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ISLAMIC AND CHRISTIAN SPAIN IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES Thomas F. Glick 6 STRUCTURE AND STABILITY
1. Sta ilit! a"# Co"ti"$it! %1&'( The standard periodizations of medieval history are based on political changes (especially cataclysmic ones) which tend to stress discontinuity between periods: the emergence of the Caliphate, and its fall; the emergence of the Party ingdoms, and their decay and con!uest in al"#ndalus; dynastic shifts and the transit of hegemony among various $ingdoms; and the great transitional dates of the wars of con!uest (%&'(, the fall of Toledo; %)%), *as +avas de Tolosa) in Christian ,pain- ,uch are the biases of traditional historiography, which saw the structure of future political forms presaged in earlier events- .ut comparative analysis tends to blur the profile pro/ected by political pea$s and valleys, and to stress phenomena which bespea$ continuity between periods, and among different societies or cultures to identify and compare their basic components- 0n a diachronic plane, societies are seen to undergo gains and losses in structure"processes of crystallization (or decrystallization) of social and cultural forms which play themselves out over long periods of time, fre!uently spanning the benchmar$s of political change1n general, the high middle ages in both al"#ndalus and in Christian ,pain were a period of crystallization, both social (the sub/ect of this chapter) and cultural (Chapter 2), a period of continuity in the elaboration of social structure from rudimentary and primitive forms in the eighth century to the relatively sharply crystallized societies of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries- .y 3structure,3 however, we mean (following Thomas ,mith) something more general than the specific building bloc$s and lin$ages of social networ$s- 1t refers, rather, to the 3relative invariance or fi4ity of relationships among the elements of a system,3 whatever those elements may be- ,tability, in this sense, implies the relative permanence of arrangements regulating the distribution of resources within the society: the greater the permanence, the more crystallized is the social or cultural networ$- The opposite process "" decrystallization "" refers to structural loss, to the loosening of social arrangements, or to the redistribution of resources-(%) 5e can describe, in the period under consideration, processes %1&)( both of crystallization and decrystallization on either side of the cultural frontier- 6rom an analytical standpoint, however, it happens that processes of crystallization and decrystallization can occur simultaneously within the same society- 5hat a historian sees depends (as suggested in the 1ntroduction) on what processes are viewed as normative-()) Thus, 7ibbon viewed the decline of the 8oman 9mpire as a decrystallizing process, whereas modern historians have detected impulses of recrystallization in the same period5ith near universality among historians, al"#ndalus has been regarded as an unstable political entity, indeed as a society one of whose characteristic features was an inability to stabilize itself- Castro:s /udgment may be ta$en as representative: 31slam was incapable of creating stable political systems

based on something other than a common religion and dictatorial rule; the totally religious character of ;uslim life hindered the creation of secular forms of communal e4istence-3 9!ually categorical is 7arc<a de Cort=zar: the ;uslims never established 3a stable political consensus3; the fall of the Caliphate is represented as the brea$ing of the 3fictitious e!uilibria3 upon which the state was built,=nchez"#lbornoz accepts the divisive nature of #ndalusi politics as given, attributing this characteristic to 3,panish pride-3(>) 94amples could be e4tended indefinitely, drawing upon many recent medievalistsThree $inds of problems arise from this characterization of the #ndalusi state- 6irst, there is a perceptual, valuative problem- Those who so characterize al"#ndalus do so on the basis of an implicit model of sound political structure, against which this particular society is /udged negatively, as falling short of some norm- ,econd is the nature of stability itself- 5hat constitutes a stable political system? 1ndeed, is political stability, however defined, commensurate with or a prere!uisite of social cohesion? This suggests a third order of analytical problem, that dealing with the social or social"psychological corollaries of political stability- Political instability seems to suggest that the society is flawed or imperfect- The search for the $ey to this imputed flaw leads to even more categorical generalizations: that the society is unable to generate sound political forms, owing to some structural, psychological, or even genetic defectThe first problem is placed into clear focus by 7uichard: there has been an e4cessive tendency on the part of historians to treat al"#ndalus as a coherent political entity, something li$e a national state on the 9uropean model, when in fact it was a segmentary, tribal society, at least in its %1&6( early centuries-(@) 1n such a social system, instability at the dynastic level is normal and e4pected because tribal political life ta$es the form of a constant testing of forces- This process has the result of forming continually shifting e!uilibria which, if 3unstable3 /udged by a criterion that places positive value on the long"term continuity of a central government or ruling institution, are not, for that, fictitious- Their reality is the reality of segmentary organization,tability of social organization and continuity in its institutions were very much a part of #ndalusi society, but their mainsprings did not lie in the ruling institution- 1n the first place, tribal organization in itself must be viewed as a stabilizing force- # number of historians have stressed the positive functions of tribal fragmentation- 7uichard, in discussing the constant state of rivalry among groups, notes that the principle of opposition was essential to the e!uilibrium of #rab society- ,uch opposition was perpetually read/usted, creating e!uilibria between hierarchized agnatic groups-(() .urns, in commenting on the survival of 1slamic society in Aalencia after the Christian con!uest, notes that 3The parado4 is that a country so rent by factionalism as to fall before the crusaders, piece by piece, was by reason of that very fragmentation tough enough to survive at its lower levels-3(B) 1n the eighth and ninth centuries, political success was tribal success, measured in tribal terms-(C) 7uichard documents this when he shows that all the political activities of the ;agila .erbers, for e4ample, had a tribal basis, from which all power was ultimately derived- The same was true of other groups, from the political turnovers of the early governors (the actions of the powerful 6ihrD family are a case in point) to the Emayyads themselves- :#bd al"8ahmFn 1 built a civil and military administration staffed almost wholly by his own $insmen and clients- 1bn haldGn notes that it was his dynasty:s hallmar$ that it bestowed office, particularly /udgeship, upon those who shared in the dynasty:s 'asabya or 3group feeling-3 Huring the fitna of the late ninth century, :#bd #llFh was reduced to the support of the same group which provided the regenerative nucleus for the inception of the CaliphateThe slave regimes of the early Party ingdoms proved too unstable to survive, lac$ing a tribal base; these were soon eliminated by the #rab and .erber elites who founded states based on family and clientage relationships-(')

The nature of 1slamic law, which regulated daily as well as religious affairs, introduced a standardization or uniformity of governance and of %1&*( social behavior which meant that political boundaries could change $aleidoscopically without interrupting the relative stability of public order on lower levels, particularly that of the town- (1n Christian ,pain, a role parallel to that of 1slamic law was played, on one level, by urban law, which was diffused by the process of the territorialization of the great 6ueros, and, on a higher level, by the diffusion of 8oman law-) The political balance in all 1slamic states of the middle ages was precarious- Princes rose and fell and tribal geography shifted constantly, but the basic structure of the society was untouched- #s 7oitein sardonically observed, the brea$down of public order was regarded as something a$in to a natural phenomenon-(2) The law was dominated by middle"class values and concerns and interpreted by that bourgeois element par e4cellence, the faqhs. 5e have previously noted the ambivalence of the fuqah' with regard to the ruling elites: on the one hand, the desire not to be compromised by power; on the other, the necessity of playing a public role in the interests of enforcing the dictates of religious law- 1n sociological terms, the legalism of medieval 1slam was the principal means of social integration, at least in urban society- The characteristic social division of power between a literate urban elite and an illiterate, rural, tribal mass e4plains the social function of the fuqah'. The /urisprudential class, as interpreters of 1slamic law, served to mediate between the ruling institutions and the tribal masses to interpret the law for the latter and, through the law, to provide a religious sanction or chec$ upon the e4cesses of rulers-(%&) The fuqah' always appeared to support the status !uo, providing the ruling elite with the legitimation of 1slamic law, as a force to countervail political instability- The state, moreover, used the fuqah' and religious institutions such as the /udgeship (qad) to ensure order and to replace, in effect, tribal relationships in an urbanizing society- Thus one gains the impression that !adis, on a day"to"day basis, were actually governing the towns, whatever the 3civil3 administrative structure may have been- 6rom this web of authority in which the fuqah' were thoroughly enmeshed comes the prevalent historical /udgment (as in *Ivi"ProvenJal) of #ndalusi 1slam, embodied in the /urisprudential class, as having been rigid and conservative, indeed deliberately so, a /udgment which, as Ervoy indicates, misconstrues the nature of 1slamic law- 1n theory, 1slamic law "" whether ;ali$i or not "" was rigid, but in practice it was fluid, malleable, and not infle4ibly systematized-(%%)#l" hushanD repeatedly shows /udges %1&+( interpreting the law pragmatically, using precedents and analogies "" in sum, a customary legal system, with informal elements superimposed upon the canonical sources1n spite of the well"$nown disinclination of many prominent fuqah' to fill public positions "" to decline the /udgeship was a sign of moral probity "" members of this class were in fact deployed with amazing fluidity to staff the /uridico"legal bureaucracy (as opposed to the royal household)- ;ones points out that the Emayyads controlled the corps of officials drawn from the faqh class by continual /uggling of administrative posts- Kudgeships turned over rapidly, and fuqah' ""fre!uently the same individuals "" held the posts of muhtasib and shib al-shurta, often in different towns- Provincial !adis were not allowed to become too powerful, and many biographies contain the phrase: 3Le was called to CMrdoba3 "" not necessarily a promotion, in ;ones: view-(%)) ,erial /udgeships, whereby a faqh would move from one town to another after a few years of service to hold the /udgeship there, became characteristic of #ndalusi administration, from early Emayyad times through the #lmohad period- #l" hushanD mentions several ninth"century faqhs who held provincial /udgeships before coming to CMrdoba, and later the pattern became more pronounced- 0f the forty" three !adis mentioned in ibn al"Nubair:s biographical dictionary (twelfth and thirteenth century, but which reflects the practice of the Taifa period as well) fourteen (thirty"two percent) held the /udgeship in two or more towns, indicating a measure of organizational continuity over the entire country-(%>)

That this period typified the Taifa, as well as the Emayyad, period demonstrates that political control by a centralized state was not the only function of serial /udgeships- Taifa"period /udges crossed political boundaries as if they did not e4ist- 1t is this feature of the administration of 1slamic law that gave stability to the social system in spite of political instability and shifting political boundaries- The contrast between the permanence of the /uridical system and the impermanence of the political system demonstrates the coe4istence of a highly crystallized social networ$ involving the urban middle class on the one hand, and, on the other, a military and ruling elite which betrayed many of the signs of lac$ of structure inherent in the steady brea$down of tribal organization1n later times one notes that, because of the peculiar historical situation caused by the increase of Christian military pressure, the fuqah' increased their social weight /ust when the system of 1slamic law was failing to %1&&( fulfill its prime role as the glue which held the polity together- 1bn haldGn records that the #lmoravids honored the fuqah', who 35ere appointed to the council, everybody according to his influence among his people in his respective village-3(%@) The height of their social and political prestige was reached, however, /ust as Christian pressure became intolerable- # measure of structural loss was the emergence of ,ufism, which, as a religious movement, was diametrically opposed in tonality and spirit, to the rule of fiqh and its interpreters (and which also had different social roots)-(%() The failure of fiqh in the waning days of #ndalusi society was, of course, the ultimate instability, a disaggregation of authority at the level which had, in the past, provided the greatest source of continuity- .ut this collapse was provo$ed from without, and was beyond the society:s ability to control# measure of social stability is the ability of the prevailing social model to predict accurately the real division of resources- 1n al"#ndalus, tribal affinity remained an accurate predictor of socio"economic status until the end of 1slamic settlement- 1n the si4teenth century, when #rab names were outlawed and ;uslims were forced to ta$e Christian names, ;oriscos complained that they were hampered in the pursuit of normal social and economic relations (marriage, commerce), lac$ing the security of $nowing the lineage of the other individuals- 0ne of the ob/ectives of the second #lpu/arras revolt was a reestablishment of tribal deference patterns through the reassumption of tribal names-(%B) .ut clearly there were other indicators of deference besides tribal ones- The related processes of conversion, urbanization, and detribalization created a dual structure whereby, for e4ample, the urban oligarchy that comprised the faqh class after the fall of the Caliphate controlled a substantial amount of resources, both power and wealth, without any meaningful participation in a tribal structure- 5hen ;u:tamid of ,eville noted in %&'B that the #ndalusis formed peoples and not tribes, he was recognizing that the basis of deference had shifted and that the traditional social model, the tribal one, was no longer an accurate predictor of the real distribution of preferment- 1bn haldGn echoed this perception later, remar$ing that 3group feeling3 had been lost in al"#ndalus, which was no longer the home of groups and tribes-(%C) 1n Christian ,pain, feudal canons insisted upon a detailed schedule of deference- The Catalan hierarchy (see section @, below) is a case in point: wealth increased as one ascended the scale from sotcastl to count- %,--( #nother e4ample is the way in which land was distributed in con!uered ;urcia in a descendant scale of value to the three classes of $nights (caballeros mayores, medianos, and menores) and three classes of peasants (peones mayores, medianos, and menores)-(%') These were standard categories and were good predictors of real social ran$, indicative of the permanence of these relationsThe growth of a non"feudal, urban middle class created within this structure islands where titles to deference were differently based (although, as noted, burghers sought to assimilate themselves to the noble schedule)- 0nly in the si4teenth century did the feudal structure of deference become an invalid predictor, as non"noble sectors controlled progressively more resources than the downwardly mobile

hidalgos,. St.$ct$.al Gai"s a"# Loss/s #t points when there is dis/unction between the inherited social model and the actual configuration of society, the time is ripe for the emergence of new social forms, a time of e4perimentation symbolized in broad stylistic changes- 1n ,mith:s view, the lac$ of correspondence between the cultural model and the actual social structure is typically caused by decrystallization of social networ$s, by structural loss-(%2) 1t seems logical, though, that structural gain could also underlie such a transition- There were two periods in #ndalusi history that produced stylistic revolutions of the dandy type, such as that of nineteenth"century 9ngland (.eau .rummel) that ,mith ta$es as the typical case- .rummel:s epoch was clearly one characterized by structural loss- 0f the two such periods in ,panish 1slamic history, the reign of :#bd al"8ahmFn 11 and Party ingdom interlude, the second was a conse!uence of a decrystallizationOcrystallization cycle in which the fall of the Caliphate was a direct antecedentThe reign of :#bd al"8ahmFn 11 ('))"'()) is more difficult to assess- Aarious contemporaneous phenomena, summarized in Table @, can be placed in a gain column; others seem better characterized as loss- The epoch is remembered as one of stylistic revolution, associated with the introduction of :#bbFsid"Persian institutions and fashions, the latter associated with the singer and courtier, NiryFb, the $ind of figure identified by ,mith as an entrepreneur of style- The facts of NiryFb:s career are well" $nown- # blac$ singer born in 1ra! in C2' whose real name was #bG:l"Lasan :#li ibn +Ffi:, he fell from favor at the court of LFrGn al"8ashDd %,-1( in .aghdad and arrived in al"#ndalus /ust before the beginning of :#bd al"8ahmFn 11:s reign- *i$e .rummel later, he became an arbiter of style- Le introduced 1ra!i singing styles, created a music school, made changes in the form of the lute- Le introduced toothpaste, popularized shaving among men, and decreed tonsorial styles- Le taught 1ra!i coo$ing and lent his name to a number of recipes- Le influenced political decisions, such as the appointment of /udges by the 9mir, and his advice was sought on virtually all issues-()&) ;ore important from our point of view than NiryFb:s innovations in fashion are the structural changes introduced in the administration of the 9mirate and their significance in terms of changing social structure- 1t was said of :#bd al"8ahmFn 11 that he 3organized the norms of the state-3()%) The initial administrative model in 1slamic, as in Christian ,pain, was a 8oman one, in some instances modified by Aisigothic practice- *ivermore:s characterization of early 1slamic rule as a +eo"8oman system, while perhaps overloo$ing those aspects peculiar to segmentary societies, is nevertheless %,-,( suggestive- The wali (governor) was the e!uivalent of the late 8oman du , and there is a correspondence of the early division of 1slamic !"ras with Aisigothic administrative districts- The #ndalusi concept of the !"ra seems to have been colored by 8oman usage- 1n the 9ast, provinces were conceived as units of agricultural land, following Persian administrative norms- 1n al"#ndalus, administrative districts were centered in and consubstantial with cities and their hinterlands: there were very few wholly rural !"ras-())) The early governors had followed ,yrian Emayyad practice by organizing the treasury, the army, and the administration of /ustice along territorial lines, which created a decentralized, tribally oriented polity wherein the vast Christian population was ruled by ;uslim garrisons housed for the most part in towns- :#bd al"8ahmFn 11 remodeled governmental institutions along :#bbFsid lines- Le strove to concentrate power in the person of the emir, to establish a secure financial base for government operations by founding state monopolies (over coinage and te4tile production, for e4ample), by bringing order and division of labor into the hierarchy of public officials (introducing new court officials based on eastern, ultimately Persian models "" the h#ib and wa$r "" and by establishing greater control over urban affairs- This last involved the introduction of a variety of :#bbFsid officials, whose administrative authority ultimately derived from the qad, such as the muhtasib (a mar$et

master with widened /urisdiction and responsibility) and the urban prefect (shib al-madna). 1n this instance, dandyism seems tied to a crystallization process, whereby tentative arrangements based on the circumstances of con!uest were yielding to more comple4 social needs, re!uiring an appropriate administrative response- 0ne can find in the crucial process of conversion both crystallization and decrystallization, depending on whether one chooses the vantage point of tribal society or of the masses- 6or the former, urbanization and the conversion of masses of people who fell outside the tribal structure implied a loss of structure in the traditional social networ$s- The more +eo" ;uslims in the body politic, the less was tribal status a good indicator of the allocation of resourcesHandyism and administrative innovation were positive responses to a new social situation- The massacre of Christians and, later in the century, the terrible tribal fitna (perhaps the last gasp of the inherited social model of a tribally based polity) were also responses to a process of structural loss6rom the point %,-0( of view of +eo";uslims, however, conversion and all that it entailed were part of a crystallization process- The increasing mass of ;uslims called for new institutions and social and cultural responses designed to meet their needs, particularly the creation of a society that was culturally and institutionally %slamic, rather than tribal in nature- 5e can associate the establishment of ;ali$ism and the beginnings of a native school of hadth with these impulses- The fact that ;ali$ism had full official support beginning only in the reign of :#bd al"8ahmFn 11 substantiates this conclusion-()>) The second crucial /uncture, that beginning with the failure of the centralized state created by :#bd al" 8ahmFn 11, had similar characteristics but with the signs changed- Handyism, in similar guise of the aping of 1ra!i customs which so characterized the Taifa courts, would seem more clearly part of a decrystallizing process- ,tructural loss and gain seem to be paired and se!uential- 1n the ninth century, the coalescence of the centralized state (gain) initiated a wave of conflict throughout the tribal networ$ (loss)- 1n the eleventh, the fall of the Caliphate (loss) initiated a reorganization of the society in decentralized polities which seemed to respond well to economic and ethnic realities (gain)The historiography of this episode is reminiscent in many respects of the catastrophic approach to the fall of the 8oman 9mpire- The demise of the Caliphate has been represented as /ust such an unmitigated disaster, with no redeeming features- 0ne e4ponent of the catastrophic view, Lussain ;ones, asserts that the dismemberment of the Caliphate 3not only surprises the #rab reader, but saddens him and fills him with disgust through considering the so"called ings of Taifas as criminals who destroyed the unity of the Caliphate and who, naming themselves emirs and $ings, sacrificed the common interest in order to satisfy their vain, egotistic, and sterile pride-3()@) .esides the valuative /udgment which virtually asserts that the Caliphate was good and its successors evil, there is also present in ;ones: analysis the notion that great political events come about through the conscious will of leaders- 9lsewhere he states that in deciding to abolish the Caliphate, the #ndalusi aristocracy had demonstrated a complete lac$ of political clarity-()() Kames Hic$ie, whose conclusion as to the significance of the fall of the Caliphate is the opposite of ;ones:, still lays e!ual emphasis on the conscious motivation of the actors- Thus he states that the aristocracy 3had come to terms with reality by abolishing a meaningless institution, doing what they did in sorrow and %,-'( sensible of the implications of their action-3()B) 1nterestingly, al",ha!undD, a thirteenth"century writer, asserted that the most illustrious sub/ects at the time of the dismemberment of the Emayyad state were unanimous in favoring the division of the Caliphate into Taifas because it led to the revvitalization of high culture-()C) ;as$ed in al",ha!undD:s observation is his awareness that the social model no longer fit the social reality- Thus he could view the Taifas positively#ll who discuss the fall of the Caliphate "" al",ha!undD e4cepted "" seem convinced that the reasons for it must lie in supposed deficiencies of the ruling #rab caste- 5- ;- 5att, for e4ample, singles out 3the absence of a middle class interested in maintaining a strong central government3 as the prime structural

deficiency leading to the collapse of the Caliphate-()') .ut it is by no means clear that a middle class is a prere!uisite of a stable government, /ust as it is not certain that shortsighted decisions by a few individuals can force the restructuring of an entire societyThe systemic nature of intergroup relations implies that the sources ot a radical social shift represented by the fall of the Caliphate must be sought, not in the structure of one group, but in the relationship among all groups- The Caliphate fell because the ethnic e!uilibrium which had summoned the edifice into being was disturbed- The essence of the shift was that the .erber minority had grown dramatically in size and power /ust at the moment when the pea$ of the curve of conversion was reachedThe increment in .erber immigration was the result of military reforms carried out by the emirs as they consolidated power, beginning in the ninth century under al"La$am 1 and :#bd al"8ahmFn 11- #t each successive stage, new #frican contingents were inscribed in the military register- Huring the reign of :#bd al"8ahmFn 111, the settling of new .erber groups reached even greater intensity as the Caliph sought to balance the influence of restive #rab rivals-()2) #t the same time another process, described by *Ivi"ProvenJal as the fusion of #rabs and +eo;uslims, but more accurately the swamping of the former by the latter, was nearing completion, with the pea$ of conversion probably reached in the first !uarter of the tenth centuryThe political fragmentation of al"#ndalus, therefore, was not so much a fall from grace as a realignment in $eeping with a shift in the ethnic balance of power- The .erbers were strong enough to disrupt the central organization of the state, but not to capture that mechanism intact- .ut %,-)( then, the elaborate civil"military apparatus needed to manage ethnic and tribal cleavages had become obsolete, once the vast ma/ority of the population was composed of ethnically homogeneous, more or less non"tribal +eo";uslims- # new e!uilibrium was sought in the political organization of regional nuclei, in accordance with realistic demographic patternsThe dismemberment of the Caliphate, once the fitna itself had subsided, did not materially disrupt the continuity of life in al"#ndalus- (5e have noted recent speculations that political regionalization was conducive to economic growth-) 6or reasons already stated, the locus of such continuity was, in rural areas, in tribal structures, and in the towns, in the /urisprudential class whose methods of training, recruitment, and political action were unchanged by the fitna. Then too, by the twelfth century at the latest, the ma/ority of the fuqah' must have been +eo";uslims, and the society was culturally and socially more homogeneous "" even though politically fractionated "" than it had ever been under the Emayyads1t is against this bac$ground that the eleventh"century transition must be considered- #gain there is a strong stylistic component; again it is a component of 1ra!i inspiration- The Taifa courts, as 7arc<a 7Mmez indicates, strove to become 3microscopic .aghdads-3 The problem was that, unli$e the 9mirate of the ninth century, the eleventh"century e4perience was less a creative integration of useful innovations with broad social demand than it was the imposition of superficial styles and customs that had no resonance beyond the $ingly courts themselves- Thus the Party ings adopted lofty caliphal titles typical of :#bbFsid usage (e-g-, al";uzaffar, 3The Aictorious3; al";u!tadir, 3The Powerful3), together with courtly pretensions that became ludicrous when reproduced on the petty scale of the period- ,mith points out that the use of empty or vestigial titles which reveal nothing of the real lives and resources of their bearers (the anti!uation of biographical models, he calls the phenomenon) is a sign of dis/unction between model and reality- 5hat is peculiar in this instance is that the titles, although historically vestigial, were deliberately introduced as part of a restructuring process- The feeling that 1ra! was the center of all culture seems to have been reinforced in the eleventh century by tremors of insecurity permeating a society that lived in perpetual fear of con!uest- 1n Ervoy:s view, this insecurity e4plains the alienation of the intelligentsia after the fall of the Caliphate, as a conse!uence of

which heterodo4 religious and philosophical movements began %,-6( to appear on the margins of society-(>&) The Taifa period seems characterized by the simultaneous play of decrystallizing forces in the cultural sphere and crystallizing ones in the political and economic spheres# similar phenomenon, where social restructuring was symbolized by stylistic changes, is the instauration of +eo"7othicism in the #sturo"*eonese $ingdom, a movement which alludes to the restoration by #lfonso 11 in ninth"century 0viedo of the Aisigothic model of $ingship (and which is not to be confused with any artistic movement)- This movement had only tenuous lin$s with the 7ermanic past and was associated with the attempts of #lfonso 11 and the .ishop Pelayo to reorganize the civil and ecclesiastical organization of the $ingdom- Pelayo wanted to establish 0viedo as a bishopric and also to establish continuity between Aisigothic and #sturian sees- 1n civil administration, palace officials were assigned the lofty titles of Aisigothic magnates, but were in fact absurd parodies- 6or e4ample, the +otary Count had been an important official in the Aisigothic court, but his counterpart in 0viedo was a simple scribe- The form or style of the reform was more significant by far than its substance, since it was impossible to recreate a peninsular"sized administrative apparatus in a small mountain $ingdom with few financial resources-(>%) #ccording to ,=nchez"#lbornoz, the wholesale adoption of 7ermanic norms (replacing late 8oman ones) was well"suited to the rude psyche of these rural mountain communities-(>)) Lowever, this $ind of stylistic change is more li$ely related to socioe"conomic changes than to group psychology- ,igns of structural loss are clear in the economic crisis of the mid"ninth century, when #lfonso 11 replaced the gold standard with silver, causing devaluation and a price rise- ,ince +eo"7othicism was in part designed to create a myth of continuity, the discontinuities that brought it into being are difficult to perceive- #t the end of the century, under #lfonso 111, when the $ingdom was much e4panded beyond its initial minute radius, it became clearer that a more comple4 $ind of administrative response was necessary to manage a society which had grown and consolidated itself-(>>) To return now to ,mith:s model: it is clear that stylistic changes affecting the development of society broadly are indeed reflections of points in socio"cultural evolution at which the prevailing model of social structure does not accord with what the structure of society really is, or has become- 6rom our point of view, however, style changes that are reflected %,-*( in administration, in norms of governance, are historically more significant than those of fashion only, and more difficult to e4plain5hile structural loss (or gain) may call forth a demand for social innovation that is broadly based, administrative changes are made by a relatively small circle of elite persons- To interpret the significance of changes in administrative styles to discover what social changes called them into being, is to realize that crystallization or decrystallization may be ta$ing place in social networ$s outside those which organize political life- The seeming anomaly of governments (as in ninth"century #sturias or eleventh"century al#ndalus) adopting a hollow model merely demonstrates that aristocracies strive to fill voids in leadership, using whatever tools they have at hand- 1n some cases, the tool is cultural borrowing; in others, it may consist of the revival of an anachronistic model, in the hope that new life can be breathed into it; or an entirely new set of rules may be inventedTo turn briefly to cultural borrowing in administrative forms, and to return to the !uestion, raised in the 1ntroduction, of the controlling nature in cultural diffusion of the disparity in structuring between contacting societies: it appears that, at various /unctures, when Christian and 1slamic societies contacted, new social realities were created for which new models of organization had to be derived- 1n certain cases, the results were e4aggerated and transitory: a case in point is the aping of #rab customs by the Christian con!uerors of Naragoza, who donned ;uslim garb and played at being shay!hs for a time- .ut behind this passing e4periment, which constituted a form of social modeling, there was a demand established for the borrowing of administrative practices by the less highly structured Christian

society from the more highly structured society of the ;uslims- Thus Kuli=n 8ibera:s theory that the #usticia of #ragMn was an imitation of the 1slamic appeals /udge (ma$ilim) has meaning if considered against this bac$ground- There was ample precedent in the Christian world- 1n *eMn and Castile, the #ndalusi shib al-s"q, later muhtasib, was adopted (as $a&a$oque, almotac'n) at a time when the Christian states lac$ed the administrative sophistication of the more comple4 contacting society- The same was true in the thirteenth century, when Christian control of medical practice among sub/ect ;uslims and Kews was highly conditioned by the ;uslim model of open access to medical practice#nother e4ample is the Christian assimilation of the dhimma model for dealing with ethno"religious minorities, a clear e4ample of the migration of a model of social organization from a socially more comple4 society to %,-+( one which had no ready"made solutions for such a problem-(>@) ,uch contacts, in sum, created a situation in which the less"structured society perceived a sense of dis/unction with the contacting society- This perceived lac$ of fit is one of the primary forces creating demand for cultural borrowing, /ust as the internal evolution of one society can create a demand for new social models0. Stat/ S!st/ms o1 th/ El/2/"th C/"t$.! The eleventh century, in both peninsular societies, was a period of political consolidation- 1n Christian ,pain the political entities that were to direct the southward e4pansion, the $ingdoms that would share political power for the rest of the middle ages, emerged at this time- 6rontiers between $ingdoms, spheres of influence or of politico"economic ob/ectives with regard to al"#ndalus, and norms of administration began to ac!uire coherent form-(>() 1n al"#ndalus an analogous process unfolded, involving the development of states whose rationale was a curious combination of territoriality and tribalism- 1n both cultures, the emergence of these states presupposed the crystallization of subcultural entities in distinct regional foci, a process which led to the emergence of culturally distinctive political entities in Christian ,pain but which was aborted in al"#ndalus by attrition of territoryThe state system of the Party ingdoms was founded on a parado4- 0n the one hand, as 7uichard indicates, the concept of the territorial state dawned only slowly in the 1slamic world- Political units, since they were ultimately defined by patterns of tribal relationships, lac$ed precise boundaries- 1ndeed, there was no interest in establishing such lines of demarcation- (The early #rabic chronicles refer to the #sturian $ingdom simply as 3the .anG #dfansh3"the sphere of influence of the 3sons of #lfonso,3 conceived tribally-) 0n the other hand, the ongoing processes of urbanization, detribalization, and conversion meant that the #ndalusi polity was steadily being deprived of its tribal ligaments, leaving as an unavoidable alternative a state encompassing some notion of territorialityThe #rab and .erber dynasts who replaced the transitory slave rulers derived power from groups who had common ethnic interests, even if tribal ties had wea$ened- The division of states among #rabs and .erbers corresponded well with patterns of ethnic settlement which in some cases dated to the eighth century- #lready noted (in Chapter (, section >) was %,-&( the tendency of Taifa $ings to form ethnic coalitions- The political shape of such alliances is typical of segmentary politics in general- Particularly among .erbers, alliances were at a distance, to avoid direct conflict with allies over resources (pasturage, for e4ample)- This gives rise to the famous chec$erboard pattern of political alliances so characteristic of +orth #frica, but which in modified form can be detected in eleventh"century al" #ndalus "" as when, for e4ample, ,eville was opposed by .ada/oz to its west and 7ranada to its eastThe original dispersion of tribes throughout the peninsula, settling in widely scattered foci, isolated from their fellow tribesmen, yet remaining in contact through networ$s of familial relationships, responds to the same impulse and served to reinforce the pattern when regional entities became fully independent in the eleventh century-(>B) The apparent fluidity of boundaries of the Taifa $ingdoms is in part mas$ed by family"based mergers and disaggregations, as for e4ample the absorption of the $ingdom of Henia in %&CB by al";u!tadir of

Naragoza and of the $ingdom of *Irida"Tortosa, ruled by his brother al";uzaffar, three years later- The changing political boundaries obscure a fairly stable association between one family (the .anG LGd, in this case) and a particular territory- 1f the frontier $ingdoms (Toledo, Naragoza) seemed to manifest greater cohesion, it was because of the conditions re!uired by military preparednessThe $ings of the Christian states also did not have $ingdoms with stable frontiers until the thirteenth century- 1nstead (in ;aravall:s characterization) they ruled over variable space whose boundaries changed in accordance with considerations of $inship-(>C) Christian society, with its recent roots in mountain states of small area, was unaccustomed to ruling over large spaces, a historical circumstance reinforced somewhat by the steady growth of seignorial domains- The propensity for $ingdoms to unite and disunite was as mar$ed on the Christian as on the ;uslim side- ,ancho el ;ayor divided his $ingdom among three sons, who inherited +avarre, Castile, and #ragMn, respectively- *ater, 6erdinand 1 also willed a tripartite division of his realm- 1n view of this flu4 of political boundaries, Pastor suggests that a more realistic view of social structure may be gained from studying economic regions (such as the ,antiago road a4is of the eleventh and twelfth centuries) rather than focusing on political entities which lac$ed geographical stability-(>') The same is even more applicable to the Taifa $ingdoms: if one focuses on economic regions %,1-( (an 9bro region, a Toledo region, a *evantine region, and so forth), greater continuity is apparent than would appear from the $aleidoscopic mutations of $ingshipsThe emergence of the Christian $ingdoms and the crystallization of cultural or subcultural units associated with particular territories were achieved on a political level by interrelated groups of nobles, who were the first to perceive ethnic solidarity-(>2) 8ivalry between groups of nobles easily found territorial e4pression, as in the enmity between *eMn and Castile, involved in competition over spheres of influence in con!uered territory-(@&) 5ith ,ancho el ;ayor the center of gravity in the west shifted decisively from *eMn to Castile, a process which gained force when Castile became a $ingdom under 6erdinand 1, and which culminated in the coronation of #lfonso A11 of Castile as 9mperor in %%>(Castilian hegemony was in all probability the result of the military power and prestige which its nobles won, as the most aggressive force in the battle against the ;uslims "" a response to its forward position on the frontier- 1n sum, there seems to have been a certain convergence in political form, if not in content, in the two cultures- To regard the title of Taifa $ings as fictive, presumably on the grounds of an imprecise or undervalued notion of territoriality, is to put a very different reading on similar geopolitical fluidity in the Christian states- The terms of the political e!uation were similar, although the proportions of course varied: boundaries (however conceived) were determined by considerations of $inship; they shifted for dynastic reasons; cohesion and continuity were provided by growing ethnic consciousness and by economic regionalization'. F/$#alism 6eudalism was a term coined by seventeenth"century political theorists and historians to describe a set of relationships thought to have been typical of medieval society- These were relationships of dependence among persons of une!ual status, were generally based on land tenure arrangements, and were thought to represent a privatized political structure called into being by the absence or wea$ness of a central or public authority- This set of relationships seems appropriate for comparative analysis, the received view being that in the peninsular states they were most sharply structured in Catalonia, imperfectly articulated in Castile and *eMn, and scarcely developed in al"#ndalus%,11( 1n the present discussion, the development of 3feudal3 relationships, especially in Christian ,pain, is seen as one element in a process of social crystallization which created patterned bonds of solidarity among individuals and social groups and therefore is viewed more as a factor of cohesion than of disaggregation-(@%) The forging of such bonds was one of a number of processes following upon

the structural loss caused by the 1slamic con!uest, and its primary function in the Christian $ingdoms was not to substitute private for public authority (a process that was aborted or at least delayed in ,pain) but rather to create solidarities to complement progressively wea$ening $inship tiesThe discussion of feudalism in medieval ,pain has been characterized by an overly facile and uncritical acceptance of an evolutionary model which assumed that all 9uropean states passed through pre"feudal, feudal, and post"feudal stages- *iberal historians of the nineteenth century proposed that countries where the implantation of feudal norms had been incomplete (,pain, 9ngland) were more advanced at the time and had escaped in some measure the servitude of man to man that was abhorrent to liberal ideals- The problems caused by an evolutionary model are not difficult to appreciate- 1t posits that there was a palpable classic feudalism which can be identified as having functioned in specific places and times, when in fact the concept was originally no more than a heuristic device- 1t follows that the model is accepted as a norm and therefore societies not meeting the norm can be typified as deviant- ,uch deviance can then easily be related to similar notions of a teleological nature, used to buttress ,pain:s supposedly unwholesome 3deviation3 from a 3normal3 historical course-(@)) 1n its etymological sense, feudalism indicates a land"tenure structure based on the fief (*atin, feudum), a grant of land in return for military service and an oath of fealty- This is the primary criterion by which it is argued that feudalism was incompletely developed in Castile- .ut the term has e4tended meanings "" to characterize an entire society as 3feudal3 (;arc .loch), indicating that 3feudal3 values typified an entire society whose land tenure and personal relationships were so structured or to characterize, as ;ar4ist historians often do, the medieval economy as a 3feudal3 mode of reduction-(@>) 0ther authors detect the form of feudal relations but find the substance wanting- Thus, .urns asserts that thirteenth" century Catalonia was feudal in structure but that 3a most imperfectly feudal soul inhabited this body3 "" in particular, that in spite of %,1,( feudal"style personal lin$ages among persons of une!ual ran$, in fact there was 3a tendency at all levels towards independent PlandQ holdings-3(@@) ,=nchez"#lbornoz has demonstrated the e4istence of 3pre"feudal3 relationships in the Aisgothic $ingdom, where fideles of the $ing were rewarded for their service by precarious grants of land or income- ,ubse!uent to the 1slamic invasion, the circumstances of constant warfare strengthened the monarchy, whose access to wealth in the form of war booty made it possible to pay salaries for military service and therefore to avoid having to organize the state on the basis of a feudal hierarchy lin$ed to the $ing by vassalatic"benefice relations- Court officials were also paid, and it was not necessary to ma$e such offices hereditary- There were, then (as summarized by Aaldeavellano) seven reasons why full"fledged feudalism never emerged in ,pain: (%) .enefices were not lin$ed to vassalage- *and grants were fre!uently made without re!uiring an oath of fealty in return- #nd the reverse was also true: vassalage did not inevitably re!uire the grant of a benefice- ()) Lence, the true fief never became established as the central element of the relationship between the monarchy and the nobility- (>) 1mmunities were never as common as they were in 6rance- 1ndeed they became comparatively more common only in the late eleventh century as an element in adaptation of 6rench political styles during that period- (@) 8oyal prerogatives were rarely ceded to lords and royal /ustice (as in 9ngland) was still felt even in supposedly immune /urisdictions, owing to the influence of 8oman law- (() Public offices did not become hereditary- (B) 5ith the e4ception of Catalonia, there was no tightly structured feudal hierarchy- (C) There was strong resistance to the subinfeudation of domains-(@() The feudal hierarchy in Catalonia represented the closest peninsular appro4imation of the 6rench model, an apparent result of the region:s Carolingian bac$ground- The upper nobility (ricshomens) consisted of counts at the top of the feudal hierarchy, then viscounts, comitores (aides of the former), and &as&essores (vassals of viscounts and comitores)- The vassals of these, holding subinfeudated grants, were the $nights (ca&allers, the e!uivalent of the Castilian infan$ones), who were chatelains of

single castles- Their vassals were sotcastls, who had grants sufficient to support a horse and arms-(@B) 9ven so, as .urns and others have noted, fiefs could be alienated without the lord:s consent and the feudal structure was looser than that envisioned in the classical model%,10( #s a system of governance, however, it is doubtful that even Catalonia could be characterized as substantially distinct from the other 1berian $ingdoms- The strong impress of 6rench feudal norms received in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries (when virtually a wholly 6rench feudal terminology was introduced) was counterbalanced by the ability of all Christian monarchs to create civil bureaucracies from the funds made available by parias, tribute received from the 1slamic $ingdomsCastro:s bizarre notion that 30ne obvious reason for the absence of feudalism was the fact that the royal power at times reached the people by way of officials and institutions that were not Christian3 is a reflection of the variegated nature of civil administration-(@C) 0f course, the fact that the 1slamic muhtasib should appear in Castilian towns as the almotac'n and in *evantine towns as the mustasaf has nothing to do with feudalism or the lac$ of it- ;ore accurate is ,=nchez"#lbornoz:s inference that the model of a highly structured civil and military bureaucracy in al"#ndalus emboldened Christian rulers to institute central controls rather than diffusing administration and /urisdiction in a feudal networ$That the Castilian ta4"collecting official should have an #rabic title, almo#arife, is simply proof of the fact that a centralized fisc was an attractive model, given the obvious ability (clear to Christian rulers) of ;uslim $ings to control the wealth of the stateComparison with 1slam also reveals the $inship"substitution role of feudal relations- 5here elite recruitment and deference entitlement were based on $inship, within a tribal framewor$, there was no need for the development of feudal"type relations- There, the iqt' or 3money fief3 e4isted purely for the purpose of remuneration of military or government service and was not hereditary- Those areas of the 1slamic world where the iqt' was most highly developed, as in ;amlu$ 9gypt and ,yria, were slave bureaucracies in which elite recruitment was on a non"tribal basis-(@') 1f one loo$s at relationships of dependence, apart from the organization of the state, however, it seems that there were ample points of convergence- #s mentioned in the discussion of clientage in Chapter @, Aisigothic customs of personal dependence may have bolstered clientage relations between ;ozarabs and +eo";uslims and their #rab overlords-(@2) 1n the western Christian $ingdoms, we have noted that the mesnada, the group of warriors in the service of a lord, tended to have the coloration of e4tended $inship groups- ;ore e4actly, it was an institution intermediate between a $inship and a feudal structure- 8oyal vassals received land %,1'( grants which they were able to ma$e hereditary, but remuneration for actual services was either by salary or by precarious grants (pr'stamos), which were lost to the vassal if he failed to perform the service-((&) The introduction of 6rench feudal norms in the eleventh and twelfth centuries seems another e4ample of a stylistic shift called into being by structural consolidation causing a lac$ of fit between the social model (in Castile, one laid down in the period of resettlement of the Huero Aalley) and the actual structure of society which had become more stratified and more comple4- ;any have noted the formal nature of feudal relations, that they gave normative meaning to pree4isting relations without affecting their structure-((%) +otes for Chapter B %- Thomas ,pence ,mith, 3#estheticism and ,ocial ,tructure: ,tyle and, ,ocial +etwor$ in the Handy *ife,3 (merican )ociological *e&iet&, >2 (%2C@), C>("C>B- +ote 8eyna Pastor:s use of similar

terminology "" 3destructuration3 and 3structural recomposition3 (+el islam al cristianismo, p- %&)Lowever, the scope of these terms is limited to the description of the restructuring of economic organization and land"tenure arrangements where the countryside was literally destructured through the loss of ;uslim inhabitants and reconstituted with a wholly new Christian population)- ,ee ,mith, 3#estheticism and ,ocial ,tructure,3 p-C@) n- %&>- #mIrico Castro, ,he )paniards, pp- )%>")%@ (emphasis mine)- K- #- 7arc<a de Cort=zar, -poca medie&al, pp- (& (emphasis mine), %%%; cf- p- %)@ for his characterization of #lmohad rule as 3superstructure-3 ,ee 7uichard:s criti!ue of ,=nchez"#lbornoz, (l-(ndalus, p- @2B@- 7uichard, (l-(ndalus, p- )C)(- %bid-, pp- @C), (%2B- .urns, %slam under the .rusaders, p- @%>C- Pastor:s e4planation of the 3political insufficiency3 of 1slam (+el islam al cristianismo, p- (B) is a gross misconstrual of the nature of 1slamic society in which, she states, all believers are li$e a tribe- 1f anything, the umma was intended to be deliberately non"tribal'- 7uichard, (l-(ndalus, pp- >'&, (@2, ((%; 1bn haldGn, ,he /uqaddimah, 1, @C, B%2- 0n the theme of social stability in the face of political instability, see Torres .alb=s, .iudades hispanomusulmanas, p- >)); 7uichard, (l-(ndalus, p. 22; Turner, 0eber and %slam, pp- '%, %C), %C@; 7oitein, /editerranean )ociety, 11, >@'%&- Ervoy, 39tude sociologi!ue,3 pp- )>>")>@; Turner, 0eber and %slam, p- ((- ,ee also, .urns, %slam under the .rusaders, p- @&>%%- Turner, 0eber and %slam, pp- 'C, %&(, %%%, %C); 7oitein, /editerranean )ociety, 11, >BB; Ervoy, 39tude sociologi!ue,3 p- )>)%)- ;ones, 3Lommes de religion,3 p- C'- The disinclination to serve may not have been purely religiously based- 7overnment service was a ris$y enterprise, and the middle class preferred the stability of business or scholarship; see 7oitein, /editerranean )ociety, 11, >C(%>- #l" hushanD, 1istoria de los #ueces de .2rdoba (#guilar ed-), pp- (B%"(B) (a /udge in ,idonia called to CMrdoba); C&C (a /udge in 9lvira, then CMrdoba)- Cf- Pp- )&(")&B, where-one of the descendants of :Emar ibn Rarahil, who spawned a family of amins and /udges, was /udge in KaIn and 9ci/a- 1bn al"Nubair, )ilat al-)ila, passim. %@- 1bn haldGn, ,he /uqaddimah, 1, (>- 0n the nature of the council of elders, see .urns, %slam under the .rusaders, pp- >'B"@&&%(- Ervoy, 39tude sociologi!ue,3 pp- )'>")'@%B- - 7arrad, 3The 0riginal ;emorial of Hon 6rancisco +STez ;uley,3 (tlante, ) (%2(@), )%2%C- 7uichard, (l-(ndalus, pp- (2, )%; 1bn haldGn, ,he /uqaddimah, 1, B%, >%B%'- Aaldeavellano, 3*as instituciones feudales en 9spaTa,3 p- )2); Torres 6ontes, *epartimiento de la huerta y campo de /urcia, p- '2%2- ,mith, 3#estheticism and ,ocial ,tructure,3 p- C>B)&- 0n NiryFb: ;a$$D, (portaciones orientales, pp- %'%"%'); Hozy, )panish %slam, pp- )B%")B(; Luici ;iranda, .ocina hispanomagribi, p- %C2- 0n dandies as a social group, see ;hammed 6erid 7hazi, 3En groupe social: *es raffinIs ($uraf'),3)tudia %slamica, %% (%2(2), >2"C%, especially pp- @'"(&, B("

BC)%- *attaba rus"m al-mamla!a (;a$$D, (portaciones orientales, p- %C2)- ;a$$D also notes (p- %2&) that there was greater interest in establishing legal norms in ninth"century al"#ndalus than in the study of tradition (hadith), per se))- *ivermore, 3rigins of )pain and 4ortugal, pp- >&)">&>, >((; .osch Ail=, (5barrac6n musulmana, p- @%; :#bd al" arDm, (l-(ndalus en el 7/u'#am al-buldn7 de 8q"t, pp- )), )C)>- ;a$$D, (portaciones orientales, p- 2@)@- Lussain ;ones, 3Consideraciones sobre la Ipoca de los reyes de Taifa,3 (l-(ndalus, >% (%2BB), >)>">)@)(- %bid., p- >&C)B- Kames Hic$ie, 31bn ,uhayd: # .iographical and Critical ,tudy,3 (l-(ndalus, )2 (%2B@), )'@)C- #l",a!undD, -logio del islam espa9ol, p- @C)'- 5- ;ontgomery 5att, ( 1istory of %slamic )pain (9dinburgh, 9dinburgh Eniversity Press, %2B(), p- 'C)2- Cagigas, (ndalucia musulmana, pp- )&")%; *Ivi"ProvenJal, :'-spagne musulmane au ;<me si<cle, pp- )>")@>&- 9- 7arc<a 7Mmez, 3.agdad y los 8einos de Taifas,3 *e&ista de 3ccidente, => (%2>@), 2; PIrUs, 4oesie andalouse, p- @2; Ervoy, 39tude sociologi!ue,3 pp- )'C")''>%- ;aravall, -l concepto de -spa9a en la edad media, pp- >&&, >%@; Claudio ,=nchez"#lbornoz, 3*a restauraciMn del orden gMtico en el palacio y en la iglesia,3 in 3r6genes de la naci2n espa9ola, 11, B)>" B>2>)- >)-,=nchez"#lbornoz, 3TradiciMn y derecho visigodos en *eMn y Castilla,3 %n&estigaciones y documentos sobre las instituciones hispanas, p- l)2>>- ,=nchez"#lbornoz, 39l precio de la vida en el reino astur"leonIs hace mil aTos,3 p- >'@- 6or further evaluations of +eo"7othicism, see Castro, ,he )paniards, pp- %'&, %'>; 7arc<a de Cort=zar, -poca medie&al, pp- %>> (as superstructure), )2%; and .arbero and Aigil, 3r6genes sociales de la reconquista, p- 2C>@- 0n the con!uerors of Naragoza, see Aerner, :os musulmanes espa9oles, p- >>; 8ibera:s theory is e4pounded in 3r6genes del #usticia de (rag2n? on the diffusion of hisba, Chalmeta, -l se9or del $oco, and 7lic$, 3;uhtasib and ;ustasaf3; on medicine, *uis 7arc<a .allester, 1istoria social de la medicina en -spa9a de los siglos ;%%% al ;@%. Aol- 1- :a minoria musulmana y morisca (;adrid: #$al, %2CB), pp- @C, (); on the dhimma model, .urns, %slam under the .rusaders, p- %B>>(- ,ee 7arc<a de Cort=zar, -poca medie&al, p- >)>>B- 7uichard, (l-(ndalus, pp- @C, >>'; on .erber alliances, see ,eddon, 3*ocal Politics and ,tate 1ntervention,3 p- %)(>C- ;aravall, -l concepto de -spa9a en la edad media, pp- >('">(2, >''>'- Pastor, .onflictos sociales, p- %C>2- %bid., p- (>@&- ,ee ;oreta, )an 4edro de .arde9a, p- ()@%- Cf- ;aravall:s view of feudalism as a unifying system rather than as a factor of decomposition (-l

concepto de -spa9a en la edad media, p- >'C)@)- ,ee 9lizabeth #- 8- .rown, 3The Tyranny of a Construct: 6eudalism and Listorians,3 (merican 1istorical *e&iew, C2 (%2C@), %&B>"%&'', especially p- %&CB- The notion that the 1slamic invasion caused a detour (des&iaci2n) in the historical route of ,panish history is that of ,=nchez"#lbornoz, who also argues that the circumstances of the 8econ!uest inhibited the normal development of 9uropean" style feudal relations- ,ee Castro:s obli!ue criticism of this aspect of ,=nchez"#lbornoz:s thought in ,he )paniards, p- %C)@>- ,ee Pastor, .onflictos sociales, p- %C n- iB, where she states that the mode of production in medieval Castile was feudal although the feudal system was not normative- #lso, cf- p- %'B% where a 3seignorial economy3 is defined as the e4ploitation of servile or semi"servile labor; but 3seignorial3 is not 3feudal3 in the strict sense@@- .urns, %slam under the .rusaders, p- )C(@(- ,=nchez"#lbornoz, -spa9aA Bn enigma hist2rico, 11, (B"C@, and 38epoblaciMn del reino asturleonIs,3 pp- @>C, @)2; 7arc<a de Cort=zar, )an /illCn de la .ogolla, p->%' (on immunities); Aaldeavellano, 3*as instituciones feudales en 9spaTa,3 p-)>(- 0n resistance to subinfeudation, see *ewis, ,he +e&elopment of )outhern Drench and .atalan )ociety, p- CB@B- Aaldeavellano, 3*as instituciones feudales en 9spaTa,3 p- )2)@C- Castro, ,he )paniards, p- @)C@'- Claude Cahen, 31$tF,3 91), 111, %&''"%&2%; *Ivi"ProvenJal, -spa9a musulmanaA%nstituciones y &ida social, p- %%(; Pedro Chalmeta, 3*e problUme de la fIodalitI hors de l:9urope chrItienne: *e cas de l:9spagne musulmane,3 %% .oloquio 1ispano-,unecino (;adrid, %2C>), pp- 2%"%%(@2- ,ee 7uichard, (l-(ndalus, p- (B& n- @, and bibliography cited(&- Aaldeavellano, 3*as instituciones feudales en 9spaTa,3 p- )@>(%- .rown, 3The Tyranny of a Construct,3 commenting on 7eorges Huby-