Aristotle Philo of Science

Marjorie Grene, Aristotle's Philosophy of Science and Aristotle's Biology Author(s): James G.
Lennox Source: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1984, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1984), pp. 365-377 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192515 . Accessed: 26/08/2013 00:41
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Marjorie
Grene, Aristotle's
Philosophy of Science Biology James G. Lennox
and Aristotle's
University of Pittsburgh
1.
Introduction
During a period stretching from the publication of the Phoenix Books edition A Portrait of Aristotle in the early 1960's through the appearance of a number of papers in the mid-1970's, Marjorie of Aristotle's to the relevance Grene turned her attention and to the philosophy, to his overall interests biological of to contemporary philosophy of that philosophy relevance biology. A Portrait of Aristotle was one among the turned me, as an undergraduate, toward Aristotle As I re-read Professor Grene's work on Aristotle 1984, a number of key themes emerged which are science. own views about the nature of biological influences which and his biology. in the summer of relevant to her
1) Throughout, there is a concern for contemporary biology's not only of its ambivalence toward teleology, and a realization, biology, but to its sensibly empirical centrality to Aristotle's 1972, pp. 79-87; 1964, pp. (1963, pp. 133-152; status there. 172-179; 1974c, pp. 238-239). as the trained perception of intelligent, The place 2) science is insisted upon, and again she foundation of biological of a the attitude of science philosophy finds in Aristotle's this emerges in her In her work on Aristotle kindred spirit. claim that the apparently mysterious notions of 'the-being-whatfield the trained simply reflect it-is' and form (eidos) by of the world as a place populated awareness naturalist's of various kinds--a world full of information, so to individuals (1963, pp. 34, 37, 154-155, 205, 208, 229, 242; 1972, pp. speak. 88-89, 98, 103; 1974b, p. 124). 3) Finally, in Aristotle's insistence on the theoretical and
PSA 1984, Volume 2, pp. 365-377 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Copyright
Association
366 zoology-methodological autonomy of each science--in particular, based on subject specific principles and concepts, Marjorie finds or refusal to be tempted by either ontological a clear-headed (1963, pp. 85-96; 1972, pp. 90-94, theoretical reductionism. 103-104). of the special Underlying all these themes is recognition philosophy. place of living, and of living things, in Aristotle's is 'the Grene reminds us that Aristotle When Professor she has something quite concrete in mind. metaphysician of life', insists that organisms are Aristotle Twice in Metaphysics Z. or the organs, more so than artifacts, paradigmatic substances, In that constitute them. tissues and underlying materials but science, life is not something to be explained, biological and Bios, the organized everything else. what explains coordinated activities that make up an organism's world, stands If you want to at the explanatory center of the biology. and of organs, tissues understand the peculiar constellation what behaviors that make up a dolphin, find out where it lives, it eats, how it reproduces, how it cools itself, how it feeds its What we would term ethology is at the young, and so on. in much the way that of biology for Aristotle, foundation biology is today. evolutionists like to think evolutionary material Understanding how things work and their ultimate constitution is worthwhile only within a theory that explains why The crucial it is good that they work and are constituted thus. question, for Aristotle as (arguably) for us is--what (if any) adaptive role does this structure or this bit of behavior play in the life of a creature of this sort in this particular ecological setting. I wish to explore these themes primarily in Professor Grene's Aristotelian studies, but with a steady eye on how these reflect, and are reflected in, her own concerns about the foundations of biology. 2. Teleology
is infamous, or famous, depending on one's Aristotle that organic organic for insisting behavior, viewpoint, development and organic structure are all explicable by reference in other, compatible, to what each is for. They are explicable of Aristotle, his As we read in A Portrait ways as well. expression 'that for the sake of which' corresponds closely to the biological concept of function (1963, p. 133). A number of contemporary philosophers and biologists, have insisted that the theory following in Darwin's footprints, the theoretical of evolution selection provides by natural as well. Yet, while explanation machinery for teleological in areas of biology for teleological explanations allowing or 'program' of a 'code' which dominated by the concepts represents a goal and directs biochemical reactions accordingly, Professor Grene has been skeptical of the validity of "selection
367 teleology". Professor Grene acknowledges that the selectionist account of teleological explanation is based on the idea that certain traits are adaptations, i.e., are selected for, and that their being adaptations, i.e., their being relatively more advantageous to their possessors than alternative forms of the same trait explains either their spread through a population and/or their maintenance in a population. is not This, she has insisted, enough. ". . .if adaptations are for no specifiable end except survival, one keeps falling back into a universal necessity which is in turn reducible to the same old tautology (that the fittest, i.e., the animals which survive, survive)." (1972, p. 87). The assumption which lies in the background of this skepticism is that the aim of the student of adaptation is to explain evolutionary changes or trends by reference to a goal. "When, however, such interactions are summed up, for long periods, in algebraic formulation, the results, neatly ordered, present apparent trends and thus once more give the appearance of . " (1972, p. 86). teleology... I have, for years, missed Professor Grene's point. It wasn't until I heard a hard line reductionist insist that only if evolutionary changes evidenced some obvious orthogenic principle would the theory of evolution meet even necessary conditions for being teleological, did I see fully what Professor Grene was She sees adaptation, as defined by evolutionists, driving at. as an achievement of populations. But I think this need not be where selectionists locate teleological explanations. Rather, it is in the domain of functional explanations of anatomical or biochemical structures, or of bits of behavior, that there is a role for teleology, as one of the other participants in this symposium has recently been arguing. The study of adaptation does not answer questions concerning, i.e., does not provide explanations of, the 'history' of phylogenetic trends; rather it seeks to explain such things as why, given a certain set of environmental problems or constraints, a humming bird in a particular environment has a specific beak or coloration. That is, hypotheses are constructed about the relative value (here not in the algebraic sense) for an organism with a life of a certain sort ('in a given niche') of a certain (variant of a) feature, elaborate studies being required to test various competing hypotheses. There is no suggestion in all this that an evolutionary change from P1 to a future population population P2 is explained by that the features present in P2 and lacking in P1 postulating were the end for which the change took place. True, underlying such 'adaptive design' reasoning is an assumption about evolutionary history: that some features of organisms are products of selection forces. But as Robert Brandon insists,
368 while the questions, 'How did this trait emerge and become rooted in a gene pool,' and 'For what (or 'why') do the members of this and even are compatible, or variety have this trait?' species related, this does not imply they are the same question or that If a trait variant is one is a "disguised" version of the other. to the organisms of higher fitness value than its alternatives which possess it, it may be continuously selected because of its To put it in a more neutral language; the presence of a value. trait variant within a species may be explained in part certain fitness of its by indicating its contribution to the relative possessors. theme in the And here I find, rhetoric aside, an Aristotelian evolutionary program. Aristotle is among those philosophers of for a that there are as many explanations science who insist subject as there are irreducibly different questions about it (Physics II. 3; Posterior Analytics II.1). and But he is an adaptationist, Aristotle is no evolutionist. that an answer to the question 'For the sake of what?' insists some of the facts responsible for, 4and thus relevant identifies 'Why do all the to explaining, certain biological explananda. 'In order to prevent viviparous quadrupeds have an epiglottis?' 'Why do all the crooked food entering the windpipe and lungs.' 'In order to allow them taloned birds also have hooked beaks?' to capture and eat their natural prey.'6 do not take the place of ones explaining These explanations how the part in question develops or what sort of materials they to them. (Cf. Gotthelf are made from--nor are they reducible They specify the adaptive role 1976; Balme 1986; Cooper 1982). the organized activities, 'bios', of the trait in the lifestyle, of the animal group under investigation. such as in Aristotle, of 'selection' There is no principle so hotly ought to underwrite the adaptive design explanations He simply insists that organisms appear to be, debated today. allow: and to come to be, as well adapted as the possibilities "nature doesn't produce at random but as he repeatedly insists, To the best for each kind of being, given the possibilities."display the ergon, the adaptive function, the what it is for, of to show that an organism's overall life-a particular feature; or locomotive refrigerative, its nutritive, reproductive, served by a feature, is to give one perceptive activities--are fundamental reason why the organism in question has just that is not committed to Aristotle feature in just that way. explaining every trait in terms of adaptive value, nor does he for such a explanation argue that this is the only legitimate But as David Balme (1980) has shown, an animal's eidos or trait. is form is arrived at by determining which of its features "For an eye is for the sake of required: teleologically something, but its being blue is not, unless this feature is a AnimaliumV 778a33-34). property of the kind." (De Generatione The color of a structure is not necessarily an incidental feature
369 of the organism--it may be part of what makes it that sort of We determine that by determining whether the blueness of animal. role in its eyes (say) plays a functional the snow leopard's life. insistence on the centrality of answering I find Aristotle's in biological science a clear point of 'what for' questions contact between his outlook and our own. Prof. Grene, holding to Aristotle's concept of that there is no modern analogue the precisely is, then, form, does not. "It biological concept of form, or some modern analogue thereof, Aristotelian which is lacking in the modern concept of adaptation, or better, mechanisms." of the organism as a pure aggregate of adaptive a If I understand her, I think this identifies (1972, p. 87). most important cleavage between the techniques of the population as an ecological and the student of adaptation geneticist techniques of population genetics phenomenon. The traditional of a in such a way that the individuals model a population of more or less random are viewed as aggregates population of discrete traits represented by the previous assortments generation; or worse, classify popu8ations abstractly as if they Even should the adaptive of single loci effects. consisted it is only by be under consideration, function of a trait overall pattern of living is that the organism's implication Professor explanation. taken into account in the adaptational Grene thus reminds us of a clear and present danger that a useful modelling the elements of a process heuristic for statistically the ethologist's, will carry us away from the field naturalist's, of the complex, experience or the evolutionary ecologist's that is the real world of selection and organized life-in-a-niche theme Which brings us to the second Aristotelian adaptation. which I find Professor Grene returning to time and again. 3. Science, perception and form
returned to Marjorie Grene has, on at least three occasions, thought, and its the role of the concept of eidos in Aristotle's translates eidos as 'form' in Tradition roots. biological of substances as unities of matter and form, and as discussions in many discussions when eide are contrasted with their 'species' In a paper I still find rendered 'genus'. genos, traditionally at the 1976 originally one delivered in scope, breathtaking Professor Grene Biology, on Aristotle's Princeton Colloquium searches for the "unity" in the concept in these two apparently popular way out She rejects a recently different roles. of genos and soietime identification suggested by Aristotle's to so closely hule ('genus' and 'matter'). Her work circles what I now see as a workable solution (provided recently by a young French scholar, Pierre Pellegrin (1982)) that, as I reread this paper I found myself coaxing and cajoling the argument under my breath. The suggested solution, not my chief concern here, is to treat as highly abstract, the genos-eidos distinction 'form of a kind', where this (roughly) to 'kind', equivalent within the unity'. means nothing more than 'unity/differences
370 within any Thus the language of 'kind' and 'form' is applicable This latter category and can be applied at any taxonomic level. fact explains David Balme's data (which Professor Grene was among that genos and eidos can refer to the first to take seriously) the same animal group and to nearly any level of generality, and as 'the water and heterogeneous that groups as extensive dwellers' or as restricted as a local variety of cicada can be that Pellegrin insists called a genos (Cf., Balme 1962, 1975). when taken as 'unity/variety of the relative pair genos/eidos, corpus. that unity', is univocal throughout the Aristotelian
Grene agrees: "..
.
of question within a given category at a number of levels and generality. In this context we can use the particularity to one another in any concepts of genos and eidos relatively This remark seems to anticipate p.121). category." (1974b, Indeed, she goes on to give an example Pellegrin's argument. from the Topics and another from the biology to make the point of how widely applicable this genos/eidos pair is. Because, she Why does she resist such a unified solution? Aristotle likes to approach insists, it is unAristotelian. Pellegrin has noted problems from a variety of perspectives. of the genos/eidos the same picture that I approached is that the Senos via claim Aristotle's relationship view that Others have stressed Aristotle's matter (1986, p. 26). the genos is mere potential, not existing except as one actual But form or another. (Balme 1980, pp. 3-4; Furth 1986). us all not to reduce the variety of Professor Grene cautions She cautions us Aristotelian approaches to one single approach. to remember that this is the same Aristotle that refuses to say In principle, there is only one appropriate form of explanation. at least, these are words of wisdom. At the close of the above-mentioned paper, Professor Grene hints darkly at her "hunch" about the unity of Aristotle's concept of 'form', to develop which would carry her "into the theory of question of the ti en einai and the Aristotelian She goes on, "Despite and its role in knowledge." perception and despite the deep differences Aristotle's anti-evolutionism I am confident that and modern science, between Aristotelian somehow Aristotle has something to say to us here." (1974b, p. 124). this hunch is played on in a number of In other places 1972, p. 103). directions (1963, pp. 80-96; interesting domains of scientific Aristotle has a notion of delimited investigation in which theoretical accounts of the natures of the basic. Understanding kinds in these domains is explanatorily 'what it is to be' for the kinds in a domain will allow us to use understand why they have their more familiar properties--to understanding progresses from what Aristotle's phrase, scientific is clearer or more understandable "to us" or "to perception" to what is clearer or more un rstandable "in the nature of things" or "without qualification", while explanation accounts for the
Professor
we
can
apply
our
what-is-it
371
former by reference to the latter. In a word, he's a realist.
Exploring what something is in zoology leads Aristotle most often to going after the details of an animal kind's "lifestyle". What is it to be a cetacean? Well, it is to spend all one's time in water, to feed there and thus to need a means of expelling water when feeding. Strangely enough, it is also to be aircooled rather than water-cooled. Cetacea also bear live young underwater, and get about by swimming rather than by walking, flying, or crawling. . .and so on. Given that being a cetacean (i.e., a cetacean's is like life) need to that, they will
have
being will at least include those basic functions for the sake of which structures and 'subroutines' exist. That is, what it is to be X is what it is to live the life of an X. Also notice that, if to specify what it is to be something is to give an account of its form, Aristotle's concept of form is as level neutral as Pellegrin insists. For the cetacea is a very extensive kind. But suppose I wish to explain not a feature common to all cetacea but one peculiar (e.g., a 'spout') to whales, the baleen, for I must now explore the lifestyle, example. the nature, of this sub-group, this form of life as opposed to that of the dolphins, or porpoises. For, if the baleen is teleologically at explicable all and it does not belong to other cetacea it must be there because of the life requirements of the group which has it (e.g., their way of feeding). Today we might say, in an extensionalist mode, that the search is on for the appropriate reference class relative to the property to be explained. Aristotle would say-whales have spouts qua cetaceans (thus find explanations for spouts by studying cetacea as a whole class and what is commonto all their lives), but these whales have baleens qua whales (thus find explanations for baleens by studying the natural history of the whale). 4. Reductionism and the unity of science
..
Notice
that,
in
biology,
the
account
of a kind's
The logical strategy just exemplified, which I believe accounts for the function of the Historia Animalium in Aristotle's zoological enterprise, is not peculiar to zoology. It is the strategy recommended in the Posterior Analytics I.5 and II.14-18, and Aristotle's favorite examples of it there are drawn from developments in geometry. And the strategy does make contact with much we would recognize as sound explanatory method. There is, that is to say, a preferred Aristotelian way to organize a domain of entities with properties, whatever those entities may be, so as to gain explanatory understanding why those entities have those properties. But the "unity of science" ends there. Zoology, from first to last, is zoology. We begin, as Professor Grene has explained with a prlema about why some kind of animal has some feature or other. We may decide that it is not, properly speaking that kind (e.g., the whales) that has it, but rather a wider kind ( e.g., the cetacea). And ultimately it is by becoming learned in the ways of cetacea that we understand why they (all and only the cetacea) have it. If explanation has a
372
preferred direction here, it is, (to return to my opening theme) to account for the parts, the tissues, and ultimately the 'chemistry', in ethological and ecological terms. Grene's approach to Aristotle is not the Marjorie disinterested approach of the classical scholar. Nor is she primarily interested in finding Aristotle in contemporary Rather her deeply felt concerns for the epistemological biology. foundations of contemporary biology have informed and motivated her work on Aristotle. The best among theoretical population geneticists have sensed the gulf between their models and techniques and the zoologist's or botanist's experience of adaptations as integrated around and relative to, a certain kind of organism's life. Professor Grene has been suggesting, sometimes patiently, that the Aristotelian notions of form and 'what it is to be' can be resources to draw upon should the biological theoretician be in search of new directions. Since she began making these suggestions, new directions have been forged, some of them Aristotelian in spirit. But I am doubtful a careful reading of Aristotle's biology has had much to do with it.1 It is much more likely that Marjorie Grene has not let biology forget its originator and one of its foremost She has been the Aristotelian theoreticians. conscience of the science of life, and it is a better science as a result. 5. Postscript--June, 1985
As those present at the PSA session devoted to Marjorie Grene's contribution to the philosophy of science will recognize, is quite the tone of her written comments on my presentation different from that displayed at that session. Nonetheless, the fundamental misunderstandings of Professor Grene's original response remains. The reader will note that more than half of her remarks are devoted to a brief concluding section of my In those comments, Professor Grene attributes a motive to paper. me which was never present, and both misreports and I'm afraid misunderstands me: "though when I reflect on it, everything he (Lennox) has said has been meant to bear on this culminating theme: Aristotle's philosophy of science, if one can call it that, "does" he (Lennox) says "make contact with much we would recognize as sound explanatory method." My actual words here (the "The logical were (and are): strategy exemplified previous examples), which I believe accounts for the function of is not Historia Animalium in Aristotle's zoological enterprise, It is the strategy recommended in the to zoology. peculiar Posterior Analytics. . . and the strategy does make contact with This method." as sound explanatory much we would recognize was (and is) a reference to the immediately preceding clearly at the notion of locating predications discussion of Aristotle's level of generality appropriate prior to searching for their It was not a blanket claim about his causal explanation. of science. Thus most of her commentary, while philosophy has salutary for those wishing to read Aristotle ahistorically,
373 little to do with my discussion (or my work).
What is perhaps more distressing to me, however, is the failure to comment on the primary focus of my discussion. The to Aristotle's centrality of living metaphysics things, the central place given to their bios--their active pursuit of lifesustaining and life-generating actions--in his account of the careful animals, comparative study of functional adaptiveness, these were the themes at the core of my discussion. And they were ideas to which (judging by the quotes and I provided) references Professor Grene would once have been sympathetic.
374
Notes that, in biological regular insistence 1Thus Aristotle's is place show that what takes we must always systems, by the materials interacting or being combined as necessitated are combined and those materials and why just they are, interacting in just that way, i.e., for the sake of what, serving what good? Cf. De Partibus Animalium (PA) I.1 642a3O-642b4; II.1 PA 646b10-30 for the general program and, as a few examples, 665a2-25; II.i14 658b2-10. esp. 663b21-64a3; III.3 III.2 of Darwin's work, Asa Gray 2Commenting on the significance to Natural Darwin's great service "Let us recognize wrote: so that instead of Science in bringing back to it Teleology: Morphology versus Teleology, we shall have Morphology wedded to On reading this, Darwin responded: Teleology." (1874, p. 81). and I do not "What you say about Teleology pleases me especially, (letter June 5, think- any one else has ever noticed the point." and adaptation, between selection, 1874). On the relationship Wright (1976); cf. Brandon (1981); explanation, teleological "The Contra this cf. Mayr (1983). Ayala (1970); Wimsatt (1972). one thing about which modern authors are unanimous is that but refers to something produced adaptation is not teleological, in the past." Unless one defines teleology more narrowly than do, this is clearly false. many modern biologists of developmental 3Cf. the discussion 77-79, vs. her problems with a selection 87. teleology teleology in 1972, pp. from pp. 80-
II.8 198a20-21, II.7 4Cf. Physica (Ph.) II.3 194b33-195a3, 199a7-8; PA I.1 642a1O-13, a31-33; I.5 645b15-20, 645b28-646a2. 5Cf. PA III.3 6PA III.1 664a2O-665a9. IV.12 693b27-694a6.
662a34-662bl4;
Animalium (GA) II 7E.g., PA 658a9, 661b24, De Generatione At GA V 788b20-22 and De Incessu Animalium (IA) 741b5, 744a3. which 704b15 it is said to be an arche of natural investigation At De Juventute (Juv.) 469a28-30, we postulate (a hypothesis). is said to (Resp.) 471b25 and GA V 788b20-22 it De Respiratione be something we see. 8For a clear Mayr 1983. presentation of the problem with this view, cf. (1972); Lennox Ph., I.1 Ethica
Balme Lloyd (1962); 9Found in Rorty (1973); (1980); and cf. footnote 10 of (1974b, p. 125).
10Cf. Posterior Analytics (Post. An.) I.2 71b33-72a5; VI.4 141a26-142a21; (Top.) Topica 184a16-184bl3;
375
Nicomachea (EN.) I.4 1095b2-8; Metaphysica (Metaph.) Z.3 1029b312; De Anima (De An.) II.2 413a11; a fine discussion of Aristotelian dialectic as the passage from relativized to objective knowing can be found in Evans 1977, Ch. 3. 11(1972, pp. 103-104); "Aristotle understood, as most modern philosophers of science until recently have not, that the investigation of nature arises out of puzzlement about some particular problem in some limited area. . ." (p. 103). "...the acknowledgement of scientific should release the realism biologist to admit the insights into the concrete manifold of his subject matter, from which his work originates and in which, however abstract and sophisticated it may become, it is still
anchored."
(p.104).
12There are exceptions; Ernst Mayr is one. But I remember Robert Brandon's surprise a year or so ago when I pointd out that Aristotle's biology, and his approach to explanation generally, is as they say today, "erotetic"--i.e., that scientific are answers to various sorts of questions and that explanations the most apropriate answer is relative to the style and level of question asked.
376
References "Teleological Ayala, F. (1970). Philosophy of Science 37: Explanation 1-15. in in Evolutionary Aristotle's Biology." Biology." and "De
and Eidos (1962). Balme, David. nGues C_lassical Quarterly N.S. 12: 81-98.
------------.
"De Partibus Aimalium I" Aristotle's (1972). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Generatione nimalium I".
Use of Differentia in Zoology." ---I--------n "Artistotle's (1975). Edited by J. Barnes, In Articles on Aristotle: Volume I Science. Gerald Duckworth and London: and R. Sorabji. M. Schofield, Company. Pages 183-193.
------------.
"Aristotle's biology was not essentialist." (1980). Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosoohie 62: 1-12.
----------?.
In Philosophical and Necessity." (1986). "Telelogy Edited by A. Gotthelf and J.C. Biolozv. Issues in Aristotle's (forthcoming.) Lennox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (1981). Studies and Questions Teleology: "Biological AndPhilosophv of Science_ in the Histry In Langua.je Cambridge:
Brandon, Robert N. Explanations." 12: 91-105.
"Aristotle on Natural Teleology." Cooper, John. (1982). Edited by M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum. a,nd Logos. Pages 197-222. Cambridge University Press.
(As printed in TheA "Letter to Asa Gray." Darwin, Charles. (1874). Francis Vol. 2. (ed.) Life and Letters of Charles Darwin. Darwin. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1896. Page 367.) Aristotle's (1977). Evans, J.D.G. Cambridge University Press. Conce2t of Dialectic. Cambridge:
An Overview." Universe: Biological "Aristotle's Furth, M. (1986). Edited by A. in Aristotle's Issues In Philosophical Biolo&y. Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (forthcoming.) "Aristotles Conception of Final (1976). Gotthelf, Allan. Review of Metaphvsics 30: 226-2544. Gray, Asa. 79-81. (1874). "Charles Robert Darwin." of Aristotle. Nature Causality." 10(June 4):
A Portrait (1963). Grene, Marjorie. sity of Chicago Press.

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Chicago:
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(1964). "Biologr and Teleology." (As reprinted in Grene (1974a).
Cambridge Review Pages 172-179.)
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"Aristotle and Modern Biology." (1972). the History of Ideas 33: (As reprinted 395-424. (1974a). Pages 74-107.)
Journal of in Grene
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The Understandins (1974a). of Nature. (Boston Studies in the Philosophv of Science, Volume XXIII.) (eds.) Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky. Dordrecht: Reidel. "Is Genus to Species (1974b). and Taxonomy." In Grene (1974a). as Matter to Form? Pages 108-126. Necessity." In
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"On the Nature of Natural (1974c). Grene (1974a). Pages 228-242.
Lennox, J.G. (1980). "Aristotle on Genera, Species the less'." Journal of the History of Biolo-v Lloyd, A.C. 67-90. (1962). "Genus Species
and 'the more and 13: 321-346. PhronAesis 7: Program." The chez
and Ordered Series."
Mayr, E. (1983). "How to Carry Out the Adaptationist American Naturalist 121: 324-334.
Pellegrin, Pierre. (1982). La Classification des Animaux Aristote. Paris: Societe d'?dition "des Belles Lettres".
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(1986). Difference "Logical and Biological Difference." In PhilosoDhical Issues in Aristotle's BioloRv. Edited by A. Gotthelf and J. Lennox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (forthcoming.)
Rorty,
R. (1973). "Genus as Matter." In Exegesis and Argument. (Phronesis SuDDlementarv Volume 1.) Edited by E.N. Lee, A.P.D. Mourelatos, and R. Rorty. New York: Humanities Press. Pages 393-420. of of
Wimsatt, W.C. (1972). and the Logical "Teleology Structure Function Statements." Studies in the History and PhilosoDhv 1-80. Scienace 3: Wright, Larry. (1976). Teleoloaical University of California Press. Explanation. Berkeley:

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Marjorie Grene, Aristotle's Philosophy of Science and Aristotle's Biology Author(s): James G.

Philosophy of Science Biology James G. Lennox

373 little to do with my discussion (or my work).

Brandon, Robert N. Explanations." 12: 91-105.

A Portrait (1963). Grene, Marjorie. sity of Chicago Press.

(1964). "Biologr and Teleology." (As reprinted in Grene (1974a).

Cambridge Review Pages 172-179.)

"On the Nature of Natural (1974c). Grene (1974a). Pages 228-242.

and Ordered Series."

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