A short introduction to formal logic

Dan Hicks v0.3.2, July 20, 2012

Thanks to Tim Pawl and my Fall 2011 Intro to Philosophy students for feedback on earlier versions. My approach to teaching logic has beneted a great deal from numerous exchanges with John Milanese.

3 Working with arguments in the wild 3.1 Formulating an argument . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Reconstructing (and evaluating) an argument 3.3 Enthymemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Improving arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Additional resources Note for instructors Fig. 1: Categorical syllogisms Fig. 2: Other argument patterns

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1 Contents
1 The 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 idea of logic Arguments and argument patterns Truth, validity, and soundness . . . Deductive validity . . . . . . . . . . Testing validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 4 8 9 11 12 15 17 18 20 23 27 1

The idea of logic

2 Some common argument patterns 2.1 Conditionals . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Other sentence logic arguments . 2.4 Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Practical reasoning . . . . . . . . 2.6 Conversational logic . . . . . . . . 2.7 Modal logics . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Logic is the branch of philosophy that deals with arguments. We often think of arguments in connection with disagreements, debates, and even shouting. Call this way of thinking about arguments argument as disagreement. For example, we might talk about the argument (meaning the disagreement) between Republicans and Democrats over taxes and the budget. But theres another way of thinking about arguments. This is less common than argument as disagreement, but its still common. For example, suppose the Republicans say that we should balance the budget because it would help the economy. Here we would say that the Republicans are giving an argument to support their position on the budget. Call this way of thinking about arguments argument as reason. An argument, on this way of thinking, is a reason why someone does (or should) believe something : the Republicans, in giving their argument, are giving reasons why you (or

whoever theyre talking to) should believe that we should balance the budget. It may seem to you that philosophy is mostly about argument as disagreement. Youre probably not wrong to think this. But logic deals only with argument as reason. Logicians philosophers who study logic are interested in the connection between reasons and the claims they support. Throughout this pamphlet, were going to be concerned entirely with arguments as reasons (even when those reasons show up in the context of a disagreement). Our goal will be to equip you with some basic concepts a logical toolkit for use in your philosophy class.

simple examples like this are easier to follow. Youll encounter many arguments with more interesting conclusions in your philosophy class.) Lines (1) and (2) of this argument are its premises. The premises are the reasons given to support the conclusion: if you believe that all humans are mortal and that Socrates is a human, then you have reason to believe that Socrates is mortal. Both premises and conclusions are steps of the argument. Premise (1) is the rst step; the last step, (3), is the conclusion. This is a good time to mention two basic rules for writing arguments in premise-conclusion form. First, every step is a declarative sentence. You can think of a declarative sentence as a sentence that can be true or false. Here are some things that arent declarative sentences, and so cant be steps of an argument: Is a human. This one isnt grammatically a sentence it doesnt have a subject. Make tacos! This one is a sentence, but its an imperative sentence a command. Theres a special logic for imperative sentences, but its not one well discuss in this pamphlet. Is it raining? Another sentence, but this one is a question. I like corn. This one is actually tricky. It can be read as a declarative sentence: a report (true or false) of how I feel about corn. But it can also be read as an optative, which is an expression of a wish, desire, or preference. On this reading, this sentence is like saying Hooray for corn! which cant be true or false. 2

1.1

Arguments and argument patterns

Its not the case that all logic textbooks are obligated to discuss this argument. But its such a standard example that I cant help but start with it. (1) All humans are mortal. (2) Socrates is a human. (3) Socrates is mortal. (1,2) (Socrates was a philosopher in ancient Athens, and is often considered the father of Western philosophy. He famously died by drinking poison.) This argument is in premise-conclusion form. In premise-conclusion form, each distinct claim of the argument is written on its own line, and the lines are numbered to make them easy to refer to. Line (3) is called the conclusion of the argument. (See what I did there, with the line number?) The conclusion is the claim that the argument is meant to support. If I were giving you this argument, I would be trying to convince you that Socrates is mortal. (Its not a very interesting or surprising conclusion. But

Our second rule is that premises come rst, conclusions come last. This rule is just about order: the conclusion of the argument should be the very last step, and the rst step (at least) should be a premise. (There are some exceptions, but we wont cover them here). Besides the steps and their numbers, the example up above had some other useful symbols. (3) started o with this symbol: This symbol is read hence or therefore, and it signals a conclusion. We know that (3) is the conclusion because of the symbol. This might seem obvious now its the last step, so of course its the conclusion. But well see more complicated arguments below, and will be very important. (If you cant gure out how to make on your computer, just start the conclusion with the word hence instead.) There were also the numbers in parentheses after (3): (1,2). These numbers indicate logical support. They tell us that step (3) is supported by steps (1) and (2), taken together. Again, this is obvious in this simple example so I wont be using them regularly in this pamphlet but itll be very useful when we get to more complicated arguments. For now, compare the earlier argument with this one: (4) All cats are mammals. (5) Whiskers is a cat. (6) Whiskers is a mammal. The two arguments look quite similar. We could even borrow from algebra and replace the nouns and names with letters: (7) All As are B s. (8) x is a A. (9) x is a B . 3

And we could go the other direction, replacing the generic letters with nouns and names. (Actually, thats how I thought up the example about Whiskers.) When we have two arguments that are similar in this way, we say that they have the same logical form or pattern. Heres another pair of examples in English, along with the generic-letter version: (10) If Obama is President then Biden is VP. (11) Obama is President. (12) Biden is VP. (10 ) If its raining then the sidewalks will be slippery. (11 ) Its raining. (12 ) The sidewalks will be slippery.

(10 ) If p then q . (11 ) p (12 ) q (The is a prime, so for example (10 ) is ten-prime and (11 ) is eleven double-prime.) These arguments all have the same pattern, though of course its dierent from the pattern we saw with Socrates and Whiskers. The next thing to notice is that, in arguments with the same pattern, the premises are related to the conclusion in the same way. The premises (10) and (11), taken together, support (12) in the same way that (10 ) and (11 ), taken together, support (12 ). And that, in turn, means that we can ask and answer some interesting questions about an argument even if all we know is the logical form. By studying the generic version of the argument (10 12 ), and without even thinking about President Obama are whether the sidewalks really are slippery, we can learn something about how the premises, in each case, support the conclusion. And we

can go on to apply that to other arguments with the same pattern, whether theyre about President Obama or the planet Mars or whatever. The move from English-language arguments (or, more generally, arguments in natural languages) to their patterns is like the move from drawing shapes on a piece of paper to studying geometry. Indeed, the study of argument-patterns goes by two names: formal logic because it studies logical form and mathematical logic because its studied mathematically. If youre reading this pamphlet for a logic class, youll go on to learn some of that mathematics. (If youre math-phobic, dont worry: you can be excellent at logic without knowing anything at all about algebra or calculus or any of that.) But, if youre not, you can still use the tools we develop here to analyze arguments. In fact, thats why I wrote this: so students who havent learned any mathematical logic at all can still use it. So far, weve only seen arguments with a single conclusion. These arguments are called simple arguments. We can build compound arguments by putting together simple arguments. Heres an example: (13) Either Obama is President or McCain is President. (14) McCain isnt President. (15) Obama is President. (13, 14) (16) If Obama is President then Biden is VP. (17) Biden is VP. (15, 16) In compound arguments, just like simple arguments, we arrange the premises rst and the conclusion last. But, unlike simple arguments, compound arguments will have steps in the middle, that are neither independent premises nor the nal conclusion. In this 4

example, (15) isnt an independent premise it follows from (13) and (14) but its also just a step on the way to (5). These intermediate steps are called subconclusions. Like conclusions, we mark subconclusions with and numbers indicating logical support. Notice that, after (17), we list only (15) and (16). This is because these only two steps, all by themselves, give support directly to the conclusion. The other steps (13) and (14) support the conclusion indirectly, by directly supporting (15).

1.2

Truth, validity, and soundness

So far, weve developed some important concepts to understand the anatomy of an argument: its premises, conclusions, and pattern. Next, we want to evaluate arguments: do the premises, taken together, give us a reason to believe the conclusion? The most familiar concept here is truth: we say that its true that Obama is President, that its false that its raining, and so on. Dening truth is a huge philosophical problem; many philosophers think of truth as something like correspondence to reality, but there are plenty of philosophers who think this denition wont do. Ill assume that truth is something like correspondence. Notice that, with this conception of truth, truth isnt the same as belief and opinion. Contrast these three sentences: Juanita believes that humans are responsible for global warming. Juan believes that humans arent responsible for global warming. Humans are responsible for global warming. The rst two sentences are about what people believe. These sen-

tences are true if, and only if, these people actually believe these things. (If, and only if, the sentences reporting their beliefs correspond to what they believe.) The third sentence has nothing to do with what anyone believes. Its true if, and only if, humans actually are responsible for global warming. (If, and only if, the sentence blaming humans corresponds to the eects of our actions.) That means whether the third sentence is true has nothing to do with whether people agree on it: Juanitas belief doesnt make the third sentence true, and Juans belief doesnt make the third sentence false. Their disagreement might make it hard for us to tell whether or not the third sentence is true, but thats a matter of our knowledge of the world, not the way the world is. Disagreement, by itself, doesnt make anyones beliefs false. The last paragraph shouldnt seem outrageous or surprising. But now Im going to make a very controversial move. Contrast these three sentences: Juanita believes that we shouldnt eat meat. Juan believes that we should eat meat. We should eat meat. Notice, rst, that the relationship between these three sentences is the same as the relationship between the last three sentences: the rst is about what Juanita believes, the second is about what Juan believes, and the third doesnt seem to have anything to do with what anyone believes. The controversial move is to assume that the third really doesnt have anything to do with what anyone believes. Like the claim that humans are responsible for global warming, we should eat meat is true if, and only if, it corresponds to the way the world actually is. This probably strikes you as much more surprising and outrageous than the global warming stu. Youve probably been taught 5

that theres a dierence between fact and opinion, and youve used this distinction to say things like theres a fact about whether humans are responsible for global warming and whether we should eat meat is a matter of individual opinion. But we often act as though there are some facts about what everyone should do: not commit murder or rape; not be racist or sexist; pay taxes; protect small children. We believe that its true that you should pay your taxes, regardless of what anyone thinks; similarly, we believe that someone who believes that murder is acceptable is wrong, and has a false belief. Philosophers call the facts corresponding to claims about what we should do (if there are any such facts) moral facts or moral truths. And philosophers disagree about whether there are moral facts. Im going to assume that there are moral facts, but only because they make thinking about the logic of what we should do easier. If its simply true or false that we should eat meat, its easier to think about the logic of arguments for and against eating meat. Arguments cannot be true or false. The individual steps of an argument can be true or false, and usually the person giving an argument would like the conclusion to be true, but the argument itself is neither true nor false. Only declarative sentences can be true or false. Instead of talking about the truth of arguments, we talk about their validity. The two ideas come together in the idea of soundness; these are illustrated in the diagram below. truth of individual sentences validity of whole argument

soundness of whole argument

All of the arguments weve seen so far have been valid. An ar-

gument thats not valid is called invalid. Heres an example of an invalid argument: (1) All cats are mammals. (2) Whiskers is a mammal. (3) Whiskers is a cat. (Since weve started a new subsection, and so that the numbers dont get too big, Ive started over the numbering of the steps.) Validity is the core concept of logic: everything we do as logicians is about trying to determine whether arguments are valid. Just like arguments cannot be true or false, conclusions cannot be valid or invalid. That goes for any sentence, but students are often tempted to say that about conclusions when they really mean the whole argument is valid or invalid. Unlike truth, philosophers all basically agree on the ocial denition of validity. The problem is that this denition is complicated.1 Heres a simpler denition: validity An argument is valid if, and only if, its premises give good reason to believe the conclusion. This denition is useful for some cases, but doesnt work with others. It works with (1-3): Even if Whiskers is a mammal and all cats are mammals, Whiskers might be some other kind of mammal, like a dog or an aardvark. Since the premises dont rule out this possibility, they dont give us good reason to believe the conclusion. So (1-3) is invalid. Next, consider these two arguments:
1

(4) If Obama is President then Biden is VP. (5) Obama is President. (6) Biden is VP.

(7) If McCain is President then Palin is VP. (8) McCain is President. (9) Palin is VP.

It should seem reasonable to think that (4-6) is valid: these premises do indeed give good reason to believe this conclusion. What about (7-9)? This argument has a false premise, (8). You might think that a false premise doesnt give good reason to believe the conclusion; so this argument would be invalid. But someone else might say that a premise if you accept it for the sake of argument or suppose that it were true can give good reason to believe the conclusion, whether its true or false. If someone really, sincerely believes that McCain is President, then that person has good reason to believe that Palin is VP. Theyre out of touch with reality, but theyre not reasoning incorrectly. Things get even more dicult when we move to formal logic dealing just with patterns, not particular arguments. In formal logic, we dont know whether the premises are true or false. All we have to work with are the generic versions: (10) if p then q (11) p (12) q If were going to say anything at all about validity in formal logic, it will have to be independent of the truth of the premises. It will have to depend only on the pattern itself. And it turns out that, for many arguments, their validity does depend only on the pattern itself:

How complicated? Just learning basic tests of validity for the simplest kinds of logic requires an entire semester-long course. Some mathematicians and philosophers devote their entire careers to studying logic. 6

formal validity property A pattern has the formal validity property (FVP) if, and only if, every argument with that pattern has the same validity. The FVP isnt based on the denition of validity up above. Its based on the much more complicated, actual denition of validity. Fortunately, you dont need to know this denition to use the FVP. The pattern (10-12) has the FVP: every argument with this pattern has the same validity. Now, (4-6) has this pattern, and its valid. So every argument with this pattern is also valid. In particular, (7-9) is valid. Heres the pattern for (1-3): (13) All F s are Gs. (14) x is a G. (15) x is a F . x is a variable for an individual (like Whiskers); F and G are classes or sets of individuals. This argument has the FVP. (1-3) has this pattern and is invalid. So this argument, which has the same pattern, is also invalid: (16) All ethicists are philosophers. (17) Peter Singer is a philosopher. (18) Peter Singer is an ethicist. (Peter Singer is an ethicist who has written several famous papers and books on poverty, vegetarianism, and medical ethics.) The examples of Whiskers (1-3) and Singer (16-18) illustrate how validity isnt a matter of the premises being true. Every step in each of these arguments is true. The problem is that the (true) premises dont support the (true) conclusion. For arguments with 7

a FVP pattern, the question of validity is settled purely by the logical relationship between its premises and its conclusion. It has nothing to do with whether any of the steps are true or false or even whether we have any idea what theyre talking about. Both of these arguments, because they have the same pattern as (10-12), are valid: (19) If McCain is President than Obama is VP. (20) McCain is President. (21) Obama is VP. (22) If bandersnatches are frumious then mome-raths outgrabe. (23) Bandersnatches are frumious. (24) Mome-raths outgrabe.

(The nonsense words in (22-24) come from a famous poem, Jabberwocky, by Lewis Carroll, who wrote Alice in Wonderland and was also a logician.) Truth (of the steps) and validity (of the argument as a whole) are independent. Weve seen examples of an invalid argument with all true steps, and examples of a valid argument with all false steps. (This would be a good time to stop and review. Go back and nd these examples, and explain to yourself why theyre valid or invalid.) My students usually start talking about ow or the argument hanging together and making sense at this point. I think all of this language is trying to say that validity depends on the relation between the steps of the argument, not features of the steps taken individually. In other words, when were trying to decide whether or not an argument is valid, we dont look at the individual steps. Instead, we look at the argument as a whole. The denition we started with suggests that, but it could

be more explicit. If we have the FVP and plenty of examples of valid and invalid patterns, we have that explicitness. Not all patterns have FVP. Here are some examples of an important exception: (25) Michelle Obama is the First Lady. (26) The First Lady lives in the White House. (28) The robber is the guards daughter. (29) The guard believes his daughter was at home during the robbery. (30) The guard believes the robber was at home during the robbery.

its more accurate to think of them as fragile. A questionable argument can be a very good argument its premises can provide very good reason to believe the conclusion. (As in (25-27).) But its easy to mistake a very good questionable argument for a very bad questionable argument. So we have to be careful with questionable arguments, and think carefully about whether the premises support the conclusion on a case-by-case basis. Distinguishing patterns with and without FVP is dicult. And, for ones with FVP, its often dicult to tell whether each is valid or invalid. You wont be expected to do any of that in this pamphlet. Instead, when we get to the list of common patterns (2), Ill tell you whether theyre valid, questionable, or invalid. Most of the argument patterns well meet have FVP. That means well be able to say, precisely and for all cases, whether theyre valid or invalid. Still, some common patterns are questionable, so its important to keep the distinction in mind. We bring the concepts of truth and validity back together with the concept of soundness. soundness An argument is sound if, and only if, it is valid and all of its premises are true. By contrast, an argument is unsound if either it is invalid or at least one of its premises is false. Arguments (1-3) and (16-18) are unsound because they are invalid. While arguments (4-6), (7-9), and (19-21) are all valid, only (4-6) is sound; the others are unsound because they have false premises.

(27) Michelle Obama lives in the White House.

(25-27) is valid, but (28-30) is not. In many cases, when we have two labels for the same thing, we can replace one label with the other and get a valid argument. However, in some cases especially dealing with what people believe this doesnt work. Suppose the guard doesnt know that his daughter is the robber the guard doesnt know (28). He believes that his daughter and the robber are completely dierent people. He also believes (falsely) that his daughter was at home during the robbery. Then (29) is true its a true report of what the guard believes. (Note the dierence between the guards belief and the sentence reporting the belief. The rst is false and the second is true!) And (30) is false: the guard doesnt believe the robber was at home; he believes the robber was out committing the robbery! So we cant swap one label (the guards daughter) for the other (the robber) in this case. Patterns without FVP are called questionable. They live between valid and invalid. Questionable arguments arent awed; 8

1.3

Deductive validity

Philosophers often like to work with a version of validity thats much stronger than the way Ive dened it here, which is called

deductive validity: deductive validity An argument is deductively valid if, and only if, it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. Consider these two arguments:

1.4

Testing validity

(1) Dan is a reliable authority on logic. (2) Dan says that all sound arguments are valid. (3) All sound arguments are valid.

(4) All sound arguments have true premises. (5) This argument is sound.

Logic, as such, is only concerned with validity. The question of whether a given premise is actually true is usually turned over to someone else, or at least to a dierent branch of knowledge. For most of the arguments in the last subsection, a logician can tell us which ones are valid and which ones are invalid, but well have to ask someone who knows something about politics to determine whether the premises of these arguments are true. In other words, logic only gives us tools for testing the validity of arguments. If you take a formal logic class, youll learn some sophisticated tools for testing arguments. However, like with math, it takes quite a bit of explanation and practice to understand just how and why these tools work. We wont go into that detail here. So, instead of explaining all the nuts and bolts to you, Im going to introduce you to a couple of simple tests that come out of the more sophisticated tools. This is like using a graphing calculator to graph the function y = 2x + 4. The inner workings of the calculator are much, much more complicated than this simple function. But you dont have to understand why the calculator does what it does in order to use it; you just have to know how to tell the calculator to graph the function.

(6) This argument has true premises.

Both arguments are valid (and sound). But (4-6) guarantees its conclusion in a way that (1-3) doesnt. The fact that Im a reliable authority on logic doesnt make it impossible for me to get things wrong sometimes. So theres a chance that (3) is false even when (1) and (2) are true. On the other hand, given (4) and (5), its completely impossible for (6) to be false. These premises, together, guarantee that the conclusion is true. If you go on to study formal logic, youll probably focus on deductive validity. But often deductive validity is too demanding for practical purposes. We dont usually need absolute guarantees for the conclusions of our arguments; we just need good, even if imperfect, reasons. Since this pamphlet is all about practical formal logic, Im not going to say much about deductive validity. 9

1.4.1

The pattern test

Our rst test is called the pattern test. Weve already used the pattern test in the last subsection, when we compared an argument to a known pattern to determine whether it was valid. Heres an example with a pattern we havent seen before:

(1) Either McCain is President or Obama is President. (2) McCain isnt President. (3) Obama is President.

(4) either p or q

F: Republicans G: people who believe that humans are responsible for global warming H: people who think we should reduce our CO2 admissions

(5) not-p (6) q

This pattern is valid, and so (7-9) is valid. Heres one more example, this time with an invalid argument: (13) If Obama is President than Biden is VP. (14) If Obama isnt President then Biden isnt VP. (15) if p then q (16) if not-p then not-q

This pattern has the formal validity property, so every argument with it has the same validity. And, in particular, every argument with this pattern is valid. So (1-3) is valid. To use the pattern test, rst make sure the argument is in premise-conclusion form. Second, compare it to some known patterns. Finally, third, read the validity of the argument o the pattern. Lets look at another example: (7) Some Republicans believe that humans are responsible for global warming. (8) Everyone who believes that humans are responsible for global warming thinks we should reduce our CO2 admissions. (9) Some Republicans think we should reduce our CO2 admissions. This argument has this pattern, though it might not be obvious at rst: (10) Some F s are Gs. (11) All Gs are H s. (12) Some F s are H s. F , G, and H all stand for sets of things. Here are their values for (7-9): 10

And this pattern is invalid. So (13-14) is invalid. The pattern test has an important advantage and an important disadvantage, and these are closely related. The advantage of the pattern test is that you dont have to think about why an argument is valid or invalid; you just have to be able to check it against a list of examples. The disadvantage is that using the pattern test doesnt do much to help you understand why some arguments are valid and some are invalid; youre just matching up patterns. Maybe its clear to you why (1-3) and (7-9) are valid, and (13-15) isnt. But, if its not clear to you, the pattern test isnt liable to seem arbitrary. So, if you use the pattern test a lot, its helpful to occasionally use the other test. 1.4.2 The counterexample test

The second test is the counterexample test. To use this test, rst make sure the argument is in premise-conclusion form. Second, try to imagine a situation in which the premises are all true and the conclusion is false. Then, third, if you can imagine such a

situation, the argument invalid. Or, fourth, if you cant imagine such a situation, the argument is valid. A situation real or ctional in which the premises of an argument are true and the conclusion is false is called a counterexample hence the name of the test. Counterexamples are especially useful for understanding why questionable and invalid arguments are question or invalid. Consider our most recent example: (13) If Obama is President then Biden is VP. (14) If Obama isnt President then Biden isnt VP. In the rst few decades of the US, the VP wasnt picked by the Presidential candidate before the election as part of the ticket; instead, he or she was the person who got second in the election. Suppose we still had this system. Since the election was very controversial, we might also suppose that there were two possible outcomes: McCain wins, and Obama only gets a small share of the vote; or Obama wins, and McCain only gets a small share of the vote. In either case, Biden, who was a much less controversial politician, would have gotten second. Then, in this situation, (13) is true: If Obama is President then Biden (who got second, after Obama) would be VP. But (14) is false: If Obama wasnt President then Biden (who got second, after McCain) would be VP. Just in case that was too complicated, heres a simpler argument with the same pattern: (15) If the window is hit by a baseball then itll break. (16) If the window isnt hit by a baseball then it wont break. There are lots of dierent ways to break a window; hitting it with a baseball is just one. For example, if its hit with a rock, itll break. So (19) is true but (20) is false, and the argument is invalid. 11

We saw another use of the counterexample test in the last subsection. This was (28-30): (17) The robber is the guards daughter. (18) The guard believes his daughter was at home during the robbery. (19) The guard believes the robber was at home during the robbery. Suppose the guard doesnt know that his daughter is the robber the guard doesnt know (21). He believes that his daughter and the robber are completely dierent people. He also believes (falsely) that his daughter was at home during the robbery. Then (22) is true its a true report of what the guard believes. And (23) is false: the guard doesnt believe the robber was at home; he believes the robber was out committing the robbery! Here we have a counterexample: a situation in which the premises are true and the conclusion is false. So this argument is invalid. Unlike the pattern test, the counterexample test can help you understand why an argument is valid or invalid. It can also help you identify logical gaps in an argument premises that the author has assumed, or that can be added to make the argument valid. For example, you might repair argument (17-18) by adding a premise in this way: (20) If Obama is President then Biden is VP. (21) If Biden is VP then Obama is President. (22) If Obama isnt President then Biden isnt VP. Another advantage of the counterexample test is that you can use it when you cant identify the pattern of the argument. Even if you didnt realize that (7-9) could be rewritten in line with the pattern (10-12), you could still use the counterexample test to con-

rm that its valid. Similarly, if you encounter an argument with very complex premises, the counterexample test might be easier to use than the pattern test. The counterexample test has a couple of important weakness, and they both come from the way the test relies on your imagination. First, even if you cant think of a counterexample, this might be due to a lack of creativity rather than the validity of the argument. If you didnt know about the way we used to elect the VP, for example, you might not think of the counterexample to argument (17-18). Second, philosophers often disagree about the outcome of thought experiments. A situation that you think is quite plausible and shows that the argument is invalid might strike someone else as completely implausible and so show nothing at all about the validity of the argument.

nens, and so its valid. All of these arguments are listed, in brief, in gs. 1 and 2.

2.1

Conditionals

One of the most frequently used patterns is modus ponens. (The Latin name means the method of armation.) (1) if p then q (2) p (3) q Weve seen several examples of modus ponens already. Modus ponens is valid. Premise (1) is also an example of a conditional statement a statement that says one thing (p, called the antecedent) is a condition for another thing (q , called the consequent). (1) says that, if the antecedent is true, then the consequent is also true. (2) says that the antecedent is true. And so (3) says that the consequent is true. Another pattern that uses a conditional premise is modus tollens (the method of denial): (4) if p then q (5) not-q (6) not-p Modus tollens is like modus ponens in reverse: (1) and (4) are the same, but (5) says that the consequent is not true. So, in (6), the antecedent cannot be true either. Modus tollens is also valid. In formal logic, its very important to make all of the connections between our ideas explicit. Consider this argument: 12

Some common argument patterns

To use the pattern test, we need a stockpile of patterns, both valid and invalid. This section gives you exactly that. The eld of biology can be subdivided based on the kinds of organisms that are studied: microbiology (which studies bacteria and other microscopic organisms), botany (which studies plants), and zoology (which studies animals), for example. Similarly, the eld of logic can be subdivided based on the kinds of arguments that are studied. There are two common ways to make these divisions: by the strength of the arguments and by the logical concepts that the argument involves. Im going to take the second approach, since this will make it easier for you to nd the pattern for an argument youre analyzing. But Ill also tell you how strong each argument is along the way. Example: your argument involves a conditional, so take a look at 2.1; you see that its an instance of modus po-

(7) Obama received the most votes in the last Presidential election. (8) Obama is President. This argument assumes that the reader understands the relationship between getting the most votes and being President. But, when we analyze the logical form, that relationship cant be assumed: (7 ) o is R (8 ) o is P This argument, as it stands, is invalid. To x it, we need to bridge the logical gap between R (the person who received the most votes) and P (the President). But thats easy to do, using a conditional and modus ponens : (7 ) o is R (8 ) if o is R then o is P (9 ) o is P The added premise, in English, says that if Obama received the most votes then he is President. The conditional connects the premise we already had to the conclusion, makes the argument an instance of modus ponens, and so makes the argument formally valid. When you are reconstructing English arguments in premiseconclusion form, this is an extremely useful technique. Some conditionals in English are stronger than others. Compare these three: If Maria throws a rock at the window then it will break. If Obama gets the most votes in 2012 then hell be re-elected. If this number is an even prime then it is the number 2. 13

The rst conditional is rather weak: if Maria throws a rock at the window but its just a pebble, or Jorge catches it, or something else gets in the way, then the window wont break after all. The second conditional is stronger, but there are still ways in which Obama can lose the election even if he gets the most votes. (In 2000, Al Gore got the most votes nationally, but didnt win the election because of the way the electoral college works. This outcome has only happened a few times.) And the third conditional is the strongest you can get: its mathematically impossible for any even number besides 2 to be prime. The validity of arguments with conditionals depends on the strength of the conditionals. This instance of modus ponens is valid, but not deductively valid, because of its weak conditional: (10) If Maria throws a rock at the window then (in most cases) it will break. (11) Maria will throw a rock at the window. (12) The window will break. By contrast, this instance of modus tollens is deductively valid, because of its strong conditional: (13) If Whiskers is a cat then (by denition) she is a mammal. (14) Whiskers is not a mammal. (15) Whiskers is not a cat. In (10), its possible for the antecedent to be true and the consequent to be false. So its possible for the premises (10, 11) to be true and the conclusion (12) false these premises dont guarantee the conclusion in the way deductive validity requires. In (13), its impossible for the antecedent to be true and the consequent to be false. So its impossible for the premises (13, 14) to be true and the conclusion (14) false these premises guarantee the conclusion.

Weak conditionals are often used to relate cause and eect: If Thao throws Juan a birthday party then Juan will be happy. If Juanita gives Jaime a ride home then Jaime wont have to walk. If Obama gets the most votes in 2012 then hell be re-elected. If I dont rell my gas tank then my car wont start. These causal conditionals are almost always weak: they describe one way in which the eect (consequent) could be caused, but not the only way. So causal arguments using modus ponens and modus tollens are almost always valid but not deductively valid. What about reasoning from eects to causes? Its tempting to make an argument like this: (16) If Thao throws Juan a birthday party then Juan will be happy. (17) Juan is happy. (18) Thao threw Juan a birthday party. This argument has this pattern, called arming the consequent: (19) if p then q (20) q (21) p (Notice that, compared to modus ponens, weve swapped the second premise and the conclusion.) (16) just tells us one way in which Juan could be made happy. Why think, in this particular 14

case, that Thao was responsible? (17) just tells us that the consequent of (16) is true; that doesnt tell us anything at all about the antecedent! This pattern is invalid. For similar reasons, denying the antecedent is also invalid: (22) if p then q (23) not-p (24) not-q And so is the fallacy of the single cause: (25) Making teachers accountable causes students to learn more. (26) Providing more funding for schools doesnt cause students to learn more. This version is a little easier to read than the more formal version: (27) If teachers are made more accountable then students will learn more. (28) Its not the case that if we provide more funding to schools then students will learn more. (29) if p then q

(30) not-(if r then q )

Here, the premise says that something (p) is the cause of some effect (q ). The conclusion says that something else (r) cannot be the cause of that same eect. This argument is invalid because there is usually more than one way to bring about some eect: we could probably get students to learn more by making teachers more accountable, providing more funding to schools, or both. The fallacy of the single cause often shows up in criticisms of other peoples arguments. Suppose Xi wrote a letter to the editor of a newspaper, arguing that, if we provide more funding to

schools, then students will learn more. Xin writes a response to the letter, attempting to criticize Xi: in fact, Xin says, if teachers are made more accountable then students will learn more. But Xins response doesnt actually criticize Xi. If both making teachers more accountable and providing more funding to schools would cause students to learn more, then both Xi and Xin are right. Xins response is only a criticism if we assume that theres one unique cause of student learning. But this response seems false. Xin has committed the fallacy of the single cause. We can x up some of these arguments by adding some additional information. Suppose we know that Thao is the only person liable to throw Juan a birthday party, and that Juan is liable to be unhappy on his birthday if he doesnt get a party. Then the fact that Juan is happy does give us reason to believe that Thao threw him a party. Heres how we can state this argument more formally and generally: (31) Thao throwing Juan a birthday party is the best available explanation of Juan being happy. (32) Juan is happy. (33) Thao threw Juan a birthday party. This pattern is called inference to the best explanation or abduction. (34) p is the best available explanation of q (35) q (36) p Abduction lets us infer from eects backwards from observed effects to unobserved causes. It is valid. When checking an abductive argument for soundness or trying to convince someone that your abductive argument is sound its best to test the pro15

posed explanation against some other possibilities. For instance, perhaps Maria threw Juan a party. But Thao is Juans best friend, and Maria doesnt even like Juan very much. So Thao throwing the party is a better explanation than Maria throwing the party. Comparing several rival explanations in this way amounts to checking to see how many dierent causes there are for the eect. The historian and philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn gave the following ve criteria for a good explanation: consistency: The explanation should be consistent with both itself and other accept ideas about cause and eect. simplicity: The explanation avoids unnecessary complications. accuracy: The explanation makes accurate predictions about observable events. fruitfulness: The explanation suggests possibilities for further exploration and development. scope: A general explanation can be applied to many dierent phenomena. For example, the theory of evolution by natural selection is a very good explanation by these criteria: it is consistent with other ideas about biology; it provides a simple mechanism for evolution over time, without assuming, for example, that evolution is directed towards some ultimate purpose; many of its predictions have turned out to be accurate; it has suggested many further lines of research; and it applies to many, many features of living organisms. Heres one more argument involving conditionals: (37) If Whiskers purrs then Whiskers is a cat. (38) If Whiskers is a cat then Whiskers has fur. (39) If Whiskers purrs then Whiskers has fur.

This argument doesnt say that Whiskers does purr, or does have fur, or is a cat. Instead, it links two conditionals together. Its called a hypothetical syllogism: (40) if p then q (41) if q then r (42) if p then r As with modus ponens, a hypothetical syllogism is valid.

cats

mammals

things with fur mammals cats

things with fur

(Venn diagrams were developed by the nineteenth-century British logician John Venn. Euler diagrams were developed by the eighteenth-century Swiss mathematician Leonhard Euler.) We also use categorical logic to talk about the individual members of categories: (4) All mammals have fur. (5) Mowser is a mammal. (6) Mowser has fur. When we symbolize these arguments, we use a lower-case letter for the individual: (4 ) all M is F

2.2

Categories

Categorical logic is the oldest kind of logic, going back to the Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle. It deals with the relationship between sets, classes, or categories of things. In this argument, the classes are cats, mammals, and things with fur: (1) All mammals have fur. (2) All cats are mammals. (3) All cats have fur. We symbolize this argument using letters for each of the categories: (1 ) all M is F (2 ) all C is M (3 ) all C is F Sometimes categorical logic is studied in high school and junior high school math classes, using Venn diagrams and Euler diagrams. Here are the Venn and Euler diagrams for the last argument: 16

(5 ) m is M (6 ) m is F When we evaluate validity, we can treat the lower-case letter as the name of a single-member class the class of all the things that are m. Until the late nineteenth century, much of the study of logic focused on categorical logic involving three classes. These arguments are called categorical syllogisms. Logicians developed terminology to precisely describe the patterns of categorical syllogisms and

determine whether they were valid and invalid. (These arguments, when valid, are all deductively valid, as in (1-3).) To help memorize the valid patterns, they gave them names. All 15 deductively valid categorical syllogisms are listed, with their names, in g. 1. However, categorical syllogisms have a number of limitations. For one thing, its often quite dicult to make these arguments sound, because they involve very strict relations among very broad categories. (2), for example, is false, because some mammals (like whales, dolphins, hippos, and shaved cats) dont have fur. For another, the terminology and rules dont work as soon as we add in a fourth class, as in this example: (7) All cats are either mammals or birds. (8) All mammals are warm-blooded. (9) All birds are warm-blooded. (10) All cats are warm-blooded. This argument is deductively valid, but the rules for categorical syllogisms cant tell us that. Driven by these limitations, in the nineteenth century logicians began to develop a much more powerful, exible, and interesting logical system called quantier logic or predicate logic. Quantier logic can do everything that categorical syllogisms can do, and much, much more. But this also means that quantier logic is much more complicated far too complicated for me to explain in this short introduction.

conditionals, we used variables p and q that stood in for sentences. And when we were discussing categorical logic, we used variables S , P , and M that stood in for categories of things. For example, we might ll in p with Whiskers is a cat and P with is a cat or the property of catness. The logic of arguments that use sentence variables is called sentence logic or propositional logic. In this subsection, well take a look at a few other common argument patterns from sentence logic. One fairly common pattern from sentence logic is disjunctive syllogism: (1) either p or q (4) Either Obama is President or McCain is President. (5) McCain isnt President. (6) Obama is President.

(2) not-p (3) q

(You can replace (2) with not-q to conclude p compare the pattern to the example below.) This pattern is deductively valid. A related pattern is called arming a disjunct:

(7) Either Ill have Mexican for dinner or Ill have sushi for dinner. (8) Ill have sushi for dinner. (9) I wont have Mexican for dinner.

(10) either p or q

(11) p (12) not-q

2.3

Other sentence logic arguments

Over the last two subsections, you may have noticed that we were using two dierent kinds of variables. When we were discussing 17

(Again, the order doesnt matter.) As with the conditional, there are several ways to understand the disjunction (either-or). English typically uses an exclusive disjunction: either p or q but not both. The example above makes the most sense with an exclusive

disjunction. Since p (having Mexican) excludes q (having sushi), if p is true then q must be false. With an exclusive disjunction, this pattern is deductively valid. But sometimes we use an inclusive disjunction: either p or q but maybe also both. We might have some of fusion Mexican sushi. Heres another example: (13) Either Ill study hard or Ill fail the test (and maybe also both, oh no!). (14) Ill study hard. (15) I wont fail the test. It would be nice if studying hard could guarantee passing, but unfortunately sometimes you end up with both. Since p (studying) doesnt exclude q (failing), we cant conclude that q is false just because p is true. With an inclusive disjunction, this pattern is invalid. So, in general, arming a disjunct is questionable: you need to gure out which kind of disjunction the author is using before you evaluate the argument. Our last pattern from sentence logic combines conditionals and disjunctions. (16) Whiskers is either a cat or a bird. (17) If Whiskers is a cat then Whiskers is warm-blooded. (18) If Whiskers is a bird then Whiskers is warm-blooded. (19) Whiskers is warm-blooded. This pattern is called dilemma or proof by cases. It is valid. As a proof by cases, this pattern is used to show that something is true whatever the case: were in case A or case B or . . . . And in each of these cases, p is true. So, whatever the case, p is true. The example above is a proof by cases. As a dilemma, this pattern 18

is often used to show that, whatever we do, something bad will happen, as in this example: (20) Either we balance the budget or we let the debt continue to grow. (21) If we balance the budget then we damage the economy. (22) If we let the debt continue to grow then we damage the economy. (23) We damage the economy (whatever we do). Heres the pattern for a dilemma: (24) either p or q (25) if p then r (26) if q then r (27) r

2.4

Induction

Induction is a mode of reasoning where we infer generalizations from particular cases. Arguments using induction are called inductive arguments. Often the particular cases are actual observations of some category of objects, and the generalization is meant to cover all objects of that type; this is called enumerative induction or simple induction. For example: (1) Robin #1 was observed eating worms. (2) Robin #2 was observed eating worms. (3) Robin #3 was observed eating worms. (4) All robins eat worms.

Heres how we can represent this type of argument formally: (5) x is F and G (6) y is F and G (7) z is F and G . . . (8) All F s are Gs. Here x, y, z represent individuals (the three individual robins) and F and G represent categories (robins and things that eat worms, respectively). The three dots . . . indicate that there is not a set number of premises for an inductive argument; we might observe 2 robins, or 15, or 15,000, before we draw the conclusion. There are also sentence versions of inductive arguments. Heres an example, and its pattern: (9) On May 1, the sun rose. (10) On May 2, the sun rose. (11) On May 3, the sun rose. (12) Every day, the sun will rise. (13) in case 1, p (14) in case 2, p (15) in case 3, p . . . (16) in all cases, p

(20) Every day, the sun will rise. (repeat of 12) (21) Tomorrow the sun will rise. (20) These sorts of arguments are also called inductive arguments. Enumerative induction is a really lousy way to infer a generalization. Compare these two examples: (22) On May 1, I was alive. (23) On May 2, I was alive. (24) On May 3, I was alive. (25) Every day, I will be alive. (22-25) (26) I am immortal. (restatement of 25) (27) Abraham Lincoln was human and mortal. (28) Ronald Reagan was human and mortal. (29) My grandmother was human and mortal. (30) All humans are mortal. (27-29) (31) I am mortal. (30)

The dierence between these examples isnt formal we could rewrite them so that the rst four steps have exactly the same pattern. So, by the FVP, either they are both valid or they are both invalid. But the rst one seems to be clearly invalid, and the second one seems to be clearly valid! (This problem was pointed out most famously by the 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume.) A much better approach is to generalize from a representative sample of the individuals were interested in. The problem with the above examples both the ones that look good and the ones that look bad is that we have no reason to think that the set of individuals we looked at resembles all of the individuals. For example, we have no reason to think that the rst three days of May are a good sample of every day throughout all time. We also dont have any reason to think that two Presidents and my 19

The generalizations produced by induction can be used to make inferences to further individuals or cases: (17) All robins eat worms. (repeat of 4) (18) This bird is a robin. (19) This bird eats worms. (17, 18)

grandmother are a good sample of all human beings. Designing a representative sample is extremely dicult pollsters and social scientists take whole classes where they learn how to design a sample and they are usually analyzed using statistical tools that are way beyond anything we want to talk about here. So lets ignore some of the details and consider this pattern: (32) Statistic s is true of the sample S . (33) Sample S is representative of population P . (34) Statistic s is approximately true of the entire population P. Statistic s can be all kinds of things: a report that x% like dogs more than cats, the average quantity of soda drunk last month, or something still more complicated. For example: (35) 72% of your classmates eat pizza at least twice a week. (36) Your classmates are representative of the entire student body. (37) About 72% of the student body eats pizza at least twice a week. As youll learn if you take statistics (and you really should take statistics), when we evaluate a generalization from a sample for validity, we need to take into account the margin of error were willing to tolerate and the sample size, or the number of individuals in the sample. (Surprisingly, the validity of this kind of generalization doesnt depend on the size of the population! A representative sample of 500 North Dakotans is just as good as a representative sample of 500 New Yorkers.) The margin of error describes how accurate we want statistic s to be about the population P . The wider the margin of error, the more condent we can be in the conclusion. If our margin of error for (37) is 25%, we can be almost certain of it, even if youre in a very small class. 20

On the other hand, if its 1%, we cant be very condent of the conclusion. Similarly, the more individuals in our sample, the more condent we can be; and the fewer individuals, the less condent.

2.5

Practical reasoning

All of the other examples discussed in this pamphlet concern theoretical reasoning: reasoning about what we (or you, or someone) should believe or whats true. Another type of reasoning is practical reasoning, reasoning about what you should we (or you, or someone) should do. (Some philosophers called pragmatists point out that believing is something we do, and so the two kinds of reasoning arent really all that distinct. But well keep the theoretical/practical distinction here.) Logicians, by and large, dont look too much at practical reasoning; this is usually the province of ethicists, philosophers who study ethics and morality. Indeed, ethics can be thought of as the study of practical reasoning: the study of the kinds of claims that give us reason to take one course of action rather than another. Since this isnt a short introduction to ethics, I wont say much about practical reasoning here. However, its good to know about some common practical arguments that dont involve controversies over ethics. Our rst argument is called instrumental reasoning or means-ends reasoning. Heres an example: (1) We should create more jobs. (2) If we increase federal spending then we will create more jobs. (3) We should increase federal spending. And heres the pattern:

(4) we should q (5) if we p then we will q (6) we should p Instrumental reasoning involves reasoning backwards, from something that we want to do (the end, q ) to a practical way to achieve it (the means, p). Instrumental reasoning is valid. But its not deductively valid, for two dierent reasons. First consider this example: (7) I should get a high grade on the test. (8) If I cheat, Ill get a high grade on the test. (9) I should cheat. In any situation where youre getting ready for a test, both premises are true. But of course the conclusion is false. At the very least, you shouldnt cheat because you dont want to violate the Honor Code: (10) I shouldnt violate the Honor Code. (11) If I dont cheat then I wont violate the Honor Code. (12) I shouldnt cheat. More generally, in practical reasoning there are two dierent kinds of shoulds or reasons for action. First there are pro tanto reasons. (9) is an example of a pro tanto reason or should: theres some reason in favor of cheating. But there are also all-thingsconsidered reasons. All things considered when I think about all the likely consequences and the kind of character I want to have I have better reasons not to cheat. When I consider all the various reasons I have to cheat or not, my pro tanto reasons for cheating are outweighed by the reasons against cheating. Unfortunately, theres no formal way to weigh all of the various reasons for and 21

against a given action; ethical theory provides some help here, but thats well beyond the scope of logic. The second reason that instrumental reasoning is not deductively valid is that there might be several dierent, incompatible means to reach our ends. Compare this argument with (1-3): (13) We should create more jobs. (14) If we cut corporate tax rates and reduce environmental regulations we will create more jobs. (15) We should cut corporate tax rates and reduce environmental regulations. This strategy for creating more jobs is incompatible with increasing federal spending. (There are several missing premises in that last sentence can you identify them?) So we cant do both of the things recommended by (3) and (15). Then it seems like (3) and (15) cant both be true. But presumably all of the premises of both arguments are true. So instrumental reasoning isnt deductively valid. A variation on instrumental reasoning is used to argue against doing something: (16) We shouldnt bankrupt the country. (17) If we increase federal spending then we will bankrupt the country. (18) We shouldnt increase federal spending. As in (1-3), we are starting with an end (in this case, an end we want to avoid) and arriving at a conclusion at a means (in this case, that we shouldnt do them). Heres the pattern: (19) we shouldnt q

(20) if we p then we will q (21) we shouldnt p This variation, like the original argument, is valid but not deductively valid, and for exactly the same reasons. Another way to argue against doing something is to point out that we cant do it: (22) Its impossible to completely eliminate poverty. (23) We shouldnt (try to) completely eliminate poverty. This kind of argument is called ought implies can. To understand the name, switch the premises around and negate them: (24) We should (ought to ) completely eliminate poverty. (25) We are able to (can ) completely eliminate poverty. This version is logically equivalent to the rst version, and its the version that was rst presented by the 18th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant. But its not the version we normally use in practical reasoning, so Im going to use this as the ocial pattern: (26) its impossible for us to p (27) we shouldnt (try to) p Ought implies can, when used in ordinary cases, is valid but not deductively valid. In ordinary language, impossible usually means very, very dicult or would require great sacrices. But sometimes the very, very dicult things are exactly the things that, all things considered, we should do. For example, it might be very, very dicult for you to give up fast food (maybe you just love Big Macs), but, all things considered (taking into account the health, economic, and environmental eects of fast food, and animal wel22

fare), you should probably do so. However, when philosophers talk about something being impossible, they mean absolutely and completely impossible. In this sense, its possible to do things that are very, very dicult its possible for you to give up fast food but not possible to do things like make 1+1=3. When we use impossible in this sense, ought implies can will be deductively valid. But we dont usually consider doing things that are impossible in this very strong sense. What things should (or shouldnt) I do, in the rst place? How do we get the rst premises for BPRI arguments? Again, thats a question for ethics rather than logic. Still, theres one important formal pattern that helps us answer this question. (28) We dont like p. (29) We should prevent (stop) p. For example, (30) We dont like that there are starving refugees in Darfur. (31) We should prevent refugees in Darfur from starving. This argument is called a practical appeal to emotion. The not liking in the premise can be replaced with pretty much any negative emotion: we hate p, p is painful, p is horrifying, were scared of p, p would make us feel humiliated, and so on. (We can also be replaced with anyone who can take action you, I, President Obama, and so on. And we can use positive emotions in place of negative emotions: the fact that everyone having adequate nutrition would make us happy gives us some reason to give everyone adequate nutrition.) In a practical appeal to emotion, our negative emotional reaction to something gives us reason prevent or stop or undo that something. Now, our emotions arent perfect guides to what we should and shouldnt do I may not like studying, but there are reasons (I should get a good grade) for

studying anyways. Again, the reasons provided by our emotions are only pro tanto reasons. So a practical appeal to emotion is valid but not deductively valid. Theres also the theoretical appeal to emotion. This argument concludes with a claim that we should believe, not an action we should take: (32) We dont like p. (33) not-p (34) I dont like that there are starving refugees in Darfur. (35) There are no starving refugees in Darfur.

Sometimes speakers will give arguments that have absolutely nothing to do with their conclusion. Heres one that was all too common before the 2008 election: (1) Obama is a Muslim. (2) Obama is a socialist. Of course, Obama isnt a Muslim. But, even if he was, this has absolutely nothing to do with whether hes a socialist. (And hes not a socialist, either.) Any argument whose premises have nothing to do with the conclusion is called an instance of the fallacy of irrelevance (fallacy is just a fancy logicians term for bad argument) and is, of course, invalid. A very subtle kind of fallacy of irrelevance is called an equivocation or ambiguity. Consider this argument: (3) Having just one cookie is better than nothing.

A theoretical appeal to emotion is invalid. The fact that we dislike something gives us reason to prevent that something, but its just wishful thinking to conclude that its not actually happening.

2.6

Conversational logic

(4) Nothing is better than God. (5) Having just one cookie is better than God. At rst glance, this argument seems valid. But nothing is being used in two dierent ways. In (3), its short for not having any cookies. But, in (4), it gives us another way of saying that God is better than everything else. Stating this argument more explicitly, we get this: (3 ) Having just one cookie is better than not having any cookies. (4 ) God is better than everything else. (5 ) Having just one cookie is better than God. Now its clear that this is invalid: the premises have pretty much nothing to do with each other, and give absolutely no reason to believe the conclusion. 23

Conversational logic also called dialectical logic, dialogical reasoning, logic of testimony, and (confusingly) informal logic deals with arguments that are given in the context of a disagreement, dispute, discussion, or other conversational exchange. At its most sophisticated, conversational logic deals with the reasons people give to each other, but also the dierent beliefs they have at the start of the conversation, the kinds of arguments they are liable to give and liable to nd convincing, the way beliefs change over the course of the conversation, and who gets to speak when and for how long. Our look at conversation wont be anywhere near that complicated well just stick to some common arguments that are evaluated by looking at their conversational context. Many of these arguments were rst discussed by logicians in the middle ages in Europe (between about 500 and 1300 CE).

Youve probably noticed that my language is very repetitious: I state things in exactly the same way, over and over again, especially in arguments. I also tend to write in relatively short, direct sentences. Philosophers do these things to avoid equivocation. Compare my style of writing with this passage: The elements of the moral argument on the status of unborn life . . . strongly favor the conclusion that this unborn segment of humanity has a right not to be killed, at least. Without laying out all the evidence here, it is fair to conclude from medicine that the humanity of the life growing in a mothers womb is undeniable and, in itself, a powerful reason for treating the unborn with respect.2 If we tried to reconstruct this argument as literally as possible, we get something like this sequence of steps: (6) The humanity of the life growing in a mothers womb is undeniable. (7) We should treat the unborn with respect. (8) This unborn segment of humanity has a right not to be killed. Because dierent terms are used in each step, its hard to see just how they t together: there isnt an explicit pattern here, and its not even clear whether (7) and (8) are really distinct steps. So lets try paraphrasing the argument in the more explicit but repetitious language of a philosopher. (6 ) All fetuses are humans. (7 ) All humans have a right not to be killed. (8 ) All fetuses have a right not to be killed.
2

This argument is much easier to understand. That also makes it easier to see the equivocation. In (6 ), humans means something like members of the biological species Homo sapiens . But, in (7 ), it means something like beings with moral standing. How are these two categories related? Maybe they overlap; maybe they dont; in either case, the argument needs another premise, to explicitly connect them. The author of the quotation equivocates on humanity, and for that reason the argument is decient. In general, you can avoid a lot of equivocation simply by using the same terms for the same ideas every time they appear and using dierent terms for dierent ideas. Another kind of fallacy of irrelevance is a strawman argument. A strawman argument is a criticism of a view that, in the conversational context, no-one actually holds. Democrats, for example, might argue along these lines: (9) Republicans want to eliminate all taxes. (10) If we eliminate all taxes than the government will be bankrupted. (11) Republicans want to bankrupt the government. Republicans at least most Republicans today do want to keep taxes low, and possibly even lower some taxes further. But, in most contexts, no-one has seriously suggested completely eliminating all taxes whatsoever. When strawman arguments involve a premise, like this one, that makes false claims about what people believe or want, then it is unsound, whether or not it is valid. Otherwise it is simply irrelevant to the debate. Our next example is the appeal to ignorance. (12) Theres no good reason to believe that p.

Widely attributed to Helen Alvar e, The Abortion Controversy (Greenhaven, 1995), p. 24, but not conrmable. 24

(13) not-p. This argument can also have not-p in the premise and p in the conclusion. Heres a version thats very common in debates: (14) My opponents arguments for p are all unsound. (15) not-p For example, a conservative anti-environmentalist might say (16) Environmentalists arguments that global warming is real are all unsound. (17) Global warming isnt real. Appeals to ignorance are always invalid: p can be true even though we have no good reason to believe it. Next up is the appeal to expertise or appeal to authority: (18) Dan is a reliable expert on logic. (19) Dan says that appeals to ignorance are invalid. (20) Appeals to ignorance are invalid. (21) x is a reliable expert on p-related issues (22) x says that p (23) p

(25) Stephen Hawking says that humans are responsible for global warming. (26) Humans are responsible for global warming. Stephen Hawking is certainly an expert on physics. But does this make him an expert on global warming? Certainly climate science involves physics. On the other hand, Dr. Hawking is an expert on theoretical physics and spacetime; he has no special expertise on global warming. So this particular argument is invalid: Dr. Hawking isnt an expert on global warming-related issues. Reliable rules out experts who are lying. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, scientists for the tobacco industry said that cigarettes didnt cause cancer. They were lying; when they said these things, they knew that cigarettes did, in fact, cause cancer. So they were experts, but not reliable experts. In that context, this argument would be valid, but unsound because the rst premise would be false: (27) Tobacco industry scientists are reliable experts on whether cigarettes cause cancer. (28) Tobacco industry scientists say that cigarettes dont cause cancer. (29) Cigarettes dont cause cancer. Another argument concerning what someone says is called an ad hominem (to the person). But this pattern is invalid: 25

The world is simply too big and too complex for any one person to know everything about everything. We have to rely on authorities and expertise for at least some things. An appeal to authority is valid but, because not even the most reliable expert is perfect, its not deductively valid. Appeals to authority can be dicult to evaluate when it comes to the rst premise and what, exactly, counts as a p-related issue. (24) Stephen Hawking is a reliable expert physicist.

(30) Nancy Pelosi is a bad person. (31) Nancy Pelosi says that humans are responsible for global warming. (32) Humans arent responsible for global warming.

(33) x is a bad person (34) x says that p

But, when arguments arent written so explicitly, it can be much less obvious: (38) All deliberate killing of an unborn fetus is unjustied and ethically reprehensible.

(35) not-p

(39) Abortion is morally wrong. Either this argument is invalid because its missing the premises that connect, for example, deliberate killing of an unborn fetus and abortion or its premise is just another way of stating the conclusion, and in the strict sense it begs the question. An argument that begs the question in the strict sense isnt necessarily awed. Mathematical proofs often beg the question in the strict sense. However, in many other contexts, we dont want to give arguments that just restate the premises. An argument that begs the question in the loose sense is always awed. In a conversation, we should give each other arguments that start from premises we all accept (or at least nd reasonable). When we dont do this, we dont give them reasons to believe our conclusion. Consider this argument, in the context of a debate between Michael Jackson and Lady Gaga fans: (40) Every Michael Jackson song is better than every Lady Gaga song. (41) Smooth Criminal is a Michael Jackson song.

Bad person can be replaced with more specic epithets shes a liar, shes a politician, shes a socialist, shes an elitist, shes a Democrat, or anything else that the person giving the argument thinks is bad. Nancy Pelosi may or may not be a bad person. But thats irrelevant to whether shes speaking truthfully when she says that humans are responsible for global warming. Ad hominem is a specic kind of fallacy of irrelevance. Its also similar to the theoretical appeal to emotion. Our nal arguments from conversational logic are all called begging the question or circular arguments. In fact, these terms are used for three kinds of arguments. Ill say that there are strict, loose, and wrong senses for using the phrase begging the question. strict Some combination of the premises is logically equivalent to the conclusion. loose One of the premises is at least as controversial as the conclusion. wrong The argument makes you think of some related issue. When arguments are written explicitly, the strict sense of begging the question isnt very interesting or common. Its easy to see that this argument begs the question in the strict sense: (36) God exists. (37) God exists. 26

(42) Bad Romance is a Lady Gaga song. (43) Smooth Criminal is better than Bad Romance. This argument is deductively valid, but no Lady Gaga fan will think the rst premise is true. This premise is even more controversial than the conclusion its supposed to support. But its not logically equivalent to the conclusion. (The conclusion doesnt

make a claim about all songs.) So this argument begs the question in the loose sense, but not the strong sense. Finally, its become common to use begs the question in the sense of raises the question or suggests the question. For example, suppose evidence comes to light that a famous boxer took a bribe and threw a ght. A commentator might say that this begs the question: how many other boxers have taken bribes? Theres no argument here, much less an argument thats awed in some way or another. Instead, this evidence leads us to wonder whether theres a more widespread problem. Some philosophers are very cranky about this usage of begs the question thats why I call it the wrong sense. Others, however, think that its ne to use a phrase in the wrong way, so long as were clear when were using it to suggest a related thought (wrong sense) and when were using it to criticize an argument (strict and loose senses).

Ill get an A on the test You dont have to worry about this terminology or exactly how all this works; these examples are just to illustrate the kind of sentences that modal logics deal with. Originally and in the strictest sense, modal logic referred to the logic of necessary and possible. For example, this argument is deductively valid in modal logic: (1) If God exists, then God exists necessarily. (2) If God exists necessarily then its not possible for God to not exist. (3) Its possible for God to not exist. (4) God does not exist. Further developments in modal logic branched o in dierent directions. The notions of is obligatory or should be done, is permitted or may be done, and is forbidden or should not be done are analyzed using deontic logic, (logic of obligations); obviously, deontic logic is important for practical reasoning and ethics. Temporal logic is used to represent tense and time, with operators like it will always be the case that and it was the case that. (You may have noticed that I play fast-and-loose with tense and time throughout this pamphlet.) Modal logics are also useful for things besides distinguishing good and bad arguments. Linguists use modal logics to represent the construction of complex sentences out of simpler sentences; computer scientists use modal logics to represent the structure of computer programs; and mathematicians use modal logics to represent the relations among various kinds of abstract mathematical objects. 27

2.7

Modal logics

Modality is a broad term for features of sentences that indicate things like the way the world is, must, should, or might be; location in time and space; and the condence the speaker has in the claim. In English, we represent modality using three kinds of constructions: tense I went to the store vs. I am going to the store vs. I will go to the store modal verbs Obama might win in 2012 vs. Obama should win in 2012 vs. Obama must win in 2012 the subjunctive mood I believe that Ill get an A on the test vs. I doubt whether Ill get an A on the test vs. I hope that

While modal logic is extremely useful in more advanced philosophy classes, and something you might start to learn in an introduction to formal logic, it is probably not something you need to know for an introductory class in philosophy. And common arguments in English rarely involve modality in a major way. I mention modal logic just to give you an idea of the directions you can take the further study of logic. This concludes our survey of common argument patterns. All of these can be found in gs. 1 and 2, at the end of the pamphlet.

ther reasons can serve as premises for them. Along the way, I try to state everything explicitly and t my argument into a valid pattern. (Its often helpful to keep in mind that a paper for a philosophy class is really just an exercise in thinking logically your instructor doesnt care what position you argue for, so long as youre practicing using the tools weve discussed in this pamphlet.) Lets see how this works with an example. Say I start o with the feeling that laissez-faire capitalism a completely free market economy is unjust. I ask myself: why do I believe that? What reasons can I give to someone who doesnt think that laissez-faire capitalism is unjust? I think a bit more, and decide that I dont like laissez-faire capitalism because not everyone has the same opportunities to succeed. In particular, rich people have many more opportunities (to get a good education, to live in crime-free neighborhoods, to get decent health care, to travel, and so on) than poor people. So I have my rst premise, my conclusion, and a subconclusion: (1) Under laissez-faire capitalism, the children of rich people have more opportunities than poor people. (SC) Under laissez-faire capitalism, people dont enjoy the same opportunities. (C) Laissez-faire capitalism is unjust. My argument is o to a start, but right now the steps are disconnected. I can bridge the rst gap by adding a conditional. (1) Under laissez-faire capitalism, rich people have more opportunities poor people. (2) If, under laissez-faire capitalism, rich people have more opportunities than poor people, then, under laissez-faire capi28

Working with arguments in the wild

In your philosophy class, youll be reading arguments written by people who take logic very seriously. Your instructor will work through these arguments in lecture, showing you how to take them apart and put them back together again. But, sooner or later (very soon, if youre one of my students), youll have to deal with an argument that hasnt been laid out for you, nice and neat in premise-conclusion form, with all of its steps in the explicit, concise language used by many philosophers. And sooner or later youll have to formulate your own arguments.

3.1

Formulating an argument

Since its by far the easier of the two, Ill deal with formulating your own argument rst. I usually work backwards, starting with something that I believe (the conclusion) and trying to work out the reasons (premises) that support my belief. Some of these premises will seem to need more support they cant stand on their own. So I treat them as subconclusions, and ask what fur-

talism, people dont have the same opportunities. (3) Under laissez-faire capitalism, people dont enjoy the same opportunities. Since this part is an instance of modus ponens, its at least valid. The rst premise is an empirical fact about history and economics. The second premise is a conditional: if some people have more opportunities than others, then people dont have the same opportunities. So I have a valid argument for my subconclusion. So far so good! What about the inference from my subconclusion to my conclusion? The basic idea is that, if people dont enjoy the same opportunities, then the system is unjust. I can include this connection in another premise: (3) Under laissez-faire capitalism, people dont enjoy the same opportunities. (4) If, under laissez-faire capitalism, people dont enjoy the same opportunities, then laissez-faire capitalism is unjust. (5) Laissez-faire capitalism is unjust. Ive got another instance of modus ponens, and the overall argument is valid. Great! Of course, this doesnt mean my argument is sound. Is premise (4) true? That amounts to asking what, exactly, the relationship is between justice and everyone having the same opportunities. Perhaps theres nothing unjust about people having unequal opportunities. This is a good point to consider an objection to my argument: what would a defender of laissez-faire capitalism say about this? That leads me from developing my basic argument to developing my paper. I can consider an objection to premise (4) from someone like the libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick, then 29

give my response, and I have my paper. As the last paragraph illustrates, developing an argument is a good way to start writing a philosophy paper. And my argument, once its developed a bit, gives my paper structure: rst Ill present my argument in premise-conclusion form and briey explain or support each premise; second Ill present an objection that Nozick might give; and nally Ill give my response. For a short paper (4-6 pages), thats probably all the more Ill need to do.

3.2

Reconstructing (and evaluating) an argument

Reconstructing an argument rewriting it in premise-conclusion form and evaluating it determining whether its valid or sound really arent dierent things. As with formulating your own argument, I recommend starting a reconstruction by working backwards and rst identifying the conclusion. What overall point is the author trying to make? It may be a good idea to read the text through several times: once to get a lay of the land, a second time to try and identify the conclusion, and possibly even a third time to conrm that this is, indeed, the conclusion. Then turn to the premises. What reasons and evidence does the author give? At this point, dont worry about trying to t things into a pattern. Just try to write down all of the key claims the various steps the author makes in her or his argument, without regard to the order. Now that all of the parts of the argument are laid out, its time to paraphrase and organize them to t them together, in other words. What steps are given as independent premises, without fur-

ther support? What other steps are they meant to support? And what conditionals (or other logical moves) are used to connect the premises and conclusions? Usually this step will require rewriting things a bit, in order to t the argument into one of the patterns. Be on the lookout for enthymemes (see the next subsection) and multiple arguments in a single passage. Overall, when you reconstruct an argument, youre trying to balance three things: accuracy, charity, and explicitness. Explicitness covers both the logical structure of the argument (what pattern does it t?) and how easy it is to understand the content of the claims. Generally, simpler language is more explicit than complex language. Accuracy is how close your reconstruction is to the authors own views. Even a radically reworked paraphrase can be accurate! Finally, charity refers to the plausibility of the argument. Think of your reconstruction as a claim about the authors views: I claim that the author thinks this. If you claim that the author is saying things that are clearly insane, evil, or false, then you should be very, very sure that those claims are accurate. Lets work through an example. Heres an argument from a prochoice activist. But, of course, opponents of abortion dont want to deal with actual women. Pre-people are much easier to deal with, as they dont have thoughts, needs or feelings, and therefore you can project whatever desires you wish onto them.3 Marcottes overall conclusion seems to be opponents of abortion dont want to deal with actual women, right in the rst sentence. The second sentence involves several claims, which we can paraphrase into more neutral language to make them more charitable:
3

Fetuses are much easier to deal with than adult women. Fetuses dont have thoughts, needs or feelings. You can project whatever desires you wish onto fetuses. Now we can ask how these parts are supposed to t together to support the conclusion. Looking at the way Marcotte uses terms like therefore, we can organize the claims into this series of steps: Fetuses dont have thoughts, needs or feelings. So you can project whatever desires you wish onto fetuses. So fetuses are much easier to deal with than adult women. So opponents of abortion dont want to deal with actual women. Theres no obvious logical pattern here; the authors made a sequence of claims, without any indication of how each is supposed to support the next. The easiest way to ll in these gaps is with a series of conditionals, making the argument a combination of several instances of modus ponens : (1) Fetuses dont have thoughts, needs or feelings. (2) If fetuses dont have thoughts, etc., then you can project whatever desires you wish onto them. (3) You can project whatever desires you wish onto fetuses. (1, 2) (4) If you can project whatever desires you wish onto fetuses then theyre much easier to deal with than actual women.

Amanda Marcotte, Ohios foetal error (Guardian Online, March 8, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/ 2011/mar/08/abortion-women. Retrieved May 31, 2011. 30

(5) Fetuses are much easier to deal with than adult women. (3, 4) (6) If fetuses are much easier to deal with than actual women then opponents of abortion dont want to deal with actual women. (7) Opponents of abortion dont want to deal with actual women. (5, 6) Since it uses modus ponens, this argument is valid. (2) is a little vague can might mean a few dierent things here but seems plausible. (4) and (6) are quite suspicious, and very likely false. So this argument is not clearly sound. Note that I didnt say that this argument is clearly unsound. I havent given you any reason to think that (4) and (6) are false. I dont know whether these premises are true or false. So I dont know whether the argument is sound or unsound. To keep the example short, Ive just given you two sentences from an opinion column. As you can see, even just these two short sentences can contain a fairly involved argument. And as well see in the next section, this is a very common feature of our reasoning: we rely on all kinds of assumptions and implicit premises that have to be stated explicitly for the argument to be formally valid. This leads to a common tradeo. On the one hand, when I reconstruct someones argument, I want to do so accurately, as close to the original as possible. On the other hand, I also want it to be explicit, clear and easy to understand. If Im totally accurate in my reconstruction, then the result will probably very dicult to understand. But if I make it easy to understand, then I might leave out some important ideas. For example, I could reconstruct Marcottes argument in this way: (1 ) Fetuses dont have thoughts, needs or feelings. 31

(2 ) If fetuses dont have thoughts &c., then they are much easier to deal with than actual women. (3 ) Fetuses are much easier to deal with than actual women. (4 ) If fetuses are much easier to deal with than actual women then opponents of abortion dont want to deal with actual women. (5 ) Opponents of abortion dont want to deal with actual women. This version is two steps shorter, and a little bit easier to understand. However, it leaves out the stu about projecting desires onto fetuses. Its more explicit but less accurate than the earlier version. That doesnt make it better or worse. We just have to choose which version were going to go with in our discussion of the argument.

3.3

Enthymemes

An enthymeme is an argument that relies on an unstated premise. Often the unstated premises are obvious or common knowledge, as in this example: (1) Obama is President. (2) Obama won the last election. The missing premise is if Obama is President then he won the last election. But everyone knows that already, so its tedious to include it when were not being as careful as possible with our reasoning. Sometimes, however, the unstated premise is highly controversial. In these cases, identifying the premise can lead to important

objections to the argument. Consider this example: (3) Americans are responsible for global warming. (C) Americans should stop global warming. The rst thing to notice here is that theres a gap between being responsible for global warming and what should be done about it: this is an enthymeme. Lets put in the missing premise: (3) Americans are responsible for global warming. (4) If Americans are responsible for global warming then Americans should stop global warming. (5) Americans should stop global warming. Now, what exactly is the relation in (4) between being responsible for global warming and having an obligation to stop it? Responsible is ambiguous; it has a normative, or moral, sense and a descriptive, or factual, sense. That is, (3) might be saying that Americans are morally responsible for solving the problem of global warming. Then the argument is sound but begs the question in the strict sense: (3) says exactly the same thing as (5). Alternatively, (3) might be making the descriptive claim that Americans are causally responsible for global warming after all, we release more greenhouse gases per person than any other country on the planet. If thats what the author of this argument means, (3) is completely uncontroversial and (4), while plausible (you broke it, you bought it), needs more support. In some cases, the person responsible for something (a toddler who knocked over an expensive vase) isnt morally responsible for it (her parent has to pay to replace the vase). In short, after uncovering the unstated premise, we realize that we need to make explicit (a) what we mean by responsible and (b) the connection between causal responsibility and moral obligations. 32

3.4

Improving arguments

Outside of mathematics, I dont think Ive ever come across an interesting argument that was perfect that both was about something more interesting than whether Whiskers is warm-blooded and was clearly and uncontroversially deductively sound. More often, an argument will initially seem to be sound, only to turn out to involve an important fallacy or a highly implausible premise when considered more carefully. In such cases especially when we disagree with the conclusion of the argument the responsible thing to do is to improve the argument. Actually, this is what youll do in a basic type of philosophy paper: you rst reconstruct an argument, then give an objection (the argument is unsound because such-and-such premise is false), and nally give a reply (show how to improve the argument to avoid the objection). In this subsection, Ill discuss a few dierent ways to improve arguments. First, you can add an unstated premise. Weve already discussed this improvement several times, including in the previous subsection. Often this is such a small and minor improvement that youll do it in your initial reconstruction. Sometimes, though, the unstated premise will be implausible or problematic in an important way, and adding it will require further improvements. Second, you can weaken the conclusion. For example, suppose the original conclusion is that we should prevent refugees in Darfur from starving. Someone might object that there are other, equally bad refugee crises around the world, such as in Sudan. One way to improve the argument and avoid this objection is to weaken the conclusion: we should prevent refugees from starving, in general and not just in Darfur. On the other hand, you can expand the premises, making

them either stronger or weaker. For example, consider the following argument, which is similar to one that we saw in the enthymeme subsection: (1) Americans can take actions to stop global warming. (2) If Americans can take actions to stop global warming then Americans should stop global warming. (3) Americans should stop global warming. As an instance of modus ponens, this argument is valid. But the conditional in (2) is controversial. You might make it less controversial by adding some qualications that weaken it, like these: If Americans can take action to stop global warming, American action is necessary to stop global warming, and global warming will cause egregious harm, then Americans should stop global warming. Then, of course, the argument will need some additional premises to support the conclusion. But sometimes this will make the argument more complicated than it really needs to be. Suppose the global warming argument (1-3) was just preliminary to a discussion of what actions Americans might or might not be able to take to stop global warming the author is most interested in whether the rst premise is true, not how it supports the conclusion. But suppose in addition that she gives the long, highly qualied, complicated replacement premise that I suggested. In this case, you dont want to make the second premise even more complicated by adding further qualications. Instead, youll want to simplify the premises, replacing the complicated one with the much simpler (2). In this case, weve made our reconstruction less accurate, but more explicit and easy to understand. 33

Alternatively, you may want to strengthen a weak premise to give better support to a conclusion. Consider these three arguments: (4) Some cats have whiskers. (5) Mowser is a cat. (6) Mowser has whiskers. (7) Most cats have whiskers. (8) Mowser is a cat. (9) Mowser has whiskers. (10) All cats have whiskers. (11) Mowser is a cat. (12) Mowser has whiskers.

(4) is too weak to support the conclusion it just says that some (at least one ) cat has whiskers, and gives us no reason to believe that Mowser is such a cat. (7) is a stronger premise, and gives more support to the conclusion; and (10) is stronger still. Finally, you can incorporate additional evidence. This is especially important in inductive arguments, when the argument is trying to generalize from particular cases.

3.5

Terminology

In order to identify patterns, all of the examples weve discussed in this pamphlet use standardized logical terminology. For example, all conditionals are represented using an if-then construction, and categorical statements are represented in one of four forms: all F s are Gs some F s are Gs no F s are Gs some F s are not Gs

We also have always represented conclusions using the symbol. In natural English, there are many, many more ways to represent logical relationships. Before we nish, Im going to give you some examples of other common ways to represent sentence logic, categorical statements, and conclusions.4

In each of these, the added phrase marks the antecedent. Only swaps the antecedent and consequent: p only if q p only provided that q p only whenever q

3.5.1

Sentence logic

both p and q p but q p yet q p. Also, q . p. however, q . although p, q

Properly characterizing conditionals is one of the most dicult things about rst learning logic. Try assuming the author is using modus ponens and arranging the antecedents and consequents so that everything ts together properly.

Each of these communicates more information, in context, than both-and alone. But, for evaluating validity, theyre all treated in exactly the same way.

3.5.2

Categoricals

all F s are Gs every (each, any) F is G whoever is F is G F s are Gs only Gs are F s none but Gs are F s no one is F unless theyre G no one is F without being G if youre F then youre G

either p or q p unless q Like or, unless has both inclusive and exclusive senses.

if p then q
4

q , if p provided that p, q q , provided that p q whenever p

whenever p, q assuming that p, q given p, q

no F s are Gs F s arent Gs there isnt a single F thats G every (each, any) F isnt G if youre F , then you arent G no one thats F is G

Much of this section is based on Harry Gensler, Introduction to logic (Routledge, second edition, 2010), pp. 18-19, 139-41. 34

some F is G F s are sometimes Gs there are F s that are G this particular F is (also) G

Most of these are used at the beginning of sentences, connecting the premises (before the phrase) to the conclusion (after the phrase). Some can also be used in the middle of the conclusion, as an adverbial phrase: Global warming, therefore, must be stopped.

3.5.3

Premises and conclusions

The words and phrases that mark premises and conclusions can sometimes also be used to mark conditionals, and vice-versa. Thats because natural language arguments often use enthymemes: the premise that connects the premise (antecedent) to the conclusion (consequent) can be left unstated.

If you cant gure out how to make the symbol you can just use one of these words instead, at the beginning of conclusion lines.

Additional resources
If youre interested in either learning more about logic or reading other explanations of how to analyze arguments, I recommend the following books. Baggini et al.: The Philosophers Toolkit: A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods Julian Baggini and Peter Fosl. The Philosophers Toolkit: A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods. Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. isbn: 9780631228745. Annotations: Discusses a broad array of specic kinds of argument, with an emphasis on the sorts of strategies often used in more advanced philosophy classes. A second edition was recently published. Fisher: The Logic of Real Arguments Alec Fisher. The Logic of Real Arguments. Second edition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004. isbn: 0521654815. 35

premises because . . . for, . . . since . . . for the sake of . . . after all . . . assuming that . . . as . . .

These are often used either at the beginning of sentences or as grammatical conjunctions, connecting the conclusion (before the phrase) to the premises (after the phrase).

conclusions hence thus so therefore must it cant be thats why this proves that

Annotations: An informal approach to logic, based on the analysis and reconstruction of arguments as they appear in ordinary contexts, e.g., opinion pieces in newspapers. However, Fisher provides basically no method for evaluating arguments after theyve been reconstructed. Gensler: Introduction to Logic Harry Gensler. Introduction to Logic. New York: Routledge, 2010. isbn: 0415996511. Annotations: A textbook, designed to be used in a wide array of introductory logic classes. Unlike other formal logic textbooks, Gensler emphasizes the use of logic rather than the mathematical study of logic for its own sake. Material covered includes some basic systems of modal logic, culminating in a proof of a version of the Golden Rule. The book moves at a fast pace, and may be dicult for beginning logic students to understand on their own. Currently the book I use in my formal logic classes. Walton: Informal Logic: A Pragmatic Approach Douglas Walton. Informal Logic: A Pragmatic Approach. Second Edition. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. isbn: 9780521713801. Annotations: Nominally a textbook in informal or conversational logic, this is better described as a presentation of the theory of conversational logic. Still, I have found nothing that comes closer to being a good textbook on conversational logic. Weston: A Rulebook for Arguments Anthony Weston. A Rulebook for Arguments. Fourth Edition. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2009. isbn: 9780872209541. 36

Annotations: A classic introductory logic textbook, and with good reason: its short, readable, and inexpensive. I used the second edition in the rst philosophy class that I ever took, and it has recently been reworked in a fourth edition. In several respects, it is the model for this pamphlet. A Workbook for Arguments is a companion book, cowritten by the same author as Rulebook and also published by Hackett, which provides numerous examples and exercises. Westons approach is informal rather than formal, and includes chapters on writing and giving oral arguments.

Note for instructors

This pamphlet provides an introduction to formal logic suitable for students in several dierent types of philosophy classes, from rst-year undergraduates in Introduction to Philosophy to nonphilosophy majors in upper-division philosophy classes. I decided to write this pamphlet after a few years of teaching Introduction to Philosophy, formal logic, and critical thinking/informal logic courses. Coming from a mathematics background, I wanted to impress upon my students the utility of formal logic: there are explicit, objective criteria for evaluating the reasons someone gives in support of a claim; one doesnt have to rely entirely on opinion or intuition. However, there simply is no time to develop anything like a useful, general system of formal logic in the context of Introduction to Philosophy. I tried various excerpts and short books including several of those listed in the additional resources designed to give lower-division students some basic logical tools without overwhelming them. But these all fell short of what I wanted, in one or more ways: a lack of formal, explicit, objective criteria; a focus on deduction at the expense of other (far more common and useful, I think) types of argument; and, in the case of books that were more rigorous and went beyond deduction, the length of time that would be needed to present this material. So, this pamphlet aims to present some basic logic, suitable for students to read independently or to be covered in a week, at most, of an Introduction to Philosophy class. While the development itself is not rigorous, its largely based on standard systems. The

criteria presented aspire to be much more explicit and objective than the various systems of informal logic and what I call the counterexample test (see 1.4.2). The one non-standard thing that I have done here is my treatment of validity. Customarily, validity is dened either (incorrectly) as a guarantee or necessitation relation between the premises and conclusion or (better, but more abstractly) as a semantic entailment relation; sometimes this is paired with a weaker such relation, cogency, for induction. Complementing this is an unhelpful distinction between deductive arguments the ones that are valid (or purport to be) and an unsystematic heap of arguments labeled inductive. Beyond the criticisms suggested by my descriptions, I have two major problems with this custom. First, it muddles epistemic, metaphysical, syntactic, and semantic relations. Second, it uses two completely dierent sets of terms for what is, at bottom, one reason-giving relation that is, the premises give reasons (better or worse) to believe the conclusion. Consequently, I present validity in these terms and modify it with deductive when the premises give the stronger sort of support. I go on to classify and present common arguments by the logical terminology they use rather than whether they are deductive. This version of this pamphlet is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License, which among other things grants you the right to modify and distribute it for non-commercial purposes and so long as the original is atA tributed to me. L TEX source code and supporting style les should be available at http://www.nd.edu/~dhicks1, and can otherwise be obtained by contacting me via email, hicks.daniel.j@gmail.com.

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Figure 1: The 15 valid categorical syllogisms Note: The category variable S can be replaced with an individual x in most of these. For example, All S s are M s becomes x is an M . Barbara (1) all M s are P s (2) all S s are M s (3) all S s are P s Celarent (4) no M s are P s (5) all S s are M s (6) no S s are P s Darii (7) all M s are P s (8) some S s are M s (9) some S s are P s Ferio (10) no M s are P s (11) some S s are M s (12) some S s are not P s Camestres (13) all P s are M s (14) no S s are M s (15) no S s are P s Cesare (16) no P s are M s (17) all S s are M s (18) no S s are P s Baroko (19) all P s are M s (20) some S s are not M s (21) some S s are not P s Festino (22) no P s are M s (23) some S s are M s (24) some S s are not P s Datisi (25) all M s are P s (26) some M s are S s (27) some S s are P s Disamis (28) some M s are P s (29) all M s are S s (30) some S s are P s Ferison (31) no M s are P s (32) some M s are S s (33) some S s are not P s Bokardo (34) some M s are not P s (35) all M s are S s (36) some S s are not P s Camenes (37) all P s are M s (38) no M s are S s (39) no S s are P s Dimaris (40) some P s are M s (41) all M s are S s (42) some S s are P s Fresison (43) no P s are M s (44) some M s are S s (45) some S s are not P s

Figure 2: Sentence, inductive, and conversational logic patterns modus ponens valid (1) if p then q (2) p (3) q modus tollens valid (4) if p then q (5) not-q (6) not-p arming the consequent invalid (7) if p then q (8) q (9) p instrumental reasoning or hypothetical syllogism means-ends reasoning valid (48) valid (18) if p then q (49) (34) we should q (19) if q then r (50) (35) if we p then we will q (20) if p then r (36) we should p disjunctive syllogism valid (21) either p or q (22) not-p (23) q arming a disjunct questionable (24) either p or q (25) p (26) q ought implies can valid (37) its impossible for us to p (38) we shouldnt (try to) p practical appeal to emotion valid (39) we dont like (the fact that) p (40) we should (try to) stop p ad hominem invalid x is a bad person x says that p not-p fallacy of irrelevance invalid the premises have nothing to do with the conclusion equivocation or ambiguity invalid one or more terms is used in two dierent ways

denying the antecedent dilemma invalid valid (10) if p then q (27) either p or q (11) not-p (28) if p then r (12) not-q (29) if q then r (30) r fallacy of the single cause generalization from a invalid sample (13) if p then q valid (14) not-(if r then q ) (31) Statistic s is true of sample S inference to the best (32) S is representative of explanation population P valid (15) q (33) s is true of P (16) p is the best available explanation of q (17) p

strawman unsound or irrelevant theoretical appeal to criticizes a position that emotion no-one in the conversation invalid (41) we dont like (the fact that) p actually holds (42) not-p appeal to ignorance invalid (43) theres no good reason to believe that p (44) not-p appeal to authority valid (45) x is a reliable expert on p-related issues (46) x says that p (47) p begging the question strict: Some combination of the premises is logically equivalent to the conclusion. loose: One of the premises is at least as controversial as the conclusion. wrong: The argument makes you think of some related issue.