North American Philosophical Publications

Morality, Agency, and Freedom in Nietzsche's "Genealogy of Morals" Author(s): Scott Jenkins Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Jan., 2003), pp. 61-80 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27744941 . Accessed: 22/02/2014 18:48
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History

of Philosophy

Volume

20, Number

1, January 2003

Quarterly

MORALITY, AGENCY, AND FREEDOM IN NIETZSCHE'S GENEALOGY OF MORALS

Scott
Nietzsche's Of topic. says, the only Nietzsche giving one later that

Jenkins
is of Morals on a single

the Genealogy On works, takes the form of a treatise into three

also divides the work a title that announces each

structure under This of the work investigation. that GM requires ef less interpretive may give the impression than Beyond fort on the part of the reader Good and Evil, Thus and other works of Nietzsche's that do not Spoke Zarathustra, or follow any familiar form.1 philosophical literary phenomenon Such most impression and interesting an be mistaken, would however. Some of the themes found in GM appear important only structure its organizational and attempts beyond views

es separate moral the particular

after one moves to reconstruct the case in the work

Nietzsche's

of Nietzsche's

his

deal explicitly with questions of action, responsibil Nietzsche's ity, and freedom, GM both elucidates understanding of agency and furnishes the background for understand required one most of themes of the Nietzsche's later work, important ing conception In what of human freedom. follows

true in is particularly thought. This on agency. While two sections only

I rely on GM and the other published writ two earlier on morality, Nietzsche's works ings, especially All Too Human and Daybreak.2 The paper is divided Human, into three sections. The first examines Nietzsche's discussion, in GM values structure and 1:13, of the understanding "evil" to have "good" and of Nietzsche's his argument deterministic of agency for the necessary a grip on us. It explains the this view of agency against

discusses

Nietzsche's agency

worldview. Completing the moral of the argument against understanding that we examine his discussion of "promising" requires 61

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62
in GM

HISTORY

OF PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY

section argues that much II. The second of GM II should of socialization of the process be read as a description through This ac which mere become human responsible agents. beings in addition to completing count of agency, Nietzsche's argument to a positive of moral view also role the agency, points against for the values the "ripest individual "good" and "evil." fruit" of this process of GM The third section of socialization, Nietzsche's

that argues the sovereign

understanding

11:2, personifies of freedom.

compatibilist

I. The Moral
Nietzsche's both hints sightful it?"good" discussion at his of the

View of Agency
"doer and and the deed" the views offers reader in GM 1:13 an in with

positive of morality and critique states: and "evil." He

the values

associated

the lightning from its separates for an action, of for the operation so popular morality also separates as if there were a from expressions of strength, strength behind the strong man, which was free neutral substratum to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such sub is no "being" behind there stratum; doing, effecting, becoming; the deed This the passage existence "the doer" Thun) contains of the (das a fiction added is merely is everything. (GM 1:13) This to the deed?

mind just as the popular flash and takes the latter a subject called lightning,

Nietzsche's

subject.3 because however, comprehensible, and its flash the existence of human agents. nying Lightning are not two separate A flash of lightning entities. is an clearly that can be said of a particular instance event, and everything of lightning

denial of famous rightfully denial is not immediately to be de Nietzsche appears

in the case of could also be said of "its" flash. Thus a mere is is the doer it that fiction that the plausible lightning, case in mind" after the But human adds fact. the of "popular a seems mere to absurd action it is fiction. say the doer to leave no is everything appears are actions certainly an event?not a doer, to be a denial of the

Nietzsche's

claim that the deed, or doing, room for an agent.4 While the claim that the agent itself is events, or doing?seems an activity but instead existence of agents.

Not Nietzsche does not offer a clear deductive surprisingly, the existence of the subject. In GM 1:13 he sim argument against in describes this the function characteristic practices concept's ply

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NIETZSCHE'S
of the proto-Christians this function does play

GENEALOGY OF MORALS

63

lambs of GM and weak I. Nevertheless, a role in Nietzsche's extended argument

the subject and the bindingness of the values against "good" and the lambs. "evil" employed Nietzsche maintains such fig that by ures rely upon two techniques of self-preservation that themselves the intelligibility of the doer-doing of agency, presuppose picture and Nietzsche's The als who description of these practices is always critical. first of these techniques involves making those individu a to weak threat the their behavior for pose responsible in order to influence that behavior. for one's ac Responsibility in not this involves of them, but sense, tions, just ownership the

blame.5

evaluation?in of moral this case, moral possibility When lambs Nietzsche's themselves "these say among is least like a bird of prey, birds of prey are evil; and whoever a lamb?would but rather its opposite, he not be good?" (GM 1:13) they mean the for all. But that lambs to establish cannot the lamb-like behavior as claim of the bird of prey proper as such

also

to behave like a lamb, Nietzsche it ought for it is argues, to ask of something that is essentially like a absurd strong, bird of prey, that it act in a weak manner. Just as it would be absurd to claim that a dangerous virus ought not to make people it to of strength be absurd "demand that it should not would ill, itself as strength" blame express (GM 1:13). The object of moral bird of prey as such, but thus cannot be the strong, dangerous an entity that is not essentially rather the kind of thing that such effects. Nietzsche's the substratum,"

produces "neutral

prey morally responsible ior. Only given a neutral harms prey for particular a subject because for what it has done involves sible, blaming more a one of its than simply having attitude toward negative the subject itself as having effects. It involves failed to viewing to which to a standard conform it could have conformed. To view a particular the birds sort of prey in this manner is to ascribe of freedom, what Nietzsche describes as terms Kantian "the absolute spontaneity to them in in

lambs employ this idea of a in order to hold the birds of subject, for their potentially harmful behav substratum does blaming the bird of or patterns of behavior become pos

of man tentionally in good and evil" (GM 11:7). Freedom in this sense, of the will, an agent to bring about events that enables is a causal capacity as free in this way, the birds kind it wishes. Viewed of whatever as a "good" agent acts of acting of prey are taken to be capable if they choose is, in a weak manner) comes freedom moral complete responsibility, (that to do so. With such the responsibility

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64
an agent conduct. make

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY

1:13) the result

ferent.

in accordance with a particular code of has for acting the lambs As Nietzsche says, the weak "gain right to for being a bird of prey" (GM the bird of prey accountable once they have reinterpreted the deeds of a bird of prey as of radically suggests lambs of GM free choices that ought to have been dif

Nietzsche that the the weak. This

the second I employ

of self-preservation technique in the following description

of

in a neutral to believe type of man needs independent and prompted by an instinct for self-preservation "subject," in which The subject self-affirmation every lie is sanctified. the soul) has perhaps (or, to use a more popular expression, in hitherto more firmly than anything been believed else on to the majority it makes of mortals, earth because possible of every kind, the sublime self-de the weak and oppressed as freedom, and their being ception that interprets weakness as a merit. thus-and-thus (GM 1:13) mention sets of a need the for a for one self-preserving of the major act themes of "self-affir

This

mation"

multifarious

the of GM, stage most in deceive and which themselves ways people in order to make In this life bearable. reinterpret phenomena a of of the case, actions, concept particular metaphysical subject a soul, is needed in order for them to view them by the weak manner. as acting in a meritorious this view selves However, be

as can for the weak, of themselves is not of primary importance seen in the fact that the lambs christen as the themselves come to regard they have good only as an afterthought?after the birds of prey as evil. a more reason in is, however, important why belief a reason not so evident for the weak, is necessary subject in the passage above. Just as this picture of the subject enables a weak to act in a "good" manner, lamb to see itself as choosing it also allows the lamb to imagine itself capable of retaliating in the face of some abuse at the hand of a strong bird of prey. There the

That

is to say, the concept enables the weak of the subject lamb to regard other than essentially This itself as something weak. attitude the "sublime that makes the constitutes self-deception" lives of the weak and in suggesting that the lambs' bearable, themselves to deceive as account themselves good, of "good" Nietzsche to view is greater than their desire a first step in his de is taking and "evil."

need

bunking

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NIETZSCHE'S
Nietzsche's ervation subject. entity deeds. and discussion a more suggests

GENEALOGY OF MORALS
of these two techniques for his target

65

"the By that bears He

this entity as "independent [wahlfrei]" in GM to emphasize 1:13 in order [indiffere?it]" that it is solely and completely for its effects. No responsible or can collection be cited as suffi of event, events, previous In this way, the subject of an action. is cient for the occurrence a is of is causal what which order, independent required exactly characterizes "neutral in order for the weak have other?could very same to imagine that an agent?itself in a number acted of different ways in which took place. one action for a choice the action The over that or an in the

specific or "the soul," subject," a particular kind of causal

of self-pres on the attack means an Nietzsche relation to one's

circumstances

good or evil?actually tral," picks simply

in question?be it in "neu itself subject, another does not and admit is thus that sub of re of fur

responsible completely of freedom ther explanation. the doctrine Thus, is the free causality Nietzsche opposes simply ject, that the causa, sui he ridicules events in BGE are those subject to the subject. lation While single second Nietzsche philosopher, meditation that bear

of the will of such a

21, and the actions a particular causal

In GM 1:13 Nietzsche most in thinking subject. likely has Kant or more the doctrine of noumenal freedom mind, specifically, as well. According in Schopenhauer that appears to the naive seems to endorse, this view that Nietzsche of understanding the cause is not the phenomenal of our actions but in subject a supersensible causal entity free from the phenomenal in GM the self as thing in itself mentioned 1:13. More order, means causa to attack Nietzsche the idea of agent generally, to which all causal tion, or immanent causation, according in actions in the causal chains of an power originate ending stead

this view of agency does not attribute one possible is Descartes, who target includes willing the attributes among

to any in his of the

are caused but are nonetheless agent. On this view, actions due to the control that an agent has over its actions. Nietzsche's be

free

One

to the idea of agent causation could opposition more a to ex than commitment to imply nothing thought in terms events all of but his laws, physical emphasis plaining on doing, a more and becoming exotic view. suggests effecting, helpful passage is found in WS.

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66

HISTORY

OF PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY

with the [B]elief in freedom of will is incompatible precisely indivisible idea of a continuous, undivided, homogeneous, is iso that every individual action it presupposes flowing: in the domain of willing it is an atomism late and indivisible] and knowing. (WS 11) Here in GM states what is only implicit 1:13, that of doings that we are left with once we do away interdetermin with is a collection "the subject" of interrelated, from the This conclusion does not follow directly ing events. the world of the subject. Understanding falsity of the doctrine as simply a collection to causal of atoms interacting according Nietzsche the collection Nietzsche with causation. However, incompatible agent in causal that even our belief relations maintains atoms is nothing more that between than an anthropomorphism no a in In has modern world view. that we place maintaining a arrive at a false understanding of the world by generalizing laws is also false friend cause For conception of agent is acquired of agency, causation, inverts the position of the for whom the concept of an efficient to our own actions.6 by attending Nietzsche

we in it does not matter how exactly purposes present a is set of "do that the world claim terpret Nietzsche's simply he is suspicious of the concept of causality, ings." While as one pos claim about Nietzsche's could be regarded doings sible formulation here of causal is that agents determinism. and actions cal claim or parts The central metaphysi are not unique entities, are of the world. They events, fundamentally to the This point leads that endorses, explicitly

which Nietzsche conclusion, unsettling we have no causal control over our actions. the skeptic.?"I To reassure have no idea how I ought of this: you will be acted

structure of the metaphysical a in instead chain interrelated of parts no different from flashes of lightning.

moment! (D 120)
Nietzsche's

I have no idea how I am actingl are right, but be sure to actl"?you at every upon\ [du wirst gethan!]

not here is hollow because it consists "reassurance" or what in showing to the skeptic what he ought he is doing, no in in but instead that the fact has control do, skeptic stating over his actions to worry and thus no reason about what he ought the ele

to be doing. As part of a continuous series of events, is "being done" by those events, skeptic just like any other ment in the causal order.

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NIETZSCHE'S
One

GENEALOGY OF MORALS

67

cannot be morally the idea that a person for assessed control," what is due to factors beyond her control (such as her disposi tions to behave, the situations she faces, or the results of her a that then insti arises for the argues actions). problem Nagel tution the of morality itself, condition of control Nagel states the on closer for it seems inspection is never met. After formulating following: that this

on doers of appreciating Nietzsche's and way position it to the is conclusions that Thomas doings by comparing Nagel at the end of his "Moral Luck."7 Moral reaches judgment, Nagel as one of its presuppositions has the "condition of observes,

problem,

I believe has no solution, the problem that in a sense be cause in of is the idea with agency incompatible something . . . actions being events, or people being things. Eventually can remains to which be ascribed the responsible nothing of self, and we are left with nothing but a larger sequence can be deplored or celebrated, but not blamed events, which
or praised.8

on the doer be up Nietzsche's position are the doing quite well. He holds that agents and actions a than parts of of events larger sequence nothing more (doings and that the "responsible with no underlying self?the doers) This last phrase hind not exist. However, insist Nietzsche would also subject?does a a that the problem has defined albeit diffi solution, by Nagel we "men of knowledge" can do to Nietzsche, cult one. According as well as the views without moral values and moral judgments, of agency Nietzsche for moral tions are and freedom believes that is to say, That they presuppose. it is only the view of agency required that is incompatible with the fact that ac people things. that

sums

judgment events and Nietzsche's structure

Locating minate the fact, weak

the appearance in GM I may

tion to the moral view of agency is based upon primarily considerations of value. Nietzsche the val believes that clearly ues "good" and "evil" make a not form of life that is of possible as lowly, miserable much value. characterizes the weak He of value that retard the flourishing of the strong is not to say that the lives of the strong, ma 1:14). This nobles of GM I represent Nietzsche's to the alternative rauding one behavior he of the weak the criticizes?for proto-Christians counterfeiters (GM

serve to illu target does not, however, In of his argument the subject. against of less than flattering of the descriptions lead one to believe that Nietzsche's objec

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68

HISTORY

OF PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY

in GM that lives beyond good and evil appears only in figure in a I The nobles of GM the second appear essay. do, however, somewhat positive light. Regardless Nietzsche's or ways to be of what of life we take values to good and evil, the ques alternatives proposed to the doctrine tion at hand is whether he objects of the subject or because because he finds it to be of little value, he finds it to be false. While ridiculing in them, he the doctrine ingly, quite the subject one. useful The moral in be denied that Nietzsche delights lambs that have and the servile faith to show that also offers us an argument designed of the subject is strictly false and, rather surpris it cannot values that this doctrine of the from that

suggests different is,

in Nietzsche's the

a way of life makes possible I. The doctrine lambs of GM of a mere a it is but eyes, fiction, that we

argument against an attempt to show that how contradictory. arose, concept a ploying completely this does not involve believes,

find in GM is not the concept of agent causation is some Nietzsche's is to explain how Instead, goal and how it and gained importance, by em subject naturalistic of such account a subject.9 undermined of agency?one that If this is possible,

mention

Nietzsche

we will have in the sub belief an account that is simpler of agency and more ject by providing In GM Nietzsche takes does not state that his argument elegant. of arguments this form, but he does express his approval of this as kind in D 95, where he characterizes "historical refutation" a Nietzsche the "definitive refutation." that dem Here, argues onstration of how a belief arose and to undermine "acquired its weight and of that belief. in GM how I can belief

the authority suffices importance" two techniques The of self-preservation outlined because play a role in this project they demonstrate a necessary in the subject became part of modern the distinctively moral blame made belief by ing possible the Christian view omnipresent and

life.10 Both of as

nearly he takes

of the world, in the modern

the pleasing self-understand are components in the subject which world. Nietzsche regards

of GM, Nietzsche offers the reader what essay to be a superior account to which of agency according a are as do but much the of causal exist, part imputable agents order as thunderstorms. account This naturalistic of agency both completes and points the historical forward refutation to Nietzsche's of the subject own conception in GM begun of freedom. I

In the second

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NIETZSCHE'S
II. Nietzsche's The second essay of GM

GENEALOGY OF MORALS
Account begins with of Agency the following questions:

69

To breed an animal with the right to make promises?is that not the paradoxical task that nature has set itself in the case of man? is it not the real problem (GM 1:1) regarding man? Surprisingly, tion of this events ratory the second paradoxical he states task that one does not essay task. Nietzsche this contain hints at an examina turn a prepa of this

when

that

first degree like and consequently like, regular, necessary, among uniform, calculable" GM II does contain (GM 11:2, first emphasis added). an account task?that of this preparatory about of bringing in human behavior does not predictable regular, beings?but examine nounces animal at

as task "presupposes men to a certain makes

to this fact when he later states luding "a beginning contains that is calculated nealogy of Morals").

an in any detail the paradoxical task that Nietzsche an the beginning of the essay, that of breeding is most with the right to promise. al Nietzsche likely that each essay (EH, in GM "Ge to mislead"

The distinction to promise the ability that the right between to promise to account of essential Nietzsche's is, nonetheless, means ac in II. to his GM He for notion of agency promising count ings for the relation actions. of ownership that exists between and their task of making preparatory and calculable?capable uniform, the task The agents human be

of "promis of producing and Nietzsche's agents, a of promising is a story about how agents entered genealogy a not natural world that contain does The merely right "subject." necessary, therefore ing"?is to promise, in section examined that Nietzsche form of free agency and agents described of violent proposes III below, believes constitutes the one to be possible. out of the pro has as its end a so threaten of

Both imputable cess of socialization the minimization cial causal order. and non-moral

free agency arise in GM II, which that could to understand

behavior

Nietzsche responsibility, part

part simple ownership the result of a social practice of conventional, and behavior. holding responsible influencing By portraying as a product for actions of this social responsibility practice, completes his argument notion against the subject. Nietzsche in terms understands the function of primitive social insti of the opening sections of

relations as of actions,

Nietzsche tutions

of the central

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70
GM

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
II, a "promise" exists between found in the

QUARTERLY

relationship and the social particular beings in which that within groups they live (GM 11:9). He maintains a a social need arises for "five or six" there inevitably group a person these basic breaks rules of conduct (GM 11:3). When on the loan of security rules and defaults that has been granted that human the group as serves the act of punish through of payment, Nietzsche suggests, see others others?"to pain upon enjoy inflicting one good, to make others suffer even more" (GM is paid a kind back of Humean premises.

creditor-debtor

by others, ment. This because suffer 11:6). we does This

sympathy, members or that these when

fact, an inversion psychological one of Nietzsche's naturalistic constitutes brute

to note It is important that Nietzsche does not think that contract of primitive with each social other, groups in to in it act with find their interest accordance they rules. Rather, he believes "conquering," humans (GM "masterly" 11:17). And with are even these strong subjects the social order. The state that of this kind groups come in contact subjects that arise

other not responsible

for maintaining

this role?"wherever they generate plays [masterly subjects] new a ruling structure soon arises, that lives." appear something on Nietzsche's view in GM II, social (GM 11:17. cf. H 99). Thus institutions ply arise minimally This new tives. and in social the structures groups and agents them of power that support serve to form human animals in a new way. that behave sim into

responsible behavior

can be viewed from two different perspec a it is the of causal mechanism result First, psychological, in human rise to a degree that gives of self-regulation beings. in terms and Nietzsche thinks drives of this change of bodily in socially desires. outward directed unproductive Formerly these same drives are now, due to the ever-present threat ways, in such a way as to make of punishment, directed inward one's behavior conform to the basic social rules mentioned above. The result against of this fear and itself," ever-present feeling of displeasure, is the putative topic of the second The as produced behavior behavior is "an animal of punishment at one's own hand this abuse the essay the "bad (GM "state" soul results turned in an which be seen

conscience" 11:16). can also

conformity significance lies not only in its regularity, but in the fact that this occurs norm. in conformity with a socially instituted for instance, Nietzsche that before the right to promise states, can be produced,

that arises within to a convention. The

of the behavior

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NIETZSCHE'S
Man

GENEALOGY OF MORALS

71

must first of all have become calculable, regular, neces if he is to be able to sary, even in his own image of himself, one who is what for his own future, which stand security does! (GM II, 1) promises be

To

of and necessary?and thus capable calculable, regular, as same not to in act in the future the way simply promising?is one has acted in the past, nor is it to be able (in theory) to pre own behavior. in the eyes of It is to be calculable dict one's that one acts in accordance maintains While Nietzsche can be explained as a new that regular of this kind behavior a new this status causal behavior has also because mechanism, to a norm that is a product it conforms of a certain kind of social To set the

or all others, for the reason another, with a common standard of behavior.

in social calculable say that human beings become one from them may expect reasonably tings is to say that in the social in question. behavior that is favored setting group. This process can be the act

of as the emergence of responsi thought hu of Individual holding bility responsible. through man are accountable and made beings punishment, through some of their behavior as properly thus come to regard theirs. This notion of imputability is Nietzsche's intended replacement for the notion His have answer the of responsibility employed by the lambs of GM or "doings" to the question come of how events status of actions involves the causal mechanism which is responsible human beings, I. to of

punishment, found in socialized that behavior element order requires

in behavior for the change as well as the new status of

in the social context in which it is found. Neither that a human agent be free from the causal

ment. the

in GM of doing, effecting, and becoming mentioned 1:13, account of agency and Nietzsche's thus portrays human action as a thoroughly natural he also Not surprisingly, phenomenon. of inverts our usual and punish understanding self-regulation It is the act with an deserves connected control of holding and the punishment responsible, to be responsible for believes it, that Nietzsche The idea that a agent has over its own actions. punishment claims, because an he could have acted subtle dif form "extremely late and

person ferently

of human judgment" (GM 11:4).

Nietzsche stood, agent gression) standard capable divides the evolution into a number

is, Nietzsche

To of stages. responsible in of promising this pro basic (the most stage a to behave in accordance with is, for Nietzsche, common reason to a social of behavior the for group

of responsibility, be a minimally

so under

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72
that one

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
is held to that standard

QUARTERLY

of being punished. sible for the five

and fear punishment through basic case, one is held respon in that one must avoid doing in the social to remain social interactions order group. Later, norms or customs and social become more complex. Arbitrary a are to set the traditions basic norms, of prac added forming In the most or six things tices constitutive of custom"

of a particular society, Nietzsche's "morality These der Sitte]. rules, which Nietzsche [Sittlichkeit in Daybreak also connects with punishment (D 9), give rise to man and further further "labor performed upon himself," by self-regulation of drives (GM 11:2). the morality of "good" and "evil" arises, Finally, along with to behave in a way the thought that a strong chooses subject the weak, not to that tends to harm and that the weak choose retaliate. ther doer Of thoughts the doing makes it possible behind as evil. This attitude toward itself regard course, Nietzsche are completely believes false. But that belief for a both of these agent fur of a to the in the fiction

values

demanded holds

upon of "evil," the metaphysical presuppositions "good" and these values, and the social and religious institutions that make in acts of self-repression then results these beliefs effective, more more and self-regulation and cruel, than those thorough,

strong itself, based

and indeed, of our behavior, uniformity further for the required self-regulation in general. The moral described practice stitutes Because morality sibility of the a stage in Nietzsche's account it makes

of custom. while Nietzsche Thus, by the morality in the subject that these beliefs and causal of freedom are completely not the will he does false, certainly deny that role in explaining the regularity and they play an important in accounting for the of agency refinement in GM 1:13 thus con of agency.

of the evolution

the weak, Nietzsche also provides the reader with a naturalistic account in of the agents who employ this doctrine. By showing are formed into self-regulating II how mere human GM beings a process of socialization?without presuppos agents though an his world?Nietzsche ing anthropomorphized completes historical refutation of the doer behind a collection of doings.

In addition to and causal freedom of the will. subject I in in how GM the belief arises and showing subject gains on the part of the need for self-preservation importance through

this naturalistic account of the possible of "good" and "evil," Nietzsche's of respon discussion in GM II completes his argument the existence against

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NIETZSCHE'S

GENEALOGY OF MORALS Individual

73

III. The Sovereign

Nietzsche's sents his by moral sovereign conception

practice, As mentioned above, Nietzsche philosophy. can in accordance lation with morality form of self-regulation complete of agency presented The evolution in a sense, with thus concludes, he

in GM described individual, 11:2, repre of the possibilities open to agents shaped a central and as such occupies role in his later asserts give the rise that self-regu to the more

right to promise. in the first two essays of GM

calls

of free Nietzsche's description at the beginning If one does not see of the second essay. agency that the sovereign individual stands at the end of this process of over for to it is action, however, creating possible responsibility look 2 and its status as an exceptional to the form of agency in general. only in sections follows. Nietzsche 3 of GM place refers II. He individual sovereign introduces this figure as

at the end of this tremendous ourselves process men the necessary, uniform, and regular], where [ofmaking tree at last brings forth fruit, where society and the moral ity of custom at last reveal what they have simply been the means to: then we discover that the ripest fruit is the sover to like liberated from himself, eign individual, only again autonomous of and custom, supramoral morality [?ber are and "moral" sittlich] (for "autonomous" ["sittlich"] man own in in the who has his short, exclusive), mutually will to and the make dependent, protracted right promises.

If we

(GM 11:2)
features here

The tial them 1.

remainder

of GM of the

11:2

is devoted

sovereign

to elaborating and I will individual, individual promising is "like agents

the

essen list

simply

before

proceeding. only to that ex

The Uniqueness: sovereign as opposed to mere himself," ist as "like among like."

2.

from morality Liberation of custom: The sovereign indi it is free from the force of custom. vidual is unique because Freedom:
come free.

3.

Nietzsche
It is also

describes
"autonomous"

this
and,

figure
of course,

as having
"sovereign."

be

4.

The right to make Responsibility: terized as a kind of responsibility.

promises

is charac

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74
5.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
of measure of value: Possession other agents according values Possession sibility final

QUARTERLY
The sovereign to their right individual to promise.

6. This

of a conscience: The awareness in its "conscience." is manifest

of its respon

Nietzsche

positive out of the bad the redirection However, its value

commentators to believe has that led some point in an entirely individual does not view the sovereign as arising sees its conscience clearly light.11 Nietzsche conscience, of drives that described in GM 11:16 as a result

of

to this idea grounds of Being" 2). Nietzsche's (BGE opposition as well, for as he reminds his genealogical us, "the cause project em of the origin of a thing and its eventual its actual utility, a in of and lie worlds purposes, system apart" place ployment sees the conscience of the fact that Nietzsche (GM 11:12). Thus as the product individual of the rather gruesome sovereign in GM not II should that he describes of socialization process lead us to conclude that he sees it as being of little worth. the The might freedom also lead and one mentioned responsibility While it is true astray.12 that in points 3 and the responsi 4 in of

of custom. required by the morality the origin of the conscience determines to one of the "preju be to succumb and function would in the first that Nietzsche dices of philosophers" ridicules . . . cannot the value be de of BGE: of chapter "things highest rived from this transitory, seductive, deceptive, paltry world, and lust [but rather] from the lap from this turmoil of delusion to think

of "making the process responsible" through bility produced or proto-moral, is moral, the first two essays Nietzsche's of GM as of the sovereign individual the "ripest fruit" description

connotations. And while GM this process has positive certainly 11:2 itself is Nietzsche's of the post-moral clearest description a positive that he seeks to explain, of conception responsibility as in be other works well. the Consider appears responsibility in TI entitled "The error of free will" of the section ginning (The Four Great Errors, 7). of "free Today we no longer have any pity for the concept it really is?the will": we know only too well what foulest of all theologians' mankind artifices, aimed at making "respon I in their sense, that is dependent sible" them. Here upon the of all simply supply psychology "making responsible."

This

passage

sponsible?one

to one points is responsible

sense

a person in which insofar as one is held

can

be

re

responsible

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NIETZSCHE'S
judgment through moral concludes sage, Nietzsche In a critical discussion is mentioned

GENEALOGY OF MORALS
and the religious section dogma. After in a remarkable

75
this pas manner.

re in which of "making responsible" not four mention Nietzsche does times, sponsibility as a concept for that matter) that (or freedom, responsibility to do without. "we immoralists" that This indicates ought a form of responsibility envisions Nietzsche that exists outside the moral institutions within which one is held responsible. forms of responsibility clearly even as interesting, 11:2. outside of GM positive phenomena, an a to to the ascetic alternative brief allusion ideal, Following Nietzsche Is there available asks: sufficient self-confidence courage, pride, daring, today, sufficient will of the spirit, will to responsi freedom of will, for "the bility [Wille zur Verantwortlichkeit], on earth? (GM 111:10) to be philosopher" henceforth?possible That Nietzsche would mention ideal the indicates "will opposition of positive alludes to the ascetic that in to responsibility" it has some degree In GM Nietzsche views some

in Nietzsche's worth mind.13 The fact that Nietzsche as well, to freedom of will in this passage is instructive re for it further confirms Nietzsche's attitude toward positive case in the the of individual. particular sponsibility sovereign as a "master of a free will" is described This figure, remember, of this rare freedom" and as having "consciousness (GM 11:2) in at the end of the process all of standing through which 3 does Nietzsche emerges (point above). responsibility certainly as being of little worth, not view all forms of responsibility and to believe that Nietzsche's there is thus no reason sovereign virtue individual is not a positive figure in GM.

the figure of the sovereign individual and Understanding Nietzsche's of and freedom positive conception responsibility an that we come to terms with the task of breeding requires animal with the right to promise, 11:2 Nietzsche for in GM equates this right with the form the sovereign individual guishes found in a moral the responsibility Since agent. that possesses the agent an to that be such promise requires ability only agent to a standard of behavior institu fear and the through that the to hold of responsibility from the moral that distin

mere held

one might of punishment described think above, as to to be understood the capacity promise right ought to a standard of behavior. oneself tions

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76
But this

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY

be a sufficient for pos condition of course, cannot, that to 11:16 The GM "tame man" the of promise. sessing right in order to conform to a system inward its drives has directed but Nietzsche describes is capable of self-regulation, a as at the with this figure as "pregnant future," not standing The moral end, of the process of making agents who responsible. in the subject of the will are also and causal freedom believe fall of regulating but they too must their own behavior, capable as sec in short of the right to make because, promises argued serves moral the same end tion II above, practice distinctively of customs

as

uniform.

custom The

and that of making the morality of custom, agents regular an indi individual But the sovereign is, of course, 1 above), that which like only to itself (point vidual, suggests in the morality of individual is not a participant the sovereign or the morality which of good and evil. individual and the sovereign between difference are not do of but these agents, possess capable promising individual the right to promise, lies in the fact that the sovereign or "supramoral of custom," is "liberated from the morality essential [?bersittlich]" reminiscent 262), (point 2 above). of his description to this Nietzsche points In a passage from BGE individual as that is of the relation sovereign to morality (BGE the defin

of "the individual" that has survived (?berlebt) ing characteristic .. hinweg it (?ber die alte Moral. and thus "lives beyond" morality cannot require that one lebt). However, "living beyond" morality to moral since all agents are a product bear no relation practice, of these tinguishes Both the institutions. the tame man Thus of GM the essential from moral 11:16 and own question the moral is, What dis individual agents?

of GM agents in accordance I are capable their of regulating behavior cus a standard of behavior, be it a system with of arbitrary in both cases toms or the morality of good and evil. But the or a is of the that institution the result power self-regulation moral tion code takes exerts place itself. In GM agent is that of a human That is to say, this self-regula upon agents. a or threat outside because of force of the only

the dominant 11:16, for example, metaphor within of society "enclosed the walls being and of peace" and thus forced to turn against itself and change In GM I, it is the force of religious and its own behavior. dogma in human false belief that brings about moral behavior beings. on the other hand, The is aware of its individual, sovereign superiority "over all those who lack the right to promise and

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NIETZSCHES
stand as their own

GENEALOGY OF MORALS

11

dividual thus We

. . ." (GM 11:2), that the guarantors implying does stand as its own guarantor. individual It is able sovereign to regulate on the power of its own behavior without depending reason in this for external and the any institution, sovereign possesses the capacity are the right to regulate

to promise. is The right to promise own one's oneself behavior?hold upon any external forces.

responsible?without Nietzsche's promises?a Breeding requires

depending

when to the sovereign he refers "the and reliable" peers strong (GM 11:2). Those are simply that potentially the right to promise possess agents those that would have been in GM the strong agents described 1:13 and GM 111:14, the nobles and natural had they predators, not been born into a society with a history of custom and moral as But Nietzsche does not believe that all strong agents to the Most he maintains, posses promise. right strong agents, norms to live custom the of and morality. currently according an ani there must be a third step in the task of breeding Thus, practice. with the right to promise. This third

first produce, institutions, through moral of "promising" and regulating their imputable agents capable own behavior. one must locate an agent that can regu Second, late its own behavior without relying on the force of social norms or institutions?but how does one find such an agent? Nietzsche the gives individual's reader a hint

that

an interpretation to provide of finally in the position an animal with the right to make "task" of breeding task that Nietzsche not explain. himself does an animal with the right to make promises obviously one

mal

siders moral reason that

ited. Freeing that one consider the possession of true beliefs about morality to be of a higher value than the benefits in accordance of acting norms. with moral For Nietzsche, commitment then, a robust an acquaintance to the truth (and possibly with GM) is required a for a moral to become free agent agent. When the

step involves finding an agent that no longer con norms to be binding institutions and moral for the these institutions and norms have discred been oneself from the force of these norms thus requires

an animal Nietzsche asks of the task of breeding with "is not this the paradoxical task promises, right to make set itself in the case of man?" has that nature his 11:1), (GM use of the word no mere is rhetorical flourish. "paradoxical" an autonomous that one first produce agent requires Producing

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78

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY

moral that act as they do be heteronomous agents essentially cause in these rules of behavior and that resides of the power his that enforce them. Thus Nietzsche the institutions justifies are in GM 11:2 that "'autonomous' 'moral' [sittlich/] and claim mutually

even he does maintain that au exclusive," though The production of an agent with from morality. tonomy arises an example of a thing the right to promise is, consequently, to be what out Nietzsche claims of its opposite, just originating to a "metaphysician" (BGE 2). like free of force understands Free will, as Nietzsche it, is thus nothing its doings. To possess the free causality of a doer behind to be autonomous?capable dom of the will is, instead, on the without one's own behavior regulating depending of custom,

unthinkable

and the particular institutions which they morality, is a of Nietzsche's freedom Thus, positive conception require. one. to free will be To for possess is, Nietzsche, compatibilist a a natu with being and this is compatible autonomous, part of ral Nietzsche order. More generally, as a collection of interrelated believes events the that viewing is compatible with While assessment.

world

but not with moral normative assessment, over the capacities we have no control and traits with which we are born (as Nagel that also points out), Nietzsche maintains kinds that these are precisely whether the of things determine one is an autonomous, well-constituted, admirable, healthy, "bad" agent sick, flawed, (where "good" agent, or a base, "good" sense outlined in the noble in GM and "bad" are used I). As parts for freedom. fication of such Since a world, Nietzsche not views all agents freedom possess as the a capacity social modi

of the strength found in some, but not all, human beings, is attainable that are born freedom only for those human beings as a certain amount is why Nietzsche with of strength. This of strong serts, in BGE 21, that "in real life it is only a matter not free or unfree wills. To be sure, Nietzsche's wills," is no real explanation of strength of the difference between and "birds of prey." These "lambs" of weak examples ness and strength, which might make one believe that Nietzsche are used not to illustrate with physical is concerned strength, and weak discussion the kind

to that Nietzsche has in mind, of strength but instead a matter is that luck. The birds of of suggest strength having and the lambs are not?no further prey are simply fortunate, is explanation possible.

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NIETZSCHE'S
This

GENEALOGY OF MORALS

79

of freedom that the from strength emergence suggests a new form of nobility, one that individual represents sovereign and morality.14 is possible of custom only after the emergence to this point in his characterization of is alluding Nietzsche the a "measure as possessing individual of value" sovereign to its it which is and 5 bound "honor above) (point by peers" a for kick the feeble windbags who promise without "reserve

for their one's the right to do so" (GM 11:2). Honoring peers and having of one's own virtues, virtues, only scorn being aware is characteristic of the noble for those without these virtues mode of valuation that Nietzsche is the of autonomy, the sovereign individual which describes sole measure in GM of value 1:10. The ideal by employed a post-moral noble that the sovereign as as well upon others, in a number of his works

value

individual, in Nietzsche's eyes.

thus As

constitutes the one value

as described in GM 111:23, Z 1:15, H 107), autonomy be the single most the facet of way important general to describe.15 seeks of life that Nietzsche (e.g. GM 11:2 could

out when employs looking mentions the "one goal" that Nietzsche

Reed College

NOTES
1. I have used Walter Kaufmanns translations of Nietzsche's

and Daybreak, where I All Too Human except in the case ofHuman, the Cambridge editions of Hollingdale's have consulted translations, edited by Richard Schacht and Maudemarie (Human, All Too Human) is trans Clark and Brian Leiter (Daybreak). On the Genealogy of Morals and Hollingdale. I have also relied upon the Kritische lated by Kaufmann edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. The only Studienausgabe, is the substitution of "morality change I have made in the translations
of custom'' for

works,

terminology. Works are cited in the text according to the following acronyms: (A) The Antichrist, (BT) The Birth of Tragedy; (D) Daybreak; (H) Human, All Too Human; (M) Assorted Opinions and Maxims; (WS) The Wanderer and his Shadow ; (GS) The Gay Science; (Z) Thus Spoke Zarathustra; (BGE) Beyond Good and Evil; (GM) On the Genealogy of Morals; (TI) Twilight of the Idols; (EH) Ecce Homo. dardize 2. Nietzsche (See GM Prefaced, in GM he assumes himself directs the reader of GM to these earlier works GM Prefaced, and GM 11:2), and he also states that his of earlier writings (GM Preface:8). knowledge

"morality

of mores,''

when

necessary,

in

order

to

stan

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80

HISTORY

OF PHILOSOPHY

QUARTERLY
to refer to

3. When I speak of "the subject" in what follows, I mean the view that Nietzsche attacks in GM 1:13. 4. Kaufmann
translated as

translates
"the doing,"

udas Thun"
or "the

as "the deed," but it could also be

The latter alternatives are

preferable
tween the latter

because

in GM

1:13 Nietzsche

activity." "the

is drawing
deed" for

a distinction
<(das Thun"

be

and and events, objects reading sound substantive. overly

makes

5. Bernard Williams the distinctive character of moral emphasizes blame in "Nietzsche's Minimalist Moral Psychology" in Nietzsche, Gene on Nietzsche's ed. Richard alogy, Morality: Essays Genealogy ofMorals, Schacht of California Press, 1994), pp. 237-247. (Berkeley: University 6. Roderick Chisholm discusses Reid's work, in "Human Freedom Watson (Oxford: Oxford University 7. Thomas
174-186. 8. Nagel, 9. Nietzsche's p. 184. naturalism requires only that we account for the char

this claim, as well as its source, in and the Self in Free Will, ed. Gary Press, 1982), pp. 24-35. in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson, pp.

Nagel,

"Moral Luck"

acteristics that make modern special kinds of entities (God, explain this fact. For a good providing a precise definition
pp. 239-241.

human beings unique without postulating the soul, the will, moral laws) in order to of the difficulties involved in discussion see Williams, of this sort of naturalism,

BGE

10. Nietzsche's views on the "seduction of grammar" in GM 1:13 and 16-17 might also account for the origin of the concept of the sub ject, but there is no space here to examine this possibility.

11. See, for example, Daniel Conway's Nietzsche and thePolitical (Lon don: Routledge, 1997), p. 19, and Lawrence Hatab's A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy (Chicago: Open Court, 1992), p. 37. arguing
Hatab,

to the responsibility mentioned 12. Hatab also appeals in GM 11:2 in that the sovereign individual is not a positive figure in GM. See
p. 37.

13. See

also TI, Skirmishes,

38.

14. Richard White also emphasizes this point. See his Nietzsche and the Problem of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1997),
pp. 145-147.

15. Many
Nehamas, and

thanks
Mathias

to B?atrice
Risse.

Longuenesse,

Clare McRae,

Alexander

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