the New World facilitated the rise of consumer markets and manufacturing. The technological inventions of the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries led to an Industrial Revolution in England. Mainly owing to changing trade routes and lack of access to the riches of the New World, some Asian countries such as China that were equal if not ahead of Europe at the time were left behind. The Industrial Revolution spread to other European countries and North America. The role of European colonialism in this historical process was twofold. By facilitating access to cheap labor (including slavery), raw materials and consumer markets, colonial domination augmented European industrial growth but, by spreading the European ideas of liberty and equality, colonialism also dug its own grave. However, the global transition from industrial to post-industrial, informatic societies has been as uneven as the spread of industrial system. Changing modes of legitimation. Agricultural surpluses changed the modes of legitimation. They led to the rise of multinational, agrarian empires. Such empires differentiated between the temporal and spiritual authorities, undertook wars of conquest, established relative security over vast expanses of territory, and thus encouraged technological and cultural exchange among different peoples under their rule. They also facilitated the rise of Universalist religions such as Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam. These Universalist religions facilitated commerce and provided legitimation doctrines for the ensuring commercial empires such as the Byzantium, Abbasid, Tang, Safavid and Ottoman. Under the industrial order, secular humanism and its Enlightenment philosophy emerged as a dominant Universalist mode of legitimation. Under the banner of the white mans burden, it provided a doctrine of legitimacy for the European and American empires. An emerging informatic empire is based more on social class than ethnicity. To advance its cause, it employs the democratic doctrines of legitimacy. By privileging liberty, equality and solidarity as their respective axial principles, liberal, social and communitarian democratic doctrines provide contradictory policy perspectives. Hence, the myth of democracy is both powerful and contentious. Globalization has been always focused on the control of natural resources through conquest, domination or trade. In this round, however, the encounter between secular and religious doctrines of legitimacy has created a global, cultural civil war within and among nations. Witness particularly the US, India, China, Israel and the Islamic world. In an increasingly atomized world, the fetish of identity has focused on consumer commodities, for those with access to material goods, and cultural identity for those without. Jihad vs MacWorld (Barber, 1995) is not the peculiarity of Islamic and American worldviews. It is a more general phenomenon reecting the great material and cultural chasms that informatic imperialism is creating in the world. Changing modes of communication. Facilitated by improvements in transportation and communication, technological and cultural exchanges have accelerated throughout history. Through such technologies as domesticated animals (donkeys, horses and camels), the wheel,

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carriages, ships, compass, writing, print, electronic media, satellites, computers and the Internet, the world has become a global village. However, this village shows none of the cohesion and intimacy of the traditional villages. There are some 10 billion pages on the World Wide Web available to all those with computer and modem access. However, the divisions in their perspectives demonstrate a materially and culturally divided world which is groping for order within anachronistic political institutions. Technological advances in the global military, economic and communication sectors have left the cultural and political sectors far behind. Hit Kill ratios, for instance, have steadily advanced in the last three centuries, but since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, the nation-state system has dominated the world political order. Technological leads and cultural lags have created an ever-widening and alarming chasm. In contrast, the democratizing impact of expanding markets, communication networks and cultural exchanges cannot be ignored. In the rising environmentalist, civil society and ecumenical movements, we have witnessed antidotes to the prevailing hegemony. Awareness of the global problems of pollution in congested cities, the ozone layer, and over-exploited forests, rivers and oceans has affected the international discourse. Non-governmental organizations such as the Greenpeace, Amnesty International and the Anti-Landmine movement have had some measurable impact. Transborder communication networks have limited the ability of governments to mislead the public. Proposition 6. The current world conicts stem from material and cultural gaps represented by two global pathologies, namely commodity and identity fetishism All historical transitions from one civilization layer to another have created zones of complexity and contradiction. The modes of production, legitimation and communication of the old and new inevitably collide. As a result of their collision, the established truths of the old order are challenged by the truths of the new system. Such contradictions are the stuff of historical transitions. As the pace of technological and economic change increases, we can expect the expansion of zones of complexity and contradiction.13 Two examples of such zones may contribute to an understanding of the enormity of ensuing social conicts. The transition from an industrial to an informatic civilization in the US provides an apt historical example. That transition may be generally dated to the postwar period (1945 present). The mode of production under industrial civilization was best symbolized by the homogenizing inuences of the assembly line and high mass consumption. The latter depended on an acquisitive society promoted by commercial advertising. The pathology of such a society could be identied as commodity fetishism, a tendency to evaluate the worth of an individual by the commodities he or she consumes. The house, automobile, clothes and perfumes consumed thus tend to dene personal identities in high-consumption societies. In his theory of the leisure class and conspicuous consumption, Thorstein Veblen (2001) had anticipated this pathology. To keep up with the Joneses became the prevailing social attitude in postwar American society. The frugality of the earlier periods of industrialization and its heroes (e.g. John D. Rockefeller) gave way to the rise of the new heroes of capitalism such as Donald Trump, with his displays of glamour, consumption and television. The Flower Revolution of the 1960s may be considered a reaction against the exacting demands of an industrial civilization. Since it was led by a postwar afuent younger generation, Peter Berger (1977) called it the soft revolution. The celebration of nature, sexuality, peace and participatory democracy were part of a cultural revolution against the exacting industrial demands for domination of nature and society based on competitiveness, elitism and

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imperialism. Since the 1960s, American society has been torn between the two competing cultural values of industrial and informatic civilizations. Increasing mobility and atomization has resulted in a passionate search for identity focused on gender, ethnicity, and religion. Social movements such as the feminist, gay, lesbian and Christian fundamentalism have become the hallmark of American cultural conicts. But so long as the economy can provide jobs, consumerism is the unifying social factor. Loss of jobs caused by the ight of American industries to low-cost locations is producing class conict, while loss or denial of social status is creating identity anxiety and conict. Commodity and identity fetishism in American society has thus become the two dialectical sides of the same social coin. Another example may focus on Iran. Under the monarchical regimes (1953 1979), Iran came directly under American political, economic and cultural inuence. With increasing oil revenues, the country entered a period of rapid economic growth and widening disparities in wealth, income and ways of life. The economic gaps increasingly sharpened the cultural chasm between the secular and religious societies. The country was deeply divided into two nations. Some 5% of the population seemed to have adopted secular values promoted by easy access to consumer goods. The other 95% reacted to the conspicuous consumption of the urban elite by resorting to their traditional identity as Shia Muslims. The social and cultural conicts between commodity and identity fetishism generated the Islamic Revolution of 1979 (Tehranian, 1980). Since the revolution, the country has continued to be deeply torn between the value systems of an industrializing and acquisitive society and the traditional agrarian values of modesty, abstinence, and frugality. Put directly into the hands of the state and its clerical-merchant rulers, oil revenues in Iran have widened the gaps and exacerbated the social conicts. The conict between the Iranian so-called conservatives and reformers may be viewed as a conict between tradition and modernity focusing on two contradictory doctrines of legitimacy. The conservative clerics emphasize velayat-i-faqih, the doctrine of guardianship of the (Shia) jurists (Tehranian, 1992). The reformers accuse them of akhundshahi, or clerical monarchy, while calling for popular sovereignty. On a global scale, the growing economic and cultural gaps within and among nations are breeding an international and intercultural civil war without physical and moral boundaries. Globalization forces are resulting in fragmentation and intense competition among ethnic, religious and status groups (Chua, 2003). Once the traditional restraints on exercise of power are weakened, the competition can erupt into bloody massacres of one group by the other. The genocide of Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda-Burundi, the Shia and Kurdish population by the Sunnis in Saddam Husseins Iraq, and the Chinese minorities in Indonesia provide the most recent examples. Globalization also creates the insecurities of distant proximity (Rosenau, 2003). The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Israeli Palestinian conict can be better understood in this light. The presence of a global oil industry has systematically brought the Persian Gulf region into the vortex of globalization and proximity to the US domestic politics. With over 60% of the world oil reserves and exports, local conicts in the Persian Gulf have inevitably become globalized. In the meantime, global forces have created a wedge between the sectors of the population who benet from the oil wealth and those who do not. The terrorist attacks on the US were the culmination of several decades of convergence of global and local forces. Global forces thus tend to have a fragmenting impact on the social structures of developed as well as developing countries. Deepening material and cultural divisions among communities that are neighbors in urban America or in Israel/Palestine are resulting in gated communities

94 M. Tehranian
of the rich and the poor. Building a wall around the West Bank to cordon off the Palestinians from Israelis serves essentially the same function as building gated communities in afuent urban neighborhoods to protect them against threats from outside. Caught in the same territorial space but with different cultural identities and styles of life, the confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians has degenerated into an endless blood feud. This confrontation assumes greater intensity when it concerns land rights between the lower strata of Israeli and Palestinian population, namely the West Bank Jewish settlers and the Palestinian Jihad and Hamas organizations. Similarly, at the global level, as physical distances diminish by the international communication networks, cultural and political differences are magnied into security threats. As a security measure, the initial response is to build physical and symbolic walls, to impose stringent visa requirements and to enlarge surveillance. Gated communities and the Berlin and Jerusalem Walls physically separate communities, but they also antagonize and strengthen the will to destroy them in a next phase of struggle. Since international disparities in wealth and income are often replicated domestically, these walls cannot ultimately contain the two fetishisms of commodity and identity. Proposition 7. A new global civilization and citizenship is beginning to respond to the challenges of constructing a more peaceful, ecologically balanced, democratic and just world Since the cultural revolution of the 1960s, a major paradigmatic shift has been taking place in the dominant worldviews of industrial civilization. The fundamental assumptions of the Enlightenve faith in (1) the ment Project have been increasingly brought into question, among them the na justice of the marketplace, (2) the innite perfectibility of humankind, (3) the inevitability of historical progress, (4) the moral legitimacy of human domination and exploitation of nature, (5) the civilizing mission of the so-called advanced nations, and (6) the universal truth of empirical science. The anti-war, national liberation, environmentalist, feminist, phenomenology and theology of liberation, and postmodernist movements each have contributed in their own unique ways to undermine the dominance of the Enlightenment worldviews. Meanwhile, informatic civilization has been emerging from the womb of industrial societies (Tehranian, 1990, Chap. 2). It has been labeled Post-Industrial (Bell, 1973), Information (Porat, 1977), Knowledge (Machlup,1980), Postmodern (Harvey, 1990) and Network (Castells, 1996 2000) Society. As in the Jain legend about the elephant and the blind men touching and describing different parts of a single creature, each of the above labels captures a different aspect of a complex and evolving social system. It is fairly clear, however, that the new modes of production depend on informatic technologies and signicantly differ from the past industrial forms in several respects. First and foremost, the application of informatic technologies has made automation and robotics increasingly possible. For example, in computer-assisted design and computer-assisted manufacturing (CAD CAM), most industries have become increasingly automated. Second, the electronic transfer of news, data and images has led to new business organizations which have been called multinational, transnational or global corporations. The global reach of some 1000 global corporations annually reported by the Fortune Magazine has made it possible for them to spread their manufacturing facilities around the world in order to minimize risks and maximize prots. Lower labor, rent, tax and regulation costs have lured the global corporation from the old industrial centers in North America and Western Europe to the industrializing countries in East Asia and Latin America. Third, this kind of exible accumulation (Harvey, 1990) has distributed the production of the different parts of a single product among diverse locations while allowing for

Civilization: A Pathway to Peace? 95

just in time assembly to meet changing market demands. Finally, with the automation and robotization of manufacturing and a consequent decline of demand for physical labor, the national economies of the informatic world have shifted from agriculture and manufacturing to services. For the US, this shift started in the late 1950s (Porat, 1977). The long-term trend for all countries has been to shift from primary (agriculture and mining) to secondary (manufacturing) and tertiary (services) production. In industrial countries, agriculture contributes about 1 3%, manufacturing about 20 30% and services about 70 80% of Gross Domestic Product. For middle and high income countries, the World Bank data show that the structures of employment have signicantly shifted from agriculture and industry to services (World Bank, 2003, p. 48). The most visible changes can be witnessed in the global and national communications systems. Informatization has facilitated several other changes, including (1) convergence of telecommunication and computers, (2) miniaturization of personal communication devices, (3) rapid expansion of the wireless and (4) application of information storage, processing and retrieval in nearly all industries and services. Internet and News networks such as the CNN, BBC, Sky TV and recently Aljazeera have provided more news and information accompanied by greater international anxiety and stereotyping.14 Improving transportation facilities have made greater international migration possible. Diasporic and cosmopolitan identities have been on the rise among a population of global nomads, including immigrants as well as TNC, NGO and IGO personnel. In contrast to the priesthoods of the agrarian and commercial eras, and the ideologues of the industrial epoch, a new class of technologues has emerged to lead the informatic revolution. Figures such as Steve Job, Bill Gates and the teeming hardware and software engineers around the world engaged in the informatic industries and services may be considered the new communications elite. In politics, however, two other types of gures have been privileged by the rise of informatic civilization. For want of better terminology, we may call them communologues and jestologues (Tehranian, 1990, p. 67). Communologues such as Ayatollah Khomeini, Zapatista leader Commandant Marcos (Ronfedt et al., 1998), and Osama Ben Laden (Ronfedt and Arquilla, 2001) are political leaders who have dipped into the rich mythological resources of particular nations to frame their respective messages. When the power of the new communications technologies are combined with the old mythologies of marginalized population, they can produce signicant social movements such as the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Al-Qaedeh in the Islamic world, or the Zapatista Movement in Mexico (Gills, 2000). The global spread of television as a source of news and entertainment has also had another interesting political consequence. It has reduced the importance of traditional political parties and privileged those leaders who can use the medium for direct appeals to the electorate. Ronald Reagan and Arnold Schwarzenegger in the US, Shintaro Ishihara in Japan, and Joseph Estrada and Fernando Poe Jr in the Philippines provide the best-known examples of actors who have made a successful transition from the world of entertainment to politics. We may call such gures jestologues, because they intuitively understand that the new mediated politics is primarily about entertaining your audience without alienating particular sets of voters. Politics as bread, circus and roots has found a new meaning in the Informatic Age. The emergence of communologues and jestologues as communication leaders in mediaintensive societies may have long-term consequences. It seems to encourage extremism. Alex De Tocquevilles (1956) warning about tyranny of majorities seems to have taken a new turn. With the decline of voluntary associations (Putnam, 2000) to act as a balancer, mass audiences seem to be easily manipulated into believing the prevailing ideological propaganda.

96 M. Tehranian
In media-intensive societies, the fundamental assumptions of liberal democracy seem to have become increasingly irrelevant to popular sovereignty. Manipulation of voter anxieties by political advertising nanced by special interests has left little room for the classical liberal view of deliberate debate on public policies (Habermas, 1991). Voluntary associations and the public sphere of discourse are increasingly shifting from the mass media to the interactive Internet channels. Informatic civilization is thus creating unprecedented challenges and opportunities. It is laying the technological foundations for a truly global civilization. It is also forcing different cultures and mythologies into direct contact, confrontation and dialogue. In the failing states of Sub-Saharan Africa, war-torn countries (former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq), and all other transitional societies, it has created zones of complexity, contradiction and chaos. Can the world build international peace, security and order out of chaos, war and human suffering? That question may be addressed by focusing on problems and prospects for more democratic global governance. The foundations of modern global governance were laid by the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the Concert of Europe (1812 1914), the League of Nations (1918 1941), and the United Nations (1945 present). It took the Thirty Years War between the Protestants and Catholics to establish the Peace of Westphalia, recognizing freedom of religion and the existing boundaries among the emerging secular European nation-states. It took the Napoleonic Wars to achieve a precarious Concert of Europe focusing on the maintenance of the European status quo. World War I led to the establishment of the League of Nations. But the failure of the US to join the League signicantly reduced its credibility and effectiveness. The League thus could not act in the cases of German, Italian and Japanese aggression. World War II revived the Leagues principle of collective security, which was embodied in the United Nations Charter. However, the onset of the Cold War in 1947 and the division of the world into the three conicting camps of capitalist, communist and non-aligned nations hampered the United Nations. The wars in Korea, Vietnam, Africa and the Middle East reected an unstable and divided world order. The end of the Cold War in 1989, the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the effective entry of China into the world markets in the 1990s placed the US in the position of a single superpower. Since the 1990s, the US has uctuated between three stark choices: (1) neoisolationismto withdraw, as the Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush advocated in 2000, from police actions and nation-building while focusing on the pursuit of its own narrower economic and political interests; (2) multilateralismto strengthen the multilateral institutions of global governance such as the United Nations or NATO in pursuit of its multilateral objectives; (3) unilateralismto act unilaterally to impose its will particularly in the zones of contradiction and chaos such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel Palestine and North Korea. The terrorist acts of 9/11 led the Bush Administration to take the latter course. That policy, however, has proved counterproductive. First, in an interdependent world, it lacks legitimacy. Second, the resources of a single state, even if a superpower, are inadequate for the challenges of state and nation building in countries that are in throes of a major historical transition to the modern world. Third, the twenty-rst-century conditions are radically different from those of the nineteenth-century, when Britain could rule a vast empire with relatively docile populations. The new informatic civilization has awakened millions of people around the world to their basic human needs, including the rights of self-determination. Unilateral policies in such context represent a historical regression. In contrast, the current institutions of global governance are profoundly out of sync with the technological and economic changes in the world (Aksu and Camilleri, 2002). The Charter of the

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United Nations was approved in 1945. In the meantime, the composition of the Security Council and the right of veto has lost much of its legitimacy. Important factors have changed the power conguration of the world, including the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the decline of the UK, France and Russia, the economic rise of Germany and Japan, the emergence of the European Union, and the rise of heavily populated countries such as China, India, Brazil and Southeast Asia. Although difcult to achieve, a revision of the UN Charter to take account of the new realities is called for. Informatic civilization is creating a new global consciousness. That consciousness is based on an increasing awareness of the worlds ecological and economic interdependence, cultural clashes and the need for dialogue and democracy. Technological advances have shown their Janus face. On the one hand, they have opened up new possibilities in mass production, global communication, space, medicine, education, agriculture and services. On the other hand, they have widened the economic and cultural gaps between the rich and poor within and among nations. The technologies of violence have dramatically increased the levels of kill by hits. The global institutions of governance have lagged far behind the technological and economic transformations.

Conclusion Instead of focusing on the trees, this essay has taken up the challenge of taking a snapshot of the forest. If its analysis is anywhere close to the empirical realities of an increasingly complex and contradictory world, the following concluding reections may be worthy of consideration: (1) If by civilization we understand the human journey toward a more peaceful and just world, the term continues to have relevance in any normative discussion of public policies. Throughout history, however, civilization also has been employed as an ideological tool to legitimate hegemonic rule by creating a wedge between us and them. The challenge is therefore to reclaim civilization as global unity in diversity, the rule of law, and pacic resolution of conicts. (2) Globalization has historically played a critical role in advancing human civilization through technological and cultural exchange. However, it also has come about by nomadic, agrarian, commercial, industrial and informatic empires. In the current round of globalization, a Pancapital Empire is employing the neoliberal doctrines of market competition and supremacy to legitimate its global control of natural resources (Tehranian, 1999). Markets are clearly necessary for the efcient allocation of resources, but they are not sufcient for the welfare of human societies. (3) Human civilization has been fuelled by the prevailing technologies, mythologies and communication carriers of each age. If we consider technological change as a decisive engine of change, human civilization has evolved from nomadic into agrarian, commercial, industrial and informatic societies. While scientic and technological advances have accelerated, the cultural lag in mythological narratives has often trapped human societies into anachronistic laws and institutions. Technological globalization has thus advanced much more rapidly than economic, political, or political globalization. (4) Since technological advances have taken place unevenly, the world currently faces a double jeopardy in technological and cultural leads and lags (Tofer, 1980). The increasing partition of the world into premodern, modern and postmodern is producing some cultural

98 M. Tehranian
contradictions and clashes of its own. The most notable pathology of this transitional period appears to be commodity and identity fetishism fueling state and opposition terrorism. (5) The passage to a truly global civilization in which the development of each person is considered a condition for the development of all is a long cherished ideal. This ideal is perhaps today the most relevant myth, or leap of faith, that the world needs for its survival and welfare. (6) The ideal of civilization at this critical period in human history may be best sustained by democratizing local, national, regional and global governance institutions. However, in the light of rapid technological changes that have taken place during the past 200 years, the doctrines of liberal, social and communitarian democracy must be rethought and revised to t the specic local, national, regional and global conditions.

Acknowledgements This paper summarizes the thesis of a forthcoming book, Civilization: A Universal Journey. I should be grateful for any corrections of facts or interpretations. I am grateful to Jerry Bentley and Barry Gills for their critical comments on earlier drafts.

Notes
1 Robert W. Cox (2002) extensively discusses the implications of the s in civilizations. He traces the genealogy of the concept of civilization to the Englightenment Movement and its zeal to spread the European rational scientictechnological civilization throughout the world. In due course, that worldview gave rise to Westen, Russian and Japanese colonialism. De-colonization and globalization have brought us into contact with a diversity of civilizations, each with their own claims to validity. Owing to rising global networks and problems, we may be at another historical turning point, enabling us to speak of civilization in the singular: human civilization. However, under the banner of globalization and civilization, that turn of events also has awakened new hegemonic projects such as the Bush Doctrine. In this paper, I argue that it would be wiser to recognize unity in diversity by acknowledging and respecting the differences. In the literature of globalization, we can nd many other plausible denitions. I have chosen the one that best describes its contemporary economic and political agenda. This is a reference to President George W. Bushs address to the Joint Session of US Congress on 20 January 2002. Bush explicitly identied the Axis of Evil to consist of Iran, Iraq and North Korea, but he left the Axis of Virtue rather implicit, presumably to consist of a Coalition of the Willing that invaded Iraq in March 2003. However, mythology is often understood as the antonym of reality. Mythologies are neither true nor false. They are relevant or irrelevant, functional or dysfunctional, in the context of specic historical situations and tasks. Myths are those narratives that explain the mysteries of nature, society and human destiny. Examples include the myths of creation, origins of history and the purpose of human life. Such myths constitute an essential part of the human condition. Science has uncovered many mysteries but it also has expanded the number of unknowns. In the face of such uncertainties, mythologies perform important social functions such as (1) reducing human ontological insecurities (Laing, 1969), (2) uniting societies around a common cause and (3) legitimating and challenging power systems. A nineteenth-century anthropologist Tylor, for instance, wrote that Human life may be roughly classed into three great stages, Savage. Barbaric, Civilized, as quoted by Gould and Kolb (1964, p. 93). Given the enormous diversity of capitalist democracies, it is not certain to what capitalism Fukuyama is referring. The elite consensus on reality is increasingly tenuous. Witness the divergence between the American and the European views on the nature of the terrorist threat; those differences are also visible among the Democratic and Republicans in the US. Reecting the increasing complexity and diversity of world society, the non-elite greatly diverge in their interests and views. To some Europeans and Asians the new Bush Doctrine of

2 3

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unilateralism, claiming the rights of pre-emptive strike, seemed arrogant and extremist. Any study of world order must therefore take account of these complex varieties. www.newamericancentury.org/ The Bush Doctrine seems to replicate the saga of Western lms. It suggests that to promote law and order in a civilized world, the US must be ready to shoot rst. In the Koran, it is Ishmael rather than Isaac who is to be sacriced. The tribal rivalries between the Jews and Arabs may be dated back to their common ancestor, Abraham. According to the Koran, when Abrahams wife Sarah gave birth to their son Isaac, she asked Abraham to banish his concubine Hagar and her son Ishmael. However, an angel later appeared to Hagar with a message from God that they will have their own nation. The Biblical story provides a slightly different myth: The childless septuagenarian receives repeated promises and a covenant from God that his seed will inherit the land and become a numerous nation. He not only has a son, Ishmael, by his wifes maidservant Hagar but has, at 100 years of age, by Sarah, a legitimate son, Isaac who is to be the heir of the promise. Yet Abraham is ready to obey Gods command to sacrice Isaac, a test of his faith, which he is not required to consummate in the end because God substitutes a ram. Abraham, Encyclopdia Britannica from Encyclopdia Britannica Premium Service: khttp://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu 3413l[Accessed 21 February 2004]. Skeptics can always puncture a particular myth by deconstructing it. At a strategic level, opposition to the Bush Doctrine can draw on American anti-colonial rather than imperial traditions. At a tactical level, the opposition can puncture the myth by asking the American government to bring democracy rst to its own electoral system (e.g. in Florida or campaign nancing). Nevertheless, the myth of democracy presents a powerfully relevant one to the current imperial ambitions. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3450317.stm To cite a mundane example, my recent phone call to Microsoft to report problems with their Windows software led me to Bangalore, India, where a courteous voice asked me to call Toshiba because the program had been bundled with a Toshiba laptop computer. My call to Toshiba, in turn, led me to another courteous voice in Istanbul, Turkey, by which I was informed to pay $25 in order to receive directions over the phone on how to deal with the problem. When I found out, however, that there is no guarantee of a solution, I chose to hang up. In an informatic civilization, my computer problem persists, while the TNCs outsource their functions to lower cost locations around the globe. Dr Daniel Newbill, my wise physician, suggests that the media should make a habit of reporting a piece of good news for every bad news about nation X that they transmit. That would perhaps give us a more realistic view of the world than the current mediated distortions we receive. That may also produce greater international understanding.

8 9 10

11

12 13

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