Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators v.

City of Manila Police Power Due Process Clause On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was approved by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to get the demographics of anyone who checks in to their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate. ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The due process contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has reason as a standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague. Ordonez v Director of Prisons August 4, 1994; Habeas Corpus Facts: Paquinto and Cabangunay are among the civilians who were tried by the military commissions during the period of martial law. Both were originally condemned to die by musketry, but their sentence was commuted by the new Constitution to reclusion perpetua. Their convictions were subsequently nullified by this Court where we held that the military tribunals had no jurisdiction to try civilians when the courts of justice were functioning. Accordingly, this Court directed the DOJ to file thecorresponding informations in the civil courts against the petitioners within 180 days from notice of the decision. No information has so far been filed against Paquinto and Cabangunay, but they have remained under detention.Ernesto Abaloc, together with Cabangunay and Paquinto, wrote to the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC)complaining that their continued detention violated their rights under Articles 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The UNHRC requested the Republic of the Philippines to submit a written explanation of their complaint. The DFA furnished the CHR with a copy of the decision. Thereupon, the Commission, through its Chairman Ordoez wrote the Secretary of Justice of its intention to sue for the release of the complaints unless criminal charges had already been filed against them. The DOJ informed the Commission that Abaloc had been released and that Paquinto and Cabangunay were still detained. The present petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court. The writ was immediately issued, a hearing was also scheduled. At the hearing, Chairman Ordoez argued for the prisoners and pleaded for their immediate release in view of the failure of the DOJ to file charges against them within the period specified. He stressed that their continued detention despite the nullification of their convictions was a clear violation of their human rights. For its part, the Office of the Sol Gen, as counsel for the respondent Director of Prisons, argued that under our ruling the Olaguer decision could not be retroactively applied to decisions of the military tribunals that have already become final or to persons who were already serving their sentence. It suggested that, under the circumstances, the only recourse of the prisoners was to reiterate and pursue their applications for executive clemency. Issue: WoN the petition for habeas corpus should be granted.

Held: Yes. The prisoners have been confined since 1974. We canonly guess at the validity of their convictions as the records of their cases have allegedly been burned. There is absolutely no question that the prisoners' plea should be heeded. The government has failed to show that their continued detention is supported by a valid conviction or by the pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate cause whatsoever. If no information can be filed against them because the records have been lost, it is not the prisoners who should be made to suffer. In the eyes of the law, Paquinto and Cabangunay are not guilty or appear to be guilty of any crime for which they may be validly held. Hence, they are entitled to be set free. Liberty is not a gift of the government but the right of the governed. Every person is free, save only for the fetters of the law that limit but do not bind him unless he affronts the rights of others or offends the public welfare. Liberty is not derived from the sufferance of the government or its magnanimity or even from the Constitution itself, which merely affirms but does not grant it. Liberty is a right that inheres in every one of us as a member of the human family. When a person is deprived of this right, all of us are diminished and debased for liberty is total and indivisible. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Jesus Cabangunay and Leonardo Paquinto should not be detained in prison a minute longer. They are ordered released IMMEDIATELY. Dizon v Eduardo G.R. No. L-59118 March 3, 1988 C. J. Teehankee Facts: Eduardo Dizon, a 30 year old businessman, and Isabel Ramos, 22 years and a former architecture student, disappeared during Martial Law. The two had been arrested with others by the military, detained in the military camp, and then claimed by the military to have been released after nine days. But they were not released to their parents, who had been visiting them, and were never seen or heard from by anyone since then. The application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus had been filed by petitioners, Juan Dizon and Soledad Ramos, on behalf of their son, Eduardo Dizon and their daughter, Isabel Ramos, respectively, who were arrested by Philippine Constabulary of the Pampanga PC Command then led by respondent Provincial Commander Col. Teddy Carian at, Sta. Ana, Pampanga without warrant of arrest or Presidential Order of Arrest. They were detained by the respondents at the PC Stockade at San Fernando, Pampanga under the jurisdiction of respondents Brig. Gen. Vicente Eduardo, then Regional Commander of the area, holding office at Camp Olivas, and Col. Teddy Carian for interrogation and investigation without assistance of counsel. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on December 29, 1981. In the return of the writ filed on behalf of respondents on January 5,1982, by then Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, and verified by respondent, then Provincial Commander Col. Carian, respondents insisted that the detainees were indeed released on September 24,1981, and submitted the supporting affidavits of the men assigned with respondent Carian's Provincial Headquarters. Respondents denied petitioners' allegation of falsification of the detainees' signatures on their release papers, claiming that the same were signed in their presence and asked for dismissal of the petition. Jose Diokno, as counsel for the petitioners, invoked the United Nations General Assembly Resolution to stop the practice of enforced disappearances. He also posed several questions to the Court. Issues: 1. Do petitioners have the burden in law of proving that the detainees are still detained by respondents or does the burden shift to respondents of proving that they did release the detainees? 2. If respondents have the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that they released the detainees, have they in fact discharged that burden in this case?

3. If respondents have not satisfied the Court that they released the detainees, but nevertheless refuse or are unable to produce their bodies, what relief may the Court grant petitioners? Held: respondents, No, reinvestigation by the CHR Case remanded to CHR for further investigation. Ratio: 1. The general rule in a number of cases that the release of a detained person renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic. Respondents make such a plea in line with their return that they had released the desaparecidos after nine days. But their return begs the question. If the release of the detainees is an established fact and not in dispute, they do not continue to be missing persons or desaparecidos. Where, however, there are grounds for grave doubts about the alleged release of the detainees, where the standard and prescribed procedure in effecting the release has not been followed, then the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the alleged release is shifted to the respondents. Release is an affirmative defense and "each party must prove his own affirmative allegations," just as the burden of proof of self-defense in a killing rests on the accused. Moreover, evidence of release lies particularly within respondents' power. 2. Diokno claimed that signatures of the detainees on their release papers were falsified. He submitted specimens of Dizons signatures and compared it to signatures on documents that respondents themselves submitted. He concluded that they were markedly different from the signatures on their supposed release certificates. With respect to Eduardo Dizon, Diokno noted particularly the very poor line quality of Dizon's signature on the release certificate when compared to the speed and freedom of his signature on his voter's application form. The Solicitor General, in turn, disputed Diokno's conclusions about the falsity of the detainees' signatures on the release certificates and questions the reliability of the specimen signatures used, adding that "it is not possible to make any comparison of signatures for the purpose of determining genuineness on the basis of xerox copies. The Court also noted that the respondents did not follow the prescribed standard procedure for releasing detainees. 1. The respondents did not release the detainees to their parents though the latter had been visiting them and, in fact Dizon's father was in the camp on the very day he was supposedly released. 2. Respondent Carian did not report the supposed releases to the Ministry of Defense or General Eduardo 3. Respondent Carian's command could not readily furnish copies of the detainees' release certificates to their parents when the latter asked for them. 4. Respondent Col. Carian had no authority, inherent or delegated, to release the detainees. Carian also claimed to release them under the pretext that they would act as spies for the military. He knew that the probability of the detainees' keeping their supposed bargain was remote. Yet, he took no precautions to insure compliance. Worse, when they broke the supposed bargain by failing to report as he says they agreed to, he took no steps to look for them. 3. Court cant grant petitioners relief. Petitioners' charges of falsification of the detainees' alleged signatures on the certificates of release, compounded by the irregularities and failure of respondents to follow the prescribed procedure in effecting the release for purposes of authentication and to produce and furnish the parents upon request copies of the release certificates need thorough investigation. It is not a trier of facts, nor does it have the means and facilities to conduct such investigation of the grave charges at bar as well as of the whereabouts and fate of the desaparecidos. More, the 1987 Constitution which was overwhelmingly ratified on February 2,1987 expressly mandated the creation of the Commission on Human Rights. The Constitution vested the Commission on Human Rights with broader powers than its predecessor committee, such as to investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. Hence the case was referred here. UMIL VS. RAMOS (GR 81567, SEPT. 8, 1990) Digest FACTS:

-The are separate motions filed by 8 different petitions seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part: "WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs." - These petitions were consolidated because of the similarity of the issues being raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the persons named therein and explain why they should not be set off to liberty without delay. - Respondents assert that the privilege of habeas corpus is not available to petitioners as they have been legally arrested and detained by virtue of valid information file in court against them. - Petitioners are members of NPA RESPONDENTS The persons sought to be produced were all legally arrested and are detained by virtue of valid informations hence a writ of HC cannot be used to set them free PETITIONERS Informations were null and void Detention is unlawful arrests made with no warrant no preliminary investigations conducted

ISSUE: WON the petitioners are illegally arrested and detained.HELD:Arrest and detention is valid. RATIO: There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyone without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. 6 The law expressly allowing arrests without warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted. In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113, which read: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; The record of the cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed has freshly committed, or were actually committing an offense when apprehended so that their arrest without warrant is clearly justified , and that they are detained by virtue of valid information filed against them. Harry Stonehill vs DOJ Sec. Diokno et al Search and Seizure General Warrants Abandonment of the Moncado Doctrine Facts: Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. By the strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued against th eir persons and their corporation. The warrant provides authority to search the persons above-named and/or the

premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and (b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein. Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law. The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just because the government blunders. ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not the proper party hence has no cause of action. It should be raised by the officers or board members of the corporation. The constitution protects the peoples right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code, as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements. Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its

major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the accused against a defective search warrant is emphasized. Guazon vs. De Villa Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents of maulings, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical informations. The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contends that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event. Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights. Held: It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights of the squatters and low income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator is properly charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent relief can be given. In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court temporary restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila. Reyes vs Bagatsing Retired Justice Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied by then Manila mayor Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that there have been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 meter radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to provide protection to the US embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution we adhere to generally accepted principles of international law. www.uberdigests.info ISSUE: Whether or not a constitutional right is being violated by the mayors ordinance. HELD: Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless element. And indeed the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law. But the same cannot be invoked as defense to the primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds and guarantees the rights to free speech and peacable

assembly. At the same time, the City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the application thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed right/s. INC vs. CA Facts: Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to the letter the episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition. Issue: Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and expression. Held: Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. RTCs ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. attack is different from offend any race or religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies.

BRALINAG v. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBUG.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993 (wala akong mahanap na abramlag, yan yung lumalabas sa search bar ) AMOLO et al vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU and ANTONIO A.SANGUTANG.R. No. 95887 March 1, 1993 ; GRIO-AQUINO,J.: Facts: The petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions) dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they taught their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control. Issue: Whether or not school children who are members or a religious sect may be expelled from school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8 Held:No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.(Teehankee) The petitioners further contend that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion. Kant Kwong v. PCGG, 156 SCRA 222, G.R. No. L-79484 (1987)- no available digest The right to travel, along with the right to freedom of movement, are constitutionally guaranteed rights. The petitioners had been barred by the government from leaving the country. This was done through a Hold-Order. The petitioners argued that this was violative of their right to travel. The Court held that the Hold-Orders impaired the petitioners' constitutional right to travel. The Hold-Orders had already expired and the grounds for their issuance had become moot. The Court said, "The right to travel and to freedom of movement is a fundamental right guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the Philippines is a signatory. That right extends to all residents regardless of nationality. And everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law. While such right is not absolute but must yield to the State's inherent police power upon which the Hold-Orders were premised, no 'good reasons' have been advanced which could justify the continued enforcement of the Hold-Orders." Thus, the Court held that the government had abused its discretion in maintaining the Hold-Orders for

an indefinite length of time, as to do so arbitrarily violated the petitioners' fundamental right to freedom of movement. It cited the UDHR in so doing.

KANT KWONG and YIM KAM SHING, petitioners, vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY RAMON A. DIAZ and COMMISSIONER MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, respondents. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: In this original action for Mandamus, petitioners pray that respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG, for short) be commanded to lift without delay the Hold-Orders issued against them by the said entity for being in violation of their right to travel and for having been issued in grave abuse of authority since they are in no way involved in ill-gotten wealth nor in transactions connected therewith. Petitioners are foreign nationals who are the representatives of the Hongkong-Chinese investors who own 33% of the shares of stock in two domestic garment corporations, namely, De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation and American Inter-Fashion Manufacturing Corporation, which firms were ordered sequestered by the PCGG on 25 March 1986 on the thesis that the Marcoses, through nominees and dummies, appear to control 67 % of the firms' shareholdings. On 13 February 1987 respondent Ramon A. Diaz, then Secretary of the PCGG, wrote the Minister of Public Information advising the latter that petitioners had been included in the HoldOrder list of the PCGG (Annex "L" Petition). On 12 March 1987 petitioners filed before the PCGG an Urgent Motion to Lift Hold-Order with the request that the Motion be set for hearing on 16 March 1987 (Annex "M," Petition). The Motion, however, was not calendared for hearing on said date. On 19 March 1987 the PCGG denied the Motion to Lift in an Order reading as follows: An "Urgent Motion to Lift Hold Order" dated March 12, 1987 was filed by Kant Kwong and Yim Kam Shing. These are the official representatives of the Hongkong investors in these two sequestered corporations. Based on records/evidence in the possession of the Commission, all made known to their principals, such as unexplained withholding of documents covering substantial past shipments, deliberate delay in cashing letters of credit resulting in the lapse thereof, failure to remit payments due for past shipments, their obvious and unmitigated campaign to obstruct the release of funds needed for operations of the two garment firms, and orchestrated acts to discredit the Officer-in-Charge of the garments firms and the Commission and to obstruct the smooth operations of the garment firms, there is need for their presence in this country to resolve the above- enumerated issues, in order that operations of the corporations are not obstructed, production will not be delayed and corporate funds may be released. The Commission therefore denies the motion for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. March 19, 1987, Pasig, Metro Manila. FOR THE COMMISSION: (SGD.) MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA Commissioner (SGD.) RAMON A. DIAZ

Secretary Hence, the present recourse predicated on the following grounds: A. The Hold-Order issued against the petitioners is a gross and unlawful violation of their constitutional right of travel and locomotion. B. The Hold-Order against the petitioners is not authorized or sanctioned by Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, nor by the Rules and Regulations of respondent PCGG. C. The Hold-Order is an act of harrassment, motivated by ill-will and vindictiveness, and violates the elementary rules of due process, fair play and human decency. D. The Hold-Order has caused and is causing damages and sufferings to the petitioners and their families. On 24 September 1987, acting upon an Urgent Motion filed by petitioner Yim Kam Shing, this Court lifted, effective immediately, the Hold-Order issued against him for the purpose of allowing him to leave for Hongkong for urgent medical treatment. Executive Order No. 1, dated 28 February 1986, created the PCGG and tasked it principally with: Section 2. ... (a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family relative, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship. xxx xxx xxx

Section 3 of the same Executive Order empowers the PCGG: (a) To conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purpose of this order. (b) To sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession any building or office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and any records pertaining thereto, in order to prevent their destruction, concealment or disappearance which would frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise prevent the Commission from accomplishing its task. xxx xxx xxx

(d) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of acts by any person or entity that may render moot and academic, or frustrate, or otherwise make ineffectual the efforts of the Commission to carry out its task under this order. xxx xxx xxx

(h) To promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. On 11 April 1986 the PCGG issued its Rules and Regulations, the pertinent section of which provides:

SECTION 2. Writ of sequestration freeze and hold orders. To enable the Commission to accomplish its task of recovering ill-gotten wealth, it may issue writs of sequestration and freeze and/or hold orders. As defined in the same Rules and Regulations, a Hold-Order is: D) ... an order to temporarily prevent a person from leaving the country where his departure will prejudice, hamper or otherwise obstruct the task of the Commission in the enforcement of Executive Orders Nos. I and 2, because such person is known or suspected to be involved in the properties or transactions covered by said Executive Orders ... In this case, the justification for the issuance of the Hold-Orders against petitioners has been summarized by the Solicitor General, thus: ... Petitioners, instead of cooperating with respondent PCGG in its task of investigating and recovering ill-gotten wealth of the former President, his immediate family, close relatives, associates or cronies, frustrated and hampered the investigation or otherwise prevented the Commission from accomplishing its task, by withholding documents covering substantial past shipments, which hold the key to the question earlier posed: Where have all the dollars gone? Have they gone a flying one by one to Switzerland? Petitioners likewise deliberately delayed the cashing of letters of credit resulting in the lapse thereof; failed to remit payments due for past shipments; obstructed the release of funds needed for operations of the two garment firms, orchestrated acts to discredit the officer-in-charge of the garment firms and respondent PCGG; and obstructed the smooth operations of the garment firms. To state that all the above acts of petitioners, in one way or another, frustrated, hampered or otherwise prevented respondent Commission from accomplishing its task under Executive Order No. 1 is to state here a consumate understatement. Hence, the issuance of the hold orders against the petitioners remain unassailable. 1 We find merit in the Petition. Petitioners' right to travel has, in fact, been impaired. 1. The validity of the Hold-Orders issued against petitioners on 13 February 1987 has already expired pursuant to the Rules and Regulations of the PCGG, which specifically provide: SECTION 1. ... (D) ... A "hold-order" shall be valid only for a maximum period of six months, unless for good reasons extended by the Commission en banc. " The PCGG has not extended the life-span of the Hold-Orders in question nor has it advanced "good reasons" for doing so. 2. The grounds f or the issuance of the Hold-Orders have become stale.

(a) The PCGG Order denying petitioners' Motion to Lift the Hold Orders against them states that "there is need for their presence in this country to resolve the issues (listed hereinbelow), in order that operations of the corporations are not obstructed, production will not be delayed and corporate funds may be released. " The enumerated issues read: unexplained withholding of documents covering substantial past shipments, deliberate delay in cashing letters of credit resulting in the lapse thereof,

failure to remit payments due for past shipments, their obvious and unmitigated campaign to obstruct the release of funds needed for operations of the two garment firms, orchestrated acts to discredit the Officer-in-Charge of the garments firms and the Commission and to obstruct the smooth operations of the garment firms ... (Paragraphing supplied). It strikes the Court, however, that although the business malpractices attributed to petitioners may have furnished sufficient basis for the issuance of the Hold-Orders against them, subsequent developments have apparently rendered them no longer controlling. Thus, as a result of the sequestration, the PCGG has already appointed an Officer-in-Charge for the two firms, with full authority to operate and manage the same (Annex "B", Petitioner); it has taken over the "management and operations of the sequestered corporations;" 2 it has "initiated changes in the management and operations of the two corporations aimed at protecting not only the interest of the government but also that of the workers;" 3 and since the take-over it has been able to accomplish the following: a. Halted the losses in the operations of the two corporations as declared by the Hongkomg investors during the last two years, by posting a modest profit thereby enabling the corporations to pay the government some P 697,000.00 in taxes i.e. from American Inter-Fashion alone. b. Discontinued the marketing agreement with Ringo Garments-Hongkong and organized a Manila-based marketing and procurement office. c. Firmed up new orders through the said local marketing office enough to sustain the full production of the two companies up to the end of the year at prices 30-50% higher than the orders previously coursed by the minority Hongkong investors through Ringo Garments, their own conduit company in Hongkong. d. Replaced the highly paid Hongkong-Chinese technicians with qualified, competent and deserving Filipino technicians who were promoted from the ranks. e. Upgraded the wages and benefits of the Filipino workers in the corporations.

f. Instituted cost-saving measures to preserve the assets and to make operations more profitable. g. Partially collected from Ringo Garments-Hongkong the amount of US$350,000.00 or P7, million representing the unpaid export bills due on past shipments. About $437,126.32 remains unpaid despite the promise of Yim Kang Shing, representing the Hongkong investors to pay same. 4 It would appear, therefore, that with the changes made and the accomplishments achieved, operations of the sequestered firms are no longer obstructed, production no longer delayed and funding is available. Indeed, if petitioners have 11 obstructed the smooth operations" of the sequestered garment firms and "discredited their Officer-in-Charge," might it not be preferable that they be out of the country to ensure the cessation of their acts allegedly inimical to the operations of the sequestered garment firms? (b) Another reason given for the issuance of the Hold-Orders is that petitioners had "frustrated and hampered the investigation or otherwise prevented the Commission from accomplishing its task." The Court takes judicial notice of the fact, however, that Civil Case No. 0002 entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et als., has been filed by the PCGG before the Sandiganbayan on 16 July 1987. To all appearances, therefore, the PCGG's investigative task relative to the sequestered garment firms and their involvement, if any, in ill-

gotten wealth or in any transactions connected therewith, has terminated. Another reason, therefore, for petitioners' continued presence in the country has been virtually eliminated. We likewise find that petitioners have been denied the rudiments of fair play. The Rules and Regulations of the PCGG specifically provide: SECTION 5. Who may contest. The person against whom a writ of sequestration or freeze or hold order is directed may request the lifting thereof in writing, either personally or through counsel within five (5) days from receipt of the writ or order, or in the case of a hold order, from date of knowledge thereof. " SECTION 6. Procedure for review of writ or order. After due hearing or motu propio for good cause shown, the Commission may lift the writ or order unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may deem necessary, taking into consideration the evidence and the circumstances of the case ... And yet, the PCGG has not given petitioners any opportunity to contest the Hold-Orders issued against them. After their issuance, no hearing had been set; a request for the same had been disregarded. Petitioners' Motion to Lift the Hold-Orders was summarily denied. The "issues" spelled out against petitioners have remained unresolved over a period of nine (9) months. The PCGG must thus be faulted for a disregard of the requirements of "fairness and due process" expressly mandated by Executive Order No. 14, reading: WHEREAS, the overriding considerations of national interest and national survival require that the Presidential Commission on Good Government achieve its vital task efficiently and effectively, with due regard to the requirements of fairness and due process (5th Whereas clause), Under the environmental circumstances of the case, the Hold-Orders against petitioners preventing them "from leaving the country cannot be prolonged indefinitely." The right to travel and to freedom of movement is a fundamental right guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution 5 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the Philippines is a signatory. 6 That right extends to all residents regardless of nationality. And "everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law. 7 While such right is not absolute but must yield to the State's inherent police power upon which the Hold-Orders were premised, no "good reasons" have been advanced which could justify the continued enforcement of the Hold-Orders. Petitioners are foreign nationals. Their 33% interest in the sequestered firms is recognized by the PCGG itself. There is no showing that those interests appear prima facie to be ill-gotten wealth. No charges have been filed against them before the Sandiganbayan. They face no criminal indictment nor have they been provisionally released on bail that their right to travel might be restricted. Although, as averred by respondents, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other, "yet it is not accurate to say that the writ will never issue to control his discretion. There is an exception to the rule if the case is otherwise proper, as in cases of gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. 8 In this case, for reasons already stated, we find that the PCGG acted with gross abuse of discretion in maintaining the Hold-Orders against petitioners for an indefinite length of time. By so doing it has arbitrarily excluded petitioners from the enjoyment of a fundamental right the right to freedom of movement to which they are entitled. 9 mandamus lies.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of the early and full restoration of petitioners' right to travel, the Court hereby LIFTS the Hold-Orders issued by respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government against petitioners, effective immediately, upon the condition that they shall hold themselves available if and whenever needed by said Commission in the performance of its task. SO ORDERED. PASEI vs Drilon (1988) Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers. Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1. Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that: 1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions 2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law 3. They are not confined to existing conditions 4. They apply equally to al members of the same class In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions. Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of public safety as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers. MANOTOC v. CA Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc. (stock brokerage house). He was in US for a certain time, went home to file a petition with SEC for appointment of a management committee for both businesses. Such was granted. However, pending disposition of a case filed with SEC, the latter

requested the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear him for departure. Consequently, a memorandum to this effect was issued. There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc which was suspected to be fake. 6 of its clients filed separate criminal complaints against the petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP respectively. He was charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail. Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to leave the country stating his desire to go to US relative to his business transactions and opportunities. Such was opposed by the prosecution and was also denied by the judges. He filed petition for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the SEC communication request denying his leave to travel abroad. According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts that granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel. ISSUE: WON petitioners constitutional right to travel was violated. HELD: NO. The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail from leaving the country because this is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his constitutional right to travel. In case he will be allowed to leave the country without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of courts. Furthermore, petitioner failed to satisfy trial court and CA of the urgency of his travel, duration thereof, as well as consent of his surety to the proposed travel. He was not able to show the necessity of his travel abroad. He never indicated that no other person in his behalf could undertake such business transaction. Article 3 Sec6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. According to SC, the order of trial court in releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the provision on right to travel. VELMONTE VS BALMONTE 170 SCRA 256 Facts: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic)of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts." On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of

the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information. Issue: Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties. Held: The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46of PD 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977),provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (CA 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the Systems [Second Whereas Clause, PD1146.] Consequently, as Feliciano Belmonte himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were above board. In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. Still, Belmonte maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information. Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the present petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. Right to Information, access to public documents CHAVEZ vs PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT Facts: -Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former government official) initiated this original action seeking(1) to prohibit and enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E.Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad including the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; and(2) to compel respondent[s] to make public all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."-Chavez is the same person initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy; he says that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports 2 bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.-PETITIONER DEMANDS that respondents make

public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have aright to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that they do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.-PETITIONER INVOKES Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. ESPONDENT ANSWERS that the above constitutional provisions refer to completed and operative official acts, not to those still being considered. Issue: Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses. Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and all government functionaries and officials who are or may be directly ot indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision. No pronouncement as to cost. RD: The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of the Constitution have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged. However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and intelligence information- there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. 24 But where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to withhold documents and other information, 25 provided that they are examined "in strict confidence" and given "scrupulous protection." (2) trade secrets and banking transactions-trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code 27 and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 28)are also exempted from compulsory disclosure (3) criminal matters- Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts neither may nor inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police information regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert criminal activities. (4) other confidential information.

- The Ethical Standards Act 31 further prohibits public officials and employees from using or divulging "confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public." Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. -In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., the Court emphasized that the information sought must be "matters of public concern," access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of full public disclosure extends only to "transactions involving public interest" and may also be "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law." - As to the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern," the Court, in Legaspi v.Civil Service Commission, elucidated: In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. -As to whether or not the above cited constitutional provisions guarantee access to information regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement, this same clarification was sought and clearly addressed by the constitutional commissioners during their deliberations, MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself? MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here, I suppose, is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction? MR. OPLE. Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards on the national interest. - Considering the intent of the Constitution, the Court believes that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed above such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.