European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol.

16, 305-309 (1986)

Short Research Note

Conversion theory and simultaneous majority/minority influence: can reactance offer an alternative explanation?
ANNE MAASS
lstituto di Psicologia, Universita di Padova, Piazza Capitaniato, 3 1-35139Padova, Italy

and RUSSELL D CLARK, Ill

Depaltment of Psychology, Flonda State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306, U.S.A

Abstract Thrr study tested whether reactance theory can account for private acceptance of a minority opinion under simultaneous malority fminority influence (reactance against majority rather than conversion toward minority). Subjects were either exposed to simultaneous majority/mmority influence or to a malority source only. As predicted by conversion theory, sublects moved away from the majority only in pnvate and in the presence of a consistent minority. In the absence of a consistent minority, sublects accepted the majority opinion in private, ruling out reactance as an alternative explanation. Introduction
Moscovici's (1980) conversion theory asserts that majority and minority influence operate by different psychological processes (comparison versus validation) leading to qualitatively different types of social influence (public compliance versus private acceptance). People tend to solve disagreements with a majority by complying publicy to the majonty without modifying their private beliefs. When confronted with a disagreeing consistent minority, they tend to modify their pnvate beliefs without necessarily admitting such an internaIized attitude change in public. Although numerous experiments have provided empirical evidence for this view using minonty influence and conformity paradigms (for summaries see Maass and Clark, 1984; Moscovia, 1980), we know of only one study which has tested the predictions of conversion theory under conditions of simultaneous influence attempts from a minonty and a majonty (Maass and Clark, 1983). In this study, subjects who were exposed simultaneously to a majority and a minority opinion moved toward the minority in private but toward the majority in public. This study also confirmed another prediction of conversion theory, namely that private acceptance of the minority opinion is mediated by cognitive activity while public compliance to the majority is unrelated to the number of arguments and counterarguments that subjects had generated. These results strongly suggest that majority and minority influence do, in fact, operate by different processes as predicted by the conversion theory

0046-2772/86/030305-05$05 .OO 01986 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Received 5 September 1984 Revised I May 1985

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Yet, cnticism of and disbelief in Moscovicis dual process model has been voiced frequently (see Latank and Wolf, 1981, Tanford and Penrod, 1984). With regard to the above experiment, a number of independent reviewers have argued that reactance theory (Brehm, 1966; Brehm and Brehm, 1981) can offer an alternative explanation of the results. Since subjects were simultaneously exposed to a minonty and a majonty, each representing opposite extremes on the same issue (for or against gay rights), subjects who internalized the minority position may not have moved toward the minority but rather away from the majority thereby restoring the freedom of choice that may have been threatened by the persistence of the majority. Given that the persistence of the majority was made salient to the subjects by explicity emphasizing the group pressure put on the minority member, psychological reactance is a very plausible explanation for the Maass and Clark results. The reactance interpretation gains additional importance in view o f recent observations suggesting that peopIe are more likely to react against freedom threatening influence attempts in pnvate than in public (e.g. Frey and Gniech, 1984). In this experiment, a communicator stated prior to his message that he either expected subjects to adopt the advocated posihon or that he expected them to move into the opposite direction. When the communicator anticipated an attitude change towards the advocated viewpoint, subjects accepted the communicators opinion in public while moving away from the advocated position in pnvate. When the communicator voiced the expectation that his message would lead to a boomerang effect, subjects moved away from the advocated viewpoint in public but adopted it in pnvate. Similar pnvate reactance effects may occur in a situation in which a person is pressured by a majonty. There are a number of reasons to suggest that reactance is more likely to occur during interaction with a majonty than w t h a minority First, due to its numerical supenority, the majority can exert greater social pressure. This is in line w t h Nemeth and Wachtlers (1983) observation that subjects experience considerably more stress dunng interaction with a majonty than w t h a minority influence source. Second, when the importance of freedom is relahvely high reactance is generally greater the more attractive the pressunng source and the greater therefore the pressure toward compliance (Brehm and Mann, 1975). Considering that deviant minorities are usually strongly disliked (for an overview see Nemeth, in press) they can be expected to produce relatively little reactance. Direct empirical evidence for this assumption comes from a comparative majority-minority influence study by Moscovici, Mugny and Papastamou (1981). In this experiment, subjects were either confronted with a disagreeing majority or minority A high degree of social pressure was induced in order to facilitate reactance. Majorities were found to elicit mild reactance effects while no such effect was observed for the minority source of influence. Further, Subjects exposed to the majority source moved away from the advocated viewpoint only on indirect items, that is on less reactive measures, but not on direct items which were exactly matching the majoritys message. Taken together, the above results suggest that pnvate reactance effects are more likely to occur during interaction with a disagreeing majonty than w t h a minority. Considenng that people in real life interactions are often exposed to simultaneous influence attempts from minorities and majorities on the same issue, it remains to be demonstrated that the private acceptance of the minority position is, indeed, a conversion toward the minonty rather than a pnvate reactance against the majority pressure. The following expenment was designed in order to test whether reactance can account for the observed internalization of the minority opinion. Subjects with moderate attitudes toward gay rights were confronted with an extreme majority opinion (either opposing or favouring gay rights). Half of the subjects were simultaneously presented with a minonty opinion (either in favour or opposing gay rights); the other half was not exposed to the minority position. Subsequently, subjects were asked to indicate their attitudes towards gay rights either in public or in private. Identical predictions can be derived from conversion and reactance theory for the case in which the minonty and the majonty position are presented simultaneously. Here, subjects are expected to move towards the majority position when asked to announce their own attitude in public while shifting toward the minonty position in private. Yet, conversion theory predicts no such pnvate shift toward the minonty position in the majonty only condition. In contrast, the reactance explanation does predict identical results for the simultaneous influence and the majority only conditions.

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Method

307

Two hundred female undergraduates (20 subjects per cell) from a Southeastern University in the U.S. who had indicated moderate attitudes toward gay rights on a pre-test were asked to read the summary of an ostensible group discussion on gay rights. In the smultaneous majonty/minority influence condition, four persons in the summary were described as consistently presenting a majority position (either in favour or opposed to gay rights) while one person consistently defended a minonty position-each party presenting eight arguments in favour of its position. Subsequently, subjects were asked to indicate their attitudes towards gay rights either in public or in pnvate. (For a detailed description of the design, the experimental matenal, the attitude scale, and relevant pilot work see Maass and Clark, 1983). In a parallel set of majority-only conditions, subjects were only exposed to the consistent majonty opinion (either favounng or opposing gay rights) while no mention was made of a deviant minonty and the respective arguments were deleted from the summary. Thus, subjects were only exposed to majonty influence. Further, two control groups were included in which subjects expressed their attitudes towards gay nghts in public or private without having been exposed to a summary of the group discussion. Thus, the present study consisted of a 2 (minonty present/minonty absent) x 2 (majonty opposing/majonty favouring gay rights) x 2 (private/public response) factorial design with two additional control groups (no influence private/no influence public).
Results

A 2 (pnvate versus public) x 2 (minority present/absent) x 2 (majonty position: opposingJfavouring gay nghts) ANACOVA was performed on the post-test attitude change scores using the pre-test scores as the covariate. Overall, majorities favounng gay rights resulted in more favourable attitudes towards gay nghts than did majorities opposing gay nghts, F(1, 151) = 8.49, p < 0.01. Majority position interacted with the presence/absence of the minonty, F(1, 151) = 5.12, p < 0.05, and, as expected from a conversion theory perspective, both effects were modified by a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 151) = 8.96, p < 0.01 (see Table 1). For subsequent individual comparisons a 2 (pnvate versus public) x 5 (majority con-minonty pro, majority pro-minority con, majority con only, majority pro only, and control) ANACOVA was performed on the data to acquire an overall error term and obtain adjusted post-test means for the two control groups. For the triple interaction, a p i o n determined, follow-up-t-tests compared private with public responses in the control and expenmental conditions. No differences between private and public responses were observed in the control group, t(189) = -0.06, n.s. In the simultaneous influence condition in which the majority opposed and the minonty favoured gay rights, subjects expressed significantly more favourable attitudes towards gay nghts in

Table 1. Adjusted means of post-test attitudes* Minonty present Maj-con Private Type of response Public 16.79 ( N = 20) 14.76 ( N = 20) Maj-pro 15.13 ( N = 20) 17.16 ( N = 20) Minonty absent Maj-con 13.26 ( N = 20) 15.59 ( N = 20) Maj-pro 17.59 ( N = 20) 17.18 ( N = 20) Control 15.63 ( N = 20) 15.72 ( N = 20)

*Means represent attitudes scores (sum of four Items) ranging from 4 to 28 with lower scores indicating stronger opposition to gay rights.

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private than in public, t(189) = 1.86,p < 0.05; in the simultaneous influence condition in which the majonty favoured and the minority opposed gay nghts, Subjects expressed more favourable attitudes towards gay nghts in public than in pnvate t(189) = - 1 . 7 8 , ~< 0.05. In the absence of a minority the results were quite different. #en the majority opposed gay rights, subjects showed more negative attitudes towards gay rights in private than in public, t(189) = - 2 . 3 5 , ~< 0.05; there was n o difference between pnvate and public responses in the majonty pro only condition, t(189) = -0.06, n.s. I n short, the subjects acceptance of the minonty in private was not a reactance against the majority position. Another way t o see the importance that the minority played in these data is to look a t cornpansons involving the presence versus absence of the minonty in pnvate and in public. T h e presence of a pro-gay minority position resulted in more favourable attitudes towards gay nghts in private than did its absence, t(189) = 3.23, p < 0.01, and the presence of a minonty opposing gay rights produced more unfavourable attitudes towards gay rights in private than did its absence, t(189) = -2.25, p < 0.05. For public responses, the two corresponding compansons were both insignificant, t(189) = -0.77, n.s., t(189) = 0, n.s., respectively. Hence, subjects moved away from the majority position only in private and in the presence of an opposing minonty position.

Conclusion
Two conclusions can b e drawn from the above results. First, the present study was able to replicate our previous findings (Maass and Clark, 1983): Subjects exposed to simultaneous influence attempts from a minonty and a majority tend to move towards the majority in public but shift their opinions slightly toward the minority in private. Second, the comparison with the majority only conditions indicates that reactance theory is unable t o account for the conversion effects observed under simultaneous majority/minonty influence. When the malority was the only source of influence, subjects showed n o tendency to move away from the advocated position. In the absence of a disagreeing minority, subjects even expressed strong private agreement with the majonty-a phenomenon rarely observed in the conformity paradigm and inconsistent with the predictions of conversion theory. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to identify the conditions under which a majority may induce private attitude changes, the results d o suggest that a consistent minonty arguing at the opposite side of the issue is able to counteract the potential impact of the majority on the pnvate level2 Thus, reactance can safely b e ruled out as an alternative explanation for the pnvate acceptance of a minority position in the simultaneous social influence paradigm (although the majonty may very well arouse reactance in different expenmental settings). This further underlines the unique capacity of consistent minorities to exert a hidden influence o n peoples pnvate opinions even in the presence of an opposing majority

It is interesting to note in this context that the minonty had a somewhat greater pnvate impact when favounng (ma]-con condition; comparison with control group: t(189) = 1.06, p < 0.15) than when opposing gay rights (maj-pro condition; companson with control: t(189) = 0.46, n.s.). When opposing gay rights the minority merely reduced conformity to the majonty without being able to induce a true shift towards its own position. (Note that these results strongly resemble Aschs work in which conformity to a majority was drastically reduced in the presence of a dissenter). The difference between the ma]-con and the maj-pro condition may be explained by the distribution of opinionsoutside the laboratory (see Moscovici and Faucheux, 1972). Only the minority favouring gay rights is advocating a true minority position since favourable attitudes towards gay rights represent a minonty view also in the population at large or in a relevant comparison group (peer group). A preliminary survey had, in fact, shown that only 12 per cent of the student sample were clearly in favour of gay rights while 56 per cent held moderate or neutral attitudes and 32 per cent clearly opposed gay rights. *It also remains unclear why subjects were more likely to accept the anti-gay viewpoint of an isolated majonty in pnvate than in public. Since there is a considerable normative pressure against discnmination of minonty groups subjects may have been somewhat reluctant to express an anti-gay viewpoint publicly while they were willing to admit hostile attitudes towards gays in pnvate.

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References

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Brehm, J. W (1966). A Theory of Psychological Reactance, Academic Press, New York. Brehm, S. S . and Brehm, J. W (1981). Psychological Reactance. A Theory ofFreedom and Control, Academic Press, New York. Brehm, J. W and Mann, M. (1975). Effect of importance of freedom and attraction to group members on influence produced by group pressure, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31. 816-824. Frey, D and Gniech, G. (1984). Negative attitude change after a freedom-threatening influence. Unpublished Manuscnpt, University of Kiel, F.R.G. Latane, B. and Wolf, S . (1981). The social impact of majorities and minorities, Psychological Review, 88: 438-453. Maass, A. and Clark, R. D., I11 (1983). Internalization versus compliance: Differential processes underlying minority influence and conformity, European Journal of Soclal Psychology, 13: 197-215. Maass, A. and Clark, R. D I11 (1984). Hidden impact of minonties: Fifteen years of minority influence research, Psychological Bulletin, 95: 428-450. Moscovici, S. (1980). Towards a theory of conversion behavior In: Berkowitz, L. (Ed.) Advances in Expenmental Social Psychoiogy, Vol. 13, pp. 209-239 Moscovici, S. and Faucheux, C . (1972). Social influence, bias, and active minorities. In: Berkowitz, L. (Ed.) Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 6, pp. 150-201. Moscovici, S., Mugny, G. and Papestamou, S. (1981). Sleeper effect et/on effet minontaire? Etude theonque et esperimentale de linfluence sociale a retardement, Cahiers de Psychologie Cognitive, 1. 199-221. Nemeth, C. J. (in press). Dissent, group process and creativity: the contribution of minority influence In: Lawler, E. (Ed.) Advance zn Group Theory and Processes, JAI Press, Greenwich, London. Nemeth, C. J. and Wachtler, J. (1983). Creative problem solving as a result of majority versus minority influence, European Journal of Social Psychology, 13: 45-55. Tanford, S. and Penrod, S. (1984). Social influence model: A formal integration of research on majority and minority influence processes, Psychological Bulletin, 95: 189-225.