CRUZ vs.

GINGOYON FACTS:

WON abuse of discretion was committed by respondent court in denying the Ex-Parte Motion.

While there are remedies available to a party adjudged in contempt of court, same may only be availed of when the procedures laid down for its availment are satisfied.
This case stemmed from a Civil Complaintfiled by Ferdinande Cruz against his neighbor, Benjamin Mina, Jr., for abatement of nuisance. Cruz sought redress from the court to declare as a nuisance the basketball goal which was permanently attached to the second floor of Minas residence but protrudes to the alley which serves as the publics only right of way. Mina was declared in default hence petitioner presented his evidence ex-parte. October 21, 2005, respondent judge Gingoyon, in his Decision, declared the basketball goal as a public nuisance but dismissed the case on the ground that petitioner lacked locus standi. ( ruling that the action for abatement of nuisance should be commenced by the city or municipal mayor and not by a private individual like the petitioner) Cruz filed an Motion for Reconsideration on the Order dated 10.21.2005 alleging that respondent judge has been secretly communicating with Benjamin Mina. Cruz, requested the respondent court to hear his motion for reconsideration on November 18, 2005. Respondent judge set the hearing for the motion for reconsideration on November 18, 2005 as per request by the petitioner and directed him to substantiate his serious charge or show cause on even date why he should not be punished for contempt. On November 18, 2005, Cruz, however, did not appear. Judge Gingoyon then motu proprio issued an Order in open court to give petitioner another 10 days to show cause. In his Compliance to the Show Cause Order, Cruz maintained that the alleged contumacious remarks he made have a leg to stand on for the same were based on the circumstances of the instant case. On November 25, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order finding petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court. An Order of Arrest was then issued against the petitioner on even date. On December 1, 2005, at 10:00 A.M., Cruz filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest contending the he already filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court. On December 1, 2005, in his Order, the respondent court denied the Ex-Parte Motion based on petitioners failure to attach the alleged duly filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. The respondent court held that unless petitioner has shown proof of filing said petition for certiorari, he cannot avail of the remedy provided in Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the filing of this petition. ISSUES: WON the respondent court properly adjudged petitioner in direct contempt of court; and

RULING: On the first issue, the court finds the it unmeritorious. Contemptuous statements made in pleadings filed with the court constitute direct contempt. A pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending has been held to be equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same within the meaning of Rule 71, 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, constitutes direct contempt. The court agrees with the respondent judge that Cruz is guilty of direct contempt of court. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Cruz with the respondent court contained a serious allegation that Judge Gingoyon has been communicating with the defendant off the record, which is considered as a grave offense. This allegation is unsubstantiated and totally bereft of factual basis. In fact, when asked to adduce proof of the allegation, petitioner was not able to give any, but repeatedly argued that it is his fair observation or conclusion. Instead of showing proof of the alleged communication between Judge Gingoyon and the defendant off the record, petitioner stubbornly insisted that there is nothing contumacious about his allegation against the Judge as he was just giving his fair and logical observation. Clearly, petitioner openly accused Judge Gingoyon of wrongdoing without factual basis. Suffice it to say that this accusation is a dangerous one as it exposes Judge Gingoyon to severe reprimand and even removal from office. On the second issue, the court finds it lack of merit. Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides: Remedy therefrom. The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The

execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him.

In this case, we find that the respondent court properly denied petitioners Ex-Parte Motion there being no proof that he already filed a petition for certiorari. Notably, the Ex-Parte Motion was filed with the respondent court on December 1, 2005 at 10:00 A.M. and therein petitioner stated that he already filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court. However, perusal of the records would show that the Petition for Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court on the same day but at 1:06 P.M. Clearly, when the motion was filed with the respondent court, it cannot be accurately said that a petition for certiorari was already duly filed with this Court. We also find the necessity to emphasize strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the [RTC], and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals (CA). A direct

invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. For the guidance of the petitioner, [t]his Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. Its jurisdiction is concurrent with the CA, and with the RTC in proper cases. However, this concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant upon a party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. Unwarranted demands upon this Courts attention must be prevented to allow time and devotion for pressing matters within its exclusive jurisdiction. Adhering to the policy on judicial hierarchy of courts, where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the [CA] or a [RTC], it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writs procurement must be presented. In consequence, the instant petition should have been filed with the CA as there is no allegation of any special or compelling reason to warrant direct recourse to this Court. However, to avoid further delay, we deem it practical to resolve the controversy.