Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
In Eva Marsal, Takara Dobashi, Barbara Weber, & Felix G. Lund (Eds.),
Ethis che Reflexionskompetenz im Grundschulalter. Konzepte des
Philosophierens mit Kindern. Hodos: Peter-Lang Verlag, 2007.
disregard for the other, there is criminality, corruption, and cheating both on a
small and a large scale, there are various endemic forms of fascism and
hoodlumism, both on the cultural and on the institutional level; and there are
myriad forms of heroism, loyalty, altruism, honest-dealing, and fundamental good
will toward the other. Looked at from this angle, the distinctions the two sets of
criteria represent don’t seem to do much good either.
Not much good unless one is thinking in terms of any given ethical system
and its relation to education. By the former I mean a normative system—a set of
ideals for both behavior and for personal dispositions (and thereby by implication a
form of subjectivity, or a characteristic way of living with the superego), which
mark out the limits and the possibilities for both individual and collective life. And
by the latter I mean, not necessarily formal education, but ethoi--practices or
customs of adults relating to children, and different adult-constructed and
maintained environments in which children find themselves, which are the basic
cultural forms that ground formal educational structures like schools.
Schooling, Neoteny, and Modal Subjectivity
The two main environments we associate with children are the home and the
school. Unlike the home, the school is the place where the forms of life of a
culture—including the ethical—are open to collaborative reconstruction. The
school, we might say, is at least potentially a collective laboratory for cultural
evolution. The human is the species marked by cultural evolution because of its
big brain and, concomitantly, because of neoteny, which means, not just the long
period of dependency (neo-tenein, extended youth) that is necessary for the big
brain to mature, but the permanent characteristics of childhood (“paedomorphism”)
that mark the species, most importantly, the brain’s lifelong capacity for growth
and change—that is, the ability to learn and reconstruct throughout the life cycle.
SCHOOLING, SUBJECTIVITY, ETHICAL RECONSTRUCTION, AND COMMUNAL PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY WITH CHILDREN 4
not we them. Even those who think they are manipulating them are simply
fulfilling their own inherent goals.
The powerlessness—indeed, the abjectness—of the traditional school as a
site for the reconstruction of modal subjectivity is dramatically borne out by the
history of universal compulsory education. The national system of Napoleonic
France in the first years of the 19th century set an enduring example of schooling in
the interests of the nation-state which, although it may seem extreme to us today,
in fact lays down principles that still underlie, if not always the institutional
mechanics, then the culture of public compulsory schooling. Schooling in the
modern Western nation state is inherently dedicated to the reproduction of class, of
relations of power between classes, of economic systems, of social relations, and of
cosmology or world view. Simply put, the school is a machine run by the state for
the reproduction of the docile consumer, worker, and “citizen,” in that order.
This is not to say that there is no counter-tradition, or that there are not
countless schools—public compulsory ones included—and countless teachers and
administrators who feel the impulse to imagine the school differently, to
understand it as “collective laboratory for cultural evolution,” a site for the
reconstruction of subjectivity, for fulfilling the promise of neoteny. And the origins
of all these impulses can be found, not so much in an interest in “betterment,” or
“progress,” or “efficiency,” or even “humanization,” but in the human possibilities
that a transformed adult-child relation offers.
The Adult-Child Relation and the Dialogical Self
The transformed adult-child relation has its origins in a new adult
construction of childhood, and therefore of any particular child, which in turn is
based on a reconstructed notion of adulthood, of subjectivity as an ongoing project.
Most specifically, it has its origins in the understanding of the child as interlocutor
rather than wild body to tamed, creature to be domesticated, or even client to be
SCHOOLING, SUBJECTIVITY, ETHICAL RECONSTRUCTION, AND COMMUNAL PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY WITH CHILDREN 7
ongoing. And the school is the natural site—even, we may say, more natural than
the home, since here “blood” is not involved, and therefore my relationship with
the child is more emblematic of the culture and the species as a whole—for this
double interlocution.
Community of Philosophical Inquiry and Ethical Reconstruction
The nation-state and the culture it represents have, in general, made an
everyday dystopia of school—where, as Rilke’s autobiographical child testified,
“Time . . . drags along with so much worry,/and waiting, things so dumb and
stupid./ Oh loneliness, oh heavy lumpish time.”5 Nevertheless, a school in which
the neotenic relation between habit and impulse is the fulcrum of practice, in which
adults are existentially engaged with children, with themselves and with each other
—what Dewey called an “embryonic society”—may be the only systematic
promise of the large-scale social and ethical reconstruction that at this particular
moment in the history of the species and the planet appears to have become a
matter of survival. And if one could think of a centerpiece of pedagogy and
curriculum for such an adult-child collective—a fundamental ur-discourse—it
would be one in which children and adults are provided a means for ongoing
collaborative reflection on the deep assumptions that ground their own knowledge.
In the realm of the ethical, these assumptions gather in a
conceptual/affective/narrative matrix, some of whose themes are fairness, equality,
right and wrong, good and bad, evil, justice, forgiveness, responsibility, self and
other. In fact it tends to be the case generally that collaborative reflection on any
philosophical concept, if pursued far enough, takes an ethical turn, for the question
“how then shall we live?” inevitably presents itself. Nor can any authentic ethical
reflection in the classroom avoid finding its way into the everyday life of the
classroom, which is a realm of ethical action just like any other dyad or group.
Inherent in the idea of dialogical ethical inquiry is the interhuman reconstruction of
SCHOOLING, SUBJECTIVITY, ETHICAL RECONSTRUCTION, AND COMMUNAL PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY WITH CHILDREN 9
relationships of power and responsibility, and thus any school that undertakes such
inquiry is implicitly committed to the ongoing reconstruction of authentic
democratic practices. The child-adult collective imagined here is also, then, an
experiment in “real” democracy—which means, not some form already arrived at
and institutionalized, but democracy as we wish, or hope, or believe it possible to
be; for democracy as an emergent political form.
This ur-discourse—which I will call “community of philosophical inquiry,”
represents, not only the liberation of a space for children’s voice, but what follows
from the opening of a marginalized voice in general: the emergence of the
“privileged stranger.”6 The voice of the privileged stranger in any culture—
whether woman, racial other, cultural other (e.g. “Arab” or “aboriginal”) or queer,
is the voice that through its very speaking names something about the “native”
culture that natives do not see because of their level of vested interest in it. I
would go even further and suggest that it represents—particularly in the case of
woman, child and queer—an element of subjectivity that is repressed in the native
—that has been silenced. The native has not heard the voice, but it is within him.
When the stranger is privileged—i.e. listened to, taken seriously in spite of the fact
that she speaks differently—it suggests what in psychoanalytic parlance is referred
to as the “withdrawal of the projection.” That is, the adult struggles to no longer
use the other as a screen on which to see the material that is in fact within himself.
The adult comes to “own” his material, and is individuated thereby, but through
alterity. It represents the “rupture of the egoist-I,” the decentering or “dethroning”
of the ego, and the recognition, critical for ethics, that, as Levinas has taught us,
the other is there even before oneself.
“Community of inquiry” as a term of use applies, not just to an ethical
community of inquiry, but rather to any community dedicated to a particular
inquiry. The academic disciplines of the school—language and literature, music
SCHOOLING, SUBJECTIVITY, ETHICAL RECONSTRUCTION, AND COMMUNAL PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY WITH CHILDREN
10
fact controls and limits the possibilities of neoteny—in order, in the larger picture,
to protect and maintain the elites that control it. Cultural evolution is not
immediately profitable or convenient for the elites. The primary condition for
suppressing and containing the possibilities of neoteny in the schools is the
suppression and containment of the very person for whom the school should be
designed—the child. Until the child becomes more active in her own education,
until she is understood to have something interesting to say, until the adult
recognizes the voice of the child, until the adult privileges the voice of the child,
we cannot expect a program in ethics to do anything but reproduce the same sort of
dysfunctional or undeveloped relations between the two binary pairs that the
private-public divide produces in the larger world. Until the adult finds the child’s
relation between impulse and habit interesting in terms of its possibilities for the
dialectical emergence of a reconstructed form of modal subjectivity—that is, until
the adult sees its neotenic possibilities—the school will remain a cultural dead
weight.
But in fact there is no more appropriate institution for the reconstruction of
relations between the binaries than the adult-child collective called “school.” Its
inherent identity as an intentional community or “embryonic society”; its
intrinsically neotenic character, and thereby its suffusion with Arendtian natality;
its location as the site of intergenerational dialogue and the transmission and
reconstruction of cultural tradition: these characteristics mark it as an evolutionary
crossroads. And that which expresses it quintessentially, and acts as the meeting
place for all its reconstructive tendencies, is systematic communal ethical inquiry.
ENDNOTES
1
Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process and State Formation and Civilization, trans.
Edmund Jephcott (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994 [1939]); Phillipe Aries, Centuries of
Childhood: A Social History of Family Life, trans. Robert Baldick (New York: Knopf,
1962); and Johann Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages: A Study of the Forms of
Life, Thought, and Art in France and the Netherlands in the 14th & 15th Centuries
(New York: Anchor Books, 1969).
22
The first: “Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it
would become a universal law.” The second: “So act to treat humanity, whether in your
own person or in that of an other, in every case as an end and never merely a means
only.” The third: “The will is . . . subject to the law in such a way that it must be
regarded also as legislating for itself and only on this account as being subject to the law
(of which it can regard itself as author).” From Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the
Metaphysics of Morals (1785), selected in L.P. Pojman, ed., Moral Philosophy: A
Reader, 3rd Edition, pp. 194-213 passim (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2003)
3
3. The term is Emmanuel Levinas’ translator’s, Richard A. Cohen, from his
“Introduction” to Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen, p. 17 (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1987).
4
See John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1988 [1922]).
5
“Childhood,” from Rainier Maria Rilke, Selected Poems, trans. Robert Bly (Harper
and Row, 1981).
6
The formulation is Sandra G. Harding’s, in her Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?
Thinking from Women’s Lives (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).
7
See John Dewey, “The Child and the Curriculum,” in M.S. Dworkin, ed., Dewey on
Education: Selections (New York: Teachers College Press, 1959 [1902]).