Bishop: Chapter 10 Key Management: Digital Signature

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Topics
Key e change
! ! ! Session "s interchange #eys Classical "s pu$lic #ey metho%s Key generation Certi&icates Key escro' Key re"ocation

Cryptographic #ey in&rastructure

! ! !

Key storage

Digital signatures
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Digital Signature
Construct that authenticate% origin an% contents o& message in a manner pro"a$le to a %isintereste% thir% party ()*u%ge+, Sen%er cannot %eny ha"ing sent message (ser"ice is )nonrepudiation+,
! -imite% to technical proo&s
.na$ility to %eny one/s cryptographic #ey 'as use% to sign

! 0ne coul% claim the cryptographic #ey 'as stolen or compromise%

-egal proo&s1 etc., pro$a$ly re2uire%3 not %ealt 'ith here

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Common 5rror
Classical: 6lice1 Bo$ share #ey k
! 6lice sen%s m 77 8 m 9k to Bo$

This is a %igital signature: (;, WRONG!! This is not a digital signature.

! <hy; Thir% party cannot %etermine 'hether 6lice or Bo$ generate% the message:
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Classical Digital Signatures

=e2uire truste% thir% party
! 6lice1 Bo$ each share #eys 'ith truste% party Cathy

To resol"e %ispute1 *u%ge gets 8 m 9kAlice1 8 m 9kBob1 an% has Cathy %ecipher them3 i& messages matche%1 contract 'as signe%: >uestion: 0ther'ise1 'ho ha% cheate%; 6lice Bo$ Cathy 8 m 9kAlice 8 m 9kAlice 8 m 9kBob csci5233 Computer Security5 Bo$ Cathy Bo$

@u$lic Key Digital Signatures

6lice/s #eys are dAlice1 eAlice 6lice sen%s Bo$
m 77 8 m 9dAlice

.n case o& %ispute1 *u%ge computes

8 8 m 9dAlice 9eAlice

an% i& it is m1 6lice signe% message

! She/s the only one 'ho #no's dAliceA
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=S6 Digital Signatures

Cse pri"ate #ey to encipher message
! @rotocol &or use is critical

Key points:
! De"er sign ran%om %ocuments1 an% 'hen signing1 al'ays sign hash an% ne"er %ocument
Mathematical properties can $e turne% against signer

! Sign message &irst1 then encipher

Changing pu$lic #eys causes &orgery csci5233 Computer SecurityB

6ttac# F1
5 ample: 6lice1 Bo$ communicating
! nA G H51 eA G 5H1 dA G 11 ! nB G BB1 eB G 531 dB G 1B

2? contracts1 num$ere% 00 to 25
! 6lice has Bo$ sign 05 an% 1B:
c G mdB mo% nB G 051B mo% BB G 3 c G mdB mo% nB G 1B1B mo% BB G 1H

! 6lice computes 051B mo% BB G 0E3 correspon%ing signature is 031H mo% BB G 5B3 claims Bo$ signe% 0E ! Iu%ge computes ceB mo% nB G 5B53 mo% BB G 0E
Signature "ali%ate%3 Bo$ is toast

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6ttac# F2: Bo$/s =e"enge

Bo$1 6lice agree to sign contract 0? 6lice enciphers1 then signs:
(me mo% BB,d mo% nA G (0?53 mo% BB,11 mo% H5 G ?3
B A

Bo$ no' changes his pu$lic #ey

! Computes r such that 13r mo% BB G ?3 say1 r G 5H ! Computes r eB mo% (nB, G 5H53 mo% ?0 G B ! =eplace pu$lic #ey eB 'ith B1 pri"ate #ey dB G 43

Bo$ claims contract 'as 13: Iu%ge computes:

! (?35H mo% H5,43 mo% BB G 13 ! Jeri&ie%3 no' 6lice is toast csci5233 Computer SecurityH

5l Kamal Digital Signature

=elies on %iscrete log pro$lem Choose p prime1 g1 d L p3 compute y G gd mo% p @u$lic #ey: (y1 g1 p,3 pri"ate #ey: d To sign contract m:
! Choose k relati"ely prime to p!11 an% not yet use% (Note: 0 < k < p-1) ! Compute a G gk mo% p ! Min% b such that m G (da N kb, mo% p!1 ! Signature is (a1 b,

To "ali%ate1 chec# that

! yaab mo% p G gm mo% p csci5233 Computer Security10

5 ample
6lice chooses p G 2H1 g G 31 d G ?
y G 3? mo% 2H G 4

6lice 'ants to sen% Bo$ signe% contract 23

! ! ! ! Chooses k G 5 (relati"ely prime to 2E an% 0L#L2E, This gi"es a G gk mo% p G 35 mo% 2H G 11 Then sol"ing 23 G (?11 N 5b, mo% 2E gi"es b G 25 6lice sen%s message 23 an% signature (111 25,

Bo$ "eri&ies signature: gm mo% p G 323 mo% 2H G E an% yaab mo% p G 4111125 mo% 2H G E
! They match1 so 6lice signe% csci5233 Computer Security11

6ttac#
5"e learns k1 correspon%ing message m1 an% signature (a1 b,
! Extended Euclidean Algorithm gi"es d1 the pri"ate #ey

5 ample &rom a$o"e: 5"e learne% 6lice signe% last message 'ith k G 5
m G (da N kb, mo% p!1 G (11d N 525, mo% 2E so 6lice/s pri"ate #ey is d G ?
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Key @oints o& Ch: 10 (Bishop,

Key management critical to e&&ecti"e use o& cryptosystems
! Di&&erent le"els o& #eys (session vs: interchange,

Keys nee% infrastructure to i%enti&y hol%ers1 allo' re"o#ing

! Digital certi&icates ! Key escro'ing complicates in&rastructure

Digital signatures pro"i%e integrity o& origin an% content

Much easier 'ith pu$lic #ey cryptosystems than 'ith classical cryptosystems csci5233 Computer Security13

De t

Bishop1 Chapter 11: Cipher techni2ues

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