Paul Chambers - U-Turn To The Past The Resurgence of The Military in Contemporary Thai Politics

U-Turn to the Past?
The Resurgence of the Military in Contemporary Thai Politics

Paul Chambers
In horseracing, horse owners hire jockeys to ride the horses. The jockeys do not own the horses. They just ride
them. A government is like a jockey. It supervises soldiers but the real owners are the country and the King. The
government supervises and employs us in compliance with the policy declared to parliament ... What I mean is
that we are the country's soldiers. Governments come and go.
--Privy Council Chair Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda, July 14, 20061
I don't care which government is in power because we're not involved in politics. If this government is gone, a
new administration will come in. However, the military has to remain neutral and defend the country as we don't
want people to kill one another.
--Army Commander Gen.Anupong Paochinda, October 8, 20082
At the moment the army is interfering... Those people who interfere in forming the government must stop and
withdraw. We are still under a military coup...They should behave with a sportsman's spirit and not interfere.
--Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, December 12, 20083
The above remarks by three Thai political leaders reflect alternative attitudes on the
role of the military in contemporary Thai politics. The first view locates King and country as
the “owners” of military “horses” while a civilian government is the “jockey” which merely
“supervises” them. The second standpoint contends that the armed forces, as a non-partisan
grouping, seeks only to avert domestic bloodshed. The last stance points to military
interference in Thailand’s democracy. The differing views—each publicly expressed—send a
message that the military today must either involve itself or defend itself from claims of
hindering Thailand’s democratization.
Across the last eight decades, Thailand’s armed forces have undergone a circuitous
trajectory in terms of political autonomy vis-à-vis civilian control. One can designate 20 core
eras illustrating alternative levels of military prowess since 1932. In 1992, following the
bloody Black May massacre, the Thai military seemed to be at its nadir in terms of support
from the people and the palace. As such, it seemed reasonable to imagine that soldiers might
be returning to the barracks indefinitely. If that were the case, Thailand might finally be
joining the ranks of “Third Wave” democracies in a unlinear historical move toward more
expansive democratization (Huntington, 1991). During the 1990s, the Thai armed forces
appeared to be becoming indoctrinated under a professionalism of compliance to elected
civilians.
And yet in 2006, there occurred a sudden military coup. The takeover immediately
enhanced the role of soldiers in domestic politics. Even after the return to civilian governance
in 2008 Thailand’s armed forces find themselves enjoying a privileged position of authority—
though this is emasculated by apparent civilian control. Among the emerging democracies of
Southeast Asia today, there is no country other than Thailand which exhibits such explicit
military intrusions over civilian governance. The military occupies a major position in what
noted political scientist Dr. Thitinan Pongsudhirak refers to as the “nonelected ‘holy trinity’
of monarchy, military, and bureaucracy.”4 Increasingly, Thai military influence today exhibits
haunting echoes back to the era of pervasive military authority during the civilian government
of Gen. Chatchai Chunhavan (1988-91).
Clearly, the armed forces today deserve much greater scrutiny as an actor on the Thai
political landscape. Yet such an enhanced position in society gives rise to several questions.
How has the role of the military in Thai politics evolved from 1992 until 2009? What
accounted for the coup of 2006? Is this renewed clout evidence of a U-turn back to the Thai
military of the 1980s? How has the armed forces continued to involve itself in Thai politics
since the country’s return to civilian governance in 2008? In what areas of civilian control do
the armed forces today hold the most sway? What does continuing military involvement say
about the contemporary state of Thai democracy? This study addresses these and other
questions
The objective of this investigation is to contribute to research on the current state of
democratization and civil-military relations in Thailand (particularly 1992-2009). The study
first examines factors contributing to unity in the Thai armed forces. It then offers an
analytical framework which attempts to shed light on the relations between civilians and
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militaries in various areas of decision-making. The investigation applies this framework to
Thailand. Afterwards, it focuses on the current and future role of the military in Thai politics.
Locating Unity in Thailand’s Armed Forces
Thailand’s armed forces are an institutionalized mechanism that monopolizes the legal
use of force throughout the country. The military, however, has been prone to be faction-
prone. Yet where the institution can find unity, it has through history usually succeeded in
trumping weak loosely-structured civilian authority. Unity has allowed it to carry out coup
d'états with impunity. Yoshifumi Tamada (1995) describes four causes of coups in Thailand:
domestic disturbances allowing the military to step in; civil-military conflicts giving rise to a
coup; military factional conflict leading to a military takeover; auto-coups to enhance military
power.5 Yet military unity (or precisely the lack thereof) has either facilitated or led to
attempted or successful coups, increasingly against civilian governments. The section below
details various forms of Thai military unity.
Ideology has long been a principle unifier of the Thai military machine. The Royal
Thai Army, originally established in 1884 under King Rama V (Chulalongkorn) initially
included as its mission the safeguarding of the monarchy from perceived or domestic threats.
This was true for the Navy and Air Force as well. Such a pro-royalist agenda helped to unite
the military, and unity was further guaranteed by the fact that various princes sat at the senior
positions of the armed forces. Yet following the 1932 coup against the absolute monarchy,
the ideology unifying the military shifted to protecting the fatherland from royalists and
foreign powers (who might seek to colonize Thailand). The mission now was to promote
Thai-centric constitutionalism and democracy. From 1947 until 1991, the military’s struggle
turned to combating communism, seen as externally-devised and (after 1957) a threat to the
Thai monarchy. In an attempt to stamp out rural support for the Communist Party of
Thailand, the armed forces set up numerous rural development projects—in a close alliance
3
with the United States. Fears of a “red” menace and counter-insurgency objectives helped to
solidify armed forces unity behind the ideology of anti-communism until the end of the Cold
War in 1991. During the 1990s, with external threat perception at an all-time low, the
military took a back-seat to civilian political players.6Today the Armed Forces have “the
important role…to safeguard independence, sovereignty, internal order, as well as protect
nation, religion, monarch, and interests of nation.”7
In terms of ideology, monarchy has proved to be an especially unifying factor. This
trend commenced with the the coup of Gen.Sarit Thanarat in 1957. Sarit’s emphasis on the
safeguarding royalism contributed to monarchy’s becoming--once again—a central ideology
uniting Thai soldiers (and Thai people). This renewed importance of kingship to the Thai
state—as undergirded by a royalist military—strengthened the institutions of the monarchy
and armed forces across the nation. It also united the military under the king. Indeed, the
king’s close relationship with arch-royalist Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda (at least since the latter’s
term as PM from 1980 to 1988) contributed to Prem’s military faction becoming dominant
across the armed forces.
Beyond ideology, factors linking soldiers together include family or marriage
connections, service in the same unit or service (especially in terms of patron-clientelism),
school ties, and personal charisma. Family connections might seem naturally important. For
example, Gens. Akradej and Yuthasak Sasiprapa are brothers and the latter is married to a
daughter of Field Marshal Prapas Charusatien (another daughter of Prapas is married to Gen.
Somdhat Attanand). But such connections do not lead to automatic promotion since they can
stir up rage and frustration in military circles if it is thought that matters of blood are being
given higher priority to considerations of seniority and capability. Indeed, one could argue
that the October 14, 1973 fall of Thanom Kittikachorn and Prapas owed partly to the fact that
Thanom’s son Narong appeared to be being groomed to succeed more seasoned military
4
officials. As such, Gen. Krit Sivara found enough support in the corps for his coup against
the three.
As for same service experiences, I am referring to instances where soldiers served in
the same region, regiment, or battalion. They might have all known each other in the Army
through shared service in the infantry, cavalry, etc. As for navy or air force military officials,
their shared service experiences are of less importance to the Thai case given that the Army
dominates the three service corps. Moreover, the notion of patron-clientelism can be crucial
to intra-service comraderie. For example, a promoted senior official may appoint his former
assistants to higher positions of power. It is assumed that the client’s proven loyalty to the
patron will carry on to higher levels.
Personal charisma is yet another factor which can unite a military together in support
of a coup or a military government. Some soldiers with enormous barami (loosely translated
as “charisma”) can continue to perpetuate their hold across networks or entourages of active
duty military personnel. Examples of highly charismatic military personnel have been Field
Marshall Gen.Phibul Songkram (dominated Thailand1938-44; 1948-57), Field Marshall
Gen.Sarit Thanarat (exerted control over Thailand 1957-63), and Gen.Prem Tinsulanond
(exerted influence 1979-Present).
A final factor uniting soldiers together is military class (see section on military
education below). By this I mean school ties in either one of two institutions. First there is the
Armed Forces Academy Preparatory School or AFAPS. The AFAPS is a 2-year pre-cadet
school for any student aspiring to work in the police or armed forces. Ties within AFAPS
became important in 1960 with the graduation of Class 1. To some extent, AFAPS ties
created a new tier of linkages—stronger even than cadet academy class connections.8 AFAPS
ties became even more important during the Thaksin Shinawatra administrations (2001-6)
given Thaksin’s pre-cadet Class 10 school ties with individuals who later became high-
ranking officers.
5
Besides AFAPS, there are school ties in army, air force, navy, or police academies.
Originally there was one single cadet academy. However, in 1949 the school was split into
four separate corps academies partly to prevent intra-class interests from spilling over into
coup attempts. Given the enormous size and budget allocation of the Thai army relative to
other services, the cadet school of any real political importance is the Chulachomklao Royal
Army Academy (CRAA). Class ties in CRAA have remained strong for many of the school’s
graduates. There are sporting and other entertainment events among class members. More
recent classes even have their own websites. Such comraderie has even pushed into the
political arena. Elements of CAA class 7, which included such politicos as Gen. Chamlong
Srimuang, Gen. Pallop Pinmanee, Gen. Manoonkrit Rupkachorn, and Gen.Sanan
Kachonprasert, played an active role in the 1976 and 1980 coups as well as the 1981 and 1985
coup attempts. Meanwhile, elements of CRAA Class 5 carried out the coup of 1991.
Following the takeover, members of Class 5 assumed senior positions in the Army, Navy, Air
Force, Police, and Supreme Command.9 The coup of 2006 was less derived from class.
Though the coup leader emerged from AFAPS Class 6 and CRAA Class 17 (as did one of his
stalwarts), other essential coup leaders emerged from Class 18, Class 20, and Class 21. Thus,
one could argue that, at least in terms of the most recent coup, school ties are becoming of
less importance in determining military loyalty.
Yet in terms of class connections today, pre-cadet ties trump cadet school connections.
This phenomenon amounts to the undoing of the 1949 military education reform. Though the
original military academy was split up 60 years ago to prevent significant unity of soldiers
across services, the current prevalence of AFAPS (where future soldiers and police study
together before heading to separate academies) reverses this trend.
The table below illustrates the school ties of Thailand’s Supreme Commander and
Army Commander (1954-Present). The information below reveals that there was a
correlation between the academy entrance date (or class number) of the Supreme and Army
6
Commander during several military terms. For example, see the years 1975-76; 1992; 1996-
98; 2000-2002; 2007; 2008-Present. Such occasions represent periods where the Thai
military has been much more monolithic.
Table 1: Thai Supreme Commanders and Army Commanders
Supreme Term Chula- Army Term Chula-

Commander chomklao Commander chomklao
Military Military
Academy Academy
(Class or first (Class or first
year in year in
school) school)
(P ) = Armed (P ) = Armed
Forces Forces
Academy Academy
Preparartory Preparartory
School—if School—if
applicable applicable
Gen.Sarit Thanarat 1957- 1920 Gen.Sarit 1954- 1920
1963 Thanarat 1963
Gen.Thanom 1963- 1921 Gen.Thanom 1963- 1921
Kittikackorn 1973 Kittikackorn 1964
ACM Thawee 1973- 1933 Gen.Prapas 1964- 1921
Chullasap 1974 Charusatien 1973
Gen.Kris Sivara 1974- 1931 Gen.Kris 1973- 1931
1975 Sivara 1975
Adm.Sangad 1975- 1935 Gen.Bunchay 1975- 1935
Chalawu 1976 Bamrungpong 1976
ACM Kamol 1976- 1936 Gen. Serm Na 1976- 1936
Dechatungka 1977 Nakhon 1978
Gen. Kriangsak 1977- 1936 Gen. Prem 1978- 1938
Chamanand 1979 Tinsulanond 1980
Gen. Serm Na 1979- 1939 Gen. Prayuth 1980- 1941
Nakhon 1981 Jarunee 1981
Gen. Saiyud Kerdpol 1981- 1941 Gen.Arthit 1981- 1943
1983 Kamlang-ek 1985
Gen. Arthit 1983- 1943 Gen.Chavalit 1986- 1
Kamlang-ek 1986 Yongchaiyudh 1990
Adm. Supha 1986- 1945 Gen.Suchinda 1990- 5
Gajaseni 1987 Kraprayoon 1992
Gen.Chavalit 1987- 1 Gen. 1992- 5
Yongchaiyudh 1990 Issarapong 1992
Noonpakdi
Gen. Sunthorn 1990- 1 Gen.Wimol 1992- 5
Kongsompong 1991 Wongwanich 1995
Gen.Suchinda 1991- 5 Gen.Pramol 1995- 6
Kraprayoon 1992 Plasin 1996
ACM Kaset Rojanan 1992- 5 Gen.Chettha 1996- 9
1992 Thanajaro 1998
ACM Voranat 1992- 4 Gen. Surayud 1998- 12 (P1)
Apichari 1994 Chulanond 2002
Gen.Watanachai 1994- 4 Gen. Somdhat 2002- 14 (P3)
Wootisiri 1995 Attanand 2003
Gen.Viroj Sangsanit 1995- 5 Gen.Chaisit 2003- 16(P5)
1996 Shinawatra 2004
7
Gen.Mongkol 1996- 9 Gen.Prawit 2004- 17(P6)
Ampornpisit 2000 Wongsawan 2005
Gen. Sampao Chusri 2000- 12 (P1) Gen.Sonthi 2005- 17 (P6)
2001 Boonyaratkli 2007
n
Adm. Narong 2001- 12(P1) Gen.Anupong 2007- 21 (P10)
Yuthavong 2002 Paochinda 2010
Gen. Surayud 2002- 12 (P1)
Chulanond 2003
Gen. Somdhat 2003- 14 (P3)
Attanand 2004
Gen. Chaisit 2004- 16 (P5)
Shinawatra 2005
Gen. Ruengroj 2005- 16 (P5)
Mahasaranond 2006
Gen. Boonsrang 2006- 17 (P6)
Niampradit 2008
Gen. Songkitti 2008- 21(P10)
Jakkapat Present
Note: Prior to Army Cadet School Class 1 (1949—first year), only the dates are given for school entry.
Beginning in 1949, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police were split into separate academies. “P” refers to the
Armed Forces Academy Preparatory School in which pre-cadets from all services could go for education.
Names in bold represent soldiers reputed to be close to Gen.Prem Tinsulanond. Names in italics represent
soldiers reputed to be close to Thaksin Shinawatra.
The Tug-of-War of Civil-Military Relations10
When a military stands united, except in terms of a commitment to civilian control,
then democracy is under threat. Yet how might we analyze the tussle for power between
civilians and the armed forces? This study defines civilian control as that distribution of
decision- making power where civilians alone have the power to decide on domestic political
issues.11 “Under civilian control, civilians alone have the right to delegate decision-making
power and the implementation of specific policies to the armed forces and the military has no
autonomous decision-making power outside those areas that were specifically defined by
civilians.”12 Moreover, it is civilians alone who decide which particular policies, or aspects of
policies, the military implements. In addition, civilian authorities control sanctioning power
vis-à-vis the military, and they can—in principle—revise their delegations at any time.13 To be
sure, civilian control is not the same as democracy and civilian control is possible without a
democratic regime. Democracy, however, is not feasible without firm and effective civilian
control of the coercive state organs, and in particular of the military. In many cases, “the
failure of civilian control of the military is sufficient to account for the existence of non-
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democratic regimes in many countries.”14 On the other hand, the existence and soundness of
civilian control does neither imply good governance, nor does it necessarily enhance the
quality of policy decisions, it does neither guarantee the respect of human rights by the ruling
elites nor the stability of the political regime. Civilian control has only one primary function:
it ensures that civilians alone are responsible for political decision-making.15
Ultimately then, to differentiate various patterns of civil-military relations and
systematically assess the degree of civilian control, this study uses a framework for
understanding civil-military relations which focuses on this balance of decision-making
between soldiers and civilians. Civilian control is on one pole of the continuum which refers
to the distribution of decision-making power under which the “civilians make all the rules and
can change them at any time”16 In addition, civilian authorities are entitled to and indeed
possess the capacity to effectively control the implementation of their decisions. They also
possess sanctioning power vis-à-vis the military, and they can—in principle—revise their
delegations at any time.17 On the other pole of the continuum is the military regime, in which
the military controls all decisions concerning political structures, processes, and policies and
the civilians do not possess any autonomous political decision-making power. In this sense,
civilian control is a relative condition, i.e., it is possible to distinguish different degrees of
civilian control (e.g., strong or weak, encompassing or limited). This continuum between
civilian and military dominance over decision-making authority can be analyzed in five areas:
elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defense, and military organization.
The area of elite recruitment refers to the core defining aspects of the political regime,
namely the rules, criteria and processes of recruiting, selecting and legitimizing the holders of
political office. Any actor who controls this area thus is able to define “who rules and who
decides who rules”.18 Civilian control over elite recruitment means that the military is
proscribed from establishing an alternative channel for access to political office, and,
simultaneously, the processes of elite selection in terms of the formation, working, and end of
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political leadership are not subject to the explicit consent or implicit acquiescence of the
military.19
Table 2: Indicators of Elite Recruitment

Dimension Indicator
Competition for public office Reserved representation for military
personnel.
Military influence on the procedures of
political competition
Political Participation Eligibility of active duty military officers for
public office.
Military veto power over forming and
dissolving of governments.
Meanwhile, the area of public policy focuses upon fiscal and economic policy, foreign
policy, and public welfare. These are the cornerstones of public policy because they most
directly affect the social, economic, and political environment which impinges upon the
wellbeing of the people. According to Thomas Dye, public policy simply put is “whatever
governments choose to do or not to do”20 More specifically, public policy can be understood
as a “framework of governmental formation and deliberation, the intention of political actors,
the formal statements of public activities, or the consequences of this activity for society”21
Table 3: Indicators of Public Policy

Dimension Indicator
Public policy decision- Military influence on the state budget.
making
Military influence on the processes of public policy
decision-making (except for national defense and internal
security)
Policy implementation Military authority over public administration.
Internal security constitutes a third area of civil-military relations and can be defined in
terms of two elements. First, it has a geographic element, focusing on the threats originating
within the realm of one’s states own territory; and second, there is a second element which
derives from the role and the duties of the various state agencies.22 In other words, it involves
the use of armed forces, by both established and new democracies, in a purely domestic
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environment, which includes public order in emergency situations (including disaster relief),
preparation for counterinsurgency warfare and terrorism, domestic intelligence gathering,
daily policing and border controlling.23 These activities are compatible with civilian control
only if civilians have the right to make the decisions on the range, duration and frequency of
all internal military operations as well as the civilian institutions, and are able to monitor their
implementation.24
Table 4: Indicators of Internal Security

Dimension Indicator
Policy-making authority Military influence in the making of internal security
policies
Control over internal security Separation of the police (and other internal security
agents agencies) from the military
Civilian oversight of military internal security operations
A fourth area, national security, remains the core function of any military, specifically
refers to the external dimension of security policy and thus pertains to state decisions
involving foreign military deployments and related operations. National defense “tasks
involve preparing for and conducting war and related military missions, managing the military
bureaucracy, training, and strategic planning.”25 Meanwhile, national defense policy—
generally formulated into security doctrines—outlines the manner in which a state plans to
ensure the security of its territory and citizens from foreign threats. Soldiers, as experts in
security matters, are often involved in the formulation and implementation of national defense
policies, even in established democracies. Since such strategies can determine the security of
a nation’s people, it is crucial that they remain under civilian jurisdiction. Furthermore, all
national defense activities can only be compatible with civilian control where civilians
oversee the range, duration and frequency of these missions and related activities, and if
civilian institutions are able to monitor the military’s external security operations.26
Table 5: Indicators of National Defense

Dimension Indicator
Policy-making authority Civilian influence in the processes of defense
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policy making
Control over implementation of Civilian oversight of military defense activities
defense policies
Finally, the area of military organization comprises decisions on all organizational
aspects of the military as an institution, which can be organized into two dimensions
(Alagappa 2001; Bland 1999; 2001; Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster 2002; Lambert 2009, 279-
296; Pion-Berlin 1992; Stepan 1988). The first dimension refers to the material aspects or
“hardware” of military organization: force size and structure, procurement and production of
military equipment, as well as other institutional, financial and technological resources of the
military. The second dimension (“software”), includes the ideational aspects of military
organization (e.g. doctrine and education); and decisions on personnel selection such as
recruitment, appointment and retirement.27 “Modern militaries tend to be structured as
rational organizations, emphasizing hierarchy, formal rules, and division of labor”.28
Moreover, they are divided into areas of specialization and generally follow standard
operating procedures. Ultimately, their reliable resources and pre-determined goals facilitate
efficiency in terms of task-execution ”29 Such expertise, training, hierarchy, and rules are not
unlike situations in any organization. Such professional evolution can lead to organizational
“autonomization,” where bureaucracies become increasingly isolated from civilian control at
all levels. Likewise, in the case of military organization, one must consider the degrees of
organizational autonomy.30
Table 6: Indicators of Military Organization

Dimension Indicator
“Hardware” of military organization Civilian influence in decisions on military
“hardware”
“Software” of military organization Civilian influence on military “software”
Application to Thailand
This five-part conceptualization for determining the level of civil-military relations is
applied below to the case of Thailand. The overall rating represents the additive parts of all
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five areas together. Where soldiers possess either all or the lion’s share of decision-making
power, civilian control is ranked low for the particular decision-making area. If civilians
always or generally succeed in exerting authority over decision-making power for a specific
decision-making area, civilian control is rated high for that area. Finally, where the military is
able to cling to autonomy, often thwarts civilian government attempts to reign it in, or is
effectively able to refuse directives from civilian leaders—without dominating them, then
civilian control is at a level of medium. Sometimes ratings cannot be pigeonholed into neat,
precise tiers. As such, I also have included low-medium and medium-high.
Elite Recruitment:
Since none of our four indicators of elite recruitment were ever institutionally
enshrined in Thai law, there was never any specific representation institutionally reserved for
military personnel. Nor was military influence on the procedures of political competition
enshrined into law. Further, there was no eligibility of active duty military officers for public
office. Finally, the military had no right to exercise veto power over the forming and
dissolving of governments. But informally, the armed forces did exercise authority over each
of these areas.
Civilian control of elite recruitment has differed across the years. Since 1988, six
different periods can be observed. These are the following: 1) the Chatchai Chunhavan
elected administration of 1988-91; 2) the military-installed government of 1991-92; 3) the
1992-2001 era of democratization; 4) the Thaksin Shinawatra elected administrations of 2001-
06; 5) the military-instated government of 2006-08; and 6) the period since the return to
democratization in early 2008.
Civilian Prime Minister, Military Autonomy: 1988-91
13
This period reflected a growing surge of pluralistic forces in Thailand, led by political
parties, business associations, the print media, and elements of civil society (including
NGOs). 1988 began with the decision by non-elected Prime Minister Gen.Prem Tinsulanond
to resign from office, making way for Chart Thai Party leader Gen. Chatchai Chunhavan to
become PM himself. Chatchai permitted Army Commander Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh to
control military reshuffles as well as the military budget. But, in 1990, Chavalit resigned,
making way for Class 5 faction head Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon to succeed him. Quarreling
between Chatchai and Suchinda over weapons purchases and military perceptions of civilian
interference in its domain led to the coup of February 21, 1991.31
In terms of reserved representation, the 1978 constitution allowed the king to appoint
the members of the Senate. From 1989 to 1991,161 or 60.2% out of 267 members of the
Upper House were active duty military personnel. The Lower House and Office of Prime
Minister, however, remained the domains of civilians. With regard to the Council of
Ministers, 11/46 or 23.9% were retired military officials.32
Yet had it wished, the military could have seated a non-elected Prime Minister in 1988
given that it controlled the majority of Senate seats and it could probably have found enough
Lower House MP allies to put together enough parliamentary votes to bring a non-elected PM
to office. Moreover, the 1978 constitution remained ambiguous on this issue. Thus, the 1988
rise to office of elected PM Chatchai was more a matter of retiring PM Gen. Prem
Tinsulanond resigning and the armed forces reluctantly agreeing to it. As such, from 1988
until 1991, the armed forces were informally able to exert influence on the procedures of
political competition—this study’s second indicator relating to elite recruitment.
As for eligibility of active duty military officers in positions of political decision-
making, the 1978 constitution did indeed ban active military officers from entering political
offices. Yet active duty military officers were informally allowed to participate in the
decision-making bodies by way of formal rules. For example, Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh,
14
Army Commander from 1986 until 1990, was informally allowed by PM Chatchai to control
military promotions, the military budget, and even sit in on all cabinet meetings.33
Meanwhile, many Thai political parties allied themselves with or were mere fronts for
military factions during this time. The Chart Thai party of PM Chatchai Chunhavan was
close to his family and that of former Gen. Pramarn Adireksan. Former Army Commander
Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh founded his New Aspiration Party in 1990. The Democrat party
was meanwhile viewed as close to Gen. Prem Tinsulanond. Then there was the Rassadorn
Party of Gen. Tienchai Sirisampan. These military-party alliances in some cases allowed
powerful armed forces personnel the power to informally meddle in party or parliamentary
politics.
Finally, with regard to a military veto power over the forming and dissolving of
governments, the Thai military could generally exert informal influence to either force a
government to form governments of its choice or dissolve governments with which it came
into disagreement. Military leaders (e.g. Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon) needed only to threaten
a coup to get their way (though this was not always successful with Chatchai).34 Indeed,
amidst incessant quarreling with Army Commander Gen. Suchinda, Chatchai resigned as
Prime Minister on December 8, 1990, only to be renominated and elected the following day.
Two months later the military overthrew him.
Ultimately, civilian control was at a level of medium during the administration of
Chatchai Chunhavan. The armed forces possessed a reserved domain in the Senate and
varying levels of connections with different political parties in parliament. Informally,
soldiers could influence the procedures of political competition as well as the formation or
dissolution of a government. However, such military authority was neither direct nor
institutionalized.
Military Supremacy: 1991-2
15
This brief interval witnessed a coup by the armed forces and establishment of military
government. The coup group ruled through its all-military National Peace-Keeping
Commission and then chose the civilian PM Anand Panyarachun to administer the country
together with an appointed Council of Ministers while an appointed and unicameral National
Legislative Assembly acted as parliament. These bodies acted under the aegis of the interim
charter, which came into force on March 1, 1991, lasting until December 9 of the same year.
But this charter did not specifically enshrine military supremacy into law, instead allowing for
ambiguity which facilitated the establishment of a domain of military appointments within
various political posts. For example, 152 or 52% of the 292 appointed lawmakers in the
unicameral assembly were soldiers (active or retired).35 Within Anand’s own cabinet, the
Ministers of Defense and Interior were simultaneously military men in the NPKC. In
December 1991, a new constitution came into force, following which elections were held in
March 1992 that propelled Gen. Suchinda himself to the post of PM.36 As for his cabinet,
seven out of the 50 members had military backgrounds. Also in 1992, a newly appointed
Senate was installed. Moreover, at least 36 senior armed forces personnel were allowed to
either chair or sit near the top of state enterprise boards.37 In May 1992, following the violent
crackdown on anti-government demonstrators, the Suchinda government was forced from
office and Anand returned to lead a brief caretaker government until elections could be held.
However, the military-dominated Senate remained in office though the Constitution was
amended to accommodate the demands of the May uprising, a major one of which was that
the PM must be an elected member of the Lower House.
The NPKC coup group exerted influence over the procedures of political competition.
This it did first by forbidding political activities until the drawing up of a constitution
(following the temporary charter of March 1991). Ultimately, enhanced military prerogatives
were enshrined in the December 1991 constitution, which gave inordinate powers of state to
the chair of the NPKC coup group as well as to interim PM Anand. For example, this charter
16
allowed for a continuation of the appointed Senate as well as for the possibility of a non-
elected MP.38 Both of these helped to ensure that the military could maintain a potential veto
over elected civilian actors in terms of the procedures of political competition. In March
1992, Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon was able to pressure Sammakhitham party leader Narong
Wongwan to step aside so that the former could assume the post of Prime Minister. Given
that prime ministers were selected or censured through joint sittings of the Lower and Upper
Houses, the military-dominated Upper House need only find alliances with a majority of
lawmakers in the Lower House to influence their parliamentary preferences.
The December 1991 constitution shored up the eligibility of active duty military
officers for public office in the Senate and (potentially) the office of Prime Minister. The
political prowess of the armed forces was further accentuated by Class 5’s establishment of
the Samakhitham Party to act as its surrogate in the Lower House. Benefiting from state
resources, political connections, and gathering together numerous parliamentary intra-party
factions, Samakkhitham or STP was formed in April, 1991, by Thiti Nakorntab, an ex-Air
Force officer-turned-businessman, who was also a close associate of Gen. Suchinda
Kraprayoon. The STP was formed to act as a “`buffer’ party between the old power
group…and the new power group of the then recently formed New Aspiration Party.”39
Ultimately, by creating a political party, the Class Five military faction could compete with
Chavalit’s Democratic Soldiers military faction (New Aspiration Party) as well as with Soi
Rajakru (Chart Thai Party) upon the parliamentary playing field. Samakhitham won the
March 1992 election by a landslide.
As for military veto power over forming and dissolving of governments, the NPKC
did indeed appoint the short-lived (1991-April 1992) Anand government and could have
forced it from office if it had desired. As for the elected government of March 1992, though
the military possessed no specific institutional powers over its duration in office, it could have
threatened a coup to informally influence the government.
17
All in all, civilian control remained low during the period of direct military jurisdiction
by the NPKC (February 1991-March 1992). Following the 1992 election however, civilian
control rose to a level of medium-low. Civilian control failed to reach a medium level
because the armed forces succeeded in informally dominating most areas of political
recruitment through the election of their Sammakhitham party and its establishment of a
coalition government and cabinet in April 1992.
Civilians Again at the Fore: 1992-2000
The mid-1990s witnessed the apparent flowering of civilian control over Thailand’s
military. As such, the military itself seemed to step back from the political stage. Three
factors helped to account for this state of affairs. First, after the Black May, 1992 massacre,
the armed forces lost an enormous amount of respect and political capital, especially when
PM Gen.Suchinda was seen being scolded by the king on national television. Suchinda was
pressured to resign and returning appointed PM Anand dismissed three key army officers
loyal to him. Moreover, Anand streamlined the state enterprise boards, decreasing military
influence on them, and making new board appointments on the basis of capability and
expertise.40 Indeed, many of these parastatals were set to be privatized. Second, two Army
commanders during the 1990s (Gen. Wimol Wongwanich and Gen. Surayudh Chulanond)
directed the military to undergo reforms and a restructuring. Actually, both Wimol and
Surayud were close to Gen.Prem Tinsulanond, who was appointed to the Privy Council in
1988 and became its chair in 1998.41 Though Prem had retired from the military in 1981, his
powerful position as chief advisor to the king (and continuing networks of influence in the
military) catapulted him to become the “surrogate strongman” of Thai politics after
Suchinda’s downfall in 1991.42 Thus, Prem’s domination of the military in the 1990s
facilitated what appeared to be the institution’s voluntary though reluctant de-politicization.
Third, the financial crisis of 1997 brought down the government of PM Gen.Chavalit
18
Yongchaiyudh, a charismatic military leader and potential competitor of Prem. This
facilitated the return to office of the Democrat party (closely allied with Prem) and its leader
Chuan Leekpai. The financial crisis also gave the military less of a reason to compete for a
higher budget given the country’s economic hard times. Moreover, Chuan in his second term
(1997-2001) took the post of Defense Minister as well as PM, pushing the military toward
various reforms.
In terms of reserved representation for soldiers, the 1992-2000 period saw a growth in
political space for civilians.43 In the Senate, the informal military reserved domain for
military appointees diminished from 154 or 55.2% out of 270 senators (1992-96) to 48 or
18.4% out of 260 (1996-2000).44 The Prime Minister and members of the Lower House were
by law required to be elected civilians. As for the Council of Ministers, the four governments
between 1992 and 2000 allowed between two and eight cabinet positions (out of
approximately 50 slots) to be held by ex-military officials.45
As for military influence on the procedures of political competition, this appeared to
diminish during the mid-1990s period. However, at least in the 1996 general election, reports
surfaced that armed forces personnel were involving themselves in elections. For example,
Gen. Akradej Sasiprapa, in assisting the New Aspiration Party of his patron Gen.Chavalit
Yongchaiyudh, threatened Democrat party vote canvassers while campaigning for New
Aspiration candidates.46 In a much more direct example of manipulation, it was rumored that
Privy Council Chair ret.Gen. Prem interfered in parliamentary politics on November 6, 1997
by influencing 12 members Prajakorn Thai party to defect from the ruling coalition and join
the opposition, thus enabling the Democrat Party to form a coalition government.47
In terms of active duty military officers’ eligibility to serve in positions of political
decision-making, this was non-existent in 1992-2000. Fallout over the Black May massacre
had seen to that. The only exception was in terms of the ability to serve in the Upper House
(which continued to diminish during this period) or the cabinet (but only as a retired soldier).
19
Finally, with regard to military veto power over the forming and dissolving of
governments, this was not extant during the period at hand. There were no rules allowing
such a military monopoly over elected governance. Nor were any instances in which the
military informally took a tutelary role to either form governments or bring about their
dissolution.
Given Thailand’s growing democratization after 1992 and diminished role of the
military in politics, it is undeniable that civilian control grew in Thailand during this period.
There were but three severe intrusions into elite recruitment. First there was military
involvement in support of pro-military political parties or candidates at election time. Second,
there was a continued reserved domain of soldiers in the Senate, despite the fact that such
representation continued to diminish. Finally, an ex-military bigwig (Gen. Prem
Tinsulanond) indirectly brought about a change of government (“silent coup”) through
applying pressure on various members of the Lower House.48 Civilian control during this
period might thus be termed medium-high given the fact that there were few rules which
guaranteed the military’s role in politics during this period and moreover, the armed forces
generally refrained from involving itself in politics.
Civilian Supremacy: 2000-2006
This era commenced following the enactment of the 1997 “People’s” constitution and
its implementation regarding the Senate beginning in 2000. Indeed this constitution now
established that senatorial candidates could only become part of that body through election.
In the 2000-06 Senate, for the first time, all members (200) were elected. Meanwhile, only 2
per cent of these were retired military officers.49 On January 6, 2001, telecommunications
tycoon and ex-police colonel Thaksin Shinawatra, together with his political party Thai Rak
Thai, won the general election by a landslide and he formed a coalition government which
was to last an entire four-year term, something which had never occurred in Thailand. In
20
February 2001, his government cobbled together a 40-person cabinet. Other than Thaksin
himself, only two retired security officials sat on the cabinet, former PM Gen.Chavalit
Yongchiayudh (Minister of Defense) and his close associate Yuthasak Sasiprapha (Deputy
Minister of Defense).50 Thaksin was re-elected by an even greater landslide in 2005, and he
maintained the quota of two former military personnel other than himself.
During this period, the armed forces possessed very little authority over procedures of
political competition. Gone were the days when they could sit on the Senate or dominate the
executive branch. Indeed, if anyone was manipulating the procedures of political competition
it was Thaksin, the elected civilian. Indeed, Thaksin’s clout in 2001 was such that he was
able to exert overriding authority throughout parliament, courts, and even compete with
Gen.Prem in terms of political influence. Thaksin saw to it that a great many top seats on the
state monitoring agencies (e.g. Constitutional Court, Election Commission) were filled by his
own loyalists. As for the military, Thaksin used a policy of appeasement. This he did by
appointing 55 Army generals to be advisors to the Prime Minister. 30 more were later
added.51 At the same time, Thaksin used Chavalit and the latter’s close supporters to
establish a wedge against Prem until the PM could maneuver his own cousin Chaisit
Shinawatra in to the post of Army Chief.52 Ultimately, whatever power the military had over
procedures of political competition derived from its association with Thaksin.
As in the past, active duty military officers were generally forbidden to hold public
office. Nor did the armed forces exert informal tutelage over Thaksin’s government.
Thaksin’s success in co-opting Chavalit and other retired military officers into Thai Rak Thai
helped to ensure that none of them would informally score political points without some
association with him. Chavalit’s New Aspiration party was merged into Thai Rak Thai as
was the Chart Pattana party (associated with Gen.Arthit Kamlang-ek). Thus, the Thai military
found political voice only through Thai Rak Thai or through the opposition Democrats (e.g.
21
Gen.Sanan Kachonprasert--deputy leader of the Democrat party). Meanwhile, Gen.
Manoonkrit Rupkachorn, a Thaksin critic, served as Senator and Senate President.
The military as an institution did not, during 2000-06 possess any veto power over
forming and dissolving of governments. There were neither formal rules nor informal tutelary
rights which allowed for armed forces’ breaches in civilian control during this time.
Given the implementation of the 1997 constitution and the 2001-06 dominance of
civilian strongman Thaksin across Thailand, civilian control of the military perhaps grew to
its highest levels in Thai history. Thaksin made use of the new constitution which buttressed
the powers of political parties and Prime Ministers against corrupt and non-democratic forces.
He also utilized his enormous financial resources to market himself or buy off potential
enemies. His landslide electoral victories, enormous popularity among the masses, and ability
to successfully joust against Gen.Prem allowed Thaksin to monopolize the political space
once dominated by the armed forces and other political parties.
Resurgence of Military Supremacy: 2006-08
Yet Thaksinocracy was not to last. Thai society became polarized between Thaksin
loyalists and opponents (the latter included royalist elites, businesspeople, civil libertarians,
the parliamentary opposition (Democrats) and disaffected soldiers). Citing disorder and lack
of unity, Gen.Sonthi Limthongkul, then Army Commander, led a coup against Thaksin,
voiding the 1997 constitution, and established a military government in Thailand—the first in
15 years. Sonthi’s military junta was called the Council for Democratic Reform (CDR), the
name of which was later changed to CNS (Council for National Security). Though Sonthi had
been a compromise candidate to become Army head, he had actually been supported by
Prem.53 The 2006 coup was directed by arch-royalist Prem supporters in the armed forces.54
Sonthi appointed as interim PM the anti-Thaksin Prem stalwart Gen.Surayudh Chulanond.
Surayudh and his cabinet of 26 administered the country, with two ministers coming from the
22
military (longtime Surayud confidant Gen. Boonrawd Somtas at Defense and Adm. Threera
Haocharoen at Transportation). Meanwhile, a National Legislative Assembly (NLA) was put
together to draw up a new constitution. The NLA was composed of 242 persons, including 76
or 31.4% active/retired military or police55). While such military representation does not
appear to approach a majority, non-military NLA representatives allied with soldiers in the
assembly to ensure voting majorities.
In terms of military influence on the procedures of political competition, political
parties, demonstrations, and related activities, were banned by the junta until July 2007. The
military-endorsed constitution of 2007 allowed for a propular referendum on the charter. Yet
soldiers were said to be attempting to influence rural Thais to vote for it. Martial law was
lifted only little-by-little from provinces considered to be pro-Thaksin in time for the
December 2007 pre-election campaign. Yet there were allegations of covert military
involvement in seeking to influence the election’s outcome. The purported plan involved
using state-run media to attack and discredit the pro-Thaksin People’s Power Party—in the
name of national security.56Another alleged plot entailed military lobbying of political parties
in a bid to prevent People’s Power from forming a government after the election.57The
military may also have similarly lobbied parties in December 2008.
With regard to the eligibility of active duty military officers for public office, this did
not transpire following the coup of 2006—though some unsuccessfully sought to enshrine the
possibility of a non-elected PM into the 2007 constitution. Still, armed forces personnel
managed to acquire greater access to positions of public decision-making. At least11 army
generals and two police generals became board members of approximately 13 state enterprise
agencies.58The trend in military involvement on state enterprise boards had gradually
dissipated after 1992 but the 2006 coup saw new hope for soldiers to re-gain their status on
these boards, increasing the potential for financial inducements in return for their influencing
public policy.
23
Lastly, one could say with confidence that the military possessed the right to veto
either the formation or dissolution of government from 2006-08. After all, the military was
ruling directly. As such, had Surayud fallen out of favor with Sonthi, one would think that
Sonthi could simply replace him with a more trustworthy PM. But despite such power,
Sonthi could not have simply replaced Surayud if he had desired. This is because Prem
Tinsulanond was Surayud’s close patron and mentor. And Prem was influential throughout
the coup government—including with Sonthi. Despite occasional disagreements, Sonthi’s
CNS coup group and the appointed government of Surayud managed to cooperate enough to
maintain order, administer the economy, produce a new constitution, and carry out elections
on December 27, 2008.
Ultimately, during this period, civilian control was quite low. The PM was an
appointed ex-military man and his cabinet was all appointed. Meanwhile the legislature (the
NLA) was similarly appointed with several members derived from the military. Prior to the
election campaign of late 2007, little political competition was allowed by the military accept
at the local level. Though the constitution forbade soldiers from holding public office, many
generals held posts at state agencies. Finally, since the military maintained a monopoly over
coercive force while dominating the country’s politics, it could conceivably influence the
formation or dissolution of any Thai government—though this was unlikely.
Civilian Prime Minister, Military Autonomy: 2008-Present
Since the return to electoral democracy in December 2007, political space has slightly
widened since the coup, seeming to represent a fall-back to the era prior to Thaksin. Lower
House MPs are still elected. Yet the 2007 constitution also called for a half-appointed (74
members), half-elected (76 members) Upper House. Following senatorial elections in early
2008, 15.3% of the entire 76 directly elected/74 appointed Senate is now composed of retired
military officials to make this an indirect reserved domain. Among the 74 appointed
24
Senators, 14 were ex-soldiers for a 9.3% military reserved domain.59 The 2008 cabinets of
civilian pro-Thaksin Prime Ministers Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat contained
2-3 ex-military men respectively. The government of civilian Democrat Abhisit Vechachiwa
(coming to office in late December 2008) contained two retired military officials.60
With regard to military influence on the procedures of political competition, this has
occurred very recently. On December 2, 2008, the pro-Thaksin People’s Power party was
dissolved, forcing the resignation of Somchai. Thereupon, throughout December, Anupong
and other military elements (including Gen. Prawit Wongsawan) met with Democrat bigwig
Suthep Thaugsuban and (former Thai Rak Thai deputy leader, now roving faction head)
Newin Chidchob to cobble together a coalition government under Democrat Abhisit
Vechachiwa which would exclude Puea Thai.61 This latent oblique intrusion into civilian
political competition indicated that despite the return to ostensible civilian rule in 2008, the
military was perfectly willing to be a more subtle political player in Thailand’s post-coup
politics.
As for the involvement of active duty soldiers in public office, this remains a preserve
at least institutionally off-limits to soldiers. Informally however, in the first half of 2009, a
nexus of power seemed to have been formed among Gen. Anupong, Defense Minister Gen.
Prawit (both of whom earlier served together in the Queen’s Guard), and Prawit’s brother
Gen. Pacharawat (Chief of Police). Prawit was already retired and Anupong was close to
Prawit. At the same time, the Army Chief was generally allowed to have his way with regard
to the military budget as well as promotions. Meanwhile, though the police were directly
overseen by the Prime Minister, PM Abhisit appeared to have granted Patcharawat carte
blanche authority—working in tandem with his brother Prawit as well as Anupong. Public
security policy has thus been more in the hands of active duty security personnel rather than
civilians or retired soldiers.
25
Lastly, in terms of military veto power over forming and dissolving of governments,
the Thai military did seek to informally influence the fall of two pro-Thaksin governments in
2008. This it sought to do in at least two instances since the election of December 2007. All
occurred during the 2008 anti-Thaksin PAD (People’s Alliance for Democracy) yellow-shirt
demonstrations and subsequent Supreme Court-ordered dissolution of the People’s Power
Party (the substitute party of Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai following the court-ordered dissolution
of the latter). First, during the demonstrations, Army Commander Gen. Anupong Paochinda
refused to order his troops to defend government buildings against advancing protestors.
Without troops to defend them, each government relied on the police—though public support
from the latter faded when the Queen attended the funeral of yellow shirt protestor, killed
during a police attempt to repress a PAD demonstration. Second, in late November, as PAD
protests in Bangkok continued unabated, Army Chief Anupong went on national television to
call for the resignation of Somchai or his dissolution of the Lower House.62 Though Somchai
refused to take heed of Anupong’s words, he could eventually only find refuge in Chiang Mai,
where pro-Thaksin opinion was much more dominant and the Democratic Alliance Against
Dictatorship (DAAD) red-shirts promised to protect the PM.
Today the level of civilian control when it comes to elite recruitment stands at
medium. Though civilian authority appears to have reemerged following the late 2007
elections, Thailand’s military continues to wield considerable influence in terms of political
influence and participation. Such a strong military is a worrying development in a country
where democratic institutions remain weakly formed.
The tables below show the evolution of military or retired military elite recruitment in
Thailand. The first follows such influence in Thai cabinets, 1932-Present. The second
reflects the sway of the armed forces in Thailand’s legislature from 1932 to the Present. The
tables show that military influence on elite recruitment was weakest when armed forces
influence was in recession (1945-47; 1973-76; after 1992). The tables reflect a general
26
chronological trend: less military representation in cabinets. The devolution of an armed
forces representation in the legislature also lessened over time, except that after 2006 you see
it spiking upward again. This possibly indicates the rise again of military influence in Thai
politics. Surprisingly, the cabinets of such military stalwarts as Sarit, Suchinda, and Chavalit
tended to have more civilians on their cabinets than did other PMs, perhaps reflecting
confidence in their own abilities to control the armed forces.
Table 7: Chronology of Thai Military Influence in Cabinet Elite Recruitment (1932-

Present)
Cabinet Duration of Government Proportion of
Military or
Retired Military
to Civilian
Cabinet
Ministers
Phya Manopakorn Nitithada 1932-33 7/15 or 46.6%
Col.Phya Phahon 1933-38 7/15 or 46.6%
Phonpayuhasena (Phayon
Yothin)
Col.Luang Phibunsongkram 1938-44 16/26 or 61.5%
(Plaek Pibulsongkram)
Major Kuang Apaiyavong 1944-45 12/23 or 52.1%
Tawee Punyaketu 1945-45 6/30 or 20%
M.R. Seni Pramoj 1945-46 2/23 or 8.6%
Pridi Banomyong 1946-46 3/17 or 17.6%
Adm. Thawal 1946-47 6/19 or 31.5%
Thamrongnavaswadhi
Field Marshall Gen.Plaek 1948-57 11/27 or 40.7%
Phibulsongkram
Pote Sarasin 1957-57 16/30 or 53.3%
Field Marshall Gen. Thanom 1957-58 17/35 or 48.5%
Kittikachorn
Field Marshall Gen. Sarit 1958-63 6/15 or 40%
Thanarat
Gen. Thanom Kittikachorn 1963-69 9/20 or 45%
Gen.Thanom Kittikachorn 1969-71 14/29 or 48.2%
Gen.Thanom Kittikachorn 1971-73 13/29 or 44.8%
Sanya Dharmasakdi 1973-75 9/28 or 32.1%
M.R. Seni Pramoj 1975-75 4/31 or 12.9%
MR Krukrit Pramoj 1975-76 10/27 or 37%
MR Seni Pramoj 1976-76 9/36 or 25%
Thanin Kravichien 1976-77 5/18 or 27.7%
Gen.Kriangsak Chamanand 1977-79 11/34 or 32.3%
27
Gen.Kriangsak Chamanand 1979-80 19/45 or 42.2%
Gen.Prem Tinsulanond I 1980-83 13/38 or 34.2%
Gen.Prem Tinsulanond II 1983-86 11/44 or 25%
Gen.Prem Tinsulanond III 1986-88 13/45 or 28.8%
Gen.Chatchai Chunhavan 1988-91 11/46 or 23.9%
Anand Panyarachun 1991-92; 1992 8/35 or 22.8%
Gen.Suchinda Kraprayoon 1992-92 7/50 or 14%
Chuan Leekpai 1 1992-95 7/49 or 14.2%
Banharn Silpa-archa 1995-96 8/51 or 15.6%
Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyud 1996-97 3/54 or 5.5%
Chuan Leekpai II 1997-01 4/50 or 8%
Thaksin Shinawatra I 2001-05 4/40 or 10%
Thaksin Shinawatra II 2005-06 4/38 or 10.5%
Gen. Surayud Chulanond 2006-08 3/27 or 11.1%
Samak Sundaravej 2008-08 3/39 or 7.6%
Somchai Wongsawat 2008-08 2/38 or 5.2%
Abhisit Vechachiwa (2008-Present) 2/36 or 5.5%

Note: Each Cabinet above represents the first Coalition of Ministers of the respective Prime Minister. Each
number of ministers includes the Prime Minister as well. Cabinet ministers holding more than one position are
double-counted. Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the following: 24 Thai Prime Ministers:
History and Name Index, Bangkok: Office of the Parliament, 2007; the Government of Thailand,
http://www.cabinet.thaigove.go.th/.
Table 8: Chronology of Thai Military Influence in Legislative Elite Recruitment (1932-

Present)
Duration Method of Number of Seats in Unicameral
Parliament Type Membership Chamber or Senate/ Level of
Military Influence
Unicameral 1932-1933 Appointed 70 (55 or 78.5% military reserved
domain of the appointed)
Unicameral 1933-1937 78 elected by 156 (50 or 64.1% military
Eligible reserved domain of the
Voters/78 appointed)
appointed
Unicameral 1937-1946 91 elected by 182 (58 or 63.7% military
Eligible reserved domain of the
appointed
Bicameral (First Senate) 1946-1947 (terminated by Indirectly 80 (33 or 41.2% ex-military
military coup) Elected (by reserved domain)
the Lower
House)63
Bicameral (Second 1947-1951 (terminated by Appointed 64 100 (35 or 35% ex-military
Senate) military coup) reserved domain of the
appointed)
Unicameral 1951-1957 123 elected 246 (106 or 86.1% military
by Eligible reserved domain of the
appointed
Unicameral 1957-1957 (terminated by 160 elected 186 (106 or 86.1% military
military coup) by Eligible reserved domain of the appointed
Voters/123
appointed
Unicameral 1957-1958 (terminated by 186 elected 307 (98 or 80.9% military reserve
military coup) by Eligible domain of the appointed)
28
Voters/121
appointed
Unicameral 1959-1968 Appointed 240 (175 or 72.9% military
reserved domain
Bicameral (Third 1968-1971 (terminated by Appointed 1968:120 (93 or 78% military
Senate) military coup) reserved domain);
1969: 44 additions: (26 military)
=164 total and 72.5% military
reserved domain
(Constitutional Drafting reserved domain)
Assembly 1)
Assembly 2)
Bicameral (Fourth 1975-1976 (terminated by Appointed 100 (20 or 20% military reserved
Senate) military coup) domain
Advisory Council of 1976-1976 Appointed 24 (24 or 100% military reserved
Prime Minister domain)
Administrative Reform 1976-1977 Appointed 340 (185 or 54.4% military
Assembly reserved domain)
Unicameral 1977-1979 Appointed 360 (245 or 68% military
Assembly 3)
Bicameral (Fifth Senate) 1979-1985 (served 6-year Appointed 1979: 225 (193 or 85.7% military
term) reserve domain);
1981:225 (176 or 78.2% military
reserve domain);
1983:243 (145 or 59.6% military
reserve domain)
Bicameral (Sixth 1985-1991 (terminated by Appointed 1985:260 (161 or 61.9% military
Senate) military coup) reserve domain);
1987:267 (156 or 58.4% military
reserve domain);
1989:267 (161 or 60.2% military
reserve domain)
Unicameral 1991-2 Appointed 292 (152 or 52% military reserve
domain)
Bicameral (Seventh 1992-1996 (served 4-year Appointed 270 (154 or 55.2% military
Senate) term) reserve domain)
Bicameral (Eighth 1996-2000 (served 4-year Appointed 260 (48 or 18.4% military reserve
Senate) term) domain)
Bicameral (Ninth 2000-2006 (served 6-year Directly 200 (2% ex-military)
Senate) term) Elected
Bicameral (Tenth 2006-2006 (terminated by Directly 200 (0% ex-military)

Senate) military coup) Elected
Unicameral 2006-2008 Appointed 242 (76 or 31.4% active/retired

military or police )
Bicameral (Eleventh 2008-Present (serves until 76 directly 150 (23 or 15.3% ex-military)65
Senate) 2014) elected/ 74
appointed
Note: Military reserved domain includes personnel of the army, air force, navy, and police.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the following: Secretariat of the Senate, 2001: 1-3;Parliament
Library, Bangkok (1991): Members of Senates 1932-1991; Neher, 1970: 241; LePoer, 1987; Surachart
Bamrungsuk, United States Foreign Policy and Thai Military Rule, 1947-1977, Duang Kamol, 1988, p.172;
Murray, 1996: 6; Dorman, 1993: 7; Surachart, 1999: 161; The Nation, 13 October 2006; The Nation, 20 February
2008; authors’s calculations.
29
Yet another council where elite recruitment has allowed the military to increase its
influence is on the Privy Council, the advisory body of the King. This regal board, though
civilian in nature, does not derive from popularly elected representatives. Rather, the
monarch appoints these representatives at his pleasure. Moreover, the Thai kingdom’s
character—with monarchically-guided democratization—has ensured that the Privy Council
complements rather than collide with the armed forces. Indeed, the military has increasingly
cooperated with and served under the monarchy since 1957. The Privy Council is
particularly influential in Thailand given its role in deliberating Thai law and offering advice
to the King, considering the promotion of civil servants including military officials, as well as
the fact that three privy councilors have also served as Prime Minister.66
Amidst military collaboration with the monarchy, statistics show that from 1949 until
2009, the number of retired military officials holding positions in the Privy Council has
continued to expand (see Table 2 below). In total, 46 Privy Councillors have served since
1949. Of this number, 16 have been retired military personnel. Prior to the chairmanship of
Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda (1949-1998), 9 possessed military backgrounds. But only since
Prem became chair (1998-Present), 7 soldiers have gained seats. Perhaps this is
understandable since Prem is the first longlasting Privy Council chair with a military
background. Regardless, the increase in numbers of armed forces personnel on the Privy
Council represents a growth of military influence in this regally-created body and, as such, a
boost for military prowess in the Thai polity. The tables below offer greater elaboration:
Table 9: Presidents of the Privy Council (1949 - Present)

Source: Jirawat Kraunggaeow, The Privy Council. Bangkok: Tonbonpinklao Limited, 2007, p.230.
# Name Period of Presidency
Presidency
1 HRH Prince Thaneeniwat Krom Muen Pittaya Larpa 18 June 1949 – 25 March 1950
Pruetiyakorn 8 April 1952 – 20 October 1958
24 April 1959 – 27 May 1963
8 June 1963 – 9 Juli 1963
14 Juli 1963 – 20 June 1968
30
30 Juli 1968 – 17 November 1971
15 December 1972 – 8 September 1974
2 HRH Prince Rangsit Prayurasakdi Krom Khun Jainad 25 March 1950 – 7 March 1951
Narendhorn (later appointed as HRH Krom Phraya Jainad
Narendhorn on 28 January 1952)
3 Lieutenant General HRH Prince Alongkod (later appointed as 13 March 1951 – 29 November 1951
HRH Krom Muen Adisorn Udomsakdi on 5 may 1952)
4 Chao Phraya Sri Dharma Tibet (Jitra Na Songkla) (temporary presidential term)
27 May 1963 – 8 June 1963
9 – 14 July 1963
5 ML Det Sanitwong 24 March 1975 – 8 September 1975
6 Mr. Sanya Dharmasakti 5 December 1975 – 4 September 1998
7 General Prem Tinsulanonda 4 September 1998
31
Table 10: Members of the Privy Council (1949-Present)
Source: Jirawat Kraunggaeow, The Privy Council. Bangkok: Tonbonpinklao Limited, 2007, p.231-5.
# Name Period of Membership
1 Lieutenant General HRH Prince Alongkod (later 18 June 1949 – 13 March 1951
appointed as HRH Krom Muen Adisorn Udomsakdi on 8 April 1952 – 19 December 1952
5 may 1952)
2 Phraya Manna Varajasaevi (Plod Na Songkla) 18 June 1949 – 29 November 1951
8 April 1952 – 20 October 1958
24 February 1959 – 20 June 1968
31 July 1968 – 17 November 1971
15 December 1972 – 7 October 1974
3 General Adul Aduldej-charas 18 June 1949 – 29 November 1951
4 HRH Prince Wiwattanachai 8 April 1952 – 20 October 1958

24 February 1959 – 22 August 1960
5 General HRH Prince Nakatara Mongkol (later 8 April 1952 – 11 February 1953
appointed as HRH Krom Muen Chantaburi Suranata
on 5 May 1952)
6 Chao Phraya Sri Dharma Tibet (Jitr Na Songkla) 8 April 1952 - 20 October 1958
24 February 1959 - 27 May 1963
8 June 1963 - 9 July 1963
14 July 1963 - 20 June 1968
31 July 1968 - 17 November 1971
15 December 1972 - 7 October 1974
7 Phraya Sri Visarn Vaja (Tian-lieng Huntrakul) 8 April 1952 - 20 October 1958
24 February 1959 - 27 August 1962
8 ML Det Sanitwong 24 April 1953 - 20 October 1958
24 February 1959 - 20 June 1968
31 July 1968 - 17 November 1971
9 General Luang Sena Narongka (Sak Sena Narongka) 14 - 19 July 1955
10 Phraya Bhorriraka Vechakarana (Bhorriraka 2 May 1957 - 20 October 1958

Tittiranonda) 24 February 1959 - 26 March 1968
11 Mr. Srisena Sombatrasiri 21 March 1958 - 20 October 1958
24 February 1959 - 20 June 1968
31 July 1968 - 17 November 1971
26 March 1975 - 6 July 1982
12 General Luang Kampanatra Saenyagorn (Kampan 5 February 1960 - 20 June 1968
Uttara-vanij) 30 July 1968 - 17 November 1971
13 General Luang Suranarongka (Thongchai Chotika- 7 July 1964 - 20 June 1968
sathira) 31 July 1968 - 20 June 1971
26 March 1975 - 18 January 1986
14 Major General Mom Thaweewongsa Tawalayasakdi 24 November 1966 - 20 June 1968
(MR Chalermlarpa Thaweewongsa appointed as Mom 31 July 1968 - 27 October 1970
Thaweewongsa Tawalyasakdi on 10 November 1929)
15 Mr. Sanya Dharmasakdi 18 - 20 June 1968
31 July 1968 - 17 November 1971
26 March 1975 - 5 December 1975
16 MJ Wongsanuwattara Devakula 4 September 1998 - 6 January 2002
32
1 - 17 November 1971
15 Decempber 1972 - 7 October 1974
26 March 1975 - 10 February 1986
17 Mr. Phrakob Huta-singha 26 March 1975 - 28 July 1994
18 Police General Atthasidha Siddhisuntara 26 March 1975 - 16 September 1998
19 Mr. Chinda Bunnaya-arkom 26 March 1975 - 8 November 1987
20 MJ Chakrabongse Pensiri Chakrapanda (appointed as 26 March 1975 - 13 October 1993

HRH Prince Chakrabongse Pensiri on 29 March 1994)
21 Mr. Kitti Sihanondana 26 March 1975 - 24 October 1993
22 Mr. Charuenpanda Isarankula Na Ayudhaya 26 March 1975 - 12 August 1991
23 ML Jirayu Napawongsa 26 March 1975 - 7 November 2003
24 General Samran Pattayakula 19 December 1975 - 24 July 1986
25 Mr. Chaovana Nasylvanta 19 December 1975 -
26 Mr. Tanin Kraivixien 15 December 1977 -
27 Mr. Kanlaya Isarasena Na Ayudhaya 18 April 1979 - 12 August 1996
28 Mr. Jitti Tingsapattiya 3 March 1984 - 3 March 1995
29 Rear Admiral ML Usni Pramoj (appointed ML Rear 3 March 1984 -

Admiral on 25 July 1992)
30 Air Vice Marshal Kamthon Sindhvananda 28 November 1987 -
31 General Prem Tinsulanonda 23 August 1988 - 4 September 1998
32 Air Chief Marshal Siddhi Savetsila 24 December 1991 -
33 Nr. Chulanoppa Sanitawongse Na Ayudhaya 24 December 1991 -
34 MR Adulyakitti Kittiyakorn 9 April 1992 - 5 May 2004
35 General Pichitr Kullavanijaya 13 July 1993 -
36 Mr. Ampol Senanarong 9 September 1994 -
37 Mr. Chamras Kemacharu 15 November 1994 -
38 ML Thaweesanti Ladawalaya 3 October 1995 -
39 MR Thepkamol Devakula 7 August 1997 -
40 Mr. Sakda Mokkamakkul 6 January 1999 -
41 Mr. Kasem Watanachai 18 July 2001 -
42 Mr. Palakorn Suwanrath 18 July 2001 -
43 Mr. Sawad Wattanayagorn 18 July 2002 -
44 General Surayud Chulanont 14 November 2003 -
45 Mr. Santi Thakral 15 March 2005 -
46 Admiral Chumpol Pachusanon 15 March 2005 -
33
Public Policy
Public policy, representing the entirety of the formulation and implementation of
government planning which impinge upon society’s welfare, has traditionally been a top-
down affair in Thailand. Public policy was determined by the absolute monarchy until 1932.
After that, the bureaucracy monopolized control over it and for only a brief period (1944-
1948) did civilians oversee it. The bureaucratic polity (in terms of the armed forces) returned
to dominate all aspects of public policy from 1948 until 1973. In terms of foreign policy, this
period saw Thailand aligned closely with the United States. As such, Bangkok sent troops to
participate in various US-led campaigns Korean War (1950-53), Vietnam War (1965-73), and
the War in Laos (1964-73).
However, from 1973 to 1977, civilian-led administrations finally began to challenge
the military with regard to control over public policy. During this period, three issues cropped
up which greatly heightened the suspicions of the armed forces toward the civilian
governments of PMs Sanya Dharmasakdi, MR Kukrit Pramoj, and MR Seni Pramoj. These
were 1) establishing formal ties with communist countries (particularly China and the USSR);
2) withdrawing US troops from Thailand; and 4) the attempt by civilian governments to
oversee rural development policy. Despite open hostility toward these moves by military
officers such as Col. Chamlong Srimuang, no senior military personnel publicly moved to try
and prevent these civilian policy modifications, given the fallout from the October 14, 1973
military massacre of students. But “it was unacceptable to the military that, after [1973]
civilian governments played a significant role in both domestic and foreign policy-making.”67
Despite military opposition, civilian governments did succeed in renegotiating agreements so
that US troops to withdrew from Thailand by 1976. Also, Thailand began to build bridges
toward an apertura with communist countries (though full diplomatic ties were not
established until the Kriangsak Chomanan regime (1977-80). As for attempts to gain greater
control over rural development, civilian governments managed to partially succeed through
34
their control of the Ministry of Interior (which appointed governors and oversaw rural
development). At the same time, the Kukrit government initiated the tambon scheme which
distributed state financing through sub-district authorities instead of the central government.68
The enhanced power of civilians in pacifying the country was seen as a direct challenge by
the military. The latter began to recruit vocational students into paramilitary groups allied
with the armed forces while the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) became a sort
of parallel state to the civilian regime. The climax of civilian-military tensions over public
policy during this time however surrounded the US attempt to rescue the crew members of the
USS Mayaguez in May 1975. During this crisis, Thailand’s elected Kukrit administration
refused US permission to launch operations from Thai bases against Khmer Rouge forces.
Thereupon, the US contacted Gen.Kriangsak Chomanand (then Chief of Staff of the Supreme
Command, later PM) who gave the green light for the US to utilize Utapao base to stage the
assault without PM Kukrit’s knowledge.69
Following the 1976 coup and especially from 1977 until 1979, the military was
returned to the driver’s seat of controlling public policy. However, from 1979 until 1988,
during the era of the half-democracy, civilians were allowed to occupy a multiplicity of
cabinet portfolios. Thus, despite the fact that first Gen. Kriangsak (1979-80) and then Gen.
Prem Tinsulanond served as unelected PMs, many elected civilians managed to direct public
policy during this period. However, the portfolios of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior, and
Finance were reserved for retired soldiers. Indeed, ACM Siddhi Savetsila served as Foreign
Minister from 1980 until 1988. Moreover, the military’s Internal Security Operations
Command (ISOC) and Capital Security Command (CSC) continued to exert influence on
social, economic, and rural development policies, rationalizing their efforts by citing the need
to ensure economic and policial stability to prevent communist subversion.70
From 1988 until 1991, the civilian government of Gen.Chatchai Chunhavan oversaw
public policy. The gradual drawback by the armed forces from dominating most areas of
35
public policy (which occurred during the Prem years) had led the military to diminish its hold
over influencing most aspects of public policy—except for those pertaining to national
security. As such, ACM Siddhi was initially kept on by Chatchai as Foreign Minister. But
Chatchai took the post of Defense Minister, gave Interior to his brother-in-law Gen.Pramarn
Adireksan, and placed a civilian (Pramuan Sabhavasu) in the Finance portfolio.
In terms of policy, the military clashed with the Chatchai government in four areas:
foreign policy, interior policy, and defense policy. In terms of foreign policy, Chatchai
sought to boost trade with Thailand’s neighbors now the Cold War was dwindling down. But
the military, whose claims to huge budget allocations necessitated enemies along the borders,
generally opposed Chatchai’s opening to former Communist and Socialist enemies. In
addition, during the 1980s, close economic and political links between Thai generals and their
counterparts in Burma Lao PDR, and anti-government forces in Cambodia helped these Thai
generals become informal Thai leaders in terms of relations with Thailand’s neighbors. An
example is Army Commander (and later PM) Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, who profited
handsomely from a lucrative timber trade in Burma. Yet the Chatchai government’s
“civilianization” of foreign policy meant a potential lessening of military links and prowess
with Thailand’s neighbors.71
In term of interior policy, the armed forces were angered when Interior Minister Gen.
Praman Adireksan transferred his own loyalists into provincial governorship positions,
ousting bureaucrats allied to the military. Praman also sought to exert his control over the
police, a domain which the military (especially Class 5) was seeking to control.72
Finally, with regard to defense policy, the Chatchai government rejected a military
plan for a new intelligence unit and the Auditor-General attempted to audit military
purchases. Indeed, Chatchai saw eye to eye with parliament in demanding more military
budget transparency. Finally, the straw that broke the camel’s back, helping to facilitate the
36
1991 coup was the Chatchai government’s attempt to put a lid on massive military requests in
late 1990.73
Following the 1991 coup, the military was once again in the shadow of power.
However, the armed forces’ appointment of a civilian (Anand Panyarachun) as PM and
Anand’s appointment of a mostly civilian cabinet showed that the military was now ready to
live with more civilian control over public policy. Indeed, the junta sought and was granted
three top positions in the Defense and Interior Ministries, while a civilian veteran diplomat
close to Gen.Prem Tinsulanond was made Foreign Minister.74The second Anand government,
however, lessened the role of the military in public policy by diminishing the number of
soldiers who could serve on state enterprise boards and moving to privatize them.75
From 1992 until 2006, public policy was in the hands of civilians for 15 years. During
this period, Interior policy gradually became the preserve of civilian control. This was
enabled by popular policies such as administrative decentralization and elections at local
levels. Moreover, the enhanced power of political parties during this period saw to it that
cabinet ministers and prime ministers must always be civilians (Constitution 1997). Various
aspects of the 1997 “people’s” constitution gave teeth to judicial bodies such as the
Administrative Court, Office of the Ombudsman, and National Counter Corruption
Commission. During the Chuan Leekpai II government, PM Chuan took the Defense portfolio
while reformist Army Commander Gen.Surayud Chulanond (following the example of army
Commander Gen.Wimol Wongawanich) sought to get the Thai military out of politics and
policy-making altogether. Chuan and Surayud added a new role for the military in Thai
foreign policy: participation in United Nations peace-keeping missions. Still, in terms of
foreign policy the armed forces continued to play an important though reduced role in
relations with Cambodia, Laos, and Burma because of shared borders…and the Thai battle
with communism.76
37
The 2001 election of Thaksin Shinawatra increased civilian control over public policy.
Indeed, the popularity of the socioeconomic programs initiated by the Thaksin government
ensured people’s continuing support for civilian control over politics and public policy.
Indeed, the Thaksin government represented the nadir of military influence over Thai public
policy. Perhaps the only occasion where the military successfully influenced Thaksin
involved the decision by the Thai government in October 2001 to reverse itself and give full
support to the US against Al Qaeda in the aftermath of 9/11.77 Under Thaksin, foreign policy
became more closely aligned with the United States. Indeed, elements of the Thai military
were sent in support of US forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Though the Thai armed
forces took a back seat to Thaksin during this time, they generally supported the PM’s pro-US
tilt.
The 2006 coup brought the military back to a dominant position in policy formulation
as well as implementation. The fact that a military man (Gen. Surayud) was appointed as PM
vouches for the argument that the armed forces once again dominated public policy despite
the fact that most of the cabinet was composed of civilian appointees.
Since the return of electoral government in 2008, the military has once again retreated
from towering over the public policy arena. However, both external and internal crises have
led to military involvement in security-related policies. Thus, the shirt colors crisis and Thai-
Cambodian border disputes have facilitated the return of the military to various aspects of
public policy. These are foreign policy, defense policy, and rural pacification policy, all of
which impinge directly upon the military’s prime objective: maintenance of national security.
In addition to national security-related public policy, the military today has continued
to exert control over public policy toward the media. This owes to partly to a tradition of
armed forces control over the Ministry of Communications. Currently the Army controls
television channels 5 and 7.78 The military also influences the media through the fact that
some members of the Mass Communication Organization of Thailand (MCOT) executive
38
board have been retired soldiers. MCOT (a former state enterprise ¾ owned by the state)
owns channels 3 and 9. As for radio stations, the military controlled 245 out of 524 stations
in 2002. This amounted to 127 owned by the Army, 21 by the Navy, 36 by the Air Force, 44
by the Police, 3 by the Ministry of Defense, and 14 by the Military High Command.79 This
proportion remained generally the same in 2008.80 The 2006 coup ushered in greater state
control of the media (at least for the period 2006-08). According to a Freedom House report
on media freedom in Thailand, in 2007, the military-backed Surayud government toughened
regulations on the media, including
one of the world’s harshest internet crime laws, imposed tight controls on the state-run broadcasting sector, and
manipulated the media in efforts to influence the outcome of the August constitutional referendum and the long-
awaited general elections on December 23. The continuation of martial law in 35 out of the country’s 76
provinces for most of the year [2008] also hampered the media, especially local radio broadcasters.81
Since 2008, amidst a heightened political role for Thailand’s military, state interference in the
media “has intensified.”82 Under the 2008 Sonthi Boonyaratklin military government, a
Broadcasting Act was implemented which continued to grant broadcasting concessions to
military vested interests.83 Ultimately the armed forces remain deeply ensconced in
regulating, influencing, and profiting from much of Thailand’s television and radio media.
In terms of foreign policy, the Thai military has recently showed itself to act
independent of civilian authorities. The dispute over territory adjacent to Preah Vihear temple
(the Thais call it Khao Phra Wihaan), which straddles the Thai-Cambodian border, touched
off a violent clash between the Thai and Cambodian armies there in July 2008. The Thai
Army exercises relative autonomy over the civilian administration in matters related to border
security. In August 2008, Thailand’s Supreme Commander Gen.Boonsrang Niempradit
injected himself into foreign policy when he warned Cambodia to “back off” from another
border temple claimed by Thailand.84
As for rural pacification, the military has involved itself in three recent attempts at
undermining support for Thaksin Shinawatra in rural North and Northeast where the former
PM is widely adulated. First, under the Surayud military government, elements in the Thai
39
military worked to build support for political parties opposed to Thaksin Shinawatra. Second,
during this same period, “officers were sent out to villages throughout the country to ‘create a
better understanding’ about the government.”85 The efforts also focused on chipping away at
Thaksin’s base. These ISOC-led efforts have been repeated under the Abhisit government,
but the goal now is to weaken support for the red-shirts. Third, and most recently, Army
Commander Gen.Anupong Paochinda ordered his troops to explain to people nationwide the
proper procedure for seeking a royal pardon. This was done on the heels of an attempt by the
pro-Thaksin red shirts to gather petitions for a royal pardon for Thaksin Shinawatra while
several anti-Thaksin groups saw this effort as an attempt to involve the King in politics.86
Finally, with regard to defense policy, the military under PM Abhisit Vechachiwa, has
found a powerful ally in Defense Minister Gen.Prawit Wongsawan, a longtime friend of
Army Commander Gen.Anupong Paochinda. Prawit’s brother Pacharawat serves as Police
Chief. This troika of associates has proved to be a strong block in seeking an enhanced
budget for Thailand’s security forces.
At the same time, the military has long succeeded in exerting power in the parliament
through control over seats on the Armed Forces Committee in Thailand’s Upper and Lower
Houses. Indeed, in 2009 the Senate, the Armed Forces committee is composed of five retired
soldiers (including the Chair) out of 10 committee members.87 Meanwhile, in the 2009 Lower
House, four out of 15 committee members are retired army personnel, including the chair.88
These positions allow the military greater access to MPs and public policy making in
parliament. Ultimtely, though the 2010 fiscal defense budget was slightly pared down by the
Abhisit government, the armed forces appear to have prevailed in setting almost all aspects of
defense policy and obtaining desired appropriations.
Ultimately, though Thailand’s military, through direct control over the ruling
administration and state budget, was once able to formally set public policy as it wished, this
authority is today only informal and exists in the areas of foreign policy (in relation to border
40
security), rural pacification policies (in relation to internal security), media policy (though
control over its own media outlets), and defense policy (especially with regard to
appropriations requests). As such, although the civilianization of public policy continued to
grow in the early 2000s, the 2006 coup ushered in a renewal of armed forces’ influence.
Today, amidst this lingering military sway, civilian control over public policy stands at a
medium level.
Internal Security
Civil-military relations in terms of Thai internal security turns on the question of
who—civilians or soldiers—exerts more authority over the maintenance of order in
emergency situations counterinsurgency and counter-terror programs, domestic intelligence
gathering, daily policing and border control. Recent Thai constitutions have contained
sections which grant the King and military enormous power to declare martial law:
The King has the prerogative of declaring and lifting the martial law in accordance with the condition
and manner under the martial laws
In the case where it is necessary to declare martial law in a certain locality as a matter of urgency, the
military authority may do so under the martial law (see for example, Section 159, 1978 constitution: Section 222,
1997 constitution; Section 188, 2007 constitution).
The 2007 constitution also grants the king the power to issue an emergency decree “for the
purpose of maintaining national or public safety or national economic security, or averting
public calamity.“ However use of this decree must be approved by the PM, Council of
Ministers, Parliament, and the Constitution Court (Section 184, 185, 2007 constitution). In
actuality, the PM applies the emergency decree. It must then be approved by the legislature
before being sent to the palace for endorsement.
Outside of various constitutions, internal security powers have traditionally been under
military control. In 1960, with the promulgation of the Ministry of Defense Administration
Act, the military enshrined two military responsibilities into law: internal security and rural
development. Furthermore, the act placed the Army, Navy, and Air Force under the aegis of
41
the Supreme Commander instead of the Ministry of Defense (the previous state of affairs). In
1962, the Supreme Command Headquarters set up the Central Security Command (CSC)—
the first military agency charged with stemming the communist insurgency. 1965 saw the
establishment of the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) to coordinate
national anti-Communist operations. CSOC organized rural villagers as local militia,
intelligence sources, and additional military manpower. CSOC was originally placed under
the direct control of the Prime Minister (Gen.Thanom Kittikachorn) but in 1969, amidst the
opening of an elected Lower House of parliament, direct control was transferred to the Army
Commander—Gen.Prapas Charusatien.89 In 1974, following the 1973 fall of the Thanom-
Prapas-Narong dictatorship, the name CSOC was changed to ISOC (Internal Security
Operations Command). By 1975, ISOC had helped to launch two ultra-right-wing
paramilitary organizations called Nawaphon and Gratin Daeng, turning the government’s anti-
communist campaign into more of a repressive vigilante crusade.90
To improve its relations with rural people, the Army, in 1976, issued Order
No.298/2519 which elaborated upon the Army’s role in national development by supporting
community development, promote better relations between soldiers and the people, and
suppress communism. As part of this effort, ISOC established three mass organizations
relating to these goals: the Thai National Defense Volunteers, the Volunteer Development and
Self Defense Villages, and the Military Reservists for National Security. Though the trainees
were peripherally taught about communism, most of the training was on military practice.
By 1983 the structure of ISOC had been modified such that ISOC was not officially
part of the Army, but rather under the Prime Minister though the Army Chief served as its
director and remained in de facto control of it. All senior army officials concurrently held the
top postings at ISOC91Under Order 83/2526, the Army Commander, as Director of ISOC, was
granted tremendous powers over national security government agencies, civilian-police-
military forces, [and] paramilitary forces. Ultimately ISOC became the vehicle through
42
which Thailand’s military, in the name of maintaining internal security, was able to exert
considerable authority over the civilian bureaucracy.
In 1987, ISOC was again restructured, with the Prime Minister (then Gen.Prem
Tinsulanond) becoming Director and the Army chief moving to be ISOC deputy chief. But
this was only a cosmetic alteration given that the Army Commander, in his new post as ISOC
Deputy Director, “was empowered fully to act on behalf of the Director-General.92
Moreover, some criticized this change as a strategy by which the Army might be able to
extend its powers over civilian agencies.93 ISOC also announced that henceforth it would be
promoting democratic values throughout Thailand. ISOC further sought to informally co-opt
politicians and political parties thought to be amenable to ISOC objectives.94
At the same time that ISOC was growing to become the military leviathan driving
Thailand’s security state against internal threats at the national level, the military separately
sought to address the maintenance of security in the country’s capital. In 1976, the Army
established the Capital Security Command (CSC) in Bangkok. CSC Commanders had the
right to exercise authority over all military forces (including all services) in the capital,
potentially making that person key to any coup and one of the most powerful soldiers in the
country. Objectives included preserving order, countering terrorism and communism, as well
as eradicating the conditions which might help communists win their struggle. As a result of
this latter objective, CSC heads often involved themselves in debates on all aspects of public
policy—normally under the purview of elected civilians. Indeed, in the early 1980s, CSC
head Gen.Arthit Kamlang-ek used his CSC powers to criticize PM Prem’s baht devaluation.
Arthit also worked to assist poor slum dwellers, and marketed military solutions to the
public.95 However, the CSC’s power to disperse unruly demonstrators was used by Gen.
Suchinda Kraprayoon in May 1992 to rationalize the violent army crackdown on protestors.
Following Black May, with much of the public disenchanted with military behavior, however,
the CSC was dissolved.96In addition, the second Anand Panyarachun government modified
43
the Government Administration in a Crisis Act of 1952, the Martial Law Act of 1954,
abolished the Internal Security Act of 1976, all of which “so that the use of armed forces in
riot control now [required] authorization by the cabinet.”97
The dwindling of the Thai communist insurgency in the 1980s, the 1991 end of the
Cold War and the diminished credibility in the armed forces after Black May placed ISOC in
growing limbo as successive governments could not agree on what to do with it. Moreover,
the 1997 financial crisis increased financial burdens for the agency as military budget
cutbacks left ISOC leaner.
Though the 1990s was a period in which the military had lost enormous credibility, its
role in development proved to be one way in which it could still connect positively with Thai
society. Originally in the 1960s-80s, rural development had been seen by the military as a
strategy to stabilize internal security by winning over rural people from Communist influence.
This followed the King’s pronouncement that “combat” and “development must be achieved
simultaneously. Moreover, the armed forces possessed a track record for military success in
development projects—success that improved living conditions, won many “hearts and
minds,” and thus reinforced national security.98 Examples of past military development
projects have been the following:
1. Operation “Greening” the Northeast (in arid parts of the Northeast).

2. Doi Tung Development Project (in the far North)
3. Penang Basin Development Project (in the far South)
4. New Hope Project (in the far South)
5. Royal Development Projects (in association with the palace throughout Thailand)99
Current national development and civic action programs include relief operations against
national disasters, helping farmers to harvest their crops, and seeking ways to help stabilize
the price of agricultural produce.100As part of development work, soldiers have also been
instructed to teach political ideology and inculcate notions of democracy.101 The 1994 Thai
Defense White Paper stated that military’s role in rural development work might grow to
encompass more areas such as environmental protection projects.102Indeed, development was
44
enshrined as a key plank of this White Paper.103 By the late 1990s, the armed forces seemed to
have lost focus from its earlier clear objective of guaranteeing national security against
communism, protection of the King, and protecting the country from unscrupulous politicians.
The Cold War and insurgency were over, the monarchy seemed safer than ever, and
democracy appeared to be on the rise in Thailand. Many were split on what should be the
future of the military as well as ISOC.
When PM Thaksin Shinawatra entered office in 2001, he delegated a military ally,
General Pallop Pinmanee (a military man often involved in political machinations), to oversee
ISOC. In 2005, the Thaksin administration passed the Decree on Government Administration
in a State of Emergency, which allowed the Prime Minister to authorize a three-month state of
emergency in response to internal or external threats. This decree was immediately applied to
cover the three provinces in Thailand’s far South where a separatist insurgency was raging.
The committee to administer states of emergency and issue recommendations to the PM was
composed of 19 persons, four of whom were civilian non-bureaucrats and five others from
Thailand’s military and police (See Section 6, Decree on Government Administration in a
State of Emergency, 2005).
At the same time, the Prime Minister, upon coming to office, was able to personally
centralize authority over the Royal Thai Police. This owed to his network of connections
within the force as well as the fact that the police were structured directly under the Office of
the Prime Minister. Originally, the Thailand National Police Department had served under
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. During the 1990s, in an attempt to dilute
Interior’s powers, the police were made an independent entity. Under PM Chuan, the police
were again set to be restructured: they were to be moved from their independent status to the
Justice Ministry. But Thaksin cancelled this order, keeping direct prime ministerial control
over them. As such, under his government, “police officers had shifted to ‘neutral gear’ when
dealing with those in power…who were subject to criminal liability, but had diligently taken
45
action against those in the anti-Thaksin movements.”104 Indeed, under Thaksin, most the Thai
police in general seemed to become embedded in the pro-Thaksin superstructure. Sometimes
they had no choice. “Before the coup, the police could hardly not respond to orders given by
the former prime minister who was a police officer, or they faced hardship in their career for
disobeying orders.”105
Meanwhile, Thaksin was planning to restructure ISOC, centralizing control over it in
the Office of the Prime Minister--himself. But not everyone in the military approved of this
reform. In 2006, an alleged bomb-plot against Thaksin was traced back to some in ISOC
itself. After the 2006 coup, junta chief and Army Commander Gen. Sonthi Bunyaratklin
served as head of ISOC. Appointed PM Surayud and the Council for National Security
(CNS) coup leaders determined that ISOC must be rejuvenated to confront terrorism, new
security challenges (e.g. cyber threats), coordinate the counterinsurgency campaign in
Thailand’s far South, unify much of the security bureaucracy, “as well as taking the lead role
for the bureaucracy to counter-balance the runaway power of any rogue government.”106 The
ISOC director was empowered to simultaneously head up the National Counter Corruption
Commission, the Department of Special Investigation and the Anti Money Laundering Office.
In June 2007, Surayud and the CNS junta resolved to once again shift the Army Commander
to be the head of ISOC, instead of the Prime Minister.107 Only after intense public criticism
was this proposal squelched.
Yet regardless of that small civilian victory, the revamped ISOC was criticized for
being a quiet coup through which the power of civilian governments would pass to the Army,
eventually paving the way for Thailand to become a military state such as that in Burma.
Indeed, the new act allows for the curtailment of the right of assembly, the placing of anyone
under house arrest, search and arrest without warrant, “intervention in the judicial process to
appoint joint police interrogators and the subpoenaing of police investigation documents
without being answerable to a court of law and with no legal redress by those affected.”108 As
46
such, the military could more easily transgress upon civilian realm and commit human rights
violations with impunity.
Despite opposition, the Surayud government approved the Internal Security Act in
October 2007, though revisions were made to ensure that there would be no redundancies
between this Act and the power of the government to declare emergency decrees. Then, in
early November the National Legislative Assembly passed the bill, only one month before the
general election. After the vote, one NLA appointee (Gen. Chockchai Hongthong), in
response to criticism that the new act would erode Thai democracy, stated that “People must
sacrifice their basic rights for the security of the country”109The Act became effective on
February 27, 2008.
So what exactly does the 2007 Internal Security Act say? It first “states that the armed
forces shall have role and responsibility to safeguard the internal security…through the
Internal Security Committee and the Cabinet’s decision-making process…having the army as
the main operation unit.”110 The Act establishes a structure of control whereby the Prime
Minister is ISOC director, the Army Commander is Deputy Director, and the Army Chief of
Staff is Secretary. This Secretary is empowered to take responsibility for the direction and
activity of ISOC. There can also be an optional Assistant Director (who must be a
bureaucrat), appointed by the PM “The Deputy Director, Assistant Director, and Secretary of
ISOC have power to command government servants, officers and employees in ISOC as
deputies of the Director, and have other powers and duties as assigned by the Director
(Chapter 1, Section 5, ISA).” There is also a board of up to 24 members chaired by the prime
minister or deputy prime miinster and comprising four other civilian ministers. Other board
members include the defense permanent secretary, the Supreme Commander, commanders of
the armed forces, high-ranking officials from the police force and other civil servant agencies
(Chapter 1, Section 10, ISA). Under the national ISOC board, there are regional and
provincial branches. Each regional branch parallels Thailand’s four military regions. As
47
such, the Internal Security Act provides that the Commander of each regional army shall be
the director of each regional ISOC subdivision (Chapter 1, Section 11, ISA).
Human Rights Watch has expressed its concern that by establishing the army chief as
ISOC deputy director and regional commanders become regional ISOC heads, this “would
place the military at the heart of a future civilian government at all levels.”111
Since late 2007, two Army officials have succeeded in dominating ISOC. These are
Army Commander Gen.Anupong Paochinda and his close friend Army Chief of Staff
Gen.Prayuth Chanucha (seen to be Anupong’s potential successor once the former retires as
Army Chief in 2010. Gen Anupong is ISOC deputy head of ISOC while Gen Prayuth serves
as ISOC secretary-general. Meanwhile, under PM Somchai Wongsawat, Lt.Gen.Athichart
Charoenying (Prayuth’s classmate from AFAPS Class 12) was appointed to head up ISOC on
behalf of Somchai. Furthermore, Lt-Gen Yuwanat Suriyakul Na Ayutthaya, also from Class
12, serves under Prayuth at the ISOC secretary-general's office. Finally, the ISOC
restructuring has witnessed the appointment of other generals, as well as colonels and
regiment commanders close to Anupong and Prayuth to key ISOC positions at the national
and regional levels.112 In 2009, although PM Abhisit Vechachiwa officially has direct
command of ISOC, it is essentially a military-controlled agency. 113
The new ISOC organizational structure is cosmetically geared to appear to be under
civilian control—given that the Prime Minister serves as Director while four other civilian
ministers can serve on the ISOC board. But the civilian board members are outnumbered by
bureaucrats (many allied with or belonging to the military) 19-5. At the same time, the
Deputy Director and Secretary (both soldiers) possess an inordinate amount of autonomy in
relation to the Director (the elected Prime Minister). Finally, ISOC is decentralized toward
higher military control. That is, regional branches are under the total control of the armed
forces. Though provincial subdivisions of ISOC are headed up by governors who were
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appointed by the Minister of the Interior, provincial ISOC heads rank lower than provincial
ones. Moreover, the more paltry budget of governors in relation to the regional commanders
(with sizeable armed forces allocations) ensures that the military maintains control should
governors come into dispute with the military. Ultimately, the new ISOC provides Thailand’s
armed forces a convenient subterfuge from which they can enhance their power due to and
despite the authority of civilian governments. This is because civilian governments who wish
to govern effectively must cooperate and lend legitimacy to ISOC, allowing the armed forces
greatly heightened authority. At the same time, soldiers cannot be officially blamed for
launching a violent crackdown given that the PM is the ISOC Director. Civilian governments
are even forced to uphold ISOC where military officials entirely control internal security
missions. However, the same civilian PM is responsible for negative fallout related to such
operations. Moreover, as Wassana Nanuam points out, the restructured ISOC gives the army
“a justification for stepping in to handle a political problem without fear that it will be
criticized for trying to intervene in politics.”114
Under the new ISA, ISOC, with a whopping new Thai Baht 8.2, has been granted
several powers which could be used to stifle civil liberties and civilian control, all in the name
of maintaining internal security. The provisions below exemplify this trend:
Section 15. In the event of an occurrence which affects internal security but which does
not yet require the declaration of a state of emergency under the Act on Public
Administration in an Emergency Situation…the Cabinet shall pass a resolution to have ISOC
take responsibility for prevention, suppression, and eradication or mitigation of this
occurrence which affects internal security, within an assigned area and time-period, and
shall make a general announcement of this fact (ISA, 27 February 2008).
Section 16 allows ISOC to order that any state official whose behavior is a threat to internal
security or an obstruction to the maintenance of internal security be excluded from a
designated area (ISA, 27 February 2008).
Section 17 authorizes ISOC to establish six centres “to coordinate efforts in dealing with
various pressing issues, including the war on drugs, illegal immigrant workers, terrorism and
transnational crime, special security concerns, the southern unrest, and the royal project to
protect and preserve forests and the natural environment.”115 The centre dealing with "special
security concerns" may be especially controversial for democracy. This is because the cenre’s
49
name itself is ambiguous and can be widely interpreted, potentially allowing the government
to invoke the aforementioned Article 15 of the National Security Act to declare a "security
area" where soldiers can be called in to instill order.116 This section also permits ISOC to take
charge of state agencies by “issuing a notification commanding state officials not to perform
any act or to perform any act” in the name of internal security.117 Section 18 allows ISOC “to
undertake criminal investigators without providing any safeguards or judicial oversight of
summons, arrests and detentions.”118
Section 19 permits ISOC the right to “act as criminal investigation officials and have powers
similar to those of public prosecutors and judges. They are given the authority to sentence any
person found involved in a threat to internal security to attend re-education camps for up to
six months. The draft does not state where such camps will be set up or under whose authority
(civilian or military). This provision will allow for arbitrary incommunicado detention in
undisclosed or inaccessible places where independent monitoring is impossible. It also
sidesteps the protections in Thailand’s criminal justice system.”119
Section 23 states that any ISOC regulation, notification, order, or action is not subject
to the law on administrative procedures. As such, civilians lose their right to legally redress
human rights violations by ISOC through the Administrative Court (ISA, 27 February 2008).
Human Rights Watch’s Sunai Phasuk has expressed deep reservations about the ISA
amnesty clause which could allow soldiers to get away with human rights violations as long
as they are on duty. In addition, he stresses that the Act does not define “security threat” and
fails to make ISOC answerable to elected representatives in Parliament.120HRW has further
opined that the establishment of ISOC will facilitate the rise of arbibrary military rule in
Thailand. “No declaration of a state of emergency would be required for the ISOC to exercise
its powers. The parliament and the courts are given no role in debating, reviewing or
approving the use of these emergency-style powers.”121
Aside from establishing a strengthened ISOC, the Surayud government, in early July
2007, approved a bill to drastically restructure the Royal Thai Police. According to the
interim Justice Minister, direct control of the police by the Prime Minister was much too
“prone to political interference and favoritism.122 The bill amounted to a wholesale
decentralization of Thailand’s constabulary, with heightened independent authority for police
director-generals in each of nine provincial police regions. Officers could only work and be
promoted in the regions where they served. In addition, several police divisions (marine
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police, railway police, foresty police, and immigration police) would be shorn from the
control of central police authorities, instead being supervised by other state agencies.123
Given that a military government had proposed this bill, its objective appears to have been to
attenuate the power of the police vis-à-vis the armed forces and weaken the power of a
coercive body known to harbor multiple security personnel sympathetic to Thaksin.
Yet with the return to elective office of pro-Thaksin Prime Ministers Samak
Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat, these governments placed on hold the police
restructuring reforms. As such, the police could perhaps still be counted on as a loyal security
tool—given that the generally anti-Thaksin military leadership at the time could not be relied
upon. When Abhisit Vechachiwa became Prime Minister, the Prime Minister’s office
continued to exert direct control over the Royal Thai police. But Abhisit did allow the
Surayud reforms to take effect on September 7, 2009. The reforms allowed politicians to
reassign more than 100,000 police officials. As a result, police power was dispersed, the
Office of the Prime Minister lost direct control over the national constabulary, and,
henceforth, the military (specifically the Army) could affectively trump all security forces in
Thailand.
Reliable police leadership remained an open question for Thailand’s military after the
2006 coup. The CNS had dismissed Police Chief Gen.Kowit Wattana in favor of Police
Gen.Seripisut, who, it was felt, was not as beholden to Thaksin. However, following the
election again of a pro-Thaksin government in 2007, Prime Minister Thaksin appointed as
Police Chief Gen.Patcharawat Wongsuwan. This was seen as a safe choice for Samak since
Patcharawat was the younger brother of ex-Army chief Prawit Wongsawat. Moreover,
Patcharawat had attended Thai Police Academy Class 25 with former interior minister
Purachai Piemsombun and former deputy prime minister Pol.Gen. Chidchai Vanasatidya.124
As such, he was seen as a potentially loyal minion to Samak. With the coming to office of
Democrat Prime Minister Abhisit in December 2008, the new government viewed
51
Patcharawat suspiciously because of his former connections with pro-Thaksin elements.
Indeed, Patcharawat was suspected of failing to adequately safeguard the March 2009
ASEAN Summit in Pattaya, unsatisfactorily provided security against violent Red Shirt
demonstrations in Bangkok, and to have perhaps helped to mastermind the April attempted
assassination of PAD leader Sondhi Limthongkul (though this could have been a mere pretext
to discredit him).125
In early August, Patcharawat completed a reshuffle list of promotions/transfers for 152
police generals which may have been viewed by the Abhisit government as continuing to
contain pro-Thaksin elements. Though the Police Commission quickly concurred with this
list, to Abhisit, such a state of affairs could not be allowed to pass muster. The perception that
most police were aligned with Thaksin, their control over the annual police reshuffle (set to
officially occur on October 1, 2009), and the desire by Abhisit to sideline police generals
appearing to be pro-Thaksin most likely influenced the Abhisit government to send the police
chief abroad, to the South, and pressure him to take leave (his retirement was set for October
1). In his place, Pol.Gen.Wichien Potposri was appointed as acting Police Chief. Wichien
had previously served as head of the Royal Court Security Police, but following the 2006
coup, he was transferred to direct “special operations and security during national
elections.”126Unlike many top police generals (e.g. Pol.Gen.Prieopan Damapong, brother of
Thaksin’s wife, who in 2009 possessed seniority in terms of promotions), Wichien has proven
to be a pliable partner by Thailand’s military establishment and thus a more practical police
chief by the Abhisit administration. With Wichien guiding the police, the military could
finally erode the often hostile (even pro-Thaksin) police leadership and reign supreme over
internal security. Wichien and Deputy PM Suthep Thuagsuban (in charge of national security
for the Democrat government) decided to postpone a decision on endorsing the Patcharawat-
influenced reshuffle until September 7. Neither wanted to upset the police chief’s brother—
Defense Minister Prawit—who holds enormous sway in the armed forces.127
52
Since the NLA’s passage of the Internal Security Act in December 2008, ISOC has
been used to “promote democracy” during the countdown to the December 2007 election.
(during which the military had been accused of backing and financially supporting parties
opposed to the pro-Thaksin Palang Prachachon party).128 At the same time, ISOC became
more involved in coordinating the southern Thailand counter-insurgency.129At the same
time, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), relied on ISOC for
funding.130 During 2008, the Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat Palang
Prachachon party governments allowed ISOC power to be centralized in the hands of Army
Chief Anupong for fear of otherwise upsetting the anti-Thaksin senior military leaders. Yet
the ability of Anupong to dominate ISOC allowed him to deny assistance to guaranteeing
stability for the two civilian governments whenever he saw fit. Indeed, Anupong refused to
order troops to end the PAD takeover of Government House, break up PAD rallies at
Parliament, or stop the PAD seizures of Bangkok’s two international airports. These moves
demonstrated a military refusal to maintain internal security for elected governments in
Thailand. Yet everything changed following the coming to power of an anti-Thaksin civilian
government at the end of 2008. Thereupon, Anupong’s ISOC moved from evading
responsibility for internal security to guaranteeing it. Indeed, in March 2009 it was revealed
that Bt1 billion had been apportioned to ISOC for rural projects aimed at weakening the pro-
Thaksin red-shirt movement.131
In April, PM Abhisit declared a state of emergency in Bangkok and surrounding areas,
following a flurry of pro-Thaksin anti-government demonstrations in Bangkok and Pattaya
which led to the cancellation of an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit.
The meeting was re-scheduled to convene in Thailand two months later. Use of the State of
Emergency (rather than ISOC) placed greater power in the hands of Abhisit’s cabinet rather
than if the Internal Security Act had been implemented (in which case Gen.Anupong would
have had more influence). As such, Minister of Defense Prawit and Minister of the Interior
53
Chaovarat Chanvirakul were able to see to it that the Red Shirts were dispersed. The former
was able to exert influence on Anupong while the latter created a royalist state-sponsored
militia called the Blue Shirts which was officially under the Ministry of Interior but actually
under the control of Newin Chidchob and the Bhumjai Thai Party.132 The military ultimately
resorted to force in its crackdown on the protestors, and the demonstration dissipated.133 Not
long afterward, during the July 2009 ASEAN Summit (held in Phuket), the Internal Security
Act was instituted to keep order, prevent any demonstrations, and prohibit the movement of
people. The order was aimed at potential pro-Thaksin rallies at the Conference venue.
Ultimately, the entire structure of a revamped ISOC under the Internal Security Act
officially took effect on August 20, 2009. But what are the implications of this revised ISOC
for civil-military relations in Thailand? In terms of individual liberties, ISOC grants greater
powers to the armed forces to decide for itself when internal security interests require it to run
roughshod over political rights, including the use of intelligence-gathering against civilians.
Meanwhile, where ISOC utilizes its powers under the Internal Security Act, the military can
generally have jurisdiction over non-military personnel. As for separation of civilian police
from military police, ISOC has facilitated a merging of functions and duties for purposes of
strengthening domestic protection. In terms of a declaration of a state of emergency or
martial law, the cabinet must initiate such actions and can be held responsible for abuses of
them. Yet the Internal Security Act allows ISOC to engage in blanket repression without a
state of emergency being declared. Indeed, given the overwhelming influence of the Army
over the ISOC, soldiers now have much more control over the issuing of such decrees.
Finally, with regard to civilian monitoring of military internal security operations, the Internal
Security Act allows very little parliamentary or judicial oversight of ISOC programs.
Ultimately then, the emergence of a restructured and strengthened ISOC has paralleled the
erosion of civil liberties as well as civilian predominance over internal security decisions. As
such, civilian control over the military in the area of internal security has moved from being
54
robust under Thaksin Shinawatra to quite low under AbhisitVechachiwa. Given the
continuing growth of Thai military prowess, this study can only predict that soldiers will
either continue to exert enormous influence on internal security or eventually monopolize it.
Moreover, where the armed forces are unable to see their domestic security prerogatives
enshrined into law (e.g.ISA), they will informally flout legal institutions and impose their
will, doing whatever they wish in the name of ensuring domestic peace and order.
National Defense
In Thailand, authority over National Defense was in the domain of the military until
1988.134 Such power was in the hands of a military (e.g. Gen.Kriangsak Chomanand, 1977-
79) or ex-military (e.g. Gen.Prem Tinsulanond) Prime Minister. Recent constitutions have
stated that “the King has the prerogative to declare war with the approval of the National
Assembly.” In addition, “the King has the prerogative to conclude a peace treaty, armistice,
and other treaties with other countries or international organizations” (see, for example,
Sections 161, 162, 1978 constitution, Sections 223, 224 , 1997 constitution, Sections 189, 190
, 2007 constitution). However, such royal power entailed an executive decision (sometimes
requiring legislative assent) sent to the palace for endorsement. Thus, only the executive (with
concurrence on some issues from the legislature) possessed formal control over National
Defense authoritative rights. This included the right to declare war or initiate hostilities with
another state. However, since the advent of civilian Prime Ministers beginning with
Chatchai Chunhavan (1988-91), authority over national defense issues has resided in elected
civilians (excluding the 1991-2, 2006-8 years of military rule). Yet informally, given the
porous nature of the border which Thailand shares with its neighbors and a lack of complete
demarcation, Thai soldiers sometimes involved themselves in hostilities (even initiating
hostilities) with the militaries of Burma, Cambodia, and Lao PDR, even without the sanction
of the Thai Prime Minister. For example, on at least two occasions in 2008 (June, October),
55
the Thai Army clashed with the Cambodian military along the two countries’ shared
boundary.
With regard to determinations of external military missions, civilian Prime Ministers
formally possess such authority. Moreover, there have been no instances where the military
informally embarks on external military missions of its own—without the approval of civilian
authorities. As for the power of civilian governments to monitor military’s national defense
activities, such formal power is vested in the Ministry of Defense. Yet where the Minister of
Defense is himself or herself a former soldier, the Ministry rarely monitors military conduct in
a thorough manner. This is because such a Defense Minister often identifies more with the
armed forces than the civilian government (which generally only administers the country for a
brief period anyway). The armed forces have, however, sought to remain isolated from
civilian monitoring with regard to National Defense—a situation deriving from the military’s
tradition of autonomy from civilian intrusions which has led it to jealously guard its
prerogatives regarding National Defense. Still, the external nature of National Defense issues
has boded well for civilian control. This is because Thailand’s armed forces have oriented
themselves in a domestic direction towards internal order and development. Moreover, with
the end of the Cold War in 1991, the military lost its chief external enemy (communism) and
found itself seeking a new objective. As such, in terms of National Defense issues, the
armed forces have receded behind the lead of civilian Prime Ministers. It thus readily
cooperated with and obeyed the Chuan II government in terms of the latter’s 1999 decision to
send Thai troops abroad as part of a peace-keeping force in East Timor.
Aside from authoritative rights, the selection of National Security-related advisors has
been another area where the Thai military has exercised its influence. Such advisors belong
to either the Defense Ministry or the National Security Council.
With regard to the Minister of Defense, Thai constitutions have often allowed active
military personnel to occupy this slot. This can be seen in the 1932a, 1932b, 1952 (1932b),
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1947, 1959, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1977, 1991a, and 2006 charters. However, the 1946, 1949,
1974, 1978 (Section 148), 1991b, 1997 (Section 207), and 2007 (Section 194) constitutions
represent the trend toward requiring the Defense Minister to be a civilian. Six elected PMs
have acted as Defense Minister: MR Seni Pramoj (1976); ret.Gen.Chatchai Chunhavan (1988-
91); ret.Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh; Chuan Leekpai (1997-2001); Samak Sundaravej (2008);
and Somchai Wongsawat (2008). In such cases, there has often been a decentralization of the
Defense Ministry. That is, civilians, instead of challenging the military, have more or less
stood aside and allowed soldiers to dominate the Defense Ministry.135Perhaps the only
exceptions to this rule have been the cases of Chavalit and, to a lesser extent, Chatchai.
Table 11: Thai Defense Ministers (1932-Present)

Civilians are indicated in bold; retired soldiers are indicated in italics
Date Name
1932-33 Phya (Gen.) Rajawangsan
1933-34 Phya (Gen.) Prasersongkram
1934-34 Phya (Gen.) Pahon Yothin
1934-41 Gen.Plaek Phibunsongkram
1941-41 Gen.Mangkorn Phromyothi
1943-44 Gen.Pichit Kriangsakpichit
1944-45 Gen.Sindhu Kamalanavin
1945-46 Gen.Chit Munsilpa

Sinadyodharaksa
1946-47 Gen. Jira Wichitsongkram
1947-49 Gen.Suk Nakrob
1957-57 Gen.Sarit Thanarat
1957-71 Gen.Thanom Kittikachorn
1971-72 Gen.Prapas Charusatien
1972-73 Gen.Thanom Kittikachorn
1973-74 Gen.Thawee Chullasap
57
1974-75 Gen.Kruan Suddhanin
1975-75 Gen.Tawich Senivansa Na

Ayudhya
1975-76 Gen.Pramarn Adireksan
1976-76 Gen.Krit Sivara
1976-76 Gen.Tawich Senivansa Na

Ayudhya
1976-76 Seni Pramoj
1976-77 Adm.Sa-ngad Chaloryu
1977-78 Gen.Lek Naeomali
1978-79 Gen.Kriangsak Chamanand
1979-86 Gen.Prem Tinsulanond (retired

from military in 1981)
1986-88 Gen.Panieng Kantarat
1988-90 Gen.Chatchai Chunhavan
1990-90 Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh
1990-91 Gen.Chatchai Chunhavan
1991-92 Gen.Prapat Krisnachan
1992-92 Gen.Suchinda Kraprayoon
1992-92 Gen. Banjob Bunnag
1992-95 Gen.Wijit Sukmak
1997-2001 Chuan Leekpai
2002-04 Gen.Thammarak Issarakul na

Ayudhaya
2004-04 Gen.Chettha Thanajaro
2004-05 Gen.Samphan Bunyanan
2005-06 Gen.Thammarak Issarakul na

Ayudhaya
2006-08 Gen.Bunrod Somdej
2008-08 Samak Sundaravej
2008-08 Somchai Wongsawat
2008-Present Gen.Prawit Wongsawan
58
Where the PM has not taken the Defense Minister’s slot, civilian governments have
always appointed retired military personnel. For example, ret.General Krit Sivara served as
Defense Minister (1976-76); ret.Gen.Prem Tinsulanond concurrently served as PM and
Defense Minister (1981-88); ret.Gen.Chatchai Chunhavan followed in the model of Prem
(1988-91); ret.Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh variously acted as Defense Minister; and Thaksin
Shinawatra also utilized retired soldiers to head the Defense Ministry. PM Abhisit
Vechachiwa has continued this trend with the appointment of ret.Gen.Prawit Wongsawat at
the end of 2008. Placing retired army generals in the position of Defense Minister is practical
for civilian governments desirous of close cooperation with and support from active senior
military leaders. The goal is to put someone in the Minister’s post who can guarantee military
support for the civilian government in power while influencing the armed forces on a range of
issues. Still, the danger is that this person may align with the active military chiefs against the
civilian government. Thus, the PM must take care to ensure that the Defense Minister is
effective but loyal.
Besides the Minister, it is also necessary to maintain civilian control over the staff
personnel in Thailand’s Defense Ministry. These staff personnel are the advisors to the
Defense Minister. They make recommendations regarding defense budget, troop
mobilization, deployments, training, and are collectively referred to as the Defense Council.
Though the Minister of Defense chairs this council, it is also comprised of his/her two
civilian deputies, the undersecretary of defence; the supreme commander of the armed forces;
the chief of staff of the Supreme Command; the commanders in chief of the three services
(the army, navy, and air force); their deputies, and chiefs of staff; „and not more than three
additional general officers selected for their outstanding ability.” Of these 18 council
members, only the three ministers and deputy ministers are civilians. The MOD is also
advised by a Permanent Secretary (currently Gen.Apichart Penkitti) and four deputies. All of
these officials are active military personnel.
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Meanwhile, the Council of Armed Forces Commanders advises the Minister of
Defense and Defense Council on matters of force mobilization and combat operations. It is
an all-military body, chaired by the Supreme Commander and is also composed of the
Commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Council furthermore commands “joint
task forces established in circumstances affecting order and security in the country.”136 This
vaguely defined objective has the potential to offer the Council a wide array of power.
The National Security Council represents another arena where the military has exerted
great authority. The National Security Council advises the Prime Minister when the country
faces a national security challenge that necessitates coordinated cabinet action or presents a
serious threat to the country's sovereignty. The PM serves as the Chair of this body but he/she
is advised by This body consists of the prime minister as chairman; the deputy prime
ministers; the NSC secretary general; the ministers of defence, foreign affairs, interior,
communications, and finance; and the supreme commander of the armed forces. Given that
only two NSC member are active duty soldier (the NSC secretary-general and the Supreme
Commander [ now called the Chief of Defense Forces]), the prime minister has been able to
dominate „the workings of the council“137 In July 2009, civilian power on the NSC increased
even more with PM Abhisit Vechachiwa’ appointment of Thawil Pliensri as NSC secretary-
general. This occurred despite intense lobbying by Army Commander Anupong Paochinda
for a replacement with an army background. „The NSC has had 14 secretary-generals over
the years, with only three of them civilians.138
All in all, in terms of National Defense, civilians and soldiers continue to struggle for
control. Though the military has traditionally dominated this issue-area, civilians have, since
the early 1990s, succeeded in chipping away at the prevailing armed forces influence. This
can be seen in terms of the dimensions of authoritative rights and selection of advisors. In
terms of the former, the military today allows the civilian PM to officially take the lead. Only
in informal situations (e.g. border conflicts) do soldiers sometimes involve themselves in
60
cross-border melees without the PM’s permission. As for the selection of advisors, the
military today remains dominant at the Ministry of Defense. Moreover, despite the fact that
defense ministers must be civilians, many of these have been retired military personnel still
enjoying close ties with active duty soldiers. The alignment of these ministers with the armed
forces and the majority representation of active duty officers in advisory posts has allowed the
military to exert considerable influence upon the MOD. Meanwhile, the National Security
Council is today dominated by Thailand’s civilian governments. Yet the military-dominated
MOD Defense Council acts as a sort of parallel body to the NSC, overlapping the latter’s
functions. As such, though civilian influence may seem to have grown in the area of National
Defense, it remains at a medium-high level.
Military Organization
Thailand’s armed forces, originally beholden to an absolute monarchy, passed through
the era of anti-monarchical absolutism (1932-44), re-established itself as a royal protector in
1957, and thus predated the advent of democratization in Thailand. As such, military
organization has traditionally operated outside the purview of civilian control. Current laws
regulating Thai armed forces doctrine, mission, resources, etc. have, for the most part, derived
from Thailand’s authoritarian era (1932-73; 1976-88). Still, institutional modifications in
terms of downsizing and increased transparency were implemented in the late 1990s while
military organizational autonomy grew in 2007.
Military behavior represents Dimension One of military organization. It encompasses
factors shaping the military mindset as well as military law.
Military doctrine and mission
With regard to military mindset, we are referring to the development of and
regulations regarding military doctrine, mission, and educational curricula. In Thailand these
stem from three sources: the king, the armed forces themselves, and, most recently, civilians
61
through the enactment of the 1997 constitution. Thailand’s monarch (as well as Privy Council
Chair Gen.Prem Tinsulanonda) periodically makes remarks on the Thai soldier’s role and his
opinions are revered by the Thai people. For example, in December, 1995, the king stated:
The soldier’s primary mission is to defend the Nation and safeguard national sovereignty and independence with
military power. In addition, soldiers have another duty which is equally important, that is, performing relief and
development work that will bring prosperity and happiness to the country and the people.139
Military influence in shaping military doctrine and mission, can be found in the 1960 Ministry
of Defense Act. During this time, Thailand was ruled by the Sarit Thanarat military
dictatorship. Article 4 of the Act defined the role and duty of the Thai armed forces as
defending and maintaining the stability of the Kingdom from external and internal threats.
The military would be specifically utilized to safeguard the monarchy, combat insurrection,
develop the country and protect national interests as defined by law (Ministry of Defense
website). In 1994, a Defense White Paper, again outlined the mission of the Thai military:
The Royal Thai Armed Forces has the responsibility of safeguarding the sovereignty, security, and national
interests of the State, conducting armed conflict or war, acting as a deterrent in order to protect the Institution of
the Monarchy, and suppressing and deterring rebellion and anarchy in order to maintain the security of the State
and to develop the country. The Armed Forces conducts its mission in accordance with the Constitution and
follows the policies laid down by the Ministry of Defense.140
Though this 1994 White Paper stipulated that the Armed Forces’ doctrine and mission would
accord with the Constitution, the two previous charters (1978, 1991) had been ratified where
an unelected government had held sway.
Given that the drafters of the 1997 constitution were chosen under a civilian
government, it can be argued that this charter established, for the first time in Thailand’s
history, the civilian orientation toward the armed forces. Yet in no part of the charter did the
drafters specifically discuss the role, mission, or doctrine of the armed forces, perhaps
reflecting a civilian fear of upsetting military leaders. Indeed, there was, as Hänggi (2009:
10) points out, only an allusion to the military in Article 6, which established the supremacy
of the Constitution over the various parts of the state.
62
In 1998, seven years since the end of the Cold War, a year after the 1997 financial
crisis and amidst efforts to restructure the armed forces, the Thai army began to look for more
missions which would keep it busy and perhaps provide it with income. As such, it donated
peacekeeping troops to the United Nations (UN), in the International Force for East Timor
(INTERFET), from 1999 to 2002.141 The Thai military also participated in reconstruction
efforts in Afghanistan (2001-2002), and the Multinational force in Iraq, offering 423
personnel from 2003 to 2004.142 The armed forces also continued to work in rural
development projects. By the early 2000s, the military appeared to have become more
professional, apolitical, and a force for good.
This changed with the 2006 military coup, after which the 1997 constitution was
voided and replaced in 2007 with a charter which had been written by drafters partly chosen
by the coup leaders themselves. Among the new provisions was one which enshrined civilian
obligations to a (more financially-strong) military. Section 77 stated the following:
The State shall protect and uphold the institution of monarchy, independence, sovereignty and integrity of the
territorial jurisdiction of the State and shall provide such armed forces, military weapons and technology as are
modern, necessary and sufficient for protecting and upholding the independence, sovereignty, national security,
the institution of monarchy, national interests and the democratic regime of government with the King as Head
of the State and for the development of the country.
In 2009, the royal Thai armed forces website stated its vision as being the country’s “main
organization in security with capabilities in defending and protecting the monarchy with
modern and effective organization deserving of the people’s and friendly countries’
confidence."143
It sees its missions today as follows:
1. To prepare the readiness of military forces and to use of military forces to protect the territory
2. To protect and uphold independence and sovereignty of the State from internal and external threats
3. To protect and safeguard the national interests and the democratic regime of government with the King
as the Head of the State
4. To protect, respect and safeguard the institution of the monarchy
5. To develop the country and assist the people
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6. To maintain internal security
7. To promote good relations with neighboring countries and alliance countries
8. Peace Keeping and Humanitarian Assistance Operations
9. To support government in solving urgent national problems144
The Thai military today is in a heightened position of influence. Since the enactment
of the military-endorsed 2007 constitution, current regulations establishing military doctrine
and missions reflect a lack of civilian control. Rather, armed forces autonomy from
“civilianization” as well as the direct top-down link between monarchy and armed forces are
ensuring that elected governments will have little authority in shaping the military mindset.
Military education
Education is another crucial component of developing the military mindset.
Prospective soldiers generally spend two years at the pre-cadet Armed Forces Academies
Preparatory School (AFAPS) and then study for up to five years at the Chulachomklao Royal
Army Academy (CRAA), Royal Navy Academy (RNA), The Royal Air Force Academy
(RAFA), or Royal Police Cadet Academy (RPCA). The most pre-eminent of the service
schools is the CRAA—all seven military prime ministers studied there. It has as its aim to
instill “a sense of loyalty to the nation, the religion and the monarch.”145 The same is true for
the other service academies, including the pre-cadet school. Yet nowhere does the curriculum
at these institutions offer any courses relating to democracy, however. These academies are
under the aegis of the Armed Forces Education Department. Other facilities include the Joint
Staff College, the National Defense College, and the National Defense Studies Institute. All
of the aforementioned training schools are ultimately accountable to the Royal Thai Armed
Forces Headquarters, not the Ministry of Defense. Given such obstacles to direct civilian
control, it is difficult for elected governments to make in the armed forces’ educational
curricula, to, for example, alter the military mindset in favor of greater appreciation of
democratic principles.
64
Military law
As for military courts, law and conduct in relation to civilian law, Section 228 of the
2007 constitution differs little from Section 281 of the 1997 constitution. Section 228 reads
as follows:
Military Courts shall have the jurisdiction to try and adjudicate criminal cases committed by persons who are
subjected to the jurisdiction of the Military Courts and other cases as provided by law. The appointment and
removal from office of military judges shall be as provided by law.
Furthermore, the 2007 constitution (carrying on from previous Thai constitutions)
proclaims that “members of the armed forces or the police force, government officials, other
State officials and officials or employees of State agencies shall enjoy the same rights and
liberties under the Constitution as those enjoyed by other persons…(Section 31).” Though
Section 31 raises questions about if and where there is separation between military and
civilian law, it could increasingly mean that civilian law could possibly become the “law of
the land.”
Under conditions where military law is imposed, civilians who defy such law can be
subject to military courts. Unfortunately for civilian control, there remains no mechanism for
challenging a decision of the Military Supreme Court in the civilian Supreme Court. (Lt. Col.
Suthee Charunbara, “The Organization of Military Courts in Thailand,” Military Law Review.
Dept. of the Army, Summer 1981, Volume 93, p.26). Yet ironically, the military-endorsed
2007 constitution modified the Human Rights Commission such that it now has the teeth to 1)
submit a case together to the Constitutional Court where the Commission agrees with the
complainant that the provisions of any law are detrimental to human rights and may
contravene the constitution; (2) submit a case to the Administrative Court where the
Commission agrees with the complainant that any rule, order or administrative act is
detrimental to human rights and might be unconstitutional as provided by the law on
establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative Court Procedure. Among cases
65
which the Human Rights Commission has accepted are those pertaining to potential human
rights transgressions by Thailand’s military (e.g. extra-judicial killings during the Thaksin
administration’s 2003 anti-narcotics campaign). (Interview with Human Rights
Commissioner, August 2008). Ultimately, civilians today are still not in control of Thai
military law. But, as evidenced by the strengthened Human Rights Commission, change may
be around the corner.
Dimension Two of military organization pertains to the resources available to the Thai
armed forces. By resources, I mean military force size and structure; the Thai armed forces’
financial resources; and finally the appointment/retirement of top military officials.
Force Size and Structure
Until the early 1990s, Thailand’s armed forces was a large, non-tranparent force which
lacked proper training, equipment, and whose decision-making structure often lacked unity
and ability to adequately coordinate. As the Cold War receded in the late 1980s, questions
began to arise as to the future force size and structure of the armed forces. Policies aimed at
downsizing the armed forces began during the Chatchai Choonhavan administration when
Chatchai began balking at certain military weapons requests and reducing parts of Prem’s
“national security state.146 Even after the 1991 coup, PM Anand Panyarachun announced that
“military might is no longer a guarantee of national security.” In late November, the army
proclaimed that it would cut its force levels by 25 percent in the next 10 years.147 Black May
1992 (which placed the military in disrepute) as well as the 1997 financial crisis added
impetus to the drive towards a reordered and restructured military. These events forced the
armed forces to reluctantly shift out of its preferred political role to a greater emphasis on
restructuring and professionalism.
The 1994 Defense White Paper stressed the military’s streamlined defense policy, including
the following clause:
66
1. Restructure the Armed Forces so that it is more compact and has professional personnel with modern
weapons and equipment so that it can guarantee the independence, sovereignty, and national interests of
the nation.148
The trend of such professional commitments continued through the 1990s. Indeed, the
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh government (1996-7) initiated proposals aimed at restructuring the
armed forces and improving public oversight of the military. The incoming Chuan Leekpai
government (1997-2001) took up these recommendations (through the Ministry of Defense or
MOD) and, in October 1999, with the necessary cooperation of reformist Army Commander
Surayud Chulanond, approved a plan to reform the MOD and restructure the military. The
goal was to build a smaller, credible, professional, more efficient, more capable, and more
transparent armed forces over the following 10 years.149There was also to be a “reallocation of
military spending from personnel to procurement and training.”150 Ultimately, the military
downsizing involved transforming the armed forces which had become top-heavy in terms of
excess high-ranking officers by encouraging early retirements by many of these officials. The
entire downsizing plan involved a total reduction of 72,000 personnel posts as well as a more
unified structural command among the three services (Army, Navy, Air Force), the Defense
Permanent Secretary, and the Supreme Command to improve coordination and facilitate
control from the Office of the Prime Minister. Yet the plan was hindered by disagreements
over whether the Defense Permanent Secretary or the Supreme Commander should have more
authority. The advent of the Thaksin administration temporarily put the reforms on hold.
From 2002 to 2004, the reforms were reviewed but the political crisis (beginning in 2005)
prevented the government from seriously taking up the armed forces reform. As such, the
aforementioned reforms appear to have been put on ice in all but name. The 2006 coup—and
heightened role of the military in Thai politics today—could mean that any military
restructuring will have to come through the initiative of the military itself.
In 2008, there was a slight inching forward of military leadership—the Office of the
Supreme Commander was renamed the the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters. As part
67
of the change, each of the armed forces’ leaders concurrently holds the post of deputy
Supreme Commander. The chief rationale for the move is that the dual posts will increase
proximity in terms of “a shortened chain of command between the Supreme Commander and
the Armed Forces leaders.”151Yet this could also increase military unity against civilian Prime
Ministers seeking to trump armed forces prerogatives. Meanwhile, in 2009, as budget outlays
for the armed forces continue to grow, military force size is simply continuing to expand—
given the rationale of the insurgency in southern Thailand and the border tiff with Cambodia.
There is in 2009 little civilian control of the Thai armed forces’ force size and structure unless
one insists that retired Gen.Prawit Wongsawat is a true representative of Thai civilian control.
Yet Prawit stands closer to Army Commander Anupong Paochinda than to PM Abhisist
Vechachiwa. Moreover, even if Prawit was proactively on the side of civilians, he would be
only one man against the corps. Ultimately, the military more than ever today guides
questions of force size, structure, and any restructuring or downsizing which Thailand may
undertake in the future. Yet with the political crisis continuing, such questions are unlikely to
be broached any time soon.
Military budgeting
As for military resources, Thailand’s military budget and military-controlled state
enterprises have provided the lion’s share of appropriations. Of these two, defense
appropriations derive mostly from the annual parliamentary budget approval process (though
there have also been “blind” military appropriations). Prior to 1992, the National Assembly
rarely rejected a defense appropriation and few details of the military budget were revealed.152
Only since the early 1990s has parliament seriously scrutinized military appropriations.
The process begins with a Lower House subcommittee, comprising MPs and outside
advisors which produces recommendations. The military standing committee may then
require hearings and interpellations. However, the legislature’s regulating of military
68
appropriations has often been ineffective given that civilians often have a lack of military
expertise Moreover, given that the chair of military standing committee is invariably part of
the ruling party, government defense policy and that of the Lower House are often one in the
same. On other occasions, either the head of the committee or several of its members are
former military officials who may be beholden to the armed forces. In such situations, the
military standing committee rarely offers sufficient civilian checks and balances of the
military with regard to the latter’s budgetary request. The only exception to this situation
occurs where an opposition MP is the chair of the standing military committee, but this has
never occurred in Thailand. Another problem derives from the fact that the Ministry of
Defense (MOD) is structured in such a way that the Armed Forces and the Permanent
Secretary of Defense (an active military officer in charge of controlling and overseeing the
MOD’s resources) are not separated. There is thus little division between the interests of
these two entities. Such a state of affairs has had the effect of diminishing civilian control
over the military in terms of military appropriations. Yet another challenge is the
decentralization of budgetary requests within the military. Indeed, though other civilian
ministries were transformed during the Thaksin administration, the MOD has remained too
dispersed. This “structure of the Thai MOD grants autonomy status (by law) to each of the
forces, empowering the commanders of each force to design or request budget items, without
having another force intervening in this matter.”153
Coups and the establishment of military governments are of course another means
through which the military has traditionally increased its budgetary outlays. Following the
1991 coup, the armed forces anticipated that military appropriations would become much
easier to obtain. But the junta’s appointment of civilian Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun
proved its undoing, at least in regard to the arms budget. Time and again, Anand rebuffed
military requests. For example, a Thai Baht 12.5billion supplemental request for fiscal year
1992 was flatly rejected.154 Though the military did get its way in some appropriations, the
69
lesson learned was that if the armed forces wanted more appropriations, a retired military
Prime Minister was preferable. This lesson was not lost on the 2006 coup leaders, who
appointed Gen.Surayudh Chulanond to the premiership.
In the aftermath of the 1992 Black May massacre, the military under Army
Commander Gen. Wimol Wongwanich, facing massive negative perceptions by the public,
media, and parliament, reluctantly agreed to a defense budget reduction for fiscal year 1993-
94. The general mid-1990s decline in military appropriations continued, owing partly to the
1997 Asian financial crisis as well as to the growing supremacy of “civilianization” in Thai
politics: the “people’s” constitution was adopted in 1997.155 Parliamentary scrutiny of military
appropriations now grew even more intense and the result was a decline in armed forces
funding. This loss in revenue led many soldiers to increasingly expand their commercial
interests as well as rely on sometimes-shady business activities156To rein in illegal military
activities and limit armed forces economic autonomy, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai and
then-Army Commander Surayudh Chulanond, ordered crackdowns military-related
“narcotics trafficking, extortion rackets, illegal bookmaking, unsecured loans from Thai
Military Bank, and corruption in the conscription process.”157The Chuan government also
sought to centralize weapons procurement, in order to establish greater government control
over armed forces funding. But confronted with intense military resistance, this proposal was
eventually shelved.158
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-06) established a new method for gaining
control of military spending: ensuring that military allocation requests would have to pass
through himself.159This he did in four ways. First, he drew former PM Gen.Chavalit
Yongchaiyudh closer to his Thai Rak Thai party (Chavalit’s New Aspiration party merged
with TRT in 2002). Chavalit was made Defense Minister. Second, Chavalit’s close aide
Gen.Yuthasak Sasiprapha was elevated to the post of Deputy Minister of Defense. Third,
Yuthasak’s brother-in-law Gen.Somdhat Attanand was made Army Commander. Somdhat
70
was close to Thai Rak Thai and cooperated with Thaksin. Fourth, the PM elevated Armed
Forces Academies Preparatory School Class 10 graduates (former classmates of Thaksin) to
various military positions. Finally, he saw to it that his cousin Gen. Chaisit Shinawatra was
made Army Commander in 2002. In this way, Thaksin was at last able to guarantee that he
would personally control the Thai military budget. From 2001 to 2006, it declined by 0.4
percent of the GDP (see table below) as the government transferred greater moneys into
alternative budget projects. Ultimately, under Thaksin, civilian control stood at its greatest
apex over military spending.
Yet the 2006 coup’s voiding of the 1997 constitution and dissolution of parliament
(ending any scrutiny by elected representatives) enabled the armed forces to run roughshod
over civilian control of defense budgeting. One military official, when asked about the
ramifications of the coup, admitted that it helped the military budget expand rapidly—though
at the expense of democracy.160 Under the 2006-2008 military-imposed Surayud
government, armed forces spending spiraled higher and higher. “The regime's first budget, for
fiscal year 2007, contained a 60% rise in military spending. The following year, the defense
budget rose 18%.”161The enactment of the 2007 constitution saw a new charter clause
(Section 77) which required the state to provide the armed forces with a sufficient (though
unspecified) amount of money to guarantee national security. Another freed up moneys for
potential military purposes. Indeed, new section 169 states that under martial law,
the Council of Ministers has the power to transfer or relocate the expenditure determined for any Government
agency or State enterprise for use in a different item from that previously determined in the Annual
Appropriations Act.
The only stipulations are that the transfer request must originate from the cabinet and that it
must be reported to the National Assembly. But parliament is given no room to modify or
cancel the request.
The return to elected governance in December 2007 paralleled the continuing growth
in military spending. To curry favor with the armed forces and fearing a potential coup, pro-
71
Thaksin prime ministers Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat did little to restrain
military requests for greater appropriations. Surprisingly, the anti-Thaksin Democrat
government of PM Abhisit Vechachiwa (the rise to power of which was assisted through
military cooperation) insisted on cuts in the military budget request for fiscal year 2010.
Thus, though military expenditures had continued to rise from US$3,333 million in 2007 to
US$4190 in 2008, to US$4500 in 2009 (with the armed forces seeking over US$5000 million
for 2010, this has now been pared down for a projected US$4,400 million budget in 2010.
Few know, of course, if the Abhisit government simultaneously promised any secret funding.
Despite the ability of the Democrat government to reject higher armed forces appropriations
requests, civilian governments in Thailand today have experienced a loss in their authority
vis-à-vis the military since the fall of Thaksin and enactment of the 2007 constitution.
Table 12: Thai Military Expenditures 1978-2009

Source: 1978-1987, 2004-2007data derived from IISS Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic
Studies, London, Routledge, various years. 1988-2003 data derived from Stockholm Institute for Strategic
Studies (SIPRI), Stockholm, various years. 2008 data derived from “Military Spending to Soar A Further
24%,”The Nation, June 28, 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com; 2009 data derived from Thai Post, May 21,
2009, http://thaimilitary.wordpress.com/2009/05/30/detail-of-defense-budget-cut/#more-407.
Fiscal Year $US million Percentage of
GDP
1978 1,202 4.0
1979 1,111 3.4
1980 1,094 3.3
1981 1,135 3.3
1982 1,361 3.9
1983 1,426 3.9
1984 1,630 4.2
1985 1,583 3.9
1986 1,562 3.7
1987 1,740 3.7
72
1988 2,132 2.8
1989 2,193 2.6
1990 2,484 2.6
1991 2,541 2.5
1992 2,914 2.6
1993 2,879 2.4
1994 3,122 2.4
1995 3,240 2.3
1996 3,240 2.2
1997 3,006 2.1
1998 2,440 1.9
1999 2,113 1.6
2000 1,982 1.4
2001 2,063 1.5
2002 2,087 1.4
2003 2,058 1.3
2004 1,962 1.2
2005 2,075 1.17
2006 2,373 1.15
2007 3,333 1.36
2008 4,190 1.4
2009 4,500 1.89
2010 4,400 NA
Figure 1: Thai Military Expenditures (1979-2009)
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(in US$ millions)
4,5
4
3,5
3
2,5
2
1,5
1
0,5
0
'79 '81 '83 '85 '87 '89 '91 '93 '95 '97 '99 '01 '03 '05 '07 '09
Figure 2: Thai Military Expenditures (1979-2009)

(% of GDP)
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
'79 '81 '83 '85 '87 '89 '91 '93 '95 '97 '99 '01 '03 '05 '07 '09
Appointment/retirement of top military officials
The rotation in armed forces leadership is highly significant to military organization in
terms of who stands at the top of and makes decisions in the name of the military pyramid.
As such, the appointment of senior armed forces personnel is always a political decision in
Thailand though matters of seniority (in terms of military class), proven loyalty, ability, and
sometimes professionalism (in that order) are significant.
The power to make reshuffles is three-tiered. The appointment or transfer of lower
ranking officers (captain to second lieutenant) is made by division commanders. Meanwhile,
74
the army chief can appoint or transfer mid-ranking officers (major to colonel).162 Finally,
with regard to reshuffle decisions for generals, each service commander-in-chief (Army,
Navy, Air Force) composes a list of personnel to be rotated either on October 1 or February 1
(the mid-year reshuffle).163 Traditionally, the complete list would thereupon be checked by
the Supreme Commander. It then proceeded to the Defense Minister who was required to
sign off on it. After this the Prime Minister had to approve it, and the palace would endorse it
on the advice of the Privy Council.164 As Prime Minister, Gen.Prem Tinsulanond had often
meddled in the biannual reshuffles in order to buttress his military support base. However,
PMs Chatchai Chunhavan, Chuan Leekpai (in the Chuan 1 government), Samak Sundaravej,
Somchai Wongsawat, and (as yet) Abhisit Vechachiwa never interfered in the appointments
process. Civilian PM involvement in reshuffles began under the Banharn Silpa-archa
government in 1995. This set a precedent for the following three governments.165 The
Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh government, as with that of Prem before him, meddled in
appointments to help shore up Chavalit’s military connections. During the Chuan II
government, Chuan (in his capacity as Defense Minister) prevented Gen.Chainrarong
Noonpakdi (of Black May fame) from being promoted to the post of Army Commander.
Yet the apparent success of civilian supremacy in the military promotions process
obscured the fact that not every military faction had faded into oblivion during the 1990s.
Just as two failed coup attempts of the 1980s had weakened Class 7, the Black May 1992
massacre did irreparable harm to Class 5 soldiers. Meanwhile, the faction of active military
personnel connected with Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh was damaged by his handling of the
1997 financial crisis in his capacity as Prime Minister. Yet there was one remaining military
strongman whose stature grew throughout the 1990s. This was Gen.Prem Tinsulanond who
was appointed to the Privy Council in 1988 and became chair of that body in 1998 (See
conclusion for a discussion of Prem). Prem has been extremely influential in terms of
military appointments. Indeed, Prem loyalist Wimol Wongwanich served as Army
75
Commander from 1992 until 1995 while Surayudh Chulanond served in the same capacity
from 1998 until 2002. Surayud was then appointed to the Privy Council, served as unelected
Prime Minister (2006-08), and then returned to the Privy Council. The 2001 advent of
Thaksin represented a challenge to Prem in terms of armed forces promotions. During
Thaksin’s tenure, given his success in eventually dominating top armed forces positions,
senior reshuffles simply became a means for him to rotate and reward his own expanding
military support base.
The 2006 coup led to a drastic change in the senior military appointments system. On
December 20, 2007, just six days prior to the election of pro-Thaksin PM Samak Sundaravej,
the junta-created National Legislative Assembly passed a decree which vastly reduces the
power of elected civilians over the reshuffles process. The new law requires that reshuffles of
high-ranking officers be vetted by a committee, whose members include the army
commander, the navy commander, air force commander, the supreme commander, and the
permanent defense secretary (himself/herself a military official) as well as the civilian defense
minister and prime minister. Previously, the defense and prime minister had the ultimate say
on appointments (though these were to be endorsed by the king). In future, if any dispute
occurs as to an appointment, a simple committee vote will settle the dispute. Given that
unelected military portion of the committee accounts for five votes as opposed to two for
civilians, the new arrangement should heighten military prowess at the expense of the
authority of civilians with regard to reshuffles.166
With regard to military retirements, the Military Service Act of 1954 (adopted under
the military dictatorship of Gen.Phibul Songkram) mandates that all armed forces personnel
must retire at age 60. Though a potential retiree can petition the government to continue
serving beyond this period, such exemptions are rarely issued, tend to be short-term, and are
often unpopular with less senior soldiers. This owes to a fear that a general may seek to more
permanently establish his/sway among officers as well as a desire by junior officers not to
76
upset the apple cart in terms of the military promotions line. Sometimes retirements serve as
a launching pad for new careers. Gen.Kriangsak Chomanand retired in 1979, only to become
PM that year. Gen.Prem Tinsulanond served as Army Commander until 1980, in time to start
serving as premier the same year. Gen. Surayud Chulanond retired as Supreme Commander
in 2003, joining the Privy Council that year.
Generally, senior military promotions are timed such that the soldier promoted has
only one or two years to serve in a top position, and thus has little time to centralize power.
For example, Gen.Sonthi Boonyaratglin, Army Commander and leader of the 2006, was
forced to retired at age 60 in 2007. Perhaps one reason why Gen.Saprang Kallayanamitr was
not permitted to succeed to Sonthi was that he too would be forced to retire in 2008. The
armed forces settled on Gen. Anupong Paochinda, whose retirement will occur in 2010.
Generally, civilian governments have had little authority in dismissing soldiers. Moreover,
even though civilian governments are legally empowered to transfer senior officers to inactive
positions, this rarely occurs. In 2006, amidst the coup (popular with most Bangkokians), PM
Thaksin sought to transfer coup leader Sonthi Boonyaratglin to an inactive posting, but the
armed forces refused to follow Thaksin’s lead. More common are instances where a
recalcitrant Army Commander is “retired” or “kicked upstairs” to become the armed forces’
Supreme Commander, a generally ceremonial position. This can be seen in the instances of
Gen. Arthit Kamlang-ek in 1986, Gen.Surayud Chulanond in 2002, and Gen. Somdhat
Attanond in 2003. Only when the military is perceived in a negative light by the public at
large, does the clout of civilian PMs enable the latter to dismiss the former. For example,
during the second Anand Panyarachun government, the appointed civilian PM declared that
any coup was “treason against the country and the throne.”167He thereupon fired Air Chief
Marshall Kaset Rojanin, Army Commander-in-Chief Gen. Issarapong Noonpakdi, and
Gen.Chainarong Noonpakdi, First Army regional commander, from their posts. Little has
changed in Thai military retirement system.
77
Given the heightened influence of the military in the post-2006 coup climate, civilians
must today tread carefully in terms of offending the armed forces. Perhaps that is why the
Abhisit Vechachiwa government opted not to fire Pol.Gen.Patcharawat Wongsawat following
government dissatisfaction in his performance as head of the Royal Thai Police—Patcharawat
is the brother of Defense Minister Gen.Prawit Wongsawat who is very close to Army
Commander Gen.Anupong Paochinda. Ultimately, in terms of military organization—
authority regarding force and structure size, military budget, and military
appointments/retirements, the armed forces have gained enormous autonomy in such
decisions vis-à-vis civilian elected governments. As such, civilian control of military
organization just barely approaches a level of medium.
From the examination of the aforementioned five decision-making areas, this study
concludes that civilian control over Thailand’s military is on the wane—relative the 1992-
2006 period. Civilian rule over internal security is especially minimal, compared to other
areas, while the brightest area is national defense. The table below synopsizes this
investigation’s findings.
Table 13: Concentration of Civilian Control over the Military

Civilian Control Pre-1992 “Black 1992-2006 Military 2006-2008 2008-Present
Decision-making May” Trumped by Surayudh and CNS Fragile Democratic
Areas Civilians Military Facade over
Government Strengthened
Military
Elite
Recruitment
Public Policy
Internal Security
National
Defense
Military
Organization
= lower = higher = medium = medium/higher
Authority over Decision-making: Thai Civil-Military Relations over Time
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Since 1932, Thailand’s armed forces have experienced differing levels of influence vis-
à-vis Thai society. Using our five-area combined framework, this study distinguishes varying
levels of civilian control over the military. Indeed, 20 eras can be discerned, in which
civilian authority vis-à-vis the armed forces alternated on a continuum between low, low-
medium, medium, medium-high, and high. Chronologically, civilian influence commenced at
a level of low, given that the military acted as a tool of the absolute monarchy to maintain
control over the Thai populace. After the 1932 coup against the absolute monarchy, military
influence over civilians grew precipitously but plunged to its lowest levels in 1944. Yet a
debilitated military was not to last. In 1947, with support from royalists, the influence of the
armed forces ascended once again, resulting in a low-medium level of civilian control—a
situation which lasted until 1948 when the armed forces (in the form of Field Marshall Plaek
Pibul Songkram) took the post of Prime Minister for himself. This marked an ascent of
military prowess to even higher levels. The coup by Army Commander-in-Chief Sarit
Thanarat and the holding of elections narrowly expanded political space, expanding civilian
breathing room to a low-middle level. Sarit’s 1958 auto-coup boosted armed forces’
influence to its furthest apex. Thereupon, Sarit and the monarchy entered into a symbiotic
relationship which augmented the political influence of each. In 1969, military-sanctioned
elections helped to legitimate the armed forces’ continuing grip on power but PM Thanom
Kittikachorn’s auto-coup of 1971 brought explicit military authoritarianism back to the fore.
From 1973-6, during a brief respite of multi-party pluralism, civilians possessed a medium
level of influence over soldiers. This owed to the expanding clout of the army faction headed
by Minister of Defense Gen. Krit Sivara—against a backdrop of a post-1973 fractured
military. His untimely death in 1976 amidst political maneuvering by rightists, monarchists,
and military factions contributed to the October 1976 coup which again brought to power
military elites. They ushered into office ultra-right-wing royalist and prime ministerial
appointee Thanin Kravichien. Under Thanin, an appointed civilian PM, civilian control
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dropped to a low-medium level. But growing armed forces dissatisfaction with Thanin (e.g.
his inability to make progress against the communist insurgency) led to the PM’s ouster in
1977. Thereupon, civilian influence plummeted to even lower levels.
In 1979, elections were held under Gen. Kriangsak Chomanan, who helped usher in a
semi-democracy in which an unelected prime minister could serve alongside an elected lower
house. Such a system offered the bare trappings of democracy while guaranteeing military
supremacy in non-regal elite positions of power. The influence of civilians now stood at low-
medium. This state of affairs continued under unelected Prime Minister Gen. Prem
Tinsulanonda. In 1988, the military finally allowed an elected PM (Chatchai Chunhavan) to
take his post though the Class Five military faction under Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon ensured
that civilian control stood at only a medium level of influence during this time. Gen.
Suchinda’s coup and military government again heightened levels of military control over
civilians. The fall of this government, in the aftermath of the “Black May”1992 massacre and
the loss of support for Suchinda from Thailand’s king (which weakened military legitimacy in
the public’s eyes) contributed to a further emergence of Thai democracy. As such, from 1992
until 2006, the Thai armed forces’ societal influence vis-à-vis civilians seemed to be at its
nadir. But the 2006 coup crushed any hope that the Thai military’s role in politics was at an
end. Indeed, its clout was institutionally boosted thanks partly to the 2007 constitution which
weakened civilian governance vis-à-vis the armed forces. The return to a nationally-elected
government in 2008 did force soldiers back to their barracks but at a cost to civilians of
institutionally enhanced prowess by the armed forces. As such, civilian control diminished to
a medium level given that the military now exercised authority somewhat autonomous from
Thailand’s elected Lower House and partly-elected Senate. Indeed, some in the armed forces
reportedly even helped to manipulate the accession to office of PM Abhisit Vechachiwa in
December 2008. Today the sway of the military is on the upswing. The table below reflects
and elaborates upon the ebb and flow of military prowess since the pre-1932 period.
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Table 14: Twenty Periods of Military Influence (Pre-1932-Present)
Period Level of Civilian Control Method Initiated
Pre-1932 Low Formation of Corps under

Absolute Monarchy
1932-44 Low Military Coup/Bahon Yothin
“Promoters”; later dominated
by Phibul Songkram
1944-47 High Forced Resignation of
Military Prime Minister
1947-48 Low-Medium Military Coup/Phibul
Songkram faction returns
1948-51 Low-Medium PM Kuang Apaiyavong
pressured to step aside by
Phibul
1951-57 Low Military “Radio” Auto-
Coup/Phibul Strengthens
Grip
1957-58 Low-Medium Military Coup (Sarit
Thanarat faction) followed
by Election of Military Prime
Minister and his party
1958-69 Low Military Auto-Coup/Sarit
Strengthens Grip; later
controlled by Thanon
Kittikachorn and Prapas
Charusatien
1969-71 Low-Medium Military Prime Minister and
his party win election/PM
Thanon Kittikachorn and
Prapas Charusatien
1971-73 Low Military Auto-Coup/Thanom
and Prapas Strengthen Grip
1973-76 Medium Military Coup/Krit Sivara
faction
1976-77 Low-Medium Military Coup/Class Seven
1977-79 Low Military Coup/Kriangsak

Chomanand faction and
Class Seven
1979-88 Low-Medium Military Prime Minister leads
elected government
1988-91 Medium Elected civilian government
alongside autonomous
military
1991-92 Low Military Coup/Class Five
1992-2001 High Election of civilian

government
81
2001-2006 High Election of civilian
government
2006-2008 Low Military Coup/Sondhi
Boonyaratklin faction
2008-Present Medium Coalition Shift with Military
Support/1st Army, Regiment
21
These 20 phases, revealing various alternating degrees of armed forces authority, also
demonstrate that Thailand’s military has long played a vigorous role in Thailand’s polity.
This occurred despite the embedded political supremacy of the monarchy, strong traditions of
authoritarianism by various bureaucracies (not only the military), and the 1980s emergence of
business associations as well as democratization efforts. Today the role of soldiers in Thai
politics (even under an elected government) is proving to be the most extensive in two
decades.
Thailand’s Military: Perpetually Political, Forever Factionalized, Again Ascendant
The Thai armed forces have been major players in Thai politics since the 1932 coup
which terminated absolute monarchy. There have, however, been but three brief respites from
dominant military clout: 1944-47; 1973-76; 1992-95. During the 1990s, some suggested that
Thai soldiers were increasingly being by-passed by new societal forces, making the armed
forces less relevant political players.168Others pointed to the disgrace suffered by the military
following the 1992 Black May massacre as a watershed event finally compelling the armed
forces back to the barracks.169 This study agrees with McCargo and Ukrist (2005) that during
the 1990s, the Thai military was never depoliticized. Instead, it was “willing to pretend to
accept limits and controls, on condition that it remain unreformed….”170 Yet there has also
been a contention that a “re-politicization” of the Thai military did occur with the election of
the Thaksin Shinawatra government in 2001 since Thaksin brought to office with him a large
team of persons with senior military backgrounds.171Thereupon, he appointed relatives,
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cronies, and pre-cadet academy classmates to high positions of military power. But by
placing responsibility for such re-politicization at the door of Thaksin, one can indirectly fault
him for the 2006 coup—in which the armed forces once again took direct political power into
their hands. Following this reasoning, Thaksin himself is ultimately to blame for the
heightened role of the armed forces in contemporary Thai politics.
There is an alternative way to analyze the political role of the Thai armed forces:
examining the competition for power and prestige among military cliques even after the
retirement of faction leaders. The mandatory age of retirement at age 60 (with some
exceptions) has often been viewed as the end of influence for a senior Thai military official
given that his/her seniority as an active duty soldier terminates with retirement. And yet in
Thailand we have witnessed retired armed forces personnel forming political parties, serving
in cabinets (including Minister of Defense), and taking seats in Parliament. While in the
military, these soldiers have often established close-knit clusters of personalist and class-
based comradeship. Meanwhile, shared service experiences, where an older infantryman
commanded a younger one, produces cohesive patron-client linkages. Such connections tend
to survive beyond retirement age. Factional competition thus links among active duty soldiers
with retired officers.
Examples of retired soldiers who have managed to exert enormous influence on the
military corps beyond the age of retirement have included Gen.Praman Adireksan,
Gen.Kriangsak Chamanand, Gen.Arthit Kamlang-ek, Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, and
Gen.Prem Tinsulanond. Gen.Prem is a special case—he has long been recognized as being
intimate with the palace. Not since the dictatorship of Gen.Sarit Thanarat (1958-63) has such
a close relationship existed between a military personage and Thai royalty. Prem’s pull on
Thai politics began in 1979 when he was elevated to the concurrent positions of Defense
Minister and Army Commander. He ascended to the premiership in 1980 but was required to
retire as a soldier in 1981. Retirement would have considerably diminished Prem’s clout
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among active duty officers but it did not. This is because, when he served as PM (1980-88),
“royal support…elevated Prem above the factional struggles and power games in the
military.”172After stepping down as PM, Prem was appointed to be a Privy Councillor and
acting Council President, given that Chief Privy Councillor Sanya Dharmasakdi was, in his
last few years, in extremely poor health.173 In 1991, the military successfully carried out a
coup against PM Chatchai Chunhavan. Prem did not negatively react to the takeover,
possibly because PM Chatchai had initiated a policy of sharply reducing the power of the
military in national politics.174
Fallout from Black May 1992 represented a massive discrediting of the armed forces
in Thai society. Only two military personages and their entourages of supporters remained
powerful. These were Gen.Prem Tinsulanond and Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyud, both retired.
Yet Chavalit had once served under Prem and was seen on many issues to be loyal to him.
Moreover, Prem could trump Chavalit because Chavalit had called for a “presidium” form of
government in the late 1980s, words which to many (apparently the palace included) smacked
of communism.175Thus, the 1992 political vacuum of active-duty or retired military leaders
allowed retired Gen.Prem Tinsulanond to fill the void.
Prem continued serving as the King’s de facto Chief advisor until 1998, when he was
appointed as Privy Council Chair. This final appointment cemented his penultimate
ascendancy (save for the palace) over the Thai armed forces. In terms of factional struggles in
the military, the early-mid 1990s reflected competition between promotions of soldiers closer
to either Prem or Chavalit.
Some may have thought that Prem’s retirement and advancing age would obstruct his
influence in the military. Yet his immeasurable prowess as the king’s top advisor, as an ex-
military man having influence with reshuffles and not bound by retirement restrictions, helped
to elevate the Privy Council to become an institution to be reckon with. And Prem ensured
that his clients were rewarded handsomely.
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As for senior military reshuffles, Prem’s loyalists have been very successful. His
clique has included Gen. Wimol Wongwanich (Army Commander 1992-95), Mongkol
Ampornpiset (Supreme Commander 1996-2000) and Surayud Chulanond (Army Commander
1998-2002, Supreme Commander 2002-03). The election of Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyud as
PM in 1995 allowed Big Jiew more leeway in the choice of senior military staff. For example,
in Chavalit’s capacity as both Minister of Defense and PM, he was able to elevate
Gen.Chettha Thanajaro (a Chavalit loyalist to the post of Army Commander). However, the
1997 financial crisis put a dent in Chavalit’s luster. By Fall 1997, his star had waned
considerably and he was pressured to resign from office in November. It seemed now that
there was no military personality or group which could challenge the dominance of Prem over
the armed forces. But Prem seemed to face gargantuan challenges with the election of
popular PM Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin brought Chavalit back with him as Defense
Minister and used Chavalit’s own military support base to carve out a source of his own
authority in the armed forces.176Thaksin saw to it that Chavalit-confidante Gen.Somdhat
Attanand was reshuffled as Army Commander (2002-3) and then Supreme Commander
(2003-04). Thereupon, Thaksin managed to position his minions (who were either relatives or
pre-cadet school class 10 schoolmates) in top positions of power. Indeed, Thaksin’s cousin
Chaisit served as Army Commander (2003-04) and Supreme Commander (2004-05). It
seemed as though Prem’s monopoly of influence over the armed forces had all but vanished.
2004 saw the promotion of Gen.Prawit Wongsawan as Army Commander. Prawit had
served in the 21st battalion of the Royal Guards (the Queen’s Guard). Though he was loyal to
Prime Minister Thaksin, he had long been an arch-royalist and was loyal to Prem. Prawit was
from Pre-cadet Class 6 and Army Cadet School Class 17. His successor as Army
Commander—Gen.Sonthi Bunyaratklin—was from these same classes. In 2005, Prem saw to
it that Sonthi, who had previously served under Prem-loyalist Surayud, was appointed to
become Army Commander (despite the wishes of Thaksin).177The two army generals who
85
spearheaded the 2006 coup under Sonthi were Gen.Saprang Kallayamitr of the Third Army
and Gen.Anupong Paochinda of the all-important First Army headquartered in Bangkok.
Sonthi could count on their backing because Saprang had long criticized Thaksin publicly. On
the other hand, Anupong, though he had graduated with Thaksin from pre-cadet Class 10, had
served, like Prawit, in the Queen’s Guard. There have been rumors that the coup was
endorsed by Gen.Prem.178Though it is difficult to ascertain the certainty of such reports, what
is true is that in the post-coup environment, Prem has returned to the apex of control over the
military. Today, the pro-Prem Gen.Anupong Paochinda continues to serve as Army
Commander while retired Gen.Prawit Wongsawat acts as Minister of Defense. Their control
over the military reflects the continuing dominance of former Queen’s Guard officers and, by
implication, Prem. Ultimately, the Thai armed forces have never been de-politicized.
As such, the three-decade period of 1979 to 2009 represents the gradual assertion of
political control by the Prem military faction over the armed forces. This era encompasses
Prem’s own retirement from the armed forces and ascension to the Privy Council. Indeed,
patronage from the palace has been a crucial factor which has enabled Prem to monopolize
authority even after the age of retirement. Though sub-factions within his network of military
clientele abound, the group remains united only under Prem himself. The failure of Thaksin
Shinawatra to effectively challenge Prem has represented the end of a final threat to the Privy
Council Chair.
Though the elections of December 2007 appeared to revitalize Thailand’s process of
democratization, 2008 marked a grim watershed for democracy in Thailand. The post-2006
coup military leadership was clearly unhappy with the electoral results—which brought a pro-
Thaksin government back to office. But they did not dare stage the conventional coup d’etat.
The coup and military government that followed it had been mostly unpopular both
domestically and internationally. At the same time, damaging events which occurred under
the CNS regime (it failed to solve any political or economic problems) caused the armed
86
forces to be seen in an increasingly negative light. Thus, as Thitinan Ponsudhirak says, the
2006 coup was a “botched” coup.179 The military’s alternative to outright takeover in January
2008 was thus to take a back seat to those opposed to Samak Sundaravej and indirectly
influence the dis-assembling of the People’s Power party administration. This it did in on
three occasions. First, the armed forces put little effort into protecting Samak’s government
(and later that of PM Somchai Wongsawat) from unruly crowds which took over Government
House, attempted to capture Parliament, and hijacked two international airports. In essence,
the Army under Gen.Anupong Paochinda was refusing to protect Thailand’s chief of
government—the Prime Minister, though the Army Commander also refused to launch a coup
against the government.
Secondly, the military at least twice called on PM Somchai to resign. This happened
once on October 16, when Gen.Anupong, at the head of a contingent of Thailand’s top brass,
appeared on Thai television to call for PM Somchai Wongsawat’s resignation to take
responsibility for bloodshed on October 7.180 In late November Anupong again called on
Somchai to either dissolve the Lower House or resign to avert the political storm, rather than
face down the PAD demonstrators. Though the Constitution Court managed to finish off the
Somchai government, forcing the dissolution of Palang Prachachon, pro-Thaksin MPs clearly
had the numbers to reconstitute a new ruling coalition. Here the armed forces again entered
the fray.
Thirdly, in mid-December 2008, the military indirectly helped to usher in the anti-
Thaksin coalition government of Democrat Abhisit Vechachiwa. A troika of pro-Prem
soldiers was apparently instrumental in this oblique intervention: Army Chief Anupong
Paochinda, retired Gen. Prawit Wongsawat, and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Prayuth Chanucha.
These three “Queen’s Musketeers” had served together in the 21st Infantry Regiment of the
Royal Guards—the Queen’s Guards. In early December, on the heels of the court verdict,
talks began between these soldiers and members of several political parties, including the
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Democrat, Chart Thai, Puea Paendin, Ruam Jai Thai Chart Pattana, as well as several
members of the new pro-Thaksin Puea Thai party to set up an anti-Thaksin ruling coalition.
The three soldiers also contacted apparent Thaksin loyalist and long-time politico Newin
Chidchob—who proved to be less than loyal.181
Newin’s support was crucial for a coalitional realignment to transpire. Born in
Buriram province, in northeastern Thailand, he could perhaps carve into Thaksin’s assumed
Isaan constituency. His father Chai served as Parliament President while Interim PM
Chaovarat Chanvirakul, a key member of Newin’s faction, was caretaker Prime Minister. The
two men could ensure that dissolution of parliament would never occur—and they did.182
Meanwhile, Newin could sway scores of former Palang Prachachon MPs to defect to the anti-
Thaksin ruling coalition—something which the Buriram bigwig proved he could easily
accomplish.
Meanwhile, the importance of the military was not lost on Thai politicians. Against
the recent backdrop of the Army’s refusal to protect ex-PM Somchai, MPs were keenly aware
of the armed forces’ resurgent relevance to coalition formation and longevity. As such, “the
troika of the 21st” was perceived as central to a new ruling coalition. In this way, Thailand’s
military became the indirect arbiter in the formation of a new civilian government.
The Democrats’ Secretary-General Suthep Thaugsuban was the key civilian go-
between between his party and Thailand’s armed forces. In an interview, he discussed how
these conversations bore fruit for the formation of a Democrat-led coalition:
I had good ties with senior figures in the Military and I particularly admired Gen.Prawit [Wongsawan].
He could be reliable and was respected by younger military officers. So I got in touch with him. He said the
military was ready to follow orders if they were lawful and legitimate…He wished me good luck. [After
meeting potential coalition partners], I told them that I had someone apart from me who could give them
assurances.183
The military triumvirate’s success in building a civilian government military
succeeded in ousting Thaksin’s elected nominee government from office without resorting to
a coup. However it triggered broad repercussions regarding Thailand’s entire process of
88
democratization. Since 1992, the country had followed a trajectory toward greater pluralism
and political space. Though it is true that Thaksin stifled parts of the rule of law, the 2006
coup put an end to democratization (except at the local level). The election of December
2007 seemed to breathe new life into pluralism but democratic roots proved shallow. 2008
witnessed a military willing and able to involve itself in unconventional, indirect political
intrusions—to the point of re-stacking the coalition.
Conclusion
Recently, Dr. Thitinan Pongsudhirak shrewdly stressed that “the Thai military sees
itself as the self-entitled defender and guardian of Thailand’s political future.”184The armed
forces is indeed a guardian of the future in terms of preserving nation and monarchy.
However, it is increasingly proving less interested in maintaining democracy and civilian
control. Thailand today is living under military tutelage. As such, democracy is on the wane.
One could even say that Thailand has sunk under the status of faulty or defective
democracy.185 Given that the military (in cooperation with the Privy Council) is exerting
growing, unhindered power over Thailand’s weak civilian governments, one could specify
that Thailand is a domain (or tutelary) defective democracy.186
2009 has been the year of military autonomy from civilian control. Gen. Prawit
Wongsawan was given the position of Defense Minister—a posting welcomed by Thailand’s
arch-royalist top brass. Prawit graduated in the same Pre-Cadet class (Class 6) and Army
Cadet School class (Class 17) as 2006 coup instigators Gen.Sonthi Boonyaratklin and
Gen.Winai Phattiyakul.187 Moreover, as mentioned above, he has long-standing ties with
Army Chief Anupong, Army Chief of Staff Prayuth, and meets the approval of the Privy
Council.
Under Prem’s guidance, Prawit, along with Army Chief Gen. Anupong and Army
Chief of Staff Prayuth have been the chief guarantors of army loyalty to the current
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government. Such support has permitted the government to survive in office. In early March,
pro-Thaksin riots in Bangkok and Pattaya were met with meek resistance by the police.
Given doubts as to police loyalty, Abhisit has now entrusted his safety to Army Chief of Staff
Prayuth.188 Continuing anti-government demonstrations by pro-Thaksin Red-Shirts in mid-
March 2009 were only halted as a result of decisions to take action by this military troika. In
addition, the military has worked to censure transmissions by pro-Thaksin media against the
ruling coalition. Furthermore, the military has used a policy of carrots (projects) and sticks
(selective repression) to quell potential anti-government demonstrations in various parts of the
country. Finally, ISOC ensured that the government would not lose face, by ensuring that no
demonstrations would occur in Phuket during the ASEAN summit. Clearly, the Abhisit
administration needs the military to stay alive.189 But does the military need or even want the
Democrats to remain in office?
On April 17, there occurred an assassination attempt on the life of PAD leader Sondhi
Limthongkul. Sondhi survived but immediately told reporters that he believed those
responsible were Anupong, Prayuth, and Prawit, who he said were keen on seizing power
from the Abhisit government. For months prior to the attack, Sondhi had accused various
political players of (including persons of enormous clout) of not doing enough against the
Thaksin movement (or being in cahoots with it). The targets of his verbal attacks included
Anupong, Prawit, Police Chief Patcharawat, Surayud, and even “influential palace
insiders.”190 Though Anupong denied any knowledge of such a plot, the bullets fired were
traced back to the Army itself.191The incident also brought into question the desire of Police
Chief Patcharawat Wongsawan, the brother of Prawit, to protect the government, given the
limp performance of the police in maintaining law and order. Indeed, both Prawit and
Patcharawat were seen as closer to Newin Chidchob and Bhumjai Thai Party than to Abhisit
and the Democrats. The anti-Thaksin PAD has now called for a massive reform of the army
and security forces system. The Yellow Shirts’ growing anti-military message mirrors that of
90
the Red Shirts, who have alleged that the armed forces led a December 2008 disguised coup
which brought Abhisit to office.192 Should the military become the common enemy of both
the pro-Thaksin UDD (United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship) and PAD, this will
not augur well for the Thai military establishment. Each movement, reflecting diverse though
powerful regions and political parties in parliament, could agree that their primary enemy is
the military itself. This could result in a diminished popular opinion of soldiers, diminished
credibility of the military (a la 1973, 1992), both of which might lead to military budget
cutbacks in parliament.
History shows that when the Thai armed forces come to office, they invariably create
political parties to help perpetuate their political interests. The coup of 1991 propagated the
Samakkhitham party. Is this what the armed forces might be currently cooking up for
Thailand’s future. There have been rumors that former coup leader Gen.Sonthi Boonyaratklin
or current Defense Minister Gen.Prawit Wongsawan might in future lead a political party.
Indeed, Prawit has been closely linked to Newin Chidchob and the Bhumjai Thai Party.
Could Bhumjai Thai be the Samakkhitham party of the next election?
The future looks stark indeed for democratic civilian control in Thailand. Thaksin is
alive, well, and ever-present in Thai politics. Meanwhile, Privy Council Chair Prem
Tinsulanonda is aging rapidly. As such, pro- and anti-Thaksinism (in terms of proxy conflict)
could well intensify. There may thus develop a high level of internal instability. The higher
the degree of threat perception by the military regarding security to the kingdom of Thailand,
the more likely a reactionary faction in the Thai armed forces will come to dominate it and
launch a military coup, returning Thailand once again to direct governance under the military.
Ukrist Pathamanand anticipates that the most likely scenario is the restoration of the half-way
democracy of Kriangsak Chomanand and Prem Tinsulanond whereby an unelected military
PM towered over an elected Lower House.193 Either alternative represents bad news for Thai
democracy—either its destruction or continued dilution. But direct military control or half-
91
way democracy, should these regimes come about at all, will not last long in Thailand. Thai
people have experienced too much pluralism to put up with authoritarianism’s return.
International pressure and the military’s own negative experiences in governing may also
prevent a resurgence of military control (or half-way control) over the country.
What we can most probably expect in terms of the future of civil-military relations in
Thailand is more of the same. The armed forces today have found their perfect niche.
Counseled by Prem, working behind the scenes with the generally compliant Abhisit
government, and strengthened by the 2007 constitution, the military has made a U-Turn back
to 1991 to become Thailand’s crucial clandestine political player. But the armed forces have
an even better deal than did the soldiers of 30 years ago. They have learned from experience
that direct governance will only create negative perceptions of them from society. Instead,
indirect domination of civilian governments allows them to augment their autonomy from
civilian authority. Weak civilian governments will come and go while a strong military
institution will endure. And should the military establish its own party with a proxy as prime
minister, then all-the-better for military interests. Amidst enhanced military tutelage over
politics and society, Thailand today has fallen off the trajectory toward democratization.
Rather, it is increasingly reverting to becoming an intensified defective domain democracy.194
The military has more power today than at any time in recent memory. Its augmented budget,
Internal Security Act powers, the Defense Ministry Act, and the Broadcasting Act all attest to
the renewed political strength of soldiers.195 But General Prem was right when he insinuated
that the military was the horse ridden by civilian “jockey” governments. Given the intensified
military prowess, the civilian government jockey can now at any time be bucked.
Post-Script
Of late, the Abhisit government has quietly eased Patcharawat Wongsawan out of active
office, pressuring him to take a leave of absence until retirement in August 2009. In
92
Patcharawat’s stead stands acting Police Chief Gen. Wichien Potposri, who appears to be
more amenable to working under an anti-Thaksin government as well as perhaps pliable by
the military. However Wichien failed to impress the Police Commission in terms of being
selected as the next national police chief—perhaps because he lacked seniority and
experience. Chairman of the Board PM Abhisit nominated Pol.Gen.Prateep Tanprasert, a
favorite of the PAD and a few pro-PAD army elements. But a majority of the 11-member
body preferred Pol.Gen.Chumpol Manmai, seen as close to Patcharawat, Prawit, the Bhumjai
Thai Party, and pro-Prawit military officers. The meeting ended inconclusively, though
Abhisit promised to renominate Prateep. The struggle, however, could represent an attempt
by the PAD and certain Democrats (including Abhisit) to wrest control of the chief’s position
from the current military/police leadership in order to achieve greater control over a police
force seen as being generally pro-Thaksin in orientation.196
As for Prawit, the government would most probably like to dismiss him from the post
of Defense Minister altogether. This is possibly because of government fears of Prawit’s
military influence, given the state’s decision to indirectly sack his brother Patcharawat. At the
same time, Prawit seems more loyal to Newin Chidchob’s Bhumjai Thai party than to the
Democrats.
But Abhisit and Suthep must be careful. The quartet of Prawit, Patcharawat,
Anupong, and Prayuth has undergirded the Abhisit administration’s survival. Still, should
Prawit depart from the post of Defense Minister, the position may go to one of Prawit’s pre-
cadet and cadet school classmates (perhaps either Gen. Sonthi or Gen.Boonsrang Niampradit)
or possibly confirmed anti-Thaksinista Gen.Saprang Kallayamitr. If any of these men take the
post, we will be witnessing the perpetuation of the 2006 coup group in positions of post-coup
power and Thailand’s military game will continue to endure.197 At the same time, if Saprang
assumes the Defense posting, there could be possible conflict within Thailand’s military
93
establishment. Saprang is supported by Sondhi Limthongkul and the PAD who have hurled
criticisms upon Anupong over the last six months and continue to do so.
Anupong himself is working to secure a stable future for those closest to him. On
June 17, 2009, Anupong transferred/promoted 75 mid-level officers as a reward for their
involvement in the 2006 coup. One of these, Lt. Col.Pattanachai Jintakanont (former
Commander of the strategically key 4th Cavalry Battalion in Bangkok) was promoted to
colonel and appointed to be the Army Chief’s Aide. His replacement was Lt. Col.Chinsorn
Ruengsuk, an aide to Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan.198 With regard to October 2009
military reshuffles, this includes Gen.Prayuth (AFAPS Class 12, Army Cadet School Class
23), who Anupong is keeping on as Army Chief of Staff, in line to be take Anupong’s own
position in 2010. At the same time, Anupong will promote another Class 10 army chum,
Gen.Teerawat Boonyapradap to become deputy Army Chief.199In Teerawat’s place, Anupong
is set to appoint Gen. Piroon Phaeopolsong, deputy Army Chief of Staff, as assistant Army
Chief. Piroon graduated with Anupong in pre-cadet school Class 10. Finally, Gen.Wit
Thephasadin na Ayutthaya (Class 11) is to be promoted to be another assistant Army Chief.200
The promotions further clinch the ascendancy of Pre-Cadet Class 10 and 12 as well as Army
Cadet School Classes 21 and 23 over Thailand’s Armed Forces. At the same time, at least
until 2010 the personal supremacy of Generals Anupong and Prayuth is assured.
In late August 2009, rumors of a military coup were again resonating. It was said that
the supposed takeover would be instigated by Generals Prawit, Anupong, Prayuth, as well as
politician Newin Chidchob. The gossip coincided with an August 17 attempt by red-shirts to
petition Thailand’s king to pardon Thaksin Shinawatra during which potential violence might
provide the necessary springboard for military intervention.201 The rumor has not come to
pass but it underlines the continuing popular perception of an extreme lack of civilian control
over Thailand’s military. Such tittle-tattle is not idle chitchat in a country where the army has
94
proved time and again that it can and will continue its role as political umpire where it—and
the Privy Council—see fit.
References
1
Sutichai Yoon, “Thai Talk: Old Soldiers Never Die; They Raise 'Career' Thoroughbreds,” The Nation, July 20
2006. http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
2
“Anupong Reiterates Army's Neutrality, Meets Prem to Brief Him on the Situation, The Nation, October 9,
2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
3
Boonradom Chitradon, “Exiled Thaksin Tells 50,000 fans Army Must Stop Meddling in Politics,” Agence
France Press (AFP) December 13, 2008, http://www.timesoftheinternet.com/28429.html.
4
Thitinan Pongsudirak, “Thailand Since the Coup,” Journal of Democracy, October 2008, Volume 19, Number
4, p.140.
5
See Yoshifumi Tamada, “Coups in Thailand, 1980-1991: Classmates, Internal Conflicts and Relations with the
Government of the Military.” Southeast Asian Studies, 33, 3, December 1995, pp.36-37.
6
For a more extensive discussion of Thai military ideology, see Ockey, James, 2001, in Alagappa, Multiah,
editor, 2001, p.201.
7
Defense of Thailand, Ministry of Defense White Paper, 2008, p.33.
8
Personal interview with very senior retired Army official, August 14, 2009.
9
Chai-anan Samudavanija, “The Military, Bureaucracy, and Globalization.” In Hewison, Kevin, editor, Political
Change in Thailand, London: Routledge, p.53.
10
This section derives from a manuscript-in-progress headed by Dr. Aurel Croissant of Heidelberg University
and funded by DFG. For more information on this project, please contact Paul Chambers, P.Chambers@uni-
heidelberg.de.
11
See Croissant, Aurel, Mitra, Subratra, Chambers, Paul, Kuhn, David, Wölf, Siegfried, Manuscript in Progress,
Civil-Military Relations in Asia, DFG Project, 2008-2011.
12
13
See also Kemp und Hudlin 1992; Pion-Berlin 1992; Kohn 1997; Bland 2001; Feaver 1996; Feaver 1999;
Welch 1976.
14
Dahl, Robert 1989, Democracy and its Critics. New York: 1989, 250.
15
Trinkunas 2005, 8.
16
Kohn 1997, 142.
17
Kemp und Hudlin 1992; Pion-Berlin 1992; Kohn 1997; Bland 2001.
18
Taylor, 2003, p.7. Cited in Croissant, Aurel, Mitra, Subratra, Chambers, Paul, Kuhn, David, Wölf, Siegfried,
Manuscript in Progress, Civil-Military Relations in Asia, DFG Project, 2008-2011.
19
Croissant, Aurel, Mitra, Subratra, Chambers, Paul, Kuhn, David, Wölf, Siegfried, Manuscript in Progress,
20
Dye, Thomas, 1992, 2.
21
Hofferbert 1973, 5, See Croissant, Aurel, Mitra, Subratra, Chambers, Paul, Kuhn, David, Wölf, Siegfried,
Manuscript in Progress, Civil-Military Relations in Asia, DFG Project, 2008-2011.
22
See also Bigo/Tsoukala 2008, p. 18.
23
Trinkunas 1999:6.
24
25
Trinkunas, 2001, p.164.
26
27
28
Norden, Deborah, in Pion-Berlin, 2001, 111-115
29
Norden, Deborah in Pion-Berlin, 2001, 117.
30
Barros and Coelho, 1986, p.439; Pion-Berlin, 1992, p.84; See Croissant, Aurel, Mitra, Subratra, Chambers,
Paul, Kuhn, David, Wölf, Siegfried, Manuscript in Progress, Civil-Military Relations in Asia, DFG Project,
2008-2011.
31
Pasuk Phongpaichit, Baker, Chris, Thailand: Economy and Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000,
p.354.
95
32
Author’s calculations.
33
Pasuk Phongpaichit, Baker, Chris, Thailand: Economy and Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000,
p.354.
34
Handley, Paul, The King Never Smiles, New Haven: Yale University Press, p.336.
35
Author’s own calculations.
36
Murray, David, Angels and Demons, Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996, p.5.
37
38
Murray, David, Angels and Demons, Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996, p.13; Phongpaichit, Baker, Chris,
Thailand: Economy and Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp-357-8.
39
Murray, David, Angels and Devils. Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996, p.39.
40
Murray, David, Angels and Devils. Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996, pp.190-94.
41
McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2004,
p.133.
42
Chai-anan Samudavanija, “The Military, Bureaucracy, and Globalization.” In Hewison, Kevin, Political
Change in Thailand, London: Routledge, 1997, p.56.
43
Surachart Bamrungsuk, „Thailand: Military Professionalism at the Crossroads,“p.77.
44
45
46
“It’s Nearing that Time,”Bangkok Post, August 5, 1999, http://www.bangkokpost.com.
47
p.133.
48
p.133.
49
50
p.134-5.
51
p.151.
52
p.137.
53
Ukrist Pathmanand, “A Different Coup d’Etat,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38, 1, February 2008, p.126.
54
Ukrist Patthmanand, “A Different Coup d’Etat?”Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38, 1, February 2008, p.129..
55
56
“Junta’s Media War a Big Mistake,” The Nation, October 26, 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
57
“People Power Party Uncovers another Military Plot, The Nation, November 3, 2007,
http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
58
Ukrist Patthmanand, “A Different Coup d’Etat?”Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38, 1, February 2008, p.137.
59
60
See Government of Thailand, http://www.cabinet.thaigov.go.th/.
61
See Wassana Nanuam, “Government Hopefuls Rendezvous with Anupong ‘the Manager,’”Bangkok Post,
December 11, 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com.
62
Wassana Nanuam, „The Coup that Never Was“ Bangkok Post, October 31, 2008,
http://www.bangkokpost.com.
63
Article 24, section 2 of the 1946 Constitution stated that Senators could not be government officials.
64
Under the 1947 and 1949 constitutions, the ban on soldiers sitting as Senators continued (Article 93, Section 5
of the 1949 Constitution). Article 33 empowered the King to appoint all Senators who were nominated by a
five-person Privy Council, an institution then dominated by the Army. See Thak, 2007: 32.
65
15.3% of the entire 76 directly elected/74 appointed Senate was composed of retired military officials to make
this an indirect reserved domain. Among the 74 appointed Senators , 14 were ex-soldiers for 9.3% military
reserved domain.
66
These Prime Ministers and their prime ministerial terms were as follows: Sanya Dammasakdi (1973-75);
Tanin Kravichien (1976-77); Gen. Surayudh Chulanond (2006-08).
67
Surachart Bamrungsuk, United States Foreign Policy and Thai Military Rule, 1947-1997. Bangkok: Duang
Kamol, 1988, pp.171.180.
68
Pasuk Pongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics. London:Oxford University Press, 2000,
p.304.
69
Wright, Joseph, The Balancing Act. Bangkok: Asia Books, 1991, pp.236-7.
70
Suchit Boonbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, Singapore: ISEAS, 1987, p.61
71
Ockey, James, 2001, p.203.
96
72
p.350.
73
p.354.
74
75
76
Ockey, James, 2001, p.203.
77
See Chambers, Paul, “US-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?” Contemporary Southeast
Asia, 26, 2004.
78
Channel Five, http://portal.tv5.co.th, http://www.ch7.com.
79
Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, Thailand Media Profile, 2002, p.10.
80
US State Department, 2008 Human Rights Report: Thailand,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119058.htm.
81
Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2008.
82
US State Department, 2008 Human Rights Report: Thailand,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119058.htm)
83
Chang Noi, „Military Biggest Winner in Political Conflict,“ The Nation, February 2, 2009,
84
“Cambodia Warned to ‘Back Off’”, Bangkok Post, August 5, 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com.
85
“Bt1 billion fund for Isoc projects in rural areas”, The Nation, March 25, 2009,
86
“Anupong Deploys Solders to Explain to People About Thaksin Pardon Petition.” The Nation, August 2, 2009,
87
Senate of Thailand, http://www.senate.go.th/th_senate/English/listofstandingcommittee.pdf.
88
Parliament of Thailand, http://www.parliament.go.th/parcy/committee.php?group_id=15.
89
Surachart Bamrungsuk, United States Foreign Policy and Thai Military Rule: 1947-1977. Bangkok: Duang
Kamol, 1988, p.95-103.
90
Pasuk Pongpaichit, Baker, Chris, Thailand: Economy and Politics, London: Oxford University Press, 2000,
pp.307-8.
91
Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, Singapore: ISEAS, 1990, p.51.
92
Chai-anan Sanudavanija, Kusuma Snitwongse, Suchit Bunbongkarn, From Armed Suppression to Political
Offensive. Bangkok: ISIS, 1990 p.112.
93
Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, Singapore: ISEAS, 1990, p.52.
94
Chai-anan Sanudavanija, Kusuma Snitwongse, Suchit Bunbongkarn, From Armed Suppression to Political
Offensive. Bangkok: ISIS, 1990 p.112.
95
Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, Singapore: ISEAS, 1990, p.58-59.
96
Murray, David, Angels and Devils, Bangkok:White Orchid Press, 1996, pp.190-191; Surachart Bamrungsuk
“Changing Patterns of Civil-Military Relations and Thailand’s Regional Outlook.” In Mares, David, editor,
Civil-Military Relations, Boulder, Colorado: Westeview Press, 1998, p.196.
97
Surachart Bamrungsuk “Changing Patterns of Civil-Military Relations and Thailand’s Regional Outlook.” In
Mares, David, editor, Civil-Military Relations, Boulder, Colorado: Westeview Press, 1998, p.196
98
Surachart Bamrungsuk, “Changing Patterns of Civil-Military Relations and Thailand’s Regional Outlook, ” In
Mares, David, editor, Civil-Military Relations, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998, p.196-7.
99
Surachart Bamrungsuk, “Changing Patterns of Civil-Military Relations and Thailand’s Regional Outlook, In
Mares, David, editor, Civil-Military Relations, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998, p.196-7.
100
The Defense of Thailand (White Paper). Ministry of Defense, 1994, p.68.
101
102
The Defense of Thailand (White Paper). Ministry of Defense, 1994, pp.68-69.
103
104
“Reform ‘will Hinder Force,’”The Nation, July 13, 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
105
Reform ‘will Hinder Force,’”The Nation, July 13, 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
106
Avudh Panananda “Thailand’s Dept. Of Homeland Security,” The Nation, Decembe 12, 2006,
107 Piyanart Srivalo, “Bill Would Put ISOC Under Army, Not PM.”The Nation, June 17, 2007,
108
Criticisms by Chulalongkorn professor Surachart Bamrungsuk and former dean of Thammasat University's
Law Faculty, Kamchai Chongchakphan. See “Law Would be a ‘Coup by Stealth.’”The Nation, July 15, 2007,
109
“NLA passes controversial Internal Security Act”, The Nation, November 8, 2007,
97
110
Defense of Thailand, Ministry of Defense White Paper, 2008, P.35.
111
“Thailand: Internal Security Act Threatens Democracy and Human Rights-- Government Proposes
Draconian Steps to Institutionalize Military Control, Human Rights Watch
November 4, 2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/11/04/thailand-internal-security-act-threatens-democracy-
and-human-rights
112
Wassana Nanuam, “ISOC to Tackle Political Conflict as a Security Threat,” Bangkok Post, November 13,
2008,http://www.bangkokpost.com.
113 “Thai Insurgency” June 11, 2009, The Economist,
http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13834203.
114
115
116
117
and-human-rights
118
and-human-rights
119
and-human-rights
120
Don Pathan, “ISOC Must Evolve to Tackle Rising Security Challenges,”The Nation,
121
and-human-rights
122
“Cabinet Approves Police-Revamp Bill,” The Nation, July 4, 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
123
“Cabinet Approves Police-Revamp Bill,” The Nation, July 4, 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
124
“Patcharawat Fact File,”The Nation, March 1, 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
125
“Thai Rath Analysis,”Bangkok Post, August 3, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com.
126
“Wichien Takes Top Police Job,” Bangkok Post, August 5, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com.
127
It is rumored that Prawit maintains close ties with active and retired military officials, including Generals
Prem Tinsulanond, Sonthi Boonyaratklin, Winai Phattiyakul, Anupong Paochinda, Prayuth Chan-ocha, ,
Surayudh Chulanond, Chettha Thanajaro, and Kowit Wattana. At the same time, Prawit has reportedly long
been close to Sanoh Tienthong, given that Prawit served as a soldier for a time in Sanoh’s province of Sa Kaew.
See Siam Report, “Prawit Wongsawan,” http://www.siamreport.com.
128
Some army officers even ordered their subordinates to vote for the Democrat Party in the 2007 election. One
promised that, in return, they would be treated to chicken curry noodles. See Wassana Nanuam, “Anupong
Rewards his Coup Allies,” Bangkok Post, June 19, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com; Wassana Nanuam,
ISOC Ordered to Promoted Democracy,”Bangkok Post, December 20, 2007, http://www.bangkokpost.com.
129
Don Pathan, “ISOC Must Evolve to Tackle Rising Security Challenges,”The Nation,
130
Piyanart Srivalo, “Draft Law Would Wean SBPAC Off Military for Funding,” The Nation, August 15, 2009,
131
“Bt1 billion fund for Isoc projects in rural areas”, The Nation, March 25, 2009,
132
“Blue Shirts Return,” Siam Report, July 2009, http://www.siamreport.blogspot.com/2009/07/blue-shirts-
return.html.
133
“Thai Army Begins Crackdown on Anti-government Demonstrators,” Thailand News.Net, April 13, 2009,
http//www.thailandnews.net/story/488936.
134
Examples of formal or informal National Defense missions abroad have included the sending of Thai troops
to participate in the First World War (1917-18); the Franco-Thai War (1940-41); the Korean War (1950-51); the
98
Vietnam War and Secret War in Laos (1964-75); border raids between Thailand and Cambodia (1979-88); the
Thai-Lao border war (1987-88); East Timor Peace-Keeping (1999-2002); bolstering of US troops in Afghanistan
(2001-2); participation in the Iraq War (2003-4); and border conflict along the Thai-Cambodian border (2008-
Present).
135
Interview with Dr. Mark Tamthai, October 10, 2008.
136
Section 47, Ministry of Defense Administration Act (2008), cited in Defense of Thailand, Ministry of Defense
White Paper, 2008, p.32.
137
Ministry of Defense of Thailand website, http://www.mod.go.th/eng_mod/index.html.
138
Wassana Nanuam,“Thawil Firms as NSC Candidate,” Bangkok Post, July 2, 2009,
139
Surachart Bamrungsuk, From Dominance to Power Sharing: the Military and Politics in Thailand, 1973-
1992, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Columbia University, 1999, p.155.
140
The Defense of Thailand (White Paper). Ministry of Defense, 1994, Message from the Supreme Commander,
p.i.
141
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetF.htm.
142
http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/coalition/thailand/ U.S. Central Command.
143
Royal Thai Armed Forces website, 2009, http://www.schq.mi.th/EN/vision_mission.htm.
144
Royal Thai Armed Forces website, 2009, http://www.schq.mi.th/EN/vision_mission.htm.
145
Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy website, www.crma.ac.th/.
146
Handley, Paul, “Princes, Politicians, Bureaucrats, Generals: The Evolution of the Privy Council Under the
Constitutional Monarchy,”A paper presented at the 10th International Conference on Thai Studies, Thammasat
University, 9-11 January 2008, p.15.
147
148
The Defense of Thailand (White Paper). Ministry of Defense, 1994, Message from the Supreme Commander,
p.58.
149
“Surayud Guns for Reforms,”Bangkok Post, February 19, 1999, http://www.bangkokpost.com.
150
Hänggi, Heiner, “Democratization and Security Governance in Southeast Asia,” Paper presented for the
International Workshop-Conference “Challenges and Prospects of Democratic Governance in Southeast Asia,”
Heidelberg, Germany, 15-17 January 2009, p.11.
151
Wassana Nanuam, “Reform at the Top of the Command Pyramid,”Bangkok Post, July 10, 2008,
152
Suchit Bunbongkarn, State of the Nation, Singapore, ISEAS, 1996, p.65.
153
Perapong Manakit, Role of Parliament in Defence Budgeting in Thailand (2007?).
154
155
In 1997 the Thai defense budget was reduced by 25 percent, the highest decline in years. See Thailand’s
Office of the Prime Minister for statistics.
156
Hänggi, Heiner, “Democratization and Security Governance in Southeast Asia,” Paper presented for the
International Workshop-Conference “Challenges and Prospects of Democratic Governance in Southeast Asia,”
Heidelberg, Germany, 15-17 January 2009, p.10-11.
157
Ockey, James, Thailand: “The Struggle to Define Civil-MilitaryRelations,” in Alagappa, Multiah, Transition
to Democratic Civilian Control, 1999, p.201.
158
p.132.
159
p.137.
160
Personal interview with very senior retired Army official, August 14, 2009.
161
“Military Must be Accountable,” Bangkok Post, July 2, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com.
162
The importance of this was demonstrated in July 2006 when Army Commander Sonthi Boonyaratklin
suddenly made 129 transfers of mid-ranking officers, at least half of which were said to be under the command
of Class 10 generals loyal to Thaksin. See “Military Transfers: Sonthi Stuns by Shifting PM’s Allies.”The
Nation, July 20, 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
163
The mid-year reshuffle, which began under the Chatchai government, allows more soldiers more chances at
promotion.
164
“It has not been uncommon for reshuffle lists to be upheld until Privy Council head Prem is satisified with
them. See “Thailand in 2006: Retreat to Military Rule,” Asian Survey47, 1, January/February 2007, p.137.
165
Suchit Bunbongkarn, State of the Nation, Singapore, ISEAS, 1996, pp.64-65.
166
“PM Loses Army Reshuffle Powers,” Bangkok Post, February 2, 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com.
167
Murray, David, Angels and Devils. Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996, p.192
168
Chai-anan Samudavanija, “The Military, Bureaucracy, and Globalization,” In Hewison, Kevin, editor,
Political Change in Thailand, London: Routledge, pp.54-55.
99
169
Surachart Bamrungsuk, „Thailand: Military Professionalism at the Crossroads,“p.77.
170
McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005,
p.129.
171
McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005,
p.134.
172
Pasuk Pongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000,
p.346.
173
Handley, Paul, „Princes, Politicians, Generals: The Evolution oft he Privy Council Under the Constitutional
Monarchy. Paper presented at the 10th International Conference on Thai Studies, Thammasat University,
Thailand, 9-11 January 2008, p.15.
174
Handley, Paul, „Princes, Politicians, Generals: The Evolution oft he Privy Council Under the Constitutional
Monarchy. Paper presented at the 10th International Conference on Thai Studies, Thammasat University,
Thailand, 9-11 January 2008, p.15.
175
Handley, Paul, The King Never Smiles, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, p.470.
176
See McCargo, Duncan, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand, Copenhagen, NIAS Press, 2004,
p.137.
177
Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Where Will Sonthi Lead “Army of the Land?” The Nation, March 24, 2006,
178
Interview with Jakrapop Penkair, March 3, 2009.
179
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Paper Presented at the 10th International Conference on Thai Studies, Thammasat
University, Thailand, 9- 11 January 2008.
180
Wassana Nanuam, „The Coup that Never Was“ Bangkok Post, October 31, 2008,
181
Wassana Nanuam, “Government Hopefuls Rendezvous with Anupong, ‘the Manager,’”Bangkok Post,
December 11, 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com.
182
Chai’s occupying the post of Parliament President also gave him the power to call a Special Session of
Parliament to officially select a new Prime Minister (which he did on December 15) following Abhisit’s
apparent success in garnering enough votes to become Prime Minister.
183
„How Suthep Installed a Democrat-led Government,“ The Nation, May 26, 2009,
184
Thitinan Pongsudirak, “Thailand Since the Coup,” Journal of Democracy, October 2008, Volume 19,
Number 4, p.146.
185
Croissant and Merkel (2003) state that “defective democracies are systems of political power that boast the
existence of a meaningful and effective universal ‘system of elections.’regulating access to political power. At
the same time, however, they significantly limit the functioning of institutions that secure basic political and
civic participatory rights and freedoms, restrictions of the horizontal checks and limitations on power, and/or
limitations on the effective political power of democratically legitimated authorities (Merkel and Croissant,
2000, 35).”
186
Merkel defines domain (tutelary) democracies as regimes where actors not legitimized by democratic vote
(e.g. the military, entrepreneurs, multinational corporations) exert partial or total control over certain political
spheres which should be under the control of democratically elected authorities (Merkel 2004).
187
Wassana Nanuam, “Top Brass Welcome Prawit’s Assignment as Defence Minister,” Bangkok Post, December
23, 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com.
188
“My Friend is my Enemy in Thailand,” Asia Times Online, May 7, 2009, http://www.atimes.com.
189
The Abhisit government’s discomposure as to maintaining itself in power has been reflected in Deputy PM
Suthep Thuasuban’s regular meetings and currying favor with senior or retired military officials. Appearing at
Defense Minister Prawit’s birthday, Suthep claimed that the relationship between the administration and the
armed forces remained strong. See Panya Thiewsangwan, “PM Extends Hand of Friendship to Prawit,” The
Nation, August 12, 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
190
Wassana Nanuam, “Attempt on Sondhi’s Life Puts Military in Dubious Light,”Bangkok Post, April 23, 2009,
191
192
193
Ukrist Pathmanand, “A Different Coup d’Etat,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38, 1, February 2008, p .139.
194
See Croissant, Aurel and Merkel, Wolfgang (2003); Merkel, Wolfgang (2004).
195
Chang Noi, „Military Biggest Winner in Political Conflict,“ The Nation, February 2, 2009,
196
Manop Thip-osod, “Scramble to be the Next Top Cop,” Bangkok Post, August 11, 2009,
http://www.bangkokpost.com; Pradit Ruangdit, Manop Thip-osod, “Abhisit Loses Police Vote,” Bangkok Post,
August 21, 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com.
100
197
Wassana Nanuam, „Prawit Fears Meddling in Lists, Bangkok Post, August 6, 2009,
198
Wassana Nanuam, “Anupong Rewards his Coup Allies,”Bangkok Post, June 19, 2009,
199
Wassana Nanuam, „Prawit Urged to Prevent Meddling in Reshuffle,” Bangkok Post, August 7, 2009,
200
Wassana Nanuam, “Source Says Prayuth to Stay as Chief-of-Staff,” Bangkok Post, August 18, 2009,
201
“Puea Thai Blows Whistle on Silent Coup Plot,” The Nation, August 17, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.
101

Paul Chambers - U-Turn To The Past The Resurgence of The Military in Contemporary Thai Politics

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Paul Chambers - U-Turn To The Past The Resurgence of The Military in Contemporary Thai Politics

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U-Turn to the Past?

The Resurgence of the Military in Contemporary Thai Politics

--Privy Council Chair Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda, July 14, 20061

--Army Commander Gen.Anupong Paochinda, October 8, 20082

--Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, December 12, 20083

interference in Thailand’s democracy. The differing views—each publicly expressed—send a

hindering Thailand’s democratization.

appeared to be becoming indoctrinated under a professionalism of compliance to elected

of Gen. Chatchai Chunhavan (1988-91).

The objective of this investigation is to contribute to research on the current state of

democratization and civil-military relations in Thailand (particularly 1992-2009). The study

Locating Unity in Thailand’s Armed Forces

details various forms of Thai military unity.

important role…to safeguard independence, sovereignty, internal order, as well as protect

nation, religion, monarch, and interests of nation.”7

In terms of ideology, monarchy has proved to be an especially unifying factor. This

safeguarding royalism contributed to monarchy’s becoming--once again—a central ideology

state—as undergirded by a royalist military—strengthened the institutions of the monarchy

across the armed forces.

Beyond ideology, factors linking soldiers together include family or marriage

connections, service in the same unit or service (especially in terms of patron-clientelism),

As for same service experiences, I am referring to instances where soldiers served in

patron will carry on to higher levels.

Marshall Gen.Phibul Songkram (dominated Thailand1938-44; 1948-57), Field Marshall

(exerted influence 1979-Present).

Srimuang, Gen. Pallop Pinmanee, Gen. Manoonkrit Rupkachorn, and Gen.Sanan

less importance in determining military loyalty.

together before heading to separate academies) reverses this trend.

military has been much more monolithic.

Table 1: Thai Supreme Commanders and Army Commanders

Supreme Term Chula- Army Term Chula-

The Tug-of-War of Civil-Military Relations10

When a military stands united, except in terms of a commitment to civilian control,

it ensures that civilians alone are responsible for political decision-making.15

Ultimately then, to differentiate various patterns of civil-military relations and

understanding civil-military relations which focuses on this balance of decision-making

civilian control is a relative condition, i.e., it is possible to distinguish different degrees of

Table 2: Indicators of Elite Recruitment

as a “framework of governmental formation and deliberation, the intention of political actors,

Table 3: Indicators of Public Policy

preparation for counterinsurgency warfare and terrorism, domestic intelligence gathering,

Table 4: Indicators of Internal Security

bureaucracy, training, and strategic planning.”25 Meanwhile, national defense policy—

Table 5: Indicators of National Defense

Finally, the area of military organization comprises decisions on all organizational

recruitment, appointment and retirement.27 “Modern militaries tend to be structured as

rational organizations, emphasizing hierarchy, formal rules, and division of labor”.28

“autonomization,” where bureaucracies become increasingly isolated from civilian control at

Table 6: Indicators of Military Organization

This five-part conceptualization for determining the level of civil-military relations is

precise tiers. As such, I also have included low-medium and medium-high.

elected administration of 1988-91; 2) the military-installed government of 1991-92; 3) the

1992-2001 era of democratization; 4) the Thaksin Shinawatra elected administrations of 2001-

democratization in early 2008.

Civilian Prime Minister, Military Autonomy: 1988-91

become PM himself. Chatchai permitted Army Commander Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh to

interference in its domain led to the coup of February 21, 1991.31

Ministers, 11/46 or 23.9% were retired military officials.32

political competition—this study’s second indicator relating to elite recruitment.

As for eligibility of active duty military officers in positions of political decision-

Two months later the military overthrew him.

Ultimately, civilian control was at a level of medium during the administration of

varying levels of connections with different political parties in parliament. Informally,