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The Christian Spiritual Foundations of Social Commitment (A perspective of / for the 3rd millennium)*

S. Lourdunathan**

Structural and Interrelated Crisis-Context


In the contemporary social living we are faced with a host of social constraints, which in turn either directly or indirectly but actively affect the life of the humans and the cosmos. Our industriali ed relations that pave way for the separation of the humans from !ature, "estructive technocratic techno-cra iness of the trans-national scientific-man leading to reduction of the dignity of human labour, #echnology constructed with out the face of the $other !ature ............... Social fragmentation in terms of caste, religion and race, %eligious fundamentalism as against foundationalism, over consumption &s 'overty #rans-national capitalism (xploitation of the 'oor, the marginali ed, #he )ntouchable, women and children (mergence of new forms of colonialism such as *+lobalisation, leading through -free mar.et, which in turn increase the *'rofit-interests of the %ich nations- and its trans-national capitalism Increase in /uman %ights violations and so on. #a.ing to this crisis-context we need to introspect our assumptions rooted in our social and religious cultural frame-paradigm, in order to bring about any change in our perception. #he problems of the contemporary religious and social life are multi-various and multi-dimensional0 Since these problems are multidimensional and inter-related we need to approach this Crisis-Context from a multi-dimensional and mutually related and relative 'oint of view. I propose a model of critical 'luralism as an approach to social and religious commitment in our every day life in the society.

_________________ *1 tal. given to the %eligious +athering, arranged by Claretian 1shram, Sevagram, 2ardha on 34th !ovember 3444. **Senior 5ecturer in 'hilosophy, 1rul 1nandar 6autonomous7 College 8arumathur, $adurai-9:; ;3<, #amilnadu

#he issues 2hat is the metaphysical-spiritual foundation of our social living= 2hat are its ethical implications for our religious and social action 6commitment7= I propose to deal with these two basic issues in this evening. I than. the excellent team of formatters at Claretian 1shram for having -created> this opportunity to interact with you all.

#he 'roblem of #hrown-1way-!ess In the language of 'hilosophy the contemporary context of interrelated problematic context may be schematised or themati ed as the problem of *#hrown-1way-!ess>. #his from the point of view of the *suffering-other,. #he Suffering-Other according to me is the #rinitarian0-#he !ature, #he "iscriminated 2omen and Children and the oppressed or marginali ed humans. 6+od is #rinitarian, it is the medium of the -way of the Cross, that intersub?ectivity of the #rinity is reali ed. #he #wo dimensions of the problem of #hrown-ness0 #he thrown-ness is both individual and social. 1s social, its dimensions are religious, cultural economical, historical. 'roblem of identity crisis is both individual and socio-religious. 1s Individual, it is a loss of sense of being a person. It is an experience of being -closed to oneself,. 1s religious it is a loss of our rooted-ness in one,s foundational faith and sense of belongingness with theother in the context of religious human community at large.

Conceptual classification of #hrown ness 'hilosophically spea.ing it is an experience of metaphysical, epistemological and ethical thrown-ness. 3. #he metaphysical #hrown ness0 It is a sense of loss of meaning for the affirmation of life, exercised by the dominant world-view. :. #he epistemological #hrown ness0 It is a sense of denial of consciousness, a sense of denial of the possibilities of understanding of the world @. #he ethical #hrown ness0 It is a sense of a denial of values to the affirmation of his existence, as a person in relation to human society. 2hat is 'erspective= It is the way we perceive ourselves. Or the way we loo. at ourselves, #he way we relate with others, #he way we become to (xist in the social life and in our religious life. It comprises of our attitude and action for or to life. It is the glass we are bound to and habituated to wear. It is the $ind-Set. It is a moral frame. It is an attitude to life. It is influenced or enforced by our 6culture A social religious life7 value frame. 'ost-$odern 'erspectives #he 'ostmodernist,s insights or theoretical discourses on 3. #he %elation between Centre and the 'eriphery :. #he issues of 'ower and "omination and its conseBuence of multiple oppressions @. #he 'roblem of Identity ...................provides us with theoretical possibility of understanding our foundations of our religious and social life. #he mechanics of power In the relation between #he Centre and the 'eriphery in our forms of life there exist a relation of the mechanics of power. It is mediated through logic of domination. 1nd the logic of domination is *interwoven> in the very roots of our socialCreligious forms of life. 3. #he concept of right or wrong is centred around the *power centre> and in terms of relations of dominations. :. Drom the lower level of family to highest of level of religious and social and environmental lives, the domination of power is operative. #hey are situated in the mechanism of 'atriarchy, Casteism, +ender, %eligion, and Capitalism. @. #he theoretical foundations of these social and religious expressions are called the -$eta-narratives, A or essentialism A superstructure etc. <. #he economy of power that is circulated and individuali ed throughout the social body extends beyond the super structure of our social and religious life.

;. 1part from the economic base of power-centre, there is non-economic, non-state basis of power is operative in the centre. 9. #he mechanics of power is embedded with in the structure of structures.

#he 5ogic of domination Eetween F and G, when F is conceived to be superior, 6through its cultural frame wor.7 then F ?ustifies himself to sub?ugate. Its social expression is the practice of a value dualistic social system where the practice of discrimination is maintained by subordinating the secondary to the primary reality. #he metaphysical thrownness that the Suffering-#rinitarian face in their life can be traced to this .ind of sub?ugation or thrown ness in their social life as oppressed people. #he conceptual distinction of conceiving reality in terms of polarities is the basic rationale for the practice of social thrown-ness. It is the polarity between the rich and the poor, priestly and the laity the holy and the unholy, the touchable and the untouchable ... the $ind and the matter, the One &s $any etc.#hese polarities provide a fertile ground that identifies the theoretical struggle between metaphysical supremacy and inferiority, mediated through a logic that ?ustifies and classifies the relation between the polari ed variables. In other words, the human mind has all along been conditioned to perceive and philosophi e in a dualistic manner whose net-result is an implicit practice of metaphysical thrown ness of the secondary entity by the primary entity. #his is expressed in a language and logic that sanction and maintain a hierarchy of classification that is implicit in philosophical discourses. #his may be situated in the context of a theoretical and practical struggle between the metaphysics of the 'rimary and the Secondary. Considered and treated as an Out-Caste, in the context of Caste-world view, the oppressed struggle against the 'rimary, namely the caste-based ideology of the /indu society, in favour of the secondary, in order to be conceived and treated, in transcendence and freedom of both. #he idea of 2ounded #otality #he need of shift in 'erspective Drom the 'erspective of the "ominant to the perspective of the subalthern inorder to reali e * the .ingdom of +od>. "ue to anomalies within the structure. Drom centric attitude to non-centric attitude to life. CritiBue of Spirituality is needed0

2e need to re-visit our spiritual foundations and examine the type of centeredness by which our foundations are oriented. #here are three possibilities of our spiritual foundations0 #he Individual centeredness, #he institutional centeredness and #he other-orientedness. 2hether it is centred and oriented towards individualism, self glorification, monism, Hnegative of the other= Or whether it is merely institutional centred = *playing our own games> in the best way possible as against our human nature 6Eeing in relation to others7 Or whether it socially emancipatory= #hese are introspective Buestions for us in the advent of the next millennium to ma.e our life more authentic and socially committed. 3. Social spirituality should ta.e us to the realm of social-otherness from individuali ed and institutionalised power centres or individuali ed C institutionalised *sacredness>. :. Our foundations need to be !on-Centric A%elational-Communitarian A Critical 'luralistic- 6Dor Spino a, Eeing in itself and Eeing in another. Dor $arcel, $an is a being with Awith-others-in-the-worldI man is a being for others. /e is in an inescapable interpersonal relationship7 #he story of !on-Competitive #ribal 6communitarian7 and the anecdote of the transplantation of the Organs to the suffering-other. Searl,s 1nalysis of %ule Eounded ness #he idea of 2ounded #otality #he !eed for 1ffirmative 1ction #he concept of inherent responsibility to the other 6inescapable7 #he logic of negation of negation or double negation A 1ffirmation of life Jesus as the necessary and sufficient foundation of Christian life. It should be oriented towards Jesus and his *'resence for Others>

#han. Gou

Being In The Presence Of The Other 2hat is the meaning of Being in the Presence of The Other? 1nd what is the meaning of Being in the Presence of The Other in context of the Gospel or in the life context of Jesus are the t o !asic issues that are ta"en for reflection in this tal". #hat is the $eaning of IV THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THROWNNESS %.& The concept of thro nness -Social #hrownness, and loneliness is increasingly recogni ed as a universal affliction that is ha ardous to social eBuality and human identity. It is a totali ed practice of human alienation. It is a factuality of in?ustice and ineBuality institutionali ed in an un?ust social order. It is an experience of dehumani ation. "ere. Eows.ill observes, *'eople are feeling lonelyI their lives consisting of proximity without presence, contiguity with out contact and familiarity without feeling. #he sad truth about us human beings is that there are now more humans with less being than ever before>;.

#his sheer antiBuity, ubiBuity and familiarity of this non-exotic and nonesoteric practice could cloa. its insidious capacity for individual and social integration. 2ith reference to its nature, the practice of -social thrownness, can be considered, as non-constructive, anti-social, and unethical. It is a suffering from and can be utili ed as a -suffering towards, that calls for greater need for social sensiti ing and purifying the -body of the society,. It is an experience of re?ection whose result is lac. of intimacy and lac. of meaning. Since its construct is social, it has to be re-constructed and re-set rather than finding fault with the individual, who suffers from social thrownness. It results from a value hierarchical practice in the society. %.' (onceptual classification of thro nness %.'.) The $etaph*sical Thro nness 0 It is a sense of loss of meaning for the affirmation of life, exercised by the dominant world-view. %.'.& The episte$ological Thro nness0 It is a sense of denial of consciousness, a sense of denial of the possibilities of understanding of the world %.'.' The ethical Thro nness+ It is a sense of a denial of values to the affirmation of his existence, as a person in relation to human society. $oreover, it should be pointed out the above mentioned conceptual distinction does not purport in any way either exhaustive or inclusive of the entire life experience of 1mbed.ar. Instead, it is intended as a philosophical analysis of the lived-experience of 1mbed.ar, especially from the point of view of his suffering and struggle as an outcaste in the Indian society. It is done so, for an efficient promotion of the research analysis only. 2e shall now proceed to analy e how the life of 1mbed.ar is conditioned and at the same time guided by the different dimensions of his -thrownness,. #he argument is that the cumulative effect of social thrownness in the life of 1mbed.ar is not a total hopelessness but positively developed into a critiBue potential of religion and society for praxis of emancipation. %.'.) ,etaph*sical Thro nness 2hat is the sense, in which a metaphysical form of thrownness is experienced in the life of 1mbed.ar, is the issue of our exposition here. $etaphysical thrownness is one of the most comprehensive forms of thrownness. It serves as the ontological foreground and bac.ground of all the other forms thrownness. It is a theoretical plat-form and a -master mood, 9 which is all pervasive and a free-floating apprehensiveness with reference to the sense of one,s separated-ness in the social-world and his place there in. Dor 1mbed.ar, it is an experience of a lac. of intimate meaningful solidarity with other beings, 6other

members of the society7 and bespea.s an initiative-emotional longing or search for an alternate philosophical frame that would contribute to his connected-ness 6relationship-with-the-others7 in the world. Such an experience of metaphysical thrown-ness compels one to involve into a critiBue- potential of an ontologism that practices exclusiveness of his being-in-the-world. 1lternately, it represents the experiential interweaving of the ultimate categories of reality, such as being and non-being, with their metaphysical and meta-psychic counterparts, namely the feelings of completeness, fullness and substantiality in contrast to those of incompleteness, emptiness, separateness and negations and a sense of loss of philosophical meaning of life.K In the face of metaphysical thrownness, one,s negative sense of separatedness or thrown-away-ness may be caused by the experience of being an infinitesimal episode of within time and space categories. One feels theoretically homeless or -alone, or thrown-away, stranded in the boundless expanse of multirelated dis?ointed and decertified beings. #hus, he or she is compelled to a feeling of foundationless or driftI a feeling of a loss of meaning in life. #his is what we term it as metaphysical thrown-ness as experienced by 1mbed.ar. In the metaphysics of thrownness, there is a sentience of the precariousness, fragility, bro.en-ness, an experience of out-caste-ness, oppressed-ness and contingency of his separated-ness from the Indian society. 1s a result or correlatively the worldviews of the dominant-other is perceived as alienating, ob?ectifying and reifying experience, by 1mbed.ar. #he world-view of the dominant-other is seen by 1mbed.ar as distortive, unreal or irrational. #he society and his experience in the society, and the world of ob?ects, may appear to be falling apartI it feels immoral and antisocial. #his facet conseBuently, force 1mbed.ar towards a serious philosophical analysis, of how such a -thrownness, is being theoretically conceived and socially practiced. #his is what has happened in the life of 1mbed.ar. Dragmented by the feeling of nonacceptance or thrown-away experience in the /indu society he see.s for a worldview that would provide and sustain his being-in-relation-to the-other in the society. #he disintegration that he experienced in the context of the dehumani ing caste-world has been exchanged for a new philosophy and religion and social order that integrates life of the discriminated people to total authenticity. In the history of philosophy, one could situate the locus of metaphysical thrown-ness in the dialectical tension between the polari ed conceptual variables. In the metaphysics of in?ustice, there always existed a hegemonic practice of domination. 1s a result, separatedness 6dualism7 serves the antithesis to the becoming of ?ustice. In 'hilosophy, the dialectics between the so-called primary reality and the secondary reality would reveal the implicit ?ustification of the

practice of metaphysical thrownness, which is theoretically schooled in those philosophies that ?ustify dualism or monism. #hey often reveal the philosophical attempt to the promotion of a logically sound institutionali ation of dichotomy or exclusivism whose social expression is existential thrownness. #he tension between the polarities is the metaphysical facet of #hrownness. 2hich is at once found reali ed by the dogmatic practice of a value-hierarchical caste-social system. 1mbed.ar observes, *#he principle of /indu social order is0 Drom each one according to his need. #o each one according to his 6caste7 nobility> L. /e adds in one of his footnote that -the differentiation between high and low is recogni ed as law and philosophy., %.'.).) -istinction !et een the Pri$ar* and Secondar* realities+ ./alue0 oriented dualistic functional realities1 Eetween the so-called 'rimary and Secondary realities such as Dorm and $atter, +od and Cosmos, 'urusa and 'ra.riti, the /oly and the unholy, the Ideal and %eal, Spirit and Eody %ational and (mpirical, )niversal and 'articular, Spiritual and Secular Sacred and 'rofane, #ranscendence and Immanence, Sub?ectivity and Ob?ectivity, #otality and Dragmentation, (volution and %evolution, )nity and "iversity, Consensus and "issents, Concord and "iscord, Culture and !ature, #he so-called /igh caste and low caste, #he priestly and the laity touchable and the untouchables there always exist a theoretical institutionali ation of the sub?ugation of the secondary by the primary reality. %.'.).& The Logic of do$ination Eetween F and G, when F is conceived to be superior, 6through its cultural frame wor.7 then F ?ustifies himself to sub?ugate 4. Its social expression is the practice of a value dualistic social system where the practice of discrimination is maintained by subordinating the secondary to the primary reality. #he metaphysical thrown-ness that 1mbed.ar faced in his life can be traced to this .ind of sub?ugation or thrownness that has lead him to adapt a critiBue of the philosophy of /induism. #his is evident from the fact that he articulates his criticism of /indu social order more vividly. /e points out that the philosophy of the /induism is value dualistic, which theoretically ?ustifies caste system. #he conceptual distinction of conceiving reality in terms of polarities is the basic rationale for the practice of social thrown-ness, is the inference made by 1mbed.ar in his writings. #hese polarities provide a fertile ground that identifies the theoretical struggle between metaphysical supremacy and inferiority, mediated through a logic that ?ustifies and classifies the relation between the polari ed variables. In other words, the human mind has all along been conditioned to perceive and philosophi e in a dualistic manner whose net-result is an implicit practice of

metaphysical thrownness of the secondary entity by the primary entity. #his is expressed in a language and logic that sanction and maintain a hierarchy of classification that is implicit in philosophical discourses. 1mbed.ar,s pain experience hence, may be situated in the context of a theoretical and practical struggle between the metaphysics of the 'rimary and the Secondary. Considered and treated as an Out-Caste, in the context of Caste-world view, his thought pattern is a dialectics or a struggle against the 'rimary, namely the caste-based ideology of the /indu society, in favour of the secondary, in order to be conceived and treated, in transcendence and freedom of both. %.'.).' 2e/olution as $ediation #he dialectical tension between the polarities may be evidenced from the history of man.ind. Dor example, the shattering of the medieval -+reat chain of Eeing,, the discovery that the earth was not the center of the universe, and the movement from panpsychist and animist views of reality to denaturali ed and devitali ed atomistic and mechanistic position represent but three developments which eventuated the facet enormous metaphysical thrownness. #he felt lac. or loss of intimacyCmeaning at the level of being in such instances could only have been catastrophic. 1rguably, the overall heritage of Cartesianism, with its legacy of rationalism, logo-centrism, scientism, and mechanism, has had a propensity to depersonali e humans and to de-personify the earth and earthlings as a whole 3M. $etaphysical thrown-ness is invariably the outcome of any vanBuishing of being by becoming, with its resulting meta-psychical and social lac. of security, stability and safety. Such a victory spells a singularly lonely and alienating reversal for those who cling to an experiential metaphysics of sameness, similarity and relationship so to stand aghast at the prospect of diversity and difference. #he causes of metaphysical thrown-ness are ultimately rooted in the principles of individuali ation 6whether these be conceived as physical, mental, ontological, social or spiritual in nature7 that produce the separateness of beings, the factuality of which can initiate an agitated yearning for a more intimate congruence with others. 1mbed.ar,s pain experience owes for a mediation of relation. /e has been conditioned to feel threatened of his dignified existence. Dor (rich Dromm, the awareness of one,s self as a separate entity is the *source of all anxiety>I one would *become insane> due to the prison of his thrownness, the remar.s, if one could not unite himself in some form or other with other men 6and7 with the world outside. 33 #o counteract the division and divisiveness of being6s7, 1mbed.ar yearns for a complete entitative integration with others, including the non-plus-ultra unity of metaphysical identity-indifference for equality3: in the context of plurality, in which all beings are related

to each other. #his metaphysical identity-in Adifference for eBuality signifies a longing for the ultimate structural unity of beings beyond any functional union that might bridge and bond them. It reflects the need to avoid its antithesis, the feeling of being imprisoned in monistic or dualistic isolation wherein he feels sealed off from any intimacy or meaning with other beingsN $etaphysical thrownness is a fertile philosophical thought for a discourse on communicative ethics for liberation. %.'.& 3piste$ological Thro nness consciousness, is constituted as an enslaved consciousness. /ence, epistemological thrown-ness serves as its sovereign a priori, in other words, as it is universal and necessary principle. (onse4uentl*5 episte$ological thro nness is the pris$ hich er percei/es and e/aluate realit*. 1t the same time, he was able to transcend the throw-ness by struggle. 1ny critiBue or analysis can be carried out by the primary condition. /e claims, *2e must stand on our own feet and fight as best we can for our rights. So carry on your agitation and organi e your forces. 'ower and prestige will come to you through struggle>3<. #hat is to say, in the case of 1mbed.ar, the epistemic thrownness is the master motivator for engaging in to protest or struggle against for an authentic religion and society. #he very fact that he does not accept &edas as the source of .nowledge indicates that 1mbed.ar,s epistemic critiBue of /induism springs form his facet of epistemological thrownness, and moves towards a new epistemology based on reason. 2hile the &edic authority demanded epistemic surrender 6coherence7, the new epistemology of 1mbed.ar is grounded in critical consciousness. (pistemological and metaphysical thrownness can be explained from the writings of Sartre as well. It pervades the writings of Sartre, according to whom human beings are metaphysically 6read -ontologically,7 contingent, gratuitous, superfluous and above all isolated entities. Drom an epistemological perspective, human consciousness is a hole in EeingI it is nothingness. /owever, li.e nature, consciousness abhors a vacuum and given the voracious vortex that it see.s a plenitude of Eeing in order to fill up the lac., the deficiency, the non-being to which it is forced. #o circumvent this innate thrownness, one attempts to unite the emptiness and nothingness that comprise consciousness 6being-for-itself7 with the fullness of Eeing, as ob?ectively instantiated by the non-conscious, Eeing-in-itself. Eut a unity of these ontological polarities of Eeing is impossible, as is the being, which symboli es their coalescence, +od. /umans are nothing but a futile and frustrated yearning to be a divine-li.e repletion. 3; Indeed, Sartre conceives +od to be but the pro?ection of human thrownness and the pro?ect of its redemption. $etaphysically and epistemologically considered, a human being is nothing else than thrownness because it is forever

frustrated in its endeavors at self-completion via other-ness. In passing, it is instructive to note that Sartre spea.s of an -originals solitude of the for-itself, and had considered as the feeling of !ausea,39 in his essay0 -On the #hrownness of the $ind,. #he 1mbed.ar phenomenon of thrown-ness finds its yearning not in the idea of +od-conditioned morality, but in an idea of an ethicised-religion enshrined in the Dhamma of Euddhism. 2hile for Sartre, the most radical attempt of consciousness to transcend its isolation is love, whereby consciousness endeavors to annihilate its contingency and to satisfy its esurient for the abundance of Eeing, for 1mbed.ar it is the 5ove of the-other-in Justice ensures the abundance of fullness of his Eeing, */ate to love>. Eut for 1mbed.ar, the radical way of overcoming epistemic-thrownness is by engaging into a critiBue at the theoretical level and a protest at the practical level. Sartre insists that the lovers strive to preserve their -internal negation, 6freedom7 yet eliminate the *external negation> 3K the abysmal metaphysicalepistemological fissure that divides them, /owever, two freedoms, cannot achieve the perpetual unity which love see.s, and so the pro?ect of love as the merging of freedoms is doomed from the outset. 1ny overcoming of the lovers, metaphysical epistemological isolation by love,s *illusion of fusion> 3L is impossible. )nfortunately, love,s inevitable failure hurls the lovers into a more desolating thrown-ness than the metaphysical and epistemic isolation they had hoped to escape prior to their pro?ect6ion7s of love. Since love was pursued as a pledge of the absolute and eternal unity of the intimates, its downfall unleashes its condemnationsI in thus sense, for Sartre, the hell is the other. Indi/iduals are perpetuall* denuding5 reif*ing and stealing each other6s o!7ecti/e !eing .!eing0for0others1 !* $eans of 8the loo"9 ):. 8 Dor 1mbed.ar epistemology and metaphysics of /induism needs to be reconstructed in favour of the freedom of the thrown-away humanity, in solidarity. Solidarity is the future-in-pro?ection. (pistemological thrown-ness is also allied to the position that one is too close to one,s self to intimately grasp the self and too far from others to .now or be .nown by them, with the result that such .nowledge is ephemeral and superficial. In the social context of casteism not only the dalits but also the non-dalits undergo the epistemological separation. 1 dalit is separated as a-varna, as the one who is incapable of being constituted in the Varna system. Eut a non-dalit is separated by means of a perpetual isolation with the other, in caste ladder, where every area is treated as a separated class against the other castes. #he cognition of each one is conditioned by the statusClocus of his caste position. $oreover, it could be further claimed that even if cognition could penetrate the interior of the self andCor of others, and it is these recesses that intimacy see.s to obtain and intimate, it is at best, only translucent rather than transparent .nowledge. #herefore, cognition falls

far short of the closeness and contact coveted for surmounting epistemic thrownness. Should it be conceded that there are transparent dimensions or elements of the conscious self cognitively attainable, it can still be maintained that most if not all of the uniBueness of the self is buried in the unconscious, in regions, of the mind not accessible to or retrievable by any type of cognition. It can then be further asserted that intimacy as.s to assess this distinctiveness, short of this thrown-ness. ConseBuently, in addition to wanting to be recogni ed for 1mbed.ar,s intrinsic worth as person, for the discriminated as humans he wishes to be .nown for being this or that special person, and when he feels that he is not so ad?udged, his epistemic-thrownness evades. /owever, the complain not only about the nonac.nowledgement of 1mbed.ar,s essential distinctiveness and of his not being understood and accepted, therein, but he also decry the fact that his very existence is un.nown or ignored such that he is seBuestered in anonymity and so bewail the feeling of being unattached to anyone or anyone in particular. In one of his dialogue with +andhi 1mbed.ar is found expressing this .ind of anonymity. /e :3 tells +andhi, that -he has no /ome in the land he is born, . In a similar vein, /usserl declares the transcendental (go to be anonymous and belonging to no one in particular and, hence it is *unremittingly lonesome.> 1ccordingly, the -thrown-away, or the people of the culture of silence have a penchant for believing that their presence is not noticed and that their absence is not missed, if the *percipi est esse>:: 6Eere.eley,s7 doctrine applies to anyone or anything in reality, it surely does so to the thrown-away people very well. Dinally, this professed cognitive inaccessibility largely accounts for the common, conviction by those who experience social thrown away-ness, that they are not only un.nown 6both as to their existence and also as to their personal and uniBue essence7, but they want to be .nown. It is a demand for identity as a person that they are also, li.e a 8antian thing-in-itself, :@ un.nowable. 1t this point, the desperation and despondency of extreme epistemic thrown-ness may accede to either the despair of depression or to the aspiring of de-construction of the epistemic-frame that refuses to provide affirmative truth to them. Dortunately, in the case of 1mbed.ar, the later has become true. 1s point of criticism, it should be emphasi ed that any model of consciousness may beget epistemic-thrownness. %eflexive version of consciousness may lead to the position that the self is caught by and insuperably confined to the web of its own self-reflections and is thereby irremediably cut off from other dimensions of the self as well as from others. Since -thrownness, is eBually if not more a case of being separated in the midst of the caste-others rather than in their absence, phenomenological models of consciousness do not escape

the problem of the consciousness, claims. 1chieving satisfactory intimacy with the-others, for 1mbed.ar, is a yet-to be, i.e., a pro?ect in the present for future. %.'.' 3thical .$oral1 Thro nness ;s understood the ethical thro nness includes the thro nness inherent in sla/er* and freedo$5 choice and responsi!ilit* as ell as in /alue0 infor$ation5 content$ent and co$$it$ent. It entails the for$ida!le $oral tas" of facing one6s thro nness .pain0experience1 in its di/erse for$s and of con/erting it into ethicall* constructi/e attitudes and social actions. . #he Varnaashrama dharma, as enshrined in the axiology of Purusarthas, cultivate the moral belief that caste practices are morally good, divinely ordained and those sudhras 6depressed class7 are born to serve-the-other, in whose return they cannot expect any fruits. In the Sartrean account of freedom, one must be responsible for one,s thrown-ness and the role the latter assumes in one,s moral existence. In the life experience of 1mbed.ar, thrownness is caused by the /indu social order yet he ta.es the responsibility to combat -thrownness,. $oreover, not only is the person responsible for his choices 6what might be called the functional freedom of consciousness7 but he is constituted as a person precisely by the series and sum of such lonely actions. 1lthough one is not responsible for being responsible, since he is condemned to freedom 6the .ind of freedom which is the structure of consciousness7 and, therefore, to thrown-ness, he alone is responsible for creating his essence, which is to say that *existence precedes essence>:L. %.'.'.) The (o$$unitarian aspect #he thrownness that lies within all choices does not stop with oneself, however on the contrary, man,s anguished responsibility includes everyone else in the sense that he is obligated to fashion himself, lucidly and courageously as possible, to be a model for all others :4. Such, for Sartre, is the awesome thrownness of freedom and responsibility that burdens everyone. Such an observation is also true in the life of 1mbed.ar. In spite of the discriminations that he faced in his life, he ta.es up the responsibility to re-build freedom, a choice that he ma.es in the face of overwhelmed thrownness, not only for himself, but also to construct the essence of freedom of the entire depressed classes. 1mbed.ar li.e Sartre situates ethics and thrown-ness in an essentially egalitarian context. !iet sche enlists an elitist morality entrenched in the self,s over-coming its thrownness and transforming it into a creative solitude. /e claims that the natural aristocrat is a lonely-at-the-top solitary who scales moral mountains not only to

individuate himself into a fully human being, but to separate himself from the pathetic moral misfits and mediocrity below who herd together to ward off the dangers and demands of thrown-ness and solitude. #he lonely masters must flee to their solitude to avoid the multitudes with their pusillanimous and venomous *resentment.> In so doing, the former must steel themselves, !iet sche warms, against the inevitable horror of being perpetually lonely and solitary, which results, from, among other things, being alone with *the ?udge and avenger of one,s own law,> that is one,s conscience@M. !iet sche,s alter ego, Oarathustra, himself *the loneliest of the lonely,> exhorts the *free spirits> and ris. ta.ers to so?ourn alone in both thrown-ness and solitude.@3 Eut 1mbed.ar,s life runs contrary to the observation of !iet sche regarding the idea of ethical thrownness. /e does not flee to solitary or to be a -superman, but deliberately opted for a community of human fellowship.

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