Nietzsche: Virtue Ethics Virtue Politics? Author(s): Christine Daigle Source: Journal of Nietzsche Studies, No.

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Nietzsche:

Virtue Ethics

.. . Virtue Politics?

Christine

Daigle

In

Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity can Nietzsche's ethics.He also asserts that not be rightly appreciated without noting the Aristotelian ethics that inspired it.2 Kaufmann's assertions are grounded in a connection he establishes between the Aristotelian notion of megalopsychia found inNicomachean Ethics and the figure of the?bermensch. Iwill approach this connection in a variety ofways in thefirst section of my essay andwill show how we must go beyond Kaufmann. If one chooses to dismiss the connection between Aristotle's and Nietzsche's Nietzsche's ethics cannot be read as ethics, as Iwill do, thisdoes notmean that an instance of virtue ethics. In the second section, I will articulate how it is possible to interpretthe ethical ideas ofNietzsche as forming a type of virtue ethics and show how Nietzsche ethics thatfocuses on the character development of the agent. Iwill define virtue can be seen as a virtue ethicist. I will explain

this article, I propose to reconstructFriedrichNietzsche's ethical teachings and read them as a form of virtue ethics.1 This reading is partly inspired by Kaufmann's generous rendering of Nietzsche's ethics. In his classic study, Kaufmann supposes that Aristotle's philosophy had a great influence on

how he shares the criticalmoment found in the revival of virtue ethicsmostly articulated in the twentieth century and also how he shares in the constructive program found therein.3 In a thirdsection, Iwill address theproblem thatawaits thosewho want to readNietzsche generously, as I do, as a virtue ethicist. This problem arises with respect to his aristocratic politics found in certain texts. It will thenbecome clear thatan articulation of his ethical ideaswith respect tohis political ideas is problematic. Iwill attempt to solve this problem, thoughmy proposed solutionwill emphasize a certain part of the corpus while necessarily overlooking another.

Nietzsche In

and Aristotle

an article titled "Aristotle and Nietzsche: and 'Megalopsychia' Aristotelian reading ofNietzsche, 'Uebermensch,'" BerndMagnus argues thatthe initiated by Walter Kaufmann, must be dismissed. In the classic Nietzsche: Aristotle's con Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist,Kaufmann suggests that ception made a tremendous impression on Nietzsche, so much so that his

JOURNAL Copyright ?

OF NIETZSCHE

STUDIES,

Issue 32, 2006

2006 The Pennsylvania

State University, University Park, PA. 1

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Christine

Daigle

Kaufmann 's reading of theproud man and the ?bermensch. Magnus argues that ?bermensch is a superficial reading of both. Magnus continues: "Aristotle's with Nietzsche's ethics?even his conception of pride?has very littletodo either moral philosophy, orwith his conception ofUebermenschen"4 He is inspiredby which Nietzsche rejectsAristotelian aphorism 198 ofBeyond Good and Evil in ethics as an instance of "[m]orality as timidity." Aristotelian concepts of eudaimonia Magnus's main point has to do with the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle talks about the one good and phronesis. In the that is sought by human beings by nature: eudaimonia, that is, happiness. we seek. The good for thehuman Happiness is the only overarching good that

Opposition toChristianity can only be understood in those terms. According to Aristotle's ethics is considerable. His assertions Kaufmann, Nietzsche's debt to stem from a connection he establishes between Aristotle's conception of pride in Nicomachean Ethics, also referredto as "greatness of soul," and the book 4 of the

who possesses thispractical wisdom thatallows him to determine virtue,which is understood as themean between a vice by excess and a vice by default. He determines virtue in view of the good, happiness, which is ultimately a life of intellectual activity. Using reason as the foundation for happiness, Aristotle establishes virtue as theway to one's own flourishing. Essentially, virtues are

exercise of one's nature, characteristically human capacities across time."5 For Aristotle, the human capacity in question is rationality in thought and action. Therefore, the individual lives a flourishing life ifone lives a rational life, that is, a life guided by phronesis, practical wisdom. The phronemos is the person

is the fulfillmentof one's distinctive function,which, according to Aristotle, is the activity of reason. The concept of eudaimonia specifies that "one lives a flourishing life if one is engaged in the successful development and active

those character traits thatwe need to flourish as human beings. Virtues are chosen by thephronemos in view of his maturation as a human being, that is, the development of his distinctive quality, rationality.Because he is practically wise, he cannot fail in identifyingproper virtues in certain situations in relation to himself. That being said, thepractically wise person does not choose virtues forwhat theywill yield but, rather, for their own sake. Charles M. Young explains: Having the correctconception of human flourishing,thatofN[icomachean] will see themselvesas beingswhose essence is the Efthics] 1.7, [thevirtuous] in thought and action.Since actingon the capacityfortherealizationof rationality will see constitutes inaction, thevirtuous of rational choice rationality principles ofwho theyare.This is a perspec their actingon theseprinciplesas constitutive
tive that is unavailable of who expression to the nonvirtuous. They cannot see what they do as the of who they are.6 they are, for they lack the correct conception

Nietzsche Aristotle's good life could not appeal to Magnus rightly points out that with the contemplative or rational activity of the because it is too intertwined

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Virtue

Ethics

, . .Virtue

Politics?

moral soul. As another instance of Platonic rationalism, Aristotle's view of the must be rejected by Nietzsche. Indeed, Nietzsche, who rejects this view of life thehuman as an essentially rational being, would certainly resist such a view of morality inwhich an individual moderates his or her own flourishing by using mean in every course of action. The other aspect practical reason to establish the thatwould have been displeasing toNietzsche is thatof eudaimonia. It is not Nietzsche would reject somuch asAristotle's con morality as goal oriented that In Antichrist of ?2,Nietzsche is clear: "What ishappiness?? ception happiness. The feeling thatpower increases?that a resistance is overcome." Happiness comes upon the exercise ofwill to power, when one's own self is the expression of thiswill to power. This assertion of power is in no way the same as the con

with Aristotle's ethics. Nietzsche's claims about virtues present them as lacking Aristotelian prudence and cleverness, which are two essential ingredients in the phronemos's virtues. Nonetheless, according toHunt, Nietzsche holds a pure

templative life advocated by Aristotle.7 Lester Hunt agrees that Nietzsche's ethics pertains to human flourishing and character building. He also considers thatNietzsche's views have little to do

ethics of virtue.Apure ethics of virtue, as Trianosky defines it, is a formof virtue ethics that"holds thatonly judgments about virtue are basic in morality, and that the Tightnessof actions is always somehow derivative from thevirtuousness of traits. [...] [F]or the pure ethic of virtue themoral goodness of traits is always both independent of the Tightness of actions and in some way originative of it as well."8 According toHunt, Nietzsche's pure ethics of virtue is one inwhich vitalism is thekey to goodness. The only intrinsicgood for Nietzsche is life; "all thegoods thathuman beings seek are only good to the extent that in some sense

We will return to this. theypromote life."9 I agree with Magnus and think that Kaufmann goes too farwhen he equates the two ethics based on a minor similaritybetween the two represented figures. As Cameron says in his book Nietzsche and the "Problem" of Morality, when Nietzsche talks about Aristotle, it ismostly to his rhetoric and poetics thathis attention is devoted. Nietzsche was familiarwith the Nicomachean Ethics and thePolitics but did not generally deal with Aristotle as ethician. Cameron points out that,generally,Aristotle escapes harsh condemnation fromNietzsche, but make Nietzsche anAristotelian. Inmany instances, that,in itself,isnot enough to

Nietzsche presents direct or indirectpositive assessments ofAristotle's thought. For example, inAntichrist ?7, Nietzsche talks about Christianity as the religion of pity and, in theprocess of doing so, declares that"Aristotle, as iswell known,

saw in pity a morbid and dangerous condition thatone did well to get at from time to timewith a purgative: he understood tragedy as a purgative." Nietzsche would have to appreciate such a stance, one coming fromamorality thatrequires a toughness of character.However, thereare also instanceswhere Aristotle suffers some blows. As Cameron says, "Since Nietzsche regardsAristotle's philosophy

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Christine

Daigle

as anti-Dionysian, and labels his own morality as 'derDionysos-Moral,' one can conclude that Nietzsche did not feel a moral kinship with Aristotelian ethics despite the fact thatboth emphasize 'human excellence.'"10

Nietzsche andVirtue Ethics

Now that I have established thata connection between Aristotle and Nietzsche me to show how one can readNietzsche as a virtue isnot possible, itremains for ethicist. I think thathis ethical thought isbest understood as being akin tovirtue

from complete. We need more specifications ifwe are to decide whether Nietzsche's ethics is an instance of virtue ethics. The definition of virtue ethics presents a theory thatfocuses on the innerstates of the moral agent ratherthanon the moral agent's performance of certain actions. Virtue ethics is concerned with determining the virtuousness of actions. It does so by concentrating not on the actions but, rather,on the character and virtuous

ethics as we find it in its twentieth-centuryrevival.What is twentieth-century virtue ethics really about?We need to saymore than, "Virtue ethics focuses on character rather than rules," and, "Virtue ethics talks about virtues instead of right actions." Of course the aforementioned affirmations are correct but far

ness of the agent. Robert Louden suggests thatvirtue ethics has two comple mentary aspects: a critical program and a constructive program.11 First, Iwould

quentialist ethics. Specifically, the points called into question in traditional moralities are the following: theoverreliance on rulemodels ofmoral choice, the overly rationalistic accounts ofmoral agency, and theformalism inherentin such theories. The firstpoint calls attention to theuniversal rules and principles pre sented in some theories as theultimate guides for action. The second point calls

like to examine the critical program.What exactly is the critical program? Virtue ethicists always criticize, explicitly or implicitly, traditional views ofmorality. This is essentially the reason why theypresent us with an alternative. The tradi tionalmoralities under attack are deontological-Kantian and utilitarian-conse

attention to thenegation of any active role on thepart of emotions and desires in the moral life.The criticism uttered by virtue ethicists in relation to the second point says that"the people we most admiremorally are not simply thosewho do theirduty and act on the correct principles, but thosewho do so with theright kinds of desires and emotions."12 Virtue ethicists can be said to be in favor of a rehabilitation of emotions and desires, that is,nonrational parts of ourselves.With respect to formalism, the thirdpoint, virtue ethicists note that morality ismore

than a mere conceptual analysis of duty concepts and logical arguments. They want to include othermethodological approaches in ethical thinking. Now Iwill turn to the second aspect, the constructive program.What exactly

is the constructive program? Having discarded traditional ethics, virtue ethicists

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Virtue

Ethics

. . . Virtue

Politics?

have an alternative to offer.13 Briefly, the constructive program aims to refocus attentionon the moral agent and on a determination of virtues. In doing so, virtue

ethics presents a view of human flourishing. There is a distinction to be made between those ethics that concentrate on the character of the agent and those thatbusy themselves with a determination of virtues. The brand I find more

virtue ethicsmakes proposals thataccommodate theflourishing of individuals, it is, of necessity, relativistic or broad enough so thatvarious individuals are allowed toflourish in theirown way. That is a tenetofAristotle, who claims that virtue is relative both to the agent and to circumstances. However, there is a way to avoid an extreme relativism that would relegate virtue ethics to the ranks of

interesting in termsof ethical "potential" is the character-based one. Indeed, its focus on the agent and his or her character allows for the development of an ethics thathas the flourishing of the individual as its strictpreoccupation. If a

those ineffective ethics. Here Iwant to consider a suggestionmade by ChristineMcKinnon. She pres ents a virtue ethics based on a naturalistic approach. She says that"virtue theo ries show us how theputative gap between the descriptive and thenormative is

and the subj ective evaluation of the coyote has nothing todo with it.15 Similarly, for McKinnon, human virtues are good things to possess forhumans given the kind of beings thathumans are, independent of any teleological consideration orpreference.What distinguishes thehuman from a coyote is the fact that virtues are not innate and one has to choose a virtue in order to possess it.The human with the capacity to cultivate them. being is not born with virtues but, rather, McKinnon defines virtues as dispositions to act in certainways, what she calls

says thatvirtue ethics isunique in itsproposition of various models, but she also argues thatvirtues can be established objectively by considering the nature of individuals. To support this claim she gives the example of the coyote. For the coyote, given itsnature, possessing a warm coat is an intrinsicallygood thing,

tobe closed: by showingwhat it isnaturally good forhumans to care about, they show why a life centered around these cares is a good life forhumans."14 She

dispositional properties. Accordingly, agents choose virtues as dispositions that can lead them to a flourishing human lifeby way of beneficial actions and deci sions entailed therein.16 It is to be noted that a virtue ethics that adopts such a naturalistic approach will still present a variety of possibilities for the flourishing of moral agents while connecting the flourishing-conducive virtues to their nature. Not any chosen character trait will qualify as virtue. Virtue ethics that concentrates on the character of agents is thus a "character-building" theory. The agent chooses virtues to build his own character.Given thekind of being an agent is, shewill

was happiness, but it can have an ultimate goal inview (Aristotle considered it be something else) and will build her character in such a way as to bring her closer to this goal. The process and the attainment of the goal may be coined

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Christine

Daigle

human flourishing. Virtue ethics is thus an ethics that is primarily concerned with thisflourishing. Is Nietzsche's ethics an instance of virtue ethics in its renewed, non Aristotelian sense? Brian Leiter would say no, as he has argued that Nietzsche's Nietzsche

Nietzsche even if itreveals itself unsystematically andmight be inneed of recon struction.Leiter is right in saying that Nietzsche shares the critical program of mistaken with respect to Nietzsche's "Morality Critics," as he calls them,but is
immoralism.

ethics cannot be understood as an instance of virtue ethics.17 He argues that only shares in the critical program of virtue ethicists.Not only that, but according toLeiter, Nietzsche goes much furtherinhis rejection ofmoral ity than virtue ethicists, in thathe rejects not only traditionalmorality but also all forms ofmorality. Contra Leiter I think that there is an ethical program in

we should promote thegood, concludes that Nietzsche is "an ethicistwho thinks butwho has a distinctive and controversial view ofwhat thatgood is."18Because Nietzsche has a good inmind and gives prescriptions on how to achieve that good, he certainly qualifies as an ethicist. Slote furtherargues that this type of ethical thinking would be close to an agent-based virtue ethics thatconcentrates on the development of the character of the agent and not on the per its efforts

Michael Slote, a contemporary virtue ethicist, has approached Interestingly, Nietzsche with prudence and questioned the lack of openness to fellow humans in Nietzsche's program as a possible disqualifier. After careful deliberation Slote

formance of specific actions. I agree with Slote that this is the approach one must takewith Nietzsche's ethical program. Let us see how this agent-based virtue ethics is proposed by Nietzsche.

Nietzsche's

Virtue Ethics

In this section, Iwill delineate Nietzsche's own brand of virtue ethics. It should be clear that Nietzsche does indeed share the critical program of virtue ethicists. His attacks against the traditionalview ofmorality and thenihilism he proposes make clear that,forhim, traditional morality is alienating to any human life. In main all thosemoral systems are distasteful to The Gay Science he says: "In the ' me which say: 'Do not do this!Renounce! Overcome thyself! On theother hand I am favorable to thosemoral systemswhich stimulateme to do something, and todo itagain from morning tillevening, todream of itat night, and thinkof noth to do itwell, as well as is possible forme alone! [...] I do not like ing else but any of thenegative virtueswhose very essence isnegation and self-renunciation" (?304). Elsewhere, inTwilight of theIdols, he talks about a sin ofmorality: "The

most general formula at thebasis of every religion and morality is: 'Do this and this?and you will be happy! Otherwise. . . .'Every morality, every religion is

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Virtue

Ethics

. ., Virtue

Politics?

call it the great original sin of reason, immortal unreason" view of traditional Nietzsche's ("Errors" 2). morality can be found throughout his writings; however, I think these quotations are satisfactory for our purpose. with which Nietzsche approaches morality. The prob These two clarify the spirit lemwith traditional morality is that itdoes not take into consideration human nature. It does not look at the individual as he is and aim to embrace what he is but, rather,aims to impose a model on him thathas no ground in the reality of this imperative?I thehuman. This model is of a transcendentnature and does not fit the immanent nature of thehuman being. Let us remember the threepoints under criticism in the critical program of virtue ethicists: theoverreliance on rule models ofmoral choice, theoverly ratio

nalistic accounts ofmoral agency, and the formalism inherent in such theories. we are talking about virtue ethicists,we would readily we did not know that If

human nature, claiming thatreason isbut a very small part of ourselves. He talks of thehuman being in termsof a fiction (see D 105).We arewronged in the con

Nietzsche. Nietzsche does reject rulemodels. His ethics say that thispertains to of creativity argues thatone must create values for oneself and not rely on any external (transcendent) rule. Nietzsche also fiercely rejects the rationalistic account of moral agency. He struggles to rehabilitate the repressed parts of

We are indeed very far from the traditional picture of the self and also far from the superiorityof reason that isproposed by traditionalphilosophical approaches and moralities in particular. Last, it is also evident that Nietzsche rejects the formalism inherent in traditionalmoralities as he would generally reject any formalism in thought.

of the instincts and passions" {BGE 12). Nietzsche says furtherthat "[i]f we desired and dared an architecture corresponding to the nature of our soul (we are too cowardly for it!)?our model would have to be the labyrinth!" (D 169).

we are neatly divided between ception of ourselves: we are led to believe that reason and instinct.But this division is illusory.The human being is a "social structure ofmany 'souls'" (BGE19). We possess a soul that is a "social structure

Nietzsche does share the critical program of virtue ethicists. The nihilism he proposes is supposed to remedy the alienating traditional philosophical (and religious) discourse. But does he stop at the nihilistic moment? Is his program purely nihilistic, as Leiter suggests? I have argued elsewhere thatfar frombeing

startfrom scratch.This iswhere his attacks on morality come intoplay. In this moment Nietzsche announces the death of God and itsmetaphysical import. Nietzsche is clear about his self-attributedimmoralism:"At bottommy expression immor?list involves two denials. I deny first a type of man who has hitherto counted as the highest, thegood, the benevolent, beneficent, I deny secondly a

His challenge purely nihilistic,Nietzsche's philosophy is entirely constructive.19 consists in rejecting the existingmorality to construct anew. The old system's deficiencies cannot be adjusted by reorganization.One must erase everythingand

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Christine

Daigle

tion of traditional morality. He also says of fellow immoralists, they "see [their] honor inaffirming" (TI "Morality" 6).20There isno question of abandoning ethics. Ethics is needed and will be his preoccupation for the first steps of his recon was a preoccupation before his reconstruction as it lead to the struction, for it rejection of the defective ethics.Nihilism is a necessary step toward this recon As he says inThe Gay Science: "We deny, andmust deny,because some struction. us wants to live and affirm itself,somethingwhich we perhaps do not as in thing yet know, do not as yet see!" (307).

kind ofmorality which has come to be accepted and to dominate as morality in itself?d?cadence morality, inmore palpable terms Christian morality" (EH "Destiny" 4). His rejection ofmorality is thusclearly identifiedby him as a rejec

in Thus Spoke resembling a mindless coincidence" (1). The ?bermensch, Zarathustra, is thefigurewho is successful inbecoming his own master. He is an Overman, more than a man, a human being that is human and more. Why more? The ?bermensch is the individual who has overcome the fragmentation

wants to affirm itself? InSchopenhauer as Educator, Nietzsche What is itthat are accountable to ourselves forour own existence; consequently, says that"We we also want to be the real helmsmen of our existence and keep it from

fearful to you inhis goodness! And you wise and enlightened men, you would which the Superman joyfully bathes his flee from theburning sun ofwisdom in nakedness! You highest men my eyes have encountered! This ismy doubt of you and my secret laughter: I thinkyou would call my Superman?a devil!"

himself refers.21Even the highest type of human being present in Nietzsche's writings, the strongman, is far below the?bermensch. He says: "Your souls are so unfamiliar with what is great that the Superman would be Nietzsche

inherent in tradition. It is theperson who has reunited himself,who has decided to live fully as he is. It is also the person who knows that life iswill to power and thathe himself is an instance of this will to power. Accordingly, he wishes to embody and respect the will topower within himself. In addition to all of this, he accepts the eternal returnhypothesis. He is ready to suppose that the actions will returneternally the same. The change and decisions hemakes during his life man to?bermensch is tremendous. So much so that we cannot talk about from an elevation from man to ?bermensch but really of a transfiguration, as

(Z "Manly Prudence"). The ?bermensch is an ideal type of human being. Every individual should emulate thisfigure as an illustration ofwhat one can become ifonly one were to engage oneself in theway of creation.When I speak of an ideal type, the ?bermensch, Imean that it is a figure towardwhich one must strive,not to be confused as a state one can reach. For one thing, it is not clear inNietzsche's we mind whether therewill ever be ?bermenschen. For another thing, I think should interpretthe figure he presents to us as a dynamic state of being. If the will topower, he will ?bermensch accepts life and himself as an instance of the

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Virtue

Ethics

. .. Virtue

Politics?

more power, characteristic ofNietzsche's be inconstant becoming. The drive for a being, will lead the individual into continuous flux and constant overcoming

of oneself. This is how one should understand the?ber of ?bermensch. But even if we are talking about a "state of flux," this is a state thatone should strive to acquire while engaging in theprocess of attainment. Nietzsche, According to thereare certain things thatone must do inorder to approach this excellence and in turnbecome an ?bermensch. Among these things are the creation of oneself

and the creation of values that is essential in supporting a new ethics. The human being should be the creator of oneself. She should be her own meant by the famous, or master and define her own rules (which iswhat is truly

and its transcendent morals has proven that itsonly possible result is alienation. Human beings must create an ethics for human beings. The individual must create an ethics that respects one's nature as human and as will to power. This

infamous, "Master morality").22 Once the sky of values has been emptied, the task is to fill it again for oneself. The individual should no longer rely on any transcendent toprovide these values, as theprevious experiment of Christianity

is expressed in Nietzsche's maxim: "What Saith thy Conscience!?Thou shalt become what thou art" (GS 270). You must flourish! Note that there is nothing in Nietzsche's writings until Beyond Good and Evil that indicates that theway

of the?bermensch is bared for certain individuals. He makes clear that this potentiality exists in every individual. It is only amatter of the individual choos ing to actualize his or her own self aswill topower.23 Thus theemphasis isplaced on the flourishing of the agent via the adoption of certain virtues in linewith
own being. one's

To this,one must add thevitalism ofNietzsche's philosophy. This is expressed most clearly inAntichrist ?2 where he says: "What is good??All thatheightens man. What is bad??All the feeling of power, thewill to power, power itself in that proceeds from weakness. What is happiness??The feeling that power increases?that a resistance isovercome." As Hunt argues, according to Nietzsche,

"Life is theonly thing that is good in itself,and is the standardbywhich thevalue of everything else is to be measured."24 We could state his fundamentalmoral principle in the followingmanner: "Anything thataffirms,creates, and augments life is good." Values chosen by individualsmust be chosen with thisprinciple in mind because, as Hunt puts it,"all thegoods that human beings seek are only good to the extent that in some sense theypromote life."25 In that,human beings will only promote themselves and theirown being as an instance of life.The individ ual will be truetohim- or herself.Only thencan one be said toflourish as a human being. So we are right to say, along with Hunt, thateven ifone fundamental rule character and not on rules. can be derived from the will topower,Nietzsche's focus is on thedevelopment of

What about virtues? Hunt suggests that,according toNietzsche, "no list of thevirtues could be complete. [. . .]Each occurrence of a virtue is different in

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10

Christine

Daigle

kind from all others. There really is no virtue other than 'thepeculiar virtue of each man'" (GS 120).26As Hunt points out, we can find two lists of virtues in Nietzsche: in Daybreak and Beyond Good and Evil. In theseworks, Nietzsche

traditional moralities that say: acquire these virtues and you will be virtuous. In Nietzsche's mind, virtues are relative to the individual. However, virtues can conflict with one another. All the virtues that one adopts for oneself in Nietzsche's new ethics are adopted in view of one's own accomplishments, in we can see how central the view of one's own flourishing. In addition to this, notion of character is in relation to thatof virtue.Virtues are adopted inview of thedevelopment of character. Character is what needs improving. We can deter

proposes courage, generosity, politeness, honesty, insight, sympathy, and soli more virtues exist, because the lists tude as virtues. However, one senses that are not exhaustive and there is no recipe on how to be virtuous as there is in

mine if it is good when we examine the question as to how itenhances thewill topower. The actions thatare thenaccomplished by thevirtuous agent are good because of the agent being virtuous, and some will be good in themselves as

should see the eternal return as an ontological notion. not want to saywhat the Nietzsche does world is like; rather, he wants toproduce a thought experiment that could serve as a guide for action.27 It is an ethical hypothesis. As such, it serves to validate the choice of action. The individual must ask himself whether the course of action he is about toundertake is some thing thathe would like to see coming back eternally.One must choose as ifthat choice is going to recur eternally.Under theperspective of the eternal return, I cannot choose something that would make me would make me unhappy or that resentful because thisunhappiness and resentmentwould haunt me in this life and forever! Further,unhappiness or resentment cannot lead to a flourishing life. So, one's choice must be made in view of the flourishing life; thuswill itbe a we will want to eternally recur. good choice, that is, one that In the determination ofwhat a good human life is, that towardwhich every human must strive, thenotions ofwill topower and eternal returnserve as guides

actions thatpromote life.This is how vitalism comes to be articulated with the virtue ethics. will topower, thenotion of the eternal return Besides the ?bermensch and the a in role Nietzsche's ethical thought. Iwill begin by saying that I plays major do not think thatwe

for choice. A choice will be good if itpromotes life as will to power. A choice will also be good ifone can will that iteternally recurs. The two considerations go hand inhand, as one can will thatone's choice eternally recur only if it leads will come about through to theflourishing lifeone pursues, a flourishing life that as to will Nietzsche's realization of ourselves the power. injunctions and pre a perfectworld. He seem can we not to fit be for call them do that) scriptions (if we we we us of us that but he also demands who that become are, requires of become strong.Our flourishing does not lie in quiet satisfaction but, rather, in

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Virtut;

Ethics

.. . Virtue

Politics?

11

a constant overcoming. His virtue ethics and the requirements ithas forhuman agents are indeed very demanding.

Nietzsche's

Virtue Politics?

we should seek "[n]ot contentment,butmore InAntichrist 2,Nietzsche says that not virtue, but proficiency (virtue in the not at but war; all, peace power; Renaissance style, virtu, virtue free of moralic acid)." This is his plan as he describes itfollowing his description of hismoral principle grounded invitalism. It is followed by a statement ofNietzsche's own philanthropy : "The weak and ill-constituted shall perish[....] And one shall help them to do so" (A 2).What

are thepolitical implications of this? me thatthere is an overwhelming tension in It seems to Nietzsche's philosophy between his ethics and his politics. Ifwe have a good rationale for reading Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist, one who is concerned with theflourishing of all individuals, how can we make sense of the thingshe sayswhen he speaks polit

chance at flourishing. No one would be placed in such a position of oppression or dire need so thathe would be incapable of pursuing his own development. A virtue politics that looks after the flourishing of all individuals within a group would advocate an equality of opportunities. This does not necessarily entail

to advocate a political system that would favor theflourishing of all. This iswhat a "virtue politics" would be. Itwould be a politics that would be concerned with theflourishing of individuals in a group. A virtue politics would want to build a social structure inwhich every individual would have an equal

from the startand from an anthropological point of view, that would bar the way of becoming an?bermensch.29 Given this, it seems tome that Nietzsche needs

ically?28 Potentially, everyone can engage in the path of self-overcoming. As every individual is an instance ofwill topower, it is open to everyone tounder take itas a task to actualize his or her own being. Some will, and some will not. If theydo not, theyare then the lower types ofhuman beings. But there isnothing,

thatan equality of resultswould follow.Again, in the Nietzschean picture, some individuals will choose to be ?bermenschen, and otherswill not. The idea is that society or thepolitical order should not play a determining role indeciding whether the individual chooses to be an ?bermensch or not or even has the ability to choose. It should be the individual's own decision. What kind of regime would a virtue politics advocate then? It seems thata democracy or even social ism (a genuine form of socialism and not some mock socialism as we found in some countries in the twentieth century)would be thebest form of government to maximize an equality of opportunities. What shall follow? We know how Nietzsche despised those two forms of political regimes. He loathed democracy and ridiculed socialism. He says, "[T]o

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mediocre and lowering his value," and further:

dolts and flatheads as their "man

us thedemocratic movement is not only a form of the decay of political organi zation but a form of the decay, namely the diminution, of man, making him The over-all degeneration ofman down towhat todayappears to the socialist
of the future"?as their ideal?this

tionand diminutionofman intotheperfectherd animal (or, as theysay, to the man of the "free society"), thisanimalization ofman into thedwarf animal of and claims, is possible thereisno doubt of it. Anyone who has once equal rights thispossibility to theend knows one kind of nausea thatother through thought men don't know?but perhaps also a new task\? (BGE 203)30 This iswhere the tension lies inNietzsche.31 When he gets political, it is not clear at all thathe is a "virtue politician." Inmany texts,he seems to adopt an

degenera

Beyond Good and Evil he says very clearly that u[e]very enhancement of the will be so work of an aristocratic society?and it type 'man' has so farbeen the an in order of rank that the ladder of and believes long society again?a again and differences invalue between man and man, and thatneeds slavery in some sense or other" (257). Again in the same book he says: each otheras equals, as suggested Even thebodywithinwhich individualstreat before?and thishappens ineveryhealthyaristocracy?if it is a livingand not a within itrefrain from dyingbody,has todo tootherbodies what the individuals will striveto will topower, it will have tobe an incarnate doing to each other: it will topower. [...] "Exploitation" andbecause lifesimplyis butbecause itis living or imperfect and primitivesociety: itbelongs to the does notbelong to a corrupt
essence of what grow, spread, seize, become predominant?not from any morality or immorality

aristocratic, ifnot Platonic, stance that is concerned with theflourishing of only a select group of individuals.32 Inmany places, he seems to be advocating a politics of oppression thatdoes not cohere with the virtue ethics I delineate. In

will to life. (BGE 259) topower,which is afterall the

lives, as a basic

organic

function;

it is a consequence

of the will

Now, unless one thinks thatweaker human beings will flourish on their own termsunder the wise guidance and gentle oppression of?bermenschen, itseems to the aristocratic politics with a virtue ethics concerned reconcile impossible

with flourishing. When providing a rationale for every individual's valuation of the freedom of others, Simone de Beauvoir says thatwe need to actively promote the liberation of other individuals so that they can do the same forus reciprocally.33

Her ideal society is one inwhich everyone is engaged in the liberation from making everyone else "free from" in order that oppression, that is, engaged in they be "free to" (be authentic, exert their freedom, make their own choices, actualize theirown project). If the goal is for everyone to flourish as authentic free beings, one needs the collaboration of all in a society that advocates an equality of opportunities. Beauvoir 's ideal societywould be a socialist society.

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Virtue

Ethics

. . . Virtue

Politics?

13

In the context of explaining how every individual must work for the liberation of the other, she criticizesNietzsche's view in the following fashion.34 She says thata philosophy ofwill to power where every individual tries to exert her own will to power would see only clashes and conflicts between individuals. No collaboration is to be expected if indeed the exertion ofwill to power is to be will topower understood as the exertion of pure force.However, we know that even not is about exerting brute force. Nietzsche would consider that as an or instance of decadence declining will to power.35 Surprisingly, and probably

to the dislike of Beauvoir, one can use the same argument thatBeauvoir works out to support a virtue politics inNietzsche. Because every individual is an instance ofwill to power and seeks to flourish as an instance of that,everyone should collaborate in creating the best conditions for everyone's ability to flourish. InBeauvoir 'spattern,human flourishing as a free authentic individual

which favor an aristocratic form of politics. One

is pursued, whereas in Nietzsche, it is theflourishing of an authentic individual as an expression ofwill to power that is to be pursued.36 But again, it is difficult to articulate thiswith the bulk ofNietzsche's texts,

them?37He calls this his own brand of philanthropy. Are we dwelling in metaphor, or are these concrete statements fora politics of the future? In a sense, a scary one, eliminating the weak ones erases the tension aforementioned. If all you have inyour society is strong individuals, thenyou can have a nonoppressive would coherewith virtue ethics. politics thatfavors the flourishing of all and that a society where you need in other Nietzsche describes However, passages, weaker individuals to take care of business while ?bermenschen take care of theirown flourishing. For example, inBeyond Good and Evil he says:
The essential experiences

is tempted to ask the follow Is is Nietzsche serious when he talks of eugenics and it,then, that ing question: when he says that eliminating theweaker individuals? Does he reallymean it theweak ones and the ill-constituted should perish and thatwe should help

must

wealth) but as their meaning and highestjustification?that ittherefore accepts with a good conscience the sacrificeof untoldhuman beingswho, for itssake,
be reduced and lowered to incomplete human beings, to slaves, to instru

of a good and healthy aristocracy, however, characteristic is that it or the common itself not as a function (whether of the monarchy

ments. (25 8)38 Could

itbe, then, that Nietzsche has a differentkind of virtue politics in mind than the one I earlier defined? I said that virtue politics is concerned with the flourishing of individuals within a group. Could we have another kind of virtue politics that would be con cerned with theflourishing of individuals as a group? In this case, it seems that a society that has oppression as one of the conditions for the flourishing of were to lead to theflourishing of stronger individuals would be acceptable if it

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large portion of inhabitants of the city-statewas a condition for thewell-being of that state. It has been stressed that ancient Greek democracy was able to flourish as itdid only because of the large number of slaves it relied on to take care of themenial tasks while the higher individuals were involved in higher tasks.Although Nietzsche certainly admired some features of the ancient Greek city-states, it is difficult to imagine him in agreement with this given what he

thegroup. Individual flourishing would notmatter; rather, it would be theflour a In the that would be of of whole focus. way, one can say that ishing primary a was the ancient Greek society organized in such way that the oppression of a

has said of the?bermensch. One of the ancient Greek political models Nietzsche could relate towould be thatof Plato. In The Republic, Plato talks about an ideal city-state that would be

we find ourselves with a system that favors the flourishing of a of all; rather, select group of individuals. Nietzsche's Again, from an anthropological point of view, there is nothing in a favor the that would that system flourishing of position justifies advocating a to In is it talk about a virtue of individuals. my opinion, impossible only group

some equality of opportunities for the children of the warrior class. All of them have an opportunity to become guardians. However, this opportunity still depends on the existence of the lower strata of the pyramid, the artisans and farmers.Consequentially, we stilldo not have a system thatfavors theflourishing

organized in three classes: the guardians, thewarriors, and the artisans and warriors will undergo a very strict farmers.Plato explains thatthe children of the educational program where their capacities will be tested so thatonly the best of themwill complete the program and become guardians. In a way, there is

politics in the second sense, that is, a virtue politics thatwould promote the would imply that some indi of individuals as a group, because it flourishing ' What isneeded, viduals flourishingwould de discarded infavor of thatof others. a that the of favors every individual, and that is then, is virtue ethics flourishing as a Nietzsche the very systems that political system possible only ifyou adopt criticizes and rejects. How are we then to find our way out? Could itbe that in political matters as well as inmoral matters we need a Nietzsche takes on is r??valuation of values? Inmorality, one of the tasks that

to criticize and reject existing values. He also criticizes and rejectsmorality. All morality? No, as we saw earlier, only a certain kind ofmorality is rejected, that

is, morality that is detrimental to thehuman. So Nietzsche r??valu?tes morality in order to present it in a new form.The idea of a morality, then, is not thrown overboard, but only a certain particular conception is done away with. Could it Nietzsche really is criticizing and rejecting be the samewith democracy? What if a certain particular form of democracy? What ifhe wants to get to a political would favor the flourishing of all (who would choose to flourish, regime that an i.e., equality of opportunities)? His best choice is a democratic form of

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Virtue

Ethics

... Virtue

Politics?

15

government. But democracy as he saw it in his days leads to mediocrity. Democracy breeds the mediocre individual and favors the cultivation of need tobe that weak. But does it Christian virtues, virtues for the way? Nietzsche an thinks that there is adequation between the two, democracy and Christianity. But we can conceive of a transfigureddemocracy at least as much as we can

that embodies the virtue politics we need in order to cohere with Nietzschean virtue ethics. To my opinion, this is the only way we can equate the political Nietzsche and the ethical Nietzsche.

conceive of a transvaluation of values in the realm ofmorality. A democracy Nietzsche advocates would not end that would adhere to thenew morality that would be thekind of regime up breeding aweaker kind of individual. Instead, it

Conclusion I have made clear in the last section that it isvery difficult to articulate the ethical views and thepolitical views ofNietzsche. Reading him as an aristocrat, asmany do and as some texts allow, excludes the virtue ethics approach that I have

aristocratic politics that caters to higher individuals' flourishing is fine. However, this is not the line of interpretation I have adopted. Given that I consider Nietzsche's virtue ethics to be universalizable, the aristocratic politic comes as a clash. An easy way outwould be to say that there is no real political

delineated: one that seeks to favor theflourishing of all individuals as instances ofwill to power. Indeed, one can interpret Nietzsche's ethics as being perfec tionistic and akin to virtue ethics without universalizing it. In this context, an

would a society of?bermenschen be like? What is thevirtue politics What, then, thatwe need in order to cohere with the seemingly desirable virtue ethics we need, that program? I thinka revalued democracy is the virtue politics that is, a democracy that no longer levels down but, rather, seeks to bring the individuals higher, a democracy thatfavors theflourishing of all.40 Brock University

Nietzsche's program inNietzsche. Indeed, one often gets the impression that individual, the ethical individual, is a loner. Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a good example of said perception. Zarathustra talks to people, he does not talkwith We do not have a Thus Conversed Zarathustra but, rather,a Thus Spoke them. Zarathustra. Zarathustra is a loner.Nietzsche includes the virtue of solitude in his list?another biographeme?39 If one is alone and attends to one's own flouri shing, thenvirtue ethics is fine. But "no man is an island."We do live together and need an ethics and a politics that will allow us to live together successfully.

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Acknowledgments Iwish to thank Leah Bradshaw forher close reading of a previous draftof thisarti cle and forher insightfulcomments. Thanks are also due to Martine B?land, who also commented on some ofmy ideas onNietzsche's politics with amost welcome Brian Lightbody contributed to thepolishing of the lattersections of this severity. articlewith the comments he made on one ofmy presentations thataddressed the connection between the ethics and thepolitics in Nietzsche's thought.

Notes
1. Thomas H. Brobjer presents an interesting article in which he discusses Nietzsche's ethics of virtue. Though I agree with most of what Brobjer says, my approach is very different than his. He focuses on other elements of Nietzsche's "affirmative morality" than I do here. One

point that struck me as inaccurate is the one he makes at the outset (and reiterates toward the affirmative ethics with ethics of virtue has not been realized" end): "This kinship of Nietzsche's (2003, 64). As will become apparent in a later section of my article, this kinship has been both .Hunt, Michael realized and debated by people like Christine Swanton, Lester Slote, and myself. 2. See Kaufmann 1968. Cf. Magnus 1980, 262. 3. Twentieth-century virtue ethicists articulate their views on a critique of the ethical tradition they inherited. They oppose this tradition (the critical moment of their program) and then propose a constructive ethical program in its stead (the constructive program). This will be explained in 4. Magnus 5. Young 6. Young 1980, 262. 1980, 138. (1998), Christine Swanton argues that any issues that she identifies as (1) the question of an action right and (2) the question of what it is thatmakes a character trait article is a defense of the argument thatNietzsche addresses both issues, Virtue Ethics"

more detail below.

1980, 150-51. 7. In her "Outline of a Nietzschean it is thatmakes

virtue ethics needs what a virtue. Her whole although

to address at least two basic

I want to note particularly is the perhaps he does so in a disturbing way. What to explain the difference in tone between Nietzsche's interesting suggestion Swanton makes brand of virtue ethics and Aristotle's own version. Aristotle talks about eudaimonia as being the happiness one reaches through the exercise of virtues. But Swanton indicates, "Though in utopia eudaimonism would be our virtue ethics, in actual bad worlds we need our virtue ethics to be we live in an the escape from mediocrity" (1998, 33). Because we a one need virtue that will ethics, promote values that a specific imperfect, corrupt world, virtue ethics in a perfect world would not necessarily promote. Aristotle's ethics would thus be ethics would be a better fit for this imperfect best suited for a perfect world, whereas Nietzsche's driven by another value: world. However in both cases, virtue ethics deals with human flourishing?flourishing of a different kind. 8. Trianosky 1990, 336. 9. Hunt 1991, 112. This book is very interesting. I agree with much of what Hunt has to say therein. However, his approach is different thanmine. Hunt focuses on the virtues, whereas I focus of character and the notion of flourishing. Nonetheless, his analysis of virtues is illuminating. 10. Cameron 2002, 154. See

on the development and vitalism

especially "Nietzsche pro or contra Aristotelian Morals?" (Cameron 2002, 146-58) for a detailed examination of the connection between the two thinkers. Cameron's position opposes mine on the presentation of Nietzsche as a virtue ethicist. He says:

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ViRTUK Ethics

... Virtue

Politics?

17

Clearly, then,Nietzsche does not belong to the classical Greek tradition of virtue ethics with its emphasis on reason and moderation. Instead, his critique of the aretaic tradition ismeant to stand virtue ethics on Nevertheless, distinction, its head, rather than to show that he and Aristotle are of one mind. ifvirtue ethics is defined exclusively as pertaining to human excellence or personal then one may be inclined to situate Nietzsche within this tradition, while still certain differences among its contributors. But this is not my position. (2002, not be a

acknowledging

157-58) Cameron wants virtue ethics. 11. Louden 12. Louden 13. An

to talk about a Nietzschean

ethics of human flourishing thatwould

1998.

with a virtuous character would

1998, 493. in interesting approach to the said constructive program is taken by Justin Oakley "Varieties of Virtue Ethics" (1996). Although Iwill not follow Oakley's detailed definition in this essay, I think his views are worth presenting here. Oakley identifies six claims that are common to all forms of virtue ethics. The first says "[a]n action is right if and only if it iswhat an agent

is admirable in an agent or what contributes to and thus the of circular escape charge reasoning. The second claim simply states that flourishing we must first determine what the good is, i.e., human good, in order to determine the rightness or wrongness of actions in relation to that good. The third claim says that virtues are irreducibly virtuous character traits from notions of what each of them is valuable in a plural intrinsic goods that "embody irreducibly plural values?i.e. way which is not reducible to a single overarching value." The fourth claim holds that "[t]he virtues are objectively good." This is related to the third claim and merely states that virtues are good independent of desire, i.e., of our desiring the virtue. The fifth claim divides among agent relative goods and agent-neutral goods in saying that some goods such as friendship are agent relative whereas others such as justice are agent neutral. Finally, the last claim holds that "[a]cting we maximize the good" (Oakley 1996, 139^10). All versions of virtue rightly does not require that ethics make (along with Approach" these six claims. Iwant to leave aside the further differentiations proposed by Oakley "A Virtue Ethics this cited article, readers might be interested to consult Oakley's

do in the circumstances" (Oakley 1996, 129). Character is primary in the determination of the Tightness or wrongness of an action. One could object thatwe are dealing with circular reasoning here: an action is right because it is chosen by a virtuous agent, and a virtuous agent is the one who performs right actions. But virtue theories generally derive

more below). 14.McKinnon 15. True

[1998], which explores the features of virtue ethics again but also discusses is interesting to note is the fundamental distinction between implications for bioethics). What virtue ethics that focuses on character and virtue ethics that focuses on virtues. Oakley's approach is remarkable, but my focus will be slightly different and inspired by McKinnon's work (on which, 1999, 10. enough, this could be seen as an instrumental good, as the coyote's fur is an "instrument" for the coyote to survive cold desert nights. However, McKinnon is using this example to illustrate her point about human virtues. There are certain fundamental human that demand that we be virtuous in a certain way. For the coyote, the fur is a fundamental characteristic, and the coyote must have a warm coat to "flourish." Similarly, as I explain, the human has certain characteristics that he or she must see to it to develop in order to characteristics

flourish as an individual.

16. According to McKinnon, one chooses virtues to build one's own character. For her, character building is the essential feature of ethics. She attempts to reconcile this view with the unity of virtues theory that is usually related to virtue-focused virtue ethics. InMcKinnon's view, unity is an intrinsic value. A lifemust be unified to be worthwhile. It can be unified only when provided continuity by its own author, i.e., the character-focused virtuous agent. For such an

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agent, unity is brought about by choosing virtues according towhat is seen as a good human life. The unity of virtues theory, held by McKinnon, differs slightly from the traditional theory. The traditional thesis holds that one must possess all virtues. McKinnon's thesis proposes that there is to the unity of virtues when the agent chooses his or her own virtues with consideration a as one not human life One need choose all the available but virtues, flourishing lifelong goal. must choose all of one's virtues with this goal inmind. For this, one must make use of practical reason, phronesis. Virtues may be different for different individuals, but to qualify must be practically wise. In what follows, Iwill not claim thatNietzsche's brand For one, he would not agree with what is the same as thatproposed byMcKinnon. I findMcKinnon's about phronesis. Nonetheless, approach worthwhile and think as virtuous, one of virtue ethics I just explained that itdoes shed

that one must be light on the process of selecting virtues to pursue. There is a sense inNietzsche selective in choosing one's virtues and that there is a unity to be found underlying this choice, i.e., the flourishing of oneself as an instance of will to power. There will be more on this later. Imust however, thatMcKinnon's acknowledge, Magnus, as a reviewer kindly remarked. 17. Leiter 1997. 18. Slote Nietzsche version of virtue ethics is indeed similar to that of

1998, 23. This is something Swanton would agree with. Slote further explains that is a perfectionistic consequentialist. An ethical view is perfectionistic when itholds that moral value is intrinsically linked to a conception of the human good. 19. See my Le nihilisme est-il un humanisme? ?tude sur Nietzsche et Sartre (2005). 20. Philippa Foot sets out to examine the question of Nietzsche's, sometimes self-attributed, revaluation of values. She notes that Nietzsche is immoralism in an article on Nietzsche's

sometimes ready to throw away notions of justice and the common good in favor of the production of stronger and more splendid men. For Foot, this is the source of Nietzsche's immoralism because, according to her, morality is necessarily connected with such notions of justice and common good. Foot then asks herself how it is possible thatwe continuously get the feeling that Nietzsche has much in common with themoralist. Her answer is as follows: "[I]n much of his work he can be seen as arguing about theway inwhich men must live in order to live well. It is the common ground between his system and that of traditional and particularly Greek morality that makes us inclined to think that he must be a moralist after all. [. . .] [H]e himself was interested, one might say, in the conditions inwhich men?at least strongmen?would flourish" (1978, 92). ethics as In this, Foot is already tracking the fundamental problem related to reading Nietzsche's an instance of virtue ethics, namely, how tomake sense of his political ideas in such a context. 21. I am thinking of certain passages and the Riddle." 22. See Nietzsches Zarathustra Moral in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, specifically "Of theVision in "Selbstbegr?ndung.

the interesting development of this idea by Volker Gerhardt der Individualit?t" (1992).

claimed that he was saying the same thing in both Thus Spoke that Nietzsche and Beyond Good and Evil, my coming claim will be problematic. In the next section, needs a political program, I will argue that the virtue ethics with the figure of the ?bermensch which goes against what Nietzsche says inBGE. It is difficult to reconcile the views expressed in 23. Given and BGE much 24. Hunt 25. Hunt 26. Hunt 27. relative to the?bermensch 1991, 112. 1991, 113. because of the order of rank of which Nietzsche makes so in the later text.

1991,78. In the following, I favor the published material and not the posthumous fragments. inNietzsche's writings Specifically, I take section 341 of GS as being themost explicit passage about the notion of the eternal recurrence and its meaning. It is formulated as a conditional and is presented as a test.

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28. True enough, a virtue ethics does not necessarily constitute an ethical program for all human beings. However, as Imentioned earlier, theway of overmanliness, which is attainable by practice of virtue ethics, is opened to all up until Beyond Good and Evil. reading like mine. will play a role determinism 29. It has been objected tome that the theory of types thatwe find inNietzsche prevents any In fact, one would be determined to be of a higher or lower type. Physiology in this determination. in Nietzsche's I firmly believe that there is no such However, philosophy. Indeed, physiology will be determinant but only to a individual may still act on her own physiology and engage in the ascending

certain extent. The

I think the example of Nietzsche himself is enlightening in that path, theway of overmanliness. relation. Nietzsche always considered himself as a decadent, as physiologically decrepit. However, by a strong act of will close to asceticism, he subjected his physiology to the necessary control Nietzsche Nietzsche as a so as to be of an ascending rather than declining type. (See Daniel and the Political [1997] for an interesting discussion of asceticism considered W. Conway's in Nietzsche.)

to qualify himself himself successful enough in this "shaping of oneself to the ?bermensch. This Nietzschean self spirit," a figure close enough belief in the power of thewill. Further, he expresses experimentation is revealing of Nietzsche's "free

this faith by his many appeals to his readers. Indeed, why appeal to one's readers if those are entirely determined by their type? 30. This is in no way a unique outburst. For example, in the later text Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche says: "Democracy has always been the declining form of the power to organize: I have Human, All Too Human, characterized modern democracy, together with its imperfect already, in manifestations such as the 'German Reich,'' as thedecaying form of the state" ("Expeditions" ?39). But democracy is not entirely bad, as he explains in BGE ?242, in that the conditions we find in democratization "are likely in the highest degree to give birth to exceptional human beings of the most dangerous and attractive quality." 31. A sign of this tension is the amount of literature devoted Nietzsche and the debate democratic/agonistic (1997); the latter, in Lawrence to the political thought of that is raging between the aristocratic/agonistic reading and the reading. The former finds a noteworthy representative inDaniel W. Conway

Hatab (1995). 32. It has been pointed out tome that it is not "many texts" but, rather, that the "balance of textual evidence" clearly lies on the side of the aristocratic reading. I want to grant this point. However, itdoes not mean that coherence would not require otherwise. Again, my claim is that if Nietzsche is a virtue ethicist as I have delineated, then coherence requires that he be a virtue politician, i.e., with a democratic leaning. 33. It is quite interesting and fruitful to appeal to Simone de Beauvoir. My work on her ethics own philosophy. Her critique of Nietzsche has led me to rethink some aspects of Nietzsche's is positions

quite interesting and, I think, to the point. However, she is still pretty close to some Nietzschean some of her ethical proposals are almost like the notion of self-overcoming. Because it is interesting to see how she bridges the gap between ethics and politics to see if Nietzschean, it can be of any help in our examination of theNietzschean problem. I have provided some hints regarding the potential comparison Ethics of Beauvoir" (2006). between Beauvoir and Nietzsche in my "The Ambiguous

be pitiful of lower human beings. Nietzsche goes so far as tomake it a higher individual's duty to be gentle toward weaker individuals: "When an exceptional human being handles themediocre more gently than he does himself or his equals, this is not mere politeness of the heart?it is

34. This critique by Simone de Beauvoir is found in The Ethics of Ambiguity (1948, 72). 35. Many passages inNietzsche's work point to the fact that one should not exert brute power or cruelty toward weaker ones but, instead, should display a healthy form of pity.An ?bermensch would be self-affirming and powerful enough so that his power would overflow, allowing him to

hisduty"(A 57). simply

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36. I doubt that there ismuch

difference

in this case between

the freedom that Beauvoir

is

sees at the core of the human being. The talking about and the will to power that Nietzsche difference between these two views could be related to the fact thatwhere Nietzsche says that he finds will to power in everything that lives and in the universe as a whole, Beauvoir talks about freedom only in relation to the individual. 37. See A 2 and also 77 "Expeditions of an Untimely Man" 36. 38. See also BGE 61 and thewhole section "What is noble" inBGE. 39. Biographeme is a term I borrow from Jean-Fran?ois Louette in his Sartre contra Nietzsche means a that theme taken out of an author's own biography. In this case, we know that (1996) Nietzsche led a very lonely life.Nietzsche would then transpose this aspect of his life into his own writings, making his own solitude a virtue. 40. Is this present inNietzsche's writings in latent form? That remains to be established, and this exegetic work is beyond the scope of this article. If itproves impossible to establish, itwill remain that a virtue politics of the kind I propose is the logical outcome of his ethical program with or without Nietzsche being its advocate.

Works
Beauvoir,

Cited
Simone de. The Ethics of Ambiguity. Trans. B. Frechtman. Secaucus, N.J.: Citadel

Press, 1948. Brobjer, Thomas H. "Nietzsche's Affirmative Morality: An Ethics of Virtue." Journal ofNietzsche Studies, no. 26 (2003): 64-78. " Cameron, Frank. Nietzsche and the "Problem ofMorality. New York: Peter Lang, 2002. 1997. Conway, Daniel W. Nietzsche and thePolitical. London: Routledge, in Moral Foot, Philippa. Virtues and Vices and Other Essays California Press, 1978. Daigle, Christine. Le nihilisme est-il un humanisme? ?tude -. Presses de l'Universit? Laval, 2005. "The Ambiguous Ethics of Beauvoir." 120-41. Montreal: McGill/Queen's Daigle, Gerhardt, Volker. "Selbstbegr?ndung. Nietzsches Hatab, (1992): 28-49. Lawrence. A Nietzschean Philosophy. sur Nietzsche Berkeley: University of

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Defense ofDemocracy. An Experiment inPostmodern Chicago: Open Court, 1995. Studies. and the Origin of Virtue. Routledge Nietzsche Hunt, Lester H. Nietzsche 1991. Routledge, Philosopher, Psychologist,

Kaufmann, Walter. Nietzsche: 1968.

Antichrist. New York: Vintage Books,

Leiter, Brian. "Nietzsche and theMorality Critics." Ethics (January 1997): 250-85. Louden, Robert B. "Virtue Ethics." InEncyclopedia ofApplied Ethics, vol. 4, editor-in-chief Ruth Chadwick, 491-98. San Diego: Academic Press, 1998. Louette, Jean-Fran?ois. 1996. Sartre contra Nietzsche. Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble,

In The Greefa and 'Uebermensch.'" 'Megalopsychia' Magnus, Bernd. "Aristotle and Nietzsche: and theGood Life, ed. David J.Depew, 260-95. Fullerton: California State University, 1980. Virtue Theories, and the Vices. Peterborough, Ontario: Christine. Character, McKinnon, Broadview -. Oakley, Press, 1999. Justin. "Varieties of Virtue Ethics." Ratio 9:2 (September 1996): 128-52. to Bioethics, ed. Helga Kuhse In A Companion "A Virtue Ethics Approach." 1998.

and Peter

Singer, 88-91. Oxford: Blackwell,

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f.Ethics

... Virtue

Politics?

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and Virtue Ethics."

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