Managing Covert Human Intelligence Sources: Lessons for Police Commanders

Dr Charl Crous, Divisional Superintendent, State Intelligence, Western Australia Police

Abstract
The development of formal Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) management has occurred over the last decade in many policing organisations world wide as part of the greater emphasis on Intelligence Led Policing. The use of confidential informants is referred to in contemporary policing as the management of CHIS. The relationship between police and those in the criminal world is however fraught with risk as this relationship is prone to unethical conduct or even corruption. The development of formal CHIS management includes the formulation of new policies and directives governing the relationship between police and informants to mitigate the risk of unethical behaviour. However the richness of CHIS information is invaluable for policing. Analysis of six months worth of data from the Auckland Metro Crime and Operations Support (AMCOS) CHIS programme indicates that CHIS information predominantly relates to organised crime activity, illicit firearms and the illicit drug environment. The complexity associated with management of this type of information poses a significant risk for policing, regardless of the governing process initiated. Research in the United Kingdom (UK) and case studies in both Northern Ireland and Queensland indicate that irrespective of policy development and governance structures, police handlers will defy process if continuous training at all levels in the organisation, coupled with some level of intrusive supervision is not occurring. A review of these international examples provides some valuable indicators for police managers in terms of risk mitigation.

international inquiries were examined as part of the research. The first is the Northern Ireland Ombudsman (2007) investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Raymond McCord Jnr and the second is the Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission (QCMC) investigation (2009) into allegations of police misconduct with regards to the management of informants Operation Capri. In both these investigations, supervisors, managers, and handling staff deviated from what is accepted CHIS management practice.

International Experiences
Several international police forces have experienced problems with informant handling in the past thirty years (Wood, 1997; Fitzgerald, 1989; Kennedy, 2004; Mollen, 1994; Morris, 2004). As a result, many regulations, policies, and procedures have been promulgated in various police organisations, each aiming to reduce risk and improve efficiency (An Garda Siochana, 2004; NSW Police, 2004; South Australia Police, 2005; Queensland Police, 2000; New Zealand Police, 2009). These regulations and policies have included manuals of best practice, ethical codes, and management restructures (Innes, 2000; Crous, 2009). The two main areas of concern in CHIS management are (1) legal and ethical elements of the direct handler-CHIS relationship, and (2) issues relating to the nature of the information provided by CHIS. Together, these present potential pitfalls both for individual staff and for the organisation as a whole. In reviewing the Northern Ireland and Queensland investigations it is evident that in both Northern Ireland and Queensland, the presence of policies, procedural directives, and formal ethical codes did not prevent harmful CHIS management practices. Reports into these occurrences indicate that, in broad terms, process deviance in relation to informants occurs when there is an absence of: Training and education emphasising ethical decision-making; Intrusive management and supervisory practice by those overseeing operational handlers; Regular, transparent auditing and performance reviews

Background
Recently, the management of informants has become an increasingly mainstream element of policing in many countries including New Zealand (Innes, 2000; Crous, 2009). New national policies and practice manuals have been developed. Several districts and areas are implementing initiatives of varying comprehensiveness relating to the management and utilisation of CHIS. This increasing use of CHIS demands a closer look at the risks surrounding this technique and how to mitigate these risks. AMCOS is an inter-district policing entity in metro Auckland responsible for specialist investigation and delivering of specialist policing support, for example Covert Human Source Management. It initiated a research project to analyse the nature of CHIS information and the risk the complexity of such information holds for police. The research project had two main elements: (1) an analysis of the nature of CHIS information collected and managed by the AMCOS Human Source Management unit (HSMU) and (2) an examination of overseas literature related to informant management. The purpose of (1) was to identify the complexity, or lack thereof, of informant-derived information, and from this extrapolate information-specific risk factors. The purpose of (2) was to identify other risk factors and potentially learn from the mistakes of others. An examination of the international literature clearly indicated that, regardless of the presence of sound policy and good processes in formal documentation, the character of the law enforcement-CHIS relationship potentially leads to process defiance by those involved in the direct management of sources.1 Process deviance is the deliberate or unconscious deviation by personnel from accepted guidelines. Two
Page 12

OPERATION CAPRI The Queensland Crime and Misconduct Inquiry 2009

During March 2001, the Queensland Police State Informant Management System (SIMS Policy) came into effect. The policy had explicit instructions on how to manage informants and how to remunerate them. However, regardless of the promulgation of the policy and related directives, there were constant rumours of unethical informant management by informant handlers. The QCMC subsequently initiated an investigation (Operation CAPRI) into misconduct by Queensland police staff who were informant handlers. The report on Operation Capri coincidentally coincided with the 20th anniversary of the Fitzegerald inquiry into misconduct in Queensland police another inquiry which also dealt with the relationship between police and informants (Fitzgerald, 1989). Operation Capri covered multiple misconduct incidents of informant handlers of the Queensland Police between 2006 and 2008.
Australasian Policing A Journal of Professional Practice and Research

Managing Covert Human Intelligence Sources: Lessons for Police Commanders

Some of these incidents related to police officers assisting a confidential informant in obtaining confidential information, informant access to police resources for their own use, organising temporary release from prison for confidential informants and the financial assistance received by informants, as well as police officers receiving financial benefits from their relationship with the informants. In their investigation the QCMC found: most of the misconduct by informant handlers occurred in an environment in which supervision was wanting; that the forming and conducting of inappropriate relationships with informers was as a result of the lack of direct supervision; the Queensland police handlers in this scenario failed to manage experienced criminals who were registered as informers - instead, the informers manipulated the handlers; handlers failed to protect and manage confidential police information with appropriate sensitivity when engaging with confidential informants; that in the scenario under investigation, handlers failed to keep proper records of all informant contact; that generally detectives in the unit under investigation formed relationship with informants that went beyond the bounds of professional association. The QCMC asserted in its report that the QPS had the SIMS at its disposal and had the policy been followed, the risk of improper association would not have been realised. The QCMC also found that individual officers were at fault, and should be held accountable, but emphasised that the greater damage was done when senior officers and supervisors condoned, or even encouraged non-compliance with regulatory directives. The non-compliance by superiors was emphasised in the QCMC report as a major contributing factor to misconduct by CHIS handlers. In conclusion, the QCMC emphasised that the problems exposed by Operation Capri were not the result of an absence of legislation, policy, or procedural guidelines, but rather non-compliance by those in authority positions which equates to process deviance.

Northern Ireland Police dispute a number of the allegations claiming there is insufficient evidence. However, the Northern Ireland Ombudsman (NIO) commented in his report that although individual officers were at fault, the accountability lay primarily with senior police officers who should have overseen the process by intrusive supervision. The NIO further asserted that although senior officers were well aware of various statutory and policy requirements already available in the UK, they showed a disregard for not only policy, but also for the law. A key solution proposed by the NIO was to institute a system of operational risk advisors specialists providing consistent advice on sensitive and covert policing practice to ensure that all police-CHIS relationships complied with regulatory directives.

Distilling Key Elements from the Queensland and Northern Ireland Experiences
Several specific elements can be extrapolated from the two reports: inconsistency in terms of recruitment practices, handling and tasking of CHIS; lack of formal review of informant behaviour, source productivity and/or the handling and management regime of sources; inadequate review of the involvement of sources in criminal offending; non-compliance with policy and practice due to a lack of supervision by senior police officers; inadequate training for CHIS handlers; ineffective dissemination of information; inadequate record keeping In both of the police agencies in question, policies and procedures governing the relationship between police and sources were promulgated. However, in both jurisdictions, insufficient supervision and insufficient supervisory training were identified as the main causes for process deviance occurring. These were the enablers of the specific problematic elements identified above. As CHIS practices become more common, and decentralised to operational commands, with local police commands showing an increasing willingness to use CHIS in their daily business, there is a major risk that management procedures will not keep pace with demand. The ultimate risk emerging is process deviance which could adversely impact on the credibility of an effective policing technique.

The McCord Report The Northern Ireland Ombudsman Inquiry 2007

In 1997, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) adopted rules for the management and use of informants that were modelled on directives produced by the UK Association of Chief Police Officers as far back as 1995. Police-informant relationships were also directed by legislation in the UK in the form of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000. However, as in Queensland, the presence of directives did not prevent process deviance. The situation in Northern Ireland was highly complex. Northern Ireland Police staff would acknowledge there were issues around practice and procedure but would refute allegations of unethical practice. However, in its inquiry, the Northern Ireland Ombudsman alleged that that the actions of police staff included: failure to arrest informants committing crime, because handlers and their supervisors protected participant informants; concealment of information and therefore a failure to disseminate intelligence obtained from sources; a failure to consider and formally review offending patterns of informants; insufficient record keeping and falsifying records; a failure to train handlers, supervisors and senior officials, especially in terms of the regulatory directives and policies that were available; insufficient intrusive management by supervisors and senior officers of the process.
Australasian Policing A Journal of Professional Practice and Research

The Nature of Chis Information in Auckland: The Complexity vs. Risk

By analysing the type of information provided by CHIS, including the complexity and nature of the criminality referred to, useful indications of the likelihood of ethical problems and process deviance can be extrapolated. Six months worth of AMCOS CHIS data from across police districts in Metro Auckland were analysed and subjected to thematic analysis. The majority of CHIS reports administrated by AMCOS related to illicit drugs. Fifty percent of CHIS reports related to low-level crime, generally termed Level 1 criminality. Within the set of Level 1 reports, the majority of CHIS reports were drug-related. One third of all CHIS reports related to the highest level of criminality - serious and organised crime (known as Level 3). The remainder of the CHIS reports referred to cross-district, geographically-dispersed criminality (known as Level 2). The Level 3 reports administrated by AMCOS HSMU described a range of complex scenarios that demanded the highest level of ethical and security awareness from CHIS handlers.
Page 13

Managing Covert Human Intelligence Sources: Lessons for Police Commanders

These included: internal power struggles in organised crime groups; availability and use of firearms in Auckland; nexus between organised gang activity and volume crime (for example, stolen motor vehicles), dealing in stolen property, receivers of stolen and genial modus operandi of criminal principals (for example, people using a stolen vehicle to commit crime); the extent of illicit drug manufacturing; the modus operandi of illicit drug operations initiated by organised entities; specific information about drug manufacturing; general information about the illicit drugs market. Such information, by its very nature, is risky. Failure to correctly manage this type of information can not only lead to direct harms such as injury, death, or the failure of operations but also major harms to reputation, both to individual police officers and to the organisation as a whole. Some of the information was provided by sources at a very high level within the criminal underworld, sources who are in a position to be undertaking serious and organised crime with or without the knowledge of their handlers. These sources describe in their reports for example, offending related to illicit drug importations and armed robberies leading to questions about their involvement in such activities. In essence, reports dealing with Level 3 (and potentially Level 2) criminality have serious implications beyond the incidents described, implications that relate to the relationship between handlers and sources. There is a serious risk that unless handlers are experienced, closely managed, and well supervised, that they will potentially engage in, or at minimum facilitate unethical or even illegal behaviour. This is a risk that is directly aggravated by the prospect that inexperienced staff at area command and district command level, will engage directly with CHIS involved in Level 2 and Level 3 criminality. Staff at these command levels will mostly be performing source handling as an additional element to their normal policing duties. Given the nature of CHIS information in Auckland, it is apparent that the risk of misconduct or process deviance by CHIS handlers is something that should not be underestimated. This is a risk that is aggravated by an overly decentralised approach and the sensitive and complexity of information obtained through CHIS management. Police handlers involved in CHIS handling and management can more easily engage in process deviance if they are not closely supervised as the complexity of relationships with those deemed to be experienced criminals is fraught with risk.

professional CHIS practice in which significant investment, auditing and performance review are needed, can be identified: recruitment and cultivation; operational management of sources; intelligence management relating to source reports; capability and capacity development for administrative and supervisory functions. Generic activities associated with recruitment and cultivation include the profiling of sources, risk assessment associated with the potential relationship between the source and police and supervision of the recruitment and the registration process. Operational management of sources encompasses managing and maintaining the relationship between police and the source, the supervision of the interactions between handlers and sources, and any operational decision-making flowing from source reports (Hanvey, 2000; Madinger, 2000). The management of intelligence relating to CHIS, encompass secure management and storage of information, and the assessment and analysis of such information. The integration of source information reports into the formal intelligence process is, for example, a key area that is resource intensive. The dissemination of analysed products is another key output required from a professional CHIS framework. Administrative and general supervisory requirements include the processes of registering, monitoring and remunerating sources. Formal source management systems require administration in terms of central registers, profiling sources and managing the completed intelligence product. The continuous supervision of an ongoing relationship between police handlers and sources include regular audits and inspections by senior managers - in addition to the more main-stream auditing and performance reviews. Internal auditing includes supervisors physically meeting with registered sources. The provision of training to staff involved in the process of source handling and management is a specific requirement for professional source management. Training includes, educating handlers and supervisors at lower levels in the organisation about CHIS practices, especially procedures applicable to operational deployment based on CHIS information received for example, executing search warrants. Other training issues include operational security and general trade craft. There are a number of specific recommendations that can be extrapolated from this: continuous training of first and foremost supervisors and senior police officers; the need for instituting formal auditing by persons independent from the process of CHIS management; consider organisational structure in terms of devolvement of the authority to deal with sources therefore the level of national coordination and regional management of the CHIS programme which should include consideration of the viability to devolve CHIS management and oversight to local police jurisdictions; consider a performance assessment framework of the CHIS programme which needs to be integrated at some level with the formal organisational performance measurement framework; continuous emphasis on ethical decision making in the process of CHIS handling; investment in terms of developing adequate support structures in order to ensure control and adequate supervision as well as sound intelligence processes that will enhance the credibility of the CHIS management framework.
Australasian Policing A Journal of Professional Practice and Research

The Solution: Risk Mitigation Through Oversight

The newly devised suite of regulatory directives governing CHIS management in the New Zealand Police is one of the most contemporary. The design and implementation of the New Zealand CHIS programme follows extensive international consultation and research to ensure minimum risk of process deviance. However, from international examples like the Northern Ireland and QCMC reviews, it can be seen that ensuring compliance with extant policy guidelines is the biggest challenge police face with CHIS management. It is evident from the two international examples reviewed, that even with formal written documentation, process deviance will occur. For successful implementation of the new CHIS policy, the NZ Police will have to continuously reflect on what the implications of formal CHIS management structures are. A formal CHIS management framework will have an impact on organisational structures, accountability arrangements and resource investment. Four specific areas of
Page 14

Managing Covert Human Intelligence Sources: Lessons for Police Commanders

Conclusion
The character of CHIS-derived information, as well as the nature of the relationship between an informant and his/her handler, poses a major risk for police staff and the organisation as a whole. CHIS management is not a simple or easy area of policing. While the NZ Police CHIS programme is one of the most contemporary, international experience indicate that that the newly designed system with all its checks and balances may not be enough. Only highly trained and experienced staff, co-ordinated at the regional and national levels, should actively manage CHIS. To avoid process deviance deviance from accepted guidelines several steps should be implemented. These relate to training, close management arrangements, and constant supervision, as well as regular auditing. Merely promulgating a policy is a recipe for problems what is now required is close attention to implementation. The end result will be worth the effort, as CHIS information is a veritable goldmine of crime-related information that cannot be gained elsewhere.

End Note
1. Billingsley (2004) conducted research amongst both handlers and covert sources in a UK police force and found that the level of process deviance is unacceptably high. Bellingsley found that most procedural breaches were related to authorised meetings with informers. Bellingley also found that 38% of those informants he surveyed had been assisted by their handlers in dealing with personal problems. Bellingsley furthermore found that irrespective of various policies and procedural arrangements, a number of informants (35% of the sample) had been involved, or were allowed to continue their criminal offending.

References
An Garda Siochana, (2004). Code of practice for Garda personnel involved in the management and use of covert human intelligence sources, An Garda Siochana, Ireland. Billinsgley, R. (2004). Process deviance and the use of informers: the solution. Public Research and Management, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 6787. Crous, C.J. ( 2009). Human Intelligence Sources: Challenges in Policy Development. Security Challenges, Vol 5, no 3 pp 117-127. Fitzgerald, G. (1989). Report of the Commission of Inquiry pursuant to orders in Council. Queensland State Government. Hanvey, P. (1995). Identifying, recruitment and handling of informants. The Home Office. Police Research Group. Home Office London. Innes, M. (2000). Professionalizing the role of the police informant: the British experience, Policing and Society, vol. 9, 2000, pp. 357383. Kennedy, G.A. (2004). Royal Commission into whether there has been corrupt or criminal conduct by any Western Australian Police Officer. Final Report Government of the State of Western Australia, Perth. Madinger, J. (2000). Confidential Informant: Law Enforcements most valuable Tool. CRC Press. Mollen, M. (1994). Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the AntiCorruption Procedures of the Police Department: Commission Report, City of New York, New York, NY. Morris, F.R. (2004). Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into certain Gardia in the Donegal Division. Government of Ireland. New South Wales Police, (2004). NSW Police informant management, NSW Informant Management and Intelligence Center, Sydney. New Zealand Police (2009). Policy on Covert Human intelligence Sources. PNHQ. Wellington. Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, (2007). Investigative report into the circumstances surrounding the death of Raymond McCord Jnr. Available on line at www.policeombudsman. org. Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission, (2009). Dangerous Liaisons: A report arising from a CMC investigation into allegations of police misconduct (Operation Capri). Available on line at www.cmc.qld.gov.au. Queensland Police, (2000). Draft Policy and Procedures state informant management system (SIMS). Queensland Police. South Australia Police (2005). Human source management: General Order, State Intelligence Branch. Adelaide. Wood, J.R.T. (1997). Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service, Final report, vol. 2, Government of the State of NSW, Sydney.

Australasian Policing A Journal of Professional Practice and Research

Page 15