German Society, Hitler and the Illusion of Restoration 1930-33 Heinrich August Winkler Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.

11, No. 4, Special Issue: Theories of Fascism. (Oct., 1976), pp. 1-16.
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Journal of Contemporary History, 1 1 (1976). 1-16

German Society, Hitler and the Illusion of Restoration 1930-33

Heinrich August Winkler

Most historians are now agreed that the National Socialists achieved their growth into a mass movement thanks t o a dual strategy which no other party in the Weimar Republic had so perfectly mastered. On the one hand, individual social groups were wooed with promises which could only have been kept a t the expense of all the other groups. On the other hand, conflicts of interest were universally denounced and apparently removed by a movement which claimed to stand above classes. The contradiction between the t w o levels of National Socialist agitation was striking but did not prove to be disturbing. The party leaders obviously felt that the individual groups were interested primarily in what had been promised t o them, rather than what the National Socialists promised others. In the last phase of the Weimar Republic the NSDAP included such heterogenous elements that it could justifiably be called a 'People's ~ a r t y ' . I~ t had convinced a majority of social groups that it was the only alternative t o the political status quo. There were, however, sectors of German society which remained largely immune to National Socialist propaganda before 1933. This is true above all of Catholic circles, which, from the time of Bismarck's establishment of the German Reich and the Kultuvkampf, had formed a community of defence with its own meta-economic ideology of integration. I t is their awareness of being a minority which accounts largely for the relative constancy of their behaviour in elections, f o r the loyalty which they showed the parties of political Catholicism, the Centre party and its Bavarian equivalent, the Bavarian People's Party. Catholic Germany had participated in the general changes of t h e political climate and from the twenties onwards moved distinctly t o the right, but only small minorities went so far as t o vote for Hitler's movement or t o join his party. The NSDAP did not make greater inroads into Catholic territories until t h e March elections of 1933,

Journal o f Contemporary History

that is after the seizure of power.2 The other sector which showed resistance t o National Socialism, though not as strongly as the Catholics, were the workers. The reasons for their division from the rest of society are in part t h e same as those cited for the Catholics: persecution and discrimination under Bismarck had had an integrating effect o n the Social Democratic workers' movement. In addition t o this, of course, and in contrast t o political Catholicism, there was the influence of a n ideology which did not iron o u t conflicting social interests, but, on the contrary, accentuated them. German Catholics had resisted National Socialism because the integration of different interests, which National Socialism promised t o bring t o its Protestant electorate, was already part of Catholic social doctrine. The working class, which was influenced by Marxist theories, for its part remained unimpressed by National Socialist slogans because it had learnt that real conflicts of interest cannot be removed on an ideological basis. In contrast to political Catholicism, the German workers' movement was, however, split down the middle. Whereas the move t o the right within the Catholic camp meant only a change of course for the Centre Party, the corresponding move t o t h e left within the workers' movement meant a strengthening of the Communists at the expense of the Social Democrats. Another section of the workers, however, found their way into Hitler's movement, a fact which was more forcibly expressed in the structure of the NSDAP membership than in its electorate. If there was a common denominator f o r that minority of German workers who were won over b y National Socialism, then it lay in its comparatively low degree of trade union organization. This was characteristic of farm workers, railway workers, postal and other community traffic and service workers; it was characteristic, too, of home workers in Saxony and Thuringia, as well as employees in mediumsized and small trade enterprises; of women workers, especially in the textile industry, and also of the unemployed youth who had been prevented from beginning their working lives b y the outbreak of the world economic crisis and who had, therefore, hardly been in contact with the trade union^.^ Numerous investigations have shown that the majority of the National Socialist electorate came from the Protestant middle classes. But in these electoral groups, too, the NSDAP had initially t o overcome considerable resistance. The predominantly middle class supporters of the early Hitler movement in Munich, Swabia and Franconia, were by n o means representative of the German population as a whole.

Winkler: German Society 1930-33

In North Germany, during the two Reichstag elections of 1924, t h e German Nationalists were able as a radical anti-republican protest movement t o catch the voters who had been disappointed by the liberal parties. In Baden and Wurttemberg, where the German National People's Party was held to be t o o Prussian, peasant and Mittelstand associations benefited from dissatisfaction with the established bourgeois parties. The National Socialists and their viilkisch allies in Northern Germany were usually regarded as a social revolunonary force outside their early regional strongholds: 'If the German National Freedom Party adopts a sensible economic programme', wrote the leading North West German craftsmen's paper in April 1924, 'then we shall have n o cause t o oppose it. But so long as it makes Marxist gestures in spite of all its assertions t o the contrary, it must expect us t o oppose it as we oppose any other Marxist party.' A t the same time, the paper noted the growing attractiveness of the radical right wing volkisch movement for young artisans.4 Indeed, the National Socialists had t o make considerable exertions t o free themselves of t h e image of a socially revolutionary movement. The combination of nationalism and socialism, as proclaimed in the party's name and programme, found conflicting responses in bourgeois circles. There was certainly a current in the academically educated bourgeoisie which wished to oppose the Marxist workers' movement with a synthesis of 'Prussianism and Socialism' and thereby hoped t o overcome a class-based society. By 'socialism', however, it understood a state of mind rather than a form of economy; the concept was directed towards work discipline not expropriation. Similar ideas also played a certain role in para-military associations. The largest group, however, which showed itself susceptible t o the slogan of a 'national Socialism' was that of the white collar workers. A vague kind of socialism corresponded t o the resentment felt by the members of the so-called 'new middle-class' in relation t o the traditional social elites; their ardent nationalism implied a marked separation from the internationalist proletariat into which the Angestellten did not wish t o sink. The economically independent strata such as the big industrialists and large landowners, the mediumscale entrepreneurs and members of the professions, down t o the master craftsmen, merchants and peasants reacted quite differently to everything which smacked of socialism. F o r the economically independent, this concept was inextricably bound up with the abolition of private property. If the National Socialists wished t o win over these strata, they had t o offer an interpretation of 'socialism' less open t o misunderstanding

Journal of Contemporary History

than their 'definitive' party programme of 1920. This is precisely what happened t o an increasing extent from 1927 onwards, when Hitler rode roughshod over the opinions of the Nazi left, led by the Strasser brothers. The workers were still being wooed by anti-capitalist slogans, more radically by Goebbels in Berlin and some other Gauleiters in the industrial districts than by party headquarters; but vis-a-vis the independent middle class, t h e socialism of the NSDAP was reinterpreted as a mere economic slant, as a general feeling for the common weal. Five weeks before the Reichstag election of 2 0 May 1928, Hitler removed one particular offending item. The Nazi leader obligingly explained that the expropriation of land for common use without compensation, urged by the party programme under Point 17, referred only t o land wrongfully acquired and primarily owned b y 'Jewish property speculation ~ o m p a n i e s . ' ~ When the world economic .crisis set in, the NSDAP had already removed certain reservations felt by the middle classes - particularly in areas which had, since 1927, suffered under the agrarian crisis and had become nuclei of National Socialist propaganda. Bitterness in relation t o the parties in power, especially the ruling Social Democrats, who were held responsible for the so-called 'mismanagement' in the Reich, provinces and communes, rose t o such a pitch that from the beginning of the year 1 9 3 0 the regional electoral successes of the National Socialists were occasionally welcomed by the press representing small businessmen. The breakthrough of the NSDAP t o a national level on 1 4 September 1 9 3 0 received a clear explanation in the columns of the Nordwestdeutsche Handweuks-Zeitung, It was by no means the case, the paper said, that all the 6.4 million National Socialist voters agreed with its programme in every aspect, for instance in the area of economic policy: 'The mental rejection of certain points of the programme nevertheless weighs less heavily with these voters than the hope that only National Socialism is still strong enough t o pull the cart out of the mud.' But u p to the end of 1 9 3 0 renewed doubts were expressed as t o the reliability of National Socialist assurances with regard t o the retention of property. The treasurer of the North West German Artisans' Association, master mason Kuchenbuch, declared a t a local meeting that the NSDAP would not be in a position to bring order t o the German state. It had t o o often been associated with the extreme left.= The big entrepreneurs remained sceptical as t o the political aims of

Winkler: German Society 1930-33

the National Socialists much longer than the master artisans. In July 1930, the Arbeitgeber, the right wing conservative journal of the Confederation of German Employers' Associations, did affirm that a number of National Socialist slogans, like 'the common good before the individual good' or 'property is an obligation not an end in itself' were approved by a wide cross-section of big business. But there were other 'utopian demands' and an 'aggressive hostility t o employers' as represented by Feder, Gregor Strasser and Goebbels. If these ideas were t o win the upper hand (and earlier on the paper had tried to establish that the centre of action was being moved from Munich to Berlin, from Hitler t o Goebbels and Strasser) then the NSDAP would be basically opposed t o the aims of big b ~ s i n e s s .The ~ commentary of the Arbeitgeber was t o a certain extent typical of the relationship between big industry and the rise of National Socialism. The employers were not made uneasy by antisemitism or antiparliamentarianism, but rather by the anticapitalist rhetoric of the Nazi left and by the general muzziness of their economic and social programme. The latter was particularily true with regard to one item: the vague corporative promises of the National Socialists. Point 25 of the 1 9 2 0 programme demanded 'the formation of estates (Stande) and professional chambers to carry out the framework of laws issued by the Reich in the federal states.' Since Bismarck's time, a parliament based on estates had been advocated by the anti-parliamentary right; it was to act as counterweight t o the Reichstag elected by universal suffrage, if not to replace it entirely, and to secure the influence of the 'economy' over legislation. O n the right wing of the business camp, above all in the circles of Rhineland heavy industry, there had long been sympathy for a corporative reform of the Weimar constitution. Once the crisis of the parliamentary system had become manifest in 1930, interest grew among other industrial groups in a political upgrading of thc executive power and t h e provisional Reich Economic Council, which had hitherto only been the advisory 'Third House' of the Weimar Republic. But in the eyes of most entrepreneurs,chiefly those involved in the export-orientated branches of largescale commerce and banking, the discussion about corporatism was burdened by the fact that Nazi advocates of such a system like O t t o Wilhelm Wagener (head of the Economic Policy Section of the NSDAP) wanted much more than merely a weakening of the political parliament: they were seeking a completely new organization of the economy. T h e majority of employers feared that such plans might lead to

Journal o f Contemporary History

stagnation and dirigisme. This aspect was explained in October 1 9 3 2 by the Deutsche Wirtschaftszeitung, organ of the German Federation of Chambers of Commerce, as follows:
The economy, employers and workers, may at best express their wishes; they have no means of seeing that these will be met even in their own organs. Their organizations will be turned into government departments, whose heads will be civil servants, and those they represent will have no legal right t o choose or remove them. In the National Socialist programme the allpowerful 'total' state becomes a reality, economic selfgovernment a mere form.8

The Nazi slogans concerning professional 'estates' did not even find whole-hearted approval among those social groups which had long recommended their own corporative structure as the model for a new social order i.e. the craftsmen. What the leading associations of craftsmen demanded was a system in which the interests of independent producers would retain the upper hand against workers and consumers, in the guild-like organizations of individual branches as well as in the federal chambers of estates responsible for questions of economic policy. The state was on no account to interfere with the decisions of employers. A delegation of the National Confederation of German Crafts and of the German Federation of Chambers of Handicraft was made aware a t the beginning of 1931 in talks with Wagener that the plans of the NSDAP were directed towards just this, that they were 'state socialist through and through.lg It was, therefore, good news for all sections of the business world when on 1 7 September 1 9 3 2 Hitler divided the Economic Policy Section of the NSDAP into one main section IV A for state enterprise under Gottfried Feder, and Section IV B for private enterprise under Walter Funk. Thus a man trusted by industrialists received the same status as the party ideologist, and Wagener's influence as head of the Economic Policy Section was greatly diminished. Even earlier, in August 1 9 3 2 , it had been rumoured in leading industrial circles that Wagener had been muzzled by Hitler with regard to matters affecting the reorganization of professional bodies. One may a t least presume that the anxious comments from business circles regarding NSDAP economic policy did not remain without influence.1 Even that current within heavy industry which traditionally had been especially antiparliamentarian and nationalistic, had strong reservations in the autumn of 1 9 3 2 with regard t o a National Socialist seizure of power. What had strengthened sympathy for the NSDAP

Winkler : Germarz Society 1930-33

in parts of the Kuhr industry was the provisional toleration of Papen's cabinet by Hitler. From the standpoint of the right-wing of German heavy industry, to have the National Socialists providing a mass base for an authoritarian regime friendly to big business, was an enticing perspective. But since 1-fitler had relinquished this course again in August 1932 in favour of a confrontation with the 'Cabinet of Barons' and, in addition, the possibility of a coalition between the NSDAP and the Centre Party had become stronger, the employers' camp became increasingly worried that the Nazis were swinging towards the left.11 A t the beginning of November 1932 the transport strike, demonstrating a spectacular cooperation between communists and National Socialists in Berlin, reinforced such fears. S o that one cannot speak of the National Socialists making a consistent move towards big industry in the summer and autumn of 1 9 3 2 , or of a rapprochement by the latter with the NSDAP. . 'The policy of General Kurt von Schleicher, the last Chancellor of the Weimar Kepublic, created a new situation. Schleicher's plans for creating employment, which many industrialists regarded as 'state socialist', his contacts with the trade unions, and his efforts to form a parliamentary 'labour axis' stretching from the left wing of the NSDAP t o the Social Democrats was calculated t o alarm large sections of the employers' camp. The alternative model of a Hitler-Papen alliance seemed the lesser evil, a t least t o those industrialists, especially in mining, who had previously given financial support to the Nazis in the hope that they would strengthen the national camp.12 I t was, however, another social group which much more directly and successfully influenced Hitler's coming t o power on 30 January 193 3. This was the R e i c h s l a n d b ~ / ~ d already , controlled by the National Socialists to a large extent, which in fact represented the interests of the greatly indebted East Elbian landowners. The landed gentry, unlike the industrialists, enjoyed the privilege of immediate access t o the decisive political factor, President Paul von Hindenburg. They made use of this privilege when in January 1933 a parliamentary disclosure of the Osthilfe scandal, compromising for many Junkers as well as the President himself, seemed to approach closer. In the final phase of the Weimar Republic economic and political power clearly proved t o be incongruous strengths.13 The Keicbslaizdbz~~d though the most influential was not the only organization a t the disposal of the National Socialists as a political instrument before the seizure of power. Within the urban and rural middle classes, too, there was 'anticipated co-ordination' and it was

Journal o f Contemporary History

actively encouraged by such party sections as the agrarian political apparatus and the Kampfgemeinscbaft Against Department Stores and Consumer Cooperatives, from whose ranks the Fighting League of the Commercial Mittelstand was formed in December 1932. The National Socialists had made their impact earliest in regional interest groupings among the peasantry in predominantly protestant areas and had, step by step, driven existing officials from their positions. From 1931, the craft guilds were disbanded. The officers of local and provincial associations, who frequently belonged to the Wirtscbaftspartei, a pure interest grouping of house owners and small traders, had t o give way to members of the NSDAP. In November 1932 the National Socialists broke into the Federation of German Retail Business: the department stores which had always been considered unwelcome competition by small shopkeepers and were attacked by the National Socialists as being Jewish were in fact forced to leave the umbrella organization of the retail trade; a representative of the National Socialists' Fighting League Against Department Stores and Consumer Cooperatives took over. The National Socialists also succeeded in achieving a massive breakthrough into the largest whitecollar trade union, the Deutscbnationaler Handlungs-Gebilfenverband. They were not able, it is true, t o take over its leadership b u t they did win over large numbers of the membership and bureaucratic apparatus. After the seizure of power they had only t o complete the work having already gained the support of the interest groups on the ~ systematically land as well as in the 'old' and 'new' ~ i t t e 1 s t a n d . lBy infiltrating these interest-groups, the National Socialists increasingly deprived the leading organizations of the rural and urban middle strata of their base. Whereas the official leadership of these associations adopted a comparatively moderate policy towards government and parliament, those functionaries adhering t o the NSDAP successfully exploited the existing groupegoism. The campaign against department stores had the same effect as the propaganda for compulsory guilds and masterexaminations in the trades and crafts: the reservations which the leadership of the associations continued to feel about the economic policy of the NSDAP were shared less and less by their members. As far as the broad strata of the middle-classes were concerned, there were only two factors which carried any weight a t the height of the economic crisis. Firstly, the National Socialists identified themselves more than any other party with the most extreme demands of these groups. Secondly, they had discovered the common denominator t o which the desires

Winkler: German Society 1930-33

of all groups could be reduced - namely a consistent struggle against the Weimar 'system' which was made the scapegoat for the misfortunes of the common man.

The deeper historical reasons for the success achieved by National Socialism in non-proletarian Protestant Germany d o not lie in the Weimar Republic. Those social strata which played the largest part in Hitler's rise t o power considered the political system of Imperial Germany a t the least as a far lesser evil than Weimar. For the Prussian landowners, the politically most privileged group in German society before the first world war, allegiance to the Hohenzollerns was as much a matter of course as it was f o r those members of the officer corps, who came from the same social background. What the conservative wing of private enterprise wanted was summed up by the powerful industrialist Albert Vogler a t a conference of leading industrial organizations in 1 9 2 4 : 'The supra-party state is a thing of the past. Let us hope that we succeed in recreating it for the future.'l5 The commercial Mittelstand and peasantry for their part regarded the patriarchal State of Imperial Germany as a system which had introduced certain protective measures in favour of small business and agriculture, and which would not have accepted an outvoting of property-owners by workers and consumers. Many, particularly among the higher civil sen7ants, along with the representatives of private enterprise, saw in the Kaisevveicb a 'supra-party' state, in which the impartiality of the administration had been paramount and where the social status of bureaucracy had still been unchallenged. White collar workers certainly had reservations with regard to the ruling elite of Imperial Germany; but nevertheless they owed t o the monarchy their special position in social security, which differentiated them f r o m industrial workers. Their claim t o an elevated social position seems at any rate t o have been respected more in Imperial Germany than in the 'Marxist' republic. The orientation towards the authoritarian system of the pre-1918 period did not necessarily imply preference for the Monarchy, but it was in any case a mortgage on parliamentary democracy. This is true not only of those strata which turned towards National Socialism after 1 9 2 9 o r else contributed t o its rise; it is also true to a certain extent of the representatives of Weimar democracy. The conception, which had its origins in constitutional monarchy, that the chief task

of parliament was t o criticize the government, survived the November revolution of 1918. The most important characteristic of a parliamentary system, the confrontation between the governmental majority and the opposition, was constantly obscured b y this anachronistic dualism. The tendency of the parties, not least the Social Democrats, t o disclaim governmental responsibility in critical situations, can ultimately be traced back to an unconscious fixation vis-i-vis the political system of the Kaiserreicb. This system had failed t o motivate the parties to consistently fight for a majority of the voters; their exclusion from active participation in government had favoured instead the ideological orientation of political parties and their restriction within a particular social milieu.16 Initially, the Weimar party system was scarcely different from that of Rismarckian Germany. It was not parliamentary, but antiparliamentary forces - the German Nationalists and then the National Socialists - who were the first to grasp the logic of the parliamentary system and to tailor their propaganda entirely towards becoming the 'people's party'. The National Socialists did not, as is well known, fully succeed in becoming a mass movement until Briining became Chancellor, and he consciously carried on the governmental practices of the imperial bureaucracy. But it was precisely the experiences of the first presidential government of the Weimar Republic which made it clear that a simple return t o the pre-parliamentary division of power between Reichstag and executive was no longer possible. A cabinet which governed in opposition to society was still less in a position t o take the wind out of the sails of an antiparliamentary mass movement than a weak parliamentary government could have done. No schematic restoration of the pre-republican regime could, therefore, be the 'right' answer t o the crisis of the Weimar system, but only a popular antiparliamentarianism. If one was successfully to declare war on democracy, then it could only be done 'in the name of the people.' The only possible alternative t o parliamentary democracy was the rule of the charismatic leader, legitimized by plebiscite. Such a system seemed t o possess a specific advantage for the middle classes. If they wished to make their influence effective, they had t o act in concert. The snag here was that many of their interests seemed irreconcilable. For instance, peasant demands for higher agricultural prices ran counter t o the interests of the consumer and t o the protectionist limitations on competition, backed by artisans and small traders. An umbrella movement of the middle strata could not therefore push divisive economic questions into the foreground, but

had t o concentrate on political slogans which transcended these conflicts. The adoption of demands made by specific social groups could only serve therefore as one aspect of the National Socialist strategy for winning power - and the party leadership wisely delegated this role to its special organizations. This procedure had a double advantage. First the NSDAP through its particular associations and their publications reached only that part of the electorate which was crucial a t the time - so that the irritation of other groups could in this way be limited. Secondly, the party leadership, by thls division of labour, avoided tying themselves to any narrow special interests. The task of the party leadership, and, in particular, that of Hitler himself, was the other part of the National Socialist dual strategy namely the integration of the groups they were trying t o recruit. It may be considered a general rule, that a mass movement will be the more likely t o produce militant reactive ideologies, the more heterogeneous its social basis and the bleaker the prospects of its individual constituent groups t o maintain or increase their share in the social product. The success of National Socialism was ultimately founded o n the fact that it seemed t o provide an answer to such challenges. It made possible the bringing together of the intermediate classes, which the liberal, conservative and so-called interest parties had failed to achieve - because they were either half-hearted about taking up the demands of individual groups, or because they had no chance, due to the limitations imposed by narrow interests, of ever mobilizing all sections of the bourgeoisie. Only the National Socialists showed themselves determined to grasp the evil by its root. They promised the radical liquidation of all factors which they held responsible for the dissolution of the natural harmony of interests: namely, the organizations and ideologies involved in the class struggle, and all institutions which sanctioned the political resolution of social conflicts. The destruction of the 'marxist' labour movement, of the parliamentary system of government, and of political pluralism was the undisguised expression of everything that National Socialism promised to contribute towards the reconstruction of the German Volksgemei~zscbaft (people's community). What one might describe as symbolic or secondary integration served t h e same purpose: the diversion of aggression against a 'diabolical' enemy, international Jewry, and the fabrication of a supra-materialistic sphere in which the nation recovered its unity. The cult of the leader and the Volksgemeinscbaft, extreme nationalism and racial ideology had their social function in precisely this attempt to mystically overcome

12

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economically determined contradiction^.^

'

I t is difficult t o estimate the value of each individual part of this ideological conglomerate for the electoral success of the National Socialists. There are indications, however, that it was not militant, antisemitism which made National Socialism into a mass movement. Even a journal as far to the right as the Nordwestdezltscbe Handwerks-Zeitung spoke in 1924 of the volkisch and National Socialist movement as being 'tainted' with a 'fanatical antisemitism' which stood in the way of 'objective work'.ls Even if one assumes that antisemitism was stronger among farmers and petty traders than among artisans (one thinks of the campaign against the 'cattle and money-lending Jews' and against 'the Jewish department stores') nevertheless, during the 1920s and 1930s other resentments, namely against the 'Marxists' and 'anonymous big capital', played a larger part as far as all sections of the intermediate classes were concerned. There is no evidence that the National Socialists influenced larger Mittelstand groups beyond the radical antisemites with their assertion that these enemies were only two faces of one and the same 'World Jewish Conspiracy'. On the other hand it makes just as little sense t o argue that Nazi antisemitism exercised a deterring effect o n the middle and upper classes during the years 1930-32. It was certainly no accident that in the propaganda of the NSDAP during these years wholesale accusations against the 'system' took up more space than details concerning the 'Jewish question'. Extreme nationalism, by itself, is also not enough to explain the rise of National Socialism. The traditional parties of the right were hardly less nationalistic than the Hitler movement, yet they lost the majority of their voters. If the cause of the success of the NSDAP among the middle classes is to be put in a nutshell, then it was the combination of two promises which proved decisive: the National Socialists agreed in principle t o maintain the traditional system of property relations and at the same time promised to radically liquidate the political system which no longer guaranteed the preservation of this order. T h e majority of those who brought the National Socialists t o power, either by giving them their votes or their money, wanted something different from that which became reality in the Third Reich. Both the middle and upper classes assumed that National Socialism wished to restore and modernize the political substance of the pre-republican system. That did not necessarily mean restoration of the Empire, but

Winkler : German Society 1930-33

13

it did mean depriving the victors of the November revolution of their power. In other words, the supporters of the National Socialists expected the destruction of the 'Marxist' labour movement and the 'party state'; they hoped for a rigid authoritarian regime, which would cease to tolerate class struggles and ideological conflict. But so far as the National Socialist leadership was concerned, these were not the aims but merely essential pre-requisites for the realization of their aims. Hitler's long-term aspirations could not be diverted in accordance with the economic needs of any social group; neither the fight against the Jews, nor the essentially unlimited conquest of 'Lebensraum' sprang from a concrete pressure of interests. Rather it was a question of prejudices becoming autonomous, which had their social origins in the middle classes, b u t which had been radicalized to such an extent that they had become a political factor sui generis. Obviously, this autonomization of ideologies was closely bound u p with a far-reaching social process of deracination, which the first world war had set in motion, with the formation of a class of 'military desperadoes' (W. Sauer) who could not find their way back into civilian life after 1 9 1 8 and who played an important part in the fascist movements in Italy as in Germany. Thisgroup, to which Hitler himself belonged, combined profoundly bourgeois anxieties with a fundamental contempt for the bourgeoisie. The nihilistic turn against all concrete interests with which National Socialism ended up was implanted in the mentality of the 'military desperadoes'.19 Such a clique could only rise to power because broad sections of German society still clung to concepts which had their origin in the long-lived Ancien Regime. They measured the crisis-ridden democratic system by the yardstick of the apparently healthy world of Imperial Germany - and rejected it. The assumption that the National Socialists would d o no more than restore an authoritarian order proved t o be a total misinterpretation of Hitler's movement; but the spread of such authoritarian illusions formed an essential element of historical continuity between the Kaiserreich and the 'Third Reich'. I t may very well be that the Weimar Republic could have survived for a long time had there n o t been the economic crisis of 1929. But it is just as likely that German democracy could have survived the great crisis without the authoritarian heritage of the past.

Jozlrnal o f Contemporary History

NOTES

1. For an explanation of the thesis that the NSDAP was an antidemocratic 'Volkspartei' see my contribution, 'Mittelstandsbewegung oder Volkspartei? Zur sozialen Basis der NSDAP' in Wolfgang Schieder, ed., Faschismus als soziale Bewegung. Deutschland und ltalien if71 Vergleich (Hamburg 1 9 7 6 ) . 2. See Gunter Plum, Gesellschuftsstruktuu und politisches Rewusstseirr in ezlzeu katholischen Region 1928-1933. Untersuchung a m Reispiel des Regierungsbezirks Aachen (Stuttgart 1972) and M. Rainer Lepsius. Evtrerneu Natio?~alismus. Struktuubedi~zgungen uor dev natio~ralsozialistischen Machtergreifir~~g ( Stuttgart 1966). 31-36. 3. The number of trrorkers who were members ot the NSDAP in September 1930 was 26.3 per cent compared with a percentage of the general working population of 46.3 per cent (Paiteistatistik, ed. by the organizational head of the NSDAP, Bd. 1 , Berlin 1935, 6 9 ff.). For the other groups the figures are as follows: white collar employees 2 4 (12.5); self-employed 18.9 (9.6); farmers 13.2 (20.7); civil servants 7.7 ( 4 . 6 ) ; other groups 9.9 (6.6). For the part played by workers in electing the NSDAP see Samuel A. Pratt, The Social Raszs of . Coirelational Stud,y of the July Nazism a91d Communism in Urban G e r m a ? ~ yA 31, 1932 Reichstag Election in Geumat~y(M. A. Thesis, Michigan State College, East Lansing 1 9 4 8 ) , 1 6 4 ff.; Werner Kaltefleiter, IViutschaft u91d Politik in I>eutschland, Konjrrnktz~r als Bestimmungsfaktor des Parteiensystems (Cologne 1 9 6 8 ) , 46-49; R . I. McKibbin, 'The Myth of the Unemployed: Who Voted for Hitler?' in ,-11lstralianJournal of Politics and History, 25 (1969), 25-40; Alexander Weber, Soziale .Merkmale der NSD.4P-Wahlev. Eine Zusammenfassuizg bisheriger empirischer Linters~lchunger2 und eine Analyse in den Gemeiriderr 'lev 1-under Raden und Hessen (Ph.D. Thesis, Freiburg 1969) as well as Carl Mierendorff 'Gesicht und Charakter der nationalsozialistischen Bewegung' in Die Gesellschaft, 7 (1930-31), 489-504. For the early years of the NSDAP especially Michael H. Kater, 'Zur Soziographie der fruhen NSLIAP' in Vieuteljahrshefte fhr Zeitgeschichte [hereafter VfZl , 1 9 ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 124-59. For the relationship between workers and National Socialism before 1933 see also Wilfried Bohnkr, L)ze ,VSL)A P in? Huhrgebiet 1920-1933 (Bonn 1974). Methodologically unsatisfactory, because it constantly blurs the differences between manual workers, craftsmen and white collar employees is .Max H. Kele, Nazis and 12'oukers (Chapel Hill 1 9 7 2 ) . 4 . ~ordwestdezrtsche Huezdwerks-Zeitung [hereafter NHZ] , 29, No.17 (24 April 1 9 2 4 ) ; No.13 ( 2 7 March 1924). See also Heinrich August Winkler, !\,littelstarzd, Demokuatie urrd ~ V a t i o r r a l s o z i a l i s n ~Die ~~s~ politisct~e Entwicklung von Handwerk rtrrd Kleinhandel in der Il'eirnarer Kepublik (Cologne 1972). 5. For this theme see Oswald Spengler, Weussentunr und Sosialismus (Munich 1 9 2 0 ) ; Dietrich Orlow, The Hzstory o f the Nazi Party. 1919-1933 (Pittsburgh 1969); Jeremy Noakes, The :Vnsi Partj~in Lower Saxony 1921 -1933 (Oxford 1 9 7 1 ) ; ~ u r g e n Kocka, 'Zur Problematik der deutschen Angestellten 1914-1933' in Hans Mommsen and others, Industrielles System und politische Entwicklung in der IVeimarer Republik ( ~ h s s e l d o r f1974), 792-811; Henry A. Turner, 'Hitler's Secret Pamphlet for Industrialists 1927' in The Jourizal of

Winkler: German Society 1930-33

15

hlodern History, 4 0 (1968), 348-73; Keinhard ~ G h n l Die , nationalsozialistische Linke 1925-19 3 0 (Meisenheim 1966). Kuhnl's work suffers from numerous distortions. The characterization of the Nazi left-wing as 'kleinburgerlich' ignores the fact that small craftsmen feared it far more than the Munich party leadership. Moreover, the influence of the left-wing did n o t end with the elimination of Otto Strasser's group in 1930. 6 . NHZ, 35 No.38 (19 September 1930): No.41 (10October 1930). 7. Georg ~ c h r z d e r , 'Das nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftsprogramm' in I)er Arbeitgeber, 2 0 No. 1 4 (15 July 1930: 'Der Sozialismus der nationalen Jugend', in ibid, No. 8 (15 April 1930). For a more detailed analysis see Heinrich August Winkler, '~nternehmerverhande zwischen ~ t a n d e i d e o l o ~ i e und Nationalsozialismus' in VfZ, 1 7 (1969), 341-71 (also in revised form in Heinz-Josef Varain, ed., Intevessenuerbande in Deutschland [Cologne 19731, 228-58). 8. 'Das Wirtschaftsprogramm des Nationalsozialismus' in Ileutsche U'irtschaftszeitung, 29 No. 4 0 (6 October 1932). The article, part of a longer series of essays, after detailing the social and fiscal aims of the National Socialists, came to the verdict that the economic programme of the NSDAP is a 'mixture of resentment and obscurity'. The weightiest objections against the Nazi programme would have t o be directed against its economic demands. 9 , Deutsches Zentralarchiu (Potsdam), Keichskommissar fur den Mictelstand, Handwerk 1 1 , Bd. 1 , No. 26. The horror which 'state socialist' plans inspired among the official representatives of the crafts and trades reveals how misleading is the concept of Werner Sombart, revived by Arthur Schweitzer in Bzg Husiirrss in the Third Reich (London 1964), 1 1 0 ff. concerning 'Handwerkersozialismus' (artisan socialism). 1 0 . Winkler, op. cit., 361 f. 11. Very revealing in this connection is the letter by the editor and head of the Rhenish-Westphalian economic service, August Heinrichsbauer, t o Gregor Strasser, the organizational head of the NSDAP, dated 2 0 September 1932 (reprinted in Plum, op. cit., 301-04). 12. With regard to financial support for the NSDAP by big industry see above all the works of Henry A. Turner, 'Big Business and the Rise of Hitler' in T h e ..\meviean Histodeal Review (hereafter AIfR), 75 (1969), 56-70; 'The Ruhrladr: Secret Cabinet of Heavy Industry in the Weimar Republic' in Central 195-228; 'C;rossunternehmertum und European Historj~, (1970), Nationalsozialismus 1930-1933' in Histonsche Zeitschrift [hereafter HZ] 221 (1975). 18-68. In the last-named essay Turner criticizes Dirk Stegmann's objections; 'Zum Verhaltnis von Grossindustrie und Nationalsozialismus 1930-1933' in r\vchiu f u i Sozialgeschichte, 1 3 (1973), 399-482. 13. On the role of the landowners in Hitler's coming to power, see most recently Heinrich Bruning, Memoiren 1918-1934 (Stuttgart 1970), 639-45. 14. With reference to agriculture see Rudolf Ileberle, Landbevolkerung und IVationalsozialismus. Eine soziologische Untevsuchung in Schleswig-Holstein 1918-1932 (Stuttgart 1963) ; Horst Gies, 'NSDAP und landwirtschaftliche Organisationen in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik' in VfZ, 1 5 (1967), 341-76. On the trading Mittelstand see Winkler, op. cit., 166-71; Peter Wulf, Die politische Haltung des schleswig-holsteinischen Handwerks 1918-1932 (Cologne 1969); Heinrich Uhlig, Die Cliavenhauser im Dritten Reich (Cologne

16

Journal o f Contemporary History

1956). On white collar employees see Iris Hamel, Volkischer Verband und nationale Gewerkschaft. Der Deutschnationale Handlungsgehilfeiz-Verband 1893-1933 (Stuttgart 1967). Less research has been done on National Socialist penetration of the civil service associations, c.f. Hans Mommsen, 'Die Stellung der Beamtenschaft in Reich, Landern und Gemeuldrn in der Ara Briining' in VfZ, 21 (1973), 151-65. On the Il'irtschaftspartei, which in the Reichstag elections of May 1928 received 4.5 per cent of the valid votes cast, see Martin Schumacher, Mittelstandsfront und Republik. Die Wirtschaftspartei Reichspartei des deutschen Mittelstandes 1919-1933 (Diisseldorf 1972). 15. Veroffeentlichungen des Keichmerbandes der Deutschen Industrie, Heft 21 (Berlin 1924), 35. 16. See especially M. Kainer Lepsius, 'Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur: Zum Problem der Dernokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft' in Wirtscbaft, Geschicl~teund Wirtschaftsgeschicbte. Festschrift firr Friedrich Lutge (Stuttgart 1966), 371-93. 17. O n the concept and meaning of 'secondary integration' in German society since the nineteenth century see Wolfgang Sauer, 'Das Problem des deutschen Nationalstaates' in Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ed., Moderne derltsche Sozialgescbichte (Cologne 1970), 406-36. 1 8 . N H Z , 29, No.13 (27 March 1924). 19. See Wolfgang Sauer, 'National Socalism: Totalitarianism or Fascism?' in AHR, 73 (1967), 404-24; Klaus Hildebrand, 'Hitlers Ort in der Geschichte des preussisch-deutschen Nationalstaates' in HZ, 2 1 7 (1973), 5 8 4 6 3 2 ; Henry A. Turner, 'Hitlers Einstellung zu sozialen und okonomischen Fragen vor 1933' in Ceschichte und Gesellschaft, 2 (1976).