Humberside Police Crime Management Branch Police Headquarters Priory Road Hull, HU5 5SF

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25/02/14

Dear Ms Calvert

Re: Decision to allow Rossendales/NELC to continue defrauding residents

I refer to your response dated 4 February 2014 regarding the complaint about Humberside Polices decision not to investigate fraud allegations. I am disappointed but not surprised that the force investigating itself over this matter has been a complete sham. That the professional standards branch (PSB) wrongly categorised the complaint such that there would be no right of appeal against the outcome was similarly predictable. Evidence has been supplied of sums fraudulently imposed on North East Lincs residents over recent years of 325,000. This is only what has been corroborated through entering into over a year and a half of litigation to literally force data from the Council. The figure only partly represents what would be discovered if investigated, and a fraction of that stolen from the least financially resilient, if all councils were accounted for. There is no evidence in support of the Economic Crime Unit (ECU) making any serious attempt to establish that the allegations had no merit. Making references to the Home Office Circular 47/2004 has on the contrary made an argument that such cases should be given priority for investigation as the guidance clearly identifies the fraud several times in the listed priorities. Similarly, citing the court of appeal case (R v Ghosh) was another own goal, figuratively speaking, in that the two stage test developed from that case to define dishonesty would in fact be satisfied and was explained in my letter to DS Wood dated 24 November 2013.

Evans v South Ribble Borough Council 1992 was cited in defence of NELC permitting Rossendales to defraud debtors with their charges. This just highlights that the department must have relied on an unreliable source with regards the law, owing to the judgment in that case having no relevance. It would be safe to put money on it being members of the Council Tax Department in whose interest it would be to ill advise DS Wood making enquiries. This is probable, given that the professionals investigating have bizarrely admitted that the council, against which the allegations were made, has been relied upon to rest assure them that there has been no criminal wrongdoing by the bailiffs, thus side stepping allegations made against them. The concerns I would like Humberside Polices Chief Constable to look into are detailed at Annex A, which incidentally does not constitute an appeal against the outcome of the PSBs investigation into my wrongly recorded and incorrectly termed complaint. However, the recording of the complaint as an organisational issue (direction and control), rather than a conduct matter will be among the issues raised. Yours sincerely

ANNEX A

Wrongly recorded complaint 1. The complaint was recorded on14.1.14 and classified as an organisational decision (direction and control) when it was clearly a conduct matter. The relevant case law for defining direction and control complaints, as opposed to conduct matters is (North Yorkshire Police Authority v IPCC (Jordan) 2010). The court ruled that a complaint could not be classed as direction and control if a conduct issue was raised. The judge found that a direction and control (decision), is essentially concerned with matters which are of a general nature, and "a decision which is made by a chief officer which is confined to a particular subject falls outside the definition of direction and control." 2. There can be no doubt that the complaint concerned conduct. For example there had been a complete failure to research and understand the law relevant to the allegations. This is made categorically clear in my letter (24.11.13). The councils word was sufficient to satisfy the ECU that there was no criminal wrongdoing which is also a conduct matter (negligence) where an obvious conflict of interest exists for a council officer to volunteer information that would incriminate the contractor for which the council is responsible. 3. The mis-categorisation of the complaint has effectively deprived me of the right to appeal to the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). There is the further issue arising where the PSB has used the term organisational rather than direction and control. This could be seen as misleading complainants that the PSB is justified in only recognising a complaint as a conduct matter when specifically naming an officer. 4. Where it has been stated at the end of the PSB response (4.2.14) that there is no right of appeal against the outcome of this process, the reference to the Police Reform Act 2002 has incorrectly been stated as, Paragraph 8A Schedule 3. The correct reference is Paragraph 4(8)(a) and was amended by Paragraph 5(2) Schedule 14 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. In any event; though there is no right of appeal, the correspondence could have been more open and stated that there is provision, subject to the Commission consenting, that the authority may refer the complaint to the IPCC. Paragraph 5(2) Schedule 14 of The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, provides so far as is relevant , the following:

"(2) In Schedule 3 (handling of complaints and conduct matters), in paragraph 4 (reference of complaints to the Commission), after sub-paragraph (7) insert "(8) In a case where (a) (b) a complaint relates to a direction and control matter, and there is no obligation under this paragraph for the appropriate authority to refer the complaint to the Commission, the appropriate authority may refer the complaint to the Commission under this paragraph only if the Commission consents.

Believing council officers there has been no criminal wrongdoing 5. The organisation (against which allegations were made) stating that there has been no criminal wrongdoing appears to have been chiefly relied on as the basis to satisfy the force that the alleged sums being defrauded are legitimate. The ECUs decision not to investigate on this basis is therefore indicative of collusion between Humberside Police and NELC. If the aforesaid is untrue then there must be unimaginable naivety on the part of the ECU if it believes council officers (under enormous pressure to lie) will say anything other than what best protects councils reputation and legal position. 6. Local authorities notoriously deny that their bailiff contractors are unlawfully imposing enforcement fees. This is evident in the way complaints from the public are dealt with, i.e., concluded as unfounded rather than upheld. Councils strive to keep upheld complaints to a minimum as they are required to submit details each year to the Local Government Ombudsman (LGO). Complaints are categorised into the number unfounded/upheld etc., which determines whether the LGO need investigate any failings. Another incentive for councils to pretend there is no malpractice, stems from the pressure existing for the head of department to submit a form 5 complaint about an offending bailiff to the certificating court. 7. For further insight into how councils make a priority of protecting their reputation over the rights of its residents by having what appears to be a policy to lie to the public, see attached: (Response 28 Jan 13 EA20130002). The document provides a case study of the way complaints about bailiff malpractice are dealt with in the case of four local authorities. The appeal aimed to establish why there was such consistency with regards councils lying to the public in these circumstances.

Home Office Circular 47/2004 8. The Home Office Circular 47/2004 has in regards this and a previous complaint been quoted in the context of justifying a decision not to investigate. The PSBs reply (4.2.14) contained text taken verbatim from the publication with no reasonable argument to support why any of the quoted content applied. Rather than providing guidance on where priority should be given by the police, the document is being used in an arbitrary way to justify inaction. Given its primary function is to prioritise cases for the investigation of fraud, rather than suggesting it fell outside recommendations, the nature of the alleged fraud would appear to align with many of those listed under the Priorities:

Frauds involving substantial sums of money. [Note: this would likely run into many millions of pounds if fully investigated]

Frauds having a significant impact on the victim(s). Frauds affecting particularly vulnerable victims (eg the elderly, people with disabilities, businesses providing key services in difficult circumstances) or in distinct communities.

Frauds giving rise to significant public concern (possibly highlighted by a high degree of press interest).

Frauds where law enforcement action could have a material deterrent effect. Frauds which indicate a risk of more substantial / extensive fraud occurring.

R v Ghosh [1982] EWCA Crim 2 9. It was contended in DS Woods email (9.11.13) that to prove fraud had taken place, it was necessary to demonstrate dishonesty beyond reasonable doubt. The court of appeal case (R v Ghosh [1982] EWCA Crim 2) was cited as the judgment defining dishonesty used in criminal prosecutions and was stated, without justification, that it was viewed that the allegation did not meet those requirements. 10. A test to define dishonesty was developed from the Ghosh case requiring (subject to the first) two stages. The first, an objective test, where a jury would be required to decide if an act was one that an ordinary decent person would consider to be dishonest and the second, a subjective test where a jury would need satisfying that the accused must have realised that what he was doing was, by those standards, dishonest. The second test (subjective) is not applied if objective test fails.

The objective test needs to be established first and the subjective test is not applied if the objective test fails. The judgment of the Court that is material to the test is as follows: In determining whether the prosecution has proved that the defendant was acting dishonestly, a jury must first of all decide whether according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people what was done was dishonest. If it was not dishonest by those standards, that is the end of the matter and the prosecution fails. If it was dishonest by those standards, then the jury must consider whether the defendant himself must have realised that what he was doing was by those standards dishonest. In most cases, where the actions are obviously dishonest by ordinary standards, there will be no doubt about it. It will be obvious that the defendant himself knew that he was acting dishonestly. It is dishonest for a defendant to act in a way which he knows ordinary people consider to be dishonest, even if he asserts or genuinely believes that he is morally justified in acting as he did. 11. Clearly a properly informed jury as to the facts of the case would have no difficulty establishing the objective test. Similarly, for the reasons laid out in the letter to DS Wood dated 24.11.13, there can be no doubt that even if councils held genuine beliefs that their actions are morally justified, they must realise that ordinary people would consider them to be dishonest. Evans v South Ribble Borough Council 1992 12. The ECUs belief that no criminal offence was committed based on the Evans v South Ribble case is misconceived for reasons laid out in letter (24.11.13) to DS Wood and in the attached Argument to Ross & Roberts Opinion - Head H. The aforesaid (attachment) contends Counsel Opinion (David Holland QC) sought by bailiff firm, Ross & Roberts to advise them as to the recoverability of certain charges (Head H) under the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992 (the Regulations). The Counsel Opinion is also attached; see Ross & Roberts Opinion - Head H.

13.

The ECUs decision appears based on the fact that because seized goods in the custody of the law can either be left on the debtors premises or removed elsewhere, bailiffs do not have to physically remove items to be entitled to impose a charge under Head H. Unfortunately, the question is not simply about whether goods have been "seized"; it more surrounds Parliaments intention when referring to the provision under head H (regulation 45(4)). Here it

refers clearly to goods which have been removed, because the goods shall be made available for collection by the debtor. Regulation 45(4) states the following: Where an authority has seized goods of the debtor in pursuance of the distress, but before sale of those goods the appropriate amount (including charges arising up to the time of the payment or tender) is paid or tendered to the authority, the authority shall accept the amount, the sale shall not be proceeded with and the goods shall be made available for collection by the debtor. Though there is reference to seized goods, this can not refer to goods which have been left on the debtors premises such as is the case where a walking possession agreement has been entered into. The reference to seized goods can only refer to goods which have been physically removed and can be made available for collection by the debtor.

Fraudulent charges (not addressed) regarding vehicle attendance 14. The matter of head C charges (attendance with a vehicle) has been omitted in all the responses from Humberside Police. For reference to the issues there is attached Argument to Opinion - Head C. Similarly as in the charges under Head H, the aforesaid contends Counsel Opinion (Alastair Tomson QC) which appears to have been sought by a Local Authority to advise them as to the recoverability of Head C charges under the Regulations. Magistrates Court abetting NELC in NNDR/Council Tax summons costs Fraud 15. Several documents were sent to the ECU comprising evidence of residents/charge payers being defrauded by the council (abetted by Grimsby Magistrates Court) by way of Council Tax and Business rates court summons costs. In all responses from Humberside Police none of the issues were addressed.

Home visit by Detective Inspector Welton in 2009

16. It is clear from the PSBs letter (4.2.14) that Humberside Police believe that a visit was made to my home in 2009 where an explanation was given for the reasons why previous allegations were not of a criminal nature. That this would be recorded as fact, when untrue, raises serious concerns about the reliability of procedures involving communications in the force. Naturally the reasons for this happening require investigating.