Devolution Reforms

Devolution Reforms in Pakistan
N8TTUTE OF MANAGEMENT 8CENCE8 | PE8HAWAR

An Assessment of Devo|ut|on
keforms |n ak|stan
Centre for ub||c o||cy kesearch
N8TTUTE OF MANAGEMENT 8CENCE8 | PE8HAWAR
ulsclalmer: All rlghLs reserved. no parL of Lhls paper be reproduced or
LransmlLLed ln any form wlLhouL Lhe permlsslon of C8 / lM|Sclences.
ConLenL may be used for educaLlonal and lnformaLlonal purposes wlLh
proper source clLaLlon.
C8 ls Lhankful Lo 8rlLlsh Plgh Commlsslon for flnanclal asslsLance.
Lead AuLhor: Aamer 1a[
Serles LdlLors: Zafar Pablb, !aved lqbal
CenLre for ubllc ollcy 8esearch (C8), 2010.
hLLp://cppr.edu.pk/
lnsLlLuLe of ManagemenL Sclences, PayaLabad, eshawar, aklsLan.
hLLp://www.lmsclences.edu.pk/
1lLle
1able of ConLenLs
LlsL of llgures and 1ables
LlsL of Acronyms
reface
AbsLracL
180l0 0l 00l0l8
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Chapter 1: Introduct|on
lmpllcaLlons of SLudy
8esearch MeLhodology
CrganlsaLlon of Lhe SLudy
Chapter 2: Good Governance, NM and Decentra||sat|on: Some 1heoret|ca| erspect|ves
lnslghLs lnLo 'Cood Covernance'
new ubllc ManagemenL (nM)
uecenLrallsaLlon
1he uark Slde of uecenLrallsaLlon
Success and lallures: Local CovernmenLs Worldwlde
Concluslon
Chapter 3: Loca| governments |n ak|stan
Local CovernmenL 8eforms slnce lndependence
SLrucLure of aklsLan's CovernmenL
uevoluLlon of ower 8eforms
ueslgn of Local CovernmenL SLrucLure .
osL uevoluLlon Plerarchy
LlmlLaLlons ln llscal uecenLrallzaLlon
ClLlzen CommunlLy 8oards (CC8s)
Chapter 4: Impacts of Devo|ut|on keforms
rlmary and Secondary LducaLlon SecLor
rogress ln rlmary PealLh Care
WaLer and SanlLaLlon
Servlce uellvery and !urlsdlcLlonal ConsLralnLs
Common lssues Plnderlng uevelopmenL
Concluslon
Chapter S: Conc|us|ons and the Way Iorward
Some ollcy lmpllcaLlons
8|b||ography
37
llgure 1: Map of aklsLan
llgure 2: uevoluLlon of ollLlcal ower
llgure 3: Crganogram of ulsLrlcL CovernmenL
llgure 4: Crganogram of 1ehsll Munlclpal AdmlnlsLraLlon
llgure 3: er CaplLa non-Wage CurrenL Spendlng on baslc PealLh
& rlmary LducaLlon ln l? 2003
llgure 6: ulsLrlbuLlon of nazlm Au Schemes ln uera lsmall khan ln l? 2003
llgure 7: Salarles uomlnaLe 8udgeLs ln khyber akhLunkhwa ln l? 2003
1able 1: Salary and non-Salary LxpendlLures on LducaLlon, 2004-2003
ll8l 0l fl0f08 80 180l08
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AC8..... ...........Annual ConfldenLlal 8eporLs
Au8 .... ...........Aslan uevelopmenL 8ank
Au..... ...........Annual uevelopmenL lan
A1 ..... ...........AppolnLmenLs, osLlngs and 1ransfers
8u....... ...........8aslc uemocracy
8Pu.... ...........8aslc PealLh unlL
CC8...............ClLlzen CommunlLy 8oards
Cu....... ...........CommunlLy uevelopmenL
uC....... ...........ulsLrlcL/ uepuLy Commlssloner
uCC.... ...........ulsLrlcL CoordlnaLlng Cfflcer
uCs ..... ...........ueveloplng CounLrles
uflu .... ...........ueparLmenL for lnLernaLlonal uevelopmenL
uMC .. ...........ulsLrlcL ManagemenL Croup
uC.... ...........ulsLrlcL ollce Cfflcer
uS ..... ...........ulsLrlcL ubllc SafeLy
uS..... ...........uecenLrallsaLlon SupporL rogramme
LuC .... ...........LxecuLlve ulsLrlcL Cfflcer
lA1A.... ...........lederally AdmlnlsLered 1rlbal Areas
ll8 ...... ...........llrsL lnvesLlgaLlon 8eporL
Co..... ...........CovernmenL of aklsLan
lCC...... ...........lnLernaLlonal Crlsls Croup
LuCs.... ...........LeasL ueveloped CounLrles
LlC ..... ...........Legal lramework Crder
LCC..... ...........Local CovernmenL Crdlnance
LPW.... ...........Lady PealLh Worker
MAC... ...........Munlclpal AdmlnlsLraLlon Crdlnance
MnA .. ...........Member naLlonal Assembly
MA.... ...........Member rovlnclal Assembly
nlC..... ...........naLlonal llnance Commlsslon
nCC.... ...........non CovernmenL CrganlsaLlon
nL..... ...........neL rlmary LnrolmenL
nM ... ...........new ubllc ManagemenL
n88..... ...........naLlonal 8econsLrucLlon 8ureau
nWl.... .........norLh-WesL lronLler rovlnce
CLCu .. ...........CrganlsaLlon of Lconomlc CooperaLlon and uevelopmenL
Cu .. ...........CuL aLlenL ueparLmenL
CC..... ...........ollce ComplalnLs Commlsslon
ll8l 0l 0f0M8
ll8l 0l 0f0M8
CC..... ...........rovlslonal ConsLlLuLlonal Crder
lC ..... ...........rovlnclal llnance Commlsslon
PLu .. ...........ubllc PealLh Lnglneerlng ueparLmenL
lPS .... ...........aklsLan lnLegraLed Pousehold Survey
SLM .... .........aklsLan Soclal and Llvlng MeasuremenL Survey
S ..... ...........ollce Servlces of aklsLan
1A ..... ...........arenL-1eacher AssoclaLlons
SMC.... ...........School ManagemenL CommlLLees
1MA ... ...........1ehsll Munlclpal AdmlnlsLraLlon
1MC ... ...........1ehsll Munlclpal Cfflcer
1C.............. .... 1own Cfflcer / 1ehsll Cfflcer
1C (l & S).........1own Cfflcer (lnfrasLrucLure and Servlces)
un ...... ...........unlLed naLlons
unlCLl ...........unlLed naLlons lnLernaLlonal Chlldren Lmergency lund
uSA..... ...........unlLed SLaLes of Amerlca
WASA.. ...........WaLer and SanlLaLlon AuLhorlLy
WPC... ...........World PealLh CrganlsaLlon
As Lhls sLudy goes Lo press for publlcaLlon, Lhelocal governmenL enLlLles ln aklsLan areon Lheverge
of abollshmenL, Lhey are now [usL nomlnally exlsLenL and almosL non-funcLlonal. 8eLurn Lo Lhe
LradlLlon clvll admlnlsLraLlon has been pursued gradually over Lhe lasL Lwo years. 1hough efforLs
from dlfferenL quarLers are underway Lo conLlnue wlLh Local CovernmenL SysLem, conslderlng Lhe
exlsLlng pollLlcal mllleu, Lhere ls llLLle chance of Lhe survlval of Lhls sysLem ln lLs presenL form.
erhaps clLlzens of aklsLan shall have Lo walL for yeL anoLher auLhorlLarlan reglmeLhaL mlghL flnd lL
'useful' Lo resurrecL Lhe dormanL seL up. CenLrallsaLlon and decenLrallsaLlon are undoubLedly
pollLlcal phenomena and lL ls, lnvarlably, Lhe pollLlcal moLlvaLlon and orlenLaLlon of governmenL of
Lhe day LhaL deLermlnes and devlses Lhe pollcy concernlng local governance. 1hls sLudy does noL
delve Loo deep lnLo Lhe pollLlcal perspecLlves of local governance, lndeed lL Lrles Lo lnvesLlgaLe LhaL
wheLher local governmenL reforms have had any poslLlve lmpacL on publlc servlce dellvery. 1he
assessmenL ls largely carrled ouL ln Lhe developmenLal conLexL of reforms and Lhe pollLlcal lssues
arelefL for amorespeclflc and focused analysls.
1he lnlLlal work on Lhls sLudy sLarLed ln 2006-2007, when local governmenLs were sLlll funcLlonal.
needless Lo say LhaL recenL sLaLe of local bodles' funcLlons has slgnlflcanLly alLered some baslc
premlses. noneLheless, readers wlll have a conslderable grasp of Lra[ecLorles, lssues, and formal
and lnformal lnsLlLuLlons LhaL shape up Lhe admlnlsLraLlve organlsaLlon of publlc secLor
managemenL and local governanceln aklsLan.
lL ls hoped LhaL Lhls sLudy sLlmulaLe many more quesLlons and furLher lnqulrles. 1he CenLre for
ubllc ollcy 8esearch ls llkely Lo conLlnue wlLh furLher analysls and readers are requesLed Lo share
Lhelr lnslghLs and commenLs wlLh Lhe C8 Leam Lo furLher lncrease our undersLandlng of
decenLrallsaLlon ln aklsLan.
Academlc research ln aklsLan ls sLlll ln lLs lnfancy. 1hough laLely we have seen more research
belng generaLed ln academla, Lhe quallLy and valldlLy of flndlngs would requlre more rlgorous
and susLalned efforL on Lhe parL of Lhose lnvolved ln Lhls enLerprlse. aklsLan ls faced wlLh
myrlad of challenges and ln order Lo flnd creaLlve soluLlons, lnsLlLuLes of hlgher learnlng ln Lhe
counLry would requlre exLra efforL Lo noL [usL sclenLlflcally analyse buL also dlssemlnaLe lLs
flndlngs Lo a wlder audlence.
Ff0l800
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uecenLrallsaLlon ls belng reckoned around Lhe globe as a successful sLraLegy ln publlc secLor
managemenL slnce Lhe Second World War. ubllc pollcy analysLs belleve LhaL devoluLlon of
admlnlsLraLlve and flscal auLhorlLles Lo Lhe democraLlcally elecLed local governmenL would
slgnlflcanLly enhanceefflclency, Lransparency and falrness ln resourceallocaLlon and soclal servlce
dellvery. AlLhough LheouLcomes of such reforms lnLroduced worldwlde, parLlcularly ln developlng
counLrles, are noL enormously consLrucLlve, beneflLs derlved from such reforms cannoL be denled
alLogeLher. ln order Lo make decenLrallsaLlon reforms successful, pre-requlslLes ln socleLy's soclal,
pollLlcal and economlc lnsLlLuLlons need Lo be meL and a falr degree of falrness, accounLablllLy,
parLlclpaLlon and efflclency lnvolved ln lmplemenLaLlon of reforms, needs Lo be ensured. 1hls
sLudy seeks Lo lnvesLlgaLe lmpacL of devoluLlon reforms of 2001 on ubllc Servlce dellvery ln
aklsLan. lnLroduced, deslgned and lmplemenLed byLhemlllLary reglme, Lhesereforms arevlewed
relaLlvely more comprehenslve as compared wlLh Lhe ones Lrled earller. AdvocaLes of reforms
oplne LhaL devoluLlon has enabled Lhe people from grass rooL level Lo parLlclpaLe ln Lhe publlc
managemenL and declslon maklng ln local governance. 1he evldence so far reveals Lhe facL LhaL
local governmenL sysLem of 2001 has noL subsLanLlally lmproved Lhe publlc servlce dellvery ln Lhe
counLry because of cerLaln lnherenL weaknesses of Lhe sysLem and amblgulLy regardlng Lhe roles
and responslblllLles of local governmenL represenLaLlves.
08lf80l
9
Much LrumpeLed devoluLlon of power reforms ln aklsLan were lnLroduced by Ceneral ervez
Musharraf ln year 2001, wlLh osLenslble clalms of devolvlng Lhe power sLrucLure Lo grass rooL
levels. Pe proposed a seven polnL agenda soon afLer havlng assumed power Lhrough a bloodless
coup LhaL emphaslsed on accounLablllLy and parLlclpaLlon as key elemenLs of good governance.
Accordlng Lo hlm, 'sham democracy' was unable Lo dellver and hence radlcal changes ln power
sLrucLure of sLaLe lnsLlLuLlons were urgenL. aklsLan's hlsLory slnce lLs lndependence deplcLs
pollLlcal lnsLablllLy and economlc downLurns wlLh a few excepLlons. uurlng Lhese years, aklsLan
has experlenced whaL ls called 'growLh wlLh ouL developmenL' (LasLerly 2003). 1he concepL of
decenLrallsed local governmenL ls noL novel ln aklsLan buL lL has remalned a rheLorlc raLher Lhan a
worklng reallLy. Looklng lnLo lLs hlsLorlcal pollLlcal conLexL, lL ls lnLeresLlng Lo see LhaL Lhree mosL
noLeworLhy decenLrallsaLlon reforms ln almosL slx decades hlsLory of aklsLan were lnLroduced by
mlllLary reglmes, Lhenon-represenLaLlvegovernmenLs, lncludlng LhemosL recenL ones. uevoluLlon
reforms of 2001 are deemed relaLlvely successful by Lhe lnLernaLlonal ald and developmenL
agencles, aL leasL ln Lerms of conslderable enhancemenL ln pollLlcal represenLaLlon of Lhe common
man aL Lhegrass rooL level.
aklsLan, ruled by Lhe mlllLary reglmes for more Lhan Lhree decades, hardly ever had a Lruly
represenLaLlve, democraLlcally elecLed and soverelgn governmenL slnce lLs lncepLlon ln 1947.
rlnclpal moLlvaLlons behlnd esLabllshmenL of local governmenL sysLems by auLhorlLarlan reglmes
were Lo somehow leglLlmlse and proLracL Lhelr llleglLlmaLe rule ln democraLlc dlsgulse. 'LeglLlmacy
has been soughL by creaLlng a locallsed paLronage sLrucLure LhaL produces a class of 'collaboraLlve
pollLlclans' who acL as condulL beLween local consLlLuencles and Lhe non represenLaLlve cenLres'
(Cheema eL al. 2003:24). llaws ln sLrucLural deslgns and reglmes' lack of pollLlcal wlll are Lwo ma[or
reasons among many LhaL have lnvarlably undermlned Lhe capablllLy and capaclLy of local
governmenL enLlLles. LnumeraLlng oLher hlndrances ln effecLlve funcLlonlng of local governmenLs,
8olls (2008) explalns LhaL cllenLellsm lowered responslveness when comblned wlLh parLlal
decenLrallzaLlon especlally wlLh llmlLed admlnlsLraLlve decenLrallzaLlon, lnformaLlon asymmeLry,
and llmlLed posslblllLles for excluslon. Scope of Lhls sLudy ls llmlLed Lo Lhe lmpacL assessmenL of
devoluLlon reforms ln key publc servlces areas l.e. healLh, educaLlon, and munlclpal servlces.
lollowlng Lhe LradlLlons, recenL endeavours Lo decenLrallse sLaLe's and governmenL's lnsLlLuLlons
have ended up ln a cosLly debacle as Lhey couldn'L lnsLlgaLe any progress ln local level governance.
lndeed many pollcy analysLs belleve LhaL sLrucLural deslgn of devoluLlon reforms acLually
recenLrallsed Lhe concenLraLlon of powers ln Lhe federal cenLre. uesplLe ban on parLlclpaLlon of
pollLlcal parLles ln local governmenL elecLlons, esLabllshed pollLlcal ellLe reappeared aL local
pollLlcal scene. lan for esLabllshlng a Lhree Llered local governmenL sysLem was lmplemenLed
haphazardly ln sLaLe LhaL was under absoluLe sway of soclal, pollLlcal and admlnlsLraLlve mllleu
domlnaLed by clvll-mlllLary bureaucracy. LffecLlve accounLablllLy mechanlsms- Lhe uLmosL prlorlLy
ln a comprehenslve publlc pollcy- have ln facL deLerloraLed sLlll furLher. rellmlnary analysls reveals
LhaL lnLer-lnsLlLuLlonal coordlnaLlon lssues deLerloraLed furLher because local governmenLs are
expecLed Lo fulfll responslblllLles ln sysLem LhaL doesn'L allow Lhem Lherequlred auLhorlLy.
Introduct|on
ChapLer 1
10
8esldes, poorly deflned enforcemenL mechanlsms also exacerbaLed Lhe slLuaLlon. uupllcaLlon of
developmenL pro[ecLs and sheer wasLage of llmlLed resources were observed as a resulL of rlvalry
creaLed beLween Lhelocal governmenL sysLem and provlnclal governmenLs.
1he bulk of local governmenL resources come from flscal Lransfers from provlnclally appolnLed
provlnclal flnance commlsslons (lC). ApproxlmaLely 80 of Lhe money Lransferred Lo dlsLrlcL
governmenL ls for salarles and non developmenL expendlLures and cannoL be used for any oLher
purposes. ercenLage of funds allocaLed for salarles ln budgeL exceeds developmenLal allocaLlons
manlfold. 1hese flndlngs reveal lnconslsLencles ln flscal decenLrallsaLlon. CovernmenL of aklsLan
ls under conLlnuous pressures from lnLernaLlonal donors, lnLernaLlonal flnanclal regulaLory
auLhorlLles and ald agencles Lo prlvaLlse naLlonallsed enLlLles LhaL provlde publlc servlces and leL
Lhe 'lnvlslble hand' Lake care of economy and publlc secLor. Powever, Lhe counLer argumenL ls LhaL
aklsLan has had a huge publlc secLor for decades and vasL ma[orlLy of populaLlon ls dependanL on
publlc provlslon of goods and servlces. ln oLher words, exlL opLlon ls noL avallable Lo marglnallsed
groups of socleLy and unforLunaLely such groups make Lhe ma[orlLy ln populaLlon. As such
swlLchlng over Lo freemarkeL economy and rolllng back of sLaLelnsLlLuLlons ls noL asLralghLforward
and slmple soluLlon. AdapLaLlon Lo lmporLed models llke nM (new ubllc ManagemenL) requlres
Llme Lo ad[usL. SLaLe's pollLlcal and admlnlsLraLlve lnsLlLuLlons normally go Lhrough LranslLlonal
phases beforeLhey aLLaln LhesLaLus of maLurlLy. ModallLles of reforms, Lherefore, requlrea vlgllanL
and serlous conslderaLlon before lmplemenLaLlon. Local governmenL reforms also call for reforms
and synchronlzaLlon ln assoclaLed lnsLlLuLlons llkeclvll servlces and hlgher Llers of governmenL.
1hls sLudy alms Lo provlde lnslghLs lnLo Lhe progress and lmpacLs of devoluLlon of power plan
lmplemenLed ln 2001 ln aklsLan, on Lhe dellvery of baslc publlc servlces. lL lnLends Lo analyse Lhe
consLralnLs of local governmenLs LhaL hlnders Lhelr capaclLy Lo dellver. Some of Lhe LhemaLlc areas
of Lhls research are,
osL devoluLlon admlnlsLraLlve dlscrepancles perLalnlng Lo Lhe delegaLlon of auLhorlLy
and responslblllLy from cenLre and provlnces Lo Lhe elecLed represenLaLlves of local
governmenL
LlmlLaLlons ln flscal decenLrallsaLlon and assoclaLed lssues
rellmlnary lmpacL assessmenL of devoluLlon reforms ln lmprovlng key publlc servlces
dellvery l.e. healLhcare, baslc educaLlon, waLer supplyand sanlLaLlon.
Accordlng Lo unch (2003), Lhe advanLages of uslng secondary daLa are savlngs ln cosL and Llme,
lmprovemenL ln quallLy, and maklng dlfflculL populaLlons easlly accesslble. 1o bulld on unch's
argumenL, Lhe use of secondary daLa also reduces Lhe probablllLy of 'researcher's re-lnvenLlon of
wheel'. A slgnlflcanL and comprehenslve research always Lakes lnLo conslderaLlon, Lhe mulLlLude
and magnlLude of body of knowledge already creaLed ln a parLlcular fleld of research. lL ls only
posslble Lo ldenLlfy Lhe mlsslng gaps and lacunas ln a research arena when a hollsLlc sLudy of
Imp||cat|ons of Study
kesearchMethodo|ogy
Introduct|on
Introduct|on
ChapLer 1
11
exlsLlng research ls conducLed. 1hls sLudy ls enLlrely based on secondary sources of daLa, beglnnlng
wlLh developmenL of some LheoreLlcal argumenLs seL as benchmarks or parameLers from wldely
accepLed Lheorles of good governance and decenLrallsaLlon. Secondary daLa from emplrlcal work
carrled ouL ln research sLudles ls Lhen assessed agalnsL LheseL parameLers. locus ls narrowed down
from a very broad conLexL of good governanceLo one of lLs model, nM (new ubllc ManagemenL)
and Lhen an elemenL of Lhemodel- decenLrallsaLlon- ls percelved ln aparLlcular form- devoluLlon of
powers. uecenLrallsaLlon ls a ma[or sLraLegy of nascenL model of nM and ls arguably an effecLlve
paradlgm ln good governance dlscourse. rlnclples of good governance models are used for
lnvesLlgaLlon as lndlcaLors. 8oLh avallable quallLaLlve and quanLlLaLlve daLa ls uLlllsed. ln oLher
words, Lhls sLudy ls based on research mapplng of normaLlve dlscourse as well as emplrlcal work.
naLure of Lhe sLudy, Lherefore, ls descrlpLlve as well as explanaLory. naLlonal and lnLernaLlonal
bllaLeral and mulLllaLeral ald and developmenL organlsaLlons' sLudles and publlcaLlons are referred
Lo ln order Lo arrlve aL some causal explanaLlons. Powever lL ls lmporLanL Lo noLe LhaL explanaLlons
of lmpacL of devoluLlon on servlce dellvery ls hlghly conLexL speclflc l.e. sLaLlsLlcs and conLexLs
wlLhln and among varlous provlnces vary enormously Lherefore dependable generallseablllLy of
explanaLlons ls noL always posslble.
Scope of research ls conflned Lo Lhe lmpacL assessmenL of devoluLlon reforms ln healLh, educaLlon
and munlclpal servlces only. varlables LhaL deLermlne lmpacLs of governmenL's pollcy are lnLer-
relaLed and are usually dependanL on each oLher for causal explanaLlons. Scale of sLudy ls llmlLed
and does noL Lake lnLo conslderaLlon oLher facLors LhaL mlghL be affecLlng Lhe ouLcomes of reforms
e.g. currenL pollLlcal scenarlo and oLher assoclaLed lssues llke law and order slLuaLlon. 1hls sLudy
wlll be helpful ln generaLlng debaLe and ln ldenLlfylng poLenLlal areas for furLher research e.g. Lhe
local governmenLs' elecLoral mechanlsm, lssues ln accounLablllLy, deLermlnanLs of voLlng
behavlour, pollLlcal perspecLlves ln publlc servlce dellvery, paLron-cllenL relaLlonshlps, vesLed
lnLeresLs of lnLernaLlonal donors, pollLlcal markeL lmperfecLlons, compaLlblllLy of local
governmenLs wlLh exlsLlng lnsLlLuLlons of publlc secLor, heLerogenelLy of socleLy and lLs lmpacL on
pollLlcal and clvlc behavlour of clLlzens.
llrsL chapLer lncludes lnLroducLlon Lo Lhe Lheme of Lhe proposed research lncludlng research
quesLlons, research meLhodology, and organlsaLlon of sLudy. ChapLer Lwo glves an accounL of
LheoreLlcal undersLandlng of prlnclples of good governance, nM as model, and decenLrallsaLlon
sLraLegy as caLalysL for lmproved publlc servlce dellvery. lL wlll also hlghllghL general emplrlcal
evldence from developlng counLrles around Lhe world. PlsLory of local governmenL ln aklsLan and
descrlpLlon of devoluLlon of power plan (2001) ls lncluded ln Lhlrd chapLer. LlmlLaLlons ln flscal
decenLrallsaLlon and lssues assoclaLed wlLh esLabllshmenL and funcLlonlng of ClLlzen CommunlLy
8oards (CC8s) ls also lncluded ln Lhls chapLer. ChapLer four examlnes Lhe progress of local
governmenL slnce lLs lncepLlon ln 2001 along wlLh consLralnLs and shorLcomlngs of locallsed
governmenLs lncludlng [urlsdlcLlonal problems. PealLh, educaLlon and munlclpal servlces secLor ls
maln focus of analysls of Lhls chapLer. 1he flfLh and flnal chapLer concludes Lhe sLudy and analyse
prospecLs of local governmenL sysLem and efflclenL servlcedellvery. lL ldenLlfles someof Lhedrlvers
for LhelmprovemenL ln efflclencyof local governmenL sysLem ln aklsLan.
Crgan|sat|onof the Study
Introduct|on
ChapLer 1
12
Lh
LasL decades of 20 cenLury wlLnessed monumenLal changes ln lnLernaLlonal pollLlcal sysLem. 1he
new lnLernaLlonal clrcumsLances afLer 1990s meanL LhaL LheWesL could aLLach expllclL pollLlcal and
lnsLlLuLlonal condlLlons Lo ald wlLhouL fear of loslng lLs Lhlrd world allles or cllenLs Lo communlsm
(LefLwlch 1994). 1he fall of communlsL reglmes demonsLraLed LhaL Lhose pollLlcal sysLems were
bureaucraLlcally lnefflclenL and non democraLlc whlleadvocaLlng WesLern pollLlcal sysLems such as
pollLlcal llberallzaLlon and admlnlsLraLlve decenLrallzaLlon (World 8ank 1991). 1he lmpacL of Lhls
LranslLlon ln lnLernaLlonal pollLlcs and power play dramaLlcally resulLed ln shaplng up Lhe
modallLles of global and reglonal governance around Lhe globe. Among Lhese modallLles, good
governancereforms appeared Lo beoneof Lheprlmeconcerns.
Pyden eL al. (2004) conLends LhaL developmenL ls now seen prlmarlly ln Lerms of progress achleved
by Lhe people Lhemselves. noneLheless, Lhe ouLcomes of such programmes, pollcles and pro[ecLs
show a plcLure LhaL ls qulLe ausLere. Palf baked developmenL reforms, mosLly carrylng a pollLlcal
agenda, almed aL soclo economlc developmenL, pollLlcal parLlclpaLlon on grass rooL level, capaclLy
bulldlng, human rlghLs lssues, soclal moblllsaLlon eLc., havenoL been ableLo dellver on lLs promlses
and evenLually culmlnaLed ln wldenlng Lhegulf of economlc, soclal and pollLlcal lnequallLles among
clLlzens of Lhe Lhlrd world sLaLes. Covernance ls a vasL, complex and dynamlc process and Lhe
naLure of deLermlnanLs lnvolved vary greaLly dependlng on varled conLexLs ln whlch lL ls belng
probed.
8eforms ln governance sLrucLure have been a common feaLure of lnlLlaLlves Laken by bllaLeral and
mulLllaLeral lnLernaLlonal donors. Changes ln pollLlcal and admlnlsLraLlve sLrucLures of developlng
counLrles were hlghly recommended Lo be Lhe prerequlslLe for developmenL. Some of Lhe ma[or
and common problems of developlng counLrles are cenLrallzaLlon of power, lack of rellable daLa,
lmperfecL markeLs, lack of consulLaLlon and lack of lmplemenLaLlon of rules and procedures.
CondlLlons for granL of ald e.g. reducLlon ln publlc expendlLures and Lhe sLrucLural ad[usLmenL
loans have been severely crlLlclzed for exacerbaLlng Lhe pollLlcal and economlc sLrucLures ln
developlng world. CorrupLlon, llllLeracy, lack of baslc and Lechnlcal educaLlon, poverLy and mlllLary
dlcLaLorshlps dldn'L allow sLandardlsed models of governance Lo yleld conslderable beneflLs ln Lhe
developlng world.
1he dlre need for good governance was hence lnLroduced as a panacea for such problems and for a
more efflclenL use of resources. AlLhough a consensus on sLandardlsed paradlgm for efflclenL
governance LhaL would synchronlze wlLh Lhe pollLlcal and soclo-economlc sLrucLures of all Lhe
naLlons of Lhe world, ls almosL lmposslble Lo arrlve aL, a more general and broad framework has
been proposed by many experLs ln Lhls fleld. 1hls chapLer alms Lo shed some llghL on LheoreLlcal
dlscourse concerned wlLh Lheory of good governance and decenLrallsaLlon. CompeLlng vlews have
been quoLed from a wlde range of conLemporary research llLeraLure. ArgumenLs and
benchmarklng developed ln Lhls chapLer are used Lo assess Lhe lmpacL of devoluLlon reforms ln
chapLer 3and 4.
Good Governance, NM and Decentra||sat|on:
Some 1heoret|ca| erspect|ves
ChapLer 2
13
Ins|ghts |nto 'GoodGovernance'
LlLerally, Lo govern means Lo rule or conLrol oLhers. Peywood (2007) brlefly deflned varlous
concepLs ln whlch governance can be percelved. 1he maln characLerlsLlc of governance ls Lhe
ablllLy Lo makecollecLlvedeclslons and LhecapaclLy Lo enforceLhem. Covernancels abroader Lerm
Lhan 'CovernmenL.' Covernance refers Lo Lhe varlous ways Lhrough whlch soclal llfe ls coordlnaLed.
rlnclpal modes of governance are markeLs, hlerarchles and neLworks. MarkeLs coordlnaLe soclal
llfe Lhrough a prlce mechanlsm whlch ls sLrucLured by Lhe forces of supply and demand. Plerarchy
lncludes bureaucracy and LradlLlonal forms of governmenL organlsaLlon, operaLlng Lhrough Lop
down auLhorlLy sysLems. neLworks are characLerlsed by lnformal relaLlonshlps beLween equal
agenLs or soclal agencles. CovernancereflecLs changes LhaL haveLaken placewlLhln governmenL as
well as ln Lhe socleLy. 1hese changes lnclude developmenL of new forms of publlc managemenL ln
whlch governmenL ls lncreaslngly conflned Lo sLeerlng (seLLlng LargeLs and sLraLeglc ob[ecLlves) as
opposed Lo rowlng (admlnlsLraLlon or servlce dellvery). '1he word governmenL ls from a Creek
word, whlch means Lo sLeer." 1he [ob of governmenL ls Lo sLeer, noL Lo row Lhe boaL. uellverlng
servlces ls rowlng, and governmenL ls noL very good aL rowlng (Savas, clLed ln Csborneand Caebler,
1992: 23)
Pyden and CourL (2002) deflned governance as 'Lhe exerclse of economlc, pollLlcal, and
admlnlsLraLlve auLhorlLy Lo manage a counLry's affalrs aL all levels.' Accordlng Lo Lhem lL comprlses
Lhe mechanlsms, processes, and lnsLlLuLlons, Lhrough whlch clLlzens and groups express Lhelr
lnLeresLs, exerclse Lhelr legal rlghLs, meeL Lhelr obllgaLlons, and medlaLe Lhelr confllcLs.
Covernance ls sald Lo have Lhree componenLs: economlc, pollLlcal, and admlnlsLraLlve. So lL can be
assessed ln pollLlcal, lnsLlLuLlonal and socloeconomlc parameLers. ollLlcal seLup of a counLry
formulaLes laws for Lhe clLlzens. Soclal aspecL lmpllcaLes Lhe way clLlzens are affecLed by pollLlcs.
Lconomlc aspecL ls concerned wlLh laws and pollcles regardlng markeLs, lncome, moneLary and
flscal lssues.
ln slmllar veln, World 8ank (1992) has ldenLlfled four aspecLs of good governance, namely publlc
secLor managemenL, accounLablllLy, legal framework for developmenL, and lnformaLlon and
Lransparency. Pyden and CourL (2002) are of Lhe oplnlon LhaL governance comprlses slx
lnsLlLuLlonal areas. ln 'clvll socleLy', clLlzens gaLher on a volunLary basls Lo promoLe speclflc lssues.
ollLlcal represenLaLlon ls deflned, pollLlcal agenda ls seL, and Lhe regulaLory apparaLus ls ouLllned
ln 'pollLlcal socleLy'. ollcy declslons are made ln 'execuLlve' on programmaLlc basls and Lhe
regulaLory apparaLus ls deslgned. 'bureaucracy' lmplemenLs pollcy and enacLs Lhe regulaLory
apparaLus. SLaLemarkeL relaLlons aredeflned ln 'economlc socleLy' and '[udlclary' enforces Lherule
of law. 1hey furLher explalned LhaL accordlng Lo currenL consensus aL Lhe global level, good
governance ls a pollLlcal seLLlng ln whlch opporLunlLles are evenly dlsLrlbuLed and a broad range of
acLors arecapableof parLlclpaLlng acLlvelylf LheydecldeLo do so.
ChapLer 2
14
1heparameLers and prlnclples used for analysls of governancereforms areas follows:
uegreeof lnvolvemenL and ownershlp of sLakeholders.
uegree Lo whlch Lhe formaLlon and sLewardshlp of rules are underLaken wlLhouL
humlllaLlon or harm Lo Lhepeople.
uegreeLo whlch rules applyequallyLo everyoneln socleLyregardless of sLaLus.
uegree Lo whlch publlc offlclals elecLed / appolnLed are responslble for
Lhelr acLlons and responslveLo publlc demands.
uegree Lo whlch declslons made by publlc offlclals are clear and open Lo
scruLlnybyclLlzens or Lhelr represenLaLlves.
uegreeLo whlch rules faclllLaLespeedyand Llmelydeclslon-maklng.
AlLhough Lhese prlnclples are qulLe comprehenslve and requlre sophlsLlcaLed meLhodologlcal
Lechnlques Lo use Lhem as lndlcaLors ln sLudy of governance reforms, Lhls sLudy would aLLempL Lo
use Lhese lndlcaLors Lo analyse Lhe devoluLlon reforms' lmpacL on publlc servlce dellvery ln
aklsLan. Cood governance can be lmplemenLed wlLhln Lhe domesLlc pollLlcal conLexL of
resLrucLurlng sLaLe bureaucracles, reformlng legal sysLems, and supporLlng democraLlc
decenLrallsaLlon, creaLlng accounLablllLy and enhanclng clvll socleLles (!enklns 2002). 1he rheLorlc
of reforms has many faceLs e.g. when good governance becomes a pollLlcal condlLlonallLy, lL ls
deemed as 'lnLerference ln soverelgnLy of ald reclplenL counLrles'. lL ls reasonably argued LhaL
sLrlngs aLLached Lo developmenL pro[ecLs would undermlne Lhe ablllLy of sLaLes Lo govern ln Lhelr
own capaclLy. 1he purvlew of Lhls sLudy doesn'L lnclude Lhls relevanL debaLe here. 1hls sLudy ls
conflned Lo posL devoluLlon progress ln healLh, educaLlon and waLer and sanlLaLlon secLors uslng
Lhe above menLloned parameLers. A prellmlnary lnvesLlgaLlon ls conducLed Lo see wheLher
devoluLlon of power ln LhesesecLors was producLlve.
Accordlng Lo Lhe World 8ank 8eporL (1999), lnnovaLlve lnsLlLuLlonal arrangemenLs can resulL ln
much beLLer servlce provlslon, even aL low levels of lncome. 8ecenL Lrends ln provldlng publlc
servlces llke houslng, waLer supply, sewerage and LransporLaLlon shows poLenLlal of publlc prlvaLe
parLnershlps. Whlle Lhe naLlonal governmenL should play lmporLanL role ln provldlng subsldles Lo
Lhe poor, many servlces llke healLh, waLer, educaLlon and LransporLaLlon are besL managed aL local
level, ln ways LhaL respond effecLlvely Lo local needs. WlLh paradlgm shlfL Lowards Lhe neo-llberal
ldeologles, nM model has been embraced by mosL developlng counLrles, replaclng LheLradlLlonal
cenLrallsed publlc admlnlsLraLlon hlerarchlcal sysLems.
ln 1980's and 1990's new managerlal approaches emerged ln publlc secLor as a resulL of
shorLcomlngs ln Lhe LradlLlonal model of publlc admlnlsLraLlon. nM, an emerglng model ln publlc
secLor ls consldered as Lhe replacemenL of Lhe LradlLlonal model of publlc admlnlsLraLlon. Mannlng
(1996, clLed ln Mlnogue 2001) explalns LhaL flnanclal, quallLaLlve and ldeologlcal pressures led Lo
art|c|pat|on:
Decency:
Ia|rness:
Accountab|||ty:
1ransparency:
Lff|c|ency:
New ub||c Management (NM)

ChapLer 2
1S
emergence of nM. Lxpandlng slze of governmenLs and Lhelr expanses were promlnenL reasons.
Pughes (1998) propoundlng nM argues LhaL LradlLlonal bureaucraLlc model whlch had valldlLy ln
lLs heydays ls becomlng obsoleLe. Pe conslders lL lnapproprlaLe Lo blfurcaLe pollLlcs from
admlnlsLraLlon and belleves LhaL nM would concenLraLe more on resulLs and flexlblllLy.
ConslderaLlon of publlc admlnlsLraLlon as a pollLlcal process agalnsL Weber's Lheory of bureaucracy
as 'legal-raLlonal auLhorlLy' ls now wldely accepLed and pracLlced docLrlne. nM as a model
emerged wlLh a loL of pollLlcal and economlcal lnnovaLlons llke decenLrallsaLlon, prlvaLlsaLlon,
performance appralsals, conLracLs ln publlc secLor servlces, resulL orlenLed sLrucLural ad[usLmenLs,
morecompeLlLlon and blend of publlc and prlvaLesecLor.
nM supporLs LhenoLlon of resourceallocaLlon Lhrough markeL supremacy as lL ls conLemplaLed as
Lhe mosL efflclenL and effecLlve way. ubllc managers would be more accounLable. ubllc would
havemoreopLlons and beLLer lncenLlves would sLlmulaLeLheperformanceof publlc servanLs. nM
requlres governmenL Lo mlnlmlse expendlLures and Lhlnk as buslness declslon maker. SLaLe
lnLervenLlon ls accepLed and welcomed ln slLuaLlons llke markeL fallures buL only as a coordlnaLor
and faclllLaLor of markeL based economy. 1hese argumenLs recelved crlLlclsm ln reLurn,
quesLlonlng Lhe accounLablllLy of auLonomous managers, confllcLs arlslng from compeLlLlon and
Lhe uncerLalnLy facLor ln publlc secLor servlce. Accordlng Lo Pughes (1998), CLCu counLrles are
geLLlng more lncllned Lowards conLracLual, parLlclpaLlve and dlscreLlonary sLyle of relaLlonshlp
beLween hlerarchlcal levels and lnsLlLuLlons wheLher publlc or prlvaLe. locus ls on lmprovemenL of

producLlon performance of publlc secLor and greaLer use of prlvaLe secLor ln soclal servlcedellvery.
8eslde Lhls, conslsLency, accounLablllLy, Lransparency and performance of publlc secLor were
deslred, whereas Pood (1991 , clLed ln Pughes 1998) conslders Managerlallsm as a shlfL Lowards
more lnLernal changes, bellevlng LhaL lL ls abouL professlonal managemenL, performance
measuremenL, ouLpuL orlenLaLlon, decenLrallsaLlon, greaLer compeLlLlon, prlvaLe sLyle of
managemenL and exLreme vlgllance ln use of resources. olldano (1999) explalns LhaL pollLlcal
decenLrallsaLlon was a ma[or sLrand of publlc servlce reform ln developlng counLrles whlch are
'enLlrely unrelaLed' Lo nM. Pe explalns LhaL ln many developlng counLrles, decenLrallsaLlon ls
usually Laken Lo mean Lhe devoluLlon of pollLlcal power Lo lower levels of governmenL, generally
elecLed local auLhorlLles. Pe caLegorlses Lhls as pollLlcal decenLrallsaLlon as compared Lo
managemenL decenLrallsaLlon, whlch means glvlng llnemanagers ln governmenL deparLmenLs and
agencles greaLer managerlal auLhorlLy and responslblllLy. 'ollLlcal decenLrallsaLlon ls ofLen seen as
an lnLegral parL of cenLral governmenL reform becauselL enLalls LheLransfer of largenumber of clvll
servanLs Lo local auLhorlLles and Lhe radlcal resLrucLurlng of cenLral deparLmenLs of healLh and
educaLlon among oLhers' (olldano 1999:20). olldano eL al. (1998) are of Lhe oplnlon LhaL
developlng counLrles have susLalned all Lhe dlsadvanLages of cenLral conLrols, and a very few
advanLages. arLly owlng Lo plLfalls of cenLral declslon maklng and LheresL Lo 'condlLlonallLy' facLor,
Lh
models of decenLrallsed local governmenL began Lo galn respecL ln LhelasL decadeof 20 cenLury.
ChapLer 2
16
Decentra||sat|on
'uecenLrallsaLlon lnvolves Lhe delegaLlon of powers Lo lower levels ln a LerrlLorlal hlerarchy,
wheLher Lhe hlerarchy ls one of governmenLs wlLhln a sLaLe or offlces wlLhln a large scale
organlsaLlon' (SmlLh 1983:1). SmlLh dlsLlngulshes lL from delegaLlon ln whlch asuperlor hands over
some of hls/her responslblllLles Lo hls/her subordlnaLe buL decenLrallsaLlon can lnvolve delegaLlon
when subordlnaLes (bureaucraL or elecLed assembly) recelves auLhorlLy and responslblllLy for a
deslgnaLed area ln a LerrlLorlal [urlsdlcLlon of Lhe organlsaLlon or sLaLe concerned. uecenLrallsaLlon
Lhus lnvolves creaLlon of smaller LerrlLorles esLabllshmenL of pollLlcal and admlnlsLraLlve
lnsLlLuLlons. Pe deflned federallsm as Lhe dlvlslon of pollLlcal power LerrlLorlally ln a consLlLuLlonal
way ln whlch every parL of LhefederaLlon ls regarded as unlLary sLaLewlLh lLs own lnLernal sysLem of
local governmenL.
Accordlng Lo 8ondlnelll and Cheema (1983), varlous auLhors have referred Lo four ma[or forms of
decenLrallsaLlon. 1hey are deconcenLraLlon, delegaLlon Lo seml auLonomous or parasLaLal
agencles, devoluLlon Lo local governmenLs and Lransfer of funcLlons from publlc Lo
nongovernmenLal lnsLlLuLlons. 1hey explalned LhaL deconcenLraLlon ls Lhe redlsLrlbuLlon of
admlnlsLraLlve responslblllLles only wlLhln cenLral governmenL. lL ls Lhe Lransfer of workload from
cenLral governmenL Lo fleld sLaff ouLslde Lhe naLlonal caplLal, wlLhouL havlng asslgned Lhem Lhe
declslon-maklng auLhorlLy. uelegaLlon of declslon-maklng auLhorlLy Lo seml-auLonomous
organlsaLlons, ouLslde Lhe governmenL mlnlsLrles, ls anoLher form of decenLrallsaLlon. ln
devoluLlon, Lhe cenLral governmenL glves up cerLaln funcLlons and creaLes new unlLs of
governmenL, ouLslde lLs dlrecL conLrol. llnally, Lhe Lransfer of plannlng and admlnlsLraLlve
responslblllLy from governmenL Lo volunLary, prlvaLe, or non-governmenLal organlsaLlons ls a
furLher Lypeof decenLrallsaLlon.
Peywood (2007) ldenLlfles LhaL devoluLlon esLabllshes Lhe besL measure of decenLrallsaLlon wlLhln
a unlLary sysLem of governmenL, l.e. one ln whlch soverelgn power ls vesLed ln a slngle naLlonal
lnsLlLuLlon. uevoluLlon has normally been lnLroduced lnLo governmenLs ln order Lo brlng Lhe sLaLe
closer Lo Lhe clLlzens and Lo avold reglonal and naLlonallsL confllcLs. roponenLs of devoluLlon
argue LhaL lL helps enormously ln besLowlng Lhe pollLlcal represenLaLlon Lo Lhe reglonal and eLhnlc
groups ln a sLaLe whlle slmulLaneously susLalnlng Lhe unlLy and soverelgnLy of Lhe sLaLe. '1he closer
a governmenL ls Lo lLs clLlzens, polls show, Lhe more Lhey LrusL lL. 1he closer lL ls, Lhe more
accounLable lLs offlclals Lend Lo be and Lhe more llkely Lhey are Lo handcrafL soluLlons raLher Lhan
creaLeone-slzeflLs-all programs (Csborne&Caebler, 1992:277).
1urner and Pulme (1997) speclfy LhaL decenLrallsaLlon purlsLs conslder devoluLlon, Lhe Lransfer of
auLhorlLy Lo sub-naLlonal governmenLs elecLorally accounLable Lo Lhe sub-naLlonal populaLlons, as
Lhe only auLhenLlc form of decenLrallsaLlon. uecenLrallsaLlon ln Lhe presenL era has been
supporLed by many pollcy analysLs argulng LhaL lL ls an essenLlal condlLlon for economlc, pollLlcal
and soclal developmenL. Asslgnlng declslon maklng powers Lo local governmenLs ls rendered
cruclal for Lhe presenL day sLaLes. 'ln developlng counLrles, Lhe over cenLrallsaLlon of auLhorlLy and
responslblllLy ln mlnlsLerlal headquarLers and caplLal clLles ls generally regarded as a formldable
obsLacleLo developmenL' (Peaphey, 1971:4, clLed ln SmlLh 1983).
ChapLer 2
17
Many auLhors, clLed ln SmlLh (1983) have advocaLed Lhe need for decenLrallsaLlon underplnned
wlLh varlous reasons. ln Lerms of economlcs, decenLrallsaLlon lmproves efflclency (Shepard, 1973).
lL enhances Lhe scope of consumers' cholce beLween publlc goods. uecenLrallsaLlon reduces cosL,
lmproves ouLpuLs and uLlllses human resources more effecLlvely (ParL, 1972). ollLlcally, lL
consolldaLes Lhe pollLlcal skllls, accounLablllLy and naLlonal lnLegraLlon by brlnglng governmenLs
closer Lo Lhe clLlzens. lL promoLes llberLy, equallLy and welfare (Mass, 1939: Plll, 1974).
uecenLrallsaLlon has parLlcularlybeen assoclaLed wlLh pro-poor pollcles. 8ondlnelll (1983) belleves
LhaL lf developmenL ls Lo mean eradlcaLlon of poverLy, lnequallLy and maLerlal deprlvaLlon lL musL
engage Lhe lnvolvemenL and moblllsaLlon of Lhe poor. arLlclpaLlon of poor ln pollLlcs ls asslsLed Lo
agreaL exLenL by decenLrallsaLlon programmes, sLrengLhenlng Lhelr maLerlal and pollLlcal poslLlons
(un, 1979). uecenLrallsaLlon ls belleved Lo lmprove access Lo admlnlsLraLlve agencles (ue Mello,
1981). 1he burden on cenLre ls reduced by decenLrallsaLlon e.g. ln 1anzanla, decenLrallsaLlon was
exerclsed ln order Lo encounLer Lhe adverse effecLs of cenLrallsaLlon llke decllnlng producLlon,
growlng opposlLlon Lo remoLe bureaucraLs and falllng off ln levels of self help (Samoff, 1979:31).
Local democracy ls necessary for naLlonal unlLy. Local level governmenL helps ln enhanclng Lhe
skllls of declslon maklng of locallyelecLed represenLaLlves.
8aLlonale for decenLrallzaLlon expllcaLed by 8ondlnelll and Cheema (1983) lncludes overcomlng
llmlLaLlon of cenLral conLrolled Lallorlng of developmenL plans ln accordance wlLh local needs of
heLerogeneous groups, reduced red Lape, senslLlvlLy Lo local problems, close conLacL beLween
offlclals and people, beLLer lnformaLlon, pollLlcal, rellglous, eLhnlc and Lrlbal represenLaLlon,
lnsLlLuLlonallsaLlon of parLlclpaLlon, neuLrallslng of conLrol by local esLabllshed ellLes, flexlble
lnnovaLlve and creaLlve admlnlsLraLlon, pollLlcal sLablllLy and naLlonal unlLy. Assesslng Lhe
developmenLal capaclLy of decenLrallsed governmenL, a revlew of World 8ank (1994) daLa for 42
developlng counLrles found LhaL where road malnLenance was decenLrallzed, backlogs are lower
and Lhe condlLlon of roads lmproved. Slmllarly, daLa for a group of developlng counLrles revealed
LhaL per caplLa cosLs of waLer ln World 8ank funded waLer pro[ecLs were four Llmes hlgher ln
cenLrallzed Lhan ln fullydecenLrallzed sysLems (8ardhan 2002).
rud'homme glves Lhe example of prlmary educaLlon where Lhe local governmenL can provlde
accounLablllLy Lo lLs speclflc needs, Lhe reglonal governmenL can have Lhe economles of scale ln
deslgnlng currlcula and correcL Lhe lnequallLles of local flnanclng of schools, Lhe cenLral
governmenL can provlde mlnlmum quallLy sLandards and audlLlng and evaluaLlon of local
performance (8ardhan 1996). 1hls argumenL emphaslses Lhe parallel supporLlve role of cenLral
governmenL ln lmprovemenL of servlce dellvery aL Lhe local level. CrlLlcal lssue LhaL usually arlses
here ls Lhe balance beLween governmenL lnLervenLlon and allowance of flscal, admlnlsLraLlve and
pollLlcal auLonomy Lo Lhe local governmenL. Powever, decenLrallsed publlc servlce allows servlces
Lo be Lallored as per pecullar needs of local communlLy. 1he medla can do much Lo dlssemlnaLe
lnformaLlon abouL publlc servlces. Plgher newspaper clrculaLlon, e.g. ln lndlan dlsLrlcLs ls
assoclaLed wlLh beLLer local-governmenL performance ln dlsLrlbuLlng food and droughL rellef
(World 8ank2004).

ChapLer 2
18

1o begln wlLh, devoluLlon of power ls accused of galvanlslng reglonal and local lnLeresLs and fuelllng
separaLlsL and secesslonlsL Lendencles LhaL mlghL lead Lo federallsm or even sLaLe collapse. CLher
crlLlcs puL forward Lhe 'ellLe capLure' argumenL l.e. Lhe fear LhaL pollLlcal power won'L acLually be
delegaLed Lo Lhe decenLrallsed governmenL and sLaLe and governmenLs' resources wlll be
conLrolled by Lhe powerful secLlons on Lhe basls of Lhelr flnanclal sLaLus ln socleLy. WlLh llmlLed
pollLlcal conLesLablllLy of local elecLlons, leaders may be suscepLlble Lo capLure by speclal lnLeresL
groups, slacken efforL Lo lmprove publlc servlces, or be lncompeLenL, wlLhouL faclng any rlsk of
loslng Lhelr poslLlons. ln LhaL case accounLablllLy, efflclency and equlLy ln servlce dellvery may
worsen under decenLrallsaLlon (8ardhan &Mookher[ee2006).
Llkewlse, Pasnaln (2008) quoLlng !ames Madlson malnLalns LhaL local governmenLs may be more
prone Lo ellLe capLure as Lhere wlll be fewer dlsLlncL pollLlcal grouplngs ln smaller [urlsdlcLlons, less
medla coverage compared Lo naLlonal elecLlons, and less cosLly for ellLes Lo purchase Lhe voLes of
less-lnformed voLers. LllLe capLure ls perhaps Lhe mosL promlnenL crlLlque ln decenLrallsaLlon
dlscourse. A wlde array facLors lead Lo ellLe capLure lncludlng lncome lnequallLles, weak
democraLlc pollLlcal lnsLlLuLlons, lack of credlblllLy of pollLlclans, lack of resources avallable for
developmenL, paLron-cllenL relaLlonshlps, corrupLlon, lack of accounLablllLy and so on. Slnce mosL
of Lhese facLors are lnLerrelaLed, Lhey have boLh lndlvldual and collecLlve lmpacL on local
governmenL.
Muker[l (1961, clLed ln SmlLh 1983) sLaLes LhaL admlnlsLraLlve arrangemenLs aL local level worsens
Lhe quallLy of admlnlsLraLlon as offlclals wlLh less educaLlon, narrow ouLlooks and hardly any
experlence are employed. uecenLrallsaLlon ls defecLlve ln budgeLlng, sLafflng, revenue collecLlon,
malnLenance work, flnanclal conLrol, lnformaLlon and honesLy. ShorLages of Lralned personnel,
dlfflculLles ln lnLergovernmenLal co-ordlnaLlon and low levels of managerlal and professlonal
capablllLy comblne Lo mlnlmlse Lhe effecLlveness of local-level lnsLlLuLlons (8ondlnelll & Mandell,
1981, 8ellly, 1981, 8onney, 1982, clLed ln SmlLh, 1983). usually Lhe cenLral governmenL can noL
meeL Lhe sLaff and resource requlremenLs of Lhe local governmenLs. 8esldes Lhls Lhe core lssue
herels LhaL local governmenLs ln many LuCs aredependanL on cenLrefor Lhelr flscal allocaLlon. Cne
of Lhe mosL sLrlklng problems ln effecLlve funcLlonlng of local governmenL ln many developlng
counLrles ls Lhe scarclLy of flnances. SmlLh (1983) quoLes an example of nlgerla where Lhe
lnLergovernmenLal relaLlons are domlnaLed by Lhe greaL perslsLenL dependence on resource
allocaLlon byhlgher levels of governmenL.
1he World 8ank reporL (1997) menLlons Lhrough emplrlcal evldence LhaL decenLrallsaLlon was
qulLe beneflclal ln Chlna, lndla and LaLln Amerlca. CompeLlLlon among Lhe provlnces and clLles
sLlmulaLed developmenL buL never wlLhouL slde effecLs l.e. causlng lnequallLles ln Lhose counLrles.
1he gap beLween reglons was wldened. As ln case of 8razll, Lhere erupLed macroeconomlc
lnsLablllLy. 8eslde Lhls Lhere was a rlsk of local governmenL capLure of resources. 1hls explalns how
cenLral governmenL role ls always lndlspensable ln susLalnable developmenL. 1he relaLlonshlp
beLween cenLral governmenL and lower Llers requlre harmony and coordlnaLlon. Conslderlng
decenLrallsaLlon ln developmenL conLexL of developlng counLrles, World 8ank (1999) advlses some
lessons for decenLrallslng.
1he Dark S|de of Decentra||sat|on
ChapLer 2
19
1he 8ank arLlculaLes LhaL dlscusslon abouL wheLher decenLrallsaLlon should happen or noL ls
lrrelevanL, Lhe way lL should be lmplemenLed ls lmporLanL and wlll explaln how successful lL ls. As
far as Lhe role of cenLral governmenL ls concerned, proponenLs of decenLrallsaLlon do noL suggesL
compleLe role back of cenLral governmenL. 1endler sLresses LhaL decenLrallsaLlon does noL enLall
cenLral governmenL sLepplng back from a role ln servlce dellvery, raLher lL enLalls deflnlng a new
supporLlve, enabllng and monlLorlng role for whlch new skllls are requlred. As such a range of
capaclLybulldlng ls requlred(1endler 1997, clLed ln Peymans eL al. 2004).
ln hls lnvesLlgaLlon of decenLrallsaLlon reforms ln Asla, MaLhur (1983) noLlced LhaL afLer LheSecond
World War, SovleL unlon sLyled cenLrallsed plannlng was adopLed ln counLrles LhaL recenLly
emerged from colonlal rule. roponenLs of decenLrallsaLlon crlLlclsed Lhls. 8uL desplLe crlLlclsm,
cenLral plannlng was assumed ln many developlng counLrles of Asla. 1hls gave blrLh Lo ldeologlcal
and pollLlcal dlvlslons over cenLrallsaLlon and decenLrallsaLlon. need for decenLrallsed
developmenL ln Asla became lnevlLable laLer wlLh lncreased demand for reduclng Lhe reglonal
dlsparlLles ln llvlng sLandards, fuelllng naLlonal dlslnLegraLlon. MaLhur (1983) descrlbes LhaL durlng
Lhe laLe 1960s, rural confllcLs arose ln lndla as a resulL of lnequlLable dlsLrlbuLlons of wealLh by
cenLral governmenL. Slmllarly raclal rloLs erupLed ln Malaysla ln 1969 because of greaLer eLhnlc
heLerogenelLy Lhere. need for decenLrallslng governmenL's affalrs Lhus galned momenLum as a
resulL of sLaLes' cenLrallsed plannlng and admlnlsLraLlons' fallure. ollLlcal and admlnlsLraLlve
decenLrallsaLlon, lf pursued vlgllanLly, can redress Lo a conslderable exLenL, Lhe grlevance of
deprlved and marglnallsed segmenLs of socleLy. uevolvlng pollLlcal and admlnlsLraLlve powers Lo
perlpherles, aL Llmes, ls a wlse sLraLegy Lo ensure naLlonal lnLegrlLy ln socleLles LhaL are eLhnlcally
heLerogeneous and soclallyfragmenLed.
uecenLrallsaLlon has been pracLlced ln dlfferenL reglons of Lhe world ln dlfferenL ways and
Lherefore lL had dlverse lmpacLs. 8ardhan & Mookher[ee (2003) belleve LhaL decenLrallzaLlon
seems Lo have dlverse effecLs ln dlfferenL counLrles. 1hey quoLe, for lnsLance, Clan and WelngasL
(1997), and !ln, Clan and WelngasL (1999) who argue LhaL decenLrallzaLlon was an lmporLanL
conLrlbuLlng facLor Lo rapld economlc growLh ln Chlna slnce Lhe early 1980s. ln conLrasL, 8lanchard
and Shlelfer (2000) argue LhaL local governmenLs reLarded growLh ln 8ussla ln Lhe 1990s. 8oLh seLs
of auLhors seem Lo agree LhaL Lhe effecLs of governmenL decenLrallzaLlon have dlffered
subsLanLlally beLween Chlna and 8ussla. 1urner and Pulme (1997) have clLed some vlLal examples
of measures Laken by sLaLes around Lhe world Lo decenLrallse Lhelr publlc admlnlsLraLlon. LxLracLs
from Lhose examples are recaplLulaLed ln Lhe followlng Lhree paragraphs ln order Lo have a gllmpse
of lnLernaLlonal scenarlo of consequences of decenLrallsaLlon reforms.
Afrlcan naLlons galned lndependence ln around 1960s and 8rlLlsh model local governmenL (non-
lndlgenous, cenLrally appolnLed) sLarLed looslng lLs valldlLy. lL was observed by Pyden (1983),
WralLh (1972) and kasflr (1983) LhaL decenLrallsaLlon was more rheLorlc Lhan pracLlce, ln facL Lhey
argued LhaL a greaLer cenLral conLrol was resumed. uC (ulsLrlcL commlssloners), Lhe cenLrally
Success andIa||ures: Loca| Governments Wor|dw|de

ChapLer 2
20
appolnLed offlcers, were glven powers Lo dlrecL dlsLrlcL counclls ln uganda (kasflr, 1983) whlle Lhe
power Lo appolnL councllors remalned wlLh cenLral governmenL. Local governmenL ln 1anzanla
had no slgnlflcanL responslblllLy and auLhorlLy as cenLral governmenL had conLrol over educaLlon,
road malnLenance and healLh (Pyden, 1983). nlgerla local counclls were dlssolved by cenLral
CovernmenL and Lhe same happened ln Senegal, Culnea, lvory CoasL, Zalre, and Chana (kasflr,
1983). 1he change even ln Lhe second round of decenLrallsaLlon ln early 1980s was also
negllglble(kasflr, 1983) e.g. Zambla's decenLrallsaLlon has glven more auLhorlLles Lo local
governmenLs buL cenLrallyappolnLed members sLlll domlnaLed Lhenew sLrucLures.
ln Sudan, devoluLlon of power was Laken over by Lhe hlghly cenLrallzed mlllLary governmenL. 1he
scenarlo ln Asla has noL been much dlfferenL Lhan Afrlca. Pere Loo, lL was more of rheLorlc and less
of a reallLy. AlLhough vlllage anchayaL (local governmenL) sysLems had been ln pracLlce ln lndla
way before lndependence yeL Lhe CollecLor (equlvalenL Lo uepuLy / ulsLrlcL Commlssloner) held
sway ln declslon maklng and had an evldenL domlnance over vlllage anchayaL and dlsLrlcL boards
(lrledman, 1983). Many anchayaLs have falled ln managlng Lhelr asslgned funcLlons (khanna and
8haLnagar, 1980) buL slmulLaneously some consplcuous achlevemenLs were also observed ln
karnaLaka(Crookand Manor, 1994), Cu[eraL, and MahrashLra.
1he case of 1halland and lndonesla ls vague l.e. Lhey have de facLo cenLral conLrols whlle
governmenL clalmed Lo have ensured local auLonomy and pollLlcal parLlclpaLlon. SlgnlflcanL
example of devolved governmenL ls observed ln hlllpplnes where addlLlonal power ls glven Lo
locally elecLed bodles and parLlclpaLlon ls exLenslve. uevoluLlon Lo local auLhorlLles ls excepLlonal
ln LaLln Amerlcan counLrles and cenLral governmenLs are domlnanL. lrom 1930s Lo 1970s, many
counLrles llke 8razll and Mexlco creaLed decenLrallsed agencles buL Parrls (1983) conslders Lhem
furLher cenLrallsaLlon. Llke many of Lhe lmporLed models of publlc managemenL and governance
from LhenorLhern developed world Lo Lhlrd world, Lheexperlenceof decenLrallsaLlon has noL been
absoluLely successful. 1he scope of local governmenL ln Asla, Afrlca and LaLln Amerlca has never
been more Lhan Lax collecLlon. SLudy of lndla, Sudan, kenya, Zambla and venezuela reveals LhaL
local governmenLs are noL generally endowed wlLh adequaLe powers and auLonomy Lo Lake
effecLlve declslons or moblllze local resources. 1hey have falled Lo enllsL Lhe co-operaLlon of Lhe
peopleand Lo sLlmulaLeparLlclpaLlon ln developmenL (8eddy, 1981).
ChapLer 2
21
Conc|us|on
Covernance ls a complex process and needs Lhorough dlagnosls of lssues and apL remedlal acLlons.
ollLlcal wlll of governmenL and coordlnaLlon among key lnsLlLuLlons along wlLh balance of power
and auLonomy are some essenLlal pre-requlslLes for Lhe developmenLal needs of sLaLe.
Covernance ls Lhus Loo broad Lo be lefL only Lo local governmenL and as such goodness of
governance ls lndlspensable prerequlslLe for resource allocaLlon Lo be efflclenL. nM as a model of
governance has been successful ln mosL developed counLrles yeL lLs compaLlblllLy and
performance ln developlng counLrles sLlll remalns quesLlonable. As observed ln flascos around Lhe
globe, especlally ln developlng counLrles, Lhe premaLure aLmosphere for half baked and
haphazardly lmporLed and lmplemenLed models of governance have exacerbaLed Lhe pollLlcal,
soclal and economlc condlLlons ln LhosecounLrles.
ollLlcal decenLrallsaLlon, where lmplemenLed gradually and approprlaLely, has shown remarkable
progress. uecenLrallsaLlon reforms have galvanlzed lmprovemenL ln efflclency, consolldaLlon of
pollLlcal skllls, accounLablllLy and naLlonal lnLegraLlon, promoLlon of llberLy, equallLy and welfare,
and maklng declslons more relevanL Lo local needs. ollLlcal parLlclpaLlon ls enhanced by
decenLrallsaLlon programmes, lmprovlng Lhelr pollLlcal poslLlons and access Lo admlnlsLraLlve
agencles. Powever, Lhe rlsk of locallsed governmenL's Lendencles Lo consolldaLe reglonal and
naLlonal ldenLlLles evenLuallyleadlng Lo sLaLe's dlslnLegraLlon looms largeln manycases.
lor many reasons, poor classes of socleLy can noL form elecLoral ma[orlLles and arLlculaLe Lhelr
pollLlcal lnLeresLs. 1hls makes local governmenL more prone Lo ellLe capLure by Lhe powerful
secLlons of Lhe socleLy. Pavlng consldered all Lhese pros and cons of decenLrallsaLlon, lL ls very
obvlous LhaL whaL maLLered ln developlng counLrles ls noL Lhe pollcy of decenLrallsaLlon lLself buL
Lhe degree of falrness, serlousness of pollLlcal wlll, accounLablllLy and Lransparency lnvolved ln lLs
lmplemenLaLlon. ollLlcal, admlnlsLraLlve and flscal devoluLlon of powers Lo local Llers of
governmenL would effecLlvely lmprove economlc and pollLlcal condlLlons and soclal servlce
dellvery lf lmplemenLed wlLh requlred vlgllanceand resources.
ChapLer 2
22
aklsLan's hlsLory ls marred wlLh pollLlcal lnsLablllLy and admlnlsLraLlve decay, barrlng few
excepLlons. 1he concepL of decenLrallsed local governmenL ls noL novel ln aklsLan buL lL has been
much of a rheLorlc Lhan reallLy. Looklng lnLo lLs hlsLorlcal pollLlcal conLexL, lL ls very lnLeresLlng Lo
see LhaL Lhree mosL slgnlflcanL decenLrallsaLlon reforms ln almosL slx decades old hlsLory of
aklsLan were lnLroduced by auLhorlLarlan mlllLary reglmes, Lhe non-represenLaLlve or non
democraLlc governmenLs. Whlle comparlng Lhese nascenL reforms lnLroduced ln 2001 wlLh
prevlous ones, a subsLanLlal range of lnnovaLlons can be seen ln admlnlsLraLlve and pollLlcal
arrangemenLs. uesplLe Lhese radlcal modlflcaLlons ln sLaLe and governmenL's lnsLlLuLlons, clvll
bureaucracy sLlll holds sway ln publlc secLor admlnlsLraLlon and clvll servanLs seldom respond Lo
Lhe needs of common clLlzens ln publlc servlces dellvery. Slmllarly Lhe mlllLary ls sLrucLurally
lncapableof enabllng popular parLlclpaLlon ln declslon maklng (uohad 2002).
8efore golng lnLo Lhe deLalls of local governmenL reforms aklsLan, a qulck flashback of Lhe hlsLory
of aklsLan's pollLlcal flucLuaLlons ls abrldged as follows. aklsLan came lnLo exlsLence ln 1947 as a
consequence of Lhe break up of posL-World War-ll 8rlLlsh lndla. 1he subsequenL separaLlon of LasL
aklsLan (now 8angladesh) ln 1971madeaklsLan's lnfanL hlsLory moreLurbulenL. 1herehavebeen
conLlnuous pollLlcal crlses and governance has been prlmarlly characLerlsed by a hlgh levels of
pollLlcal, flscal and admlnlsLraLlve concenLraLlon ln cenLre. CounLry's slx decades old hlsLory has
been qulLechaoLlc wlLh numerous changes ln governmenLs lncludlng four ma[or mlllLary coups and
wars wlLh lndla over 8angladesh and kashmlr ln 1948, 1963 and 1971. 1hese pollLlcally cenLrallzlng
facLors led aklsLan Lo cenLre orlenLed mlllLary spendlng (1alboL 2003, !alal 1993). LlemenLs of
welfare dropped down ln prlorlLles llsL and aklsLan gradually descended lnLo belng a securlLy
sLaLe. 1he ConsLlLuLlon of 1936 envlsaged a decenLrallzed federaLlon wlLh slgnlflcanL provlnclal
publlc spendlng responslblllLles and revenueralslng powers.
Ceneral Ayub khan, aklsLan's flrsL Marshal Law admlnlsLraLor lnLroduced 8u (8aslc uemocracy)
sysLem ln 1939. lL was supposed Lo lnlLlaLe grass rooLs democracy Lo a largely llllLeraLe populaLlon,
by glvlng llmlLed represenLaLlon and lnvolvemenL ln declslon maklng aL a level equal wlLh Lhelr
capablllLy. ln Lhan WesL aklsLan (now aklsLan), aL Lhe lowesL Ller, 37939 vlllages were dlvlded lnLo
4314 unlon Counclls, Lowns wlLh less Lhan 14000 populaLlons dlvlded lnLo 222 1own CommlLLees
and Lowns of more Lhan 14000 populaLlons lnLo 810 unlon CommlLLees (Saddlqul 1992). 1he oLher
Llers had some members elecLed lndlrecLly by Lhese dlrecLly elecLed members and some offlclal
members nomlnaLed by Lhe governmenL. 1hey had offlclals as chalrman (AsslsLanL Commlssloner
or 1ehslldar, a governmenL appolnLee ln case of Munlclpal CommlLLee, uepuLy Commlssloner, and
Commlssloner) (8lzvl 1976, clLed ln Cheema eL al. 2003). Cheema eL al. (2003) conflrm LhaL Lhls
sysLem was under Lhe bureaucracy Lhrough conLrolllng auLhorlLy vesLed ln Lhe uC (uepuLy
Commlssloner), commlssloner and Lhe governmenL for dlfferenL Llers. ConsLlLuLlon of 1962 llnked
Lhe resldenL's offlce Lo Lhe newly creaLed local bodles by declarlng 80,000 8aslc democraLs as
elecLoral collegefor elecLlng presldenL and naLlonal and provlnclal assemblles.
Loca| Government keforms s|nce Independence |n1947
Loca| Governments |n ak|stan
ChapLer 3
23
'LlecLlons Lo Lhe 8aslc uemocracles counclls were held aL Lhe lowesL Ller, called Lhe unlon Counclls,
buL a LhaL Llme marLlal law exLended over Lhe counLry and elecLed represenLaLlves were usually
people who were noL acLlve ln naLlonal pollLlcal affalrs and who, because Lhey owed Lhelr very
exlsLence Lo Lhe naLlonal governmenL, supporLed Lhe marLlal law reglme ln a pleblsclLe' (lrledman,
1983:37-38). Accordlng Lo lrledman (1983), Lhese local governmenLs had very llLLle lnfluence,
fundlng and auLhorlLy buL Lhey were able Lo perform arblLraLlon among vlllagers, whlch was a
cusLomary need of LhesocleLy.
Clvll and mlllLary bureaucraLs belleved LhaL WesLern democracy was noL sulLable for aklsLan as
Lhey LhoughL lL would end up ln creaLlon of weak governmenL because Lhe common people were
llllLeraLe and lgnoranL of represenLaLlve democracy. Ayub khan wrlLes ln hls auLoblography LhaL 8u
was sysLem Lo 'sulL Lhe genlus of Lhe people' (khan, 1967) buL for hls deLracLors, lL was a form of
'represenLaLlonal dlcLaLorshlp' (Cheema eL al. 2003:7). ln 8uSysLem, bureaucracy was supposed Lo
gulde Lhe pollLlclans whlle reslsLlng Lhelr corroslve" lnfluences. Ayub's mlllLary reglme and Lhe
lnLroducLlon of 'useful' decenLrallsaLlon reforms Lhus became models LhaL were followed by Cen.
Zlaand Cen. Musharaff wlLh moreor less, slmllar approach.
CenLrallzaLlon of pollLlcal power was also seen as a way of redresslng Lhe lndlrecL conLrol of Lhe
Lh
mlllLary ln pollLlcs, whlch perslsLed by vlrLue of Lhe 8 ConsLlLuLlonal AmendmenL lnsLlLuLed by Lhe
Zla reglme (World 8ank 2000). '1he elghLles dlffered from earller perlods ln LhaL lnsLead of a
domlnanL role, Lhey saw Lhe bureaucracy emerglng as [unlor parLners ln Lhelr alllance wlLh Lhe
mlllLary over sLaLeconLrol (Cheema&Sayeed 2004).
1he sysLem of 8aslc uemocracles could noL esLabllsh and was knocked down ln 1969. 1hls sysLem
dld noL moblllze Lhe rural populaLlon around lnsLlLuLlons of naLlonal lnLegraLlon. lLs focus was on
economlc developmenL and soclal welfare alone. 1he auLhorlLy of Lhe clvll servlce was lncreased ln
Lhe 8u SysLem, and Lhe wealLhy landlords and lndusLrlallsLs goL beLLer off. 1wenLy Lwo wealLhy
landlord and lndusLrlallsL famllles were argued Lo own around 60 of Lhe naLlon's resources.
AlmosL Lhe same sLraLegy l.e. leglLlmlsaLlon of mlllLary reglme and cenLrallsaLlon of pollLlcal power
aL federal and provlnclal level vla elecLoral represenLaLlon only aL Lhe local level was revlsed by Zla-
ul-Paq. Local governmenLs were revlved under LCCs (Local governmenL Crdlnances) and local
bodles were elecLed ln four provlnces durlng 1979 and 1980 (!alal 1993). 1he mlllLary repeaLed lLs
sLraLegyof 'dlvldeand rule' bycreaLlng anew class of compeLlng, collaboraLlvelocal pollLlclans.
Cheema and Mohmand (2003) compared Local governmenL Crdlnance (LCC) of 1979 wlLh 8aslc
democracles 1939 and explalned LhaL Lhere has been llLLle change ln Lhe granL of flnanclal powers
and funcLlon Lo local governmenL durlng Zla and Ayub reglmes. AnoLher commonallLy was Lhe
conLlnuaLlon of rural urban dlvlde aL Lhe level of rural or dlsLrlcL counclls, Lown and munlclpal
commlLLees and corporaLlons. LlecLed federal and provlnclal governmenLs were revlved ln 1983
whlch were domlnaLed by local pollLlclans. 1hls ulLlmaLely paved way for paLronage by elecLed
naLlonal mlnlsLers. 1hey had sLarLed uslng developmenL funds Lo galn Lhelr personal pollLlcal
mlleage. '1he absence of pollLlcal llnkages beLween dlfferenL Llers of governmenL, whlch was an
ouLcome of Lhe non parLy basls for pollLlcs, creaLed Lenslons beLween provlnclal and local
pollLlclans wlLh Lhelocal Ller belng vlewed as acompeLlng sLrucLureof paLronage(Wllder 1999).
ChapLer 3
24
ChapLer 3
LaLer durlng Lhe democraLlc decade from 1988 Lo 1999, federal and provlnclal governmenLs had
secured Lhe sway over Lhe developmenL funds and slmulLaneously Lhe flnanclal capaclLy of local
governmenLs became weaker and hence local bodles were suspended beLween 1993 and 1998.
CharlLon eL al. (2002) explaln LhaL unLll AugusL 14, 2001, aklsLan was dlvlded lnLo four
deconcenLraLed Llers l.e. federaLlon, provlnces, dlvlslons, and dlsLrlcLs. ueconcenLraLlon led Lo Lhe
enLrenchmenL of a bureaucraLlc sLrucLure based on Lhe colonlal paradlgm whereby an ellLe federal
cadre of federal clvll servanLs e.g. Lhe uMC (ulsLrlcL ManagemenL Croup) and ollce Servlce of
aklsLan, (S) are chosen by compeLlLlve exams. 1he overwhelmlng auLhorlLy of Lhe bureaucraLs
has exacerbaLed corrupLlon, lll-plannlng, growLh of urban cenLres, Lhe depleLlon of educaLlon,
healLh and oLher clvlc faclllLles ln urban and rural areas allke, and a pollce servlce LhaL fosLers crlme
(Calsranl 2001).
Accordlng Lo Lhe consLlLuLlon, aklsLan ls a federaLlon of four provlnces: 8aluchlsLan, Lhe norLh-
WesL lronLler rovlnce (nWl), un[ab, and Slndh. Covernor appolnLed by Lhe presldenL head Lhe
provlnce. 1here ls also Lhe lederally AdmlnlsLered 1rlbal Areas (lA1A), Lhe CaplLal LerrlLory, whlch
lncludes Lhe caplLal clLy of lslamabad. 1hese areas and LerrlLory are under Lhe [urlsdlcLlon of Lhe
federal governmenL. 1he norLhern Areas are admlnlsLered as 'unlon 1errlLorles' and are LreaLed as
an lnLegral parL of aklsLan. 1he aklsLanl admlnlsLered porLlon of Lhe dlspuLed !ammu and
kashmlr reglon lncludes Azad kashmlr, a separaLe and auLonomous governmenL LhaL malnLalns
sLrong Lles Lo aklsLan. 1he presldenL ls elecLed for a flve-year Lerm by an elecLoral college
conslsLlng of Lhe SenaLe, naLlonal assembly, and Lhe rovlnclal assemblles. 1he prlme mlnlsLer ls
elecLed byLhenaLlonal Assemblyfor aflveyear Lerm.
1heblcameral parllamenL or 'Ma[lls-e-Shoora' conslsLs of LheSenaLehavlng100seaLs. lLs members
arelndlrecLly elecLed by provlnclal assemblles Lo servefour-year Lerms. 1henaLlonal Assembly has
342 seaLs ouL of whlch, 60 seaLs are reserved for women, 10 seaLs reserved for mlnorlLles and
members elecLed by popular voLe serve flve-year Lerms. Lach of Lhe four provlnces, un[ab, Slndh,
norLhwesL lronLler, and 8alochlsLan has a Chlef MlnlsLer and provlnclal assembly. norLhern Areas
used Lo be admlnlsLered by Lhe lederal CovernmenL, Lhough recenLly by Lhe end of 2009, lL ls
renamed as CllglL-8alLlsLan, and granLed a 'provlnce-llke' sLaLus, wlLh an elecLed Chlef MlnlsLer and
resldenL appolnLed Covernor, buL lL sLlll has no lnsLlLuLlonal llnk wlLh Lhe four provlnces or Lhe
aklsLanl consLlLuLlon. Lach provlnce has a governor appolnLed by Lhe presldenL, and a chlef
mlnlsLer who ls Lhe leader of Lhe leglslaLlve assembly's ma[orlLy parLy or coallLlon. 1he chlef
mlnlsLer ls asslsLed by a councll of mlnlsLers chosen by Lhe chlef mlnlsLer and formally approved by
Lhe governor. lA1A ls governed dlrecLly by Lhe resldenL Lhrough Covernor, nWl, under Lhe
colonlal law of lC8 (lronLler Crlmes 8egulaLlons).
Structure of ak|stan's Government

2S

I|gure1: Mapof ak|stanhttp:]]www.thecommonwea|th.org]earbooknomeInterna|]13894S]
ChapLer 3
26
Devo|ut|onof ower keforms |n2001
Accordlng Lo World 8ank (2004), aklsLan's far-reachlng devoluLlon lnlLlaLlve of 2001 has been
deslgned wlLh Lhree broad and lnLer-relaLed ob[ecLlves: 1o ln[ecL new blood lnLo a pollLlcal sysLem
consldered Lo be Lhe domaln of hlsLorlcally enLrenched lnLeresLs, Lo provlde poslLlve measures
enabllng marglnallzed clLlzens l.e. women, workers, peasanLs Lo access formal pollLlcs, and Lo
lnLroduce a measure of sLablllLy lnLo a LurbulenL pollLlcal scene by creaLlng a sLronger llne of
accounLablllLy beLween new pollLlclans and local elecLoraLes. 1he provlnclal governmenLs
promulgaLed Lhe Local CovernmenL Crdlnance, 2001 ln Lhelr respecLlve provlnces Lo esLabllsh a
new lnLegraLed local governmenL sysLem wlLh effecL from 14Lh AugusL 2001, Lo funcLlon wlLhln Lhe
provlnclal framework and adhere Lo Lhe federal and provlnclal laws. 1he new sysLem reorlenLs
admlnlsLraLlvesysLem Lo allow publlc parLlclpaLlon ln local declslon maklng.
1he raLlonale for Lhls sysLem holds LhaL Lhe local governmenLs are accounLable Lo clLlzens for all
Lhelr declslons. lL enables Lhe poslLlve elemenLs of socleLy Lo parLlclpaLe ln communlLy work and
developmenL relaLed acLlvlLles. ulsLrlcL bureaucracy ls responslble Lo Lhe elecLed represenLaLlves.
More operaLlonal auLonomy ls ensured Lo Lhe dlsLrlcL level offlces. AdmlnlsLraLlve and flnanclal
powers of Lhe non operaLlonal dlvlslonal offlces have been delegaLed Lo Lhe dlsLrlcL level. 1hls
sysLem may beexplalned Lhrough Lhe3us Local CovernmenL model (llgure2). lL has also abollshed
Lhe rural urban dlvlde. 1he new local governmenL plan has noL been applled Lo Lhe canLonmenL
areas ln clLles and dlsLrlcLs. Slmllarly, lL ls noL lmplemenLed ln lA1A (lederally AdmlnlsLered 1rlbal
Areas). 1he elecLlons for Lhe local governmenLs were held durlng Lhe perlod uecember 2000 Lo
SepLember 2001. 8arrlng a few excepLlons (a boycoLL ln karachl and gender dlscrlmlnaLlon cases ln
some parLs of Lhe nWl) Lhey were held ln a falr, lmparLlal, and non-vlolenL manner. Cf Lhe
126,462 new unlon counclllors, 17 were women alLhough 33 of seaLs were reserved (CharlLon
eL al. 2002)
.
I|gure 2: Devo|ut|on of o||t|ca| ower
Source:
http:]]www.nrb.gov.pk]|oca|_government]f|gure_1.g|f
ChapLer 3
27
Des|gnof Loca| Government Structure
1he flrsL Ller of local governmenL wlLhln Lhe provlnce ls Lhe dlsLrlcL. un[ab rovlnce has Lhe largesL
number of dlsLrlcLs (33) followed by 8alochlsLan (28), nWl (24), and Slndh (23). Lach ulsLrlcL
CovernmenL ls headed by a Zlla nazlm (ulsLrlcL AdmlnlsLraLor) who ls an elecLed offlclal. 1he Zlla
nazlm ls asslsLed by a ulsLrlcL CoordlnaLlon Cfflcer (uCC) appolnLed by Lhe provlnclal governmenL
from Lhe federal or provlnclal clvll servlce and ls Lhe head of Lhe ulsLrlcL CoordlnaLlon Croup of
Cfflces. ln addlLlon, Lhe uCC coordlnaLes Lhe LxecuLlve ulsLrlcL Cfflcers (LuCs), who are also
appolnLed by Lhe provlnclal governmenL and head Lhe varlous dlsLrlcL offlces (such as CommunlLy
uevelopmenL, LducaLlon, PealLh, eLc.) LhaL comprlseLhedlsLrlcL admlnlsLraLlon.
1he second Ller of local governmenL below Lhe provlnces and Lhe dlsLrlcLs ls called 1ehsll Munlclpal
AdmlnlsLraLlon (1MA) or 1own Munlclpal AdmlnlsLraLlon ln four caplLal clLles. 1ehslls are smaller ln
slze Lhan Lhe dlsLrlcLs and have been asslgned funcLlons LhaL are dlfferenL from Lhe funcLlons and
responslblllLles of Lhe dlsLrlcL governmenLs. 1he sLrucLure of Lhe 1MAs ls slmllar Lo LhaL of Lhe
dlsLrlcL governmenLs. Lach 1MA ls headed by a 1ehsll nazlm who ls asslsLed by a 1ehsll Munlclpal
Cfflcer (1MC) appolnLed by Lhe provlnclal governmenL. 1he 1MC ls Lhe admlnlsLraLlve offlcer-ln-
charge of Lhe 1ehsll Cfflcers (1Cs) headlng Lhe varlous offlces aL Lhe Lehsll level (1C-Munlclpal
8egulaLlons, 1C-lnfrasLrucLure&Servlces, 1C-lannlng, and 1C-llnance). ln addlLlon, Lhe1MCalso
coordlnaLes Lhe Chlef Cfflcers, who are responslble for Lhe operaLlon and malnLenance of
munlclpal servlces under LheLerrlLorlal [urlsdlcLlon of LheLehslls.
1he Lhlrd and Lhe lowesL Ller of local governmenL ls Lhe unlon, whlch ls also Lhe smallesL ln slze. 1he
unlon AdmlnlsLraLlon conslsLs of Lhe unlon nazlm, Lhe unlon nalb nazlm, and a maxlmum of Lhree
unlon SecreLarles. 1heunlon SecreLarles coordlnaLecommunlLy developmenL and servlcedellvery
under Lhe supervlslon of Lhe unlon nazlm or Lhe unlon nalb nazlm. 1he unlon nazlms and unlon
nalb nazlms are Lhe only offlclals ln Lhe local governmenL sLrucLure who are dlrecLly elecLed by
clLlzens. 1hey compeLe for offlce on a [olnL LlckeL and, upon belng elecLed, become members of Lhe
unlon Councll. 1heunlon nalb nazlms also becomemembers of Lhe1ehsll Councll, whlleLheunlon
nazlms become members of Lhe ulsLrlcL Councll. 1he 1ehsll Councll and Lhe ulsLrlcL Councll elecL
1ehsll nazlms and ulsLrlcL nazlms respecLlvely.
1he nazlms aL Lhese Lwo levels of local governmenL are noL members of Lhe Counclls, buL raLher
represenLaLlves of Lhe larger communlLy. 1he relaLlonshlp among Lhe dlsLrlcL, Lehsll, and unlon
counclls ls flscally non-hlerarchlcal. Powever, Lhey are geographlcally and pollLlcally lnLegraLed.
1he dlsLrlcL, as Lhe largesL geographlcal unlL, may lnclude wlLhln lLs borders one or more Lehslls.
Lach Lehsll (1ehsll Munlclpal AdmlnlsLraLlon) lncludes a cerLaln number of unlons, whlch may
lnclude vlllages. ollLlcally, Lhe Lhree Llers of local governmenL are lnLernally lnLerrelaLed Lhrough
Lhe sysLem of dlrecL and lndlrecL elecLlons descrlbed above. Crganograms ln llgure 3 and 4
summarlses Lhe lnLegraLlon of local bureaucracy wlLh local governmenL aL ulsLrlcL and 1ehsll/1own
level.
ChapLer 3
28
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LuC
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LuC
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uevelopmenL
LuC
LducaLlon
LuC
llnance &
lannlng
LuC
PealLh
LuC
lnformaLlon
1echnology
LuC
Law
LuC
LlLeracy
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8evenue
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Works &
Servlces
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uuC, Clvll uefence
uuC, CoordlnaLlon
uuC, Puman 8esource ManagemenL
ulsLrlcL CoordlnaLlon Cfflcer
Zlla nazlm
nalb Zlla nazlm
Zlla Councll
I|gure 3
Crganogram of D|str|ct Government
Source: http:]]www.nrb.gov.pk]|oca|_government]f|gure_2.g|f?NCCACnL=1
ChapLer 3
29
.
I|gure 4
Crganogram of 1ehs|| Mun|c|pa| Adm|n|strat|on
Source: http:]]www.nrb.gov.pk]|oca|_government]tehs||_muc|pa|_adm|n_organagram.htm
ChapLer 3
1ehsll munlclpal admlnlsLraLlon
CrganlzaLlon
1ehsll nazlm
lnLernal AudlL
ComplalnL Cell
Ceneral LsLab.Mdmn.
ubllc lnformaLlon
1C
llnance
1ehslal Munlclpal
Cfflcer
1ehsll
Councll
nAl8 1ehsll nazlm
Convener
1ehsll Councll
Cfflce
1C
lnfrasLrucLure
and Servlces
1C
Munlclpal
8egulalons
1C
lannlng
Chlef Cffler aL
non- 1PA PC
Chlef Cffler aL
1MA PC
Speclal hyslcal
lannlng
Land use
lannlng (Land
Sub-ulvlslon,
Zonlng, and use)
WaLer Supply.
SanlLaLlon and
Solld WasLe
ManagemenL
8oads, SLreeLs
and SLreeL
LlghLlng
llre llghLlng
arks and
Cpen spaces
1rafflc
Lnglneerlng
CLhers
CLhers
Sewerage/
uralnage
Llcenslng AccounLlng
Survey
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Annual
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CosL
accounLlng
8evenue
vlgllance
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Leakages
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laclllLles &
roperLles
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of 8oads And
uralns
uevelopmenL
laclllLaLlon/
ConLrol
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laclllLaLlon
/ConLrol
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uevelopmenL
kachl Abadl
AmelloraLlon
lans
CoordlnaLlon
and llaLs on wlLh
nelghbourlng
Lehslls and
unlons/vlllage
Counclls
CLhers
CLhers
30
ost Devo|ut|on n|erarchy
L|m|tat|ons |nI|sca| Decentra||zat|on
Someof Lhema[or sLrucLural changes broughL abouL ln devoluLlon plan areworLh menLlonlng here.
8efore Lhe devoluLlon reforms, Lhe deconcenLraLed provlnclal bureaucracy aL Lhe dlsLrlcL level was
accounLable Lo Lhelr non-elecLed provlnclal secreLarlaL whereas under Lhe LCC Lhey are
accounLable Lo Lhe elecLed heads of dlsLrlcL and 1ehsll governmenLs. ulLlmaLe declslon maklng
auLhorlLy has been shlfLed from provlnclal governmenL dlsLrlcL offlcer who would reporL Lo Lhe
provlnclal bureaucracy, Lo an elecLed nazlm (Mayor) who ls ulLlmaLely answerable Lo hls dlsLrlcL's
consLlLuenLs. 1he uepuLy Commlssloner (uC), used Lo reporL Lo Lhe non-elecLed provlnclal
bureaucracy, whereas ln Lhe local governmenL sysLem Lhe head of Lhe dlsLrlcL admlnlsLraLlon, Lhe
ulsLrlcL CoordlnaLlon Cfflcer (uCC) reporLs Lo LheelecLed ulsLrlcL nazlm.
1he auLhorlLy of Lhe nazlm over Lhe uCC and LxecuLlve ulsLrlcL Cfflcers (LuC) ls clrcumscrlbed ln
maLLers of Lransfers and promoLlons, whlch conLlnueLo remaln under Lhepurvlew of Lheprovlnclal
secreLarlaL. Slnce Lhe auLhorlLy of nazlm ls llmlLed ln Lhls regard, publlc scruLlny and accounLablllLy
ln publlc secLor managemenL remalns amblguous. Moreover Lhe non-parLy basls of local
governmenL elecLlons has lnvarlably ended up weakenlng pollLlcal llnkages beLween elecLed
provlnclal governmenLs and local governmenLs. ollLlcal parLles ln governmenL aL Lhe provlnclal
level vlew local governmenLs as a compeLlng Ller. under LCC plan, dlsLrlcL governmenLs' lead
responslblllLles lnclude decldlng on Lhe locaLlon of new schools, arranglng fundlng for Lhelr
consLrucLlon, monlLorlng Lhe schools, carrylng ouL annual evaluaLlon of Leachers and provlde
powers Lo dlsLrlcL offlcers for Leachers' appolnLmenL, Lransfer and promoLlon (lCC, 2004).
llscal decenLrallzaLlon was lnLended Lo enable Lhe clLlzens Lo esLabllsh lndependenL local
governmenLs and Lo glveLhem declslon maklng responslblllLy ln publlc servlce dellvery. lmposlLlon
of Laxes and revenue generaLlon for servlce dellvery were also lncluded ln Lhe flscal
decenLrallsaLlon. Accordlng Lo CharlLon eL al. (2002), Lhe new Local CovernmenL SysLem envlsages
formula based flscal Lransfers Lo Lhe dlsLrlcLs Lhrough rovlnclal llnance Awards. ln addlLlon, local
governmenLs are allowed Lo levy local Laxes/fees from a speclfled llsL of local Laxes/ fees. 1o
promoLe Lrade and commerce ln Lhe counLry Lhe lmporL/exporL Lax (ocLrol) on movemenL of goods
Lhrough dlsLrlcL has been ellmlnaLed. Accordlng Lo Lhenew LCC, local governmenLs arenoL allowed
Lo lncur any debL Lo flnanceLhelr expendlLures. 1heprlnclpleof Lheformulafor provlnclal Lo dlsLrlcL
Lransfers ls LhaL dlsLrlcL and local governmenL should generaLe Lhelr own resources Lo Lhe exLenL
posslble. revlous local governmenL reforms falled Lo esLabllsh an adequaLe flscal Lransfer sysLem
wlLh Lhe resulL LhaL local counclls were unable Lo perform even Lhe llmlLed expendlLure funcLlons
asslgned Lo Lhem (Pyder 1999).
1he scenarlo wlLh devoluLlon reforms ln 2001 ls noL much dlfferenL. 1he 'rovlnclal llnance
Commlsslon' awards deLermlne Lhe non-dlscreLlonary lnLergovernmenLal flscal Lransfer
process.1he bulk of local governmenL resources are flscal Lransfers from provlnclally appolnLed
provlnclal flnance commlsslons (lC), up Lo 98 ln some cases (lCC 2004). ulsLrlcL governmenLs
ChapLer 3
31
have llmlLed dlscreLlon over Lhelr budgeLary resources. Cver 80 of Lhe money Lransferred ls for
salarles and cannoL be used for any oLher purposes. Pasnaln (2008) malnLalns LhaL Lhe provlnclal
allocable amounL ls Lransferred Lo Lhe local governmenL broadly under Lwo separaLe block granLs,
onefor recurrenL expendlLures, whlch consLlLuLes approxlmaLely 88 of LheallocableamounL, and
Lhe remalnder for developmenL expendlLures, wlLh no de [ure dlscreLlon Lo local governmenLs Lo
re-allocaLe across Lhese Lwo wlndows. ln oLher words, flscal decenLrallsaLlon has [usL been pald llp
servlce and local governmenLs rely almosL solely on hlgher Llers of governmenL for Lhelr flnanclal
requlremenLs.
1MAs have some revenue ralslng auLhorlLles buL agaln Lhe sLrlngs aLLached wlLh LhaL auLhorlLy
lmpedes effecLlveness and efflclency ln flscal affalrs. 1MA revenues from own source (Lhe parklng
fee, caLLle markeL fee, Lax on Lransfer of lmmovable properLy eLc.) are noL allocaLed Lo any
funcLlonal unlL of Lhe 1MA. WaLer fees are noL earmarked for waLer servlces, raLher Lhese become
parL of Lhe overall 1MA pool of revenues (nayyar-SLone eL al. 2006). Such pool arrangemenL
provldes no lncenLlve for Lhe 1C-l&S (1own Cfflcer - lnfrasLrucLure and Servlces) Lo lmprove lLs
collecLlon efflclency. ApparenLly Lhelocal governmenLs haveLheapproprlaLlon auLhorlLy over Lhelr
flscal recelpLs whlch lnclude revenues Lransferred Lo Lhem from Lhe provlnce. Powever, Lhrough
varlous admlnlsLraLlve orders Lhe local governmenLs are ofLen dlrecLed Lo respecL hlsLorlc salary
allocaLlons as well as varlous approprlaLlons Lo operaLlonal expendlLures ln accordance wlLh Lhe
prevlous ouLlays (Cyan 2007).
Such norms or consLralnLs compel Lhem Lo be paLh dependanL and as such local governmenL
represenLaLlves hardly have any opporLunlLy Lo brlng ln lnnovaLlons lnLo Lhelr revenue ralslng and
resource allocaLlon formulae. Councll's lnvolvemenL ls lnslgnlflcanL and nomlnal. Cyan and orLer
(2004) conLends LhaL law prescrlbes Lhe councll's role ln budgeL maklng buL Lhls funcLlon ls aL all
levels of governmenL led by Lhe execuLlve ln such a way LhaL marglnallzes councll. Au (Annual
uevelopmenL lan) dlsLrlbuLed among unlon counclls mosLly goes lnLo a large number of small
pro[ecLs. 1he amounL of fund becomes meagre when lL Lrlckles down Lo a unlon councll level. ln
allocaLlon of Au, LuC-llnance domlnaLes Lhe budgeLlng auLhorlLy Wllllamson eL al. (2003). 1hree
argumenLs are offered here, flrsLly, local governmenLs are sLlll dependanL on hlgher Llers of
governmenL for Lhelr flscal arrangemenLs, secondly, LhelnsLlLuLlonal norms coerceLhem Lo bepaLh
dependanL and bea parL of LhesLream, Lhlrdly, deslgn of flscal decenLrallsaLlon leaves Lhe1MA and
unlon Councll wlLh lnadequaLe funds LhaL are seldom sufflclenL for any subsLanLlal developmenL
pro[ecL.
ConsequenLly such developmenL funds are spenL or aL Llmes wasLed ln a large number of small
pro[ecLs. llgure 3 clLed ln Wllllamson eL al. (2003) compares per caplLa non wage (uevelopmenL
fund allocaLlon) ln baslc healLh and prlmary educaLlon of dlsLrlcL uera lsmall khan and AbboLLabad
wlLh uganda, a counLry wlLh per caplLa lncome almosL half LhaL of aklsLan. llgure 6 shows LhaL
wlLhln LhaL llmlLed porLlon allocaLed Lo baslc healLh and prlmary educaLlon, roads or lnfrasLrucLure
developmenL pro[ecLs are prlmary concerns for local governmenL offlclals. LlLeraLure reveals LhaL
oLher Lhan Lhe Lhree reasons menLloned above, local pollLlclans flnd lL more useful Lo lnlLlaLe
lnfrasLrucLure pro[ecLs aL local level because such Lrlumphs are more vlslble and noLlceable and
evenLuallyadd up ln bulldlng pollLlcal credlblllLyfor local pollLlclans.
ChapLer 3
32
Local nazlms and counclllors enhance Lhelr chances of geLLlng re-elecLed. ConcreLe reforms ln
healLh and educaLlon secLor e.g. lncrease ln enrolmenL ln prlmary schools or reducLlon ln lnfanL
morLallLy raLes requlreserlousness of pollLlcal wlll, enLhuslasm and moreresources. Powever, such
meanlngful changes may noL galvanlse pollLlclans' pollLlcal lmage. llgure 6 ls an lllusLraLlon
explalnlng dlsLrlbuLlon of nazlm Au schemes ln uera lsmall khan ln l? 2003. AnoLher reason for
poor performance by local governmenL ls LhaL lC and verLlcal programmes adversely affecLs Lhe
efflclency of resource allocaLlons as lL wldens Lhe gap beLween salary and non-salary expendlLures.
(llgure7)
I|gure: S
er Cap|ta Non-Wage Current Spend|ng on 8as|c nea|th and r|mary Lducat|on |n I200S
.
ly=llscal ?ear
Sources: AbboLLabad ulsLrlcL CovL. 2004. 8evlsed LsLlmaLes 2003-4 and 8udgeL LsLlmaLes CovL.
2004. 8udgeL for Lhe year 2004/3. uera lsmall khan: dara lsmall khan ulsLrlcL local CovL: World
bank, 1he 2004. 1he 8epubllc of uganda counLy lnLegraLed flduclary AssessmenL 2004.vol.2: ubllc
LxpendlLure8evlew WashlngLon, uC:1heworld 8ank.
Source: ClLed ln Wllllamson eL al. (2003)
ChapLer 3
33
I|gure: 6 D|str|but|on of Naz|m AD Schemes |n Dera Isma|| khan |n I 200S
AD = Annua| Deve|opment |an, I = I|sca| year
Source : uera lsmall khan ulsLrlcL local CovernmenL 2004 . 8udgeL for Lhe ?ear 2003/3 .
Source: ClLed ln Wllllamson eL al. (2003)
I|gure 7: Sa|ar|es Dom|nate 8udgets |n NWI |n I 200S
ChapLer 3
34
ChapLer 3
C|t|zenCommun|ty 8oards (CC8s)
ln order Lo make Lhe mosL of decenLrallsaLlon reforms, effecLlve local volunLary communlLy
organlsaLlons are exLremely crlLlcal. CommunlLy organlsaLlons play caLalyLlc role ln ldenLlflcaLlon
and sLreamllnlng of local pecullar developmenLal needs and arLlculaLlon of clLlzen's volce.
unforLunaLely esLabllshmenL of CC8s, ln leLLer and splrlL, as per Lhe local governmenL plan
remalned a wlshful Lhlnklng and evenLually communlLy parLlclpaLlon and grass rooL level
lnvolvemenL of clLlzens remalned eluslve. CC8s are volunLary and non proflL groups of local people
formed under Lhe Local CovernmenL Crdlnance 2001, ln order Lo promoLe communlLy
parLlclpaLlon ln local governmenL and lnvolved ln musLerlng local parLlclpaLlon of communlLles ln
developmenLal acLlvlLles. Accordlng Lo uecenLrallsaLlon SupporL rogramme (uS), communlLy
parLlclpaLlon ln local governmenL ls lmporLanL, boLh Lo ensure LhaL plannlng and developmenL are
carrled ouL ln accordance wlLh local needs, and Lo monlLor servlce dellvery and promoLe
Lransparencyand accounLablllLy.
CC8s lnvolve malnly ln developmenL, managemenL and malnLenance of publlc faclllLles. 1hey are
also lnvolved ln developmenLal acLlvlLles llke moblllzaLlon of resources, asslsLance of desLlLuLe,
wldows and poor famllles, esLabllshmenL of cooperaLlves, organlslng assoclaLlons llke 1As
(arenL-1eacher AssoclaLlons) for communlLy parLlclpaLlon. CC8s arerequlred Lo ralse20 of funds
for a pro[ecL Lhemselves whlle Lhe remalnlng 80 would be provlded by local governmenLs. 23 of
local governmenL developmenL funds are reserved for CC8s. 1hls money can noL be spenL on
anyLhlng else, lf noL used, lL ls carrled forward. CC8 prepares pro[ecL proposal asslsLed by local
governmenL offlcers. 1he pro[ecL proposal ls Lhen submlLLed Lo Lhe LuC-Cu (CommunlLy
uevelopmenL), Lhe 1ehsll/1own Cfflcer (lannlng), or Lhe unlon SecreLary Cu. Local governmenL
offlcers rank Lhe proposals and lncorporaLe Lhem ln Lhe Annual uevelopmenL rogram. 1he
pro[ecLs are Lhen submlLLed Lo Lhe councll for approval. When approved, Lhe local governmenL and
Lhe CC8 slgn an agreemenL for lmplemenLaLlon of Lhe pro[ecL. MonlLorlng ls [olnLly carrled ouL by
LheCC8, councll monlLorlng commlLLees and local governmenL offlces deallng wlLh CC8s.
Powever as menLloned above, CC8s ln mosL cases remaln elLher non exlsLenL or aL Lhe mosL,
nomlnal enLlLles. LaLlf (2006) malnLalns LhaL CC8s have dlfflculLles ln geLLlng Lhelr pro[ecLs sLarLed
malnly because Lhey (members from local communlLy) do noL have Lhe capaclLy Lo submlL
Lechnlcal proposal and cosL esLlmaLes. CovernmenL lacks sLaff Lo process proposals and
appllcaLlons. nazlms' conLrol on CC8s fund and pro[ecLs also undermlnes LheablllLy and progress of
CC8s. LuC- Cuhas agreaL deal of auLhorlLy ln pro[ecL approval and as such LheyarenoL answerable
Lo local governmenL.
AddlLlonally, LuC-Cu has Loo many responslblllLles and hls offlce ls amalgamaLlon of deparLmenL
of labour, soclal welfare, sporLs, culLure, cooperaLlves, and communlLy organlsaLlons. 1herefore
CC8s are one of many concerns for Lhe offlce of LuC-Cu and usually CC8s drops down ln prlorlLy
llsL. Cn conLrary, lnfluenLlal buslness communlLy and pollLlcal paLrons domlnaLe Lhe affalrs of CC8s.
nCCs geL reglsLered as CC8s ln order Lo geL exLra fundlng from local governmenL. nazlm see CC8s
as a LhreaL Lo Lhelr own auLhorlLy and paLronage. 1here ls no formal accounLablllLy mechanlsm
lnvolved ln esLabllshmenL and funcLlonlng of CC8s llke elecLlons. ulspuLes over malnLenance and
3S
ownershlp of CC8s and delays by relevanL llne deparLmenL ln pro[ecL approval and fund sancLlons
havebeen wldelywlLnessed.
WorsL case scenarlo have been reporLed ln form of fraudulenL reglsLraLlon of CC8s whereln people
announced fake moLorcycle draws ln order Lo obLaln 23 naLlonal lu card numbers Lo geL a CC8
reglsLered on behalf of people who don'L even know abouL lL. LaLlf (2006) menLlons LhaL ln un[ab
only 37 of CC8s have submlLLed pro[ecL proposal ouL of whlch half were approved. 8s. 8 8llllon
allocaLed for CC8s ls unspenL (!lCA clLed ln LaLlf 2006). 1here are some excepLlons Loo. under Lhe
guldellnes for CC8s, 2 pro[ecLs are allowed per CC8 per year. Powever ln ChlnloL, 24 pro[ecLs were
awarded Lo oneCC8ln oneyear (LaLlf 2006). ln Lhelr analysls, Cyan and orLer (2004) argueLhaL Lhe
LCC provlde for 23 allocaLlon of developmenL budgeL for CC8s and beyond Lhls Lhere are no
lncenLlves for Lhe local governmenLs. rovlnclal governmenLs reckon CC8s as compeLlLors for Lhelr
flscal space. 1hey prescrlbe LhaL a provlnclal granL brlnglng addlLlonal funds as maLchlng
arrangemenLs for CC8s pro[ecLs would creaLe a poslLlve pollLlcal aLmosphere by prescrlblng
process condlLlons for CC8 reglsLraLlon, local dlalogue and publlc access, pro[ecL approval and
monlLorlng arrangemenLs and allow addlLlonal lncenLlve funds for local dlscreLlonary allocaLlon. A
componenL of Lhe granL would flnance lncenLlves for local governmenLs where CC8 allocaLlons are
provlded ln Llmefor Lhelr pro[ecLs.
ChapLer 3
36
ln Lhe llghL of LheoreLlcal underplnnlng dlscussed ln chapLer 2, Lhls chapLer hlghllghLs Lhe lmpacL of
reforms on publlc servlce dellvery, uslng Lhe avallable secondary daLa and sLudles conducLed for
assessmenL of devoluLlon reforms ln aklsLan. Scope of devoluLlon reforms and lLs lnLended
lmpllcaLlon ln Lerms of dellverables ls vasL and as such assessmenL of every componenL ls noL
posslble ln a slngle research paper. Powever, Lhls sLudy focuses chlefly on lmpacL of reforms uslng
lndlcaLors llke baslc healLh, prlmary educaLlon and waLer and sanlLaLlon faclllLles Lo arrlve aL a
general undersLandlng.
Some basellne sLudles by World 8ank, uflu, Aslan uevelopmenL 8ank and unlLed naLlons
uevelopmenL rogramme have already been conducLed ln order Lo assess Lhe lmpacL of
uevoluLlon reforms ln developmenL conLexL, locallsed governmenL are expecLed Lo efflclenLly
dellver healLh, educaLlon and munlclpal servlces ln such a manner LhaL Lhey could be more
responslve Lo Lhe local needs of communlLy and be able Lo provlde efflclenL and bespoke servlces
for whlch Lhey could be held accounLable. 1hese benchmarks or parameLers are used Lo gauge Lhe
exLenL Lo whlch local governmenL reforms ln aklsLan (2001) have been successful ln lmprovlng
publlc servlcedellvery.
AdmlnlsLraLlon of Leachlng hosplLals, agrlculLural research and developmenL, supervlslon of
forelgn funded pro[ecLs, and regulaLlon of medlcal sLandards have remalned aL Lhe provlnclal level
even afLer Lhe devoluLlon of oLher acLlvlLles ln Lhe same deparLmenLs. CerLaln budgeLary heads of
expendlLures have effecLlvely been reLalned aL Lhe provlnclal level e.g. salary and allowance
expendlLures of all deparLmenL employees. rlmary healLh care and managemenL of dlsLrlcL and
1ehsll hosplLals, assessmenL and collecLlon of land Laxes, agrlculLural lncome Lax, agrlculLural
exLenslon and farm waLer managemenL, plannlng and deslgn of dlsLrlcL roads and bulldlngs are
now devolved Lo Lhe dlsLrlcL governmenLs from Lhe provlnce. Servlces such as Lhe esLabllshmenL of
new schools, up gradaLlon of exlsLlng schools, and Lhe malnLenance and lnspecLlon of schools are
now Lhe responslblllLy of Lhe dlsLrlcL governmenLs. Servlces provlded by Lhe local governmenL and
8ural uevelopmenL deparLmenL, houslng, urban developmenL, and ubllc PealLh Lnglneerlng
ueparLmenL (PLu) have been devolved from Lhe provlnclal Lo Lhe 1ehsll level. key munlclpal
servlces such as waLer supply, sewerage, sanlLaLlon, dralnage schemes and sLreeL llghLs have been
devolved from urban/ 8ural counclls Lo 1ehsll/ 1own level.
8lrd's eyevlew of posL devoluLlon plcLurels dlscouraglng. 1hefemale-malellLeracy gap lncreased ln
aklsLan whlle lL decllned ln Lhe comparaLor counLrles, whlle lnfanL morLallLy decllned by 36 ln
Lhe comparaLor counLrles, compared Lo only 27 ln aklsLan (Cyan and orLer 2004). Pasnaln
(2003), analyslng Lhe pre-devoluLlon perlod menLlons LhaL aklsLan had Lhe worsL soclal lndlcaLors
ln Lhe developlng world. 1he 1990s, aklsLan's decade of democracy, was also a decade of
sLagnaLlon. 1he adulL llLeracy raLe ln 2001/02 aL 43 was only sllghLly hlgher Lhan ln 1993-96, and
Lhe neL prlmary enrolmenLs (nL) raLe had decllned from 46 ln 1991-92 Lo 42 ln 2001-02.
Access Lo lndoor plped drlnklng waLer decllned from 23 Lo 22, and Lhere were only mlnor
lmprovemenLs ln lmmunlzaLlon coverageand reducLlons ln Lhelncldenceof dlarrhoea.
.
Impacts of Devo|ut|on keforms ChapLer 4
37
r|mary andSecondary Lducat|onSector
1wo maln varlables have been Laken lnLo accounL here, posL devoluLlon enrolmenL of chlldren ln
schools and enhanced parLlclpaLlon of clLlzens, especlally Lhe parenLs, ln lmprovlng servlce
dellvery. AudlL of soclal servlce dellvery ln aklsLan by CockcrofL eL al. (2003) found LhaL neL school
enrolmenL (ln any school or grade) among chlldren aged 3-9 years lncreased from 70 ln 2002 Lo
77 ln 2004. CuL of all 3-9 year old chlldren ln 2004, 43 were enrolled ln governmenL schools,
30 ln prlvaLeschools, 3 ln madarls and 1 ln non-formal schools. 8eLween 2002and 2004, Lhere
was a2 lncreaseln enrolmenL lnLo governmenL schools and 3 lncreaseln enrolmenL lnLo prlvaLe
schools ls observed. 1he percenLage of enrolled chlldren ln governmenL schools fell because of Lhe
greaLer lncrease ln enrolmenL lnLo prlvaLe schools. 1wo reasons whlch parenLs gave for sendlng a
chlld Lo a governmenL school were ease of access and Lhe low cosL lncenLlves. ln 2004, 73 of
parenLs of chlldren ln a governmenL school were saLlsfled wlLh Lhe school, compared wlLh 91 for
chlldren ln a prlvaLe school, 86 for chlldren ln a non-formal school, and 93 for chlldren ln
madarls.
1he governmenL's acLlon plan for educaLlon secLor reforms seL a goal of ralslng nL (neL prlmary
enrolmenL) from 66 ln 2001 Lo 76 ln 2004 (MlnlsLry of LducaLlon, Co 2002). Accordlng Lo Lhe
MlnlsLry of Lconomlc Affalrs and SLaLlsLlcs, Co (2002), Lhe flgure for nL ln 2001 was 66. lPS
(aklsLan lnLegraLed Pousehold Survey) from Lhe 1990sflnds LhaL overall enrolmenLs were low and
Lhey exhlblLed perslsLenL, large gender, urban-rural, and rlch-poor gaps. rlmary gross enrolmenL
raLes among Lhe Lop 3 declles, by per caplLa consumpLlon, were around 90, whereas LhaL among
Lhe boLLom 3 declles was around 30. Slmllarly, ln Slndh only 23 of glrls llvlng ln rural areas were
enrolled ln prlmary school, compared Lo 62 ln lLs urban areas (keefer eL al. 2003). unlCLl's nL
flgure for aklsLan durlng Lhe perlod 1996-2003 ls 36 l.e. 62 male and 31 female (CockcrofL eL
al. 2003). 1he aklsLan Soclal and Llvlng SLandards MeasuremenL Survey (SLSM) (2004-03) had
reporLed anLflgureof 32(lederal 8ureau of SLaLlsLlcs 2003).
1rends observed ln Lhese sLaLlsLlcs are self explanaLory. WhaL ls obvlous ls LhaL desplLe
resLrucLurlng and lnLegraLlon of local bureaucracy and local governmenLs and provlslon for
esLabllshmenL of clLlzens' commlLLees, resulLs are far from saLlsfacLory. LnrolmenL ln schools has
been elLher sLagnanL or lncreased lnslgnlflcanLly. lndeed LhesllghL enhancemenL ln enrolmenL may
well be aLLrlbuLed Lo Lhe general lncrease ln demand for educaLlon as lL has been observed by Lhe
burgeonlng number of prlvaLe schools boLh ln rural and urban areas. Changes observed ln publlc
schools reveals rural / urban and gender blas l.e. progress can be seen only ln urban publlc schools
and lLs mosLlymalesLudenLs whoseenrolmenL has lmproved sllghLly.
ApproxlmaLely 70 populaLlon of aklsLan ls rural and dependenL on agrlculLure for Lhelr
subslsLence, dlrecLly or lndlrecLly. lL ls malnly Lhe cosL of schoollng LhaL consLralns parenLs Lo
absLaln from sendlng Lhelr chlldren Lo schools. Walklng dlsLance Lo school and faclllLles provlded ln
school also slgnlflcanLly deLermlneLhedeclslon of parenLs ln Lhls regard. CosL of schoollng may also
lnclude opporLunlLy cosLs l.e. chlldren helplng parenLs ln anlmal husbandry, culLlvable land and
1 lural of Madrasa, arellglous (Musllm) educaLlon lnsLlLuLe.
38
uolng oLher household chores may lncur hlgh opporLunlLy cosLs lf allowed Lo pursue Lhelr
educaLlon. As menLloned ln prevlous chapLer, local governmenL are prlmarlly concerned wlLh
noLlceable pro[ecLs lnsLead of lmprovlng Lhe enrolmenL and educaLlon sLandards. keefer eL al.
(2003) sLudy of 100 vlllages show LhaL compeLlLlon for voLes leads Lo school consLrucLlon (Langlble
and vlslble) buL llLLleLo LhelmprovemenL of quallLyof educaLlon.
SMCs (School ManagemenL CommlLLees), known as School Counclls ln un[ab, 1As (arenL-
1eacher AssoclaLlons) ln nWl, arenL 1eacher School ManagemenL CommlLLees (1SMCs) ln
8alochlsLan, operaLe wlLh varylng degrees of effecLlveness under Lhe new sysLem of devoluLlon.
Pead Leachers have Lhe lnfluence ln mosL of Lhe cases and Lhey selecL members for SMCs. 1As are
domlnaLed by Leachers raLher Lhan parenLs (WaLson and khan 2004). Surprlslngly, research sLudles
reveal LhaL mosL SMCmembers haveno ldea of Lhelr [obs and responslblllLles. A [olnL sLudy by Au8,
uflu, World 8ank (2004) menLlons LhaL ln many dlsLrlcLs of Slndh, locally elecLed offlclals were
pushlng for unlon nazlmeen Lo bechalrpersons of SMCs, or werepressurlng school headmasLers Lo
make purchases from cerLaln dealers. ConLrarlly, ln some cases, acLlve encouragemenL of SMCs by
dlsLrlcL or unlon nazlm has resulLed ln slgnlflcanL lmprovemenLs ln school quallLy. khalrpur ls
among Lhe mosL lnnovaLlve dlsLrlcLs ln Lerms of communlLy lnvolvemenL ln servlce dellvery. SMCs,
wlLh Lhehelp of unlon counclls, havebeen glven LheresponslblllLy Lo consLrucL shelLer less schools.
noL only have 33 been compleLed, buL wlLh communlLy monlLorlng, Lhelr consLrucLlon cosLs were
reduced Lo around 8s.200000 - 230000 as compared Lo approxlmaLely 8s.780000 for slmllar ones
prevlouslybullL byLheLducaLlon deparLmenL.

Analysls of some key lndlcaLors ln healLh secLor of aklsLan porLrays a dlsmal plcLure. Local
governmenL ordlnance (2001) made Lhe provlnces responslble for plannlng and monlLorlng of
healLh servlces buL noL for dellvery of healLh servlces, whlch are now a dlsLrlcL funcLlon. 1he efforLs
of local governmenLs Lo lmprove healLh servlces, lncludlng lncreaslng avallablllLy of medlclnes are
reflecLed ln Lhe lncreased saLlsfacLlon of boLh servlce users and households beLween 2001/2 and
2004. 8uL Lhe saLlsfacLlon of governmenL healLh servlce users ls sLlll lower Lhan LhaL of users of
prlvaLe and unquallfled pracLlLloners and household saLlsfacLlon (CockcrofL eL al. 2003). 1he soclal
audlL 2004 flgure of 27 of households saLlsfled wlLh governmenL healLh servlces ls comparable
wlLh Lhe SLSM survey flgures of 36 saLlsfled wlLh governmenL baslc healLh faclllLles and 11
saLlsfled wlLh famlly plannlng servlces ln 2004. Powever, Lherels also evldenceof a decllneln useof
governmenL faclllLles beLween 2001/2 and 2004 (SLSM Survey 2003). LeL's gauge Lhe progress of
healLh secLor on basls of someLlmeLesLed prlnclples of good governanceas follows.
1he exLenL Lo whlch rules apply equally Lo everyone ln socleLy lrrespecLlve of sLaLus and Lhe
degreeof lnvolvemenL and ownershlp of Lheconcerned sLakeholders areconsldered Lo beof ma[or
lmporLance ln publlc pollcy formulaLlon. racLlce ln healLh secLor of aklsLan before and afLer Lhe
devoluLlon reforms dos noL seem Lo be coherenL wlLh Lhese prlnclples. ln 2004, vulnerable
households and Lhose who pald Lo Lravel Lo Lhe faclllLles were less llkely Lo be saLlsfled wlLh
avallable governmenL healLh servlces, whlle urban dwellers, Lhe educaLed, and women were more
llkely Lo be saLlsfled. 1hls slmply lndlcaLes LhaL poor classes of socleLy llvlng ln Lhe urban areas have
rogress |nr|mary nea|thCare
39
noL been LargeLed for Lhe servlce dellvery. SLudy conducLed by Wllllamson eL al. (2003) ascerLaln
LhaL access Lo governmenL healLh faclllLles remalns a problem ln rural areas, wlLh around 30 of
households lacklng a healLh faclllLy ln Lhelr vlllages. Medlcal sLaff aL governmenL healLh faclllLy has
llLLle or no say ln Lhe allocaLlon of Lhe medlclne supply budgeL. PealLh unlLs run ouL of speclflcally
requlred medlclnes whlle Lhey slmulLaneously recelve Lhose medlclnes LhaL Lhey may noL need aL
LhaL parLlcular polnL of Llme.
ln quesL for ldenLlflcaLlon of reasons for poor access Lo baslc publlc servlces by Lhe people resldlng
ln LheremoLerural areas, Wllllamson eL al. (2003) found LhaL many Leachers and healLh workers are
unwllllng Lo work ln remoLe areas, reason belng, Lhey have Lo Lravel dally Lo and from Lhose remoLe
workplaces. 8esldes Lhls, Lhere ls exLra cosL and Llme lnvolved ln Lravelllng. 1hey may noL flnd
sulLable accommodaLlon. ln 8Pus (8aslc PealLh unlLs), docLors geL accommodaLlon buL faclllLles
llkegood schools for Lhelr chlldren arenoL avallable. AlLernaLlvely Lheycan earn good moneylf Lhey
go for prlvaLe pracLlce or sLay aL urban cenLres. ln remoLe areas Lhey also have llLLle scope of
supplemenLlng Lhelr prlvaLepracLlcewhlch obvlously can bebesL managed lf Lheywork aL an urban
sLaLlon. ulsLrlcL healLh and educaLlon secLor do noL provlde regular supporL Lo Lhelr fronLllne sLaff
ln fleld becauseLheylack adequaLeLransporL servlce, operaLlonal fundlng and capaclLy. 1hls means
LhaL sLaff ls less llkelyLo beableLo dellver professlonal servlces.
1he exLenL Lo whlch publlc offlclals elecLed / appolnLed are responslble for Lhelr acLlons and
responslve Lo publlc demands ls Lermed as accounLablllLy whlle Lransparency ls Lhe degree Lo
whlch declslons made by publlc offlclals are clear and open Lo scruLlny by clLlzens or Lhelr
represenLaLlves. CreaLlng accounLable relaLlons beLween clLlzens and elecLed represenLaLlves has
proven eluslve slnce aklsLan's formaLlon ln 1947 (!alal 1993). erpeLual lack of such
lnsLlLuLlonallsed prerequlslLes have sLagnaLed lmprovemenL ln Lhe healLh secLor of aklsLan.
AlmosL all users of governmenL faclllLles ln 2004 pald someLhlng for Lhe vlslL, lncludlng
lnvesLlgaLlon fees. Medlclnes were noL provlded by Lhe faclllLy (Wllllamson eL al. 2003). Pe
elaboraLed furLher LhaL abouL half Lhe governmenL servlce users, who pald fees, pald more Lhan
Lhe offlclal raLe. AbouL 7 pald for medlclnes ln governmenL faclllLles, 3 pald healLh workers, and
9 lncurred oLher cosLs. Less Lhan a Lhlrd of users of governmenL healLh faclllLles ln Lhe lasL Lhree
monLhs reporLed LhaL Lhey recelved all Lhe prescrlbed medlclnes from Lhe faclllLy. 1hls ranged from
38 ln un[ab down Lo 9 ln nWl.
eople would be more saLlsfled lf Lhe medlclnes are all avallable and dellvered Lo Lhem free of
charge. SwlLchlng over Lo prlvaLe healLh faclllLles, Lhe 'exlL' opLlon may well be deslrable buL noL
always an affordable and vlable for Lhe sLruggllng classes of socleLy. Checks and balances on Lhe
prlvaLe pracLlces of docLors and oLher healLh faclllLles are almosL nexL Lo non exlsLenL. CorrupLlon
aL governmenL healLh faclllLles boLh aL rural and urban areas ls sLlll ublqulLous. SLaff aL Lhe faclllLles
ls lnvolved ln selllng Lhe drugs, whlch are supposed Lo be avallable free of charge for Lhe publlc.
SLaff aL Lhe faclllLles ls also reporLed Lo be lnvolved ln personal mlsuse of all equlpmenL lncludlng
ambulances. Ceneral publlc conslders lL as sheer wasLage of Llme Lo complaln agalnsL such
nulsance as Lhey argue LhaL Lhey can noL change Lhe sysLem. LlecLed local governmenL has
overslghL auLhorlLy over Lhe dlsLrlcL sLaff ls nomlnal as LhaL sLaff ls recrulLed, works under, and ls
responslbleLo Lheprovlnclal governmenL.
40
laLe as Lhe end of Lhe second quarLer of Lhe flnanclal year. 1hus, even Lhough dlsLrlcL governmenLs
have Lhe legal and lnsLlLuLlonal auLhorlLy Lo provlde varlous healLh servlces, Lhelr ablllLy Lo
effecLlvely manage Lhese servlces ls consLralned by Lhe provlnclal bureaucracy's admlnlsLraLlve
conLrol over dlsLrlcL sLaff (nayyar-SLoneeL al. 2006).
ApproxlmaLely 73 of Lhe budgeL ls consumed by salarles of medlcal and non-medlcal sLaff, whlle
only abouL 13 ls allocaLed for medlclne and relaLed consumables. All cosLs ln Lhe Lable are
covered by Lhe provlnclal governmenL Lhrough granLs Lo Lhe dlsLrlcL governmenL (nayyar-SLone eL
al. 2006).
1ab|e 1
Sa|ary and Non-Sa|ary Lxpend|tures on Lducat|on, 2004200S, ks. M||||ons
Source: S|a|kot D|str|ct 8udget c|ted |n Nayyar-Stone et a| (2006)
nayyar-SLone eL al (2006) elaboraLe LhaL Lhe revenues collecLed by varlous hosplLals and oLher
healLh faclllLles are noL reLalned by Lhe ulsLrlcL CovernmenL, raLher, Lhey are deposlLed ln Lhe
provlnclal governmenL's accounL. 1he amounL collecLed aL Lhe dlsLrlcL level becomes parL of Lhe
provlnclal pool of resources. lL ls dlsLrlbuLed among Lhe dlsLrlcLs accordlng Lo Lhe rovlnclal
llnanclal Commlsslon (lC) award's formula and noL accordlng Lo Lhe acLual amounL collecLed ln
each dlsLrlcL.
LlmlLaLlons of local publlc offlclals consLraln Lhem ln varylng degrees e.g. Lhe sLaff of Lhe LuC-
PealLh offlce spends more Llme ln deallng wlLh managemenL lssues of dally rouLlne and managlng
varlous aspecLs of healLh servlces raLher Lhan provldlng Lhe acLual servlces. L.g. Lhe Medlcal
SuperlnLendenL of any hosplLal or Senlor Medlcal Cfflcer of a 8ural PealLh CenLre ls a quallfled and
experlenced docLor buL mosL of hls Llme ls spenL managlng Lhe Lechnlcal and admlnlsLraLlve
maLLers of Lhe hosplLal (nayyar-SLone eL al. 2006). naLurally ln such clrcumsLances, essenLlal Lasks
requlred for lmprovemenLs ln healLh servlces are pushed down ln prlorlLy llsLs and offlclals'
lnvolvemenL ln admlnlsLraLlve affalrs become unavoldable for Lhem. rovlnclal and federal
governmenLs usually abuse Lhelr auLhorlLy Lo manlpulaLe local admlnlsLraLlon ln order Lo secure
Lhelr pollLlcal paLronage. World 8ank (2004b) expllcaLes LhaL byLheLhreaL of unpleasanL Lransfer or
Lhe promlse of an aLLracLlve one, Lhe senlor sLaff members can be puL under pressure Lo accede Lo
Lransfer of a[unlor sLaff.
ulsLrlcL 8udgeL 8evlsed 8udgeL LsLlmaLes
Salary non - Salary Salary non - Salary
SlalkoL (un[ab) 1,416 97 40 3 1,467 93 76 3

41
A very common pracLlcebydocLors aL governmenL healLh faclllLles ls LhaL Lheypersuadeand coerce
paLlenLs Lo see Lhem aL Lhelr personal prlvaLe cllnlcs, whereby Lhey charge Lhem dearly for
consulLaLlon and medlclnes and aL Llmes a wlde range of unnecessary medlcal LesLs. CovernmenL
healLh pollcy ls leasL concerned wlLh Lhe conLrol of reLall prlces of drugs ln markeL. Well known
speclallsL physlclans geL brlbed by Lhe medlclne manufacLurers for klckback ln reLurn for
prescrlblng Lhelr drugs Lo paLlenLs, even lf noL necessary. 1he dllemma ls LhaL poor llllLeraLe
paLlenLs can noL dlsLlngulsh or ldenLlfy Lhe alLernaLlve cheap medlclnes leavlng Lhem wlLh no oLher
opLlon Lhan purchaslng medlclnes prescrlbed by Lhe prlvaLe pracLlLloners. A rough esLlmaLe of
dlsLrlbuLlon cosLs of medlclnes produced ls around 80 of LoLal reLall prlce charged ln Lhe markeL.
Cne can well lmaglne whaL porLlon of LhaL unlL prlce goes Lo Lhe one who prescrlbes, or Lo be more
preclse, sell Lhem on behalf of Lheproducers.
Cn poslLlve slde, Wllllamson eL al. (2003) quoLe LhaL among Lhose LhaL usually used governmenL
healLh faclllLles, more people knew how Lo complaln abouL servlces ln 2004 (12 ln 2001/2 and
16 ln 2004). Among oLher lnsLances, lL was found by Au8/uflu/World 8ank (2004) LhaL some
healLh commlLLee ln karachl clalmed Lo have boLh lncreased Lhe aLLendance of sLaff by 20 and
lmproved Lhe quallLy of malnLenance and repalr. 1hls clalm was generally verlfled by nCCs and
[ournallsLs. Slmllarly, LheclLy healLh commlLLeesLaLed LhaL lL had vlslLed 23hosplLals ln LhelasL year
Lo oversee Lhe quallLy of servlce and reduce absenLeelsm. 1he commlLLee members belleve LhaL
Lhls lmprovemenL has been achleved because of Lhelr conslsLenL monlLorlng. 8eporLs are common
LhaL docLors are more ofLen presenL ln healLh faclllLles and Leachers ln schools as compared Lo pre-
devoluLlon perlods. 1he lncreaslng avallablllLy of sLaff can lead Lo Lhe lncreased chances LhaL local
faclllLles, parLlcularly for healLh, wlll acLually have medlclnes avallable for Lhe LreaLmenL. WlLh Lhe
full devoluLlon of procuremenL, publlc medlcal faclllLles are now well sLocked and Lherefore more
uLlllzed by Lhe publlc. 8uL such excepLlons are seldom observed and ln many cases, resLrlcLed only
Lo somelargeclLles.
Au8/uflu/World 8ank (2004) menLlons a case abouL user fees ln healLh. ln kllla Salfullah and
karachl, no Cu(CuL aLlenL ueparLmenL) fee was charged, buL oLher recelpLs were deposlLed lnLo
Lhe provlnclal accounL. ln 8annu and 8ahawalpur, Lhe Cu fee and oLher user charges were
deposlLed lnLo Lhe provlnclal accounL. ln khalrpur, by conLrasL, Cu fees are collecLed and
deposlLed ln a [olnL accounL of Lhe faclllLy and nalb nazlm of Lhe unlon councll concerned Lo be
spenL on small day Lo day requlremenLs of Lhe faclllLy. ln lalsalabad, Cufee and oLher recelpLs do
beneflL Lhe dlsLrlcL as Lhey are deposlLed ln dlsLrlcL accounL. A serles of dlscrepancles ln flscal and
admlnlsLraLlvemechanlsms ls observed here.
1he long Lerm cosLs of such shorL Lerm approaches are dearer. CLher Lhan Lhe overrldlng auLhorlLy
ln local affalrs by Lhe provlnclal llne mlnlsLrles, lL ls Lhe confuslon regardlng [urlsdlcLlonal
demarcaLlon and subsequenL non compllance of rules and procedures LhaL deLerloraLe Lhe already
dlmlnlshed effecLlveness and efflclency of publlc secLor organlsaLlons sLlll furLher. 1he
procuremenL process for obLalnlng medlclnes ls also sLlll carrled ouL by Lhe provlnclal governmenL,
whlch ofLen delays medlclneprocuremenL unLll afLer Lheend of LheflrsL quarLer and someLlmes as
42
Water andSan|tat|on
khan (1998) wroLe LhaL ln 1998 lL was esLlmaLed LhaL Lhe urban areas of aklsLan generaLed abouL
20 mllllon Lons of solld wasLe per annum and LhaL Lhere was noL a slngle clLy ln aklsLan wlLh a
properly planned wasLe managemenL sysLem. 1he raLe of collecLlon was esLlmaLed aL 31 Lo 69.
8ased on flgures from several surveys, Lhe WPC/unlCLl [olnL monlLorlng sysLem reporLed access
Lo lmproved sanlLaLlon ln 2000 as 93 ln urban and 44 ln rural areas (WPC/unlCLl 2001).
Accordlng Lo Lhe lPS (2001-2), only 17 of aklsLanls pald for Lhe waLer LhaL Lhey used ln 2001,
43 ln urban cenLres and 7 ln rural areas. Powever, Lhls probably excludes lrregular paymenLs for
communlLy malnLalned waLer schemes. naLlonal WaLer SecLor roflle descrlbe LhaL aklsLan's
overall waLer supply coverage ln 2001 was 63 of Lhe naLlonal populaLlon, 84 ln Lhe 12 ma[or
urban cenLres, 32 ln lnLermedlaLeurban cenLres, and 33 ln rural areas. AbouL 37 of peoplehad
plped supply Lo Lhelr homes, Lhe remalnder goL waLer from hand pumps, wells, communlLy Laps or
prlvaLe waLer vendors. Cver 30 of vlllage waLer supply was Lhrough prlvaLe hand pumps.
(MlnlsLry of WaLer and ower, Co, 2002)
rlor Lo devoluLlon reforms, provlnclal ubllc PealLh Lnglneerlng ueparLmenL (PLu) was malnly
responslble for Lhe developmenL and malnLenance of waLer and sanlLaLlon servlces, speclflcally for
largepro[ecLs ln rural areas. uevelopmenL AuLhorlLles (uAs) and WaLer and SanlLaLlon AssoclaLlons
(WASAs) were provldlng slmllar servlces ln large, urban cenLres. Au8/uflu/World 8ank (2004
)reporL LhaL alLhough ln governmenLal Lerms, waLer and sanlLaLlon are now clearly asslgned Lo
1ehslls or Lowns wlLh an excepLlon Lo ClLy ulsLrlcLs (where Lhey are dlsLrlcLs' responslblllLles), Lhe
slLuaLlon of arrangemenLs reveals Lhe lncompeLence of provlnclal conLrol. Lach provlnce has
devolved PLuln adlfferenL way. 1hepre-devoluLlon sLrucLureof LhedeparLmenL was Lhesameln
all four provlnces. ln nWl, PLuhad lnlLlally been devolved Lo Lhe dlsLrlcL and noL 1MA level, buL
was subsequenLly recenLrallzed Lo Lhe dlvlslon or clrcle level. Slndh and un[ab were good
examples of lmplemenLaLlon of Lhe LCC, buL even Lhere, lL was mosLly Lhe provlnclal conLrol.
rogress of decenLrallsed governmenL can hardly be [udged ln a falrly as mosL of Lhe managemenL
sLlll remalns ouL of local governmenL dlrecL conLrol.
nayyar-SLone(2006) descrlbeLhaL 1MAs areprovldlng waLer servlces only ln Lheurban cenLres and
more Lhan 60 of Lhe populaLlon llvlng ln rural areas ls noL covered by 1MA servlces. Coverage ln
Lhe maln Lowns ranges from 70-80 for waLer supply and from 30-60 for underground sewerage
servlces. MalnLenance of Lhe exlsLlng lnfrasLrucLure ls very poor wlLh rusLed plpes, broken sewers
and broken or lnefflclenL Lube wells. 8esldes, mosL of Lhe 1MAs do noL have accuraLe daLa on
servlce levels and relaLed servlce dellvery lndlcaLors. Whereas Wllllamson eL al. (2003) found LhaL
access Lo safe drlnklng waLer ls reasonable excepL ln nWl where 46 of households dld noL have
access Lo safe porLable waLer supply. 61 of households ln aklsLan has access Lo hand or moLor
powered waLer pump lmplylng LhaL mosL peoplerelyon prlvaLewaLer supplyschemes (Co 2002).
AnoLher ma[or lssue ln regard Lo waLer supply ls user fees and uLlllLy bllllng. 1he facL LhaL waLer
producLlon cosLs are hlgher Lhan lncome from paymenL of bllls, worsens flscal lmbalances. urban
households are more llkely Lhan rural households Lo pay for Lhelr waLer supply lndlcaLlng Lhe
dlfflculLles ln collecLlng user charges ln rural areas (Co 2002). 8yand large, Lhls problemhas
43
exacerbaLed ln posL devoluLlon era. Local represenLaLlves flnd lL very hard Lo levy user fees for
waLer supply and oLher assoclaLed uLlllLy charges ln rural consLlLuencles LhaL ls where he/she
geLselecLed from. nazlmeen fear Lhe loss of voLe banks ln case lf Lhey supporL Lhe 1MA
admlnlsLraLlon ln punlshlng Lhe defaulLers. 8evenue generaLed from vasL rural areas ls Lhus usually
lnsufflclenL Lo produceand malnLaln LhewaLer supply schemes. urban clLlzenry, on LheoLher hand,
can noL easllyavold paylng LhewaLer and sanlLaLlon user charges.
8ural and urban admlnlsLraLlve dlvlslons have been abollshed slnce 2001 wlLh Lhe onseL of local
governmenLs. ollLlcal acLlvlsm and voLer LurnouL ls hlgher ln rural areas and local governmenL
represenLaLlves usually bank on rural consLlLuencles Lo seek voLe from where Lhey mosLly belong.
uevelopmenL funds allocaLed aL Lehsll and Lown level mosLly geL spenL ln rural Lowns or rural
suburbs of clLles. ln oLher words, clLlzens ln urban areas pay Lhe prlce for servlces LhaL are hlghly
LargeLed Lowards Lhe rural areas. 1hls ls a Lyplcal 'free rlder' lssue. urban populace cannoL usually
geL away wlLh paylng for Lhese servlces because of relaLlvely hlgher levels of accounLablllLy and
probablllLy of dlsconnecLlon of faclllLy. ConLrary Lo Lhelr rural counLerparLs, Lhelr pollLlcal
connecLlons wlLh nazlmeen are noL sLrong enough Lo sLlpulaLe exempLlons from paymenLs or
punlLlvecharges ln caseof defaulL.
1he mosL frequenLly dlscussed lssue ln Lhe recenL devoluLlon reforms ln aklsLan ls [urlsdlcLlonal
overlap beLween dlfferenL Llers of governmenL and federal/provlnclal bureaucracy. ubllc cannoL
assess servlces provlded when varlous levels of governmenL are lnvolved ln dellverlng Lhe same
servlces e.g. ln healLh and educaLlon secLors, all Lhree Llers of governmenL are lnvolved l.e. federal,
provlnclal and local governmenL. Accordlng Lo Lhe Au8/uflu/World 8ank (2004), Lhe overlap Lhus
weakens lncenLlves Lo perform well on servlce dellvery and encourages pollLlclans Lo LargeL
servlces Lo Lhelr core supporLers. !urlsdlcLlonal overlap ls Lhus a ma[or lssue ln all servlces lncludlng
educaLlon and healLh servlces.
MulLlple levels of governmenLs provldlng same servlces ends up ln dupllcaLlon of pro[ecLs l.e.
overprovlslon of servlces and pro[ecLs ln cerLaln areas aL Lhe expense of oLhers. 1hls lssue ls relaLed
Lo [urlsdlcLlonal overlaps emanaLlng from sLrucLural flaws ln deslgn of lnLer-governmenLal
hlerarchy. 1he provlnclal and federal governmenL provlde developmenL granLs Lo each member of
Lhe provlnclal assembly (MA) and Member naLlonal Assembly (MnA), for underLaklng
developmenL work ln hls/her consLlLuency. MosL MAs and MnAs do noL lnvolve 1MAs ln Lhe
execuLlon of Lhelr developmenL programs. lederal and provlnclal governmenLs are sLlll Lhe maln
declslon makers ln promoLlng and execuLlng naLlonal pollcy prlorlLles and hold sway ln local
governmenL expendlLures on servlcedellvery vlaLop down verLlcal programs.
Slnce Lhe provlnclal governmenL remalns Lhe LuC's employer, lL holds A1 powers over Lhem. 1hls
ls hlghly pollLlclsed arrangemenL Lo lnfluence Lransfers ln Lhe dlsLrlcL. Senlor ulsLrlcL managers are
employed by Lhe provlnclal governmenL and Lhey are bound Lo comply as per provlnclal orders.
Passan (2002) argues LhaL Lheprovlnclal supporLlng auLhorlLles Lend Lo keep aLlghL conLrol boLh on
auLhorlLy and resources of Lhe local governmenLs and Lhe federal governmenL and Lhe federal
pollLlcal auLhorlLles have Lhe same approach Lowards provlnces. nazlm's conLrol over local pollce
Serv|ce De||very and Iur|sd|ct|ona| Constra|nts
44
Pead ls sLlll very LlLular. 1he ablllLy of local governmenLs Lo lmplemenL local and speclal regulaLlons
has been affecLed because Lhere are no procedural deLalls and LhaL Lhe verLlcal relaLlonshlp of Lhe
pollce chlef wlLh hls deparLmenLal hlerarchy sLand ln Lhe way of lmplemenLlng Lhe new
arrangemenLs under Lhe ollce Crder. !urlsdlcLlonal demarcaLlon ls also requlred ln healLh and
educaLlon secLor, absence of whlch would ulLlmaLely deLerloraLe Lhe relaLlonshlp beLween Lhe
servlceprovlders and LheclLlzens as well as beLween Lhepollcymakers and Lheservlceprovlders.
lnLer and lnLra dlsLrlcL sLaff Lransfers were consldered Lo be Lhe maln reasons of confllcL beLween
provlnclal and local governmenLs by Au8/uflu/World 8ank (2004). SLudy explalns LhaL Lhe
relaLlonshlp beLween LhedlsLrlcL nazlm and Lhesenlor sLaff ln LhedlsLrlcL, parLlcularly LheuCCand
uC, can be vulnerable. nazlmeen have very llLLleeffecLlve auLhorlLy over Lhese sLaff as wrlLlng Lhe
Annual ConfldenLlal 8eporLs (AC8s) of uCCs ls [usL a nomlnal mechanlsm for enforclng
accounLablllLy. 1ehsll level managers possess greaLer conLrol over preparlng salary budgeLs and
over local personnel, Lhelr recrulLmenL and Lransfer. Powever, ln Lhe dlsLrlcLs, lL's Lhe oLher way
round. ulsLrlcL offlclals, have weak conLrol over sLaff numbers. 1hey cannoL, on Lhelr own, declde
Lhelr salary budgeLs or sack Lhe exLra sLaff and can only recrulL wlLhln lnsLrucLlons glven by Lhe
provlnces. lormulaLlon of paypollcyls nelLher ln dlsLrlcL nor Lehsll auLhorlLles' [urlsdlcLlon.
ln slmllar veln, lnLernaLlonal Crlsls Croup (lCC 2004) hlghllghLs some of Lhe LransformaLlons ln posL
devoluLlon perlod. Accordlng Lo Lhe reporL, SecLlon 20 of LCCmakes nazlm personally responslble
for flnanclal losses and unlawful expendlLures. Several nazlms complaln LhaL Lhls creaLes
"responslblllLy wlLhouL auLhorlLy" and leaves Lhem vulnerable. Many admlnlsLraLlve powers
prevlously exerclsed by Lhe dlsLrlcL commlssloner remalned unspeclfled ln Lhe new sysLem. oorly
deflned enforcemenL mechanlsms are anoLher problem. Whlle Lhe 1ehsll admlnlsLraLlon en[oys
quasl-[udlclal powers such as lmposlng flnes, lLs offlclals flnd lL nearly lmposslble Lo enforce Lhelr
wrlL wlLhouL Lhe enforcemenL powers prevlously exerclsed by execuLlve maglsLraLes backed by Lhe
pollce. 1he reporL also spells ouL LhaL coordlnaLlon has grown worse. 1here are no hlerarchlcal
llnkages beLween Lhe varlous levels of local governmenL, and each pracLlcally operaLes ln lsolaLlon.
1here ls vlrLual absence of accounLablllLy of dlsLrlcL nazlms. 1he provlnclal Local CovernmenL
Commlsslon can lnlLlaLe speclal audlLs and lnspecLlons of dlsLrlcL governmenLs buL Lhese can aL
besL be sporadlc and are noL a vlable subsLlLuLe Lo permanenL, lnsLlLuLlonallsed checks and
balances aL dlsLrlcL level. 1he exLenslve range of flnanclal conLrols and Lhelr effecLlve exerclse,
however, remaln conLlngenL on Lhe pollLlcal relaLlonshlp beLween nazlms and Lhe councll headed
by Lhe nalb nazlm. Slnce Lhe nazlm and nalb nazlm are elecLed on a [olnL LlckeL, Lhe former can
wleld enormous lnfluence over Lhe councll wlLhouL endurlng correspondlng leglslaLlve checks on
hls auLhorlLy

AC8 (Annual ConfldenLlal 8eporL) ls legacy of colonlal clvll admlnlsLraLlon whereln superlor offlcers wrlLe annual
progress reporL of subordlnaLe sLaff ensurlng lLs uLmosL confldenLlallLy. lronlcally, Lhe person whose AC8 ls wrlLLen
remalns LoLallyobllvlous of LhenaLureand conLenL of reporL.
2
4S

1he greaLer focus on physlcal lnfrasLrucLure lnvesLmenLs, Lhe emphasls on small, locallzed
developmenL schemes, and Lhe lack of efflclenL prlorlLlzaLlon of operaLlons and malnLenance
suggesLs LhaL reLurns for provldlng vlslble, LargeLed beneflLs are hlgher for local pollcy-makers.
Cheema and Mohmand (2004) found ln vlllages Lhey surveyed ln un[ab LhaL sanlLaLlon and draln
provlslon was belng LargeLed Lo speclflc households even wlLhln a lane ln a glven vlllage. 1hls ls
worse case scenarlo ln selecLed provlslon of servlces. SelecLed provlslon of servlces ls a menace
LhaL ls common across all secLors. Local and reglonal pollLlclans wlLh llmlLed resources have lesser
opporLunlLles Lo bulld Lhelr pollLlcal credlblllLy and Lherefore usually have Lo go for selecLed
provlslon of publlc servlces. Wllder (1999) quoLes a very lnLeresLlng example of pollLlcal paLronage
ln aklsLan. Pe relaLes Lhe words of former members of Lhe naLlonal Assembly from un[ab as
Annual ConfldenLlal 8eporLs (AC8s) of uCCs ls [usL a nomlnal mechanlsm for enforclng
accounLablllLy. 1ehsll level managers possess greaLer conLrol over preparlng salary budgeLs and
over local personnel, Lhelr recrulLmenL and Lransfer. Powever, ln Lhe dlsLrlcLs, lL's Lhe oLher way
round. saylng: eople now Lhlnk LhaL Lhe [ob of an MnA and MA ls Lo flx Lhelr guLLers, geL Lhelr
chlldren enrolled ln school, arrange for [ob Lransfers . Lhese Lhlngs consume your whole day.." .
Look, we geL elecLed because we are 'ba'asar log' (lnfluenLlal people) ln our area. eople voLe for
me because Lhey percelve me as someone who can help Lhem...somebody's son ls a maLrlc fall and
l geL hlm a [ob as a Leacher or a governmenL servanL. . ." Pe (Wllder) furLher explalned LhaL voLlng
behavlour ls lncreaslngly belng lnfluenced by voLer demands for parLlcular local lssues such as
asslsLance ln 'Lhana-kaLchehrl' (pollce sLaLlon and courLs affalrs), or Lhe need for a road, school, or
baslc healLh unlL ln Lhelr vlllage or for an elecLrlclLy, Lelephone, or naLural gas connecLlon for Lhelr
house, or for [obs, promoLlons, or Lransfers ln Lheworkplace.
As Lhe evldence reveals, healLh, educaLlon and munlclpal servlces provlslon responslblllLles
overlap among local, provlnclal and federal governmenL and clvll admlnlsLraLlon of respecLlve
deparLmenLs. When such uncerLalnLles exlsL, lower Llers of pollcy makers caplLulaLe Lo hlgher ones
and declslon maklng becomes Lop down exerclse. Also, credlL clalmlng for a parLlcular servlce
becomes dlfflculL lf mulLlpleLlers of governmenL areprovldlng Lhesameservlce. 1hls dlsLorLlon can
Lhen creaLe lncenLlves for pollLlclans Lo focus on selecLed beneflLs or on more vlslble lnLervenLlons
(Pasnaln 2008). ln a socleLy LhaL ls hlghly fragmenLed on Lhe basls of prlmordlal facLors llke lncome,
educaLlon, eLhnlclLy, language and culLure, Lallorlng of servlces as per Lhe requlremenLs of local
populace becomes all Lhe more dlfflculL. Pusnaln (2003) belleves LhaL one reason for selecLed
dellvery of goods and servlces ls hlgher degree of fragmenLaLlon, facLlonallsaLlon and polarlsaLlon
of socleLy and pollLlcal parLy sysLem. ulfferenL eLhnlc groups have varled problems and dlfferenL
preferences maklng lL dlfflculL for pollcymakers Lo dellver baslc servlces
Pusnaln (2003) concludes LhaL ma[or causes of lnefflclenL servlce dellvery are ellLe capLure of
resources, pollLlcal lnsLablllLy and lnformaLlon asymmeLry. lssues assoclaLed wlLh funcLlonlng of
local governmenL are mulLlfaceLed. AparL from pollLlcal and flscal lssues, admlnlsLraLlve and
CommonIssues n|nder|ng Deve|opment

46
capaclLy llmlLaLlons lmpede Lhe developmenL lnlLlaLlves. Wllllamson eL al (2003) expllcaLes LhaL
many LuCs who are Leachers and docLors by professlon, and have had no prevlous experlence ln
managlng sLaff and allocaLlng budgeLs arenow requlred Lo carry ouL such roles. lL ls common Lo flnd
an LuC llnance and plannlng wlLh a background unrelaLed Lo Lhe demands of such a Lask.
roponenLs of devoluLlon reforms clalmed LhaL new local governmenL sysLem would lmprove Lhe
access relaLlonshlps beLween Lhe pollcy makers and clLlzens. lL was belleved LhaL prevlously clvll
servanLs and members of naLlonal and provlnclal assembly were noL easlly accesslble and
accounLable Lo Lhe masses. 1here has been a poslLlve change ln Lerms of access relaLlonshlp
beLween local governmenL represenLaLlves and clLlzens. 8eporL by u1CL ln 2003 found LhaL
approxlmaLely 23 of households reporLed havlng some conLacL wlLh Lhelr unlon counclllors over
Lhe precedlng Lwelve monLhs, up from 22 ln 2001. Cver 60 of Lhe households clalmed LhaL Lhey
would approach a unlon counclllor or nazlm for Lhelr problems, as compared Lo only 10 who
would approach an MA or MnA. Powever such access cannoL be consldered as a vlLal
achlevemenL. 1ake for lnsLance n88's (2002) naLlonal survey whlch lndlcaLes LhaL clLlzens prlmarlly
accessed unlon Counclllors for flnanclal asslsLance. Less Lhan 2 approached Lhem ln relaLlon Lo
47
Concluslon
As menLloned earller, lL won'L be falr Lo [udge Lhe performance of local governmenLs ln dellvery of
soclal servlces for Lwo maln reasons. llrsL, Lhe very deslgn and ulLlmaLely Lhe embedded rule of
federal and provlnclal governmenLs and clvll bureaucracy aL Lhe dlsLrlcL level dldnoL really allow
sufflclenL auLhorlLy Lo Lhe local governmenLs. Secondly, local governmenLs are ln Lhelr lnfancy
sLage. lL Lakes decades for a sysLem Lo evolve and ulLlmaLely geL lnsLlLuLlonally maLure enough Lo
prove lLs worLh. ln aklsLan, servlce provlders are cenLrally conLrolled and Lherefore Lhe
accounLablllLy mechanlsms aL local levels are naLurally far from effecLlve. nomlnal revenue ralslng
capaclLy of local governmenLs leaves Lhem wlLh reduced opporLunlLles Lo make dlfference and
Lhereby maklng Lhe assessmenL of Lhelr performance all Lhe more dlfflculL. 1hls sLudy however,
ldenLlfles key lssues ln healLh, educaLlon and munlclpal servlces secLors uslng secondary daLa from
nascenL research conducLed ln Lhls fleld.
unquallfled healLh pracLlLloners serve people ln rural areas and Lhere ls no lmprovemenL ln posL
devoluLlon perlod Lo check such hazardous pracLlces. CosLs lnvolved ln Lravel Lo relaLlvely beLLer
healLh faclllLles ln urban areas keeps a largepopulacedeprlved of baslc healLh servlces. urban rural
blas ln provlslon of healLh faclllLles perslsLs desplLe lnLegraLlon of urban and rural areas ln LCC
2001. SwlLchlng over Lo prlvaLe healLh provlders ls an expenslve and unaffordable opLlon for
marglnallse ma[orlLy of rural clLlzenry. lncreased lncenLlves are requlred for aLLracLlng quallfled
sLaff ln rural healLh faclllLles. AllocaLlon for provlslon of free medlclne ln budgeL allocaLlons ls
negllglble and a huge chunk of budgeL goes Lo salarles. LmbezzlemenLs ln dlsLrlbuLlon of llmlLed
free medlclnes remaln Lhe order of Lhe day. PealLh managers and auxlllary sLaff are noL dlrecLly
answerableLo LheelecLed represenLaLlveof local governmenL and henceLhelr accounLablllLyls non
exlsLenL. MosL managerlal posLs are fllled ln by docLors who evenLually spend mosL of Lhelr Llme ln
deallng wlLh managerlal lssues (appolnLmenLs, posLlngs, Lransfers and oLher rouLlne offlclal
managemenL) lnsLead of focuslng on lmprovemenL of healLh faclllLles.
1here ls hardly any slgnlflcanL progress seen ln lmprovemenL of enrolmenL ln prlmary and
secondary publlc schools ln pre and posL devoluLlon perlods. CosL of schoollng remalns by far Lhe
ma[or hlndrance for parenLs wlshlng Lo send Lhelr chlldren Lo schools. 8udgeL allocaLlon for
faclllLles ln school ls lnslgnlflcanL and llke budgeLs ln healLh secLor, enormous percenLage of
allocaLlon goes Lo salarles and admlnlsLraLlve heads of accounL. CverslghL mechanlsm prlmarlly
lnLended vla school managemenL commlLLees ls elLher weak or non-exlsLenL aL all. lndeed among
Lhe exlsLenL ones, mosL are capLured by elLher Lhe school sLaff or local governmenL represenLaLlves
and as such Lhere ls leasL lnvolvemenL or parLlclpaLlon from parenLs. WlLh a few mlnor excepLlons,
boLh, healLh and educaLlon secLors show hlgh levels of paLh dependenL Lendencles. osL
devoluLlon sLrucLure of governmenL and publlc secLor may well have changed ln books buL Lhe
pracLlces ln publlc servlcedellvery haveelLher noL changed or deLerloraLed.
WaLer supply and sanlLaLlon secLors ls no dlfferenL. eople Lry Lhelr level besL Lo Lurn Lo prlvaLe
sources of waLer supply. CollecLlon of user fee ls an admlnlsLraLlve and pollLlcal lssue ln rural areas
where consumpLlon ls hlgher. 1MA admlnlsLraLlon ls undersLaffed and lncapable Lo mlLlgaLe Lhe
free
48
free rlder lssue ln rural areas. Slnce Lhe voLe blocs of elecLed local governmenL represenLaLlves llve
malnly ln rural areas, Lhey usually pressurlse 1MA admlnlsLraLlon for lmpunlLy of defaulLers.
LlmlLed revenue ralslng / Lax levylng and collecLlon auLhorlLy of 1MA conflne Lhelr budgeLs and
afLer LherecurrenL expenses, llmlLed resources areavallablefor malnLenanceand developmenL.
!urlsdlcLlonal overlaps have been commonly observed. MulLlple Llers of governmenL provlde
slmllar resulLlng ln overprovlslon of servlces ln some areas aL Lhe expense of oLher deservlng
consLlLuencles. LlmlLed developmenL funds and naLure of local pollLlcal organlsaLlons compel local
governmenL represenLaLlves Lo LargeL Lhe provlslon aL hls/her consLlLuency only. Cyan and orLer
(2004) sLaLe LhaL currenLly verLlcal programs (Lhose cascadlng from upper levels of governmenL)
guaranLees federal and provlnclal assembly members LhaL Lhey wlll be able Lo use local salary,
sLafflng, resource allocaLlon and developmenL conLracLlng as Lhe prlme source of paLronage and
plunder. 1he provlnclal assembly members conslder Lhe counclllors and Lhe nazlms as Lhelr
pollLlcal compeLlLors ln Lhe consLlLuencles. LllLe capLure of local resources has also been reporLed.
lor local governmenL Lo perform well, Lhe exlsLence of professlonal and capable publlc secLor
organlsaLlons ls a pre condlLlon. Cne can only expecL local governmenL Lo dellver when Lhls
precondlLlon ls meL.
49
lL ls cerLalnly noL a Lyplcal Lo flnd gllLches ln Lhe devolved local governmenL sysLem LhaL ls ln lLs
lnfancy, speclflcally conslderlng lL ln Lhe conLexL of developlng counLry llke aklsLan LhaL has been
golng Lhrough a serles of pollLlcal and economlc dlsorders. ln developlng counLrles lL ls noL [usL Lhe
pollcy deslgn of decenLrallsaLlon LhaL maLLers buL also Lhe degree of falrness, serlousness of
pollLlcal wlll, accounLablllLy and Lransparency lnvolved ln lLs lmplemenLaLlon. Covernance ls a
Lerrlbly complex process and same ls Lhe case wlLh devlslng and lmplemenLlng an ldeal publlc
pollcy. key Lo success ls sysLemaLlc lnvesLlgaLlon of lssues and proper plannlng for effecLlve
managemenL. Cood governance ls Loo crlLlcal Lo be lefL only Lo local governmenL. WlLhouL meeLlng
Lhe essenLlal pre-requlslLes for Lhe developmenLal needs of sLaLe l.e. slncere pollLlcal wlll of pollLy
and coordlnaLlon among sLrong lnsLlLuLlons along wlLh balanceof power and auLonomy, successful
publlc pollcy wlll remaln adream. uecenLrallsaLlon models havebeen successful ln mosL developed
counLrles afLer golng Lhrough LranslLlonal phases yeL lLs synchronlsaLlon wlLh soclo-pollLlcal and
economlc conLexLs ln developlng counLrles needs careful conslderaLlons.
ln Lhe process of ldenLlflcaLlon of lssues ln LCS ln aklsLan, Lhe llmlLaLlons ln delegaLlon of auLhorlLy
and responslblllLles Lo Lhe elecLed members of local governmenL are also deplcLed clearly. Servlce
provlders are cenLrally conLrolled wlLh very llmlLed accounLablllLy and unllmlLed auLhorlLy. LlecLed
governmenLs on Lhe oLher hand have llmlLed conLrol over Lhe flnances and Lhe servlces Lhey
supporL and dellver. Local CovernmenL Crdlnance has over-cenLrallzed Lhe A1 powers ln Lhe
hands of uCC. llscal decenLrallzaLlon Lo Lhe local represenLaLlves ls llmlLed and nomlnal because
dlsLrlcLs governmenLs sLlll have Lhe same convenLlonal Lax collecLlon and expendlLure domalns.
ollLlclans are more concerned wlLh paLronage and consolldaLlng Lhelr voLe bank Lhan provldlng
programmaLlc publlc goods and servlces LhaL would beneflL ma[orlLy of Lhe clLlzens. 1he budgeL
consLralnLs can also lead Lo unpredlcLable flow of resources Lo local governmenLs Lhereby
undermlnlng Lhelr ablllLy and capaclLy Lo plan, manage and coordlnaLe resources effecLlvely and
efflclenLly.
1he gap beLween salary and non-salary expendlLures ls huge. 8ulks of funds are allocaLed Lo wages
and hence Lhe small porLlon of LoLal funds lefL afLer Lhe allocaLlons of salarles ls lnadequaLe Lo spur
developmenL. Many bureaucraLs worklng as LuCs lack Lhe requlred managerlal skllls and
capablllLles as Lhey are noL quallfled, Lralned, and experlenced for efflclenL publlc managemenL.
8easons for approach Lo Lhe local governmenL were found Lo be almed aL flnanclal asslsLance and
rarely concerned wlLh any lmprovemenLs ln healLh and educaLlonal servlce provlslon. ubllc
percepLlons of local pollLlclans' scope of responslblllLy seldom go beyond Lhe ldea LhaL lL ls only
abouL lmplemenLaLlon of developmenL schemes such as roads, waLer supply or elecLrlclLy eLc.
ubllc's demand of accounLablllLy ln resource allocaLlon and servlce dellvery has rarely been
observed. Cenerally, ln mosL of publlc secLor organlsaLlons, commonly observed lssues were
culLureof absenLeelsm, poor moLlvaLlon, lackof dlsclpllne, and lnadequaLeand nonquallfled sLaff.
MulLlple Llers of governmenL and several publlc deparLmenLs are lnvolved ln dellvery of same
servlces. verLlcal programs by federal and provlnclal governmenL consequenLly resulLs ln
dupllcaLlon of pro[ecLs. 1hls noL only undermlnes coordlnaLed plannlng buL also creaLes ownershlp
1he Way Iorward
ChapLer 3
S0
problems and evenLually leads Lo over-provlslon of servlces ln some areas and deprlvaLlon ln
oLhers areas. 8ureaucraLs are employed by Lhe provlnclal governmenL and Lhey are
undersLandably bound Lo comply Lhe provlnclal governmenL's lnsLrucLlons. rovlnclal
governmenLs belng Lhelr employer, hold A1 powers over mosL of Lheclvll bureaucracy. Senlor sLaff
ln publlc organlsaLlons are pressurlsed by provlnclal governmenL Lo comply wlLh Lhe Lransfer
lnsLrucLlons of Lhe subordlnaLe sLaff. rovlnclal auLhorlLles Lry Lo keep a LlghL conLrol on auLhorlLy
and resources of Lhe local governmenLs. lederal pollLlcal auLhorlLles follow slmllar approach
Lowards provlnces.
A more lenlenL probe of decenLrallsaLlon reforms may come up wlLh somewhaL encouraglng
argumenLs as well, speclflcally when Lhe 'lnfancy' facLor consldered. 1hls ls noL Lo say LhaL Lhe new
sysLem ls absoluLely fuLlle. noLwlLhsLandlng all Lhe flaws expllcaLed ln Lhe analysls, Lhe new sysLem
shows aL leasL some slgns of hope for beLLer prospecLs. Plgher level of publlc engagemenL wlLh Lhe
new local governmenLs, especlally Lhe unlon counclls, ls encouraglng. Servlces from 1ehslls ln
parLlcular seem Lo be dolng conslderably well. Mlnlmally Lhough, Lhere has been an lncrease ln neL
school enrolmenL among 3-9 year old chlldren. Whlle Lhe lncrease slnce 2002 ls more lnLo prlvaLe
schools, governmenL schools are apparenLly caLerlng more for glrls and chlldren from vulnerable
households.
ulsLrlcL governmenL, Lehsll admlnlsLraLlon and unlon admlnlsLraLlon desperaLely need harmonlsed
plannlng and coordlnaLed provlslon of servlces. 1hese are lmperaLlve condlLlons wlLhouL whlch,
local governance cannoL make efflclenL use of resources. lor Lhe formulaLlon of a sysLem of flscal
Lransfers beLween dlfferenL levels of governmenL, lL wlll be lmporLanL Lo ensure Lransparency and
allowance of auLhorlLy Lo local governmenLs ln order Lo ralse addlLlonal resources. Awareness of
Lhelr rlghLs and clvlc educaLlon needs dlssemlnaLlon ln publlc ln llghL of devoluLlon reforms. ubllc
should also be lnformed abouL whaL Lhey should expecL of newly elecLed represenLaLlves. As
suggesLed by CockcrofL eL al. (2003), Lhe sLrongesL lndlvldual facLor ln users' saLlsfacLlon was Lhe
user reporL of recelvlng medlclnes ln governmenL faclllLles.
8educlng embezzlemenLs ln provlslon of medlclne and LransparenL accounLablllLy measures are of
uLmosL lmporLance ln order Lo keep Lhe clLlzens lnformed abouL Lhe faclllLles Lhey are enLlLled Lo.
1o lmprove Lhe lnLeracLlon beLween docLors and oLher healLh care provlders and Lhelr paLlenLs, a
solld cusLomer orlenLed approach could be a rellable soluLlon. lnsLlLuLlonal capaclLy bulldlng
mechanlsms are needed whlch would dlmlnlsh Lhe Lendency of paLronage by pollLlclans e.g. as
Pasnaln (2003) prescrlbes, Lhe esLabllshmenL of lndependenL ubllc Servlce Commlsslons LhaL
areglven supervlsory role ln Lhe recrulLmenL and career managemenL of key servlce dellvery
personnel, lmprovemenLs ln Lhe legal, and regulaLory framework for procuremenL ln order Lo
provlde clLlzens wlLh access Lo key publlc records. ClLlzens' lnvolvemenL vla Lhelr local
represenLaLlves ln publlc accounLs commlLLees should be lmproved ln a manner LhaL would be
conslsLenL wlLh boLLom up approach raLher Lhan Lop down.
Some o||cy Imp||cat|ons
1he Way Iorward
ChapLer 3
S1
Local governmenL sLaff conducL can be lmproved by lnvolvlng Lhe local governmenL managers ln
A1 declslon maklng. 1ransparency of A1 process needs Lo be lmproved and Lhls would only be
posslble lf local governmenL represenLaLlves are glven subsLanLlal auLhorlLy and lnvolvemenL ln lLs
declslon maklng, afLer all lL ls Lhe local governmenL LhaL ls ulLlmaLely held responslble for dellvery
of publlc servlces. rofesslonallsaLlon of clvll bureaucracy l.e. 'rlghL man for Lhe rlghL [ob' ls
essenLlal. Slnce local governmenLs work ln coordlnaLlon wlLh appolnLed publlc offlclals, reformlng
clvll servlces deparLmenLs are equally lmporLanL. 1here should be lnnovaLlve soluLlons developed
Lo encouragesLaff Lo serveln remoLeareas l.e. provldlng addlLlonal allowances, bulldlng resldenLlal
faclllLles aL remoLeareas for Leachers and healLh workers along wlLh all oLher baslc faclllLles. Checks
and balances by dlsLrlcL healLh and educaLlon sLaff, monlLorlng commlLLees, and by Lhe provlnclal
governmenLs needs Lo be ensured. CommunlLles and unlon counclllors should monlLor sLaff's
aLLendance.
A greaLer volume of non-salary developmenLal fundlng ls requlred from cenLral and provlnclal
governmenL along wlLh sufflclenL declslon maklng auLhorlLy for Lhe elecLed local governmenL for
key publlc servlces. ollcy makers should ensure devoluLlon of resource allocaLlon responslblllLles
Lo Lhe local governmenL. 1horough scruLlny of developmenL funds by publlc would fosLer
accounLablllLy and efflclency. CommunlLy lnvolvemenL and parLlclpaLlon of Lhe concerned
sLakeholders mlghL lead Lo Lhe lmprovemenL of publlc servlces. Pavlng consldered all Lhese pros
and cons of decenLrallsaLlon, lL ls very obvlous LhaL pollLlcal decenLrallsaLlon can be effecLlve when
applled and lmplemenLed ln leLLer and splrlL. lmprovemenL ln pollLlcal skllls, naLlonal lnLegraLlon,
democracy, equallLy and welfare, and maklng declslons more relevanL Lo local needs are all
advanLages of decenLrallsaLlon, provlded lL follows Lhe prlnclples of parLlclpaLlon, falrness,
accounLablllLy, Lransparencyand efflclency.
Slncere pollLlcal wlll and supporL from hlgher Llers of governmenL ls vlLal for local governmenL Lo
perform and dellver. unforLunaLely devoluLlon of power reforms have been lmplemenLed vla
presldenLlal ordlnance buL Lhelr recognlLlon as Lhlrd Ller of governmenL has noL been proLecLed by
lncorporaLlng lL ln Lhe consLlLuLlon of aklsLan. lf declslon maklng ls lnLended Lo be broughL down
Lo grass rooL level, a far greaLer lnvolvemenL of unlon counclls ls essenLlal. ulsLrlcL as a devolved Ller
of local governmenL ls Loo large Lo be consldered as local. ln some cases number of unlon counclls
lncluded ln one dlsLrlcL ls approxlmaLely 100. lf dlsLrlcL ls eplcenLre of local governmenLs' pollLlcal,
admlnlsLraLlve and flscal declslon maklng, devoluLlon of power wlll remaln noLhlng more Lhan
rheLorlc.
8lzvl (2007) clarlfy LhaL redeflnlng power sLrucLure does noL mean compleLe Lransfer of auLhorlLy
from cenLre Lo local level- lnsLead lL calls for parLlclpaLlon of local governmenL ln plannlng and
declslon maklng process. Slmllarly Panson (1998) advocaLes LhaL an educaLlon sysLem, run by
governmenL ls Lhe one LhaL ls an opLlmum blend of cenLrallsaLlon and decenLrallsaLlon and as such
Lhere cannoL be an efflclenL educaLlon sysLem LhaL ls LoLally decenLrallsed. llnally Lhe deslgners of
publlc pollcy should always regard Lhe sLaLus of economlc poslLlon of masses ln socleLy and
evaluaLewheLher exlL opLlon ls avallableLo Lhepeoplel.e. wheLher Lheycan afford Lo swlLch over Lo
prlvaLe provlslon of publlc goods and servlces. ln case of aklsLan, Lhls may be a deslrable opLlon
buL cerLalnly noL an affordable one for marglnallsed classes. 1helr rellance on publlc servlces
provlslon makes effecLlvedevoluLlon reforms aLop prlorlLy.
1he Way Iorward
ChapLer 3
S2
Allen, 1. &1homas, A. (2000) lovettyooJuevelopmeot lo21st ceototy. Cxford unlverslLyress:
London
Au8, uflu, World 8ank. (2004) uevolotloo lo loklstoo vol. 1-J, lslamabad: Aslan
uevelopmenL 8ank, ueparLmenL for lnLernaLlonal uevelopmenL (uflu), and World 8ank
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8l0ll0f80

uecenLrallsaLlon ls belng reckoned around Lhe globe as a successful sLraLegy ln
publlc secLor managemenL slnce Lhe Second World War. ubllc pollcy analysLs
belleve LhaL devoluLlon of admlnlsLraLlve and flscal auLhorlLles Lo Lhe
democraLlcally elecLed local governmenL would slgnlflcanLly enhance
efflclency, Lransparency and falrness ln resource allocaLlon and soclal servlce
dellvery. AlLhough Lhe ouLcomes of such reforms lnLroduced worldwlde,
parLlcularly ln developlng counLrles, are noL enormously consLrucLlve, beneflLs
derlved from such reforms cannoL be denled alLogeLher. ln order Lo make
decenLrallsaLlon reforms successful, pre-requlslLes ln socleLy's soclal, pollLlcal
and economlc lnsLlLuLlons need Lo be meL and a falr degree of falrness,
accounLablllLy, parLlclpaLlon and efflclency lnvolved ln lmplemenLaLlon of
reforms, needs Lo be ensured. 1hls sLudy seeks Lo lnvesLlgaLe lmpacL of
devoluLlon reforms of 2001 on ubllc Servlce dellvery ln aklsLan. lnLroduced,
deslgned and lmplemenLed by Lhe mlllLary reglme, Lhese reforms are vlewed
relaLlvely more comprehenslve as compared wlLh Lhe ones Lrled earller.
AdvocaLes of reforms oplne LhaL devoluLlon has enabled Lhe people from grass
rooL level Lo parLlclpaLe ln Lhe publlc managemenL and declslon maklng ln local
governance. 1he evldence so far reveals Lhe facL LhaL local governmenL sysLem
of 2001 has noL subsLanLlally lmproved Lhe publlc servlce dellvery ln Lhe
counLry because of cerLaln lnherenL weaknesses of Lhe sysLem and amblgulLy
regardlng Lheroles and responslblllLles of local governmenL represenLaLlves.
1-A, 5ectot -5, lbose-vll, noyotoboJ,lesbowot
lbooe. (091) 9219544, (091) 5861024-26 (091) 9217451
cpptlmscleoces.eJo.p

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