The Question of "Eclecticism" Studies in Later Greek Philosophy Edited by John M. illon and !. !. Lon" #$%&E'S%T( )* +!L%*)'$%!

P'ESS ,erkeley - Los !n"eles - ).ford / 0122 The 'e"ents of the #ni3ersity of +alifornia

Preface

Preface %n the period 45 ,.+. 6!. . 7558 Greek philosophers belon"ed to an intellectual tradition that had persisted for fi3e or si. hundred years. They 9ere more distant from their %onian ori"ins than 9e are today from the 'eformation and the +opernican 'e3olution. :o9 did they8 and their interpreters ;such as the 'oman +icero<8 re"ard that tradition and the schools to 9hich they claimed alle"iance= >hat contribution did philosophy make at that time to reli"ious thou"ht8 to scientific methodolo"y8 or to the emer"ence of certain concepts 9e no9 take for "ranted= %n 9hat perspecti3es8 3ie9in" the period in "eneral8 should 9e re"ard the si"nificance of Plato?s philosophy8 !ristotle8 Stoicism8 and Skepticism= These are some of the "eneral @uestions addressed in the chapters of this book. The period that it co3ers is stron"ly in need of ree.amination. %t has tended to fall outside standard di3isions of the history of philosophy8 9hile its principal fi"ures ha3e "enerally been do9n"raded as "eclectics8" indiscriminate assemblers of other thinkers? doctrines. The purpose of this book is re3ision and reassessment of this unhelpful notion8 a "oal it pursues by means of detailed ease studies of some of the most interestin" philosophers and concepts at 9ork in the period. The book be"an its life as a collo@uium on later Greek philosophy held in ublin8 at Trinity +olle"e8 as part of the @uin6 A 3iii A @uennial meetin" of the Ei"hth %nternational +lassical +on"ress ;*.%.E.+.< in !u"ust 012B. The collo@uium 9as or"aniCed for *.%.E.+. by !nthony Lon"8 9ho in3ited the participants to consider the theme of so6called eclecticism in the period from +icero to about !. . 755. Each chapter of the book 9as 9ritten as an ori"inal paper read to the collo@uium8 9hose participants also included *rederick ,renk8 >alter +halmers8 Joachim +lassen8 John +learyD Geor"e Eerferd8 %an Eidd8 Mirosla3 Marco3ich8 Paul Morau.8 'eimer MFller8 !nn Sheppard8 'ichard SorabGi8 Gisela Striker8 Gre"ory &lastos8 and !braham >asserstein. They and others ha3e helped to shape the form the book has taken. The editors are particularly "rateful to oris Eretschmer of the #ni3ersity of +alifornia Press for her interest and ad3ice at all sta"es of its production8 and to the John Simon Gu""enheim Memorial *oundation for the a9ard of a *ello9ship to !.!. Lon"8 9hich facilitated the final sta"es of the editorial process. They also e.press their thanks to Thomas +hance and Jeff Purinton8 9ho "a3e 3aluable research assistance. Technical details8 9hich any 9ork of ancient philosophical interpretation re@uires8 ha3e been lar"ely confined to footnotes. The main ar"uments of each chapter8 9here they depend on philolo"y8 are de3eloped throu"h translation of the Greek and Latin ori"inals. Greek 9ords8 9hich are transliterated in the main te.t8 are also e.plained in the %nde. of

Greek and Latin Philosophical Terms. Thus the book is desi"ned to appeal to as 9ide an audience as possible. HJ.M. .8 !.!.L. A i. A Preface

$otes on contributors

$otes on contributors Jac@ues ,rundsch9i" is Professor of the :istory of !ncient Philosophy at the #ni3ersity of Pads I6$anterre. :is publications include the ,udJ edition of !ristotle8 Topics 8 3ols. 06B ;01KL<8 and articles on Plato8 !ristotle8 and :ellenistic philosophy. :e is also editor of Les Stoiciens et leur lo"i@ue ;01L2<8 and co6editor of oubt and o"matism ;0125< and Science and Speculation ;0127<. John M. illon is 'e"ius Professor of Greek at Trinity +olle"e8 ublin. :is books include %amblichi fra"menta ;01LM <8 The Middle Platonists ;01LL<8 ! +lassical Le.icon for *inne"an?s >ake 8 9ith ,. )?:ehir ;01LL<8 T9o Treatises of Philo of !le.andria 8 9ith a3id >inston ;012M<8 and Proclus on the Parmenides of Plato 8 9ith Glenn Morro9 ;012L<. Pierlui"i onini is Professor of !ncient Philosophy at the #ni3ersity of Turin. :is publications on later Greek philosophy include Tre studi sull?aristotelismo nel %% secolo d.c . ;01LM<8 Le scuole l?anima l?imperoN la filosofia antica da !ntioco a Plotino ;0127<8 and studies on the problem of determinism. John Glucker is Professor of +lassical Philolo"y and Philosophy in Tel6!3i3 #ni3ersity8 %srael. :e is the author of !ntiochus A.A and the Late !cademy ;01L2<8 articles on Greek and Latin literature8 ancient philosophy8 and the methods and history of +lassical philolo"yD he has also 9ritten t9o books on the Presocratics and Plato in :ebre9. +harles :. Eahn is Professor of Philosophy at the #ni3ersity of Pennsyl3ania. :is books include !na.imander and the )ri"ins of Greek +osmolo"y ;01K5<8 The &erb ",e" in !ncient Greek ;01LM<8 and The !rt and Thou"ht of :eraclitus ;01L1<8 and he is currently at 9ork on a book on Plato and the Socratic dialo"ue. !. !. Lon" is Professor of +lassics at the #ni3ersity of +alifornia8 ,erkeley. :is books include Lan"ua"e and Thou"ht in Sophocles ;01K2<8 :ellenistic Philosophy ;01LBD 7d ed. 012K<8 and The :ellenistic Philosophers 8 9ith .$. Sedley8 7 3ols. ;012L<8 and he is the editor of Problems in Stoicism ;01L0< and co6editor of Theophrastus of Eresus ;0124<. Jaap Mansfeld is Professor of !ncient and Patristic Philosophy at the #ni3ersity of #trecht. :is publications include ie)ffenbarun" des Parmenides und die menschliche >elt ;01KB<8 The Pseudo6:ippocratic Tract Peri :ebdomadon +h. 0600 and Greek

Philosophy ;01L0<8 !n !le.andrian Platonist a"ainst ualism 8 9ith P.>. 3an der :orst ;01LB<8 and ie &orsokratiker 8 7 3ols. ;012M8 012K<. G. >atson is Professor of Greek at St. Patrick?s +olle"e8 May6nooth8 'epublic of %reland. :e is the author of The Stoic Theory of Eno9led"e ;01KK<8 Plato?s #n9ritten Teachin" ;01LM<8 and articles on other topics in Greek philosophy. A .i A $otes on contributors

!bbre3iations

!bbre3iations The follo9in" abbre3iations are used to refer to standard reference 9orks and periodicals. !bbre3iated references to ancient te.ts follo9 the con3entions of LSJ and the ).ford Latin ictionary . !LG:J !rbeiten Cur Literatur und Geschichte des :ellenistischen Judentums !$'> !ufstie" und $ieder"an" der rOmischen >elt ,%+S ,ulletin of the %nstitute of +lassical Studies of the #ni3ersity of London +J +lassical Journal +Ph +lassical Philolo"y +Q +lassical Quarterly E ie *ra"mente der &orsokratiker 8 ed. :. iels and >. EranC o.. Graeci o.o"raphi Graeci 8 ed. :. iels J'S Journal of 'oman Studies LSJ Liddell6Scott6Jones8 ! Greek6En"lish Le.icon )+T ).ford +lassical Te.t 'E Paulys 'eal6encyclopPdie der classischen !ltertums9issenschaft

A .ii A 'E! 'e3ue des Etudes !nciennes 'EG 'e3ue des Etudes Grec@ues 'EL 'e3ue des Etudes Latines 'Ph 'e3ue de Philolo"ie 'S* 'i3ista +ritica di Storia della *ilosofia S&* Stoicorum 3eterum fra"menta 8 ed. :. 3on !rnim T!P! Transactions of the !merican Philolo"ical !ssociation &i". +hr . &i"iliae +hristianae A .iii A !bbre3iations

+hronolo"y

+hronolo"y ,.+. MB067L0 Epicurus MMB67K7 Qeno of +itium8 founder of Stoic school M776ca. 72L Theophrastus head of Peripatetic school ca. 725675K +hrysippus ca. 7LM67B7 !rcesilaus head of !cademy 044 +arneades? embassy to 'ome ca. 0M4645 Posidonius8 Stoic philosopher ca. 071 Panaetius becomes head of Stoa ca. 0726005 +litomachus head of !cademy ca. 0056L1 Philo of Larissa head of !cademy 05K6BM +icero 2L !ntiochus secedes from !cademy ;=<256K5

!enesidemus re3i3es Pyrrhonism M0 ,attle of !ctium ca. M56!. . B4 Philo of !le.andria ca. 74 ,.+. R*ull SiCeS . Potamo8 founder of so6called Eclectic school ca. 74 R*ull SiCeS . Eudorus of !le.andria8 Platonist philosopher ca. 74 . !rius idymus8 do.o"rapher

A .i3 A !. . ca. B ,.+. 6K4 Seneca the (oun"er ca. 0st century "Lon"inus8" author of )n the Sublime ca. M56055 ca. B56007 ca. 456055 Quintilian8 rhetorician io +hrysostom8 sophist and rhetorician Moderatus of Gades8 $eo6Pytha"orean philosopher

ca. 456075 Plutarch of +haeroneia ca. 4460M4 Epictetus ca. L56045 $icomachus of Gerasa8 $eo6Pytha"orean philosopher ca. 206045 *a3orinus8 !cademic philosopher ca. 2M60K0 Ptolemy8 astronomer and "eo"rapher ca. 05560K5 L. +al3enus Taurus8 Platonist philosopher ca. 0706025 Marcus !urelius ca. 07M6025 !puleius of Madaurus8 rhetorician8 no3elist8 Platonist philosopher ca. 0746024 Ma.imus of Tyre8 sophist ca. 0716011 Galen ca. 0M56025 !ulus Gellius8 'oman encyclopaedist ca. 045 . $umenius of !pamea8 Platonist philosopher ca. 045 . !lbinus8 Platonist philosopher ca. 0456704 +lement of !le.andria8 +hristian theolo"ian 0L56ca. 7B4 *la3ius Philostratus8 sophist ca. 0L4 . !tticus8 Platonist philosopher ca. 755 !le.ander of !phrodisias8 !ristotelian commentator ca. 755 . Se.tus Empiricus8 Pyrrhonist philosopher ca. 755 . io"enes Laertius8 author of philosophers? li3es 75467L5 Plotinus ca. 774 . !mmonius Saccas8 Platonist philosopher

A .3 A 7M76ca. M54 ca. 7K56MB5 Bth century MM56ML1 M4B6BM5

Porphyry8 Platonist philosopher Eusebius of +aesarea8 bishop +alcidius8 Platonist commentator ,asil of +aesarea8 bishop !u"ustine of :ippo

%ntroduction

%ntroduction A0A There is a period in the history of Greek philosophy8 co3erin" rou"hly the first century ,.+. and the first t9o centuries !. . 8 that has lon" been a source of embarrassment to intellectual historians. The immediately precedin" period8 no9 commonly called :ellenistic philosophy8 had seen the emer"ence of three ne9 mo3ements8 Stoic8 Epicurean8 and Skeptic8 the last of 9hich actually came to characteriCe Plato?s successors in the !cademy. The third century !. . is marked by the de3elopment of that hi"hly ori"inal interpretation of Plato that 9e call $eoplatonism and also by the flo9erin" of the "reat tradition of commentary on !ristotle8 ushered in by !le.ander of !phrodisias. ,et9een these t9o 9ell6defined periods 9e find a series of thinkers 9hose contribution to philosophy has been dispara"in"ly labeled eclectic . They include such 9ell6kno9n amateurs as the 'omans +icero and Seneca8 but also such professional Greek philosophers as the Stoics Panaetius and Posidonius8 the Platonists !ntiochus8 Plutarch8 and !lbinus8 and doctors and scientists such as Galen and Ptolemy. %n this period8 it has seemed8 it 9as no lon"er possible to be a "pure6blooded" follo9er of any of the traditional schools. This supposed mer"in" of philosophical identifies has been accounted for by another 9ell6publiciCed A7A opinion about this periodN its decline of intellectual 3i"or and its loss of creati3ity. These ne"ati3e features 9ere often attributed to the hea3y hand of 'ome and its demands for an undifferentiated pabulum8 consistin" of a compromise bet9een the doctrines of the 9arrin" schools and emphasiCin" moral edification rather than the cut and thrust of ar"ument. This process mi"ht seem to be e.emplified by the proconsul L. Gellius

Poplicola8 9ho in !thens in K1 ,.+. "called to"ether the philosophers of the time8 and ur"ently ad3ised them to come at len"th to some settlement of their contro3ersies" ;+icero e le"ibus 0.4M<. )ne of the principal 3illains of the piece8 in this scenario8 is +icero8 9hose hastily composed accounts of the :ellenistic mo3ements may seem to deal a deathblo9 to any further inno3ations in those philosophies. Such a 3ie9 of intellectual history 9as "i3en credence by the immense authority of Eduard Qeller8 9hose still indispensable account of the 9hole of Greek philosophy 9as hea3ily influenced by the :e"elian tendency to 3ie9 intellectual history in terms of alternations bet9een periods of hi"h and lo9 creati3ity. >e 9ould not 9ish to assert that there is no 3alidity 9hate3er in this 3ie9 of history. !r"uably8 ad3enturous speculation did decline durin" this period. There can also be obser3ed a "ro9th of faith in authority8 a seekin" for "ancient" sources ;leadin" to the proliferation of pseudepi"rapha<8 and the domination of the concept of "the +lassical." )n the other hand8 the 9ork of philosophy should be seen as continuin"8 if in different modes. The dissemination and assimilation of established ideas and methodolo"ies 9ere a stimulus to critical reflection and inno3ation. %f this period lacks an indi3idual philosopher comparable to Plato8 !ristotle8 Epicurus8 or Qeno8 that is not a reason for hastily adGud"in" it to be second6rate8 dull8 and lar"ely deri3ati3e from the past in its perspecti3es. The purpose of the present collection of essays is to offer a series of studies that 9ill pro3ide the basis for a deeper understandin" of the real intellectual character of that a"e. Such a AMA collection8 arisin" as it does from a set of collo@uium papers8 cannot aspire to be comprehensi3e. :o9e3er8 9e do think that the mo3ements and indi3iduals constitutin" the key factors in this period are represented8 e3en if not necessarily in proportion to their importance. %f the Epicureans do not find much place here8 that is no accident. They remain curiously peripheral8 for reasons related to the intro3erted nature of their mo3ement and the hostility it inspired in the schools directly influenced by Plato. $e3ertheless8 they do make their appearance in 3arious connections8 as the inde. 9ill testify. The dominant theme of this book is a critical ree.amination of the traditional ;since Qeller< characteriCation of this period8 its "eclecticism." The dispiritin" connotations of this term are nicely e.pressed in this @uotation from the article on Eclecticism in the Encyclopaedia ,ritannica ;0Bth edition<N Eclecticism al9ays tends to sprin" up after a period of 3i"orous constructi3e speculation8 especially in the later sta"es of a contro3ersy bet9een thinkers of pre6eminent ability. Their respecti3e follo9ers8 and more especially cultured laymen8 lackin" the capacity for ori"inal 9ork8 seekin" for a solution in some kind of compromise8 take refu"e in a combination of those elements in the opposin" systems 9hich seem to afford a sound practical theory.

!ctually8 in reference to our period8 9here this definition is most at home8 to characteriCe the :ellenistic a"e as "a period of 3i"orous constructi3e speculation" 9ould ha3e been a considerably hi"her estimate than 9as common at the time the article 9as 9rittenD it is only in the last "eneration or so that the study of :ellenistic philosophy has come into its o9n8 and its e.citin" features ha3e ceased to be o3ershado9ed by the to9erin" fi"ures of Plato and !ristotle. !s for contro3ersy8 that by no means comes to an end in our period8 9hich 9itnesses the emer"ence of8 amon" other thin"s8 a rene9ed Skepticism8 under the ae"is of !enesidemus and his $eo6Pyrrhonism8 9hose 3i"orous scrutiny of the 9hole history of philosophy is charted in the pa"es ABA of Se.tus Empiricus. !s for compromise8 it is true that some of the thinkers in our period 9ere impatient of the terminolo"ical niceties and fine conceptual distinctions that had characteriCed inter6school debates in the :ellenistic period. To9ard the end of that epoch8 !ntiochus of !scalon had combined Platonic8 !ristotelian8 and Stoic concepts in his ethics8 9hile discardin" the Stoic insistence on the absolute irrele3ance of all bodily and e.ternal "oods for happiness. >e find Seneca and Plutarch e@ually un9illin" to "o alon" 9ith the more biCarre features of Stoicism. Galen too8 and Ptolemy8 as +hapter L indicates8 9ere more interested in the 3alidity of empiricism in "eneral terms than in 3ery precise Gustification of its detail. Sometimes such attitudes do in3ol3e a fuCCiness of thou"ht. More often8 ho9e3er8 they point to a deliberate interest in establishin" a theory or a concept on the basis of the "eneral consensus of a 3ery lon"6standin" and tested intellectual tradition. Eclecticism 8 then8 in its peGorati3e sense8 seems a less than useful term to capture the particular @uality of intellectual life in this period. )ur studies should pro3ide a number of su""estions for replacin" it 9ith more informati3e and less complacent terminolo"y. The reader 9ho has follo9ed us so far 9ill ha3e seen ho9 di3erse are the thinkers it has been fashionable to call eclectic. To place the term and the concept in their historical perspecti3e is the purpose of Pierlui"i onini?s chapter8 9hich be"ins the book. There 9as a use for the Greek 3erb ekle"ein to si"nify selectin" the best from a "roup of thin"s. ,ut in philosophical parlance neither the 9ord itself nor the concept it e.presses is attested before the 'oman period8 and then only rarely8 in notable contrast to its free and mainly dero"atory employment in modem histories of philosophy. This ne"ati3e connotation of eclecticism8 ho9e3er8 is also to be contrasted 9ith the 9ay the term 9as used 9hen it first became 9idespread in modem times. Jakob ,rucker8 the most influential historian of philosophy in the mid6ei"hteenth centuryD re"arded 9hat he called the "eclectic method of philosophiCin"" A4A as characteristic of such seminal fi"ures of recent philosophy as :obbes8 escartes8 and LeibniC. >hat ,rucker 9as commendin"Hand in this he 9as follo9ed by iderotH9as the eclectics? refusal to submit to tailor6made and supposedly authoritati3e doctrines. !s iderot e.pressed it8 "the eclectic "oes back to the dearest "eneral principles8 e.amines them8 discusses them8 admits nothin" e.cept on the e3idence of his o9n e.perience and

reason." :o9e3er8 such ancient philosophers of our period as the !le.andrian Platonists 9ere not considered to ha3e been eclectics in this honorable sense. They 9ere seen8 rather8 as "syncretists8" 9hose efforts to reconcile different opinions had yielded a disorderly Gumble. #nder the influence of German idealism8 the term eclecticism itself lost its connections 9ith a critical and open approach to in@uiry and assumed the opprobrious sense 9ith 9hich Qeller employed it. !nd 3ia Qeller8 as 9e stated at the outset8 eclecticism has persistently been 3ie9ed as an obGecti3ely 3alid cate"ory for describin" the philosophy of our period. onini?s sur3ey8 by tracin" the ori"ins of eclecticism in the history of Greek philosophy8 confirms the inade@uacy of the term to capture the 3ariety and interest of the men and ideas discussed in this book. e3elopments 9ithin the !cademy durin" the first half of the first century ,.+. played a maGor part in shapin" the philosophical tendencies of the ne.t t9o hundred and fifty years. Philo of Larissa sou"ht to miti"ate the e.treme skepticism of his predecessors ;!rcesilaus8 +arneades8 and +litomachus< by claimin" that the !cademyD from Plato on9ard8 had been united in its modest disa3o9al of human access to absolutely certain truths. This implausible thesis "enerated t9o opposite responses in the !cademics !ntiochus and !enesidemus. !ntiochus8 renouncin" all skepticism8 put for9ard an alternati3e unitary tradition8 that of Plato8 !ristotle8 and Stoicism8 9hose essential a"reements on most points of doctrine he opposed to the $e9 !cademic support for "suspension of Gud"ment about e3erythin"." !enesidemus8 in order to free Skepticism from its no96tarnished pedi"ree8 aban6 AKA doned the !cademy and founded a $eo6Pyrrhonian philosophy. These schisms8 for all their differences8 e.hibit a common interest in attachin" the proper contemporary stance of philosophyD in its proponents? 3ie98 to an authoritati3e tradition. They also sho9 ho9 eclecticism and skepticism 9ere alternati3e medicines for dealin" 9ith the same illnessH a philosophical le"acy that had become diffuse and multiform. Eclecticism8 as in !ntiochus8 su""ests that disa"reements bet9een philosophers are merely 3erbal and that at bottom the doctrines of superficially discrepant systems are compatible. Skepticism8 by contrast8 insists that the do"matists? contradictions of one another indicate actually contradictory doctrines8 9hich are not e.plicable as 3erbal or simply conceptual differences. )ur collection of "case histories" be"ins 9ith that of +icero8 dealt 9ith by John Glucker in "+icero?s philosophical affiliations." +icero?s philosophical position has "enerally been 3ie9ed as an ostensibly consistent adherence to the moderate skepticism of Philo?s *ourth !cademy8 a stance 9hich allo9ed him8 in his later 9ritin"s8 to e.plore 9hat could be said for and a"ainst alternati3e doctrines. ! difficulty that this 3ie9 of +icero fails to meet is the absence of any support for skepticism in the e republica and e le"ibus 8 composed in the 45s ,.+. The positi3e tone of these 9orks8 to say nothin" of their deliberately Platonic titles8 could be seen as deri3in" from +icero?s sympathy for the more doctrinaire teachin"s of !ntiochus of !scalon8 9ith 9hom +icero had studied in !thens in L1 ,.+. )n the other hand8 ho9e3er "enerous to9ard !ntiochus +icero sho9s himself to be in the main body of his philosophical 9ritin"s8 composed in the last three years of his life8

he ne3er commits himself in them to ")ld !cademic" do"matism. Glucker seeks to sol3e these problems by ar"uin" that there 9ere in fact three sta"es in +icero?s philosophical de3elopmentN an initial adherence to Philo 9as follo9ed by an affiliation lastin" o3er thirty years ;L16BK ,.+. <8 to the doctrinaire Platonism of !ntiochus8 9hich 9as in turn suc6 ALA ceeded8 in +icero?s final yearsHhis most fertile period of philosophical compositionHby a return to the position of the Philonian $e9 !cademy. Glucker?s thesis directs sharp attention to a number of passa"es in 9hich +icero "i3es indications of his philosophical position8 some of 9hich ha3e been underemphasiCed at the e.pense of others. +icero?s readers ha3e been reluctant to take him seriously enou"h as a philosopher to credit him 9ith "enuine chan"es of school alle"ianceD but if one is 9illin" to "rant him that honor8 Glucker?s scenario is certainly the best e.planation of the e3idence. !s a philosophical 9riter8 +icero sees himself as pro3idin" his 'oman readers 9ith an entire conspectus of the Greek philosophical tradition. The case of the Je9ish philosopher Philo of !le.andria is comparable8 thou"h 3ery different in its assessment and use of that tradition. Philo?s position is remarkable in that he re"ards Moses8 @ua di3inely inspired author of the Pentateuch8 as the first philosopher and the Greeks as presentin" mere reflections of his teachin"8 distorted to a "reater or lesser de"ree. !bo3e all8 the study of the philosophy of the schools is to be subordinated to the e.e"esis of Scripture. Jaap Mansfeld8 in +hapter M8 presents an illuminatin" account of ho9 Philo uses a do.o"raphic parade of the doctrines of the 3arious schools as a foil for his e.position of the Mosaic philosophy. :e di3ides his essay into t9o parts8 each in3esti"atin" a different strate"y of Philo?s. The first demonstrates ho9 Philo uses 3arious opinions8 particularly Stoic and Peripatetic ones8 to set up a se@uence of "literal" and "alle"orical" interpretations of a scriptural passa"e. The second e.ploits the Skeptic techni@ue of constructin" a dissensio 8 or disa"reement8 by arran"in" the theories of the philosophers in polar opposition8 a"ain in order to pro3ide a foil for the doctrine of Moses. %nstead of usin" these disa"reements as "rounds for suspension of Gud"ment8 Philo in3okes them as e3idence of human fallibility. %nspired by God8 Moses transcends the doubts of those 9ho rely on purely human 9isdom. A2A Either +icero or Philo may fairly be denominated eclectic 8 at least in their strate"ies. ;>hate3er 9e belie3e about +icero8 it is still reasonable to claim that Philo?s o9n Mosaic philosophy is a fairly coherent brand of Middle Platonism.< ,ut the ne.t t9o chapters address fi"ures 9ho 9ould claim to be professional school philosophers and 9ho 9ould be "reatly distressed to think that they de3iated from school orthodo.y. %n +hapter B John illon looks at 9hat orthodo.y 8 can si"nify in a situation 9here there is no lon"er any central 3alidatin" authority8 but simply a rather 3a"ue tradition. :e concludes that orthodo.y8 althou"h an ideal much stri3en for8 is essentially a state of mind8 permittin" !ntiochus to break 9ith his predecessors and "return" to do"matism8 Plutarch to challen"e the pre3ailin" consensus on the issue of the creation of the 9orld in time8 !lbinus to adopt freely much Peripatetic doctrine8 and !tticus in turn to in3ei"h bitterly

a"ainst this8 9hile himself adoptin" Stoic formulations. The $eo6Pytha"oreans are a special case8 9ith their o9n peculiar relationship to Plato and their o9n doctrinal s@uabbles8 particularly on the @uestion of 9hether the %ndefinite yad is primordial or is deri3ed from the )ne. Their preoccupation 9ith such relati3ely esoteric @uestions alerts us to the fact that8 alon"side the blurrin" of philosophical identities8 there 9ere some 9ho 9ere much concerned 9ith 3alidatin" their orthodo.y 9ithin a closed tradition. Pierlui"i onini8 in +hapter 48 focuses on one particularly interestin" essay of Plutarch?s8 to sho9 ho9 he8 thou"h an "orthodo." Platonist accordin" to his li"hts8 could freely use scientific doctrine borro9ed from other schools to elucidate a problem of natural philosophy ;">hat is the moon made of="<8 but 9ith a stin" in the tail. The myth of the e facie "corrects" the scientific section in 3arious 9aysN it sho9s that scientific e.planation ;such as the Peripatetics or Stoics 9ould offer< can pro3ide the material cause of the moon?s e.istence8 but is inade@uate to address the final cause8 the true purpose of the moon. This can only be done by means of a Platonist myth. To this e.tent Plu6 A1A tarch too is "usin" philosophy8" rather in the manner of Philo of !le.andria. onini?s treatment 3indicates the unity of the e facie 8 9hich has fre@uently been impu"ned8 ar"uin" that Plutarch?s supposed eclecticism has a serious philosophical purpose. %n his study of Se.tus Empiricus8 Jac@ues ,runsch9i" starts from the data common to skepticism and eclecticism ;see p. K abo3e< and then considers the intricate problems the skeptic faced in his analysis and refutation of the criterion of truth. >ritin" in about !. . 7558 Se.tus 9as the le"atee of a concept that had been utiliCed and interpreted in many different 9ays o3er the fi3e precedin" centuries. %n order to Gustify his strate"y of pittin" one do"matic doctrine a"ainst another8 Se.tus as a skeptic must assume that he and his opponents all ha3e the same notions and use the same 9ords to e.press them8 for 9ithout this assumption he has no basis for indicatin" actual contradictions o3er doctrines. ,ut the skeptic is also tempted to e.pose disa"reements bet9een do"matists o3er their definitions of the same terms. This approach8 because it reGects the assumption of a common conceptual le"acy8 is incompatible 9ith the former one. ,runsch9i" finds Se.tus combinin" these t9o methodolo"ies in his treatment of the criterion of math. Se.tus starts from an apparently uni3ocal notion of kriterion 8 accordin" to 9hich this term stands for somethin" that pro3ides "immediate kno9led"e" ;prodelos <. :is subse@uent discussion8 ho9e3er8 includes inappropriate attempts to e.pose conceptual disa"reements o3er the di3ision of the kriterion into different aspects and also introduces a @uite different conception of it as that 9hich tests none3ident matters ;adelos <. These t9o conceptions seem to belon" to different traditions8 the prodelic to Stoicism8 the adelic to Epicureanism. Se.tus says nothin" to indicate that in his discussions he is shiftin" about bet9een these t9o notions. :e may8 ho9e3er8 ha3e thou"ht himself Gustified in doin" so8 on the "round that elimination of the prodelic kriterion disposes of the immediate e3idence necessary for the operation of the adelic kriterion of the Epicureans. A 05 A

>hile it suited skeptics to represent doctrinaire philosophers as proponents of radically discrepant opinions8 practicin" scientists had an interest in playin" do9n fine differences bet9een concepts or theories 9hose "eneral tenor they could appropriate as underpinnin" for their methodolo"y. :i"hly instructi3e in this re"ard8 thou"h ne"lected8 is Ptolemy?s short essay )n the +riterion and +ommandin"6*aculty . !.!. Lon" "i3es an account of this 9ork in +hapter L that seeks to place Ptolemy?s position on these concepts in its intellectual conte.t and to assess its bearin" on his researches. Ptolemy8 9ho o9ed no alle"iance to any school of philosophy8 analyCes the criterion of truth in terms that re3eal his indebtedness to the tradition dra9n upon by Se.tus Empiricus. Like Se.tus8 he analyCes different aspects of the criterion and builds much of his account on a distinction bet9een sense6perception and intellect. #nlike Se.tus8 he does not treat these as ri3al claimants to the role of decisi3e co"niti3e faculties8 9hich can be set a"ainst one another or eliminated in turn8 but attributes positi3e functions to them conGointly. +ompletely i"norin" the issues that had "enerated skepticism8 Ptolemy strikes a balance bet9een empiricism and rationalism in a manner 9hich he could e.pect 9ould 9in "eneral support from all the doctrinaire schools of philosophy. :is "eclecticism8" manifested in the "round he shares8 or implicitly claims to share8 9ith competin" epistemolo"ies8 9ould be better termed a methodolo"y of optimum a"reement. !s such8 it can be interpreted as the re3erse of the skeptical strate"y of refutin" all doctrines by e.posin" them as contradictory to each other. Ptolemy?s synthetic stance on the criterion of truth and his refusal to en"a"e 9ith @uestions of terminolo"y or fine6tunin" is e.actly the same as that of his contemporary scientist8 Galen. ,oth men opted for an epistemolo"y that "ranted due 9ei"ht8 as they sa9 it8 to the reciprocal importance of controlled obser3ations and theoretical postulates. The use they made of their philosophical inheritance enabled them not only to resist the skeptical e.ploitation of "disa"reement8" A 00 A but also to stake a middle "round in the contro3ersies bet9een e.treme rationalists and empiricists that 9ere issues in medicine8 for Galen8 or in harmonics8 for Ptolemy. >hat 9e 9itness in these strate"ies is an inno3ati3e manipulation of traditional concepts in the interests of a ne9 kind of philosophy of science. )ur earlier studies ha3e e.hibited philosophers usin" their philosophical inheritance in 3arious 9ays8 either for the enhancement of their positions or for the more e.act definition of them. >e turn finally to t9o chapters in 9hich concepts are seen to take on ne9 depth and comple.ity throu"h cross6fertiliCation bet9een philosophical traditions. %ma"ination8 as the concept of a mental faculty capable of producin" 9hat its possessor has ne3er e.perienced8 is not identified by any specific term in +lassical Greek philosophy. Philostratus8 ho9e3er8 in the third century !. . 8 uses the term phantasia ;compare our "fantasy"< to describe the artist?s ability to create somethin" 9hich the eye has ne3er seen ;contrast mimesis <8 but the mind has concei3ed. G. >atson in3esti"ates the lar"ely uncharted mute 9hich transformed phantasia from its ori"inal Platonic relation to fallible opinion ;do.a < and sense6perception ;aisthesis < into a term for the creati3e ima"ination. >ithout e.traneous influence8 he ar"ues8 one 9ho accepted Plato?s strictures on the co"niti3e 9eakness of the senses 9ould scarcely ele3ate phantasia to the

status of mental illumination. (et such a usa"e occurs not only in the Platonic6soundin" conte.ts of Philostratus but also in earlier and similar passa"es of +icero8 "Lon"inus8" Quintilian8 and io +hrysostom. )ne due to the mediatin" influences is the tendency for such 9riters to make literature superior to the 3isual arts. %n Stoicism8 the capacity to "make a transition" from the seen to the unseen is a distincti3e feature of human phantasia 8 and this 9as closely linked 9ith lekta 8 the "incorporeal" meanin"s of sentences. The presumption of such a Stoic back"round helps to e.plain ho9 9riters of a Platonic cast could be"in to 3ie9 phantasia appro36 A 07 A in"ly8 thanks to its connection 9ith the domain of reason ;lo"os < and "meanin"s" that are not reducible to physical thin"s. ! second factor that points in the same direction is the intense interest Platonist 9riters of our period took in the @uestion of human access to the di3ine nature. The key te.t 9as Plato?s Timaeus 8 9here the di3ine creator is pictured as a craftsman 9ho models the 9orld on intelli"ible *orms. *or Plato himself8 di3ine creati3ity 9as not an e.ercise of phantasia . Stoics8 9ho accepted the craftsman ima"e of God but reGected Plato?s t9o69orld metaphysics8 helped to su""est that the artist8 9orkin" creati3ely 9ith phantasia 8 is like God. :ence it became possible for Platonist 9riters8 under Stoic influence8 to treat an artist?s 3ision as similar in kind8 thou"h co"niti3ely inferior8 to the di3ine 3ision of perfect ,eauty. ! second modem notion that 9as facilitated by a strikin" con3er"ence of different philosophical traditions is that of the 9ill. !s formulated by !@uinas8 3oluntas is an essentially spiritual po9er that e.ercises decisi3e control o3er 3oluntary actions. >orkin" as he did 9ith an !ristotelian theory of the soul8 !@uinas incorporated all the concepts !ristotle used in his account of human action. %n !ristotle8 ho9e3er8 these conceptsH9hat is "up to us8" the 3oluntary8 desire for the end ;boulesis <8 and deliberate desire for the means ;prohairesis <Hare not fled to"ether by a sin"le notion of 9ill8 as 3oluntas unites them in !@uinas. +harles Eahn8 in +hapter 18 makes these points8 in order to sho9 that "our" concept of the 9ill can be 3ie9ed from a number of different perspecti3es8 in selectin" one of 9hich a historian 9ill incline to emphasiCe particular philosophers and traditions. ,y studyin" a 9ide ran"e of concepts and thinkers from !ristotle to !u"ustine8 he sho9s that !lbrecht ihle in his recent book The Theory of >ill in +lassical !nti@uity laid undue 9ei"ht on the theolo"ical and biblical perspecti3e8 hi"hly important thou"h this 9as for !u"ustine and !@uinas. Eahn identifies four historical sta"es that cumulati3ely shaped modem ;i.e.8 from escartes on9ard< notions of the 9illN ;0< the early Stoic theory of human A 0M A action8 in 9hich the mind?s "assent" and responsibility for its "impulses" are de3elopedD ;7< the translation into Latin of Greek philosophical terms 9hich8 as 9ith 3oluntas and liberum arbitrium 8 ac@uired a resonance absent from the Greek ori"inalsD ;M< the later Stoic interest in a concept of moral character or moral identityHan introspecti3e self bent on conformity 9ith the "9ill of God"H9here this is e.pressed by Epictetus in the term prohairesis and by Seneca 9ith 3oluntas D ;B< the !u"ustinian notion8 influenced on the one hand by $eoplatonism and on the other by his meditations on Scripture8 of a spiritual

realm to 9hich the human 9ill belon"ed. Eahn allo9s that the concept of the 9ill as an o3erall attitude of obedience or disobedience to the 9ill of God 9as only "fi"urati3ely" anticipated in the later Stoic tradition. ,ut that tradition8 in conGunction 9ith the other factors he isolates8 played its part in shapin" the thou"ht of !u"ustine and !@uinas. The issues 9e ha3e outlined here are sufficient8 9e belie3e8 to pro3oke rene9ed attention to this curious but fascinatin" chapter of intellectual history. "'ene9ed attention8" since our 'enaissance predecessors needed no encoura"ement to find food for reflection in their study of +icero8 Plutarch8 Philo8 Galen8 Ptolemy8 and so on. !nd here8 perhaps8 is 9here 9e reach somethin" like a proper use for the term eclectic . E3ery culture is both selecti3e and synthetic in its approach to the tradition it ackno9led"es as its o9nD and the fact of ackno9led"ment itself in3ol3es the promotion of this or that idea or thinker and the demotion of other parts of the tradition. The period sur3eyed in this book 9as unusually rich in its cultural resources. *urther patterns of thou"ht are certainly 9aitin" to be reco3ered there8 obscured merely by a lack of discrimination in our present cultural perspecti3es. J. .8 !.!.L. A 04 A

0 The history of the concept of eclecticism

0 The history of the concept of eclecticism Pierlui"i onini !nti@uity kne9 both the concept of eclectic philosophy and the term itself8 but both 9ere much less 9idespread than their popularity in modern times 9ould lead one to think. The idea that a philosophy could sho9 the combined influence of other thinkers 9as by no means unusual in the classical 9orldN 9e need only be reminded of the 9ay !ristotle e.plains Plato?s thou"ht in the first book of Metaphysics as a creati3e blend of the philosophies of Parmenides8 :eraclitus8 Socrates8 and the Pytha"oreans ;!K.12La71ff.<. Like9ise8 the idea that a particular doctrine or philosophical statement could be the result of the combination of t9o or more others 9as fairly common.R0S ,ut the ancients ne3er %n 9ritin" this paper % ha3e been "reatly helped by the discussion that follo9ed my first draft8 read at the *%E+ +on"ress in ublinD % 9ould like to thank all those 9ho took part in that debate. % am particularly "rateful to the late Professor Paul Morau.8 9ho allo9ed me to see important parts of his second 3olume on Greek !ristotelianism before publicationD to Jaap Mansfeld8 9ho "enerously made a3ailable to me much 3aluable material on the history of eclecticismD and to Tony Lon". % alone of course am responsible for the interpretation offered here. R0S A 0K A labeled these t9o kinds of mi.ture eclecticism . >hen this term is employed8 it has an entirely different meanin"N it means a philosophy 9hose structural character is that of deliberately plannin" to select some doctrines out of many philosophies and fit them to"ether. There are8 ho9e3er8 only a fe9 kno9n e.amples of the use of the term in this sense. The most important one is in io"enes Laertius8 9ho says that "an eclectic school 9as introduced by Potamo of !le.andria8 9ho made a selection from the tenets of all the e.istin" sects" ;0.708 trans. :icks8 Loeb +lassical Library<8 the meanin" of the Greek 3erb ekle"einTekle"esthai bein" precisely "to choose8 to make a selection." %n connection 9ith io"enes? statement about Potamo it is 3ery interestin" to find that an "eclectic philosopher" from !le.andria is mentioned in an inscription from Ephesus 9hich has recently been published.R7S !nother instance of the term is pro3ided by the +hristian 9riter +lement of !le.andriaN he calls his o9n ideal of the philosophical method eklektikon ;Strom . 0.ML.K<. *inally8 it should be remarked that Galen t9ice speaks of a medical school 9hich is called eklektike by some people.RMS #nfortunately8 9e are not in

a position to say 9hether the name 9as first "i3en to this medical school and then transferred to Potamo?s philosophy or 9hether the re3erse happened. R7SRMS A 0L A %f eclecticism has by this date become a relati3ely technical notion8 its ori"ins8 in the sense used by +lementHconstitutin" a corpus of theories by selectin" from many doctrinesHha3e roots at least as far back as Ienophon. :e makes Socrates speak of readin"s from the 9orks of ancient 9ise men8 "9hich 9e select Rekle"ometha S on the basis of 9hate3er 9e percei3e "ood" in themD and there are other e.amples of this use of the term.RBS ,ut until the 'oman period neither this idea nor the term ekle"ein may yet ha3e established a re"ular place in philosophy. ! fra"ment of Epicurus?s 9ork )n$ature is particularly interestin"8 because it seems to contain a distinction bet9een the constructi3e use of someone else?s doctrines and the "confused mi.ture" of ideas deri3in" from different sourcesDR4S but neither here nor in an apparently similar passa"e of Theophrastus is the 3erb ekle"ein or any of its deri3ati3es employed.RKS $or8 it seems8 is such a distinction familiar to other ancient 9riters. RBSR4SRKS A 02 A To sum up8 9e may say that the 3ery fe9 ancient thinkers 9ho described their o9n philosophy as "eclecticism" "a3e a dearly positi3e meanin" to this term8 that these authors did not represent schools of maGor importance8 and8 finally8 that there are traces of a distinction bet9een a "ood and a bad mi.ture of doctrines emanatin" from di3er"ent ori"ins. >hen compared 9ith the 3ery limited e3idence from anti@uity8 the many references in modem histories of philosophy to eclecticism or eclectics as typical features of later Greek thou"ht may thus seem e.cessi3e. E3en more remarkable is the fact that the use of these terms in modem times has not reflected the same point of 3ie98 but has under"one many chan"es from the 'enaissance to the present. $o9adays e3eryone a"rees that eclecticism8 3ie9ed as a "eneral feature of a sta"e of ancient thou"ht8 9as a 3ery bad thin"D that philosophy from the end of the second century ,.+. 8 or from the first century ,.+. to Plotinus8 9as bad8 and that it 9as bad abo3e all because it 9as eclectic8 is a 9idespread con3iction e3en amon" +lassical scholars. ,ut fe9 amon" them seem to be a9are that there 9as a lon" period in philosophical historio"raphy and in European thou"ht in 9hich eclecticism 9as nothin" less than the ideal to9ard 9hich philosophy aimed and 9hich 9as accepted as a model by intellectual historians. %n the chief monument of this historio"raphy in the ei"hteenth century8 Jakob ,rucker?s :istoria critica philosophiae 8 one disco3ers that "the eclectic method of philosophiCin"8 lon" appro3ed by intelli"ent men and practiced by philosophers of the "reatest ability8" produced its "reatest 9orks in se3enteenth6 and ei"hteenth6century Europe8 thanks to the "reat philosophers 9ho founded modem thou"ht by fi"htin" a"ainst sectarian ideas and the principle of authorityRLS D so ,rucker presents philosophers RLS A 01 A

such as Giordano ,runo8 *rancis ,acon8 +ampanella8 :obbes8 escartes8 LeibniC8 and +hristian Thomasius as "men 9ho rene9ed the uni3ersal eclectic philosophy."R2S The article Eclectisme 9ritten by iderot for the EncyclopJdie contained a flatterin" definition of an eclectic 9hich8 like most of the article8 is in fact deri3ed from8 or almost translated from8 ,rucker.R1S The eclectic is a philosopher 9ho8 tramplin" underfoot preGudice8 tradition8 anti@uity8 "eneral a"reement8 authorityHin a 9ord8 e3erythin" that controls the minds of the common herdHdares to think for himself8 returns to the clearest "eneral principles8 e.amines them8 discusses them8 admits nothin" that is not based on the testimony of his e.perience and his reasonD and from all the philosophies he has analyCed 9ithout respect and bias he makes for himself a particular and domestic one 9hich belon"s to him.... There is no leader of a sect 9ho has not been more or less eclectic.... The Eclectics are amon" the philosophers 9ho are the kin"s on the face of the earth8 the only ones 9ho ha3e remained in the state of nature8 9here e3erythin" belon"ed to e3eryone. ;trans. !.!. Lon"< %n these authors8 so "reat is the praise of eclecticism as a philosophical attitude opposed to do"matism8 to sectarian ideas8 and R2SR1S A 75 A to the principle of authority that they state that anyone 9ho becomes a faithful disciple of an eclectic philosophy loses by this 3ery fact the ri"ht of bein" considered eclectic. ,rucker and iderot 9ere not e3en inno3atorsD their praise of philosophical eclecticism 9as the result of lon" studies and positi3e e3aluation of the concept of eclecticism 9hich be"an to de3elop in Europe from the late 'enaissance. Some 9orks on the history of philosophical historio"raphy 9hich ha3e appeared recently in *rance and %talyR05S enable us to follo9 fairly dearly the de3elopment and the "ro9in" popularity of this concept bet9een the si.teenth and the ei"hteenth centuryD this popularity is not necessarily linked 9ith that of the philosophy of the Enli"htenment8 as is seen in the 9orks of %talian historians of the first part of the ei"hteenth century. There 9e e3en find eclecticism bein" praised for apolo"etic purposes8 and specifically to further +atholic apolo"etics.R00S E3en the +atholic opponents of the EncyclopJdie thou"ht that a positi3e and +hristian interpretation of eclecticism 9as possible.R07S %t seems therefore reasonable to conGecture that in all these cases the "reatest influence 9as the tradition of +hristian eclecticism as it had been specified by +lement of !le.andria.R0MS %n any case8 in ,rucker himself reli"ious problems ha3e decisi3e importanceD the @uarrel a"ainst do"matism is aimed only a"ainst +atholicism and is stron"ly influenced by Protestant theolo"y. R05SR00SR07SR0MS A 70 A

,ut for historians of ancient thou"ht it may be particularly interestin" to note that in ,rucker and iderot the hi"h estimate of eclectic philosophy 9as not at all connected 9ith a similar e3aluation of ancient eclecticism. This eclecticism8 they said8 had been professed by !le.andrian Platonists8 startin" 9ith !mmonius Saccas and Plotinus8 i.e.8 by those 9hom 9e no9 call $eo6platonists. ;The link bet9een !mmonius and Potamo8 9ho 9as the only person ancient tradition undeniably called an eclectic8 9as8 besides8 3ery difficult to pro3e.<R0BS ,ut the Platonic eclectics of !le.andria had not really been eclectics8 for it could not be denied that they had formed a real sect. Moreo3er8 instead of choosin" the best doctrines and seekin" the truth8 they had8 rather8 aimed to reconcile 9idely different opinions and had succeeded only in producin" a "heap" ;massa <8 a "lar"ely shapeless mass" ;chaos ma"nam partem informe <.R04S They therefore deser3ed to be called syncretistae 8 syncretists8 far more than eclectics. !ncient philosophy8 then8 had produced the name rather than the practice of eclecticism. !nd anti@uity had kno9n only the "pla"ue" of syncretism8R0KS that "diseased reconciliation of doctrines and opinions 9hich are utterly discrepant" ;malesana do"6matum et sententiarum toto caelo inter se dissidentium conciliatio < 9hich later on afflicted modern philosophy as 9ell in 3arious 9ays. E3en in determinin" the only feature of the !le.andrians that could still be considered really eclectic ;namely8 the un9illin"ness to follo9 blindly the authority of a master<8 ,rucker 9as able to repeat his 3ery unfa3orable Gud"ment of their philoso6 R0BSR04SR0KS A 77 A phy.R0LS iderot 9as perhaps only sli"htly less harsh in his "eneral remarks on syncretism.R02S ,ut the total Gud"ment 9hich historians in the period of the Enli"htenment passed on eclectic philosophy in anti@uity remained 3ery unfa3orableD and it determined the outlook of later historians. :o9e3er8 in the last decades of the ei"hteenth centuryD 9hile the popularity of the :istoria critica in Europe continued8 the chan"e of philosophical outlook in Germany prepared the 9ay for a radical chan"e in the e3aluation of eclecticism. !fter Eant8 eclecticism could no lon"er be a philosophical or historio"raphical ideal.R01S !t the end of the century the ne"ati3e opinion on ancient eclectic philosophy8 9hich had already been sanctioned by the !"e of Enli"htenment8 9as thus reconciled 9ith the recent depreciation of the 3ery concept of eclecticismN a discredited name could no9 9ithout difficulty be "i3en to a bad philosophy. This situation lasted throu"hout the nineteenth century8 almost 9ithout e.ceptions.R75S %n particular8 it is presupposed by E. Qeller?s Philosophie der Griechen 8 the 9ork that 9as to influence most deeply the 9hole trend of subse@uent studies of ancient thou"ht.R70S %n order to discuss Qeller?s 3ie9s 9ith some accuracy 9e ou"ht R0LSR02SR01SR75SR70S A 7M A also to consider other de3elopments 9hich had taken place in the meantime in philosophical historio"raphy. )ne 9as the popularity of the term $eoplatonism and the distinction bet9een the $eoplatonic school and eclecticism. ;Thus in Qeller

$eoplatonism 9as no lon"er eclecticism8 althou"h someho9 eclecticism had prepared the 9ay for it.< !nother de3elopment 9as that8 9hile bein" impo3erished by separation from the independent philosophical tradition of $eoplatonism8 eclecticism in a looser sense e.panded and came to stand for a "eneral feature of philosophical thou"ht from the end of the second8 or from the first8 century ,.+. up to Plotinus. %t is ob3iously impossible to e.plain in detail all this chan"e as 9ell8 but anyone 9ho reads Qeller?s account of the "eneral features of eclecticism can ha3e no doubts about his stron"ly unfa3orable Gud"ment. >e find a "reat number of e.pressions such as "the dyin" out of a scientific outlook8" "scientific decline8" "a merely e.terior connection bet9een different positions8" and "uncritical philosophiCin"." %t is temptin" to say that Qeller calls eclecticism 9hat ,rucker called syncretism8 yet the meanin" of the Gud"ment remains e.actly the same. %t is strikin"8 ho9e3er8 that Qeller does not e3en attempt to define philosophical eclecticism e.actlyD he seems to assume that its e.istence8 as 9ell as the scope of the concept8 is ob3ious. (et 9hen Qeller uses the term eclecticism as a hu"e "eneraliCation8 makin" no attempt to establish a precise link 9ith the only ancient philosophical tradition for 9hich the name is attested8 he may 9ell seem "uilty of carelessness. ,ut the 9orst is to come. %nstead of pro3idin" a definition of eclecticism8 Qeller preferred to "i3e t9o principal e.planations of the ori"in of the phenomenon8 in a section 9ith the si"nificant title ")ri"in and +haracter of Eclecticism" ;"Entstehun"s"rFnde und +harakter des Eklekticismus"<. )ne reason 9as intrinsic to the de3elopment of Greek philosophyD the other he deri3ed from the "eneral historical situation. !ccordin" to Qeller8 the intrinsic reason 9as the protracted debate amon" the philosophical schools. %t is e.tremely important to note here that the only ones concerned are A 7B A the three "reat :ellenistic schools8 Stoicism8 Epicureanism8 and !cademic Skepticism. Thou"h Qeller ne3er stated this presupposition fully or e3en e.plicitly8R77S the subse@uent parts of his discussion make it @uite ob3ious. The "3ery nature of thin"s" ;these or similar 9ords occur fre@uently in the chapter in @uestion8 9ith eclecticism appearin" in the end as the lo"ical result of a natural process< entails this conse@uenceN as the debate dies out bet9een the founders and upholders of different systems8 each of 9hom 9as ea"er to stress his o9n point of 3ie9 and to underline di3er"ences from other schools8 and as @uarrels abate8 those points that the different doctrines ha3e in common emer"eD all the more so8 since these doctrines had ori"inated from a common "round. ;This is an unmistakable hint of the ori"in of eclecticism from the three "reat :ellenistic philosophies.< )nce this happens8 the typical refusal of the Skeptics ;"neither this nor that"< chan"es into the eclectic reconciliation of different positionsN "both this and that." Se3eral points in this reconstruction cause mis"i3in"s. %n the first place Qeller stresses the role of !cademic Skepticism as really pa3in" the 9ay for eclecticism and belie3es that the idea of "immediate kno9led"e8" 9hich is the fundamental principle of eclecticism8 "oes back to skeptical attitudes. :e therefore belie3es that it 9as "not at all accidental" that it 9as precisely "the successors of +arneades" 9ho 9ere the chief source from 9hich eclectic attitudes de3eloped.R7MS %t is clear8 ho9e3er8 that he consid6 R77SR7MS

A 74 A ers some Stoics 9ho "o as far back as the second century ,.+. 8 such as ,oethus and Panaetius8 to be eclectics8 and one therefore 9onders ho9 these men8 9ho can hardly be included amon" +arneades? successors8 could ha3e become eclectics. ,ut Qeller?s theory has an e3en more obGectionable limitation in that it attempts to trace the ori"ins of eclecticism solely to the interaction amon" the three maGor :ellenistic philosophies. This theory 9ould ha3e point only if so6called eclecticism had been a contact bet9een and a mi.ture of the doctrines of the Stoic8 Epicurean8 and !cademic schools. ,ut it is 9ell kno9n that e3ents turned out @uite differently. Epicureanism remained almost completely free from e.ternal influences8 and it did not influence in an eclectic manner any important thinker ;9ith the e.ception of Seneca8 9ho 9as a completely peculiar and isolated instance<. Moreo3erHand this is the most important pointH9e do not kno9 of a sin"le instance of a mi.ture only of Stoic8 Epicurean8 and !cademic positions. *rom the time of Qeller himself8 in fact8 eclecticism is a completely different phenomenon from the one postulated in this theory. %t is8 rather8 the contact and mutual interaction bet9een the :ellenistic philosophies8 particularly Stoicism8 and three other philosophies 9hich 9ent back to a pre3ious a"e and indeed had under"one a considerable decline in the :ellenistic periodN do"matic Platonism8 !ristotelianism8 and Pytha"oreanism. Qeller?s theory has no e.planation to offer for this rene9al of philosophies 9hose ori"in 9as earlier than the :ellenistic a"e8 for the contact bet9een them and their reaction to StoicismHin short8 for e3erythin" that actually happened bet9een Panaetius and !le.ander of !phrodisias. E@ually @uestionable is the second reason adduced by Qeller8 the e.ternal cause. %n his 3ie9 this 9as the influence of the 'oman frame of mind8 9hose typical feature 9as a hi"hly practical A 7K A and moral outlook. ;This 3ie9 of the 'oman frame of mind seems to be one of the most successful fables con3enues in +lassical studies.< %f such influence had really e.isted and had had a really decisi3e effect on philosophy8 eclecticism 9ould necessarily ha3e turned out to be a sort of moraliCin" Stoic6Skeptical6Epicurean lin"ua franca . %n fact it is 9ell kno9n that precisely in the 'oman period8 philosophies 9ith metaphysical interests or foundations8 such as Platonism8 !ristotelianism8 and Pytha"oreanism8 emer"ed a"ain and helped to create a ne9 3ision of the 9orld in 9hich metaphysics had an e3er6"ro9in" role. %t is also 9ell kno9n that precisely in that period the pre6:ellenistic ideal of pure speculation ;theoria < reappeared and became 9idespread. ;%t is remarkable that one of the first 3i"orous confirmations of this ideal is found in the 'oman8 Seneca.< Thus Qeller?s theory on the ori"in and nature of eclecticism is a typical e.ample of a priori ar"umentD it e.plains 9onderfully 9hat ne3er happened8 9hile lea3in" 9hat actually happened totally une.plained. The time has come to think a"ain about the real problemN the sudden reappearance8 almost at the same time8 of do"matic Platonism and !ristotelianism8 as 9ell as Pytha"oreanism8 and the interaction of these three philosophies 9ith :ellenistic philosophy8 especially Stoicism.

%t has not been pleasant to criticiCe a historian to 9hom e3ery student of ancient thou"ht is still enormously indebted. $e3ertheless8 this 9as necessary. Qeller 9as chiefly responsible for disseminatin" a ne"ati3e and unfa3orable concept of eclecticism 9hich until a fe9 years a"o almost completely pre3ailed in the study of ancient philosophy.R7BS $o one 9ho used this concept R7BS A 7L A after Qeller ree.amined its theoretical foundations8 and no one noticed that it 9as unable to keep dose to the actual e3idence. This8 ho9e3er8 does not mean that thin"s ha3e not chan"ed at all from Qeller?s time to the present day. Some de3elopments in subse@uent studies in the lon" run 9eakened the foundations of Qeller?s theory. The point that seems to ha3e caused most dissatisfaction amon" scholars 9as the e.cessi3ely "eneric nature of the concept of eclecticism8 its application 9ithout distinction to se3eral centuries of the history of thou"ht. %t soon became dear that undifferentiated eclecticism i"nored the many differences bet9een thinkers in the period from Panaetius to Plotinus. *urther distinctions 9ere therefore de3ised to do Gustice to these. There is not much to say on the attempt made by some scholars to put for9ard a"ain the old distinction bet9een eclecticism and syncretism. !ccordin" to the definition "i3en by the most e.plicit upholder of this distinction8R74S syncretism is only "the superficial and unauthentic a"reement of the hetero"eneous and disparate elements 9hose irreducible differences are blurred"D eclecticism8 accordin" to him8 sho9s a "reater de"ree of conceptual accuracy8 since it is "the reunion by Gu.taposition of reconcilable philosophical theses. The eclectic chooses8 makes a selection8" e3en thou"h he still lacks a synthetic and or"aniCin" point of 3ie9 that can create a unity 9hich is more than a mere Gu.taposition. !s one can see8 ho9e3er8 this is not e.actly ,rucker?s or iderot?s distinction. $ot e3en the term eclecticism has a fully positi3e meanin" hereN it betokens a de"ree of confusion and superficiality that is only sli"htly lo9er than that of syncretism. $or does the distinction reflect the substance of the te.t of Epicurus mentioned abo3e ;p. 0L<. ,ut the absence of ancient supportin" e3idence is not its "reatest fault. ,asically it errs in bein" completely di3orced from the intentions of the ancient authors R74S A 72 A and in relyin" completely on the intuitions of modem interpreters8 9ho in each instance ha3e to decide 9hether a "i3en philosopher should be included amon" eclectics or be confined to the shameful circle of syncretists. *inallyD the distinction has the 9eakness of not bein" "enerally accepted by historians of philosophyD the 9ord syncretism is lar"ely used no9 as a technical term in the history of reli"ion8 and8 abo3e all8 ancient reli"ionsD R7KS 9hen it is still used in the history of philosophy it seems on the 9hole not to differ from eclecticism .R7LS

The distinction bet9een eclectic and orthodo. philosophers8 9hich Earl Praechter in3ented8R72S 9as far more 9idespread. !ccordin" to this point of 3ie9 those philosophers could be considered orthodo. 9ho stro3e to remain loyal to an ori"inal core of doctrines held to be essential to8 and typical of8 the school from 9hich they dre9 their name8 and 9ho in many cases 9ere hostile to the intrusion of alien doctrines. Those 9ho had no such concern and 9ere open to e.traneous influences 9ere eclectic. ! considerable ad3anta"e of this distinction 9as its applicability to all philosophical schoolsN thus amon" Platonists8 !tticus and Taurus 9ere typically orthodo.8 9hereas "!lbinus" and !puleius 9ere definitely eclecticD amon" Stoics8 Epictetus 9as orthodo.8 9hile Seneca 9as absolutely eclectic and Marcus !urelius 9as eclectic to a lesser e.tentD amon" !ristotelians8 !le.ander 9as orthodo. and contrasted 9ith the eclectic !ristocles. +larity and the ease 9ith 9hich it could be applied are doubtless @ualities in fa3or of Praechter?s classification. (et in this case R7KSR7LSR72S A 71 A too the defects in the end turn out to be "reater than the 3irtues. The absence of any reco"nition of Gust this distinction from +lassical philosophy is not particularly seriousD one could say that 9hen !tticus reGects !ristotelian doctrines he in fact contrasts his o9n orthodo. Platonism 9ith his opponents? eclectic interpretation. ,ut such a su""estion could not be the basis for a reasonable classification of all Platonists ;or of all the philosophers of the other schools< under the t9o headin"s of eclectic and orthodo.. >hat "ood reasons are there for acceptin" !tticus as the standard of Platonic orthodo.y= ,y treatin" him as such ;as Praechter did<8 9e 9ould simply adopt in an uncritical manner his o9n point of 3ie98 9ithout takin" into account the fact that !tticus himself 9as considered by later Platonists to ha3e been a philosopher 9ho had abandoned the school?s tradition.R71S >e 9ould also be "uilty of serious inGustice to the intentions of the other side. Most so6called eclectics 9ere honestly persuaded that they 9ere loyal to the school?s traditionDRM5S on the other hand8 e3en so6called orthodo. philosophers 9ere often e.posed to e.ternal influences 9hose importance 9as underestimated by Praechter and his follo9ers. *or these reasons Praechter?s distinction appears today less and less con3incin"8 and se3eral su""estions for correctin" the 9orst faults of the pre3ious approaches are no9 a3ailable.RM0S The R71SRM5SRM0S A M5 A most recent is also the one that has been most carefully thou"ht out. %n his introduction to the second 3olume of his monumental 9ork on Greek !ristotelianism8 Paul Morau. proposes a distinction bet9een de facto orthodo.y and intentional orthodo.yN the latter 9ould then also apply to nearly all the philosophers 9ho are traditionally considered eclectic8 such as "!lbinus8" insofar as they at least appear sincerely con3inced that they are presentin" the "enuine 3ersion of their school?s doctrine8 e3en 9hen they insert elements of different ori"ins. Morau.8 ho9e3er8 makes it important to sho9 that e.ternal

elements are accepted only 9hen they are considered useful in clarifyin"8 completin"8 or defendin" the doctrine of the school. E.amples of this are the acceptance by !ristotle of Mytilene of Stoic doctrines and of !ristotelian ones by "!lbinus." Similarly8 Morau. seems to achie3e a more precise definition of the concept of eclecticism. !lthou"h he continues to speak of "undeniable" or "effecti3e" eclecticismRM7S 9ith re"ard to authors 9ho accept doctrines not belon"in" to their o9n schools8 he is careful to distin"uish this eclecticism8 9hich may 3ery easily be reconciled 9ith full and loyal membership in a philosophical school8 from Galen?s eclecticism stated as a "uidin" principleN the latter consists in a refusal to belon" to any pre3iously established system8 either of philosophy or medicine8 and has nothin" to do 9ith "a more or less casual and arbitrary combination of elements comin" from different sources." "Galen?s choice ... is seen as al9ays ha3in" scientific foundations. Galen?s eclecticism is the immediate result of his strict scientific ideal." )ther scholars in recent times ha3e already noted Galen?s @uite special position. RMMS Thus a fully positi3e and honorable sense of eclecticism has reappeared in the history of philosophy. RM7SRMMS A M0 A This re3ie9 sho9s that the term eclecticism has been used by modern historians ;after Qeller< to indicate different philosophical attitudes 9ith a number of different senses. Let us try to enumerate these for the sake of clarity. 0. There is first of all the ne"ati3e meanin" of the term8 ori"inatin" chiefly from Qeller and denotin" a combination of hetero"eneous elements that is substantially uncritical and more or less deliberate. %n this sense the term has under"one a stron" decline in recent years. ;%n the sense employed by Praechter8 in3ol3in" the antithesis bet9een eclecticism and orthodo.y8 the term is indeed dyin" out.< The more penetratin" the interpretation of indi3idual authors once contemptuously defined as eclectic becomes8 the more inade@uate this sense of eclecticism appears. !fter the most recent studies it seems 3ery difficult to dismiss and condemn as eclectic authors such as !rius idymus8 Plutarch and the Middle Platonists in "eneral8 or e3en8 % should like to add8 Seneca.RMBS 7. The term may be used as a statement of fact8 9ithout any positi3e or ne"ati3e implicationsN it simply states that the doctrine of a philosophical school is combined in an author?s thou"ht 9ith elements of a different ori"in. M. Eclecticism is also defined as the more or less arbitrary attitude of authors 9ho accept into the doctrine of their o9n school e.traneous elements because they are honestly con3inced that these are compatible 9ith8 and indeed helpful in e.plainin" or defendin"8 their o9n doctrine. B. The eclectic attitude of Potamo and +lement8 9hich is completely deliberate and stated at the outset8 can ob3iously continue to be described as eclecticism.

4. More recent discussions indicate8 ho9e3er8 that this attitude must be distin"uished from another one8 9hich chooses amon" doctrines 9ith the same deliberate pro"ram but 9hose spirit is stron"ly anti6do"matic and anti6sectarian. The typical e.ample is Galen. RMBS A M7 A K. *inally8 althou"h it has not yet been mentioned8 there is a si.th attitude8 9hich must be distin"uished as absolutely different from all pre3ious ones and 9hich is often called eclectic. %t is the posture of !ntiochus of !scalon8 9ho tried to pro3e the basic a"reement bet9een Platonism8 !ristotelianism8 and Stoicism and tended to make these three schools coincide and form a sin"le common doctrine. $o9 e3en if the results obtained by !ntiochus may seem similar to those of eclecticism of types ;0< and ;M<8 his point of departure is completely idiosyncratic. >as there anyone 9ho really adopted it after him= Platonists open to !ristotelian influence may in a certain sense be considered his heirs. ,ut 9ho amon" them 9as e@ually open to Stoicism as 9ell= To conclude8 it seems that !ntiochus?s position is indeed 3ery personal8 and it is better to consider it sui "eneris. So 9e ha3e a3ailable today no fe9er than si. different interpretations of the concept of eclecticismN this may cause some diCCiness. )ther interpretations are perhaps possible and may ha3e escaped meD others 9ill probably be su""ested by this book. %f8 ho9e3er8 % may be allo9ed to state 9hat lesson % think % ha3e learned from the account Gust "i3en8 my impression is that it is no9 9ise to use "reat caution in applyin" such an ambi"uous term. The history of the discussion seems to produce an e.hortation to employ the term sparin"lyN in fact8 as 9as said abo3e8 sense ;0< is already disappearin"8 and accordin" to some scholars8 sense ;K<8 namely !ntiochus8 has in fact nothin" to do 9ith eclecticism. RM4S ! further 9idenin" of senses ;B< and ;4< seems difficult in the li"ht of the 9arnin"8 often proclaimed in recent years8RMKS that eclecticism as a deliberate plan 9as a rare and un6 RM4SRMKS A MM A usual position in anti@uity and essentially forei"n to the traditions and philosophical customs of the :ellenistic and 'oman a"es8 9here the desire to look back to a 9ell6 defined school or tradition is al9ays e3ident. %n fact Potamo and +lement had no follo9ers in pa"an philosophy. !s for Galen?s anti6do"matic eclecticism8 it is difficult to find e3en one ancient philosopher 9ho reproduces his features e.actly. Perhaps Seneca alone mi"ht be compared 9ith him on account of his critical attention to themes of contemporary Platonism and Epicureanism and his fre@uent claims of intellectual freedom and independenceD but in fact he remains different. %n my Gud"ment there is either no eclecticism in Seneca or there is a hint of a further 9idenin" of the meanin" of the term.RMLS %t seems therefore that only senses ;7< and ;M< may be effecti3ely and 9idely applied. :o9e3er8 the former of these is also open to obGections. >hile it is true that it seems rather harmless and comfortable8 perhaps it is innocent only because it has not much capacity to e.plain thin"sN it re"isters the facts but does not make their @ualities and

causes clear. >hen 9e ackno9led"e that a doctrine is composite8 9e can hardly a3oid askin" oursel3es ho9 and 9hy it 9as put to"ether. >e shall then ine3itably be compelled to ans9er the @uestion by chan"in" our innocent eclecticism into another one8 for the most part belon"in" to sense ;0< or ;M<. RMLS A MB A

7 +icero?s philosophical affiliations

7 +icero?s philosophical affiliations John Glucker +icero and the Philosophical Schools of :is !"e Let us start 9ith affiliations . % ha3e chosen the term @uite deliberately. !nother contender8 alle"iance 8 is medie3al and feudal and in3ol3es no free choice. !ffiliation 8 also medie3al and feudal in ori"in8 is deri3ed from Latin filius and may remind us of filius6familias Hbut it does denote8 in our modem lan"ua"es8 a free adoption into a society of a member 9ho is thereafter free to end his membership or "chan"e his affiliation." This is no mere 9ordplay. %n a famous passa"e8 Seneca ;$Q L.M7.7< 9ritesN "Therefore so many communities Rfamiliae S of philosophers ha3e perished 9ithout a successor8" and he specifiesN "!cademics both older and youn"er Ret 3eteres et minores S8 Pyrrhonians8 Pytha"oreans8 Se.tians." +icero himself ;$ 0.00<8 9ritin" in !u"ust of B4 ,.+. 8 lon" after the demise of the !cad6 This is a shortened and edited 3ersion of the paper as ori"inally drafted. %n my ori"inal 3ersion fuller @uotations 9ere supplied and all @uotations 9ere in the ori"inal Greek and Latin. ! section on probo8 probare 8 their Latin co"nates and Greek counterparts8 9as omitted as too technical for this 3olume. A M4 A emy as an institution8R0S has a similar "familial" e.pressionN "9hich R!cademyS % understand in Greece itself is practically bereft Rorbam S." !bandonin" one philosophical school for another is "mo3in" back into an old house from a ne9 one" ;+icero !cad . 0.0M<. ! claim to be heir to the traditions of the !cademy is called "li3in" off Rdepasci S the ancient estate of the !cademy" ;+icero Le" . 0.44<.R7S Philosophy8 then8 is no mere assembla"e of peopleN rather8 it is a community made up of communitiesD and the label of a school is of far "reater importance than purity of doctrine or de"ree of eclecticism. !ntiochus8 in his final incarnation8 9as Stoic in his epistemolo"yRMS and a Peripatetic of sorts in his ethics. *or the modem historian8 he is an eclectic ;or Eclectic<. *or +icero= ... ":e 9as called an !cademic8 but 9as in fact8 if he had made a 3ery fe9 chan"es8 the purest Stoic" ;Luc . 0M7<.RBS The first of the "eclectic" philosophersHas modem scholars ha3e commonly 3ie9ed themHPanaetius 9as "a lo3er of Plato and !ristotle" ;fr. 4L &an Straaten<8 9ho "9as al9ays ready 9ith a @uotation from Plato8 !ristotle8 Ienocrates8 Theophrastus8 or icaearchus" ;+icero *in . B.L1<. (et he 9as elected head of the Stoic school in !thens8 and probably Gustified his !cademic

and Peripatetic borro9in"s by claimin" a Socratic and Platonic descent for the early Stoa. R4S The term eklektikos does not seem to R0SR7SRMSRBSR4S A MK A be used before Galen8 or much after himDRKS and e3en Galen is at least as interested in e.plainin" ho9 people become affiliated to the more definable "sects" ;haireseis <.RLS Potamo of !le.andria is the only one described as representin" bothHan eklektike hairesis ;Suda s.3. Potamon 8 707K !dlerD io"enes Laertius 0.70<.R2S %f8 as the ).ford +lassical ictionary tells us8 he 9as the "founder of the Eclectic School8" 9e hear nothin" of the subse@uent fortunes of that "school."R1S E3en 9hen the old institutions be"in to disinte"rate8 one does not cease to claim affiliation to their traditions and to belon" to a hairesis8 secta 8 or disciplina .R05S +icero8 9ho stands on the di3idin" line bet9een the !cademy as a school and !cademic Skepticism as a "school of thou"ht8" Gustifies his support for it as for an apparently "deserted and derelict school8" 9hose doctrines8 ho9e3er8 ha3e not ceased to e.ist 9ith the demise of their e.ponents ;$ 0.00<. ! century later8 one can already be a Stoic8 Epicurean8 or Platonist any9here in the Empire8 belon"in" to no institutionDR00S and Marcus !urelius?s chairs of philosophy in !thens are instituted in the four maGor "sects." ,ut affiliation to one of these "sects" remains a crucial matter of philosophical identity throu"hout the ancient 9orld. )ne can no more be a "mere" philosopher than call oneself8 in our modem 9orld8 a "mere" +hristianD and the chairs of Platonic8 Stoic8 or Epicurean philosophy are not unlike the chairs of +atholic8 E3an"elical8 or Je9ish theolo"y in modem uni3ersities.R07S !ffiliations chan"e8 of course8 in philosophy Gust as in politics8 RKSRLSR2SR1SR05SR00SR07S A ML A albeit not so often.R0MS !rcesilaus8 at first a pupil of Theophrastus8 9as lured a9ay into the !cademy by his friend +rantor ; io"enes Laertius B.716M5<. !ntiochus chan"ed his affiliation8 as % belie3e8 t9iceDR0BS and his pupils io and !risto defected to the Peripatos. R04S >hat happened in Greece couldHand didHhappen in its cultural pro3ince8 'ome. +icero?s famous letter to Trebatius Testa of *ebruary of 4M ,.+. ;*am . L.07< be"ins 9ith the 9ordsN "%?m 9onderin" 9hy it is that you ha3e stopped sendin" me letters. My Mend Pansa has informed me that you ha3e turned Epicurean."R0KS The rest of the letter8 despite its Gocular style8R0LS dra9s serious conclusions from this "con3ersion" as to the conduct of Trebatius?s pri3ate and public life. The Epicurean inGunction not to en"a"e in politics 9as seriously follo9ed by !tticus himself most of his life. ,y adoptin" an Epicurean affiliation8 Trebatius 9as bound to chan"e his 9hole outlook and conduct Gust like any Greek follo9er of a philosophical sect. >hat8 then8 of +icero himself= Modem scholarship tends either to emphasiCe his continuous loyalty to !cademic Skepticism and its last representati3e8 his teacher Philo of Larissa8 or to d9ell on his "eclectic" inconsistency8 especially in the field of

R0MSR0BSR04SR0KSR0LS A M2 A ethics.R02S ,ut despite such sli"ht de3iations8 and 9ith a fe9 honorable e.ceptions to 9hich 9e shall soon return8 +icero?s lifelon" R02S A M1 A loyalty to Philo and Skepticism is taken for "ranted. The reason is not far to seek.R01S !s a contemporary scholar 9ho is 9ell a9are of the importance of affiliations reminds us8 9e find declarations of alle"iance to the Skeptical !cademy both in +icero?s earliest theoretical 9ork8 e in3entione 8 9ritten about 20 ,.+. 8 and in his last 9ork8 e officiis ;7.L62<8 9ritten in the last fe9 months of his life.R75S The passa"e in e in3entione is sharp and dear. )ne identifies in it immediately such !cademic Skeptical terms as affirmatio ;apophasis <8 @uaerentes dubitanter ;skeptomenoi <8 and assentior ;sunkatatithemai <8 and its last sentence is a stron" promise of lifelon" alle"iance. ,ut promisesHin philosophy Gust as much as in reli"ion or politics Hare often made to be broken. %n 20 or 25 ,.+. 8 9hen he 9rote e in3entione 8R70S +icero 9as youn"8 relati3ely unkno9n8 and still under the stron" and fresh influence of Philo of Larissa. ! year or t9o later8 in L18 he studied in !thens itself under !ntiochus. :is subse@uent career8 especially after his prosecution of &erres in L5 and his consulate in KM8 turned him into R01SR75SR70S A B5 A one of the leadin" orators and statesmen in 'ome8 a pater patriae despite his e@uestrian ori"ins. Such a career called for resolute action and firm con3ictionsHat least in ethics and in political theoryHrather than doubt8 an open mind8 and constant deliberation and 3acillation. :a3in" already anticipated a later sta"e8 let us no9 Gump to +icero?s later philosophical 9ritin"s. +icero ne3er tires of speakin" about himself8 and the philosophical 9ritin"s of his last years are Gust as full of self6re3elations as any of his speeches and letters. Many of these passa"es are often @uoted in modem research in support of the pre3ailin" 3ie9 that +icero o9ed a lifelon" alle"iance to !cademic Skepticism. T9o crucial passa"es are rarely discussed or mentioned8 and in such cases they are misunderstood. % therefore @uote them in fullN Tum illeN "istuc @uidem considerabo8 nec 3ero sine te. sed de te ipso @uid est" in@uit "@uod audio=" "Quanam" in@uam "de re=" "'elictam ate 3eterem !cademiam"R77S in@uit8 "tractari autem no3am."

"Quid er"o" in@uam "!ntiocho id ma"is licuit nostro familiari8 remi"rare in domum 3eterem e no3a8 @uam nobis in no3ato e 3etere= certe enim recentissima @uae@ue sunt correcta et emendata ma.ime..." ;!cad . 0.0M< "% 9ill deal 9ith your point8" he reGoined8 "althou"h % shall re@uire your assistance. ,ut 9hat is this ne9s % hear about yourself=" ">hat about8 e.actly=" % asked. R77S A B0 A "That the )ld !cademy has been abandoned by you8 and the $e9 one is bein" dealt 9ith." ">hat then=" % said. "%s our friend !ntiochus to ha3e had more liberty to return from the ne9 school to the old8 than 9e are to ha3e to mo3e out of the old one into the ne9= >hy8 there is no @uestion that the ne9est theories are al9ays most correct and free from error..." ;trans. adapted from 'ackham8 Loeb +lassical Library< Multis etiam sensi mirabile 3ideri earn nobis potissimum probatam esse philosophiam8 @uae lucem eriperet et @uasi noctem @uandam rebus offunderet8 desertae@ue disciplinae et iam pridem relictae patrocinium necopinatum a nobis esse susceptum. ;$ 0.K< Many also8 as % ha3e noticed8 are surprised at my choosin" to espouse a philosophy that in their 3ie9 robs the 9orld of dayli"ht and floods it 9ith a darkness as of ni"htD and they 9onder at my comin" for9ard out of the blue to take up the case of a derelict system and one that has lon" been "i3en up. ;trans. adapted from 'ackham8 Loeb +lassical Library< % start 9ith the second of these pieces of e3idence8 if only because % ha3e found it @uoted no9here. The philosophy that takes a9ay the dayli"ht8 co3ers all in darkness8 and is no9 deserted and abandoned e3en in Greece itself ;$ 0.00< is8 of course8 !cademic Skepticism8 orHto use +icero?s e.pressionHthat of the !cademici ;$ 0.08 00<.R7MS %t is no ne9 method ;ratio <D it has endured since Socrates ;$ 0.00<. (et +icero has taken up its case ;pa6 R7MS A B7 A trocinium ... susceptum8 $ 0.KD patrocinium suscepimus8 $ 0.00<8 in his o9n 9ords8 "out of the blue" ;necopinatum <.R7BS >e return to our first passa"e8 !cademica 0.0M. !ny unpreGudiced reader 9ould take it to mean Gust 9hat it says. &arro is accusin" +icero of ha3in" recently deserted !ntiochus?s

")ld !cademy" for 9hat heHand !ntiochusHcalled the "$e9 !cademy." The parallel 9ith !ntiochus in +icero?s ans9er makes it @uite dearN both +icero and !ntiochus before him had deserted one type of !cademy and "mi"rated" to another. %n the ei"hteenth century8 9hen the flood"ates of modem secondary literature had not yet been opened8 and scholars could still read and reread their ancient te.ts 9ith the proper attention8 this 9as @uite dear to +onyers Middleton8 9ho 9roteN This it 9as that induced +icero8 in his ad3anced life and ripened Gud"ement8 to desert the )ld !cademy8 and declare for the $e98 from a lon" e.perience of the 3ariety of those sects8 9ho called themsel3es the proprietors of truth8 and the sole "uides of life8 and throu"h a despair of findin" any thin" certain8 he 9as "lad8 after all his pains8 to take up 9ith the probable.R74S Middleton @uotes as his e3idence our passa"e of !cademica 0 as 9ell as Tusculans 0.0L and )rator 7ML. Modern scholarship8 in the person of James S. 'eid8 cannot i"nore the first of these R7BSR74S A BM A passa"es. ,ut 'eid is ob3iously disturbed by the plain sense of that passa"e. >hen8 in his "reat commentary8 he reaches the 9ord tractari ;"to be dealt 9ith"<8 he comments 9ith reliefN "tractari N it is important to notice that this implies a reference to some 9ritin"s of +icero8 9hich can only be the ?!cademica? itself ;cf. %ntrod. p. 04<. The illusion of the dialo"ue is not here carefully preser3ed."R7KS Let us turn8 then8 to pa"e 04 of the %ntroductionN %t has been supposed by many scholars8R7LS on the stren"th of certain passa"es in the !cademicaPosteriora 8R72S that +icero had for a time abandoned the 3ie9s he learned from Philo8 and resumed them Gust before the !cademica 9as 9ritten. %n 0M8 &arro char"es +icero 9ith desertin" the )ld !cademy for the $e98 and +icero seems to admit the char"e. ,ut. one of the phrases used by &arro ;tractari autem no3am < points to a solution of the difficulty. &arro e3idently means that +icero8 ha3in" in earlier 9orks copied the 9ritin"s of the ")ld !cademy" philosophers8 is about to dra9 on the literary stores of the $e9 !cademy.R71S >e ha3e already seen that this is hardly the sense of our passa"eHor of the other piece of e3idence8 $ 0.K8 9here the 9ord R7KSR7LSR72SR71S A BB A tractari is not used and the terminolo"y of affiliation is @uite dear. ,ut 9hat of 'eid?s "solution8" his ne9 interpretation of tractari ;for 9hich he adduces no e3idence<= %n late medie3al and 'enaissance Latin8 tractare does indeed mean "to treat in 9ritin"8" and one could fill bookshel3es 9ith books called Tractatus de .. . ,ut to the best of my kno9led"e8 this is not +lassical Latin8RM5S and certainly is not +iceronian.RM0S *or

+icero8 tractare is simply "to deal 9ith8" and if 9ritin" is in3ol3ed as a matter of fact8 it is no part of the sense. Thus the orator8 he says ;)r . 002<8 "should be in possession of all the topics familiar to and treated by Rtractatos S philosophy8" and 9hen he deli3ers his speech he should be able to "deal 9ith the subGect6matter" ;rem tractare8 e or . 7.00B8 00KD cf. ar"umenta tractare8 e or . 7.00L<. More fre@uent and specific is causam ;or causas < tractare ;+luent . 45<8 often coupled 9ith a"ere ; e or . 0.L5D M &err . 05< or 9ith a"itate ;+luent . 27D Planc . B<N i.e.8 take up a case and deal 9ith it thorou"hly as counsel8 a sense reminiscent of our "taken up its case" ;patrocinium ... susceptum < of $ 0.K8 00. !nother +iceronian idiom8 not peculiar to him8RM7S is personam tractare 8 "to act someone?s part" ;!rch . M8 Q . 'osc 758 )ff . M.05K<. Take or lea3e either of these +iceronian senses. +icero is accused by &arro either of takin" up as a la9yer the cause of the "$e9" !cademy ;his o9n patrocinium... susceptum <8 or of representin" in his o9n person8 as an actor in the dialo"ues of his RM5SRM0SRM7S A B4 A o9n composition8 the 3ie9 of that sectHas he does8 indeed8 in *in . 4 and has most probably done in the lost :ortensius . !nd8 9hate3er the sense of tractari in !cad . 0.0M8 the e.pression "the )ld !cademy has been abandoned by you" ;relictam a te 3eterem !cademiam < in it is hi"hly reminiscent of "a derelict system and one that has lon" been "i3en up" ;desertae@ue disciplinae et ism pridem relictae < of $ 0.K8 accompanied8 as it is8 by "my comin" for9ard out of the blue to take up the case" ;patrocinium necopinstum a nobis susceptum <.RMMS +icero is not a careless 9riter. So much should be dear e3en from our t9o passa"es. %t 9as dear to 'udolf :irCel in 022M Ht9o years before the appearance of 'eid?s editionHand his footnote 0 on pp. B22621 of the third 3olume of his monumental #ntersuchun"en Cu +iceros philoso6phischen Schriften is a model of lucidity8 bre3ity ;in a book not distin"uished for that @uality<8 and "ood sense. :irCel reads correctly our passa"e of !cademica 0 ;althou"h he makes no reference to $ 0.K and 00<8 and deduces from it that before his later 3olte6face ;and probably e3er since L1 ,.+. and !ntiochus in !thens<8 +icero re"arded himself8 and 9as re"arded by others8 as a follo9er of !ntiochus?s ")ld !cademy." ,ut the e3idence he adduces for that period ;!tt . 4.058 *am . 04.B8 K8 Le" . 0.M1< is only part of 9hat is a3ailable. Since +icero?s espousal of the ")ld !cademy" in a period bet9een e in3entione of 20625 ,.+. and !cademica % of B4 ,.+. is my demonstrandum 8 % shall deal 9ith his o9n e3idence in some detail. )ur first piece of e3idence comes from Pro Murena KM6KB8 of the year of +icero?s consulate8 KM ,.+. +icero is comparin" his o9n milder brand of philosophy 9ith the harsher approach of RMMS A BK A the Stoic +ato. ;My footnotes to the passa"e 9ill ser3e as comments on the sort of philosophy represented Rtractata =S here by +icero.<

Those men of our school8 % say8 descendin" from Plato and !ristotle8RMBS bein" moderate and restrained people8 say that 9ith the 9ise man "ratitude counts for somethin"D that it is characteristic of the "ood man to feel pityDRM4S that there are distinct types of crimes8 9ith different penalties attached to themDRMKS that there is a place for for"i3eness 9ith the consistent manDRMLS that the 9ise man himself often holds some opinion 9ith respect to 9hat he does not kno9DRM2S that he is sometimes an"ryDRM1S and is open to persuasion and mollificationDRB5S that he sometimes alters 9hat he has said8 if it pro3es to be better soD that he on occasion departs from his opinionDRB0S that all his 3irtues are controlled by a kind of mean.RB7S E.cept for one short sentence8 e3erythin" in this passa"e represents !ntiochus?s ")ld !cademy." RMBSRM4SRMKSRMLSRM2SRM1SRB5SRB0SRB7S A BL A )ur ne.t piece of e3idence comes from the lost e consulatu suo of K5 ,.+. +icero himself ; i3 . 0.0L677< has preser3ed for us8 from the second book8 a lon" speech addressed to himself by the Muse #rania. These are the rele3ant linesNRBMS :aec adeo penitus cura 3idere sa"aci otia @ui studiis laeti tenuere decoris in@ue !cademia umbrifera nitido@ue Lyceo funderunt clams fecundi pectoris artis. e @uibus ereptum primo iam a flore iu3entae te patria in media 3irtutum mole loca3it. Such 9ere the truths they beheld 9ho8 painfully searchin" for 9isdom8 "ladly de3oted their leisure to study of all that 9as noble8 9ho8 in !cademy?s shade and Lyceum?s daCClin" efful"ence uttered the brilliant reflections of minds aboundin" in culture8 torn from these studies8 in youth?s early da9n8 your country recalled you8 "i3in" you place in the thick of the stru""le for public preferment. ;trans. *alconer8 Loeb +lassical Library< +icero8 of course8 ne3er studied in the umbriferous !cademy8 9hich 9as deserted durin" his stay in !thens ;*in . 4.067< and in 9hich 9e ha3e no e3idence that !ntiochus e3er tau"ht.RBBS $or could he ha3e studied in the nitid Lyceum8 since !ristotle?s school had8 by that time8 almost certainly ceased to e.ist.RB4S The references are metaphorical and

poetical. The combination of !cademy and Lyceum si"nifies +icero?s philosophical ancestry at the time he 9as called back in a hurry by his countryD it is that RBMSRBBSRB4S A B2 A combination of early !cademy and early Peripatos 9hich 9as the hallmark of !ntiochus?s school. Ten years after the e consolatu 8 +icero could still declare himself a 3otary of the !ncient Philosophy. % refer to the peroration of his letter to +ato ;*am . 04.B8 K<8 9ritten in ecember of 40 or January of 45 from his proconsulate in TarsusN :aec i"itur8 @uae mihi tecum communis est8 societas studiorum at@ue artium nostrarum8 @uibus a pueritia dediti et de3incti soli prope modum nos philosophiam 3eram illam et anti@uam8 @uae @uibusdam oti esse ac desidiae 3idetur8 in forum at@ue in ipsam aciem paene dedu.imus8 tecum a"it de mea laude. This community of studies and disciplines 9hich you and % share8 to 9hich bein" practically alone de3oted and bound since childhood8 9e ha3e dra9n that true and ancient philosophy8 thou"ht by some to be a matter for leisure and rela.ation8 into the public sphere and practically into the line of battleHthis summons you to embark on my praise. "Since childhood" reminds us of "in youth?s early da9n" from our last passa"eHthat is8 +icero?s studies in !thens under !ntiochus. The e.pression "that true and ancient philosophy" should lea3e no doubt. $ot only is "ancient" an ob3ious allusion to !ntiochus?s ")ld !cademy8" harkin" back to "the philosophy of the ancients" ;anti@uorum ratio8 !cad . 0.BM<8 but callin" such a philosophy "true" could not ha3e been the act of a Skeptic. >e come no9 to e le"ibus 0.M1N Perturbatricem autem harum omnium rerum !cademiam8 hanc ab !rcesila et +arneade recentem8 e.oremus ut sileatD nam si in3aserit in haec8 @uae satis scite nobis instructa et composita 3identur8 nimias edet ruinasD @uam @uidem e"o placare cupio8 summo3ere non audeo. !s for that disrupter of all these matters8 this recent !cademy of !rcesilaus and +arneades8 let us plead for its silence. *or if it makes an assault upon those thin"s 9hich 9e find ele"antly enou"h set out and arran"ed8 it 9ill cause too much destruction. A B1 A *or my part8 % 9ould seek to placate it8 since % dare not try to dispose of it. :irCel8 in the footnote % ha3e referred to8 and PohlenCRBKS took it for "ranted ;9ith reser3ations on :irCel?s part8 on 9hich more later< that at the time of 9ritin" +icero 9as still a follo9er of !ntiochus. Mean9hile8 a contro3ersy has ra"ed about the date of

composition of e le"ibus 8 some scholars puttin" it as late as BB6BM ,.+. This contro3ersy has been lar"ely settled no9 by P. L. Schmidt?s thorou"h and con3incin" treatment of most of the issues in3ol3ed8 returnin" the 9ork to its traditional milieu8 the late 45s ,.+.RBLS ,ut 9hen it comes to our passa"e8 Schmidt?s discussion is rather disappointin".RB2S :e is @uite a9are of the 3ie9 of :irCelRB1S and PohlenC.R45S (et he rehearses the old tale of +icero?s lifelon" alle"iance to Skepticism8 @uotin" a"ain our t9o old friends8 %n3 . 7.05 and )ff . 7.Lff.8 in support of this 3ie9.R40S :o9 does it happen8 then8 that 9e ha3e in our passa"e such a se3ere criticism of the Skeptical !cademy= "%f 9e Gust i"nore %n3 . 7.058 +icero 9as not faced by any necessity from themes in the 9orks of the 45s to represent himself as a $e9 !cademic8 and still less so by the tenor of our 9ork."R47S This 9ill not do. %t is not Gust that +icero does not represent himself as a "$e9" !cademicD he criticiCes the "$e9" !cademy RBKSRBLSRB2SRB1SR45SR40SR47S A 45 A as se3erely as only an outsider can do ;althou"h also as respectfully as only an old alumnus 9ould<. E3en the 9ords of 'ep M.18 "make your reply to +arneades8 9ho is in the habit of castin" ridicule on the best causes by his talent for misrepresentation8" are not @uite as harshD and at least they are not spoken by +icero in his o9n person. $o8 our passa"e of e le"ibus HGust like the refutation of +arneades? speech "a"ainst Gustice" 9hich follo9s on Philus?s "ad3ocacy of immorality" ;improbitatis patrocinium8 'ep . M.2< Hcould hardly ha3e come from +icero?s last years 9hen8 as a born6a"ain Skeptic8 he 9as an admirer of +arneades. %t belon"s to the period 9hen he 9as still an a3o9ed follo9er of !ntiochus.R4MS >hen did +icero chan"e his philosophical affiliations and take up a"ain the case of the Skeptical !cademy= *or a lon" time % belie3ed that the moment of truth came in July of 40 ,.+. 9hen8 on his 9ay to his !sian proconsulate8 he stayed for a 9hile 9ith !ristus8 !ntiochus?s brother and successor8 in !thens and may ha3e become finally disillusioned 9ith the ")ld !cademy" and its doctrines. The te.t of the rele3ant passa"e8 !tt . 4.05.48 is hopelessly corrupt. %ts first sentence8 "!thens po9erfully pleased me8" etc. ;3alde me !thenae delectarunt . . .<8 is fairly secure. ,ut the crucial sentence is the ne.t one. Tyrrell and Purser readN "sed multumUeaUphilosophia sursum deorsum8 si @uidem est in !risto8 R4MS A 40 A apud @uem eram." They take it that +icero?s strictures on the topsy6tur3y state of !thenian philosophy ;the mss. a"ree on this part of the te.t< are meant to include8 if not to sin"le out8 !ristus8 of 9hom Plutarch ;,rut . 7< is also critical.R4BS Shackleton ,ailey8 ho9e3er8 emendsN "sed muVtata mulWta. philosophia sursum deorsum. si @uid est8 est in !risto8 apud @uem cram." :e translatesN ",ut many thin"s ha3e chan"ed8 and philosophy is all at si.es and se3ens8 anythin" of 3alue bein" represented by !ristus." :is comment isN "% do not belie3e that +icero 9rote this of his hospes et familiaris Rhost and friendS

;,rut . MM7<8 particularly as sli"htin" criticism of a friend of ,rutus ... mi"ht ha3e Garred upon his correspondent. !"roikia RboorishnessS 9as not amon" his failin"s."R44S This ar"ument 9ould not make me lose much sleep. +icero?s correspondent is not ,rutus but !tticus8 on 9hose perfect discretion he can relyD and in other letters to !tticus8 he says much more dama"in" thin"s about ,rutus himself and about many another "host and friend." ,ut e3en if he 9ere disappointed 9ith !ristus8 this does not imply "i3in" up his ad3ocacy of !ntiochus?s school. !fter all8 his letter to +ato from Tarsus 9hich 9e ha3e Gust noted8 *am . 04.B.K8 9as 9ritten later8 and in it he still adheres to "that true and ancient philosophy." !s to his disputation 9ith !ristus recorded in Tusc . 4.77H9hether it took place on the same occasion or on his 9ay back from !siaR4KS Hit is the R4BSR44SR4KS A 47 A same old ar"ument he had held "fre@uently 9ith !ntiochus8" 9hose echoes 9e hear in his discussion 9ith Piso in *in . 4.L1ff.8 and on 9hich8 as he tells us in Luc . 0MB8 he had ne3er been able to make up his mindN the choice bet9een the lo"ical consistency of the Stoics and the realism of the Peripatetic and !ntiochian "three kinds of "oods." $o ne9 matter here. More to the point is the lan"ua"e of our first t9o pieces of e3idence8 !cad 0.0M and $ 0.K8 00. ",ut 9hat is this ne9s % hear about yourself" and "out of the blue" both sound like recent ne9s. The earliest e3idence for +icero?s rene9ed alle"iance to !cademic Skepticism comes at the end of his )rator ;7ML8 on 9hich more later<. The first dear e3idence in a properly philosophical 9ork can be found in t9o fra"ments of his :ortensius 8 from *ebruary of B4 ,.+. The first fra"ment ;!u"ustine +. !cad . M.0B6M0< readsN "%f therefore there is nothin" certain8 and it is not for the 9ise man to hold an opinion8 the 9ise man 9ill ne3er appro3e anythin"." !. GrilliR4LS ascribes this sentence to :ortensius of the dialo"ue and takes the passa"e of !u"ustine8 +. !cad . 0.M.LH formerly printed by Plasber" as a fra"ment of +icero?s !cademicus 7R42S Hto be +icero?s ans9er to :ortensius.R41S :is ar"uments seem to me utterly con3incin". Since the second fra"ment is readily a3ailable in Plasber"?s edition of the !cademic books of +icero8 % shall not @uote it here. The reader can see for R4LSR42SR41S A 4M A himself that the position taken in it is dearly that of the Skeptical !cademyHand8 since !u"ustine introduces it 9ith the 9ords "in our +icero?s opinion" ;placuit +iceroni nostro <8 it is by no9 also +icero?s. +icero8 then8 chan"ed his affiliations t9iceN once8 from a youthful enthusiasm for Philo of Larissa and !cademic Skepticism to !ntiochus?s ")ld !cademy"Halbeit 9ith reser3ations and 9ith a lin"erin" respect for the Skeptical traditionRK5S Hand then8 some time in B4 ,.+. 8 back to the Skepticism of +arneades and Philo. +icero?s o9n e3idence seems so o3er9helmin" that one 9onders 9hat it is that made so many scholars i"nore it8

or feel uncomfortable 9hen faced 9ith it and attempt to find an unsatisfactory solution to an ima"inary difficulty. The combination of +icero?s early statement in %n3 . 7.05 9ith his repeated statements of alle"iance to Skepticism in his later philosophical corpus is one reason for this. %t has caused e3en some of our contemporary e.perts such as >eische and Schmidt8 both fully a9are of the si"nificance of philosophical affiliations8 to i"nore the rest of the e3idence or to try to "et around it.RK0S ,ut one other possible cause for the persistent adherence of so much of modern scholarship to this picture of the e3er6faithful +icero may be the "e3idence" of Plutarch in his Life of +icero B ;2K7+6 <N RK5SRK0S A 4B A )n comin" to !thens he attended the lectures of !ntiochus of !scalon and 9as charmed by his fluency and "race of diction8 9hile not appro3in" of Rouk epainon S his inno3ations in doctrine. *or !ntiochus had already fallen a9ay from 9hat 9as called the $e9 !cademy8 and abandoned the sect Rstasis S of +arneades8 either s9ayed by clarity Renar"eia S and sensations or8 as some say8 by a feelin" of ambitious opposition to the disciples of +litomachus and Philo to chan"e his 3ie9s and culti3ate in most cases the Stoic 3ie9point. ,ut +icero lo3ed Re"apa S those thin"s Rsc . the stance of +arneadesS and de3oted himself the rather to them8 intendin" in case he 9as alto"ether dri3en out of a public career8 to chan"e his 9ay of life a9ay from the *orum and the state8 and li3e @uietly in the company of philosophy. ;trans. adapted from Perrin8 Loeb +lassical Library< Plutarch has al9ays been one of the most popular authors both 9ith +lassical scholars and 9ith the "eneral public8 read in the ori"inal or in one of the numerous translations produced e3er since the 'enaissance. ,ut 9hat is the 3alue of his "e3idence"= $o independent court or Gury 9ould accept his testimony as a"ainst the dear e3idence of the numerous passa"es of +icero himself. ,ut other points in his passa"e sho9 dearly that it is far from bein" historical. Plutarch claims that +icero continued his philosophical studies e3er since his youth8 9ith the e.press purpose of retirin" into a life of philosophy if he 9ere to be remo3ed from politics. $ot only does +icero8 $ 0.L628 see thin"s differently e3en in retrospectHfor he says there that because he had been eGected from public life8 he 9as no9 applyin" himself to philosophy. ,ut in Le" . 0.1ff.8 ha3in" been asked by !tticus ;4ff.< to apply himself to 9ritin" history8 he replies that if he has the time on his retirement from the 'epublic8 he intends to employ it8 like his teacher Mucius Scae3ola8 in "i3in" free le"al ad3ice to people. This8 by the 9ay8 is another proof that +icero could not ha3e 9ritten e le"ibus in the last years of his life8 9hen forced retirement from politics 9as no lon"er a remote prospect and 9hen he 9as dedicatin" his time to philosophical A 44 A 9orks. ,ut it also sho9s that as late as 45 ,.+. 8 +icero had no plan of that retirement into a philosophical otium D ho9 much less so8 then8 in L1 ,.+. =

Plutarch8 of course8 is no more reliable than his sourcesD and 9hen it comes to 'oman affairs8 his understandin" of the information and the back"round of his sources is likely to be deficient8 especially if he relies on Latin sources and his o9n imperfect command of Latin.RK7S %t has been the pre3ailin" 3ie98 most probably e3er since !.:.L. :eeren?s e *ontibus et auctoritate &itarum parallelarum Plutarchi of 02758 confirmed on this point by :ermann Peter?s ie Quellen Plutarchs in den ,io"raphien der 'Omer of 02K48 that Plutarch?s main source for his Life of +icero 9as the Greek bio"raphy 9ritten by M. Tullius Tiro.RKMS ,ut it 9as ar"ued as lon" a"o as 01578 by !lfred Gudeman in a little6 kno9n 9ork called Tile Sources of Plutarch?s Lift of +icero 8RKBS that Plutarch?s source or sources could not ha3e been Tiro or any other contemporary or near6contemporary like Sallust or Li3y ;for no one 9ould dream of accusin" Plutarch of ha3in" read the 3arious 9ritin"s of +icero in the ori"inal for himselfHas Gudeman need only mention<8RK4S but a post6!u"ustan source8 and in Latin . Gudeman opts for Suetonius?s lost Life of +icero 8 9hich is not unlikely. >hat concerns us here is that the source is most prob6 RK7SRKMSRKBSRK4S A 4K A ably Latin and late8 and thus liable to confuse issues and chronolo"y. !n attempt to translate Plutarch?s passa"e back into Latin 9ould repay the effort. Many of his e.pressions ha3e e.act8 or almost e.act8 parallels in +icero?s e.tant 9ritin"s.RKKS The presumed later Latin source dearly dre9 on passa"es in +icero?s 9ritin"s. % shall take as one e.ample Plutarch?s 9ords ",ut +icero lo3ed Re"apa S those thin"s." %f this is meant to refer to the 3ie9s of +litomachus and PhiloHor e3en to the "eneral 3ie9 of the Skeptical !cademyHthis is hardly dear or 3ery "ood Greek. ,ut a +iceronian parallel8 Luc . 7.18 could illustrate 9hat may be lurkin" behind itN "but someho9 or other most men prefer to "o 9ron"8 and to defend tooth and nail the system for 9hich they ha3e come to feel an affection Radama3erunt S."RKLS !nother e.ampleN Plutarch?s "his inno3ations in doctrine Rdo"mata S" 9ould make no sense8 as it stands8 in a +iceronian te.t. !ntiochus8 after all8 could introduce no inno3ations into the do"mata RKKSRKLS A 4L A of the Skeptical !cademy8 since it hadHand +icero is one of our main sources for thisH no do"mata . ,ut the source mi"ht ha3e misunderstood +icero?s o9n statement ;Luc . 0M7<8 "he 9as called an !cademic8 but 9as in fact8 if he had made a 3ery fe9 chan"es8 the purest Stoic8" to mean that !ntiochus did8 indeed8 introduce some chan"es into the doctrines of the !cademy. :ere it is possible that the misapprehension arose already in Plutarch?s source. %n the case of "9hile not appro3in"" ;ouk epainon < the error is dearly Plutarch?s o9n. The "synchroniCation" of e3ents that occurred ;more or less< in 3arious periods of +icero?s life may ha3e been already the 9ork of Plutarch?s source8 or it may ha3e been done by Plutarch himself.RK2S >hoe3er did this telescopin" may already ha3e anticipated the error of modem scholarship and combined +icero?s statement in e in3entione 9ith

his fre@uent references to his Skeptical affiliations in his later 9ritin"s. ,e that as it may8 Plutarch?s testimony is in no 9ay a piece of reliable e3idence8 to be preferred to +icero?s o9n "enuine and datable statements. %t is8 in the best case8 the result of a misunderstandin" of earlier sources by Plutarch or his source or both8 and in the 9orst case8 an ancient piece of speculation 9hich is no better than any modem speculation 9hen faced 9ith +icero?s o9n 9ords. E3en if it 9ere a smoother and a more consistent piece of narrati3e8 it could hardly out9ei"h our firsthand e3idence. 7. +icero?s T9o Philosophical +orpora >hat8 if any8 9ere the effects of +icero?s chan"es in philosophical affiliation on the nature of his philosophical 9ritin"s of the 3arious periods= Since +icero 9rote no philosophical 9orks at the RK2S A 42 A period of e in3entione 8 9e ha3e to deal 9ith t9o sets of 9orks onlyN e oratore8 e republica 8 and e le"ibus of the late 45s ,.+. 8 and +icero?s later philosophical 9ritin"s of BK6BM ,.+. That there is a difference bet9een the t9o sets is no9 "enerally ackno9led"edHbut 9hat sort of difference= %n a recent article8 P.L. Schmidt 9rites8 ":is philosophical 9orks fall into t9o "reat contrastin" cycles8 dependin" on the chan"ed political conditions8" and e.plains that the 9orks of the 45s 9ere 9ritten 9hen +icero still belie3ed he had an acti3e political role to play8 9hereas the later 9orks 9ere already 9ritten from the standpoint of a pri3ate indi3idual philosophiCin" at his leisure.RK1S This is correct as far as it "oes8 and "i3es us one likely bio"raphical reason for the chan"e in attitude and affiliations8 but it is still far from describin" the essential nature of the difference in philosophical outlook. Gallus Qoll8 in his detailed study of the form of +icero?s dialo"ues8 RL5S has noticed that the dialo"ues of the 45s display more Platonic imitation both in form and themes8 9hereas the dialo"ues of the last years are more a3o9edly !ristotelian. RL0S ,ut on the @uestion of 9hether this may ha3e anythin" to do 9ith "an internal chan"e in +icero?s artistic intentions8" he seems to falter. !lthou"h he 9ould ha3e preferred to ans9er in the affirmati3e8 the e@ual @uantity of references to Plato and !ristotle in 9orks of both periods8 and 9ith the same complimentary epithets8 seems to con3ince him that this is merely a matter of adoptin" a different literary "enus to suit different literary themes. :e calls the earlier dialo"ues ,ildun"sdialo"e ;"educational dialo"ues"< and the later dialo"ues >issensdialo"e ;"scientific dialo"ues"<8 and takes this to be the source of their differences.RL7S The Platonism of +icero?s cycle of the 45s 9as a fa3orite RK1SRL5SRL0SRL7S A 41 A theme in studies of these 9orks published in the "eneration before and after the Second >orld >ar. Much of this literature is mentioned and discussed in t9o 9ell6kno9n articles8 one by Pierre ,oyancJ and one by Earl ,Fchner8 each of 9hich has the 9ord

Platonism in the title.RLMS ,Fchner?s article marks the be"innin" of a reaction a"ainst the "PlatoniCin"" fashion. :e points out that +icero?s ar"uments a"ainst community of property8 marria"e8 and children amon" the Guardians in e 'ep . B are not an isolated case of a criticism of Plato. +icero?s 9hole approach to the 3ery essence of the state8 9hich he bases on the historical e.perience of the Greeks and 'omans8 is the e.act opposite of Plato?s. ""eometrical construction" of the state8 in his 'epublic 8 out of "eneral characteristics of human nature. ,Fchner also touches on the sore point of e oratore . Plato?s denial of the 3ery e.istence of an ars rhetorica re@uires no elaboration. %t is also clearly an e.a""eration to speak of "Platonism in 'ome." :o9e3er much +icero8 ,rutus8 and8 to some e.tent8 &arro may ha3e been admirers of Plato8 they hardly instituted a school or a mo3ement like *icino?s "Platonic !cademy" of *lorenceD +ambrid"e PlatonismD !merican Transcendentalism8 9ith its emphasis on Plato and the later PlatonistsD neo6EantianismD ,ritish :e"elianismHor8 indeed8 the mo3ement in late anti@uity that 9e call $eoplatonism. ,ut e3en in speakin" merely of +icero?s Platonism 9e should be cautious. Quintilian?s ta" of Platonis aemulus 8 "Plato?s counterpart8" comin" as it does in his comparati3e catalo"ue of Greek and Latin classics ;05.0.07M<8 is tendentious. That +icero is unusually 9ell 3ersed in Plato8 as his translations of Timaeus and RLMS A K5 A Prota"oras and the innumerable @uotations and references in his 9ritin"s sho98 is admired. These Platonic loci ha3e been collected by Thelma ,. eGraff in a 9ell6kno9n article.RLBS ,ut all it pro3es is +icero?s intimate familiarity 9ith Plato and his comprehension of the plain meanin" of Plato?s Greek te.t. >hat matters8 as >alter ,urkert has emphasiCed8RL4S is ho9 and throu"h 9hose interpretation +icero read his Plato. !fter all8 Plato?s 9ritin"s ha3e al9ays been a3ailable8 and there had been numerous "Platonisms" e3en by +icero?s time. +icero may ha3e chan"ed his 3ie9 of the essence and orientation of Plato?s philosophy 9hen he chan"ed his philosophical affiliation around BK ,.+. Serious 9ork on this issue has ne3er8 to my kno9led"e8 been doneH perhaps because the chan"e in +icero?s affiliation has not so far recei3ed the attention it deser3es. This8 ho9e3er8 is not the place to launch such a proGect. !ll 9e can do here is point to an ob3ious chan"e in philosophical orientation bet9een the 9ritin"s of the 45s and those of the B5s. Put briefly8 the 9ritin"s of the 45s are "do"matic8" 9hile those of the B5s are Skeptical. % shall not "o into e oratore . ! dialo"ue on the art of rhetoric by a master of the trade can hardly be e.pected to present us 9ith a Skeptical orientationHalthou"h )rator does end e.actly on such a Skeptical note. ,ut e republica is hardly the 9ork of a Skeptic. >e ha3e already seen that +arneades? 'oman speech a"ainst Plato?s and !ristotle?s idea of Gustice8 defended by Philus in ,ook 7 as "the ad3ocacy of immorality8" is immediately refuted by Scipio. !s to e le"ibus 8 9e ha3e already noted and discussed the offendin" passa"e8 0.M18 9here +icero uses the stron"est lan"ua"e in any of his 9ritin"s a"ainst the !cademy of !rcesilaus and +arneades. Such thin"s could hardly be e.pectedHand are ne3er foundHin the philosophical 9ritin"s of the B5s.

This is not to say that in the 9orks of the 45s !ntiochus is RLBSRL4S A K0 A al9ays or usually +icero?s source8 or that his philosophy is represented by +icero?s persons of the dialo"ues. Ma. PohlenC has already adduced some 3ery co"ent e3idence a"ainst the thesis of :oyer8 'eitCenstein8 and Theiler that !ntiochus is the source of e le"ibus .RLKS $or is e republica 8 9ith its emphasis on 'oman history and e.perience8 more likely to be based on a 9ork by !ntiochus. %n the best case8 some pans of it8 like the refutation of +arneades in ,ook M or the ar"uments a"ainst Plato?s communalism amon" the Guardians in ,ook B8 may be partly dra9n from !ntiochian materials. ,y the late 45s8 a 9hole "eneration had passed since +icero?s studies 9ith !ntiochus in !thens in L1 ,.+. D and there 9ere issues on 9hich +icero had ne3er seen eye to eye 9ith !ntiochus and his school.RLLS >hat matters is that in these 9ritin"s +icero is still hi"hly critical of !rcesilaus8 +arneades8 and the recentior !cademia and that his philosophical orientation is still positi3e and do"matic. +icero?s constant and recurrin" statements of alle"iance to the Skeptical !cademy in his later philosophical 9orks are a commonplace. >e ha3e already seen that these declarations of rene9ed alle"iance start as early as )rator of BK and :ortensius of *ebruary B4. They continue unabated until e officiis of the last year of his life.RL2S This is not Gust a matter of formal and sporadic self6re3elationsN the ne9 attitude affects the form and purport of these 9orks. >e do not ha3e +icero?s :ortensius 8 and it is inconcei3able that in such a protreptic8 +icero 9ould ha3e emphasiCed his Skeptical 3ie9s to the e.clusion of any statements concernin" the assets and consolations of philosophy. There are indeed t9o fra"ments in 9hich +icero seems to point out that some positi3e RLKSRLLSRL2S A K7 A philosophical ideas can be accepted e3en by the Skeptic.RL1S ,ut 9e ha3e also noticed that e3en in that dialo"ue +icero himself represents or defends a Skeptical position. The !cademic books8 in both 3ersions8 are of course a manifesto of the Skeptical tradition in the !cademy a"ainst !ntiochus and the Stoa. $or are e finibus8 e natura deorum 8 and e di3inatione the kind of 9orks that 9ould 9arm the heart of a do"matic. !nyone 9ho recei3es the impression that at the end of the Tusculans +icero has settled to his o9n and his interlocutor?s satisfaction the problems of death8 sufferin"8 the perturbations of the soul8 or the self6sufficiency of 3irtue must ha3e for"otten :irtius?s 9ords8 addressed to +icero himself8 in e fato BN "Moreo3er8 your Tusculan isputations sho9 that you ha3e adopted this !cademic practice of ar"uin" a"ainst the thesis ad3anced." E3en e officiis 8 in 9hich +icero admittedly follo9s Panaetius8 is full of Skeptical declarations such as 7.L62 and M.75.

%f it is true that e officiis8 Tusculans 8 and e3en the last book of e finibus ha3e a sli"htly more "do"matic" rin" to them and lea3e the reader 9ith a far less de3astatin" impression than8 say8 e di3inatione 8 the e.planation of this has al9ays been a3ailable in some statements of +icero himself. )ne may as 9ell @uote a"ain one of the most famous and most 9idely cited of them8 )ff . M.75N "Moreo3er8 our !cademy "i3es us "reat lee9ay8 so that 9e may le"itimately defend 9hate3er turns out most plausible Rprobabile S." The sentence is 9idely @uoted and discussed8 but mostly out of conte.t8 9hich is +icero?s preference for the Stoic formula that "9hate3er is honorable seems to be useful8 and nothin" is useful 9hich does not seem honorable" o3er the distinction bet9een honestum and utile dra9n "by the old !cademics and by your RL1S A KM A Peripatetics8 9ho 9ere once the same as the !cademics."R25S Marcus +icero8 as a pupil of the "do"matic" +ratippus8 may ha3e to be faithful to the doctrines of his school. :is Skeptical father can pick and choose 9hiche3er doctrine seems to him to be more probabilis at the time8 9hate3er its ancestry. E3en then8 he has no obli"ation to stick to the doctrine that appears to him to be probabilis N ">ith others8 9ho ar"ue on the basis of fi.ed rules8 this is the caseN 9e li3e from day to day." ! skeptic like +icero can chan"e his mind from day to dayHand from 9ork to 9ork. Eclecticism= )ne mi"ht8 at first si"ht8 interpret that 9ay the statement of +icero?s interlocutor in Tusc . 4.27N "Since no chains of any definite doctrine constrain you8 and you sip from all of them8 9hate3er principally mo3es you 9ith the appearance of truth ..." ,ut e3en here8 the picture is not that of a 9ell6or"aniCed body of eclectic philosophy like that of !ntiochus ;or Potamo=<8 but of the bee flittin" from flo9er to flo9er and choosin" accordin" to its taste and mood at the time. ">e li3e from day to day" is no recipe for a consistent body of eclectic doctrine. That this is +icero?s practice8 and no mere matter of pro"rammatic declarations ne3er carried out8 is dear to any reader of these late philosophical 9orks. e finibus B64 brin" out this matter @uite forcefully. %n ,ook B +icero uses a"ainst +atoHalbeit in an ampler formHar"uments dan"erously similar to those used by Piso a"ainst +icero himself in 4.LKff.D and a"ain8 +icero?s o9n ar"uments in ,ook 4 a"ainst Piso are 3ery similar to those used by +ato a"ainst +icero in ,ook B. There is8 to be sure8 a differ6 R25S A KB A ence of a "ood fe9 years bet9een the dramatic dates of ,ooks B and 4. The problem discussed thereHthe sufficiency of 3irtue for happiness and the status of the "e.ternal "oods"His8 as 9e ha3e already noted ;p. 47 abo3e<8 one that had e.ercised

+icero?s mind e3er since his studies 9ith !ntiochus in !thens. !t that time8 and also durin" his 3isit to !thens in 40 or 45 ,.+. 9hen he ar"ued about the same problem 9ith !ristus of !scalon8 he 9as far from happy 9ith !ntiochus?s "Peripatetic" solution. :is 9a3erin" bet9een the Stoic and Peripatetic6!ntiochian positions in *in . B64 is beautifully described by +icero himself in Luc . 0MB8 9ritten about the same timeN "% am dra""ed in different directionsHno9 the latter 3ie9 seems the more plausible8 no9 the formerD and yet % firmly belie3e that unless one or the other is true8 3irtue is o3erthro9n." !t the end of Tusculans ;4.075<8 he seems to ha3e adopted a compromise based on a rulin" by +arneades.R20S (et 9hen he reaches )ff . M.758 he seems to opt once more for the Stoic e@uation bet9een "honorable" and "useful8" 9hich is essentially a species of the same ar"ument. ">e li3e from day to day" almost in the literal sense. That this practice is no in3ention of +icero?s is dear from his o9n 9ords. %t is a "liberty" ;licentia < "i3en him and others of the same school of thou"ht ;nobis < by "our !cademy" ;)ff . M.75<. %t is a pri3ile"e "i3en "to us alone in philosophy" ;Tusc . B.2M<D it is "9e" 9ho "li3e for the day ... and so are alone free" ;Tusc . 4.MM<D "but 9e ... say some thin"s are plausible8 others the op6 R20S A K4 A posite" ;)ff . 7.L<. %f in doubt as to that "9e"H9hich could8 after all8 be a polite reference to +icero himselfHthe end of that lon" passa"e8 )ff . 7.L628 should reassure usN "but these thin"s ha3e been set out carefully enou"h8 % think8 in our !cademics ." >hate3er the sources of +icero?s o9n speeches in his !cademic books8R27S the 3ie9s he e.presses there are not his o9n peculiar 3ie9sHnot e3en those peculiar to PhiloR2MS H but the traditional 3ie9s of !rcesilaus and +arneades and their follo9ers. This practice of acceptin" for the time bein" 9hat seems to one "chiefly plausible" ;ma.ime probabile < 9as ;admittedly8 on +icero?s o9n e3idenceD but 9hy distrust it 9hen it concerns the school he supports=< already that of +arneades. The !ntiochian Lucullus ;Luc . K5< describes the method of the Skeptical !cademy as "speakin" pro and contra e3erythin""Hnot only contra e3erythin"8 but also pro e3erythin". %f 9e 9ant an e.ample of +arneades at 9ork8 9e ha3e it in Luc . 0M0 and 0M1. %n 0M0 9e readN "+arneades used to put for9ard the 3ie9Hnot that he held it himself but in order to combat the Stoics 9ith itHthat the chief "ood 9as to enGoy those thin"s that nature had recommended as primary."R2BS ,ut in 0M1 9e ha3eN "so that % should follo9 +alliphon8 9hose opinion indeed +arneades 9as constantly defendin" 9ith so much Ceal that he 9as thou"ht actually to accept it ;althou"h +litomachus used to declare that he had ne3er been able to understand 9hat +arneades did accept<." +litomachus 9as an industrious8 but not an unduly perspicacious8 pupil. :e 9as that parado.ical animal8 an orthodo. +arneadean8 R24S 9hich8 to a more intelli"ent follo9er of the Skeptical !cademy8 9ould be tantamount to an attempt to be a do"matic skeptic. +arneades? practice 9as8 in principle8 Gust like that 9hich 9e R27SR2MSR2BSR24S A KK A

ha3e obser3ed in +icero?s later 9ritin"sN to defend 9hiche3er a3ailable or possible doctrine appealed to him for the time bein"H9hether it 9as merely for the sake of ar"ument8 or in a more "positi3e" fashion8 as probabilis . That this in3ol3es constant chan"es of mind and position is only natural. >hat +litomachus did not "rasp and +icero8 in his later sta"e8 does is that as lon" as you ha3e not "i3en up your basic Skeptical orientation and methods8 these constant 3acillations8 far from bein" alien to your approach8 are of its essence. +icero?s "day6to6day eclecticism" is therefore far from bein" his o9n in3ention. %n his philosophical corpus of the 45s8 then8 +icero reGected the Skepticism of +arneades and adopted some positi3e doctrines. %t is hi"hly likely8 as SchmidtR2KS has su""ested8 that this has somethin" to do 9ith his rene9ed hopes8 after his return from e.ile and 9ith the ne9 political constellation bein" formed in 'ome8 of a return to political acti3ity8 if only as an Jminence "rise . % 9ould haCard a "uess that8 throu"hout the period bet9een his studies in !thens in L1 ,.+. and his forced retirement from politics after Pharsalus8 +icero re@uired some positi3e doctrines to correspond to the positi3e role he played as a statesman and orator. !ntiochus?s approach8 e3en if not his e.act doctrines8 suited +icero to the hilt. :e could claim for himself a respectable Platonic pedi"ree8 more ancient than +ato?s Stoic one and far less se3ere. urin" his final years of political e.communication8 di3orce8 the failure of his second marria"e8 and the death of Tullia8 his doubts and hesitations turned him naturally back to9ard the skepticism of his earlier years. %t may be no accident that one @uestion that had bothered him e3er since his year in !thensH the problem of the self6sufficiency of 3irtue as a"ainst the "e.ternal "oods"Hrecurs 9ith such a"oniCin" fre@uency in the 9ritin"s of his last years. %n his predicament durin" those years8 that of the 3irtuous man sufferin" from an accumulation of e.ternal R2KS A KL A e3ils8 this problem 9as for him more than a mere matter of ethical theory. ,ut once he returned to his old Skeptical affiliation8 he 9as as consistent as he could mana"e to be. E3en his last 9ork as a master of rhetoric8 )rator of BK ,.+. 8 ends on a note of dear !cademic Skepticism 9hich presa"es much of 9hat 9e find in his later 9orks. The !cademy and +icero?s relation to it are not mentioned e.plicitly there. The !cademy has8 indeed8 been mentioned before ;07< as +icero?s trainin" "round as an orator8 and not Gust as a philosopher. E3en the Platonic %deas are mentioned in 1605 to illustrate +icero?s conception of the ideal orator. ,ut 9hen 9e turn to 7ML8 9e cannot help bein" struck by e.pressions such as "nor shall % e3er affirm that this opinion of mine is truer than yours8" 9here "% shall affirm" ;affirmabo < presa"es +icero?s fre@uent use of that 3erb in the !cademic books in a "do"matic" sense ;e.".8 !cad . 0.BKD Luc . 28 0B<D or the ne.t sentenceN "$ot only may you and % differ in our opinion8 but % myself may ha3e different opinions at different times8" 9hich presa"es "9e li3e from day to day" of the Tusculans .

There 9as8 ho9e3er8 one corner 9hich +icero appears to ha3e kept sealed off from this rene9ed Skepticism8 albeit 9ithout pointin" this out ;as he mi"ht ha3e done in the 45s<. %t is8 % suspect8 no mere accident that +arneades is totally absent from the first t9o books of the Tusculans 8 9hich deal 9ith contemnin" death and endurin" pain and sufferin". %t is8 of course8 no accident that the fra"ments of his +onsolatio sho9 no trace of Skepticism. They deal 9ith life as a punishment and a mi"ration ;067<D 9ith the di3ine nature of the soul ;B<D 9ith apotheosis and life after death ;46K<D and 9ith the blessin"s of consolation for +icero and for some of his 'oman forebears ;L605<.R2LS Tullia?s R2LS A K2 A death and consecration 9ere too dose to +icero?s heart to be tampered 9ith by Skepticism8 not merely because ;as Pliny8 $: Praef . 778 tells us< he follo9ed an earlier +onsolatio by +rantor the "do"matic" !cademic ;albeit !rcesilaus? bosom friend<8 9hich Panaetius had recommended to !elius Tubero to learn by heart ;Luc . 0M4<. !fter all8 in e officiis +icero follo9s Panaetius himself8 but this does not deter him from declarin" his loyalty to the Skeptical !cademy a fe9 times in the course of that 9ork. There are t9o other 9orks of +icero?s later period that sho9 no trace of Skepticism. !"ain8 it is no accident that both of them are of a some9hat pri3ate natureN for they are dedicated to +icero?s lifelon" and closest friend8 !tticus8 and they deal 9ith t9o issues shared by both of themN friendship and old a"e. This is not the place to enter into the intricate problem of the composition and sources of +ato maior de senectute and Laelius de amicitia 8 both 9ritten in BB ,.+. ,ut one common characteristic makes them stand out a"ainst all other e.tant 9orks of the same period. %n both8 +icero has abandoned the milieu of the other 9orks of this periodHthat of +icero himself and his friendsH and has returned to earlier "enerations and to the "reat departed8 as he did in e republica and e oratore . :e himself tells us that this is no accidentN ",esides8 discourses of this kind seem in some 9ay to ac@uire "reater di"nity 9hen founded on the authority of men of old8 especially such as are reno9nedD and hence8 in readin" my o9n 9ork Rsc. )n )ld !"e S8 % am at times so affected that % think the speaker is +ato and not myself." More di"nity= More than 9hatHor 9hose= !s to "authority8" is this a proper e.pression for a Skeptical !cademic to use= !fter all8 if the Skeptic does not disclose his opinion8 it is "in order that the listeners may be "uided by reason rather than authority" ;Luc . K5<. ,ut the passa"e 9e ha3e Gust @uoted from e amicitia B is reminiscent of +otta?s 9ords in $ M.4N ",ut on any @uestion of reli"ion % am "uided by the hi"h priests Titus +oruncanius8 Publius Scipio8 and Publius Scae3ola8 not Qeno or +leanthes or +hrysippusD and % ha3e Gaius Laelius8 au"ur and philosopher A K1 A in one8 9hom % 9ould rather hear discoursin" on reli"ion ... than any leadin" Stoic." This in contrast to +otta?s o9n earlier statementN "*or % am in no small 9ay mo3ed by your authority8 ,albus." "!uthority" a"ainHand here a"ain the authority of those ancient and illustrious menHand 'omansHas a"ainst that of any philosopher8 includin" +arneades8

9hose refutation of the Stoics is about to be e.pounded by +otta himself8 +icero?s mouthpiece in this 9ork. The ar"uments of the !cademics cannot easily be refuted ;0.0M<8 but in matters of reli"ion8 the authority of our 'oman ancestors is far "reater. There is one issue in Laelius de amicitia about 9hich % ha3e al9ays felt some9hat perturbed. The 9ork is dedicated to !tticusD and 9hen +icero comes to define friendship8 it is ;75< "complete a"reement on all matters human and di3ine8 accompanied by "ood9ill and affection." That there e.isted bet9een +icero and !tticus ""ood9ill and affection8" this "oes 9ithout sayin". ,ut "complete a"reement on all matters human and di3ine" bet9een an Epicurean and one of the most thorou"h critics of Epicurean philosophy in the 9hole of e.tant literature= )ld a"e and sufferin" may ha3e helped +icero turn back to !cademic Skepticism in matters philosophical. :e may not ha3e made up his mind to his dyin" day concernin" the sufficiency of 3irtue to happiness and the importance of e.ternal "oods. :e may ha3e found the 3arious philosophical proofs for the e.istence of the "ods and ar"uments about their nature inade@uate8 contradictoryD and sufficiently refuted by +arneades. ,ut for the consolations of reli"ion8 9ith its promise of life after death8 and for the consolations of old a"e and friendship8 he reser3ed a comer 9hich 9as not to be in3aded by his skepticism. A L5 A

M Philosophy in the ser3ice of Scripture Philo?s e.e"etical strate"ies

M Philosophy in the ser3ice of Scripture Philo?s e.e"etical strate"ies Jaap Mansfeld %ntroduction >hate3er one may think of the terms eclecticism and eclectic as used in a "eneral sense8 they continue to be useful and applicable in the case of Philo?s philosophical interpretations of Scripture and of his scriptural interpretations of Greek philosophy. %n this chapter % shall try to describe the different le3els on 9hich Philo?s eclectic strate"ies 9ork and to pro3ide the necessary @ualifications so far as the idea of eclecticism itself is concerned. %n Part 08 % shall attempt to account for the t9o 9ays of *or Philo8 % ha3e used the Loeb edition and the 3olumes that ha3e been published of Les oeu3res de Philon d?!le.andrie ;01K06<8 abbre3iated here as )eu3. Ph! . )ther editions used are indicated in the footnotes. Translations of Philonic te.ts are from the Loeb edition8 9ith occasional modifications. %ndispensable instruments for research included G. Mayer8 %nde. Philoneus ;,erlin8 01LB< ;does not include the fra"ments<D ,iblia patristicaN SupplJment. Philon d?!le.andrie ;Paris8 0127< ;inde. of all the biblical passa"es @uoted or alluded to<D and '. 'adice8 *ilone d?!lessandriaN biblio"rafia "enerale 01ML60127 ;$aples8 012M< ;biblio"raphie raisonnJe <. A L0 A interpretin" Scripture that are 3alid accordin" to PhiloN the literal 9ay8 and the alle"orical 9ay. Some of the interpretations called literal by Philo may strike us as bein" alle"orical8 for instance the one concerned 9ith the Platonic cosmolo"y8 9hich he finds in the first chapters of Genesis. *or Philo8 ho9e3er8 the alle"orical or8 as he often calls it8 the deeper interpretation pertains to the inner8 not the outer8 9orld. %t follo9s that philosophical theories that are useful at the literal le3el need not be so at the alle"orical8 and con3ersely. The application of this distinction thro9s some li"ht on the 3e.ed problem of the place of the so6called philosophical treatises 9ithin the Philonic corpus . %n Part 78 % shall deal 9ith Philo?s use of the Skeptic techni@ue of constructin" a "disa"reement" ;diaphonia < by arran"in" the theories of the philosophers in polar opposition. Philo e.ploits this techni@ue in order to neutraliCe and o3ercome these conflictin" 3ie9s. (et a responsible choice amon" the more important of the 9arrin" doctrines is feasible8 because for Philo 9hat Moses says is decisi3e. Philo feels he has a

ri"ht to adduce the philosophical 3ie9s of the Greeks because he is con3inced that Greek philosophy itself deri3es from the interpretation of the books of Moses. 0. 'eCeption and Le3els of E.e"esis E.e"esis of the Torah by means of concepts and terms deri3ed from Greek philosophy did not be"in 9ith Philo. *ra"ments of the 9ritin"s of his predecessor and fello96 !le.andrian !ristobulus ;perhaps ca. 055 ,.+. < sur3i3e. %n his books8 Philo often enou"h refers to other Je9ish e.e"etes 9ho had proposed a philosophical interpretation of Scripture. *or e.ample8 at QG 0.2 he attributes to others the important ;Middle< PlatoniCin" e.e"esis of Genesis 0N7L as referrin" to an intelli"ible8 and of 7NL as A L7 A referrin" to a sensible8 Man ;"some ... ha3e said"<.R0S !ristobulus had already stated that Pytha"oras8 Plato8 and Socrates8 as 9ell as )rpheus8 Linus8 :esiod8 :omer8 and e3en !ratus8 are dependent on Moses ;ap . Euseb. PE 0M.07X!ristob. frr. M64<. !s is 9ell kno9n8 this is also Philo?s 3ie9. !ccordin" to the fra"ment e deo K6L ;partly printed at S&* 7.B77<8R7S Moses spoke of the "technical fire" 9hich informs the 9orld lon" before the ;Stoic< philosophers did8 and much more dearly. Plato?s account of the formation of the 9orld and of man in the Timaeus had been anticipated in a superior 9ay in the first chapters of Genesis.RMS The parado.ical 3ie9 of the Stoic Qeno that only the 9ise man is free ;Prob . 4M< and his ethical principle that one should li3e in a"reement 9ith nature ;0K5< ha3e been deri3ed from the la9"i3er of the Je9s ;4L8 0K5<. :eraclitus?s 3ie9 that as lon" as 9e are in the body 9e li3e the death of the soulRBS has been deri3ed ;L! 0.05L< or e3en stolen ;QG B.047< from Moses8 and his theory that the opposites are "one" comes from the same source ;:er . 70B8 QG M.4<. The "deeper meanin"" of Genesis 04N02 is said to ha3e been "praised by some of the philosophers 9ho came after9ardN !ristotle and the Peripatetics8 ... Pytha"oras" ;QG M.0K<. %n a remarkable passa"e ;!et . LK<8 Philo ar"ues that the Stoics ,oethus of Sidon and Panaetius8 9ho abandoned the theory of the periodical confla"rations and re"enerations of the 9orld8 did so under "di3ine inspiration" ;theoleptoi D this is the only occurrence of the adGecti3e listed in the %nde. Philoneus <. There is today a "ro9in" consensus that Philo 9as8 first and foremost8 a deeply reli"ious Je9ish person 9ho li3ed accordin" R0SR7SRMSRBS A LM A to the Mosaic la9s and 9hose primary obGecti3e as a 9riter and scholar 9as the faithful interpretation of Scripture. This8 it is thou"ht8 e.plains 9hat is often called his eclecticism8R4S or rather8 ;as % 9ould prefer to say< his preferences in the fields of Greek philosophy. To attribute a nai3e sort of eclectic attitude to him or to su""est that he 9as merely a constant dabbler in the commonplaces found in abundance in the philosophical and rhetorical circles of his day 9ould be not only unfair but false. There is more system in his interpretation of the sacred te.t than is 3isible at first blushN there are themes8 such as the creation of the 9orld by a pro3ident God8 or the "mi"ration" of the soul8 that are o3er9helmin"ly present in most of 9hat sur3i3es. *urthermore8 once it is ackno9led"ed that some of the indi3idual tracts constitutin" the !lle"orical +ommentary are

constructed as a series of @uestions and ans9ers "eared to the e.e"esis of the indi3idual 3erses that form a biblical pericope8 after the pattern of the much more formal Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim and %n E.odum 8 these treatises turn out to be far less ramblin" and incoherent than they ha3e often been assumed to be.RKS % 9ould like to add that in these more formal commentaries the indi3idual @uestions and ans9ers dealin" 9ith separate lemmata tend to "roup themsel3es in dusters 9hich possess a definite thematic unityD they are therefore comparable to the indi3idual alle"orical tracts 9ith their lar"er and more 3aried themes. %ndeed8 for all their roots in the Sabbath litur"y of the syna"o"ue and the study6house 9hich may ha3e been connected there9ith8 and for all their R4SRKS A LB A affinities 9ith earlier Greek literary forms ;the scientific problemata 8 or the "problems and solutions" literature dealin" 9ith the poets already mentioned by !ristotle in Poet . 74.0BK5bK<8 lar"e sections of the Quaestiones are 3ery much concerned 9ith one dominant themeN the 3icissitudes of the human soul. That8 presumably8 can be e.plained on the assumption that Philo 9as familiar 9ith a Middle Platonist e.e"esis of the )dysseyRLS accordin" to 9hich )dysseus?s arduous Gourney home symboliCes the labors of the soul attemptin" to return to its ori"inal abode. ;,ut 9e do not kno9 that this 9as a formal commentary of the "problems and solutions" type.< :o9e3er8 a better understandin" of Philo?s e.e"etical aims and method of presentation is by no means e@ui3alent to an e.planation of his so6called eclecticism8 that is to say8 his important use of Greek philosophical ideas. The matter is much more complicated than that. Philo belon"s to t9o different 9orlds and to t9o traditions8 that of Greek philosophy and that of the Je9ish e.e"esis of the ,ible. Perhaps the German term 'eCeption 8 less ambi"uous and more informati3e than eclecticism 8 should be preferred. %n Philo?s case8 as in that of some of his Je9ish predecessors8 'eCeption Hfor 9hich "assimilation" is perhaps a better e@ui3alent than the u"ly "reception"His concerned 9ith t9o inherited historical comple.ities8 each of 9hich has its o9n definite and special character. (et Philo endea3ors to interpret each of these in terms of the other. +onse@uently8 the attempt to unra3el RLS A L4 A the strands of his in"enious fabric is uphill 9ork. :is attitude to9ard Greek philosophy is dependent on his position as an e.e"ete8 and his attitude to9ard the ,ible is to a lar"e de"ree dependent on his philosophical beliefs. The student of Philo is therefore faced 9ith an interpreti3e circle that threatens to be 3icious rather than hermeneutical. Philo?s attitude to9ard Greek philosophy may be eclectic8 and his 'eCeption be determined by his Je9ish back"round. :o9e3er8 his attitude to9ard the e.e"esis of Scripture may also be eclectic8 both because8 from a philosophical point of 3ie98 he belie3ed that certain thin"s in Scripture are more important than other thin"s8 and insofar as concerns his e3aluation of the 9orks of his Je9ish predecessors ;some of 9hom 9ere themsel3es interested. in Greek philosophy<.

,ut the history of pre6Philonic !le.andrian e.e"esis of the Torah ;for a dear "eneral reference to 9hich see8 for e.ample8 Mos . 0.B< must for the most part be e.tracted from Philo?s o9n 9orks.R2S *urthermore8 as % shall ar"ue8 Philo is both capable of assimilatin" an e.istin" "eclectic" doctrineHor8 as % 9ould prefer to say8 of reinterpretin" and inte"ratin" doctrines considered to be +lassical ;here names such as Posidonius8 !ntiochus8 and Eudorus come to mind<Hand of distin"uishin" bet9een the main schools of Greek philosophy in a more historically responsible manner. :e is8 moreo3er8 @uite capable of ali"nin" himself 9ith a doctrine that does fall outside the scope of8 say8 the Middle Platonism of his day. :e is e3en capable of an eclectic8 or reinterpreti3e8 attitude to9ard certain Middle Platonist doctrines. There is another important point. Philo throu"hout distin"uishes bet9een 9hat he calls the "literal" and 9hat he calls the "alle"orical" interpretation8 the latter as a rule representin" the core of his thou"ht. This distinction is lar"ely unheeded in the R2S A LK A scholarly literature8R1S and understandably so8 because the "literal" interpretations presented ;or cited from others< often look @uite alle"orical to us. )ne should8 ho9e3er8 follo9 Philo?s o9n indications8 for these are rele3ant to the e3aluation of his attitude to9ard Greek philosophy ;his "eclecticism"<. % shall ar"ue presently that philosophical theories e.ist 9hich can be adduced at the literal but not at the alle"orical le3el8 and con3ersely. ,ut % do not 9ish to ar"ue a"ainst the "ro9in" modem consensusR05S that claims that much of Philo?s philosophiCin" reflects the reinterpreti3e system of his so6called Middle Platonist contemporaries. *or instance8 althou"h Philo read the Timaeus for himself8 e opificio mundi 8 the first treatise of the E.position of the La9 8 is much influenced by Middle Platonism8 and its points of 3ie9 can be paralleled from numerous passa"es else9here in Philo. This is important8 since our sources for Middle Platonism ;9ith the e.ception of Timaeus Locrus and a fe9 fra"ments of Eudorus and !rius idymus< are all rather later than Philo. >e are therefore in a position to postulate that this reinterpreti3e system ori"inated in !le.andria after8 say8 45 ,.+.R00S :o9e3er8 there are other 9orks 9hich cannot8 by any stretchin" of the term8 be called Middle Platonist. *or instance8 if his R1SR05SR00S A LL A only sur3i3in" 9orks 9ere Quod omnis probus liber and e animalibus 8 9ould 9e not say that "if he had made a fe9 little chan"es8" Philo could be desi"nated a "most "enuine Stoic8" e3en more so8 perhaps8 than !ntiochus8 for 9hom the sobri@uet 9as coined by +icero ;!cad . 7. 0M7<=R07S %n Philo?s day8 the theories of the Stoics ;unlike those of the Presocratics< li3ed on not only in books8 but also in persons 9ho sa9 themsel3es as Stoics. %ndeed8 not only does there e.ist the phenomenon kno9n as 'oman Stoicism8 but

there 9ere e3en Stoics around in the days of !le.ander of !phrodisias and Plotinus. %t may therefore be of some importance to point out that Philo?s contemporary and fello96 !le.andrian8 +haeremon8 9ho 9as a notorious enemy of the Je9s8 9as a Stoic. +haeremon interpreted E"yptian reli"ion in the terms of Greek philosophy8 Gust as Philo did for the Je9ish reli"ionD he appears to ha3e been a member of the E"yptian embassy to Gaius in !. . B58 Gust as Philo 9as one of the Je9ish embassy.R0MS Philo may ha3e been familiar 9ith +haeremon?s 3ie9s8 for ;Mos . 0.7M< he speaks of the E"yptian "philosophy con3eyed in symbols8 as displayed in the so6called holy letters" ;the hiero"lyphs<8 thus mentionin" one of +haeremon?s fa3orite themes.R0BS %f e3en an E"yptian could be a Stoic in !le.andria8 there must8 of course8 ha3e been other Stoics in to9n. *urthermore8 in another philosophical 9ork8 e aeternitate mundi 8 Philo8 rather than proceedin" in a Middle Platonist 9ay8 displays a rather thorou"h kno9led"e of the 3arious doctrines concerned 9ith this topic as professed by the important schools R07SR0MSR0BS A L2 A and is perfectly capable of distin"uishin" the Stoics from Plato and !ristotle8 and !ristotle from the Stoics and Plato. :e lists three 3ie9s concernin" the cosmos that ha3e been put for9ardNR04S ;0< that the 9orld is eternal8 uncreated and imperishableD ;7< the opposite 3ie98 that it is created and 9ill be destroyedD the third 3ie9 ;M< is a compromise8 9hich "takes from"R0KS ;7< the idea that it is created and from ;0< that it is imperishable ;!et . L<. This presentation is systematic8 not historical. The three main 3ie9s are presented in the manner of a Skeptic "disa"reement" follo9ed by a compromise. %n !et . L8 the !ristotelian ;and Pytha"orean< 3ie9 is cited first and that of ; emocritus<8 Epicurus8 and the Stoics secondD in 26078 this order is re3ersed. The 3ie9 of Plato ;and :esiod< is cited last both at L and at 2602. The su""estion at !et . L that the third 3ie9 is a compromise bet9een the other t9o is of course only tenable from a systematic and not from a historical point of 3ie9 ;cf. n. 0K abo3e<. The "Succession" in the descripti3e passa"e ;2602< is determined by both systematic and historical considerations. The important 3ie9s8 those of the Epicureans6and6StoicsT!ristotleT Plato8 are presented in an in3erted historical se@uence. Presumably8 Philo belie3es that the history of Greek philosophy is one of decadence and that the farther one "oes back8 the nearer one "ets to the truth8 that is to say8 to 9hat Moses tau"ht. The same R04SR0KS A L1 A su""estion is entailed by the series of ancestors of the main 3ie9sH emocritusTsome Pytha"oreansT:esiodHthe earliest of 9hom is a"ain closest to Moses. Philo8 naturally8 sides 9ith Moses.R0LS :o9e3er8 the te.t of e aeternitate 8 after an e.tensi3e presentation of !ristotle?s case ;taken upHas Philo sho9sHalso by Theophrastus and other Peripatetics8 and by some Stoics< a"ainst the orthodo. Stoic 3ie9 that the 9orld 9ill necessarily be destroyed and reborn a"ain8 breaks off 9ith the announcement that the !ristotelian ar"uments 9ill be met "point by point" ;045<.

The 3arious doctrines8 % 9ould like to su""est8 are here described in an order of 3alidity. The theory of emocritus and Epicurus8 cited first8 is farthest from the truth8 because these thinkers8 9hen "eneratin" and destroyin" a plurality of 9orlds8 only appeal to matter and chance. The Stoic theory is better8 because it ascribes the "eneration of the one 9orld to God and its destruction to *ire. %t is curious that Philo has here chosen to present a 3ery unorthodo. Stoic 3ie9 of the 9orld6confla"rationD possibly he could not resist the temptation to for"et that the Stoic *ire is the same "od as the "od 9ho "enerates the uni3erse8 in order to ha3e the Stoic *ire resemble the elemental instrument used by his o9n "od. :e also ar"ues that in a 9ay the Stoics present the 9orld as bein" eternal. Presumably8 he emphasiCes this aspect of "enuine Stoic thou"ht in order to e.pose it as a bastard form of !ristotelianism8 or at any rate in order to brin" it closer to !ristotle?s 3ie9. !ristotle?s theory8 he ar"ues8 is better insofar as it is more God6fearin"8 since he does not 9ant to credit God 9ith creatin" somethin" that 9ould be less than perfect8 i.e.8 destructible. Plato?s theory ho9e3er8 is the best8 because it comes closest to Moses?. The best parallels for this presentation in the "uise of an e3aluati3e se@uence are to be found in the later philosophical 9orks R0LS A 25 A of +icero8 for 9hich % may refer to >. GOrler?s disco3eryR02S of 9hat he calls a Stufensystem 8 a triadic pattern accordin" to 9hich you first ha3e a "lo9" 3ie9D ne.t8 an "ele3ated" 3ie9 sharply opposed to the lo9 3ie9D and8 third8 a "middle" 3ie9 that is a sort of compromise bet9een the t9o others. %n $ 08 for instance8 the Epicurean 3ie98 the first to be discussed8 is reGected ;cf. the position of the Epicurean 3ie9 in e aeternitate <. The Stoic position8 presented ne.t ;$ 7<8 is admired8 but a more moderate 3ie9 is ar"ued in book M. !ccordin" to GOrler8 +icero does not really choose bet9een the more ele3ated and the middle positionD the latter is to be preferred from a rational point of 3ie98 9hile the former is 9hat he 9ould really like to prefer. GOrler ar"ues that this refusal to take sides in a definite 9ay is characteristic of +icero and in fact is 9hat his philosophical position amounts to8 9hich may be ri"ht. >hat cannot be ri"ht8 ho9e3er8 is his claim that the pattern of presentation is +icero?s8 for this is ruled out by the parallel in Philo.R01S Philo8 9ho has no affinities 9ith Skepticism so far as his o9n con3ictions are concerned8 is in a position to make a definite choice amon" possible options.R75S +icero and Philo each use the pattern in their o9n 9ay8 9hich % think pro3es that the scheme is traditional. :o9e3er this may be8 as one studies the 9ay Philo presents 3arious philosophical doctrines in e aeternitate mundi 8 it "radually becomes clear that he is not merely dependent on "eclectic" R02SR01SR75S A 20 A systems such as the ;lar"ely hypothetical< !le.andrian Platonism of his day8 but is also familiar ;as is +icero<8 9ith a more historical approach to the "reat men and systems of

the Greek past 9hich enables him to state8 compare8 and Gud"e their respecti3e 3ie9s. !ctually8 Philo?s contemporary8 the $eo6Pytha"orean or Middle Platonist Eudorus8 is also said to ha3e 9ritten an e.tensi3e historical 9ork in 9hich he described the 3arious doctrines of the schools8 and !rius idymus apparently did somethin" similar.R70S %n another philosophical 9ork8 e animalibus 8 Philo in his reply to !le.ander?s array of ar"uments ;LM6055< defends the Stoic 3ie9 that the animals do not possess reasonD they ha3e been created for the benefit of man. !lthou"h Philo does not say so8 it is certain that the opposite 3ie9 is unacceptable to him8 not only because it conflicts 9ith the prescriptions of the Mosaic cult but also because it cannot be s@uared 9ith statements about man and the animals in ScriptureD in this 9ork8 ho9e3er8 no biblical references are "i3en.R77S !t Genesis 7N018 man is said to ha3e "i3en names to the animals ;this is Philo?s sensible man8 to be distin"uished from the intelli"ible man at Genesis 0N7L<. !t )pif . 0B26B1 and 0.028 758 708 Philo ar"ues that man obtains this honor because he is the lord of the animals ;cf. Praem . 1<. Scriptural support for the latter idea is found else9here8 at Genesis 0N7K ;archetosan < and 0N72 ;archete <8 i.e.8 in the pericope 9hich8 accordin" to Philo8 deals 9ith the intelli"ible man. There is only one @uotation of Genesis 0N72 in PhiloN at QG 7.4K ;pp. 0B56B0 Marcus<8 9here it ser3es to e.plain God?s speech to $oah at Genesis 1N067 ;9hich echoes 0N72<. $oah is made "ri"hteous kin" of earthly creatures" and is said to ha3e "been e@ual in honor not to the molded and earthly Man Rof Genesis 7NLS but to him 9ho 9as made in the likeness and form8 9ho is incorporeal" ;p. 0B0 Marcus8 9hose partly hypothetical translation % R70SR77S A 27 A ha3e correctedD cf. also )eu3r. Ph. ad loc .<. !ccordin" to Philo ;p. 0B7 Marcus<8 this is the "literal" interpretationH9hich8 one should note8 he does not reGectD the "deeper meanin"" is concerned 9ith the domination of mind o3er the body8 the senses8 and the passions. The theme of man?s domination of the animals ;in a literal sense< also occurs else9here ;e.".8 )pif . 2M62B8 0B78 !"ric . 28 Pro3 . 0.18 7.054<8 9here scriptural e3idence is not @uoted. %t appears to be the case that Genesis 0N7K and 72 9ere no fa3orites 9ith Philo ;andTor 9ith the Je9ish e.e"etical tradition he is follo9in"< and that he preferred to conflate the idea of domination from Genesis 0N7K and 71 9ith that of the "i3in" of names at Genesis 7N018 9hich fi"ures much more prominently in his oeu3re. That tralaticious material is used by Philo also appears from QG 7.KK8 9here another tradition is follo9ed ;or another possibility is e.ploited< and $oah is made to represent the "first molded Ri.e.8 sensibleS man." The lack of biblical references in e animalibus may therefore be e.plained by means of Philo?s attitude to9ard Genesis 0N7K and 72 else9here. *urthermore8 it does not seem to ha3e been noticed that in a remote corner of the QG ;0.1B<8 9here he comments on Genesis KNL ;God 9ill 9ipe out man and destroy the beasts<8 Philo ar"ues as follo9sN "The literal meanin" is this R$.,. 9hat follo9s has also been preser3ed in GreekSN it makes it clearly kno9n that the beasts Ralo"aS 9ere not primarily "enerated for their o9n

sakes8 but for the sake of men and for their ser3ice . !nd 9hen these 9ere destroyed8 the former 9ere ri"htly destroyed to"ether 9ith them8 since there no lon"er e.isted those for 9hich they 9ere made" ;my italics<. This "literal meanin"" of Genesis KNL ;for 9hich cf. also !brah . B4< not only a"rees 9ith the interpretation of Genesis 7N01 at )pif 0B26B1 and QG 0.028 758 70 ;9here8 as 9e ha3e noticed8 the idea of domination has been blended in from Genesis 0N7K and 72< but also 9ith the point of 3ie9 defended by Philo in !nim . LM6055. !ccordin" to QG 0.1B8 A 2M A the "alle"orical meanin"" is that "Man is the mind 9ithin us8 and beast is sensation." The latter is 3ery dose to the 3ie9 presented in the alle"orical commentary ;L! 7.1602D e.e"esis of Genesis 7N01 a"ain<8 9here8 ho9e3er8 the animals are said to represent the passions ;for 9hich cf. also the "deeper meanin"" at QG 7.4K<. !nother parallel is at QG 7.1 ;on Genesis KN0L8 "9hate3er is on earth shall die." QuestionN ">hat sins did the beasts commit="<. :ere the "literal meanin"" is set out at much "reater len"th8 and an interestin" and si"nificant link 9ith the philosophical 3ie9s reGected in e animalibus is to be found in Philo?s phrase8 "the beasts 9ere made8 not for their o9n sake8 as 9ise men reason 8 but for . . . men" ;my italics<. !ccordin" to the "deeper meanin"" as set out here8 the animals represent the "earthly part of the body8" i.e.8 the senses8 9hich must die to"ether 9ith the body ;of. QG 0.1B< 9hen the latter is "delu"ed by streams of passion. . .. *or a life of e3il is death." ;+f. also +onf . 7M67B.< %t follo9s that the philosophical 3ie9 defended by Philo in e animalibus 8 9hich is that of the Stoics8 is pertinent only at the literal le3el of the interpretation of the rele3ant te.ts in Scripture. !ccordin" to Philo8 the literal interpretation8 if it pro3ides a satisfactory sense8 is fully acceptableD the symbolic or alle"orical or deeper interpretation8 ho9e3er8 is 9hat his e.e"esis is really about. !pparently8 it is important for Philo that the literal interpretation of man?s namin" of the animals8 blended 9ith the idea of his lordship o3er them8 can be defended on purely philosophical "rounds and that here Greek philosophy ;in the "uise of a Stoic doctrine< and Scripture meet. %t should also be noted that the alle"orical interpretation8 i.e.8 the domination of mind o3er the body8 the senses8 the passions8 is deri3ed from ;or8 rather8 "eared to< the domination of the animals by man in the literal interpretation. The deeper meanin" e.ploits themes familiar from both Stoic and Platonic philosophyN reason 3ersus the passions A 2B A or8 more Platonically8 reason 3ersus the body. e animalibus itself only enters the outer orbit of Philo?s thou"ht8 that connected 9ith the literal interpretation. *rom the passa"es studied abo3e it appears that Philo?s attitude to9ard Greek philosophy is a 3ery complicated one indeed. :e may dra9 on "eclectic" Middle Platonist theories for the literal interpretation of the creation story as 9ell as on purely Stoic ideas for the literal interpretation of man?s relation to the animals. ,ut 9hat is useful at the literal le3el need not be so at the alle"orical. *urthermore8 e3en at the literal le3el Philo may see fit to produce an interpreti3e blend of his o9n8 as in the case of the 9orld?s possible end8

described in terms both Platonic and Stoic. The demands of scriptural e.e"esis seem often to be decisi3e in respect to the option chosen. Some of Philo?s literal interpretations seem to be an already traditional part of Je9ish philosophical e.e"esis ;e.".8 the t9o types of man8 QG 0.2<. oubtless8 there are also unphilosophical Je9ish motifs of an already traditional nature in Philo8 9hich further influenced his selection amon" possible optionsD but this is a subGect better left to the historians of Je9ish thou"ht.R7MS 'eadin" throu"h Philo8 ho9e3er8 one cannot help feelin" that for all his Je9ish piety and loyalty to Moses and for all his indebtedness to specifically Je9ish e.e"etical themes8 Greek philosophy really dominates the field8R7BS and that Moses and the Je9ish prophets are 3irtually con3erted into Greek philosophers. The attitude of Philo and his !le.andrian predecessors 9as not adopted by the rabbis 9ho "a3e shape to the orthodo. Judaism 9hich 9as to de3elop after the destruction of the temple by Titus. This sho9s that in the interpretation of Scripture other options 9ere open. R7MSR7BS A 24 A !n important @uestion8 then8 9hich % belie3e has not yet been ans9ered in a fully satisfactory 9ay8 isN 9hy did Philo and his !le.andrian predecessors choose to interpret Scripture as a ;Greek< philosophy= The ans9er8 % belie3e8 is pro3ided by Philo?s ;and his predecessors?< 3ie9 of the history of Mosaic philosophy. Moses came first8 and the Greeks ha3e taken o3er his ideas8 or perhaps in indi3idual cases been fa3ored 9ith a special re3elation 9hich made them talk in the manner of Moses. %t follo9s that8 for Philo8 it is perfectly le"itimate to adduce the 3ie9s of the Greek philosophers for the interpretation of ScriptureD for all practical purposes8 they can be seen as fello96 e.e"etes . >ithout e.ception8 Philo cites his Je9ish predecessors 9ithout "i3in" their names. ! fe9 times8 he "i3es the names of his Greek predecessors8 but their 3ie9s8 too8 are usually cited ;or e3en paraphrased< anonymously.R74S %n this 9ay8 Greek philosophy8 9hich by no means al9ays pro3ides a correct interpretation of Scrip6rare8 is as indispensable to e.e"esis as the not al9ays correct 3ie9s of the Je9ish e.e"etes cited by Philo. *urthermore8 the history of Greek philosophy itself can be understood as one of ;re6<interpretationN !ristotle?s interpretation of Plato8R7KS Qeno?s interpretation of Plato and !ristotle ;think of !ntiochus<. The Middle Platonists of Philo?s !le.andria certainly belon"ed to such an interpreti3e tradition or school of thou"ht8 and it is only natural that Philo tamed to these contemporaries and studied the most up6to6date interpretation of Plato that 9as a3ailable ;indeed8 his predecessors 9ho introduced the t9o types of man seem already to ha3e done so<. The study of Greek philosophy8 9hen 3ie9ed from this an"le8 is8 ultimately8 a study of the pa"an interpreti3e tradition 9hich itself8 in the last R74SR7KS A 2K A resort8 is nothin" but an interpretation of Scripture8 either directly or at one or more remo3es.

>hen placed in this perspecti3e8 Philo?s so6called philosophical 9orks are not as sin"ular as they ha3e often been thou"ht to be. !ll of them deal 9ith matters that are ultimately "eared to the interpretation of Scripture. Philo must really ha3e felt rather superior to his Greek collea"ues8 for they did not ha3e the books of Moses. :is 9illin"ness in the philosophical 9orks to meet them8 as it 9ere8 in their o9n field ;cf. et . 0ff.< sho9s his sense of securityN only the follo9er of Moses ;to 9hose authority a discreet reference is se3eral times inserted at focal points of the ar"ument< is in a position to adGudicate bet9een the competin" 3ie9s of the Greek. e.perts. )n the other hand8 Philo belie3es that the study of pa"an philosophy ;itself the se@uel to the study of the "standard curriculum" Renkuklia S< is a necessary condition for the study and understandin" of the true8 i.e.8 the Mosaic philosophy.R7LS This su""ests that he belie3ed the Greeks had often been better e.e"etes of Scripture than their Je9ish collea"ues8 or at least not inferior to them. The philosophical 9orks8 amon" 9hich e animalibus and e pro3identia C ha3e been pro3ed to be 9orks of Philo?s old a"e8R72S in this sense pa3e the 9ay for the e.e"esis of Scripture. Some of these 9ritin"s ;!et.8 Pro3 . 08 and Prob .<R71S may ha3e had as their intended public the pa"an philosophical milieu8 and others ;Pro3 . 78 !nim .< the Je9ish apostates. This does not entail8 ho9e3er8 that no systematic position is reser3ed for them in the de3elopin" "rand desi"n of Philo?s 9ork. Philo?s proof8 presented to the Greeks8 that their o9n philosophy in its most representati3e and 3aluable aspects is confirmed by and e3en deri3ed from R7LSR72SR71S A 2L A the La9 implies that it 9ould be useful for Greek philosophers to study the Torah. Je9ish apostates 9ho use Greek philosophy a"ainst the Torah8 as !le.ander did8 are in3ited to return to the truth. Simultaneously8 ho9e3er8 these 9orks may ser3e as an introduction to the more important discussions of Greek philosophers about subGects that are dominant in the Torah8 an introduction already doctored to suit the Je9ish point of 3ie98 9hich those 9ho 9ant to interpret Scripture in a rational 9ay may use 9ith profit. ,ecause the Greek philosophers are Philo?s predecessors8 he can use them the 9ay he uses his Je9ish collea"uesN he can read them 9ith an open mind8 reGect 9hat is 9ron" or one6sided8 and adduce and use 9hat is satisfactory and feasible. )n the other hand8 his use of Scripture is not as in3ariably decisi3e as a modern consensus 9ould 9ant us to belie3e. % ha3e already referredRM5S to the curious 9ay Genesis 0N7K and 72 are treated8 and % 9ould like to add a related instance. %n Philo8 9e find both the 3ie9 that Genesis 0N7L and 7NL are about the creation of the same man and that they are about different types of man8 i.e.8 the "created man" ;epoiesen < and the "molded man" ;eplastesen <. The latter 3ie98 as 9e ha3e noticed8 is attributed by him to others ;QG 0.2<RM0S but not reGected ;it is also the startin" point of the alle"ory at L! 0.M4ff.<.RM7S The other 3ie9 is not reGected either. Tobin has ar"ued that the "t9o types" interpretation is later than the "one man" interpretation.RMMS There is an interestin" complication 9hich8 to my kno9led"e8 has not

RM5SRM0SRM7SRMMS A 22 A been obser3edN Genesis 4N0b67 does not enter into this discussion. :ere8 it 9ould appear8 the te.t of the ,ible states beyond possible doubt that the "created" ;intelli"ible< man8 i.e.8 the man "in the ima"e" of Genesis 0N7L8 and the "molded" ;sensible< man of 7NL are the same personN ;0b< )n the day on 9hich God created Repoiesen S !dam8 he created Repoiesen S him in the ima"e of God. ;7< Male and female he created Repoiesen S them8 and he praised them. !nd he called them by the name of !dam8 on the day on 9hich he created Repoiesen S them. ;M< !nd !dam li3ed for t9o hundred and thirty years and be"at . . . The ;sensible< !dam ;the "molded" man of 7NL< 9ho be"at Seth ;4NM8 cf. BN74< is "male and female8" Gust like the ;intelli"ible< anthropos at 0N7L8 and the 3erb for created at 4N0b6 7 is none other than the epoiesen also found at 0N7L. (et Philo can be 3ery do"matic about the differences bet9een the t9o types of man ;as at )pif . 0MB6M4<. $o98 as lon" as Je9ish e.e"etes belie3ed that 0N7L and 7NL refer to the same man8 they 9ere in a position to i"nore 4N0b678 9hich merely confirms this 3ie9. ,ut it is certainly odd that those 9ho belie3ed that t9o types of man are in3ol3ed i"nored 4N0b678 9hich contradicts this interpretation ;they also 3irtually i"nored Genesis 0N7K and 728 like9ise hard to s@uare 9ith the t9o different types<.RMBS )ne mayD of course8 assume that they kept silent about this part of the e3idence on purpose8 but it is perhaps more to the point to assume that 9hat they did 9as not so much interpret the ,ible as reinterpret the 3ie9 of their predecessors8 9ho had only discussed 0N7L and 0NL. Philo ne3er @uotes or refers to Genesis 4N0b678 althou"h he @uotes and comments on 4N0a8 "this is the book of the "eneration of men."RM4S Most remarkablyD ho9e3er8 he connects this half63erse. not 9ith 9hat follo9s but 9ith 9hat precedes8 that is8 9ith the brief "enealo"y of !dam RMBSRM4S A 21 A that concludes Genesis B ;QG 0.L16258 et . 0M26M1D cf. esp. !brah . 18 epile"ei <. (et he kno9s that Genesis 4 also contains the ;full< ""enealo"y of !dam8" for he cites and interprets the characteriCation of Seth at QG 0.20 from this chapter ;Genesis 4NM<. Thus the a9k9ard8 or un9elcome8 3erses 4N0b67 9ere tactfully omitted. To repeat8 9e may perhaps assume that Philo8 rather than 9illfully distortin" the e3idence8 felt committed8 9ithout noticin" 9hat this entailed8 to an e.e"etical tradition that had failed to take these 3erses into account. (et in a person 9ho is merely a loyal follo9er of Moses this procedure is most note9orthy. >e are Gustified in concludin" that his predecessors8 and Philo himself8 really 9anted 3ery much to produce a ;Middle< PlatoniCin" interpretation of the creation story in Genesis. %n other 9ords8 they 9ere prepared to be silent about scriptural e3idence that could not find a place in their philosophy. !nd yet8 at ;QG M.M ;Greek fra"ment<8 Philo posits that one should not interpret Scripture by ar"uin" from the part to the 9hole8 but8 con3ersely8 should adduce all the e3idence a3ailable. 7. issension and ecision

The SkepticalRMKS technical term for disa"reement8 diaphonia ;dissensio <8RMLS occurs only once in the Philonic corpus8 at :er . 7B2N RMKSRMLS A 15 A "Philosophy is full of disa"reement 8 because truth flees from the credulous mind8 9hich deals in conGecture. %t is her nature to elude disco3ery and pursuit8 and it is this 9hich in my opinion produces these 3erbal feudin"s Rstaseis S." These sentences round off a description ;7BK6BL< of 9hat Philo calls the "do"matic Rdo"matikas S 9ran"lin"s of the sophists8" of 9hich he lists the follo9in" ;7BK<N ;0< those 9ho say the uni3erse has not come to be 3ersus those 9ho say it has8 and ;7< those 9ho say it 9ill be destroyed 3ersus those 9ho say that "thou"h by nature destructible8 it 9ill ne3er be destroyed8 since it is held to"ether by a bond of superior stren"th8 namely the 9ill of its Maker." %n a parallel passa"e ;Ebr . 011<8 9hich deri3es from one of !enesidemus?s tropes8RM2S Philo in a similar 9ay opposes the anti6creationists to the creationists8 and those 9ho reGect pro3idence ;the description recalls emocritus and the Epicureans< to those 9ho belie3e in it.RM1S >e are of course immediately reminded of the debate reported by Philo in e aeternitate mundi and e pro3identia 0 and recall that in these philosophical 9orks ;as indeed also else9here< he each time adopted one of these opposed optionsN the 9orld has been created8 is therefore by nature destructible8 but is held to"ether by the 9ill of its creator. !t :er . 7BK8 Philo ne.t opposes ;M< those 9ho maintain that "nothin" is but all thin"s RM2SRM1S A 10 A become" to those 9ho assume the opposite. !lthou"h these or similar issues are familiar ;cf. Ienophon Mere . 0.08 0B8 Plato Tht . 047E8 !ristotle +ael . M.08 712b0B6MM Ralthou"h in a more intricate formS8 and ps.6!rist. MIG 0.1LBa76B and 1L4a0B604<8 the most plausible assumption is that Philo here reproduces a Skeptic "disa"reement." $e.t8 Philo turns ;B< to those 9ho make man the criterionRB5S ;his actual 9ords refer to those 9ho say man is the measure of all thin"s<8 9hom he opposes to those 9ho make ha3oc of the criteria of both sense6perception and mindD and ;4< to those 9ho maintain that all thin"s are beyond comprehension8 9hom he opposes to those 9ho hold that a "ood many thin"s can be kno9n. The Prota"orean reference in ;B< may be read as a caption for those 9ho assi"n complete reliability to all sense6e.perience such as the Epicureans8 they bein" opposed to thorou"h6"oin" Skeptics such as the Pyrrhonists. !t ;4< he dearly has the !cademic Skeptics and presumably their opponents8 the Stoics8 in mind. These neat "re3ersals" ;peritropai <8 9hich reduce the !cademics and the Pyrrhonists to mere parties in a "disa"reement" ;diaphonia <8 may concei3ably be Philo?s o9n cle3er idea. :e 9ants no truck 9ith Skepticism8 of 9hate3er denomination8 as a serious sect ;cf. QG M.MM8 9hich mentions "!cademics" and "Skeptics" in one breath<. )ne may compare the characteriCation of the Sophist as a Skeptic at *u" . 705N ":e strikes all representati3es of learnin"8 opposin" each indi3idually and all in common8 and is struck by all in return8 since they naturally defend the doctrines Rdo"mata S to 9hich

their soul has "i3en birth." ;*or this conflict bet9een all the others and the Skeptics8 cf. also +icero !cad . 7.L5.< *inally8 in :er . 7BL8 Philo briefly lists the "disa"reements" RB5S A 17 A concerned 9ith a plurality of natural phenomena8 in a manner that anticipates the use of ps.6Plutarch by8 say8 %renaeus and Eusebius8 and of ps.6Plutarch and !etius by Theodoretus.RB0S !ccordin" to Philo in :er . 7BL8 these @uarrels "o on until the "male mid9ife 9ho is also the Gud"e obser3es the brood of each disputant?s soul8 thro9s a9ay all that is not 9orth rearin"8 but sa3es 9hat is 9orth sa3in" and appro3es it for such careful treatment as is re@uired." +olson ad loc . of course refers to Socrates ;e.".8 Plato Tht . 040<8 and Mar"uerite :arl ad loc . links the "Gud"e" 9ith !braham8 i.e.8 "the human intellect in its hi"hest function8 9hich assimilates it to the di3ine Lo"os" ;my translation<. )ne may also think of passa"es such as Plato Phaedo 1K!611E8 and perhaps Ienophon Mem . 0.0.0060B8 9here Socrates8 disappointed by the disa"reement amon" the natural philosophers8 "oes his o9n 9ay ;note that the latter passa"e is @uoted in a Skeptical conte.t by Eusebius PE 04.K7.Lff.<. !s far as the ima"e of the Gud"e is concerned8 it is also interestin" to recall !ristotle Metaph. , 0.114b7f.N "one 9ho has heard all the conflictin" theories8 like one 9ho has heard both sides in a la9suit8 is necessarily more competent to Gud"e" ;trans. Tredennick<. )ne may also compare +icero *at . M1N "+hrysippus in the "uise of a respected umpire" ;+hrysippus tam@uam arbiter honorarius <. RB0S A 1M A %n another passa"e8 !br . 0K76KB8 the "disa"reement" is presented in much less scathin" terms8 and indeed culminates in a list of issues that are of primary importance to Philo. :e here e.plains 9hy God spared one of the cities of the plainN the fi3e cities symboliCe the senses8 the fifth representin" si"ht. The eyes obser3e the hea3ens and dra9 the mind in the same direction so that it starts 9onderin" and philosophiCin" ;a Platonic theme8 cf. Tim . BLa<. This 9onderin" is not open6minded8 but follo9s the pattern of a "disa"reement"N are these phenomena created8 or do they ha3e a be"innin"= !re they infinitely many8 or finitely many ;cf. the related points of !enesidemus ap . Se.tus P: 0.040 and Philo Ebr . 011<= !re there four elements8 or should one add a more di3ine substance as a fifth= The @uestion that follo9s su""ests an ans9er is possible and leads to further @uestions8 thus sho9in" 9hat philosophy really is aboutN "%f the 9orld has indeed come into bein"8 by 9hose a"ency did it come into bein" and 9ho is the emiur"e as to his bein" and @uality8 9hat 9as his purpose in makin" it8 and 9hat does he do no98 and 9hat is his occupation and 9ay of life=" ,riefly commentin" on the former passa"e ;:er . 7BK6B2<8 $ikipro9etCky points outN "The disa"reements 9hich abound in philosophy are brou"ht about by the fact that the mindH9ithout doubt for lack of an unerrin" criterionHbas let "o of the truth in fa3or of conGectures and probabilities."RB7S This is not entirely correctD as lon" as no definite and

obGecti3e decision re"ardin" 9arrin" 3ie9s is feasible8 the mind cannot reach the truth on its o9n. :o9e3er8 Philo su""ests that such a decision is8 after all8 9ithin reachD the passa"e on the "male mid9ife and Gud"e" may of course be read as an e.hortation to proceed in an eclectic 9ay8 but there is more to it. Truth8 9hich flees the conGecturin" soul8 may re3eal itself to the ri"ht sort of person8 9ho is then able to decide 9hich philosophical 3ie9s are incorrect and 9hich are correct8 and to 9hat e.tent. !s Seneca said8 "The truth is mine" RB7S A 1B A ;@uod 3erum est8 meum est8 Ep . 07.00<. The @uestion as to the manner in 9hich8 accordin" to Philo8 such a decision is brou"ht about or rendered possible is therefore a le"itimate one. The ans9er8 as 9ill appear from the passa"e to be studied no98 isN because God takes the decision for us and makes it kno9n to us8 either immediately or throu"h the books of his prophets8 especially Moses. !s JanYcek has sho9n8RBMS Philo8 9hen speakin" of dilemmas in a Skeptical manner ;or of Skeptical dilemmas< introduces a 3ocabulary for "to be in doubt" that is his o9nN endoiaCein8 epamphoteriCein 8 etc. Se3eral times Philo tells us that God is not one 9ho does not kno9 the ans9er ;QG 0.708 "God does not doubt RendoiaCei S"D 0.448 "there is neither doubt Rendoiasmos S nor Gealousy about God"D cf.8 e.".8 )pif . 0B1<. Man8 ho9e3er8 is a "natural doubter" ;epamphoteristen tei phusei8 QG 0.44<. Man?s natural propensity to doubt is presented here in terms that are a fascinatin" distortion of the 3ery familiar Stoic theory of perception. >hereas Stoics supposed that certain sense6 impressions8 by their sheer clarity8 naturally induce the mind?s assent8 Philo su""ests that man?s natural response to all impressions is ambi3alent. % @uote this te.t after the Greek ;the !rmenian is confused<N ">hene3er the impression of an obGect occurs Rto usS8 three thin"s immediately resultN disinclination a9ay from 9hat appears8 inclination to9ard 9hat appears8 and8 third8 doubt Rendoiasmos S inclined to9ard both these directions8 because the soul is dra9n both 9ays as to 9hether Rthe impressionS should be accepted or not."RBBS Time and a"ain8 Philo in such conte.ts uses the metaphor of the scales of the balance. Se3eral passa"es in the bio"raphy of Moses repay further study in this conte.t. !t Mos . 0.7067B8 9e are informed about RBMSRBBS A 14 A the education of the youn" prince. :e has E"yptians instructin" him in a number of subGects8 and "Greeks to teach him the other standard disciplines" ;7M<8 9ho ha3e been summoned from Greece at "reat e.pense ;70<. +haldaean scholars teach him their nati3e "science of the hea3enly bodies8" 9hich he ac@uires from the E"yptians as 9ell8 9ho further instruct him in the "philosophy con3eyed in symbols as displayed in their so6 called holy letters" ;7M67B<.RB4S Moses 9as a prodi"ious pupil ;70677<8 fore6stallin" the instruction of his teachers and ad3ancin" beyond their capacities8 "so that his seemed a case rather of recollection Ranamnesis S than of learnin"8 and indeed he himself de3ised

and propounded problems that are difficult to sol3e. *or "reat natures car3e out much that is ne9 in the 9ay of kno9led"e Repisteme S .... The "ifted soul Reuphues psuche S takes the lead in meetin" the lessons "i3en by itself Rcf. abo3e8 "recollection"S rather than by the teacherRBKS . . . and as soon as it has a "rasp of some scientific principle presses for9ard." The amusin" anachronisms need not bother us. >hat is at issue is that Philo impro3ises an e.planation for Moses? de3elopment to9ard his outstandin" role as the prophet of God. :e cannot8 of course8 ha3e the Greeks teach him philosophy8 since all such philosophy8 accordin" to Philo8 is later than and deri3ed from Moses. :e cannot ha3e him study the books of Moses either. Therefore8 recourse is had to a PlatoniCin" su""estionN in "oin" beyond his teachers8 i.e.8 to9ard philosophy8 Moses seems to remember 9hat his soul 9ould ha3e kno9n before enterin" his body. %t is8 by the 9ay8 rather astonishin" that Philo is silent about possible Je9ish teachersD presumably8 he belie3ed that one could not speak of these in the conte.t of the education of an E"yptian prince. $othin" is said about the influence upon youn" Moses of the stories about the "li3in" la9s" ;sc . the Patriarchs< either. RB4SRBKS A 1K A $o98 Moses? attitude to9ard his teacher much resembles that to9ard the teachin"s of Greek philosophy recommended by Philo else9hereN ">hen he had mastered the lore of both "roups of teachers8 both 9here they a"reed and 9here they differed Ren hois te sumphonousi kai diapherousi S8 he rose abo3e their @uarrels Reridas S 9ithout infatuation 9ith 3ictory Raphiloneikos D cf. belo9S and sou"ht for the truth . :is mind 9as incapable of acceptin" any falsehood8 as is the 9ay 9ith the a""ressi3e sectarians Rhairesiomachois S8 9ho defend the doctrines Rdo"mata S they ha3e propounded 9ithout e.aminin" 9hether they can stand scrutiny8 and thus put themsel3es on a par 9ith hired la9yers 9ho ha3e no thou"ht or care for Gustice" ;7BD my italics<. !pparently8 such sectarians ar"ue that "the truth is mine." The term hairesiomachos is uni@ue not only in the Philonic corpus but8 it appears8 in the 9hole of Greek literature ;cf.8 ho9e3er8 Pro3 . 7.248 "in the manner of those 9ho indul"e in sectarian strife"<. )ne cannot help feelin" that Philo some9hat o3erplays his handD his description of Moses? attitude to9ard the a""ressi3e sectarians 9ould be rather more apt as an analysis of the recommended attitude to9ard dissentin" philosophers. The term erides 8 "@uarrels8" is also found in the "disa"reement" of the philosophers at :er . 7BL. ;+f. Mos . 0.7B8 "9ithout infatuation 9ith 3ictory esche9in" the @uarrels" Raphiloneikos tas eridas huperbas SD :er . 7BL "@uarrels and infatuations 9ith 3ictory" Reridas kai philoneikeias S<. Moses is "9ithout infatuation 9ith 3ictory" in contrast to the haeresiomachoi 8RBLS and haeresis is a term denotin" a RBLS A 1L A philosophical sect ;or school of thou"ht<. The di3ision of the teachers in the opposite camps re@uired by a Skeptic "disa"reement" is labored8 since no information is pro3ided

as to the point 9here the E"yptians and the +haldaeans ;and presumably the Greeks< differed. The only philosophical studies hinted at are in the field of astronomy ;+haldaeans and E"yptians<8 insofar as the theory of the hea3enly bodies is part of physics ;cf. :er . 7BLD !brah . 0K7f.<8 and an E"yptian type of mystery is hinted at. %n the concludin" sentence8 the 9arrin" parties are described as 9hat Philo else9here calls "sophists" ;cf.8 e.".8 Mos . 7.7078 "the 9ord6catchers and sophists 9ho sell their tenets and ar"uments Rdo"mata kai lo"ous S ...8 9ho fore3er use philosophy a"ainst philosophy 9ithout a blush"<. Philo su""ests that Moses is capable of determinin" 9hich8 amon" the opposed 3ie9s8 is true ;cf. the interestin" parallel about the element of truth in the "standard curriculum" at QG M.M7<8 Gust like the "male mid9ife and Gud"e" at :er . 7BLD and it is interestin" to note that he is credited 9ith an understandin" not only of the disa"reement8 but also of the a"reement ;Mos . 0.7B8 sumphonousi < amon" the sectarians8 a point 9hich reminds us of !ntiochus and others. ,ut Moses8 as Philo saysH and had to say in 3ie9 of 9hat he sa9 as Moses? contribution to human thou"htHnot only took from his teachers 9hat 9as true8 but 9ent much farther. ! later sta"e in his de3elopment is described at Mos . 0.BLf.N he has left E"ypt and li3es in !rabia. !lready he has a special relationship 9ith God ;BK<. :e no9 pursues the e.ercise of 3irtue ;arete <8 trained by his o9n 9ise reason ;en heautoi lo"ismon asteion D cf. abo3e on his "ifted nature and anamnesis <8 and under this mana"ement he "labored to fit himself for the best forms of life8 the theoretical and practical. :e 9as fore3er openin" the scroll of philosophical doctrines Rphilosophias aei anelitton do"mata S8 di"ested them in9ardly8 committed them to memory and brou"ht his personal conduct into conformity 9ith themD for he desired truth rather than seemin"" ;B2D my italics<. :ere the anachronism is fla"rant e3en from Philo?s o9n point of 3ie9D momentarily A 12 A for"ettin" his con3iction that all philosophy deri3es from Moses8 i.e.8 from the books later composed by Moses himself8 he has him make a thorou"h study of the philosophical literature ;on his o9n8 to be sure<. +onse@uently8 Moses follo9s the educational course prescribed by Philo else9hereN first the "standard curriculum" ;Mos . 0.7067B<8 then the philosophical theories ;BL<. !ccordin" to Philo8 the "ood philosopher is one 9hose life a"rees 9ith his doctrine ;and he belie3es this can best be realiCed in a Je9ish conte.tD cf. t9o important passa"es8 Mos . M.B2 and Prob . 0K5<. Moses is such a philosopher?8 he pursues the truth 8 so 9e may presume his attitude to9ard the philosophical doctrines anachronistically studied by him resembled that to9ard the "standard curriculum." The reconstruction pro3ided by Philo of Moses? educational career is most re3ealin". Perhaps better than any other passa"e it tells us ho9 important a Greek education ;includin" philosophy< really 9as in his 3ie98 for he cannot ima"ine the de3elopment of his "reatest hero in any other terms. >e should no9 turn to some passa"es8 dealin" 9ith important points of la98 9here e3en Moses himself is ;uncharacteristically< in doubt. :is first problem8 in3ol3in" the conflict bet9een a di3ine rule and a reasonable human claim8 is described at Mos . 7.774672. Moses "9a3ered in his Gud"ment8 and oscillated as on a balance .... So8 3acillatin"

bet9een refusal and assent8 he besou"ht God to act as a Gud"e Rcf. :er . 7BLS and "i3e an oracle declarin" his decision. !nd God hearkened to him and 3ouchsafed an ans9er."RB2S God8 it 9ill be recalled8 is not a doubter. :is RB2S A 11 A "oracle"Hin Philo8 chresmos usually denotes a 3erse8 or set of 3erses8 from ScriptureHis a sort of compromise pro3idin" a rider to the rule that allo9s for the reasonable claim. The section Mos . 7.7776M7 as a 9hole is based on $umbers 1N060BD in the biblical te.t8 9hen presented 9ith the problem ;1605<8 Moses saysN "Stand here8 and % shall hear 9hether God utters a command about you." The te.t continuesN "!nd God spoke to Moses8 sayin" ..." The important epistemolo"ical interlude has therefore been interpolated by Philo. Moses? second problem is described at Mos . 7.7MB6B4 and is based on $umbers 7LN0600. :ere he is presented 9ith a petition of orphaned "irls 9hich similarly entails a conflict bet9een an established rule and a reasonable claim. "$aturally8 therefore8 in this 9a3erin" and undecided state of mind8 he referred the difficulty to God8 9ho alone8 as he kne98 can distin"uish by infallible and absolutely unerrin" criteria the finest differences and thereby sho9 his truth and Gustice."RB1S This time8 God?s ans9er is not an amendment of the rule8 but a decision bet9een the ri3al claims8 and he comes do9n in fa3or of the "irls? case. !"ain8 Moses? doubt is not found in the biblical passa"e8 9hich merely says ;$umbers 7LN46K<N "!nd Moses brou"ht the Gud"ment about them before God. !nd the Lord said..." >ith these passa"es in e 3ita Moysis 8 . aubeR45S has inter6 RB1SR45S A 055 A estin"ly compared the thirteenth interpreti3e rule ;Middab < attributed to 'abbi %shmael ;ne9 compared 9ith those of :illel<NR40S "T9o scriptural passa"es may contradict one another until a third one comes and tips the balance bet9een them" ;my italics<. $ote that at QG M.M ;Greek fra"ment< Philo8 a"ainst the e.treme literalists8 emphasiCes the unity of ScriptureN one should Gud"e the part from the 9hole. %t is not dear 9hether %shmael?s rule deri3es from Philo8R47S or 9hether8 perhaps8 both Philo and %shmael reflect an established rule of midrash 9hich Philo 9ould proGect into the distant past8 in order to sho9 God actually deli3erin" an "oracle." >e may compare Eusebius?s characteriCation of the acti3ities of the Je9ish e.e"etesN "the lo"ical method Rlo"ikos tropos S of the philosophy of the :ebre9s8" "a lo"ic 9hich pursues the truth8 unlike the cle3er sophistries of the Greeks" ;PE 00.4.0<. :o9e3er this may be8 if 9e adduce the Philonic passa"es about the conflictin" ideas of the philosophers that are adGudicated by the true Gud"e8 a sort of methodolo"y appears. Man is uncertain8 a doubter by natureD one may8 in the Skeptic 9ay8 describe ho9 opinions differ and dash. ,ut the epoche of Skepticism is not acceptable8 because a derision is needed. Such a decision is pro3ided by God8 either directly ;as 9hen the sa"e

H e.".8 MosesHis in doubt< or throu"h his oracles as taken do9n by Moses. The teachin"s of Scripture are decisi3e for the adGudication of the conflicts amon" the Greek philosophers8 9ho8 themsel3es8 ha3e borro9ed some of Moses? ideas and interpreted them more or less correctly8 but 9ho ha3e ne3er taken the 9hole of the teachin"s contained in Scripture seriously enou"h.R4MS i3ersity and disa"reement could arise precisely because Scripture 9as not adduced the 9ay it should be. R40SR47SR4MS A 050 A ! midrashic ori"in for Philo?s rule of adGudication is8 as 9e ha3e seen8 not certain. >hat is at any rate certain is that the metaphor of the balance in relation to human ratiocinati3e processes is not his o9n idea. >e may assume he borro9ed it from StoiciCin" sources8 or from the common philosophical Gar"on of his time.R4BS %t occurs in passa"es 9here Se.tus discusses Stoic epistemolo"y ;M . L.MLXS&* 7.05LD M . L.BB5XS&* 7.0428 p. MK8 lines 261<8 and8 in a Stoic conte.t8 in Philo himself8 Prob . K0 X S&* M.MKM8 P6 218 line M ;typical Philonic terminolo"yN "The mind is poised Risorropei S as on a balance Rplastin"i S"<. These three te.ts 9ere discussed some years a"o by E.6:. 'olke in a study dealin" 9ith the metaphors in the Stoic fra"mentsDR44S because the e3idence is late and couched in "eneral lan"ua"e8 he can only su""est that it is not incompatible 9ith +hrysippus?s epistemolo"y. :o9e3er8 he has missed the most important te.t8 Plutarch St. Pep . 05B4,6 ;XS&* 7.1LM<N this pro3es that +hrysippus here refutes the EpicureansR4KS 9hoH+hrysippus impliesHhad ar"ued that 9hen it is necessary to choose one of t9o e@ui3alent and e@ually pressin" alternati3es8 the "ad3entitious motion" in the soul "takes an inclination Repiklisis S of itself and resol3es the perple.ity." "%n many places8" ho9e3er8 +hrysippus cited as e3idence dice and "the balance" ;Cu"on DR4LS cf. S&* 7.05L8 0428 cited abo3e< and many other thin"s "that cannot fall or in6dine no9 one 9ay no9 another 9ithout some cause." R4BSR44SR4KSR4LS A 057 A To conclude8 % 9ould like to point out that Philo really needed the Skeptic aloofness from the theories of the do"matists8 because in this 9ay ;strate"ically adoptin" the Skeptics? techni@ue of or"aniCation< he could be"in byD so to speak8 neutraliCin" them and reducin" them to one side in a "disa"reement." #nlike the Skeptics8 ho9e3er8 he belie3ed that the scales could be8 and should be8 tipped8 at least 9here the more important perple.ities are at issue. God takes the decision for usHnot8 ho9e3er8 9ithout an endurin" effort on our o9n side ;cf. Sacrif . 25ff.<. E3en Moses only recei3ed his re3elations after a preparatory period. %n Philo?s day8 God?s decisions are represented by the collected oracles of Moses ;and his fello96prophets< and their correct e.e"esis8 and Philo seems to assume that God assists and inspiresR42S the studious and humble interpreter ;cf. esp. Sacrif LL6L1<. >ith the backin" of the books of Moses and supported by the reli"ious traditions of his people 9hich are "rounded in these books8 the studious e.e"ete is in a position to lord it o3er the Greek philosophers. The other side of this coin8R41S of course8 is that it is the body of di3er"ent opinions amon" the Greek philosophers that is adGudicated by Scripture and its correct interpretation. %ne3itablyD the male mid9ife and Gud"e 9ill make an eclectic impression. :o9e3er8 to the e.tent thatHas 9e noticed in the first part of this chapterH

Philo?s e.e"esis operates on different le3els8 his eclecticism may be said to be free of syncretistic taints.RK5S R42SR41SRK5S A 05M A

B ")rthodo.y" and "Eclecticism" Middle Platonists and $eo6Pytha"oreans

B ")rthodo.y" and "Eclecticism" Middle Platonists and $eo6Pytha"oreans John M. illon The disappearance from the philosophic scene8 after 22 ,.+. 8 of the Platonic !cademy as an institution is no98 % think8 follo9in" on the researches of John Lynch and John Glucker8 an accepted fact8 and one that raises a number of interestin" issues.R0S +hief amon" these is a @uestion that is central to this book8 to 9it8 9hat criteria can be established for estimatin" orthodo.y and heterodo.y in Platonism durin" the period commonly kno9n as Middle Platonic8 that is8 from !ntiochus of !scalon in the 25s and L5s ,.+. to Plotinus in the mid6third century !. . = % do not propose to conduct a slo9 march throu"h the period in @uestion in search of material for my theme. % 9ant instead to focus on a number of re3ealin" instances 9here the issue of orthodo.y or eclecticismHbein" part of8 or outside of8 a consensus or a mainstreamHbecomes a 3ital matter8 since such instances 9ill suffice 3ery 9ell to illustrate the dimensions of the problem. R0S A 05B A % *irst8 let us consider !ntiochus of !scalon and his claims of a return to the )ld !cademy8 since it is 9ith !ntiochus that the issue of eclecticism be"ins to raise its head seriously in the history of later Platonism ;Panaetius and Posidonius could be seen8 % suppose8 as "eclectic" Stoics<Hindeed8 in many older 9orks !ntiochus is presented as inau"uratin" a lon" period of "eclectic philosophy."R7S am on record as protestin" a"ainst the use of this 9ord as a label for the Platonist ;and other< philosophers of this period8RMS but my protest is only 3alid if the term be used in a dismissi3e or peGorati3e sense8 9ith the implication that the philosophers concerned 9ere too muddleheaded or li"ht6minded to stick to the principles of any one of the four main :ellenistic schools. %n fact8 there is nothin" at all 9ron" 9ith bein" "eclectic8" if that means simply that one is prepared to adopt a "ood formulation8 or a 3alid line of ar"ument8 from a ri3al school or indi3idual and adGust one?s philosophical position accordin"ly.RBS %n this sense8 most of the "reat philosophers are eclectics8 and eclecticism is a mark of acuteness and ori"inality8 as opposed to narro96minded sectarianism.R4S R7SRMSRBSR4S A 054 A

)n that interpretation of the term8 there can be no dispute8 % think8 that !ntiochus 9as eclectic8 offensi3e as the term 9ould ha3e seemed to him. :is stri3in"Hand that is 9hat makes him interestin" in the present conte.tH9as all for orthodo.y and a return to purity of doctrine. espite the stron" polemical conte.t of his mo3e ;his distancin" of himself from Philo of Larissa and the *ourth !cademy<8 there is no need to doubt that !ntiochus "enuinely felt himself to be returnin" to the true Platonic tradition of the )ld !cademy by reGectin" the ;e.cessi3e< skepticism of the $e9. %f his epistemolo"y8 9ith its criterion of certainty in kataleptike phantasia 8 and his ethics8 9ith its basis in oikeiosis 8 and his physics8 9ith its lo"os 6theory8 sound suspiciously like Stoicism to us8 he has a coherent e.planationN Qeno 9as a pupil of Polemo8 the last head of the )ld !cademy8 and he learned his lessons there better than his fello96pupil !rcesilaus8 9ho took o3er the !cademy from Polemo ;cf. +icero *in . B.M.74<. !s for the Peripatos8 !ristotle and Theophrastus are part of the )ld !cademic consensus ;cf. +icero !cad 7.04ff.<. Such disa"reements as they had 9ere matters of terminolo"y8 not substance ;!cad . 0.02<. The accuracy of !ntiochus?s 3ie9 of the history of philosophy is not our concern in the present conte.t.RKS !ll that is rele3ant is his stri3in" for orthodo.y8 9ith his simultaneous belief that he 9as Gustified in appropriatin" such Stoic doctrines and formulations as he could find any adumbrations of in Plato or the )ld !cademics. :e is not uncritical of the Stoics8 in fact. :e feels that they 9ent too far8 in the sphere of ethics8 in denyin" any role in happiness to bodily and e.ternal "oods8 and he sharply criticiCes +hrysippus ;ap . +icero *in . 4.72< for treatin" man8 for theoretical purposes8 not as a mind in a body8 but as mind and nothin" else. %n this respect Qeno de3iated from the !cademic consensus RKS A 05K A ;9hich8 for !ntiochus8 incorporates !ristotle?s teachin" in the Ethics 8 9hich he had learned from Polemo<8 and !ntiochus condemns him for that. %n fact8 !ntiochus appears to ha3e fooled nobodyHnot his contemporary and admirer8 +icero8 nor later commentators8 such as Plutarch or $umenius8RLS but he did perhaps start somethin"8 and that is a contro3ersy about orthodo.y 9ithin the Platonist tradition. The contro3ersy8 strictly speakin"8 be"an 9ith the attempt by Philo of Larissa to ar"ue for the unity of the !cademic tradition8 tryin" to sho98 on the one hand8 that the Skepticism of the $e9 !cademy could claim support from the procedures of both Socrates and Plato8 and8 on the other8 that the $e9 !cademiciansHin particular8 +arneadesHdid not absolutely 9ithhold assent to impressions8 but only denied the Stoic criterion of certainty. Philo stated a position8 but it 9as !ntiochus?s 3iolent reaction to thisR2S that really started the contro3ersy8 one carried on by the author of the !nonymous Theaetetus +ommentary H9hoe3er and 9hene3er he 9asD Plutarch8 in his lost 9ork8 )n the #nity of the !cademy since Plato 8 Lamprias +at. KMD and $umenius8 in his 9ork )n the i3er"ence of the !cademics flora Plato 8 of 9hich 9e ha3e a number of entertainin" fra"ments. >hat side one took in this contro3ersy ine3itably had some bearin" on one?s o9n attitude to Skepticism. Plutarch8 for instance8 is @uite hospitable to it8 thou"h chiefly as a 9eapon

to use a"ainst the Stoics. % cannot see Plutarch as a "enuine Skeptic8 but he does cherish the Skeptical tradition8R1S as did +icero before him8 and as $umenius does not. RLSR2SR1S A 05L A %% %t is not this aspect of Plutarch8 ho9e3er8 that % 9ant to discuss ne.t ;our e3idence on it has8 unfortunately8 lar"ely 3anished<8 but8 rather8 his place in the spectrum of contemporary Platonism bet9een the poles of Stoicism and Peripateticism8 on 9hich all Platonists are ine3itably situated ;e3en if they choose to take up a "Pytha"orean" stance8 they cannot entirely sidestep this situation<. Plutarch?s position 9ithin the Platonist tradition cannot be properly e3aluated8 it seems to me8 so lon" as the notion of an "orthodo." Platonism is maintainedHpropounded8 necessarily8 by an official Platonic !cademy. :einrich Orrie?s study " ie Stellun" Plutarchs im Platonismus seiner Qeit8"R05S for instance8 Secondarily8 also8 as in the case of +icero before him8 he employs it to sa3e himself the trouble of "oin" any deeper into @uestions of physical philosophy than he 9ants to. +f.8 e.".8 his remarks at the end of his short essay on The Principle of +old ;144!<H si"nificantly enou"h8 addressed to *a3orinus8 9ho professed !cademic SkepticismN "+ompare these statements8 *a3orinus8 9ith the pronouncements of othersD and if these notions of mine are neither deficient nor much superior in plausibility ; < to those of others8 say fare9ell to do"ma ; <8 bein" con3inced as you are that it is more philosophical to suspend Gud"ment ; < 9hen the truth is obscure than to come to conclusions ; <" ;trans. :elm6bold8 emended<. R05S A 052 A 9hile presentin" Plutarch?s philosophical position fairly enou"h8 misrepresents the situation8 it seems to me8 by postulatin" somethin" he terms school6Platonism ;represented by such fi"ures as !lbinus and Taurus<8 and settin" Plutarch o3er a"ainst this8 as if it 9ere an official orthodo.y. The only place 9here 9e find Plutarch settin" himself e.plicitly a"ainst 9hat could be re"arded as the orthodo. Platonist position is in his treatise )n the +reation of the Soul in the Timaeus 8 and it is interestin" to obser3e ho9 he phrases his opposition. Pace Orrie ;p. B2<8 he does not present himself as takin" on a Platonist "establishment." :e reco"niCes that he is "oin" a"ainst the 3ie9s of all8 or at least "the most hi"hly re"arded" ;0507 <8 of pre3ious commentators8 but he does not 3ie9 those commentators as a homo"eneous "roup. Thou"h all choose to deny that the 9orld 9as created at a point in time ;050M!<8 some are follo9ers of Ienocrates? 3ie98 and others of that of +rantor8 9hile still others8 like Eudorus8 seek to reconcile the t9o 3ie9s and Plutarch deals 9ith each of them in turn. $or does he speak here as an outsider attackin" the establishment8 but as the true interpreter of Plato?s doctrine correctin" the mistakes of predecessorsN "Such bein" the 9hole of 9hat they say ... to me they both seem to be utterly mistaken

about Plato?s opinion8 if a standard of plausibility is to be used8 not in promotion of one?s o9n doctrines8 but 9ith a desire to say somethin" that a"rees 9ith Plato" ;050M,8 trans. +herniss<. %t may seem to us that promotin" his o9n doctrines in the "uise of an e.e"esis of the Timaeus is precisely 9hat Plutarch himself is doin"8 but that is not8 plainly8 ho9 he sees it. Else9here8 in his treatise )n Moral &irtue 8 thou"h his position of hospitality to !ristotelian ethical doctrine mi"ht be considered A 051 A almost as contro3ersial8 9e find no su""estion that he has any consciousness of this. :is polemic is all 9ith outsiders8 chiefly the Stoics. !nd yet there is much that is peculiar in his doctrine here. )ne of Plutarch?s most distincti3e doctrines8 apart from his 9ell6kno9n dualism ;thou"h closely in3ol3ed 9ith it<8 is his 3ie9 of the soul as essentially nonrational ;kaute kath?heauten < ;Proc. an . 050B 6E< and distinct from intellect. %t is this essential soul that he sees in the "nature di3ided about bodies" of Timaeus M4! and in the "maleficent soul" of La9s 058 and it is the cornerstone of his theory in )n the +reation of the Soul . %t also fi"ures in the treatise )n Moral &irtue .R00S !t the outset ;BB5 <8 Plutarch raises the @uestion of 9hat the essential nature Rousia S of moral 3irtue is8 and ho9 it arisesD and 9hether that part of the soul 9hich recei3es it is e@uipped 9ith its o9n reason Rlo"os S8 or merely shares in one alien to itD and if the latter8 9hether it does this after the manner of thin"s 9hich are min"led 9ith somethin" better8 or8 rather8 9hether it is said to participate in the potency Rdunamis S of the rulin" element throu"h submittin". to its administration and "o3ernance. :ere8 admittedly8 he speaks of a part Rmorion S of the soul8 rather than of soul in "eneral8 but it presently becomes plain that 9hat he has in mind is not really the lo9er or "passionate" soul in the traditional Platonic sense8 so much as soul distinct from intellect. ! little further on ;BB0 <8 in the course of his introductory sur3ey of pre3ious opinion8 he criticiCes those8 particularly the Stoics8 9ho assume intellect and soul to be a unityN "%t seems to ha3e eluded all these philosophers in 9hat 9ay each of us is truly t9ofold and composite. *or that other t9ofold nature R00S A 005 A of ours they ha3e not discerned8 but merely the more ob3ious one8 the blend of soul and body." Pytha"oras8 ho9e3er8 and8 abo3e all8 Plato reco"niCed "that there is some element of composition8 some t9ofold nature and dissimilarity of the 3ery soul 9ithin itself8 since the irrational8 like an alien body8 is min"led and Goined 9ith reason Rlo"os S by some

compulsion of nature.R07S :ere he speaks8 rather misleadin"ly8 of the t9ofold nature of "the 3ery soul 9ithin itself8" but 9e can take it8 % think8 that he is usin" soul in a loose sense8 as those 9ho ha3e not discerned the true situation 9ould use it. The truth8 as 9e see8 is that there are three entities8 body8 soul8 and nous ;intellect<8 and this trichotomy lea3es soul as essentially and of itself alo"os 8 nonrational8 thou"h ha3in" a part that is recepti3e to reason ;BB0* ff.<. %n )n Moral &irtue 8 it must be admitted8 Plutarch obscures the doctrine 9hich he presents 3ery plainly in )n the +reation of the Soul 8 by speakin"8 for the most part8 of the "nonrational part" ;alo"on meros < of the soul8 rather than soul itself8 as opposed to nous 8 and it is possible that he has not yet fully clarified his position in his o9n mind ;if8 as % assume8 )n Moral &irtue is earlier than )n the +reation of the Soul <8 but he says enou"h8 % think8 to sho9 that this remarkable doctrine 9as already in his mind.R0MS >hat is interestin" for our present purpose is that he sho9s no consciousness of unorthodo.y on this point8 as he does on the matter of the temporal creation of the 9orld ;thou"h8 as % ha3e said earlier8 unorthodo.y is not @uite the ri"ht 9ord<. The other notable aspect of the treatise )n Moral &irtue 8 of course8 is its 9holehearted adoption of !ristotelian doctrine8 deri3ed directly from the $icomachean Ethics 8 chiefly ,ooks 7.46L R07SR0MS A 000 A ;on the mean< and L ;on akrasia <8 9ith some influence also from the e anima .R0BS This can be labeled eclecticism8 but % do not see that the term is 3ery useful. %t is dear from his presentation of !ristotle?s position at BB7,6+ that Plutarch re"ards him as substantially adoptin" Plato?s doctrine of the soul ;e.cept that he "later" assi"ned the "spirited" part Rthumoeides S une@ui3ocally to the irrational part of the soulHa de3elopment Plutarch does not @uarrel 9ith<. This enables Plutarch to present8 for instance8 the theory of the mean ;in BBB+6BB4!< unhesitatin"ly as Platonic doctrine. !lthou"h the chief source for his doctrine here8 as % ha3e said8 is $icomachean Ethics 7.46L8 there are some elements obser3able8 modifyin" the !ristotelian position8 9hich8 once a"ain8 mi"ht misleadin"ly be termed eclectic. *irst of all8 !ristotle describes 3irtue as a he.is state ;005KbMK<8 but Plutarch8 at BBB*8 describes it as a "mo3ement" ;kinesis < and "po9er" ;dunamis < concerned 9ith the mana"ement of the irrational8 and doin" this by fine6tunin" and harmoniCin" its discordant e.cesses ;cf. BBBE8 BB4+<. This seems a Pytha"oriCin" turn of phrase8 and that8 to"ether 9ith the laudatory mention of Pytha"oras in the do.o"raphy ;BB0E<8 points to a Pytha"orean element in the mi. that Plutarch is presentin" to us. This Pytha"oreanism can be sho9n 9ith fair certainty to be mediated throu"h Posidonius8 by a comparison 9ith Galen e plac. :ipp. et Plat . B.L.M1 ;p. 715 e Lacy< and 4.K.BM ;p. MMB e Lacy<8R04S but Plutarch?s interest in Pytha"oras and Pytha"oreanism is 9ell enou"h attested apart R0BSR04S A 007 A

from thisR0KS to make it probable that he is not simply. dependent on Posidonius here. *urther8 the acti3ity of 3irtue is described as a "harmoniCin"" ;sunharmo"a < of the irrational by the rational soul in a 3ariety of Pytha"orean pseudepi"rapha8R0LS 9hich indicates a tendency in many of these 9orks to claim !ristotelian ethical theory for Pytha"oras. Metopos?s treatise )n &irtue ;pp. 00K670 Thesleff< is a "ood e.ample of this ;he also produces the formulation8 found at &irt. mor . BB5 8 that the passions are the "matter" Rhule S of ethical 3irtue8 0018 line 2<. >hile not bein" necessarily dependent on any of these intermediate sources for his interpretation of !ristotle8 therefore8 Plutarch 9as doubtless a9are of most of them. %f this is eclecticism8 it is certainly not mindless eclecticism. %t is based on a 3ie9 of the history of philosophy8 mistaken perhaps8 but perfectly coherent8 9hich sees Plato as a follo9er of Pytha"oras8 !ristotle as essentially still a Platonist8 and a consistent ethical position bein" held by all three. !s to the doctrine of the distinctness of soul and intellect8 9hich does not8 as % say8 recei3e dear articulation in this treatise but comes out dearly in the dialo"ues )n the *ace in tie Moon ;1BM! ff.< and )n the aemon of Socrates ;410 ff.<8 as 9ell as in )n the +reation of tie Soul 8 that is a piece of "unorthodo.y8" on the ori"ins of 9hich % ha3e speculated else9here8 thou"h 9ithout definite conclusions8R02S but it is one for 9hich Plutarch is at pains to find Platonic antecedents ;e.".8 Tim . M5,8 15!8 Phaedr . 7BL+8 La9s 07.1K0 8 R0KSR0LSR02S A 00M A 1KK 6E<8 and 9hich8 as % ha3e said8 he does not re"ard as settin" him in opposition to any official Platonic tradition.R01S %n summary8 Plutarch may be a bit of a ma3erick8 but he does not 3ie9 himself as such ;e.cept perhaps in the matter of a temporal creation<8 and % can see no e3idence of any contemporary "school6Platonism" from 9hich he can be said to de3iate. %%% Plutarch did not8 ho9e3er8 escape criticism8 at least in a later "eneration. The situation in !thenian Platonism durin" the rest of the second century !. . is in fact interestin"ly comple.. >e kno9 of no Platonist in !thens8 after !mmonius?s death8 durin" Plutarch?s lifetime ;unless perhaps Gaius or the shado9y fi"ure of $icostratus 9as based there<8 but in the decades after his death the dominant Platonist in !thens8 +al3enus Taurus8 re"ards Plutarch 9ith affection and likes to @uote him ;cf. !ulus Gellius $! 0.7K<. Taurus?s position in ethics accords 9ith Plutarch?s ;$! 0.7K< and so does his propensity for attackin" the Stoics ;he 9rote8 like Plutarch8 a 9ork e.posin" their inconsistencies R$! 07.4S<8 but on the @uestion of the temporal creation of the 9orld ;9hich resol3es itself into the @uestion of the true meanin" of Plato?s "e"onen 8 at Tim . 72,<8 he re3erts to the more traditional line that it is not to be taken literally8 and he indeed produces an elaborate list of four possible nonliteral meanin"s ;ap . Philoponus e aet. mundi 8 p. 0B48 lines 0Mff. 'abe<. :e refers to "certain others" 9ho ha3e held that the 9orld accordin" to Plato is created8 but 9ithout any particular rancor or any su""estion that they should be e.communicated. :e is simply +oncerned to defend the opposite point of 3ie9. R01S

A 00B A %& 'ather more rancor appears a "eneration later8 in the treatise of !tticus8 the dominant !thenian Platonist of the ne.t "eneration ;fl. !. . 0L4Hpossibly because he 9as then appointed 'e"ius Professor of Platonism by Marcus !urelius<8 entitled8 belli"erently8 !"ainst those 9ho claim to interpret the doctrine of Plato throu"h that of !ristotle .R75S % ha3e su""ested else9hereR70S that !tticus 9as not necessarily al9ays as bad6tempered as this but 9as pro3oked by the attempt of a contemporary PeripateticHperhaps !ristocles8 in his :istory of Philosophy ;@uoted by Eusebius Gust before his @uotations from !tticus< Hto subsume Plato under !ristotle by ar"uin" for their essential a"reement8 but 9ith !ristotle presented as the perfecter of Plato?s doctrines. %n fact8 in launchin" this attack !tticus is out of line 9ith the maGority of Platonist opinion. !ntiochus8 Plutarch8 Taurus8 and !lbinus all accepted the broad a"reement of Plato and !ristotle8 thou"h 9ith !ristotle properly subordinated to PlatoD any of them 9ould probably ha3e bristled at a complementary mo3e to9ard anne.ation on the part of an !ristotelian8 thou"h none of them8 perhaps8 9ould ha3e "one as far as !tticus.R77S !tticus?s name is re"ularly linked by later $eoplatonists 9ith that of Plutarch8 since they both maintained the doctrine of the creation of the 9orld8 but in fact on most @uestions they 9ere far apart. !tticus?s attack on !ristotelian ethical theory is also an attack on pre3ious Platonists8 such as Plutarch and Taurus. :e R75SR70SR77S A 004 A takes a stron" line on the issue of the self6sufficiency of 3irtue for happiness8 e.coriatin" !ristotle for makin" happiness dependent on bodily and e.ternal "oods8 as 9ell as spiritual ones ;fr. C es Places8 21B+ ff.<N :is first disa"reement 9ith Plato is in a most "eneral8 3ast and essential matterN he does not preser3e the condition of happiness nor allo9 that 3irtue is sufficient for its attainment8 but he abases the po9er of 3irtue and considers it to be in need of the ad3anta"e accruin" from chance8 in order 9ith their help to be able to attain happinessD left to itself8 he alle"es8 it 9ould be @uite incapable of attainin" happiness. $o9 Plutarch does not actually take a position on this in )n Moral &irtue 8 since the @uestion does not come up8 but in the course of a polemic a"ainst +hrysippus8 in +omm. not . 05K5+ ff.8 he attacks him for not admittin" bodily and e.ternal "oods as formin" an essential part ;sumplerotika < of happiness8 althou"h nature commends them to us. So his attitude is not in doubt8 and !tticus is in direct conflict 9ith it. Taurus8 too8 9as critical of the Stoic position in ethics. >e ha3e a most interestin" passa"e in !ulus Gellius ;$! 07.4<8 9here Taurus8 after remindin" his hearers of his disa"reement 9ith the Stoa8 "i3es an account of Stoic ethical theory. :e does not8 ho9e3er8 "i3e his o9n 3ie98 apart from criticiCin" the Stoic ideal of freedom from passion ;apatheia 8 05<D but % think it is safe to assume that he a"reed 9ith Plutarch8 since

preference for moderation in passions ;metriopatheia < o3er apatkeia seems to "o to"ether 9ith acceptance of the role in happiness of bodily and e.ternal "oods. E3en on the @uestion of the interpretation of Timaeus M4! if. ;the description of the creation of the >orld Soul8 9hich is bound up 9ith their doctrine on the creation of the 9orld<8 !tticus is not entirely at one 9ith Plutarch8 as has been 9ell sho9n recently by >erner euse.R7MS They both belie3e in a pre6cosmic maleficent R7MS A 00K A soul8 but !tticus appears to retreat from Plutarch?s radical distinction bet9een soul and intellect into a more orthodo. position. Plutarch had taken the "undi3ided essence" of Tim . M4! to be nous 8 but the e3idence of Proclus ;3ia Porphyry< is that !tticus took it to be "di3ine soul" ;theia psuche <.R7BS This mi"ht seem to be a slender foundation on 9hich to build a difference of opinion8 but8 as euse sho9s8 the interpretation of this passa"e by Galen in his +ompendium oft he Timaeus 8R74S chap. B8 sho9s that8 9hile interpretin" it as a literal creation in a"reement 9ith Plutarch and !tticus8 he takes the "undi3ided essence" to be8 not nous 8 but "that soul 9hich is of the nature of that 9hich al9ays remains in one and the same state8" 9hich is plainly not intellect itself but8 rather8 rational di3ine soulD 9hile the "di3ided essence" he interprets as a disorderly soul immanent in matter. The inference is reasonable8 % think8 that Galen is influenced here by !tticus?s +ommentary on the Timaeus 8 rather than by Plutarch. %f this difference bet9een Plutarch and !tticus is not a mira"e8 9hat is the si"nificance of it= Presumably !tticus disliked Plutarch?s theory that soul in its essence is nonrational8 a doctrine harder to Gustify Platonically than that of the e.istence of a mal6eficent soul as 9ell as a rational one. ,ut if !tticus did make this alteration8 he seems to ha3e made it 9ithout much fanfare. )n the "eneral @uestion of the creation of the 9orld8 ho9e3er8 he is Gust as defensi3e as Plutarch ;fr. B8 250+<N !t this point8 9e 9ould ask not to be harassed by those from our o9n hearth Rsc . fello96 PlatonistsS8 9ho hold the 3ie9 that the 9orld is uncreated accordin" to Plato. They must pardon us if8 in interpretin" the doctrines of Plato8 9e rely on 9hat he8 as a Greek8 is sayin" to us as Greeks8 in clear and strai"htfor9ard idiom. R7BSR74S A 00L A :e then "oes on to @uote Tim . M5!M6K. >e must remember that in the inter3al bet9een himself and Plutarch8 Taurus in his +ommentary had come to the defense of the nonliteral interpretation of the Timaeus account8 in particular 9ith the subtle distinction of 3arious possible meanin"s of "enerated ;"enetos <. !tticus?s emphasis on "9e Greeks" sounds rather like a sneer at o3er6subtle Le3antines like Taurus ;9ho came from ,eirut<8 9hose Greek may not be of the purest.R7KS !tticus?s reason for postulatin" the creation of the 9orld is actually rather different from Plutarch?s. :e is concerned 9ith the preser3ation of di3ine pro3idence8 9hich he sees

!ristotle as underminin"8 not least by his postulation of the uncreatedness of the 9orld ;fr. B8 250+<8 on the "round that that 9hich ne3er came into bein" 9ould not be in need of pro3idential care to maintain itself in bein". This forms no part of Plutarch?s ar"ument in )n the +reation of tile Soul 8 thou"h he 9ould doubtless not ha3e dissented from it. The @uestion must no9 be asked8 does !tticus?s stron" opposition to Peripateticism @ualify him for the epithet orthodo. = *or some historians of philosophy8 !tticus is a paradi"m of orthodo.y. Philip Merlan8 for instance8 in The +ambrid"e :istory of Later Greek and Early Medie3al Philosophy ;p. LM< says8 correctlyN "!tticus is opposed not only to any kind of eclecticism or syncretism. :e obGects e3en to 9hat in later Platonism 9ill become standard8 3iC. treatin" !ristotle?s philosophy as a kind of introduction to Plato." Earl Mras8 in an article in Glotta 8R7LS reGects the epithet eclectic applied to !tticus by his earlier ,udJ editor8 ,audry8 in his %ntroduction ;pp. 3iii6...ii<. % a"ree 9ith Mras in R7KSR7LS A 002 A reGectin" the epithet8 but % a"ree 9ith ,audry in his presentation of !tticus?s position. ,audry sho9s 3ery 9ell ho9 !tticus?s opposition to Peripateticism a"ain and a"ain in3ol3es him in takin" up positions that are frankly Stoic. %n ethics8 althou"h he could find some Gustification in a ten6dentious interpretation of certain passa"es of Plato ;e.".8 Meno 2LE622E8 'ep . 1.425 642M!8 or La9s 0.KM0,6 8 all of 9hich8 ho9e3er8 could be e@ually 9ell adduced in support of the opposite position< for his doctrine of the self6sufficiency of 3irtue8 !tticus can only attack !ristotle by "oin" o3er 9holeheartedly to +hrysippus. !"ain8 in the area of metaphysics8 9e "et a passa"e like this ;ft. 2820B! ff.<N *urther8 Plato says that the soul or"aniCes the uni3erse8 penetratin" throu"h all of it8 ... and that nature is nothin" else but soulHand ob3iously rational soulHand he concludes from this that e3erythin" happens accordin" to pro3idence8 as it happens accordin" to nature. $o98 this passa"e uses terminolo"y found in the +ratylus ;diakosmein 8 cf. B55!1< and the Phaedrus ;dioikeisthai 8 cf. 7BK+7<8 but the o3erall tone is Stoic8 the rational soul fillin" the role of the lo"os 8 or indeed of "od himself ;cf.8 e.".8 S&* 7.0571 Rfrom :ippolytusS8 05M4 Rfrom +lementS8 05B7 Rfrom ProclusS<. %n the area of lo"ic8 a"ain8 the "ame of attackin" !ristotle?s +ate"ories 8 in 9hich 9e kno9 from Simplicius that !tticus Goined 9ith a 9ill8 in3ol3ed one almost ine3itably in adoptin" principles and formulations of Stoic lo"ic. The truth is8 of course8 that no later Platonist8 startin" from Speusippus and Ienocrates8 could be strictly "orthodo.8" since Plato did not lea3e a body of doctrine 9hich could

simply be adopted8 but8 rather8 a series of "uidin" ideas8 replete 9ith loose ends and e3en contradictions8 9hich re@uired interpretation.R72S ,y R72S A 001 A the second century !. . 8 one in effect had the choice of adoptin" !ristotelian or Stoic terminolo"y and concepts to "i3e formal structure to one?s interpretation of 9hat Plato meant8 and there 9as no central authority such as a Platonic !cademy to make e. cathedra pronouncements on ho9 far one could "o. $or8 % think8 9as Platonism any the 9orse for that. & ! rather different8 and most interestin"8 situation is that of the $eo6Pytha"oreans8 and specifically such men as Moderatus of Gades ;late first century !. . <8 $icomachus of Gerasa ;ca. !. . L56045<8 and $umenius of !pamea ;fl. ca. !. . 045<. :ere the problem is one not so much of orthodo.y8 but of ho9 seriously to take heresy8 in the ori"inal sense of hairesis .R71S %n The Middle Platonists ;chap. L< % firmly included these men8 and the $eo6Pytha"orean mo3ement as a 9hole8 as a subdi3ision of Platonism8 and in that % am unrepentant8 but % 9ould not 9ish to deny that there are complications. $eo6Pytha"oreanism ;or "Pytha"oreanism8" as its partisans 9ould certainly preferZ< is a rather special state of mind. %t may8 of course8 be more than that. %t may e3en "o so far as to enGoin upon its partisans a distinct bios 8 or 9ay of life8 in3ol3in" 3e"etarianism8 periods of silence8 and the obser3ance of sundry taboos and practices8 thou"h it need not. !t the least8 ho9e3er8 it issues in a "eneral attitude of one6upmanship in relation to all "later" philosophies ;e.cept8 of course8 Epicureanism8 to 9hich one had no desire to claim an ancestry<. The 3arious pseudo6Pytha"oric te.ts ;no9 con3eniently collected by :ol"er Thesleff<RM5S e.emplify this 3ery 9ell. These :ellenistic productions8 in R71SRM5S A 075 A their bo"us oric8 are cle3erly composed to prefi"ure 3arious salient aspects of Platonic8 !ristotelian8 or Stoic ethics8 physics8 or e3en ;as in the case of "!rchytas" )n the +ate"ories < lo"ic. Primarily8 ho9e3er8 the tar"et is Plato8 since he is the man considered to ha3e had personal contacts 9ith Pytha"oreans8 and 9hen identifiable Pytha"oreans arise8 from the first century ,.+. on8 it is as adherents ;albeit of 3aryin" de"rees of dissidence< of the Platonic hairesis that they appear. %t is this dissidence of theirs8 both from the "eneral run of Platonists and to some e.tent from each other8 that % 9ish to consider no9. %n its e.treme form it can be @uite belli"erent. +onsider Moderatus?s complaint a"ainst the Platonists8 preser3ed for us by Porphyry in his Life of Pytha"oras ;4M<. Moderatus has Gust e.plained that Pytha"orean philosophy proper became e.tinct because of its difficult and eni"matic form8 and because it 9as 9ritten in oricN

!nd in addition Plato and !ristotle and Speusippus and !risto.enus and Ienocrates appropriated for themsel3es 9hat 9as fruitful 9ith only minor touchin" up8 9hile 9hat 9as superficial or fri3olous8 and 9hate3er could be put for9ard by 9ay of refutation and mockery of the School by those 9ho later 9ere concerned to slander it8 they collected and set apart as the distincti3e teachin" of the mo3ement. These are stron" 9ords8 and put Moderatus in an interestin" position. !ll Pytha"oreans professed to re"ard Plato as no more than a brilliant follo9er of Pytha"oras8 but no one else8 % think8 is recorded as "rumblin" that the 9hole mo3ement 9as hiGacked by arri3iste Platonists ;and !ristotelians<. $umenius is prepared to be censorious about the $e9 !cademy ;and about !ntiochus of !scalon?s ne9 do"matism< in his treatise )n the i3er"ence of the !cademics from Plato 8RM0S but that is @uite another matterN $umenius is presentin" himself as the defender of Platonic ;thou"h RM0S A 070 A also8 of course8 Pytha"orean< "orthodo.y." !ll he is doin" is reGectin" the "Socratic" element in Platonism in fa3or of the do"matic autos epha tradition of Pytha"oras. :is treatise )n the Secret octrines of Plato ;of 9hich 9e kno9 almost nothin"< 9as presumably in support of the same line. !s for $icomachus8 he is @uite content to e.pound a mathematical Platonism in his %ntroduction to !rithmetic and Manual of :armonics 8 thou"h he asserts his Pytha"oreanism throu"h his Life of Pytha"oras ;9hich forms an important source for those of Porphyry and %amblichus< and by his @uotin" of numerous Pytha"orean pseudepi"rapha.RM7S :is Theolo"y of !rithmetic is also inspired by Pytha"orean number6mysticism8 thou"h e.poundin" doctrines that fit 9ithin the Platonic spectrum.RMMS $icomachus is not ;in his sur3i3in" 9orks< a contro3ersialist8 but he almost ine3itably inserts himself into a distincti3ely Pytha"orean contro3ersy8 on a @uestion no less basic than that of the first principles. >hich 9ay true orthodo.y lies in this matter is not entirely clear8 but on the 9hole it seems that the )ld Pytha"orean doctrine en3isa"ed a pair of principles8 the monad and the dyad8 both e@ually primordial8 thou"h the monad 9as naturally dominant.RMBS Later speculation8 ho9e3er8 as represented by the sources behind !le.ander Polyhistor ;ap . io"enes Laertius 2.7B6MM< and Se.tus Empiricus ;M 05.7B262B<8 and8 most spectacularly8 Eudorus of !le.andria ;ap . Simplicius %n phys .8 0208 lines 05ff. iels<8 proposed the monad8 or the )ne8 as the supreme principle8 from 9hich the dyad deri3ed. Eudorus8 indeed8 "oes further ;perhaps tryin" to reconcile the t9o traditions< and declaresN "%t must be said that the Pytha"oreans postulated RM7SRMMSRMBS A 077 A on the hi"hest le3el the )ne as a first principle8 and then on a secondary le3el t9o principles of e.istent thin"s8 the )ne and the nature opposed to this." This secondary )ne he "oes on to term the monad8 and its opposite number the indefinite dyad.

This rather darin" inno3ation Eudorus may ha3e deri3ed from reflection on the "limit" ;peras <8 "unlimited" ;apeiron <8 and "cause of the mi.ture" of Philebus 7KE6M5ED certainly it puts him beyond the pale of Pytha"orean orthodo.y. %ndeed8 he does not count in the tradition as a Pytha"orean but8 rather8 as an "!cademic8"RM4S so that he ranks more as a fello96tra3eler8 a Pytha"oriCin" Platonist8 than as a Pytha"orean. There are considerable subtleties here8 9ithin the spectrum. %t is this @uestion of first principles8 thou"h8 that is the subGect of the clearest intra6school contro3ersy bet9een Pytha"oreans of 9hich 9e ha3e e3idence. +alcidius8 in chap. 714 of his Timaeus +ommentary 8 reports $umenius?s 3ie9s on this @uestion8 apparently almost 3erbatim. %t is 9orth8 % think8 @uotin" the passa"e in e.tenso 8RMKS since it "i3es a "ood idea not only of $umenius?s relation to his immediate Pytha"orean predecessors8 but also of his stance 9ithin Platonism as a 9holeN $o9 the doctrine of Pytha"oras must be discussed. The Pytha"orean $umenius attacks this Stoic doctrine of the principles on the basis of the doctrine of Pytha"oras ;9ith 9hich8 in his opinion8 Plato?s doctrine is in complete accordance<8 and he says that Pytha"oras calls the Godhead the monad8 matter the dyad. $o98 accordin" to Pytha"oras8 in as far as this dyad is undetermined it did not ori"inate8 but in so far as it is determined it has an ori"in. %n other 9ordsN before it 9as adorned 9ith form and order8 it 9as 9ithout be"innin" or ori"in8 but its "eneration 9as the adornment and embellishment by the Godhead 9ho re"ulated it. Since8 therefore8 this "eneration is a later e3ent8 the unadorned and unborn substance should be held to be as old as God by 9hom it 9as re"ulated. ,ut some Pytha"oreans misunderstood this theory RM4SRMKS A 07M A and came to think that also this un@ualified and limitless dyad 9as produced by the utterly uni@ue monad and that8 thus8 the monad abandonin" its o9n nature assumed the appearance of the dyad. ,ut this is 9ron"8 because in this case that 9hich 9as8 the monad8 9ould cease to e.ist and that 9hich 9as not8 the dyad8 9ould come into bein"8 and God 9ould be chan"ed into matter and the monad into the un@ualified and limitless dyad. E3en to people of mediocre education this is ob3iously impossible. >hat $umenius is in fact doin" here is undertakin" an interpretation of the doctrine of the Timaeus not unlike that of Plutarch8 but presented as the teachin" of Pytha"oras. The emiur"e is the monad8 the primiti3e chaos of Tim . M5! is the dyad8 9hich then is adorned and recei3es orderin" by the emiur"e8 and as such may be said to be "created8" but is other9ise uncreated8 and coe3al 9ith the monad. :is attack on those Pytha"oreans 9ho "misunderstood this theory8" a class 9hich certainly includes both Moderatus and $icomachus8RMLS as 9ell as the tradition represented by !le.ander Polyhistor8 is interestin"ly comparable to that of Plutarch on his Platonic predecessors in )n the +reation of the Soul . %n each case8 the pre3ailin" orthodo.y is bein" condemned from the perspecti3e of a "truer" orthodo.y8 9hich "oes back to the roots of the tradition.

This is not8 of course8 to imply that $umenius is really a "conser3ati3e" Pytha"orean. :e is simply usin" the tradition to ser3e his philosophic purposes8 as 9as Plutarch. %n fact8 he ran"ed 9idely8 as 9e kno98 o3er the field of Eastern 9isdom8 pickin" up reinforcement for his ideas from Je9ish8 %ranian8 RMLS A 07B A E"yptian8 and e3en %ndian reli"ion. Eusebius @uotes a si"nificant e.tract from book 0 of his dialo"ue )n the Good NRM2S )n this @uestion8 after ha3in" cited8 and sealed oursel3es 9ith8 the e3idences of Plato8 9e should "o back further and "ird oursel3es 9ithRM1S the teachin"s of Pytha"oras8 and then call in the aid of peoples of reno9n8 adducin" their rites of initiation8 their doctrines8 and their established traditions8 performed in conformity 9ith Plato?s precepts8 such as are ordained by the ,rahmans8 the Je9s8 the Ma"i8 and the E"yptians. $ot only the content8 but the terminolo"y of this passa"e is si"nificant. $umenius proposes to take his start from Plato8 and si"ned 9ith the si"n of PlatoHhis use of semainomai here introduces a mildly hieratic noteHthen "ird himself about 9ith the doctrines of Pytha"oras8 before takin" on the inherited 9isdom of "peoples of reno9n" ;ta ethne ta eudokimounta <. The order of pro"ression is si"nificantN Pytha"oras and ta ethne are hi"hly honored8 but they must conform to the doctrines of Plato. $o9 all this is distinctly eccentric8 but 9ho 9ill dare to call it eclectic= $umenius is not Gust bro9sin" in the supermarket of philosophy and comparati3e reli"ion. :e has a coherent system8 a rather dualistic form of Platonism8 and he is embellishin" and enrichin" it by the application of a further principleHthe same that for the $eoplatonists brou"ht :omer8 :esiod8 )rpheus8 and the "ods of +haldaea into the foldHthat Plato is di3inely inspired and thus 9ill be found to be in accord 9ith all other di3inely inspired indi3iduals and traditions. This theory may not commend itself 3ery stron"ly to us8 but it has to be ackno9led"ed as a theoryD and follo9in" it does not8 it seems to me8 make one an eclectic8 at least in the peGorati3e sense in 9hich this 9ord is "enerally used. $umenius?s inno3a6 RM2SRM1S A 074 A tions in doctrine8 such as the distinction bet9een the *ather and the +reator ;frr. 008 70<8 the splittin" of the emiur"e ;fr. 00<8 or the theory of t9o souls ;frr. BB8 47<8 are de3elopments e.plicable from 9ithin Platonism8 not importations from 9ithout ;thou"h the possibility of influence from Persia or from the Gnostics cannot be e.cluded<. :e is8 % ha3e said8 sealed 9ith the seal of Plato8 and this is his talisman or phylactery 9hen plun"in" into the maCe of )riental reli"ion. &%

This in3esti"ation has proceeded far enou"h to make its point. >e ha3e looked at t9o "roups 9ithin later Platonism8 the second6century !thenians ;% 9ill not call them a school<8 and a succession of distin"uished "Pytha"oreans." The study of each "roup is instructi3e in its 9ay and demonstrates sufficiently8 % think8 the limitations of any interpretation that employs the concepts of orthodo.y and eclecticism . To end 9here 9e be"anN any li3in" philosophical mo3ement8 composed of independent minds unfettered by an official establishment of Guardians of the *aith8 is "oin" to be "eclectic" in a positi3e sense. !re Peter Geach and EliCabeth !nscombe "orthodo." or "eclectic" >itt"ensteinians= %s !.J. !yer an eclectic :umean= !re Sartre and Merleau6 Ponty to be seen as eclectic phenomenolo"ists= %s it a sin or a 3irtue to be an eclectic :e"elian8 Mar.ist8 or *reudian= Eclecticism has for too lon" been used as a term of contempt in the area of later Greek philosophy. !s such8 let us ha3e done 9ith it. A 07K A

4 Science and metaphysics Platonism8 !ristotelianism8 and Stoicism in Plutarch?s )n the *ace in the Moon

4 Science and metaphysics Platonism8 !ristotelianism8 and Stoicism in Plutarch?s )n the *ace in the Moon Pierlui"i onin The treatise e facie in orbe lunae is certainly one of the least studied amon" Plutarch?s philosophical 9ritin"s. The difficult and technical nature of some scientific discussions in the treatise probably e.plains its lack of popularity8 but its e.tremely composite nature must also ha3e contributed. %ndeed8 the e facie may be considered composite in t9o 9ays and for t9o different reasons. *irst8 there is an ob3ious problem in the plan of the 9ork8 9hich consists of t9o sections 9idely di3er"ent in nature. The first part is a scientific discussion8 and accordin" to the e.perts it is a hi"h6@uality account for the man in the street.R0S Physics8 astronomy8 and "eometrical optics are here used to e.plain the % 9ould like to thank *.E. ,renk8 S.J.8 for his helpful su""estions. R0S A 07L A nature of the moon and its spots8 and the e.planation proposed is the closet to scientific truth that 9e kno9 from anti@uity. The second part is as different from this as one could ima"ineN it is a fanciful eschatolo"ical myth8 filled 9ith souls and demons8 9here the moon and the sun8 9hich are held to be the soul?s ori"in and destination8 ser3e to e.plain its life a9ay from the earth. +urrent interpretations of the e facie either totally i"nore the e.istence of one of the t9o parts8R7S or disre"ard one of them by subordinatin" its meanin" and function to the re3elation or demonstration of a "truth" 9hich is held to be fully e.pressed only in the other.RMS @ The only useful startin" point for understandin" the 9ork is the su""estion that the @uestion of the final cause is the theme connectin" its t9o parts.RBS The e facie 8 ho9e3er8 has a composite character in a second sense too. %ts contents are enormously 3aried and hetero"eneousD not only are data of ancient science assembled8 but also themes 9hose ori"in is philosophical and 9hich deri3e from Plato8 !ristotle8 and the Stoics. %t does not seem reasonable to seek to e.plain the presence of these different scientific and philosophical themes 9ithout tryin" to sol3e the problem of the unity and of R7SRMSRBS A 072 A

the 9hole meanin" of the dialo"ueHunless one resorts to traditional philolo"ical e.planations ;mechanical contamination of sources and double 3ersions<8 9ith 9hich current Plutarch scholars are ;ri"htlyD in my opinion< increasin"ly dissatisfied. Let us then ask oursel3es to 9hat e.tent and ho9 the different philosophical streams found in the e facie contribute to a possible "eneral plan. %t is ob3ious8 and has ne3er been doubted8 that Plato more than anyone else influenced Plutarch.R4S Themes of Platonic ori"in are concentrated in t9o sections8 9hich are the most important for the philosophical meanin" of the dialo"ue. The first ;chapters 07604< is also the hi"h point of a fierce @uarrel 9ith Stoicism. The emphasis on the teleolo"y underlyin" the or"aniCation of the uni3erse and the corporeal structure of li3in" bein"s8 and the stress on the superiority of "9hat is better" o3er necessity8 both recall 9ell6kno9n Platonic te.ts8 from the Phaedo to the Timaeus 8 and also Platonic 9ritin"s closer in time to Plutarch ;for e.ample8 Galen?s e usu partium <. The other important. topic sho9in" Platonic inspiration is the eschatolo"ical myth.RKS The scenery 9ith ima"inary "eo"raphical elements calls to mind the Timaeus and the !tlantis mythD the e.periences under"one a9ay from the earth by the souls look back to the myths in the Phaedrus and 'epublic D and the presence of the demons reminds one of the Symposium 8 but e3en more of the demonolo"ical theories of Ienocrates8 a Platonist 9ho is e.plicitly named in 1BM*. :o9e3er8 in the e facie there are also some themes that are not only forei"n but perhaps e3en hostile to Plato?s philosophy ;at least apparently so<. %n the final myth Plato alone 9ould not suffice to e.plain the R4SRKS A 071 A hypothesis of the "double death8" to"ether 9ith all the elements connected 9ith itD and 9hereas it is perhaps ri"ht to consider such details as the connection of the souls 9ith the moon and the sun relati3ely insi"nificant ;for these may be mere fancies Gustified by the myth but 9ithout any real philosophical importance<8 9e are certainly 9orried by the bodily nature 9ith 9hich the souls suddenly seem endo9ed 9hen they reach the moon8 and in 9hich8 sooner or later8 they are fated to dissol3e.RLS Therefore at least in this case the hypothesis of Stoic influence8 9hich in the past has often been put for9ard8 seems some9hat plausibleD for it cannot be denied that the role of Stoicism in the e facie is 3ery important. Stoicism is the chief focus of the dispute in the first part. The earthy nature of the moon is demonstrated by confutin" different theses8 and of these the one that recei3es most attention is indeed the Stoic theory ;accordin" to 9hich the moon is a mi.ture of air and fire<D it is also demonstrated by confutin" the theory of natural places8 9hich is attributed only to the Stoics. ;The speakers opposed to it do not in3ol3e !ristotle in the @uarrel.< ,esides this8 in accordance 9ith a "ood method commonly used by Plutarch in philosophical disputes8 the Stoic theses ser3e also to inspire those 9ho criticiCe them.R2S >hen they are turned a"ainst their supporters and carried to absurdity or placed in contradiction amon" themsel3es8 they help to demonstrate the opposite ar"ument8 9hich Plutarch fa3ors. The disputes are not al9ays 9ell founded8R1S but as a "eneral rule it is al9ays possible to say that Plutarch?s intention 9as to use his opponents?

ar"uments to destroy Stoicism from inside and 9ith its o9n 9eapons. This dear and stron" interest in his opponents? theses may ha3e facilitated his assimilation of Stoic elements. RLSR2SR1S A 0M5 A ,ut 9e can "o further. The scientific core of the e facie 8 or essentially the 9hole of the first part 9ith the e.ception of the philosophical @uarrel in chapters 076048 certainly cannot be deri3ed from Plato. *irst8 the theory of the earthy nature of the moon is not at all PlatonicDR05S second8 it is impossible to find in Plato a similar e.ample of a serious discussion of a problem in physics ;e3en thou"h Plutarch is dealin" 9ith celestial physics<8 let alone such a discussion carried on 9ith the aid of other special sciences such as astronomy and optics. ,oth the scientific content and the method of the discussion cannot8 then8 be e.plained in terms of a precise Platonic model. :o9e3er8 this conclusion is perhaps not 3ery importantD in other 9ords8 one should not make the mistake of identifyin" the area of Platonism in Plutarch only 9ith that of the coincidences 9ith the ialo"ues of Plato. Sometimes one for"ets that there 9ere nearly fi3e centuries of chan"es ;includin" chan"es 9ithin the schools that follo9ed Plato< bet9een Plutarch and his distant master. ,ut once this is remembered8 Plutarch can be allo9ed to find some Platonic doctrine 9hich is not to be found e.plicitly in the ialo"ues but had by then become part of the tradition of the school. %n e.plainin" the situation of the e facie 8 9e can usefully in3oke the doctrines current in Platonism in the early imperial period8 9hich by no9 had appropriated the !ristotelian threefold di3ision of theoretical sciences. !s the idaskalikos sho9s8R00S physics8 to"ether 9ith R05SR00S A 0M0 A mathematics8 9as accepted as one of the speculati3e sciences of lo9er rank than theolo"y. %n the frame9ork of such Platonism e3en the first part of the e facie could be considered perfectly Platonic. %n any case it is 9ell kno9n that Plutarch else9here sho9s important contacts 9ith contemporary Platonism8 9hich had absorbed many !ristotelian doctrines.R07S The e facie includes passa"esR0MS 9hich could su""est that Plutarch8 in his 3ery tendentious attempt to present Stoicism as a modern materialism that denied di3ine pro3idence8 considered !ristotle and !ristotelians as 3aluable allies. ,ut it is e3en more important to note that Plutarch kne9 the threefold !ristotelian di3ision of theoretical sciences and used it in the e facie 8 thou"h in the dis"uised form of myth. Thus the information ;1B7,< about the acti3ities of the stran"er in the island of +ronos ;and the stran"er is the source from 9hich the myth appears to ha3e come< can hardly be anythin" but a metaphorical hint of this doctrine. The stran"er8 9e are told8 "9hile he ser3ed the "od became at his leisure ac@uainted 9ith astronomy8 in 9hich he made as much pro"ress as one can by practicin" "eometry8 and 9ith the rest of philosophy by dealin" 9ith so much of it as is possible for the natural philosopher." The choice of the sciences and acti3ities necessary for the ser3ants of +ronos is ob3iously R07SR0MS

A 0M7 A deliberate. >e find astronomy and "eometry Goined to"ether to form the bulk of mathematics ;this is one of the possible positions of astronomy in Middle Platonism8 thou"h accordin" to another interpretation it belon"ed to physics<DR0BS and 9e find the remainder of philosophy8 9hich belon"s to physics. ,ut e3erythin" is at the "od?s ser3ice and desi"ned for his 9orship. :ere 9e see the ob3ious preeminence of theolo"y o3er all the theoretical sciences. The island of +ronos thus seems to be a metaphor for a Platonic school of the first or second century !. . D and the pro"ram of acti3ities of the "od?s ser3ants seems to coincide 9ith the conceptual frame9ork of the e facie itself. ,ut 9hat conse@uences deri3e from this as far as the composition of the dialo"ue and the relationship bet9een myth and science are concerned= Some form of subordination or inferiority of the other t9o theoretical sciences to theolo"y is dearly implicit in Plutarch?s e.position.R04S *or !ristotle8 too8 first philosophy8 i.e.8 theolo"y8 9as superior to the other sciences. ,ut is myth simply identical 9ith theolo"y= !nd precisely in 9hat sense are the results of the scientific section of the e facie inferior or subordinate to the truths of theolo"y= %t is possible to ans9er the first @uestion immediately. Myth cannot be considered as the literal e.pression of supreme theolo"ical science. %t is at most a foreshado9in" or metaphor of a R0BSR04S A 0MM A truth8 9hich must still be interpreted in its entirety.R0KS ,ecause of this it is impossible that 9here3er the data of science and the information "i3en by mythical characters conflict8 such information should definitely be considered a literal truth that corrects the errors of science or e.tends its obGecti3e limits. ,ut 9hat are these limits8 and 9herein lies the inferiority of science to the theolo"y foreshado9ed in the myth= E3en thou"h Platonists accepted physical science and astronomy 9ithin the realm of reco"niCed theoretical sciences8 they undoubtedly set limits to the co"niti3e 3alue of these subGects. %f they adopted from !ristotle the threefold di3ision of the sciences8 they could not endorse the theory it implied8 the idea that the inferiority of physics to first philosophy 9as only a.iolo"ical and the defenseH9hich in !ristotle 9as doubtless inspired by the @uarrel 9ith PlatoHof the independence and self6sufficiency of the special sciences8 each of 9hich 9as or"aniCed around principles that 9ere proper to it and could not be deduced from any supposedly supreme science. ,esides8 such a theory of science coe.ists in !ristotle 9ith the idea of an eternal 9orld8 9hich had neither been built ori"inally by di3ine pro3idence nor 9as "o3erned by it. ,ut if the 9orld 9as formed by di3ine po9er ;9hich for Plutarch is literally true< and is constantly 9atched o3er by "od?s pro3idence8 then physics cannot be based only on physical principlesN it must at some point yield to theolo"y8 or at least it should dra9 its fundamental principles from this discipline. )ne can see8 then8 9hat difficulties 9ere caused 9hen a cosmolo"y based on di3ine craftsmanship and pro3idence8 such as Middle Platonism and in particular

Plutarch?s philosophy8 took o3er !ristotle?s threefold di3ision. Plutarch dearly sho9s 9hat his position is 9hen he briefly outlines the history of Greek thou"ht in Life of $icias 7M8 9here Plato is praised precisely because "he had made the necessity of nature subordinate to di3ine and truer R0KS A 0MB A principles."R0LS !ccordin" to Plutarch8 then8 physics looked back to metaphysical principles. Many details in the scientific section of the e facie 9hich may ha3e seemed insi"nificant no9 become important8 and some 9hich could be e.plained only 9ith difficulty no9 become transparent. >e can8 for e.ample8 better understand 9hy the speakers 9ho uphold the earthy nature of the moon and 9ho ha3e al9ays been held to present the position of Plutarch himself ne3er completely identify themsel3es 9ith the thesis for 9hich they ar"ue. Lamprias and Lucius8 e3en thou"h they sometimes speak as if the ar"ument about the earthy nature 9ere their o9n ;e.".8 170*8 17K,8 1M4+<8 else9here speak as if the same ar"ument had been stated by other persons8 9ith 9hom they do not 9ish to identify themsel3es. The most disturbin" instance is in 17M!N ">e e.press no opinion of our o9n no9D but those 9ho suppose that the moon is earth8 9hy do they turn thin"s upside do9n any more than you RStoicsS=" %t is surely imprudent to su""est that these incon"ruities sho9 traces of a double 3ersion of the e facie 8 one bein" more do"matic and the other more skeptical.R02S The detachment 9ith 9hich8 in 17M! and else9here8R01S the theory of the earthy nature of the moon is presented reflects the proper caution of a PlatonistHone 9ho kno9s he is treatin" the @uestion from an absolutely partial point of 3ie98 discussin" as a R0LSR02SR01S A 0M4 A physicist and astronomer a matter 9hich is not simply physical and astronomical. The scientific section of the e facie ar"ues for the earthy nature of the moon as if the planet 9ere only a body in a 9orld containin" bodies8 9hich is dearly not the caseN the moon is a li3in" and di3ine body8 as the ad3ocates of its earthy nature do not themsel3es fail to note in 1M4+. The point of 3ie9 e.pressed in the first part of the 9ork must therefore seem limited and partial to Plutarch himself8 and this e.plains his caution. >e find this same caution in the @uestion concernin" the final cause of the moon8 9hen the problem is posed in 172+. :ere 9e learn that the moon transmits do9n9ard the heat of the upper re"ions and8 in3ersely8 ser3es as a filter to purify the e.halations 9hich the earth sends up9ard. This could 9ell be true8 but it is certainly partial. Such an e.planation considers the moon and the entire uni3erse only from their material perspecti3e and establishes their functions only for this aspect. %f8 ho9e3er8 the moon8 the hea3enly bodies8 and the 9hole 9orld are not merely material obGects8 there should be some other function for all of them8 and this is su""ested by the remark immediately added to the physical e.planation already mentionedN "%t is not dear to us 9hether her earthiness and solidity ha3e any use suitable to other ends also" ;172+<. Plutarch has done all he could to be understood.

$o98 the "other ends" 9hich could be ser3ed by the planets8 the moon and the sun in particular8 are hinted at in the final myth. )f course8 since this is a myth8 only some of its elements are for Plutarch "truths" to be understood in an absolutely literal sense. They are relati3ely fe98 ho9e3er8 and restricted to those 9hich a"ree 9ith doctrines commonly accepted by Middle PlatonismN that there is an intelli"ible di3ine element8 9hate3er its structure may beD that the 9orld and the hea3enly bodies are 3isible and li3in" di3initiesD that man?s bein" has not a corporeal nature alone8 but consists of the union of a body and a soul8 of 9hich at least a part must be immortal. !part from these fe9 fi.ed points of Platonic philosophy8 e3erythin" cannot be understood simply in a literal sense8 but needs to be interpreted. $o9 it is A 0MK A fairly difficult to try to "uess the truth of 9hich the myth could "i3e a hint8 but a "ood criterion of Gud"ment could be the presupposition that there is a consistent connection bet9een the t9o sections of the e facie 8 and that therefore 9hat is said in the myth deri3es its meanin" from the theses in the first section. % shall try to follo9 this criterion and discuss some details of the myth that are rele3ant to the total meanin" of the dialo"ue. %n the first place8 in some cases the myth e.presses an opinion on the problems already discussed in the first section from a scientific point of 3ie9. The e.istence of islands in the ocean and of a "reat continent on the other side of the ocean8 9hich is stated in the myth ;1B0!6,<8 runs the risk of directly contradictin" the thesis put for9ard in the first part of Lamprias?s account8 9hich declares 9ith certainty that the idea of the outer ocean bein" not continuous but broken up by mainlands is "absurd and false" ;170+<. The chief subGect of the discussion8 the material nature of the moon8 is e.plained differently in the t9o sections8 thou"h not 9ith complete contradictionN by the earthy nature in the first part8 and in the second by the su""estion that the moon is a mi.ture of the earth?s and the stars? natures. ,ut precisely in the passa"e in 9hich the myth su""ests this ne9 e.planation8 9e find another potential contradiction to the ar"uments of science e.pressed in the first part. Sulla reports that the moon8 insofar as it is a mi.ture of earth and of star or ether ;by this he surely means the purest form of fireN cf. 1BME6*<8 "is at once animated and fertile and at the same time has the proportion of li"htness to hea3iness in e@uipoise." %t is not said e.plicitly but is su""ested here that this balance bet9een forces is the reason 9hy the moon occupies in the uni3erse the place that is proper to itD but in the scientific e.position in chapter K ;17M+6 <8 the speed of re3olution is said to pre3ent the moon ;in this case understood as bein" endo9ed 9ith an earthy nature and hence hea3y< from fallin" back on the earth. %t seems8 then8 that Plutarch is not at all 9orried by his contradiction in the myth of the scientific theories pre3iously ad6 A 0ML A

3anced. ,ut there is e3en a case that lea3es no doubt that Plutarch 9ants to stress in the myth that he is contradictin" the science he had used in the first part. %n 1BB!8 after a di"ression on the nature of the hea3enly bodies8 Sulla continues as follo9sN "So much for the moon?s substance. !s to her breadth and ma"nitude8 it is not 9hat the "eometers say8 but many times "reater. She measures off the earth?s shado9 9ith fe9 of her o9n ma"nitudes not because it is small but she more ardently hastens her motion in order that she may @uickly pass throu"h the "loomy place bearin" a9ay the souls of the "ood 9hich cry out and ur"e her ..." :ere 9e seem to ha3e a completely deliberate and hostile reference to the ar"uments in 17M, on the crossin" of the earth?s shado9 in eclipses and to those in 1M7,8 9here there is a respectful citation of the calculations of !ristarchus pro3in" that the moon?s diameter is much shorter than the earth?s. :o9e3er8 a fe9 lines belo9 9e are astonished a"ain8 but in a 3ery different manner. !fter speakin" of the souls of the "ood8 9hich hasten to come out of the shado98 Sulla describes the moanin" procession of the souls of the e3il8 9ho press upon the moon from behind and are terrified by itN "The souls ... are fri"htened off also by the so6called face 9hen they "et near it8 for it has a "rim and horrible aspect. %t is no such thin"8 ho9e3er8 but Gust as our earth contains "ulfs that are deep and e.tensi3e ... so those features are depths and hollo9s of the moon" ;1BB,6+<. This is indeed a remarkable passa"eD the e.planation of the face of the moon is here e.actly the same as the one proposed in the scientific section in 1M4+DR75S indeed8 the confirmation science obtains here from the mythical account is e3en stren"thened by the detail that Plutarch here stressesHthat the souls of the e3il see in the moon?s face 9hat is not there. %t is implied that the souls of the "ood do not decei3e themsel3es on the planet?s R75S A 0M2 A true nature. ;)ne should8 rather8 say that it is not simply implied8 for Sulla relates an e.planation 9hich ultimately comes from the ser3ants of +ronos8 9ho belon" indeed to the better soulsD cf. 1BB . These sho9 themsel3es here8 then8 as no less than scientist demons rather than 9ise demons. ,esides8 are not physics and astronomy studied in the island of +ronos=< !s one can see8 the picture resultin" from a comparison bet9een the ans9ers "i3en by the t9o parts of the e facie to some problems raised in both of them is full of contrastsN there are cases 9here myth deliberately contradicts science8 others 9here myth corrects it8 and others still 9here it confirms it fully. >hat could be the sense of such une@ual correspondences= %n fact it is not difficult to understand 9hy Plutarch 9anted to insert in the myth elements 9hich contradicted the scientific theory. E3en if it 9ere true that they contain 3esti"es of Platonic irony8R70S the fact remains that they are concerned precisely 9ith physical and mathematical6astronomical science. The contradictions must therefore ha3e e.actly the same sense as the some9hat skeptical reser3ation in the first part of the 9orkD they ha3e the purpose of insistin" on the nondefiniti3e8 not fully certain8 nonabsolute nature of scientific e.planations. The Platonic philosopher su""ests that 9hen one en"a"es in the science of nature or of the hea3ens8 one must al9ays remember that in a 9ider 3ision ;as should al9ays be the case8 since sciences are neither

autonomous nor self6sufficient< the e.planations could be different8 in3ol3in" metaphysical forces or entities 9hich are not e3en e.actly perceptible by science. (et the e.planations of the myth are not literally trueN they are only an e.ample and a su""estion of ho9 matters could other9ise stand. !t the end of the tale ;1B4 < Sulla si"nificantly in3ites his listeners not to "belie3e" it but to "make 9hat they 9ill" of it8 that is8 to interpret it in the manner in 9hich R70S A 0M1 A it may best be interpreted. ,esides8 Gust 9here the myth more e.plicitly contradicts science it does so in such a 9ay8 and 9ith such enormously false reasonin"8R77S that surely Plutarch?s aim 9as not to ad3ocate acceptance of the myth8 least of all in this case8 as pure truthN he probably 9anted to su""est the e.act opposite8 that it cannot be true in the actual terms stated by Sulla8 but must simply be understood as a hint of another truth8 different from physical truth. >hat Plutarch means to produce 9ith re"ard to scientific matters is8 ho9e3er8 a sense of 9atchful reser3ation and not of corrosi3e mistrustD an irrationalist critic of science could ne3er ha3e 9ritten the first part of the e facie . *or this reason8 after ha3in" belied science in the most astonishin" manner8 he has inserted in the myth the e.planation in 1BB,6+ on the face of the moon8 9here the scientific theory is proposed a"ain and confirmed. +learly8 therefore8 the effecti3e and important subGect of the e facie is not really the nature and functions of the moon. This @uestion ser3es only to e.emplify8 throu"h the discussion of a specific problem8 the difficulties inherent in a more "eneral @uestion belon"in" to the speculati3e philosophy of Middle PlatonismN the relationship bet9een physics and metaphysics8 and bet9een special sciences and theolo"y. This is the real problem8 and it may be su""ested that in Plutarch?s oeu3re this @uestion is not presented by the e facie alone.R7MS %f Plutarch has there discussed the implications for Platonism of certain key !ristotelian principles8 that is not an unimportant point. The e 3irtute R77SR7MS A 0B5 A morali 9ill no lon"er seem uni@ue in his 9orkD and if 9e also bear in mind the interpretation recently put for9ard for the e "enio SocratisR7BS ;a 9ell6constructed 9ork on the contrast bet9een an acti3e and a speculati3e life<8 9e shall ha3e to admit that the presence of !ristotelianism in Plutarch is much "reater than 9e had been accustomed to think. !nother problem raised by the myth in the e facie is the corporeality of the soul. This thesis is implicit in the passa"e ;1BM 6E< 9here Sulla describes the second period of the souls? stay in the moonN "second8 in appearance resemblin" a ray of li"ht8 but in respect of their nature8 9hich in the upper re"ion is buoyant as it is here in ours8 resemblin" the ether about the moon8 they "et from it both tension and stren"th as ed"ed instruments "et a temperD for 9hat la.ness and diffuseness they still ha3e is stren"thened and becomes firm and translucent. %n conse@uence they are nourished by any e.halation that reaches them8 and :eraclitus 9as ri"ht in sayin"N ?Souls employ the sense of smell in :ades.?"

$ot only is the soul?s corporeality here dearly stated8 but the lan"ua"e is dearly that of the Stoics.R74S The same thesis is a"ain confirmed in 1B4!6,8 9here the death of the souls is mentionedN ")f these8 as has been said8 the moon is the element8 for they are resol3ed into it as the bodies of the dead are resol3ed into earth." %f 9e admitted that Plutarch follo9ed a R7BSR74S A 0B0 A Stoic source here8R7KS 9e 9ould also e.acerbate the incon"ruity of 9hich he 9ould ha3e been "uilty. !fter ha3in" fou"ht a"ainst the Stoics in most of his 9ork8 he 9ould ha3e deri3ed from them a doctrine that is contrary to e3erythin" 9e 9ould e.pect from a Platohist8 and Gust in a conte.t 9here the ar"ument should by no9 be e.clusi3ely metaphysical and theolo"ical. %f8 ho9e3er8 9e do not consider the myth a self6contained account but e.amine it in the li"ht of the problems raised by the entire 9ork and of the hypothesis that e3erythin" has one meanin"8 the difficulty appears to be far less seriousN 9e may conclude that Plutarch 9as in a certain sense compelled to accept a kind of materialiCation of the soul. Let us indeed consider once a"ain the specific problem tackled in both parts of the e facie . %t deals 9ith the nature and function of the moon8 i.e.8 the material and the final cause. The first part of the 9ork "oes some 9ay to9ard specifyin" the material cause and8 in connection 9ith this8 the final cause tooN if the moon has an earthy nature8 its function is compatible 9ith such a nature8 i.e.8 the reflection of the sun?s rays and the transmission and purification of the earth?s e.halations. ,ut this same first part8 as 9e ha3e seen8 leads one to understand that such accounts are inad6 R7KS A 0B7 A e@uate8 since they consider the moon solely as a physical and inanimate body. The myth has e.actly the task of correctin" these limitations of scienceD and it starts by correctin" the account of the material cause. ,ut it is important to note ho9 it corrects it. !t 1BME 9e are told that the moon has not a simple and unmi.ed nature ;in other 9ords8 it has not the same nature as the earth8 as 9as ar"ued in the first part< but is "a blend as it 9ere of star and earth8" and "because it has been permeated throu"h and throu"h by ether is animated and fertile." )ne must ine3itably conclude from this that it is the addition of starry substance ;ether or fire< that makes the moon animatedD the moon?s soul has therefore an ethereal nature. ,ut this result has in turn some una3oidable conse@uences8 9hich Plutarch dra9s 9ith "reat coherenceN accordin" to the ne9 e.planation of the material nature8 the account of final causality 9ill also ha3e to be correctedD the ne9 specification of this 9ill ha3e to take the ne9 nature into account8 and since the nature is no9 animated8 the final cause of the moon in the ne9 account 9ill deal 9ith the soul8 its 3icissitudes8 its ori"in8 and its destination. !t this point the identification of the soul?s nature 9ith the moon?s ether ;9hich is in fact dearly e.pressed in 1BM <8 and hence the materialiCation of the soul8 is imposed by the 3ery lo"ic of the construction. The final cause of the moon therefore becomes dean %t consists in the task of producin" ;1B4+< and

recei3in" for a certain period of time the souls that ha3e come back from their first death ;the separation from the body< and finally dissol3in" them into the lunar substance itself. )b3iously8 Plutarch does not at all intend to abandon the Platonic doctrine of the immortality of the soul. *or in addition to a body and a mortal soul8 man has nous or intelli"ence ;1BM!<. *ifty years a"o :amilton persuasi3ely ar"ued that Plutarch?s distinction bet9een soul and intelli"ence ;e3en if it 9as certainly influenced by !ristotle< 9as meant to reproduce the Timaeus?s distinction bet9een the mortal and the immortal part of the A 0BM A soul.R7LS *urther8 there cannot be any doubt 9hatsoe3er that nous in Plutarch is immortal and immaterial. %t is defined as apathes 8 "impassible8" nor is there e3er any mention of a "third death" or of a dissolution of the intelli"ence into the sun. *inally8 in the passa"e that indicates the separation of intelli"ence from the soul8 9e are dearly meant to understand that it yearns to be Goined not to the sun as a hea3enly body ;besides8 of 9hat material substance or element could one still ima"ine intelli"ence to be made8 seein" that ether has already been used in order to e.plain the mortal nature of the soul=<. The aim of nous is instead the supreme and ideal "oal that re3eals itself in the sun8 namely8 the Good found in the 'epublic 8 or the first "od found in Middle PlatonismN "%t is separated by lo3e for the ima"e in the sun throu"h 9hich shines forth manifest the desirable and fair and di3ine and blessed8 to9ard 9hich all nature in one 9ay or another yearns."R72S %n conclusion8 the materialiCation of the soul in the e facie is perfectly connected 9ith the fundamental subGects of the treatise and is cle3erly incorporated in an anthropolo"y8 psycholo"y8 and metaphysics 9hich can be presented as an interpretation of the Timaeus . Gi3en this situation8 e3en the possible use of a Stoic source by Plutarch8 9hich in fact is made at least probable by some passa"es in the myth8R71S is no lon"er at all alarmin"8 incon"ruous8 or scandalous. That Plutarch could put his 9ide readin" to "ood use in composin" the e facie is e.actly 9hat 9e should e.pect of him8 but his total conception remains firmly Platonic6!ristotelian. R7LSR72SR71S A 0BB A %f this is so8 the e facie hardly Gustifies the old preGudice that makes Plutarch an eclectic8 or at least an eclectic of lo9er @uality.RM5S %ts Platonic6!ristotelian philosophical structure acts as a filter and criterion not only for conceptions of a different philosophical ori"in ;Stoic elements and "skeptical" reser3ations<8 but also for the scientific problems discussed in the treatise. Therefore8 if one really 9anted to speak of eclecticism8 one 9ould ha3e to say that the e facie is eclectic in one of the most positi3e senses that could be "i3en to the termN for its 9ealth of philosophical kno9led"e and scientific information and for the solidity 9ith 9hich such kno9led"e and information is or"aniCed accordin" to a precise philosophical position. Still8 it could be obGected8 this philosophical position has a composite character8 it is not simply Platonism but a possible 3ersion of Platonism8 such as Plutarch and other

philosophers of those times concei3ed it8 an interpretation of Platonism stron"ly e.posed to !ristotelian influences. The criterion itself 9hich Plutarch used could thus be considered "eclectic" in one of the current meanin"s of the term. % do not think that this obGection can be sustained. Mutual influences bet9een Platonism and !ristotelianism ha3e e.isted since the time of the ancient !cademyN should 9e then say that Platonic6 !ristotelian eclecticism 9as born there and at that time= Many absurdities could result from this statement. %t 9ould perhaps be 9iser to admit once and for all that the dialo"ue bet9een the philosophies of Plato and !ristotle is somethin" essential for all those 9ho8 at any time in the history of ancient thou"ht8 ha3e looked back to the one or the other philosophy. Eclecticism is @uite inade@uate to describe this situation. RM5S A 0B4 A

K Se.tus Empiricus on the kriterion The Skeptic as conceptual le"atee

K Se.tus Empiricus on the kriterion The Skeptic as conceptual le"atee Jac@ues ,runschi" Skepticism8 as is 9ell kno9n8 is a therapy for philosophical illnesses. ,ut it does not spend much time in classifyin" those illnessesN the disease to fi"ht a"ainst8 in spite of its manifold forms8 is al9ays do"matism. To the Skeptic8 all non6Skeptical schools are do"matic8 9hether "properly speakin"" ;idios8 P: 0.M< or in a particular 9ayN the !cademy itself professes a kind of upside6do9n do"matism ;P: 0.77K<. Eclecticism is ne3er mentioned by Se.tus8 althou"h the thin" is not unkno9n in ancient philosophy8 nor is the 9ord unemployed ;see onini8 +hapter 0 abo3e<. The reason for this silence is perhaps that eclecticism is less a philosophical illness than an alternati3e medicine8 aimin" at curin" the same ills as Skepticism does ;namely8 This is a re3ised8 some9hat enlar"ed8 and as far as possible an"liciCed 3ersion of the paper read in *rench at the ublin +on"ress. % benefited from obser3ations made there8 in particular by Pierlui"i onini8 Tony Lon"8 Jaap Mansfeld8 and 'eimar MFllerD % am most "rateful to them all. !nother8 more "eneral 3ersion 9as read at the *reie #ni3ersitPt8 ,erlin8 in January 0124D % recei3ed a number of useful su""estions from my audience there. % first tried to translate the *rench draft myselfD but if it reads as tolerable En"lish8 this is entirely due to Jonathan ,arnes?s "enerous and careful help. % am afraid there are still many traces in this paper of its *rench descentD if such a doctor did not cure them8 certainly they are incurable. A 0BK A conflicts amon" the do"matists<8 but in an opposite 9ay and on the basis of a different dia"nosis. To the eclectic8 doctrinal conflicts are superficial conflictsD philosophical doctrines are compatible at bottom8 at least piecemeal8 and perhaps e3en "lobally they con3er"e. >hen lookin" at the philosophical sta"e8 the Skeptic sees @uite a different playN to him8 the disa"reement bet9een systems is irreducible. !n eclectic philosopher mi"ht actually accuse the Skeptic of bein" himself a kind of metaphilosophical do"matist8 in the sense that he admits not only that philosophers seem to contradict each other8 but also that they actually do soD one mi"ht remind him of his Cetetic disposition and in3ite him to be more careful before assertin" the obGecti3e reality of those conflicts. ,ut the Skeptic 9ould not be embarrassed by this obGectionN he could ans9er that in this conte.t8 there 9as no difference bet9een sayin" and doin"D if philosophers say that they contradict each other ;and they say so rather loudly<8 this means that they do contradict each other. %t 9ould be a piece of real do"matism to claim that deep6le3el a"reement hides beneath surface6le3el disa"reement.

,y 3irtue of his initial decisions8 the Skeptic is so immune to eclectic temptations that he does not e3en feel the need to speak about them. )n the other hand8 he is ne3er fired of e.hibitin" the anta"onisms bet9een do"matists8 and he sharpens them by all the means at his disposal. :e is so little prone to "loss o3er differences that he takes "reat pains to demarcate himself from those philosophical schools 9hich for some reason ha3e been taken as "close nei"hbors" to Skepticism ;P: 0.7056B0<.R0S R0S A 0BL A This fundamental opposition bet9een eclecticism and Skepticism has certain conse@uences. o"matists contradict each other in their statements D those contradictions make do"matism a 9eak position ;and eclecticism a fundamentally meanin"less one<8 only if they are real contradictions . The eclectic "ame 9ill thus be to miti"ate the contradictions8 by sho9in" that do"matists do not speak about the same thin"s8 do not consider them in the same respects8 do not desi"nate them 9ith the same 9ordsD their dissensions are merely 3erbal8 since they use the same 9ords for different concepts and different 9ords for the same conceptsD because they disa"ree on the conceptual le3el8 they are able to a"ree at the le3el of do"ma8 to a "reater e.tent than they themsel3es belie3e.R7S )n the other hand8 the Skeptic must assume that do"matists8 9hen @uarrelin" about their opposite do"mas8 all ha3e the same notions and use the same 9ords to e.press themN only on this condition can he claim that he understands 9hat their debates are all about and attack their do"mas from a position of kno9led"e. Let us notice8 ho9e3er8 that this strate"y is likely to come into conflict 9ith another tendency8 e@ually natural to the Skeptic. !ccustomed as he is to point out the disa"reements bet9een do"matic doctrines 8 9hen he notices that do"matists "i3e different definitions of the same terms he 9ill ine3itably be tempted to e.pose those conceptual disa"reementsD the reader 9ill thus be presented 9ith the broadest possible "disa"reement" ;diaphonia < bet9een do"matists. ,ut this is a dan"erous "ameN if he tries to 9in on this "round too8 he 9eakens his position else9here8 since R7S A 0B2 A he GeopardiCes the identity of the conceptual le"acy shared by the different schools. >e may 9ell e.pect that he 9ill 3acillate o3er 9hat to do 9hen it is dear that a "i3en concept is differently construed by different schoolsN he has e@ually "ood reasons for pointin" out this difference and for sayin" nothin" about it8 or e3en for denyin" itD but dearly he cannot do all these thin"s at the same time. >e can see this 3acillation8 % belie3e8 in more than one passa"e in Se.tus. % shall content myself 9ith one e.ample8 in 9hich it is especially conspicuous. %n M 28 Se.tus de3otes a len"thy section ;M556MMK< to an analysis of the notion ;epinoia < of proof ;apodei.is <. :e barely mentions the disa"reements bet9een schools concernin" certain aspects of this notion ;MMK<D e3ery9here else in this section8 he offers as an in3esti"ation of a unitary concept of proof 9hat is in fact ;if % am not mistaken in 9hat % said else9here about this

section<RMS a patch9ork of se3eral palpably different definitions of this notion. !fter this analysis8 the implicit meanin" of 9hich is that all philosophers ha3e an almost completely identical notion of proof8 Se.tus takes up a ne9 problem8 namely8 the problem of the e.istence ;hupar.is < of proof ;MMK6ML<. :e first asks if the concept ;epinoia kai prolepsis < implies the e.istence of its obGect. This is a 3ital @uestion to Skepticism as a 9hole8 and it has a rele3ance far beyond the particular case of the notion of proof8 for if the "ontolo"ical" implication holds ;i.e.8 if 9e may infer from essence to e.istence<8 the Skeptic finds himself in a 3ery a9k9ard position. :o9 could he both claim that he has the notion of a proof and suspend Gud"ment about the e.istence of proof= :is enemies8 particularly the Epicureans8RBS as RMSRBS A 0B1 A Se.tus says here8 9ill try to catch him in the follo9in" trapN if you understand 9hat a proof is8 if you ha3e a notion of it8 then proof does e.istD and if you do not understand it8 then ho9 can you in@uire about somethin" you ha3e no notion of= !ns9erin" this obGection8 Se.tus "rants one of the premisesN it is indeed impossible to conduct any in@uiry 9ithout ha3in" a notion of 9hat it bears on. ,ut in order to "et round the obGection alle"edly in3ol3ed in this premise8 he successi3ely adopts t9o completely different tactics. *irst ;MM7!6MM!<8 his reply is some9hat ironical. *ar from sayin" that 9e ha3e no notion of 9hat the in@uiry is about8 9e 9ould say8 on the contrary8 that 9e ha3e more than 9e need8 for the do"matists supply us 9ith a @uantity of such notions8 and di3er"ent ones at thatD 9e are threatened not 9ith conceptual 3acuity but8 rather8 9ith conceptual surplus. Lackin" any criterion to decide amon" the competin" definitions8 9e should rather take refu"e in suspension of Gud"ment ;epoche < once a"ain. This ans9er presupposes that the definitions "i3en of the same term by the different do"matisms are different and indeed incompatible.R4S %t seems to imply8 moreo3er8 that the Skeptic accepts the ontolo"ical implicationN if8 by counterfactual hypothesis8 the do"matists 9ere presentin" a unified front at the conceptual le3el8 the Skeptic 9ould ha3e no other choice than to admit the e.istence of the obGect captured by their common concept. Se.tus says so e.plicitlyN "%f Rby counterfactual hypothesisSRKS 9e had a sin"le preconception of 9hat the in@uiry is about8 9e 9ould R4SRKS A 045 A belie3e8 under "uidance of this preconception8 that an obGect indeed e.ists8 e.actly as it 9ould ha3e been "i3en to us in this unitary notion" ;MMMa<. Second8 in MMBa6MMKa Se.tus?s tactics shift completely. :e then @uite dearly reGects the ontolo"ical implication8 and he makes a sharp distinction bet9een ;a< conception ;ennoia8 epinoia <8 "mere motion of the intellect" 9hich in3ol3es no Gud"ment at all8 no assertion 9hatsoe3er as to 9hether its obGect e.ists or not8 and ;b< "raspin" or understandin" ;katalepsis <8 9hich has a propositional content and in3ol3es the assertion of this content. RLS $o9 the Skeptic can claim that he has notions of thin"s8 "in the 9ay 9e mentioned"

;MMBa<8R2S 9ithout bein" thereby committed to admit that the thin" understood e.ists. Turnin" the obGection back on his opponents8 he sho9s that unless this distinction is made8 e3en a do"matist like Epicurus could not himself reGect8 say8 a physical doctrine that he disappro3ed ofN if you 9ish to reGect8 e.".8 the four6elements theory8 you must ha3e the preconception ;prolepsis < of the four elementsD but this prolepsis must not imply the katalepsis that the elements are indeed four. % think this passa"e sho9s dearly that t9o different and8 indeed8 incompatible ans9ers to the same obGection are put side by side. The first one accepts the ontolo"ical inference and is based on a supposed fact of conceptual diaphonia D the second one reGects the "ontolo"ical" inference and admits that the different do"matists8 and the Skeptic himself8 ha3e the same concept in mind. The difference is "reat enou"h8 % think8 to pre3ent us from construin" them as alternati3e strate"ies8 to be adopted as occasion re@uires. *or they do indeed presuppose philosophical as6 RLSR2S A 040 A sumptions8 and those assumptions are at the same time hea3y8 contradictory8 and crucial ones for the determination of the proper Skeptical attitude. %t is probably 9orth9hile to remark that this problem of a common lan"ua"e amon" philosophers8 9hich is raised in M 28 as 9e ha3e Gust seen8 apropos of the particular case of the notion of proof8 is also dealt 9ith at the be"innin" of P: 78 but in @uite "eneral terms and in a place 9hich marks it as a 3ital preliminary @uestion. The problem is set in sli"htly different terms from those of M 2. ,efore be"innin" the detailed criticism of do"matic philosophies8 Se.tus asks 9hether the Skeptic can le"itimately conduct in@uiries about 9hate3er the do"matists say unless he "rasps it ;katalambanein <. $o9 if he "rasps it8 ho9 can he remain perple.ed ;aporein < about 9hat he is "raspin"= The problem is thus put in terms of katalepsis D here it is sol3ed 3ia a distinction bet9een t9o meanin"s of this 9ord8 only one of 9hich matches the use made of it in the M 2 passa"e. %n the 9eak sense8 katalepsis is e@ui3alent to the mere conception ;noein kaplos X epinoia in M 2<8 9hich does not in3ol3e any assertion of e.istence concernin" the obGect concei3ed. %n the stron" sense ;9hich is the Stoic sense of katalepsis 8 and also the sense 9hich in M 2 is opposed to epinoia <8 katalepsis in3ol3es the assertion that its obGect e.ists. Those terminolo"ical differences apart8 the solution to the problem in P: is the same as the second solution in the M 2 te.t. Se.tus sho9s that if a katalepsis in the stron" sense 9as re@uired for in@uiries8 the do"matists 9ould be unable to criticiCe each otherD but since only katalepsis in the 9eak sense is a prere@uisite of research8 nothin" pre3ents the Skeptic from ha3in" a noesis of 9hat his in@uiries are about8 and this noesis does not imply the e.istence of its obGect ;P: 7.05<. %n this "eneral treatment of the @uestion in P: 8 the "ontolo"ical" implication is thus firmly reGected8 and there is no mention 9hatsoe3er of conceptual diaphonia D the first solution of the M 2 passa"e is not to be found in P: . !lthou"h the 3e.ed @uestion of the chronolo"ical relationships bet9een M and P: lies outside the scope A 047 A

of this paper8 % may remark in passin" that on this point the P: 3ersion is clearer and more decided than the M 3ersion.R1S These fe9 "eneral considerations do not claim to be anythin" more than a sketchy analysis of the problems Skepticism is faced 9ith 9hen tryin" to deal 9ith the conceptual le"acy it has inherited. % hope they 9ill not pro3e useless 9hen studyin" the particular notion 9ith 9hich the rest of this paper 9ill deal8 namely8 the notion of a kriterion .R05S %t "oes 9ithout sayin" that this notion is supremely important in Se.tus?s in@uiry8 as it is central in the philosophical tenets of the :ellenistic period. >hen Se.tus comes to "rips 9ith it8 it already has a 3ery lon" historyD and this history has been further e.tended8 in its earlier part8 by the fact that earlier philosophical doctrines ;of the classical and e3en the !rchaic period< ha3e been reinterpreted by the Skeptics and retrospecti3ely construed as so many ans9ers to the kriterion @uestion. urin" this lon" history8 the 9ord kriterion 9as applied to different entities8 construed in different meanin"s8 subdi3ided alon" different lines. These intricate de3elopments ha3e been e.6 R1SR05S A 04M A cellently analyCed not lon" a"o.R00S % shall rely on this and try8 by e.aminin" the re"ularities and irre"ularities in Se.tus?s o9n 9orks8 to unco3er some traces of this past history8 of the problems he inherited from it8 and of the labor he had to e.pend because of those problems. The 9ord kriterion 8 accordin" to Se.tus8 is used in many sensesD he de3otes t9o rou"hly parallel sections ;M L.716ML and P: 7.0B60L< to their orderly enumeration. ,efore lookin" at this classification8 ho9e3er8 it may be of some interest to point out somethin" peculiar to the M 3ersion. %n M L.74Hi.e.8 e3en before "i3in" any account of the se3eral meanin"s of the 9ord kriterion HSe.tus makes use of this 9ordD and the sense in 9hich he uses it is at the same time ;0< defined precisely and uni3ocally8 ;7< determinati3e of the o3erall structure of books L628 ;M< missin" in the classification "i3en later of the different meanin"s of this 9ord in L.716ML8 and ;B< inconsistent 9ith the sense that8 in this later classification8 9ill be marked out as the proper obGect of Skeptical in@uiry. :ere indeed are a lot of anomalies. Let us look at them in a little more detail. %n the conte.t of the passa"e % ha3e in mind ;L.7B674<8 Se.tus is "i3in" Gustifications for the plan he 9ill follo9 in his "specific" e.amination of the three main parts of do"matic philosophy ;lo"ic8 physics8 ethics<.R07S :e first e.plains 9hy he be"ins 9ith lo"ic all parts of philosophy employ "the principles and procedures" ;tas archas kai tous tropous < of the disco3ery of truthD but only lo"ic8 inasmuch as it in3ol3es the theory of kriteria and apodei.eis 8 takes them as its e.plicit topics. The distinction thus R00SR07S A 04B A sketched is then taken up a"ain 9ith more detail8 so as to offer a methodical subdi3ision for the 9hole sur3ey of lo"icN

Since it is "enerally accepted Rdokei S that 9hat is e3ident Renar"e S is kno9n from itself Rautothen S throu"h some criterion Rdia kriteriou tinos S8 9hereas 9hat is nonmanifest Radela S has to be tracked do9n throu"h si"ns and proofs Rdia semeion kai apodei.eon S8 by 9ay of transfer Rkata metabasin S from 9hat is e3ident8 9e shall ask oursel3es in order8 first 8 9hether there is a criterion for thin"s that sho9 up from themsel3es8 either perceptually or intellectually Rei esti ti kriterion ton autothen kat?aisthesin e dianoian prospiptonton S8 and then 8 9hether there is a semiotic or probati3e procedure concernin" nonmanifest thin"s Rei esti semeiotikos e apodeiktikos ton adelon tropos S. %n this first occurrence8 the notion of kriterion seems to be a uni3ocal notion8 about 9hich there is a consensus ;dokei < amon" philosophersD from 9hat is said here8 9e could not "uess that the 9ord that e.presses this notion is "used in more than one 9ay" ;pollachos le"omenon <8 as 9e shall learn later on. The Skeptic himself is a part of this consensusD he is of course about to thro9 suspicion on the e.istence of anythin" satisfyin" the definition of kriterion 8 but he does not think of criticiCin" the definition itself as such. This is indeed a case 9here the Skeptic has an ennoia in common 9ith his opponents8 9hich makes him competent to e.amine and challen"e the do"matic positions8 some of them affirmin" and some denyin" that the obGect of this ennoia e.ists.R0MS This concept of a kriterion is "i3en its sense by bein" con69asted 9ith the concepts of a si"n and of a proof . This contrast is paralleled8 a pane obGecti 8 by that bet9een thin"s e3ident ;enar"e 8 and also prophane 8 L.7K8 and prodela 8 2.0B0< and thin"s non6manifest ;adela 8 and also suneskiasmena 8 L.7K<. The former may be kno9n directly and immediatelyD the latter can only be attained mediately and indirectly8 on the basis of e3idence 9hich R0MS A 044 A stands to them as a si"n to the thin" si"nified8 or a proof to the thin" pro3ed. %mmediate kno9led"e is called kno9led"e throu"h a kriterion 8 so that to say that there is a kriterion is e.actly the same as to say that 9e do ha3e some immediate kno9led"e. $o doubt there is some parado. in usin" the same preposition8 dia 8 9hich brin"s to mind mediation or instrumentality or a middle term8 to describe both the role of the kriterion in immediate kno9led"e ;dia kriteriou tinos < and the function of si"ns and proofs in indirect kno9led"e ;dia semeion kai apodei.eon <D this parallelism could su""est8 misleadin"ly8 that the kriterion acts as a middle term bet9een the kno9er and the kno9n8 e.actly like si"ns and proofsD in fact8 9hat is kno9n "throu"h a kriterion " is kno9n spontaneously ;autothen <8 and thus 9ithout any middle term. To e.plain this parado.8 9e mi"ht 9ell suppose that the theory 9hich here comes into play implies not only that 9e do ha3e some immediate kno9led"e8 but also that it comes in 3arious kinds. There are immediate truths 9hich are perceptual and there are immediate truths 9hich are intellectual ;kat?aisthesin e dianoian <. %n order to distin"uish them 9ithout suppressin" 9hat they ha3e in common8 it is temptin" to say that perception and intellection are t9o different 9ays of "raspin" immediate truths. %f they 9ere not different from one another8

it 9ould probably be pointless to distin"uish both of them ;under the name of kriteria < from the kno9er himself8 9ho "rasps these immediate truths "throu"h them8" or8 perhaps more e.actly8 by 9ay of their specific tonalityN diakriterioutinos 8 let us say8 because dia kriterioutinos . The conception of a kriterion 8 9hich identifies kno9led"e throu"h a kriterion 9ith immediate kno9led"e8 % shall christen prodelic . %t is hardly necessary to point out that the prodelic conception of a kriterion is completely different from our o9n notion of a criterion in ordinary lan"ua"e. >e make use of 9hat 9e call a criterion 9hen 9e are unable to ans9er some @uestion immediately. *or instance8 9hen 9e cannot easily see 9hether some obGect a is * or not8 9e try to find a criterion for *6ness. A 04K A %f there is a property G8 other than *8 such that ;0< ;I< *. iff G.8 and ;7< it is possible to decide immediately 9hether Ga or not8 then 9e say that there is a criterion a3ailable. %n a similar case8 the prodelic conception of the krtierion 9ould commit us to sayin" that here is a case of kno9led"e throu"h a si"nD only if 9e had been able to find immediately that *a ;or not6*a< could 9e say that here is a case of kno9led"e throu"h a kriterion . The prodelic conception of the kriterion and the mediateTimmediate distinction in kno9led"e 9ith 9hich it is linked constitute the 3ery basis of the o3erall structure of M L62H9ith this @ualification8 that since the notion of a kriterion is specified as a kriterion of truth8R0BS the first part of the books 9ill fall into t9o sections8 correspondin" to the t9o hal3es of the phrase. >e thus "et the follo9in" scheme8 as Se.tus 9ill 9ork it outN ;0.0< the kriterion ;M L.7L6BBK<D ;0.7< the true and truth ;M 2.060B5<D ;7.0< si"ns ;M 2. 0B06711<D ;7.7< proofs ;M 2.M556B20<. %n P: the scheme is rou"hly the same.R04S Some interestin" differences may be pointed out. *irst8 as % said earlier8 P: "i3es no due as to 9hat is meant by kriterion before it distin"uishes the se3eral meanin"s of the 9ord ;P: 7.0M60B<. Second8 9e can see that the prodelic conception of the kriterion still determines the structure of the account8 if 9e look at the end of the section de3oted to the kriterion of truth ;P: 7.1461K<. This is the 9ay Se.tus sums up 9hat is to be learned from this sectionN R0BSR04S A 04L A The kriterion of truth pro3ed shaky Raporou SD so it is no more possible to be positi3e8 either about thin"s 9hich seem to be e3ident Rperi ton enar"on einai dokounton S8 to the e.tent that 9e rely on Rhoson epi S 9hat the do"matists say8 or about nonmanifest thin"s Rperi ton adelon SD for since the do"matists think that they can "rasp the latter on the e3idence of the former8 if 9e are obli"ed to suspend RGud"mentS about thin"s said to be e3ident Rperi ton enar"on kaloumenon S8R0KS ho9 could 9e dare to make pronouncements about nonmanifest thin"s=

:ere 9e can see that the enar"eTadela distinction is still predominant8 but that nonetheless Se.tus sho9s 9ith clarity ho9 "reatly altered the enar"e are after the theories of the kriterion ha3e been subGected to criticism. $o9 the e3ident thin"s are nothin" more than "so6called e3idences"D and this is because kriterion and enar"eia are conceptually linked to"ether8 so that once the e.istence of anythin" satisfyin" the definition of a kriterion is made doubtful8 the e.istence of anythin" enar"es at once becomes @uestionable. $o similar indication can be found in the correspondin" passa"e of M 28 9here Se.tus sums up the results of his in@uiry about the kriterion of truth ;0B5<. Third8 9e may notice a similar contrast bet9een the t9o 3ersions on the follo9in" point. The P: 3ersion makes perfectly dear8 as may be seen from the @uotation abo3e8 that criticiCin" the kriterion leads to t9o different resultsN its first upshot8 a direct one8 is to make impossible any "raspin" of enar"e 8 since these are the proper obGects of kno9led"e throu"h a kriterion D its second upshot8 a conse@uential one8 is to make impossible any access to adela 8 by remo3in" any basis on 9hich si"ns and proofs mi"ht be "rounded. %t is thus theoretically superfluous to submit these latter procedures to a specific criticismD later on8 the te.t makes dear that this criticism 9ill be "i3en "Gust as a make69ei"ht" ;ek pollou tou periontos 8 7.1K<. %n the M 3ersion8 Se.tus is far from sho9in" such an a9areness about this situation. True8 R0KS A 042 A he describes si"ns and proofs as procedures "9hich start from the kriterion Rapo tou kriteriou S to arri3e at a "rasp of those truths 9hich do not sho9 up from themsel3es" ;2.B5<D but he also de6dares that once the criticism of the kriterion is brou"ht to an end8 "one still has to deal 9ith the class of nonmanifest thin"s" Rleipomenes de eti tes ton adelon diaphoras 8 2.0B7S. %n this he seems to ha3e completely for"otten 9hat he himself had said about the crucial role of enar"e in the kno9led"e of adela ;L.74<. $o9 let us ha3e a look at the di3ision of the meanin"s of the term kriterion . %n the M 3ersion8 a preamble ;L.7L672< comes before this di3ision8 the effect of 9hich is to insert it into the o3erall frame of the discussion about the kriterion of truth. Se.tus 9ill deal separately8 he says8 9ith the notion of a kriterion and 9ith the notion of truth. To each of these he 9ill de3ote ;0< an "e.e"etic" section8 in 9hich he 9ill sho9 ;0.0< in ho9 many senses it is said8 and then ;0.7< 9hat nature the do"matists ha3e assi"ned to itD after that8 ;7< a "more aporetic" section 9ill e.amine "9hether anythin" of the kind can e.ist." The section about the kriterion is indeed articulated in this 9ay.R0LS This di3ision is in principle dear and 9ell formed. Section ;0< corresponds to the analysis of ennoia 8 first as re"ards its 3arious meanin"s ;0.0<8 then as re"ards its 3arious references 8 i.e.8 the 3arious entities 9hich8 historically8 ha3e been identified as kriteria ;0.7<. Section ;7< raises the problem of 9hether there e.ists some obGect matchin" the ennoia and conducts a critical in@uiry into the doctrines that sol3e this problem in one 9ay or another. The comparati3e term more aporetic ;aporetikoteron < su""ests8 ho9e3er8 that the di3ision bet9een e.e"esis and polemic is not totally 9aterti"ht. !s a matter of fact8 9e can see that the lon" historical re3ie9 ;L.BK67K7<8 9hich ans9ers to section ;7< and 9hich

supposedly is limited to a purely e.e"etical aim8 is not 9ithout polemical bearin"s. There are t9o reasons for this. *irst8 R0LS A 041 A 9hen Se.tus "i3es an account of 3arious doctrines that made reason8 or perception8 or both8 kriteria of truth8 he cannot keep himself from pointin" out deli"htedly that these 3ie9s are not only different but also incompatible 9ith one another8 and hence ri3als to one another ;staseis 8 L.BL8 7K06K7<. Second8 in this section8 9hich he claims 9ill sho9 that the do"matists had different 3ie9s about the "nature" of the kriterion 8 i.e.8 about the entity 9hich is the kriterion 8 he lists not only those people 9ho admit that there is a kriterion and locate it here or there8 but also those 9ho claim there is no kriterion at allD the latter8 he thinks8 are no less do"matists than the former. This e.tensi3e "e.e"etical" account thus describes a fairly strenuous battle ;diastasis 8 L.BKD diaphonia 8 L.7K0<D to say the least8 it prepares the 9ay to the counterar"ument ;antirrhesis 8 L.7K0< that is to follo98 i.e.8 to section ;7<8 the so6called more aporetic section. !ll the more strikin" is the contrast bet9een this section ;0.7< and the pre3ious one ;0.0<N here 9e find a table of the different meanin"s of the term kriterion 8 in 9hich 9e cannot percei3e the faintest hint that their differences are meant to be 3ie9ed as disa"reements. True8 the notion of a kriterion no9 appears as bereft of the uni3ocal character it seemed to possess 9hen it first occurred ;L.74<D but no philosophical conflicts are "enerated8 on the face of it8 by the plurality of its meanin"s. )n the one hand8 it is not at all su""ested that the do"matic schools 9ere una9are of this state of affairs8 and that bein" una9are of it has in3ol3ed them in artificial @uarrels based on conceptual misunderstandin"s. ;This is the 9ay an eclectic 9ould treat the matter.< )n the other hand8 it is not su""ested either that the different meanin"s of the term kriterion are such that if you adopt one of them8 you are committed to abandonin" the others and to @uarrelin" 9ith those people 9ho make a different choice. ;This is the 9ay a special kind of skeptic 9ould treat the matter8 namely8 the champion of a conceptual skepticism8 denyin" to philosophers any ri"ht to make use of the same 3ocabulary A 0K5 A and to li3e in common on the same conceptual estate. Se.tus does indeed sometimes apply this conceptual skepticism8 as 9e ha3e seenD but here he does not do anythin" of the kind.< The table of the different meanin"s of kriterion 8 ho9e3er8 has some puCCles and a maGor surprise in store. Let us first recall its o3erall structure8 9hich is rou"hly the same in M ;L.716ML< as in P: ;7.0B60K<D it descends in sta"es throu"h three different le3els of diairesis N ;!< 0. Eriterion of life or practical conduct. 7. Eriterion of e.istence or truth.

;,< 7.0. General senseN "e3ery measure of apprehension." 7.7. Special senseN "e3ery technical measure of apprehension." 7.M. "Quite special" senseN "e3ery Rtechnical8 P: S measure of apprehension of somethin" nonmanifest R adelou pra"matos S" X kriterion lo"ikon . ;+< 7.M.0. !s a"ent ;huph?ou <. 7.M.7. !s instrument ;di?hou <. 7.M.M. !s application or 9orkin" out ;kath?ho8 P:D hos prosbole kai schesis8 M <. )f course the surprise is that here the prodelic conception of a kriterion is supplanted by an adelic conception 9hich is e.actly its opposite. ,efore tacklin" this bi" knot8 ho9e3er8 % shall make some remarks on other points. %t has been plausibly claimed that the three steps in Se.tus?s di3ision came from different historical areasD he seems to ha3e "rafted initially independent di3isions onto one another8 and to ha3e done so in a some9hat forced 9ay.R02S The ;!< distinction is at least as old as Epicurus8R01S and Skepticism made a constant and R02SR01S A 0K0 A central use of it.R75S The ;,< di3ision occurs in pseudo6Galen?s :istoria philosopha 8 9hich probably dra9s on the same source as does Se.tus.R70S ! some9hat different 3ersion of di3ision ;+< occurs in the criteriolo"ical considerations of the eclectic Potamo of !le.andria ; io"enes Laertius 0.70<8 9ho mi"ht ha3e borro9ed it from Posidonius8 9ho 9rote a Peri kriteriou ; io"enes Laertius L.4B<.R77S *rom these historical parallels8 let us here dra9 first of all the follo9in" conclusionN at e3ery step of the diairesis 8 3arious meanin"s are put side by side8 9hich are not there bemuse Se.tus himself8 or his source8 "athered them to"ether in a critical or skeptical mood. *ar from bein" 3arious meanin"s some of 9hich ha3e been fa3ored by one particular school and some by another8 they are the result of conceptual distinctions 9orked out each time by the same philosopher or by the same school. Those different meanin"s are thus not 3ie9ed as e.clusi3e of one another. This may be seen most dearly in the case of di3ision ;+<8 9hich Se.tus illustrates by means of a comparison 9ith measurin". %n order to 9ei"h some obGect8 for instance8 an a"ent is needed8 the 9ei"her8 an instrument8 the scalesD an application of the instrument to the obGect to be 9ei"hed8 the usin" of the scales. Similarly8 in order to make a Gud"ment an a"ent is needed8 manD an instrument8 perception or intellectionD an application of the instrument to the obGect to be Gud"ed8 the usin" of mental impression ;prosbole tes phantasias <. This comparison makes perfectly dear that each of the three conditions is necessary and none is sufficientD hence it 9ould be a mistake to describe man8 perception8 intellection8 impression8 as ri3al candidates to the tide of kriterion . Some Skeptics8 ho9e3er8 did soN they selected different philosophers as the supporters of these different candidates8 R75SR70SR77S A 0K7 A

and thus created an impression that there 9as a diaphonia about the kriterion ; io"enes Laertius 1.14<.R7MS Se.tus ou"ht to be free from this mistake. :o9e3er8 he once lapses into it ;at least in the M 3ersion<8 namely in the transition from his e.e"etical to his aporetic section ;M L.7K0<N !s % ha3e already said8 ;a< some people kept the kriterion 8 locatin" it 9ithin reason8 some 9ithin irrational perceptions8 and some 9ithin bothD and ;b< some ha3e called this 9ay the a"ent8 e.".8 man8 some the instrument8 e.".8 perception and intellection8 some the application8 e.".8 impression. Let us try to adGust8 as far as possible8 our obGections to each of these parties Rstaseis S. This rather stran"e passa"e puts side by side ;a< 3ie9s about 9hat is the kriterion 8 and ;b< 3ie9s about 9hat a kriterion is8 namely8 those of di3ision ;+<. The former are ob3iously incompatibleD the latter are not so8 and they are described by Se.tus as bein" so8 althou"h he kno9s 3ery 9ell that they are not so. #nderstandably8 some people ha3e been tempted to emend the te.t8 eliminatin" the ;b< section as an interpolated "loss.R7BS % belie3e 9e must resist this temptation8 ho9e3er8 bemuse the tripartite scheme of a"entTinstrumentTapplication pro3ides the 3ery frame9ork for the 9hole subse@uent discussionNR74S it 9ould be stran"e not to find it mentioned in the preamble 9hich introduces this discussion. More "enerally8 9e already kno9 that Se.tus?s strate"y to9ard conceptual disa"reements lacks continuityD here8 as else9here8 he mi"ht ha3e allo9ed himself to introduce a diaphonia in a conte.t 9here it 9as @uite out of place. Somethin" should also be said about di3ision ;,<8 9hich in3ol3es difficulties of another kind8 in particular because M and P: differ te.tually. *rom a formal point of 3ie98 the meanin"s 9ithin this di3ision are e.tensionally decreasin" and intension6 R7MSR7BSR74S A 0KM A ally increasin" notionsN there is a "eneral sense of the kriterion ;koinos <8 a special sense ;idios <8 and a "@uite special" sense ;idiaitata <. %n the "eneral sense ;7.0<8 "e3ery measure of apprehension" ;pan metron katalepseos < is a kriterion D in this first sense8 9e may call kriteria those "natural" kriteria 8 si"ht8 hearin"8 taste8 as 9ell as othersD they are e.plicitly mentioned here Gust because they 9ill be eliminated in the ne.t step of the di3ision. %n the special sense ;7.7<8 indeed8 only the "artificial measures of apprehension" ;pan metron katalepseos technikon < are kriteria D in this sense8 technical instruments of measure8 such as rules8 compasses8 scales8 are kriteria . Thin"s "et more comple. 9ith the "@uite special" sense ;7.M<8 9hich is defined8 in the main manuscripts of P: 8 as "e3ery artificial measure of apprehension of somethin" nonmanifest" ;pan metron katalepseos technikon adelou pra"matos <8 and more briefly8 in M 8 as "e3ery measure of apprehension of somethin" nonmanifest" ;pan metron katalepseos adelou pra"matos <. ,oth 3ersions a"ree in addin"8 in 3ery similar terms8 that this meanin" e.cludes those kriteria 9hich are of use in ordinary life ;biotika < and is satisfied only by those 9hich are lo"ika ;rational8

or8 perhaps more accurately8 discursi3e<8 namely8 those 9hich do"matic philosophers introduced in order to disco3er or to discriminate 9hat is true. Let us put aside8 for the moment8 the @uestion concernin" the adelon obGect. *irst8 % should like to try to sol3e the problem concernin" the 3ariant readin"s. Moreo3er8 as 9e shall see8 the t9o @uestions are someho9 connected. !lmost e3erybody a"rees in thinkin" that the M te.t and the P: te.t must be made to coincideDR7KS but there are t9o 9ays of doin" so8 and each one has its champions.R7LS ,y 9ritin" technikon in both te.ts ;so >. :eintC and his follo9ers<8 one admittedly "ets a nicely articulated system R7KSR7LS A 0KB A of definitions that satisfactorily matches the koinosTidiosTidiaitata schemeN pan metron katalepseos phusika ;7.0< R*ull SiCeS p.m.k. technikon biotika ;7.7< R*ull SiCeS p. m. k. technikon adelou pra"matos lo"ika ;7.M< R*ull SiCeS

! number of obGections8 ho9e3er8 can be raised a"ainst this scheme. ;0< %t is made suspect by its 3ery formal perfection. The occurrence of technikon is 9hat 9e mi"ht call a lectio lo"ice facilior . ;7< %n order to make this formal perfection complete8 9e ha3e to reinterpret some elements in the te.t8 in a some9hat forced 9ay. >hen Se.tus presents the ;7.7< meanin"8 he says that it e.cludes phusika 8 and8 9hen he presents the ;7.M< meanin"8 that it e.cludes biotika . %n order to "et matters @uite in order8 biotika should form the e.act

surplus of ;7.7< o3er ;7.M<8 as phusika form the e.act surplus of ;7.0< o3er ;7.7<D that means that biotika are Gust the artificial measurin" instruments and that natural percepti3e faculties are not co3ered by this 9ord. Such a limitation of the concept of krriteria biotika has found its championsDR72S but a sufficient reason for puttin" it aside is pro3ided by P: 0.7M67B8 9here Se.tus enumerates the component parts of the "e.perience of life" ;biotike teresis <N the first one is "nature?s "uidance" ;huphe"esis phuseos <8 9hich makes us "naturally apt at percei3in" and intelle"iCin"." Percepti3e faculties are therefore co3ered by the term biotika .R71S R72SR71S A 0K4 A ;M< %n the P: 3ersion of the di3ision8 kriteria lo"ika are a subset of kriteria technika . ! proof that this is so is claimed to be found in Se.tus?s 9ordin"N in the ;7.M< sense8 he says8 biotika are not kriteria any lon"er ;ouketi <D only lo"ika are. This 9ord ouketi is supposed8 it is claimed8 to imply that lo"ika dearly are already kriteria in the ;7.7< sense. RM5S This8 % take it8 is a non se@uiturN from the fact that somethin" is not the case any lon"er8 it is not possible to infer that some other thin" 9as already the case.RM0S ;B< *rom the substanti3e point of 3ie98 it seems difficult to claim that kriteria lo"ika are artificial kriteia . %n fact8 in the ;+< di3ision8 Se.tus distin"uishes three meanin"s 9hich are8 he e.plicitly says8 subdi3isions of the kriterion lo"ikon ;M L.M48 P: 7.0K<D no9 these meanin"s are e.emplified8 respecti3ely8 by man8 perception and intellection8 and the application of the phantasia Hi.e.8 by entities8 faculties8 or acts that are 9holly natural. %n 3ie9 of all these ar"uments8 % think it better to abandon the idea of keepin" the 9ord technikon in P: and insertin" it in M 8 9ithin the definitions of the kriterion in the "@uite special" meanin" ;7.M<8 i.e.8 of the kriterion lo"ikon . % prefer to depict the ;,< di3ision alon" the follo9in" linesN pan metron katalepseos phusika technika lo"ika biotika ;7.0< R*ull SiCeS p.m.k. technikon R*ull SiCeS ;7.7< p.m.k. adelou pra"matos R*ull SiCeS

;7.M< This scheme is admittedly less satisfactory from a purely formal point of 3ie98 but it seems to fit better the ends at 9hich this di3ision is aimin"D these are8 % belie3e8 to isolate and to specify that meanin" of the 9ord kriterion 9hich is of interest only to RM5SRM0S A 0KK A philosophers8 and 9hich is the only one really of interest to them.RM7S $o98 % think8 9e can finally come to "rips 9ith the main problem this di3ision raisesN namely8 the abrupt substitution of adelon for prodelon as the specific obGect of kno9led"e throu"h a kriterion . This is indeed a contradiction8 since the different meanin"s of the 9ord kriterion that occur in the rele3ant passa"es ;M L.74 and MM< are both supposed to be the meanin" in 9hich the 9ord 9ill be used throu"hout the 9hole in@uiry in ,ook L. +onceptual contradiction has been officially e.pelled throu"h the door8 in the meanin"s di3isionD it seems to come back in throu"h the 9indo98 in the une.pected form of a diaphonia bet9een Se.tus and Se.tus himself. This anomaly has seldom been noticed8 as far as % kno9D those commentators 9ho ha3e noticed it ha3e tried to e.plain it a9ay in t9o different fashions. )ne 9ay ;that of >. :eintC< is to make it sharper8 but so as to lessen its importance. The other ;that of G. Striker and also of J. ,arnes8 as 9e shall see<8 on the contrary8 is to blunt it and reduce it to ambi"uity. % shall say somethin" about both attempts before su""estin" a third 9ay out of the puCCle. !s 9e ha3e already seen8 :eintC inserts the 9ord technikon into the definition of kriterion lo"ikon in M L.MM ;on the model RM7S A 0KL A of the P: parallel<. :e kno9s 3ery 9ell that the later subdi3ision of this kriterion 8 9hich specifies it as perception8 intellection8 and impression ;MB6ML<8 is not in fa3or of this su""estionN all those are natural faculties.RMMS ,ut he subtly turns the ar"ument the other 9ay around.RMBS %f technikon is read in MM8 the contradiction bet9een MM and MB6ML is the same as that bet9een MM and 74D and he claims that MB6ML ;in spite of 9hat Se.tus himself says< sho9s that 9hen subdi3idin" the kriterion lo"ikon 8 Se.tus no lon"er has any thou"ht of the adelic conception of a kriterion 9hich he Gust described in MMD as a matter of fact8 accordin" to :eintC8 9hat he has in mind is a"ain the prodelic conception8 9hich occurred in 74 and 9ill be the sin"le topic of e3erythin" 9hich follo9s in ,ook L. Some kind of momentary and unconscious aberration8 caused by a laborious attempt to harmoniCe a number of different schemes8 is thus supposed to be the reason 9hy Se.tus8 if only briefly8 attributes to the kriterion the task of kno9in" adela . ,y the name of kriteria lo"ika 8 in MM8 he can only refer ;contrary to his usual terminolo"y< to si"n and

proof8 i.e.8 dialectical ;hence technical < procedures for "raspin" adela D those 9ill be studied RMMSRMBS A 0K2 A only in ,ook 28 after the end of the in@uiry concernin" kriterion in the normalHi.e.8 prodelicHsense. This interpretation is @uestionable in se3eral 9ays. *irst8 some terminolo"ical likenesses may be pointed out8 9hich seem to sho9 that ;pace :eintC< the notion of a kriterion lo"ikon has the same content in MM ;ta lo"ika kai haper hoi do"matikoi ton philosopkon pareisa"ousi < as in MB ;peri tou lo"ikou kai para tois philosophois thruloumenou <. More "enerally8 :eintC assi"ns to Se.tus an implausible mi.ture of a9areness and una9areness of 9hat he is doin"N he is supposed to try to harmoniCe different conceptual systems 9ithout dearly realiCin" their differences. ,ut the crucial point is to kno9 9hether :eintC is ri"ht in claimin" that apart from its passin" occurrence in L.MM ;and also in P: 7.04<8 the adelic concept of the kriterion plays no part in Se.tus8 and the prodelic concept is "i3en pride of place in the 9hole in@uiry concernin" kriterion . %t is perfectly true that the prodelic concept is dearly in the forefront in the prefacin" and concludin" sections % ha3e already @uoted.RM4S ,ut in the in@uiry proper8 thin"s are far from bein" so clear. ! first disturbin" factor is that the prodelic concept of a kriterion co3ers both intellectual and perceptual immediate truths ;L.74<.RMKS %s it enou"h for Se.tus to be allo9ed to count as upholders of the kriterion ;as he does in M L6BL< those philosophers 9ho locate it in lo"os 8 as 9ell as those 9ho locate it in the "irrational e3idences" ;en tais alo"ois enar"eiais <= %n order to be true to the prodelic concept8 one should find lo"os here construed as a po9er of intellectual intuition8 able to "rasp "rational immediate truths8" and not as a discursi3e and ar"umentati3e faculty. ,ut the concept of a rational immediate truth and the phrase enar"eia lo"ike occur no9here in Se.tus8 as far as % kno9D on the contrary8 enar"eia and lo"os are fre@uently contrasted ;P: M.278 0M48 7KK8 7L78 M 00.7M1<. The early "in@uirers into natureD? 9ho RM4SRMKS A 0K1 A are the historical illustrations of the identification of the kriterion 9ith lo"os ;M L.216 0B5<8 are ratiocinators 9hose theories are based on a rational criticism of sensory e3idence ;L.21<D the principles and elements they claim to be the foundations of the physical 9orld offer a typical e.ample of adela entities ;M 05.747<. They cannot thus be saddled 9ith 3ie9s about the kriterion unless a strictly prodelic conception of this notion is left aside. There are also occasions 9here statements about adela bein" kno9able or unkno9able are e.plicitly classified by Se.tus as 3ie9s about the e.istence of a kriterion . Ienophanes8 e.".8 says that a true kno9led"e of "ods is not allo9ed to man ; E 70,MB<D

commentin" on this fra"ment8 Se.tus says that the "ods are here only a representati3e sample of the 9hole class of adela ;M L.45<. Ienophanes? doctrine may thus be summed up by sayin" that no man "rasps the truth8 at least in the field of adela ;M L.40<D and this is e@ui3alent to denyin" the e.istence of a kriterion ;L.47<.RMLS %n many other places8 Se.es can be seen to be distortin" or e3en breakin" the conceptual frame that "oes alon" 9ith the prodelic concept of a kriterion ;namely8 the frame that opposes enar"es and adelon8 autothen and me autothen8 kriterion and semeion kai apodei.is <. :e admits8 at least as a theoretical possibility8 that somethin" adelon mi"ht be true "from itself" ;autothen <8 the other horn of the dilemma bein" that it mi"ht be true "as somethin" pro3ed" ;hos apodeichthen8 M 2.70<. %n M 2.ML18 he "i3es a syllo"istic Gustification of the adelic conception of a kriterion N e3ery adelon 8 he says8 needs a decision ;epikrisis <8 and 9hat needs a decision re@uires a kriterion . %n M 2.7K8 he "oes so far as to contrast immediate kno9led"e and kno9led"e throu"h a kriterion N if anybody is claimin" that this adelon is true and that one false8 those statements should come either "from themsel3es and 9ithout any kriterion8 " i.e.8 "immediately" ;e. het6 RMLS A 0L5 A oimou <8 or "9ith a kriterion ." $o doubt a methodical search throu"h the te.ts mi"ht collect many other such obser3ations8 but % think these fe9 e.amples 9ill be enou"h to sho9 that the adelic concept of a kriterion is far from bein" as unobtrusi3e in Se.tus as :eintC claims it to beD 9hen 9e find the prodelic definition and the adelic one side by side in the first para"raphs of ,ook L8 9e cannot dismiss this fact as a localiCed accident. !ccordin" to G. Striker8 the parado. should be e.plained in a completely different 9ay. She holds that the prodelic definition is the only one that Se.tus inherited from pre3ious historyD despite the differences bet9een the Epicurean concept and the Stoic concept of a kriterion ;those differences are 3ery 9ell brou"ht out in her bookD but more on this later<8 neither school is supposed to define a kriterion as an instrument for "raspin" adela . The adelic definition in Se.tus should be construed as a kind of translation of the earlier prodelic definition into Skeptical lan"ua"e. !ccordin" to the Skeptic8 any assumption do"matically asserted "oes beyond 9hat it is permissible to say8 and thereby bears on somethin" adelon . >hat the do"matist calls enar"es and claims to "rasp dia kriteriou tinos is e.actly the same thin" as 9hat the Skeptic polemically calls adelon .RM2S !lon" the same lines8 J. ,arnes sees no escape from the parado. e.cept by supposin" a "systematic ambi"uity" in the terms adelos8 prodelos8 enar"es .RM1S RM2SRM1S A 0L0 A This su""estion has the undoubted merit of dra9in" attention to some important features of the Skeptical stance. Se.tus certainly does not take the 9idespread distinction bet9een enar"e and adela at its face 3alue8 e3en if he is constantly makin" a dialectical use of it. %n M L.MKB8 a definition of 9hat is enar"es that is substantially the same as the definition in M L.74RB5S is e.plicitly attributed to "our opponents" ;hupo ton enantion <. Se.tus claims on this occasion that nothin" can naturally be "rasped "from itself" ;e. heautou <D

nothin" can be said about the e.ternal 9orld e.cept by conGecture ;stochaComai 8 MK4<8 by inference from si"ns ;semeioumai MK4D semeiosis 8 MKL<. %t follo9s that nothin" is enar"es ;MKB< and e3erythin" is adelon ;MK2<8 so that the do"matist 9ould do better to call. adelon ;in the terminolo"y 9hich he shares 9ith his Skeptical opponent< 9hat he calls enar"es D the class of enar"e is empty8 de facto if not de Gure. %t is no less true that the reason 9hy the Skeptic construes the do"matic assertions as beatin" on adela 8 e3en 9hen the do"matist does not say so8 is that these assertions claim to e.press 9hat thin"s are in themsel3es8 of their o9n nature. !ny claim to katalepsis 8 RB0S let us say8 immediately turns its obGect into an adelon 8 ho9e3er enar"es it is said to be. !s Se.tus repeatedly asserts8 "i3in" one?s assent to somethin" adelon is enou"h to land one in do"matism ;P: 0.0K8 01L8 705<D con3ersely8 it seems that bein" a do"matist ;speakin" in a do"matic tone or mood< is enou"h to turn 9hat one claims to assent to into somethin" adelon .RB7S RB5SRB0SRB7S A 0L7 A These ar"uments8 ho9e3er8 do not8 % think8 entirely Gustify Striker?s interpretation. o"matists and Skeptics disa"ree about the reference of the terms enar"es and adelon D this does not mean they disa"ree about the meanin" of these terms and about their conceptual contrast. %f the Skeptic belie3es the class of enar"e to be empty8 this does not imply that he takes the notion of an enar"es as meanin"less and freely substitutable by its contrary. >hen the @uestion is ho9 to define the concept of a kriterion 8 the referential e@ui3alence bet9een 9hat the do"matist calls an enar"es and 9hat the Skeptic calls an adelon does not allo9 the latter to substitute enar"es for adelon 9ithin the definitionD it is impossible to say that definin" a kriterion as an instrument for "raspin" prodela and definin" it as an instrument for "raspin" adela are e@ui3alent8 undifferentiated definitions. )f course Se.tus mi"ht ha3e made the mistake8 but to be sure that he did not8 it is enou"h to point out that in the definition in M L.MM8 the adelon obGect is mentioned as a specific difference that distin"uishes kriteria lo"ika from the other kinds of kriteria D the obGects of those must thus be enar"e . %f both the terms enar"es and adelon did not keep a stable and distincti3e conceptual meanin"8 the differences amon" the 3arious classes of kriteria 9ould 3anish8 and the 9hole classification ;distinction R,S< 9ould collapse. The A 0LM A substanti3e difference bet9een the prodelic and the adelic conception of a kriterion looks thus to be irreducible. :o98 then8 to account for their bein" to"ether in Se.tus?s te.t= % 9ould su""est that it is8 abo3e all8 a matter of conceptual inheritance8 althou"h to in3oke history8 in this circumstance8 is not to "i3e up tryin" to understand 9hat happened. Striker?s book8 in this respect8 offers all the materials re@uired for an e.planation 9hich she nonetheless does not elicit. Let us look at the differences bet9een the Epicurean and the Stoic concept of a kriterion 8 as they are pellucidly described in her book.

%n Epicurus8 the predominant useRBMS of the notion is fundamentally based on an analo"y bet9een kriterion and kanon . ! kanon 8 a ruler or a s@uare8 is paradi"matically ri"ht and allo9s the problematic ri"htness of a line or an an"le to be tested. Similarly8 a kriterion of truth is a pur3eyor of truths8 immediately e3ident in themsel3es8 that can be used to test the truth63alue of opinions ;or theories or hypotheses8 etc.< that bear on not perceptible or not immediately kno9n states of affairs8 and thus are neither dearly true nor dearly false. Their bein" intrinsically true is 9hat allo9s them to function as they doD but their 3alue as a kriterion depends on their bein" used to test the truth63alue of statements other than themsel3es.RBBS )n the other hand8 the predominant Stoic use of this notionRB4S is no lon"er determined by the kanon6 paradi"m. Phantasia kataleptike is claimed to be a kriterion 8 not because it allo9s one to test somethin" other than 9hat it "presents8" but because it al6 RBMSRBBSRB4S A 0LB A lo9s one to state that somethin" is the case8 9hich is the 3ery state of affairs "presented" by it ;and causally producti3e of it<DRBKS 9hat makes us kno9 that somethin" is the case is the same as 9hat constitutes the criterion of this kno9led"e bein" true.RBLS There is8 therefore8 an ob3ious identity bet9een the Stoic concept and 9hat % ha3e called the prodelic concept of a kriterion N the truths that phantasia kataleptike is supposed to supply are immediate and e3ident. ,ut8 accordin" to Striker8 there is no such identity bet9een the Epicurean concept and the adelic concept of M L.MM. :er reasons are the follo9in".RB2S The Epicurean kriteria can be used for other ends than Gust testin" statements about nonperceptible states of affairsD indeed8 they can play their role in confirmatory and nonconfirmatory procedures8 desi"ned to decide about perceptible cases8 as 9ell as in contestatory and noncontestatory procedures8 9hich are desi"ned to decide about nonperceptible cases. This obser3ation is perfectly ri"ht8 but does not establish the point at issue. The opinions tested by 9ay of confirmation e. hypothesi bear on states of affairs that are potentially perceptible but not actually percei3ed. That is 9hy they need confirmationD they are8 Epicurus says8 "9aitin"" to be confirmed ;prosmenon8 Ep. :dt . M28 E 7B<. The distinction e.6 RBKSRBLSRB2S A 0L4 A pressed in Epicurus by the pair prosmenonTadelon is thus the same as 9hat is e.pressed in another terminolo"y ;Se.tus P: 7.1Lff8 M 2.0B4ff.< by distin"uishin" t9o classes of adela N circumstantial adela ;pros kairon <8 9hich are such only de facto and for the time bein"8 and adela by nature ;phusei <8 9hich are such by fi"ht and at any time. %n the latter terminolo"y8 the "Epicurean" kriterion al9ays refers to some adelon pra"ma 8 and there is nothin" to pre3ent us from identifyin" it 9ith Se.tus?s adelic concept. %t remains to be understood ho9 and 9hy8 9ithout any e.planation or e3en any indication that he 9as a9are of them8 Se.tus left in his te.t those contradictory sediments of the conceptual history of kriterion . )ne mi"ht in3oke8 in @uite "eneral terms8 his 3acillatin"

strate"ies 9hen conceptual disa"reements are at stakeD 9e ha3e seen many e.amples of this. ,ut in the case of kriterion 8 a more specific reason may be su""ested. %n its "Epicurean" meanin"8 a kriterion 8 as such8 bears on some adelon D but it presupposes the "raspin" of some enar"es 8 since it is in itself e3idently true and it is neither possible nor necessary to certify this truth a"ain8 by applyin" a kriterion . %t thus turns out that if the Skeptic succeeds in sho9in" that no immediate truth is accessible to us8 he 9ill ha3e killed t9o birds 9ith one stone. :e 9ill ha3e established that there is no kriterion in the prodelic ;Stoic< sense8 since to say that there is some kriterion in this sense is to say that 9e ha3e some immediate kno9led"e. !nd he 9ill also ha3e established that there is no kriterion in the adelic ;Epicurean< sense8 since to say that there is some kriterion in this sense is to say that 9e can test adela by referrin" them to some immediate e3idence. Se.tus?s stance has thus some Gustification8 e3en if it is still surprisin" that he did not make it e.plicit. A 0LK A

L Ptolemy )n the +riterion !n epistemolo"y for the practicin" scientist

L Ptolemy )n the +riterion !n epistemolo"y for the practicin" scientist !. !. Lon" The manuscripts of Ptolemy include a short essay entitled )n the +riterion and +ommandin"6*aculty .R0S This title corresponds to the book?s di3ision into t9o une@ual parts. %ts first three @uarters ;sections 0607< present an account of co"niti3e faculties and their functions8 describe the different contributions of sense6perception and intellect8 and outline the muses of dubious or erroneous Gud"ment on the one hand and the secure determination of truth on the other. %n the short final part ;sections 0M60K<8 Ptolemy appends an account of the relationship bet9een body and soul8 This paper 9ould not ha3e been 9ritten 9ithout the stimulus and corporate 9ork on Ptolemy of my Li3erpool and Manchester collea"ues. % thank them all8 especially !nthony Lloyd. ! translation of Ptolemy8 )n the +riterion 8 9ith notes8 9ill appear in a 3olume of essays on Truth in Greek Philosophy8 in :onour of G.,. Eerferd 8 edited by Pamela :uby and Gordon Eneale8 for Li3erpool #ni3ersity Press. This paper8 thou"h presented to the ublin conference8 9as also 9ritten as a token of friendship for Geor"e Eerferd8 and so it is included in that 3olume as 9ell. R0S A 0LL A locatin" the 3arious co"niti3e faculties in different bodily or"ans on the basis of assumptions about the elementary or material constituents of body and soul. The upshot of the first part is a theory that scientific kno9led"e ;episteme < is the systematic orderin" of empirical dataN intellect8 thou"h "more 3aluable" than sense6perception ;0B8 line 0L<8 depends on the senses for its primary contents8 and both "principles" ;archai < must be appropriately combined in any scientific study. %n the second part8 Ptolemy concludes that body and soul interact in the human constitution8 the soul bein" "blended" 9ith those re"ions of the body 9hich contain its functions. These are familiar ans9ers to familiar @uestionsD nor does Ptolemy?s approach to them "i3e any "limpse of ne9 3istas to e.plore or unforeseen perils to a3oid. The course he tra3els is short and fiat8 thou"h sometimes obscure in descriptionD and obscurity has been his essay?s fate. The first translation into a modem lan"ua"e appeared only in 01258R7S and little has been done as yet to elucidate the positions that Ptolemy defends and to e.plain 9hy he 9rites as he does. Source6criticism rather than intellectual history has been the principal method applied to his 9ork8 "i3in" the impression that Ptolemy 9rote

)n the +riterion in order to satisfy dili"ent hunters for parallel passa"es from the 3arious philosophers 9ho pro3ided his cultural back"round.RMS T9o brief R7SRMS A 0L2 A points can be made in defense of a more "enerous readin" of his essay. *irst8 Ptolemy 9as a practicin" scientist8 not a philosopher 9ith any declared alle"iance to one of the established schools. Second8 the breadth and nature of his scientific interestsH astronomy8 astrolo"y8 music8 optics8 "eo"raphyHdo much to e.plain 9hy he found it useful to state his position on epistemolo"y and psycholo"y. :o9 9e interpret his eclecticism8 or attitude to the cultural tradition8 is a @uestion to 9hich both these points 9ill be pertinent. :is empiricist thesis and his psychosomatic thesisHto refer back to Ptolemy?s t9o principal claims in this bookH9ere "i3en an interestin" prominence by the first modern editor8 %shmael ,ullialdus8 in a "brief note" at the conclusion of his 0KKM edition.RBS #nder the headin" !d subtilissimi philosophi 'enati +artesii de animae specie intellectui impressa opinionem 8 ,ullialdus dre9 on both of Ptolemy?s theses in a trenchant criticism of escartes?s most famous ar"ument8 a criticism that can be summariCed as follo9s. E"o co"ito8 er"o sum does nothin" to shake the clarity and e3idence of the principle nihil est in intellectu8 @uod prius non fuerit in sensu . escartes?s inference8 thou"h true and 3alid8 does not support his claim that the soul e.ists @uite independently of the body. The subGect of his co"ito is not anima co"itans 8 as he proposed8 but homo ipse co"itans 8 9hich is a composite of body and soul. "Since it is man himself 9ho thinks8 and 9ho cannot produce any actions e.cept by the conGunct operation of his constituent parts8 he 9ill not be able to perform any function of reasonin" or thinkin" e.cept by the conGunct operations of the intellect and the bodily or"ans desi"ned for recei3in" impressions of thin"s and for containin" spirits" ;01K<. !ccordin"ly8 ,ullialdus concludes8 "the criteria established by Ptolemy8 and ac6 RBS A 0L1 A kno9led"ed by uni3ersal a"reementHsense6perception and intellectH9ill remain undisturbed" ;01K<. ,ullialdus?s recourse to Ptolemy as a 9eapon a"ainst es6canes is one of the for"otten cul6de6sacs of intellectual history8 and comparable8 one mi"ht say8 to usin" a nut to crack a sled"e6hammer. $o committed idealist or skeptic 9ould be con3erted to materialism or empiricism by readin" Ptolemy?s )n the +riterion and +ommandin"6*aculty . :is essay not only omits any reference to !cademic and Pyrrhonian attacks on the foundations of kno9led"e8 it also a3oids the sli"htest su""estion that any contro3ersy attends an account of the criterion of truth. $e3er hintin" at any of the battery of a3ailable ar"uments for or a"ainst skepticism8 9hich 9ere commonplace in his day8 Ptolemy 9rites as if the only issue is to settle the relati3e criterial contributions of sense6perception and intellect8 from an implied basis of "eneral a"reement concernin" human accessibility to ho9 thin"s

really are. :e ad3ances no aporiai 8 de3elops no comple. ar"uments8 and indicates no @uestions that need fuller consideration. :e names no philosophers either as supporters or as opponents8 and his book is almost completely free from the "eneraliCed polemics 9hich are so common in this kind of 9ritin".R4S $either of these omissions is his practice else9here. :ere8 ho9e3er8 his essay takes the form of a statement8 to the effect that the facts are strai"htfor9ardly such as he describes them or at least may most reasonably be so construed. These bland procedures 9ould be disconcertin" if Ptolemy 9ere en"a"in" directly 9ith the issues that Se.tus Empiricus records in his ar"uments a"ainst all 3ersions of the criterion of truth ;!d3ersus mathematicos L<. Se.tus de3otes se3eral pa"es to refutin" the notion that 9hat he calls the instrumental criterion is "intellect usin" sense6perception as its assistant" ;M L.M4B6K2<. This is Gust the thesis8 in effect8 that Ptolemy ad3ances 9ith6 R4S A 025 A out a hint of its bein" problematic. >hether or not either kne9 the 9ork of the other8 a matter that the chronolo"y seems to lea3e completely open8 Se.tus?s tripartite analysis of the criterion in terms of "a"ent8" "instrument8" and "mode of application" ;M L.M46ML< appears identical8 apart from minor differences of terminolo"y8 to three aspects of Ptolemy?s introductory scheme ;M8 line 0L6B8 line 0B<. This di3ision of the criterion8 on 9hich % 9ill ha3e more to say shortly8 is peculiar to Se.tus and Ptolemy8 and there are innumerable other indications of their contemporaneity. %n order to understand Ptolemy?s practice8 ho9e3er8 9e need to compare his robust silence on skepticism 9ith the attitude of related intellectuals of his time8 especially Galen8 and to assess his particular aims in 9ritin" this essay8 its bearin" on his scientific outlook8 and his relationships to the 3arious do"matic philosophies 9hich parallel and illustrate 3irtually e3ery term and idea he uses. *or it should be emphasiCed that )n the +riterion o9es any ori"inality and independence it has to Ptolemy?s or"aniCation and selection of standard concepts and strate"ies. %t 9ould be difficult to find any te.t from the 'oman Empire that pro3ides better material for testin" the usefulness and limitations of "eclecticism" as an inde. of a thinker?s intellectual stance. The +riterion of Truth and Ptolemy?s ,ack"round !t the time of Ptolemy and Se.tus it had become 3irtually de ri"ueur for any thinker to state his position on the "criterion of truth." ,y be"innin" his criticism of the "do"matists" 9ith an e.tensi3e sur3ey of their opinions on this subGect8 Se.tus "i3es the impression that this had al9ays been so and that an entire history of Greek philosophy could be 9ritten by detailin" a succession of doctrines ans9erin" to this concept. $or is this peculiar to Se.tus. :e reflects the common practice of the do.o"raphical tradition 9here "the criterion" had become a con3e6 A 020 A nient cate"ory for classifyin" 9hat 9e 9ould call different theories of kno9led"e.RKS %n fact8 as is no9 "enerally reco"niCed8 the criterion of truth only became an e.plicitly named and dominant subGect of discussion in the :ellenistic period. *irst Epicurus and

then the Stoics publiciCed the notion that a philosopher?s primary task is to establish the foundations of our kno9led"e of the 9orld8 and to do so by settin" out the canonical standards 9hich are man?s natural e@uipment for makin" secure discriminations bet9een truth and falsehood or bet9een 9hat is and 9hat is not. The paramount importance they attached to the criterion of truth should be seen as both a conse@uence and a cause of the contemporary de3elopment of skepticism. !s moralists8 Epicureans and Stoics looked to disco3erable facts about human nature and the 9orld at lar"e as the "rounds for their conceptions of happiness. Epicurus 3ery probably elaborated his "canonic" as a reGoinder to the Pyrrhonian denial that there are obGecti3e or "natural" criteria for discriminatin" facts and 3alues8RLS thus distancin" himself from earlier atomist reser3ations about the co"niti3e reliability of the senses. The Stoics @uite certainly 9ere fiercely attacked by the ne9ly skeptical !cademy Gust as soon as Qeno of +itium promul"ated the "co"niti3e impression" ;phantasia kataleptike < as a state of a9areness that "uarantees secure and accurate perception of its obGect.R2S The :ellenistic debates bet9een do"matists and Skeptics 9ere RKSRLSR2S A 027 A conducted in terms that became permanent features of the intellectual tradition8 and the common property of all philosophers and scientists in the 'oman Empire. $othin" about such a 9riter?s school alle"iance or sympathy can be inferred from his usin" such ori"inally Epicurean terms as enar"eia 8 "self6e3idence8" prolepsis 8 "preconception8" epimarturesis 8 "attestation8" or from his dra9in" from the much richer technical lan"ua"e of Stoicism such 9ords as katalepsis 8 "co"nition8" sunkatathesis 8 "assent8" ;koine < ennoia 8 ";common< conception."R1S >ithin the :ellenistic period itself a common philosophical Gar"on had de3eloped8 and terms emanatin" from one school 9ere fre@uently appropriated by another. >hat came to be shared8 moreo3er8 9as not Gust 9ords or concepts8 but somethin" 9e mi"ht call professionalism or e.pertise. Ptolemy and his contemporaries 9ere 9ritin" for audiences 9ho had been educated similarly to themsel3es8 and 9hom they could e.pect to be familiar 9ith an intellectual tradition characteriCed by a community of concepts8 standard @uestions and ans9ers8 common ar"umentati3e methods and obGections. ialectical interchan"es bet9een the schools of philosophy and medicine8 educational curricula8 learned commentaries8 and do.o"raphical handbooks helped this process of unification @uite as much as the mer"in" of philosophical identities or eclecticism associated more specifically 9ith thinkers such as !ntiochus of !scalon or Philo of !le.andria.R05S This lin"ua franca is shared by Ptolemy and Se.tus but8 like any lan"ua"e8 it is a blunt instrument. !mbi"uities could arise R1SR05S A 02M A as technical terms became disseminated and detached from their ori"inal conte.ts. Eatalepsis is a case in point. %n Stoicism8 its ori"inal home8 it si"nifies an infallible act of co"nition based on the kataleptic impression8 and such impressions refer primarily to

self6certifyin" acts of sense6perception. >riters of the 'oman Empire8 ho9e3er8 fre@uently use katalepsis as a synonym for episteme or "nosis 8 mental apprehension @uite "enerally.R00S Ptolemy8 like Galen8 complains about e.cessi3e fussiness o3er terminolo"y8 but he reco"niCes the importance of pickin" out the different properties of multiple items for 9hich a sin"le name is in use.R07S The criterion of truth itself is an e.ample. !s a technical term8 this be"ins its life8 as % 9as sayin"8 to describe the Stoic and Epicurean accounts of the natural means at our disposal for makin" utterly secure discriminations bet9een truth and falsehood. The application of a criterion of truth8 in this usa"e of the term8 tests the e.istence of somethin" or the truth of a proposition about somethin". Self6e3idence ;enar"eia < from sense6perceptions or the clarity and distinctness of co"niti3e impressions ;phantasiai kataleptikai < pro3ided Epicurus and the Stoics8 respecti3ely8 9ith incorri"ible standards for Gud"in" 9hat really e.istsD and the primary locus of both criteria 9as the phenomenal 9orld. There are no precise analo"ues to these doctrines in earlier Greek philosophy. :ence it is an anachronism8 in a sense8 for Se.tus Empiricus to identify the criteria of truth of philosophers from the 9hole precedin" periodH:eraclitus R00SR07S A 02B A and Parmenides do9n to !ristotle and Theophrastus. Throu"hout this time8 ho9e3er8 philosophers had been preoccupied 9ith @uestions concernin" the co"niti3e 3alue of our mental faculties8 and particularly about the reliability of the senses as compared or contrasted 9ith that of the intellect. %n a conte.t discussin" Prota"oras?s dictum that man is the measure of all thin"s ;a likely precursor of the technical concept of the criterion of truth<8 !ristotle saysN ">e say that kno9led"e and sense6perception are the measure of thin"s because our reco"nition of somethin" is due to them" ;Metaph . !054MaM76M4<. R0MS This kind of remark about co"niti3e faculties could ha3e been made by almost any philosopher from the time of :eraclitus and Parmenides on9ard. %n desi"natin" sense6 perception and intellect as "the measure of thin"s8" !ristotle 9as not anticipatin" the Stoic and Epicurean interest in a criterion that is an infallible means of Gud"in" particular matters of factD he 9as makin" the much simpler point that sense6perception and kno9led"e are the mental faculties that furnish all our understandin" of thin"s. This claim does not imply that e3ery application of these faculties to a particular problem 9ill eo ipso settle the truth of the ans9er to it. To skeptical doubts of the emocritean 3ariety8 the Peripatetics responded by contrastin" the sense6perceptions of the normal and healthy 9ith those of the sick8 a strate"y too "eneral to co3er the indubitable Gud"ment about particular states of affairs for 9hich Epicureans and Stoics desi"ned their specific criteria of truth.R0BS R0MSR0BS A 024 A %n :ellenistic practice8 as Gisela Striker has 9ell obser3ed8R04S "criterion of truth" 9as used to include both of the cases Gust describedHan infallible means of establishin" particular matters of fact8 as 9ith the Stoics? co"niti3e impression8 and also8 @uite

"enerally8 the co"niti3e faculties men ha3e at their disposal. %n this latter sense of the term8 most Greek philosophers could be said to ha3e stated opinions on the criterion of truth8 as Se.tus Empiricus maintains that they did8 e3en thou"h they did not use the e.pression or en3isa"e anythin" comparable to its specific sense. Misrepresentation8 ho9e3er8 could arise if the t9o senses 9ere run to"ether8 so implyin" that an opinion on the 3alue of our co"niti3e faculties committed its holder to an opinion about the infallible application of one or more of these8 or that !ristotle8 for instance8 9as concerned 9ith Gust the same epistemolo"ical @uestions as the Stoics. Se.tus in the do.o"raphy and criticism of M L does nothin" e.plicitly to disambi"uate these t9o concerns. To that e.tent his account of the 3ie9s adopted on the criterion is misleadin"ly homo"eneous as 9ell as anachronistic. %t is also ill suited to capture a position like that of Ptolemy8 9ho is e.plicitly interested in both these senses of the criterion8 but the second more prominently than the firstDR0KS for Ptolemy "i3es more attention to adGudicatin" bet9een the co"niti3e contributions of sense6perception and intellect than to in3itin" the full Skeptical challen"e by specifyin" the precise conditions under 9hich comple. facts can be infallibly determined. ,ut e3en Se.6ms8 by his practice8 enables his readers to distin"uish bet9een theories about criterial faculties in "eneral and theories about criterial applications in particular. This helps us to see that Ptol6 R04SR0KS A 02K A emy belon"s more closely 9ith Se.tus?s 3ie9 of the Platonic and !ristotelian tradition than 9ith Stoicism or Epicureanism.R0LS %t 9ould be 9ron" to imply that @uestions about criterial faculties and @uestions about criterial applications had to be satisfied 9ith different ans9ers. Plato and !ristotle sometimes su""est that any properly functionin" acti3ity of intellect ;nous < is immediately co"niCant of the truth. :ellenistic philosophers8 ho9e3er8 appear to ha3e reco"niCed the conceptual difference bet9een these @uestions8 or somethin" like them8 and to ha3e distin"uished different aspects of the criterion of truth accordin"ly. Potamo of !le.andria8 9ho founded a so6called eclectic school of philosophy at the time of the emperor !u"ustus8 is said to ha3e distin"uished bet9een the "a"ent" and the "instrument" of the criterion of truth8 identifyin" the former of these 9ith the he"emonikon ;the Stoic term for intellect< and the latter 9ith "the most accurate impression" ;phantasia <.R02S !s 9e shall see from the fuller aspectual schemes of Ptolemy and Se.tus8 the relation of a"ent to instrument deri3es its conte.t from acti3ities like 9ei"hin"8 and measurin" len"ths. ,y analo"y 9ith these8 the criterion of truth is represented as doin" for putati3e facts 9hat a 9ei"her does for ma"nitudes 9ith his scales. %n Potamo?s scheme8 the intellect @ua a"ent is the criterial faculty 9hich passes Gud"ment8 and the "most accurate impression" is the instrumental standard 9hich the intellect applies to make its Gud"ment. Potamo?s identifications of a"ent and instrument are so specifically Stoic that his t9ofold distinction probably arose first in that school. %ts suitability there is easy to sho9. %n Stoicism8 co"nition ;katalepsis < results from assent to a co"niti3e ;kataleptic < R0LSR02S A 02L A

impression.R01S The distinction bet9een a"ent and instrument rarities this relationship by indicatin" that 9ell6founded Gud"ment is an act of the intellect usin" co"niti3e impressions as its instrumental standard. Moreo3er8 the Stoic lists of criteria of truth specify co"niti3e facultiesHkno9led"e8 sense6perception8 ri"ht reasonR75S Has 9ell as co"niti3e impressions8 preconceptions8 and common conceptions8 any one of 9hich is @uite particular8 as faculties are not8 in its content. ,esides its ackno9led"ment of the t9o criterial aspects % ha3e been discussin"8 Potamo?s scheme has t9o further uses. *irst8 it makes it possible to detect different sources of sound and unsound Gud"ments. *aulty discriminations may be due either to unsound instruments ;e.".8 inaccurate sense6perceptions< or alternati3ely8 or in addition8 to the unsound minds or co"niti3e faculties that apply them. Second8 his scheme is sufficiently "eneral ;recall his "eclectic" stance< to accommodate other accounts of the criterion besides the Stoics? and thus to pro3ide a basis for classifyin" or reconcilin" different opinions on the subGect. ,oth of these points can be illustrated from the use to 9hich the t9ofold criterial scheme is put in the compendium of Platonism by !lcinous or !lbinus8 a document rou"hly contemporary 9ith Ptolemy and Se.tus.R70S !lbinus8 as % 9ill call him8 reflects current practice by be"innin" his summary of Plato?s philosophy 9ith an account of the criterion. Like Potamo8 he identifies the "a"ent" aspect 9ith intellect or8 as he says later8 "the philosopher." The "instrumental" aspect in !lbinus is different. :e calls it "a natural criterion for Gud"in" truths and falsehoods" or8 more summarily8 "natural lo"os ." T9o subdi3isions of this follo9N first8 a distinction bet9een di3ine lo"os 8 absolutely accurate but inaccessible to man8 and human lo"os 8 9hich is "infallible for the kno9led"e of thin"s." Second8 !lbinus di3ides lo"os into "sci6 R01SR75SR70S A 022 A entific" ;epistemonikos <8 9hose domain is stable intelli"ibles8 9hich it handles securely8 and "opinin"" ;do.astos < or "plausible8" 9hose sphere is unstable sensibles8 9hich it handles only conGecturally. !lbinus?s scheme sho9s ho9 the presumably Stoic distinction bet9een criterial a"ent and criterial instrument could be applied to his 3ersion of Platonism. :is di3ision into scientific and opinin" lo"os ;also found in Ptolemy and in Se.ms?s account of Ienophanes8 Parmenides8 and Ienocrates<R77S e.ploits the t9o criterial aspects effecti3ely8 for these enable him to sho9 ho9 a sin"le a"ent8 intellect8 can make Gud"ments of different epistemic 3alue on the basis of t9o different criterial instruments8 scientific and opinin" lo"os . !ctually8 ho9e3er8 !lbinus ends up by blurtin" Potamo?s sharp distinction bet9een a"ent and instrumentD he describes lo"os itself8 as 9ell as intellect8 as a "Gud"e8" and thus assimilates criterial faculties to the instruments ;opinion or science< that they apply in Gud"in".

%n !lbinus?s defense8 it can be said that his distinction bet9een intellect and lo"os is no more than a fa[on de parler 8 enablin" him to indicate t9o different co"niti3e states of the intellect itself. $e3ertheless8 his procedure seems to illustrate the difficulty of applyin" a conception of the criterion desi"ned for one philosophy to another for 9hich it 9as not intended. Turnin" no9 to Ptolemy and Se.tus8 9e find them startin" from a more comple. di3ision of criterial aspects. %s it likely8 % 9ant to ask8 that their schemes 9ere prompted by a concern ;not ori"inal to them< to e.pound the criterion of truth in 9ays that preser3e Potatoo?s distinctions bet9een a"ent and instrument8 but do not risk con6 flarin" them8 as !lbinus does= Ptolemy be"ins his book by elaboratin" a fi3efold scheme8 illustrated by analo"y 9ith the la9 court ;dikasterion <8 to 9hich R77S A 021 A kriterion had been applied in :ellenistic Greek.R7MS The first and fifth terms of his schemeHobGect of Gud"ment ;"9hat is"< and obGecti3e ;"truth"<Hare an inessential complication8 9hich he probably introduced to assist 9ith his probably ori"inal la96court analo"y. :is remainin" three terms correspond broadly in thou"ht8 thou"h not e.actly in diction8 to a threefold scheme 9hich Se.tus prefaces to his treatment of the criterion.R7BS They a"ree 9ith Potamo and !lbinus in distin"uishin" a"ent from instrument8 the 9ei"her or measurer from his scales or ruler. Their interestin" addition is 9hat Se.tus calls "mode of application" or simply "mode8" and Ptolemy "manner" ;literally "by 9hich"<.R74S This third criterial aspect is analo"ous to the 9ei"hin" or inclination of a balance that a 9ei"her secures 9ith his scales8 or the ali"nment a builder secures 9ith his rule.R7KS %t refers8 in other 9ords8 to the actual Gud"ment or decision the a"ent obtains throu"h applyin" his instruments8 i.e.8 the final outcome of the criterial process. >hat this comes to differs8 at least terminolo"ically8 in the t9o accounts. !ccordin" to Se.tus8 the three aspects yield the follo9in" formula as the fully e.plicated criterion of truthN a man Gud"es throu"h the instrumentality of sense6perception or thou"ht by the application of an impression ;phantasia <.R7LS %n Ptolemy the formula is stated like thisN the intellect Gud"es throu"h the instrumentality of sense6perception by ;the operation of< lo"os .R72S R7MSR7BSR74SR7KSR7LSR72S A 015 A Ptolemy?s e.clusion of thou"ht as a criterial instrument is an idiosyncratic feature8 to 9hich % 9ill return. )ther9ise8 the differences bet9een him and Se.tus are superficial rather than substantial. >hat Ptolemy means by lo"os 8 it emer"es8 is thou"ht8 dianoia 8 analyCed as "internal speech" ;endiathetos lo"os <D and this in turn is di3ided into kno9led"e and opinion. These are differentiated ;cf. !lbinus< by the systematic and utterly secure nature of kno9led"e and the simple8 isolated apprehension of opinion.R71S Se.tus?s e@ui3alent to Ptolemy?s lo"os 9as phantasia . >hen Se.tus comes to discuss this third aspect of the criterion8 he does so e.clusi3ely by reference to the Stoic and !cademic doctrines of "co"niti3e" and "con3incin"" impressions8 of 9hich the latter8

thou"h associated 9ith the Skeptical !cademy8 has a Stoic ori"in.RM5S %n some accounts of Stoic theory8 a co"niti3e ;9hich 9ill also normally be a con3incin"< impression is either a piece of systematic kno9led"e or a true but 9eakly held opinion8 dependin" on 9hether it is the co"niti3e impression of a 9ise man or a fool.RM0S Thus there is no incompatibility bet9een Ptolemy?s and Se.tus?s accounts of the third criterial aspect. ,oth their formulae allo9 the final sta"e of a criterial process to be the stable kno9led"e or unstable opinion 9hich the mind arri3es at by its application or its criterial instruments. R71SRM5SRM0S A 010 A %n itself this is scarcely a note9orthy claim. ,ut no9 consider it in relation to the t9ofold scheme. There 9e found Potamo identifyin" the instrument 9ith "the most accurate impression"Hthe scales8 so to speak. ,ut any one impression is an indication or apparent determination of some fact. !nd thisH 9hat the impression indicatesHis not analo"ous to the scales themsel3es8 but to the 9ei"ht that they re"ister. *urthermore8 the threefold scheme8 by distin"uishin" instruments from the mode of Gud"ment they facilitate8 hi"hli"hts the Gudicial function of the third member8 the intellect itself. %t is the intellect?s task to use criterial instruments for the production of its Gud"ments. This point has special rele3ance to Stoicism8 9here a mark of the fool is precipitancy in assentin" to impressions8 an o3erhasty readin" of the scales8 as 9e mi"ht say. This una3oidably intricate discussion of criterial schemes helps to elucidate Se.tus?s do.o"raphy and criticism8 and the particular interests and contributions of Ptolemy. Se.tus structures his criticism of the do"matists around the three aspects of the criterion of truth8 ar"uin" a"ainst each of them in turn. %mplicitly8 it seems8 he indicates the ne9 de3elopments of :ellenistic philosophy by identifyin" the criterion @ua "mode of application" 9ith phantasia and by confinin" his criticism to the Stoics and !cademic Skeptics. Presumably he or his sources could find nothin" comparable to the Stoics? "co"niti3e" or the !cademics? "con3incin"" impressions in pre6:ellenistic philosophy. :ence his criticism of this aspect e.cludes e3eryone from the earlier period. The criterion @ua "instrument8" ho9e3er8 9as entirely suitable for analyCin" their 3ie9s on the relati3e merits of sense6perception ;aisthesis < or opinion ;do.a <8 on the one hand8 3ersus intellect8 etc. ;nous8 lo"os8 episteme 8 or dianoia < on the other. These are the principal terms Se.tus uses in this part of his do.o"raphy.RM7S There he dra9s constantly on the t9ofold distinction RM7S A 017 A bet9een a"ent and instrument8 as8 for instance8 in his account of Plato makin" lo"os the criterion8 in association 9ith e3idence recei3ed throu"h sense6perception.RMMS *or our understandin" of Ptolemy and his milieu8 9e need to reco"niCe that he is concerned both 9ith the "eneral and older @uestion8 ">hat are the respecti3e contributions of sense6perception and intellect to our kno9led"e of the 9orld=" and 9ith the more recent and specific @uestion8 ">hat reliable criterion do 9e ha3e for

discriminatin" bet9een particular truths and falsehoods=" %n orthodo. Stoicism the first @uestion had been 3irtually reduced to the secondN "co"niti3e impressions8" as e.periences of a mind that has no "irrational" faculty8 are themsel3es "rational" and so transcend the old distinction bet9een bare sensation and intellect.RMBS Ptolemy?s entire strate"y is to preser3e and elucidate this distinction. So he ans9ers the first @uestion as posed in the terms % ha3e statedD but his response to it helps to pro3ide his ans9er to the second @uestion. :e thus combines the t9o approaches to the criterion of truth that 9e ha3e found in Se.tusN the pre6:ellenistic interest in e3aluatin" co"niti3e faculties8 and the :ellenistic concern 9ith the application of indubitable standards. RMMSRMBS A 01M A Ptolemy?s Epistemolo"y :a3in" elaborated his criterial scheme and introduced the concepts he 9ill apply to its 3arious aspects8 Ptolemy concludes the main part of his essay ;sections 2607< 9ith an account of his epistemolo"y that loses little by bein" summariCed as follo9s. %ntellect is posterior to sense6perception in its actualiCation and depends on the "transmission" ;diadosis < of sense6impressions ;phantasiai < for its primary co"nition of obGects.RM4S ,ut sense6perception is limited to the immediate e.periences it under"oes8 and it cannot pass Gud"ment on any e.ternal obGects as such.RMKS Some of the 9ays it may be affected misrepresent e.ternal obGects. %t is also liable to confusion and impediment 9hen it has to deal 9ith properties common to more than one sense8 or impressions from comple. obGects.RMLS (et it al9ays tells the truth about the 9ay it is affectedD and its apprehension of its simple and specific obGectsHseein" colors8 hearin" sounds8 etc.H 9hen these are percei3ed under dear and normal conditions8 is al9ays 3eridical8 or as infallible as a human faculty can be.RM2S #nder these circumstances8 the senses are immediately co"niti3e of their proper obGects and need no other foundation8 so far as self6 e3idence itself ;enar"eia < is concerned.RM1S %ntellect8 thou"h dependent on sense6perception for its startin"6point8 is the "more 3aluable" criterion8 and it is not subGect to the same limitations.RB5S Throu"h memory of percepts and the concepts it ac@uires thereby8 intellect can pass Gud"ment on sense6 perception and on e.ternal obGectsD it adGudicates doubtful cases8 classifies sensory e3idence on the basis of its empirically RM4SRMKSRMLSRM2SRM1SRB5S A 01B A deri3ed concepts8 and applies purely rational processes to its assessment of obGects.RB0S %ntellect has an intrinsic and "infallible" capacity to discriminate amon" any impressions that it recei3es8 in contrast 9ith the confusion that may attend the senses.RB7S Like these8 it is liable to error 9hen it has to pass Gud"ment on comple. obGectsHe.".8 "man is the same as horse @ua animal but different @ua rational"RBMS Hbut it has its o9n pro3ince of "proper" obGects ;theoretical and practical< about 9hich it al9ays tells the truthN e.".8 same and different8 e@ual and une@ual8 appropriate and inappropriate.RBBS More "enerally8 intellect8 unlike sense6perception8 functions by dra9in" inferences about

obGects. >hen these are one6off apprehensions8 so to speak8 or "detached" from a scientific disposition8 the result is merely opinion ;do.a <. Science ;episteme < is a stable and incontro3ertible state of the intellect8 consistin" in self6e3ident and e.pert discrimination. More particularly8 science 9orks by analysis and synthesis8 or collection and di3ision8 classifyin" e.istin" thin"s accordin" to species and "enera and di3idin" them accordin"ly do9n to indi3isible particulars.RB4S Scholars ha3e run" the chan"es in their choice of Ptolemy?s sources or philosophical forebears. ,oll ar"ued for a late Peripatetic compendiumD Lammert opted for the Middle Stoa8 and especially Posidonius8 9ho 9rote a book )n the +riterion ; io"enes Laertius L.4B<D Manuli8 ackno9led"in" "a massi3e Stoic6Peripatetic presence8" finds e3idence in a number of cases to su""est "a more strict parallelism 9ith Middle Platonism8" as in !lbinus.RBKS $one of these proposals is patently false. $or does any or e3en all of them to"ether suffice to characteriCe Ptolemy?s epis6 RB0SRB7SRBMSRBBSRB4SRBKS A 014 A temolo"y. ! full "enealo"y of his terms and ideas 9ould ha3e to include Epicurus and the !cademic Skeptics.RBLS $or8 ho9e3er8 is it satisfactory to re"ard his position as one of undifferentiated eclecticism. %f 9e had reason to think Ptolemy accepted a philosophical label8RB2S ,oll?s assessment 9ould be nearest the markN Ptolemy?s @ualified empiricism is more ob3iously !ristotelian than Stoic8 incorporatin" as it does the doctrine of specific and common sensibles and e.cludin" the Stoics? self6certifyin" impressions of comple.8 empirical obGects.RB1S :o9e3er8 it is far better to let Ptolemy be his o9n man8 and to re"ard him as cullin" the full resources of the philosophical tradition 9ithout car3in" it up into school cate"ories in order to make the points he 9ants to make. R45S >e ha3e already seen that he does not attempt to combat Skepticism in the terms that the Skeptic lays do9n. :is little essay should be read8 % su""est8 as a practicin" scientist?s statement of 9here he stands on the epistemolo"ical RBLSRB2SRB1SR45S A 01K A issues that arise in his day6to6day 9ork. %n a 9ord or t9o8 Ptolemy is concerned 9ith the proper relationship bet9een research or empirical obser3ations on the one hand and theoretical or rational principles and "eneraliCations on the other. Ptolemy 9on his first editor?s appro3al by makin" sense6perception the startin" point of all concepts and co"nitions. !lthou"h he at one point countenances obGects peculiar to thou"ht ;"same" and "different" etc.N 0K8 line 260L8 line 0<8 the main burden of his doctrine supports ,ullialdus?s empiricist readin". Strikin"ly8 in his preamble Ptolemy makes sense6perception the only criterial "instrument" ;48 lines 0760M<8 and later he insists that the obGects of sense6perception and thou"ht are identical8 thou"h apprehended in different 9ays.R40S ,ut ,ullialdus understated Ptolemy?s more prominent stress on the limitations of sense6perception as a co"niti3e faculty8 and on intellect?s sole responsibility

for Gud"in" obGects8 9hether by applyin" its concepts to the e3idence of the senses or by usin" one sense to check another ;0M8 line 7560B8 line MD 0B8 line 7B6048 line 0D 048 line 0M60K8 line B<. %f Ptolemy?s purpose in this book 9as to strike a balance bet9een empiricism and rationalism8 that 9ould account for the selection of material 9e find it con3enient to call Peripatetic8 Stoic8 etc. % ha3e already e.plained 9hy it 9ould be mistaken to call his selection eclectic in any peGorati3e sense. (et in a perfectly defensible sense his procedure is eclectic8 thou"h % should prefer to describe it as a methodolo"y of optimum a"reement. There are 3ery dose 3erbal and conceptual parallels bet9een Ptolemy?s account and the positions that Se.tus8 9ith some anachronism8 attributes to Plato and the Peripatetics.R47S These do not sho9 that R40SR47S A 01L A Ptolemy has simply cobbled his account to"ether out of do.o"raphical handbooks. 'ather8 they indicate that he presented his o9n 3ie9s in a form that could in3ite a 9ide measure of a"reement. *or the same reason8 % surmise8 he took o3er and elaborated the threefold scheme of the criterion8 thus formulatin" his epistemolo"y in accordance 9ith the most up6to6date practice. Moreo3er8 his use of that scheme enabled him to e.press his 3ie9s in an arran"ement that e.hibited minimum disa"reement 9ith Stoicism. )n Ptolemy?s scheme8 intellect uses lo"os ;its conceptual apparatus< as its mode of adGudicatin" comple. or doubtful obser3ations8 9hich it cannot resol3e by sense6perception alone. %n Stoicism8 sense6perception or thou"ht pro3ides the mind 9ith co"niti3e impressions8 9hose criterial po9er in3ol3es concepts that cause us to identify obGects correctly.R4MS The principal differences o3er details are due to different models of mindN the Stoics treat phantasiai from the sense6or"ans as rational ;lo"ikai <8 9hile Ptolemy prefers the more familiar notion of a di3ision8 mediated by phantasia 8 bet9een ra9 ;i.e.8 nonrational< data and the intellect?s interpretation of these. !t the le3el that concerns Ptolemy8 he 9ould not be unreasonable in re"ardin" the Stoic account as a fine di3er"ence from his o9n rather than a @uite different treatment of kno9led"e. E3en an Epicurean could find much to en6done in Ptolemy?s account of the relationship and differences bet9een sense6 perception and rational Gud"ment.R4BS Ptolemy?s complete suppression of any skeptical 9orries or reGoinders can no9 be reconsidered. )ne of the Pyrrhonian Skeptics? principal strate"ies for discomfitin" the do"matists 9as to indicate their mutual "disa"reement" ;diaphonia < and the ab6 R4MSR4BS A 012 A sence of an a"reed criterion to resol3e it. ,y de3elopin" a 3ie9 of the criterion of truth that e.ploits optimum a"reement bet9een the schools8 Ptolemy has an ans9er to this challen"e. :e can maintain8 as !ntiochus of !scalon did8 that some apparent differences bet9een schools are terminolo"ical rather than doctrinal. Such a stance coheres

completely 9ith the impatience Ptolemy 3oices to9ard those 9ho confuse @uestions of lan"ua"e 9ith @uestions about facts ;18 lines 0604<. !s a reformed !cademic Skeptic8 !ntiochus had had the stron"est of reasons for playin" up consensus in the philosophical tradition8 as a foundation for defendin" his positi3e doctrines in ethics and epistemolo"y. %f this is a principal e.planation of his so6called eclecticism8 it moti3ates that practice in a manner not yet sufficiently studied. Ptolemy?s procedures certainly ha3e an important precursor in !ntiochus.R44S Ptolemy and Galen +learer still is Ptolemy?s affinity to his contemporary Galen8 a point 9ell emphasiCed8 thou"h not specifically on epistemolo"y8 R44S A 011 A by Paola Manuli.R4KS Galen repeatedly indicates that the eclectic tendencies of his o9n approach to epistemolo"y are "rounded in his resistance to Skepticism. %n e optima doctrina he attacks Skepticism @uite openly. !"ainst *a3orinus8 9ho had 9ritten three books in refutation of the Stoics? co"niti3e impression8 Galen takes o3er the Stoic terminolo"y8 interpretin" katalepton to mean "securely kno9able" ;3ol. 08 B7<.R4LS !part from Pyrrhonists and !cademics8 he says8 e3eryone a"rees that they can distin"uish bet9een the illusions e.perienced in dreams or insanity8 and percei3in" trulyD they take true perception to constitute secure kno9led"e8 and e3erythin" pictured in dreams or insanity to be false. %f the Skeptics refuse to concede this8 the criteria of truth are utterly confounded ;3ol. 08 BM<. Galen maintains that the e.istence of a "natural criterion" is plainly e3ident and that it ser3es as the source of such artificial criteria as compass8 cubit8 and scales ;3ol. 08 B2D e plac. :ipp. et Plat .8 3ol. 48 L7M<. The natural criterion that Galen proposes is enar"eia 8 "self6e3idence8" 9hether of sensible or intelli"ible obGects ;3ol. 08 B1<.R42S Such e3idence8 he obser3es8 cannot be Gud"ed by anythin" else. Galen cannot stop a Skeptic from disbelie3in" itD but such a desperate fello9 9ill learn nothin" from him. Like Ptolemy8 Galen accepts the e.tension of self6e3idence to indemonstrable truths of reason8 such as "thin"s 9hich are e@ual to the same thin" are e@ual to one another8" or "if e@uals are added to e@uals8 their sum is e@ual" ;Meth. med .8 3ol. 058 MKD cf. )pt. sect .8 3ol. 08 052<. !nother 9ay of describin" self6e3idence8 R4KSR4LSR42S A 755 A or 9hat discriminates it from other criteria8 is "the common conception of all people" ;)pt. sect .8 3ol. 08 051<. Galen?s e.amples of self6e3ident8 indemonstrable8 "commonly concei3ed" truths8 not accessible to sense6perception8 indicate the sense of Ptolemy?s o3erly brief reference to the specific obGects of the intellect ;+rit . 0K8 line 0L60L8 line 0<. More "enerally8 Galen?s recourse to self6e3idence and common conception sho9s the same concern 9ith optimum a"reement8 as a methodolo"ical principle8 that 9e found in Ptolemy. ,y their time8 enar"eia and koine ennoia are terms at home in all treatments of epistemolo"y. !s Galen remarks in e plac. :ipp. et Plat .8 3ol. 48 LL2N

The Gud"ment on these thin"s is referred to phantasia 8 as the recent !cademics say8 not only that 9hich is con3incin" but also tested and undi3erted8 or co"niti3e as +hrysippus and his follo9ers say8 or sense6perception and self6e3ident thou"ht as men in "eneral say. %n spite of the apparent difference of the terms8 on careful scrutiny they ha3e the same sense8 as 9hen someone says he be"ins from the common conceptions8 and that he posits these as the primary and intrinsically reliable criteria of e3erythin". :ere 9e find the same indifference to terminolo"ical and fine conceptual distinctions that Ptolemy e.hibits. ;%ndeed the difference bet9een the !cademics? "con3incin"" impression and the co"niti3e impression of the Stoics could only be treated as a fine one by someone 9ho 9as either philosophically inept or unconcerned8 for his o9n purposes8 9ith the distinction bet9een the "apparently true" and the "certainly true." Galen kne9 the difference8 but chooses here to i"nore it.< Galen also likes to stren"then the case for an epistemolo"ical consensus by the de3ice8 so fa3ored at this period8 of citin" the "ancient philosophers" ;e.".8 Meth. med .8 3ol. 058 MK<. E@ually redolent of Ptolemy?s doctrine and approach is Galen?s treatment of the mind?s criterial po9er in 3irtue of its concepts and capacities for inference. The characteristics of "natural criteria" are their uni3ersality and common nature. "% declare that 9e all ha3e natural criteria8 and % put this as a reminder8 not as A 750 A an instruction or proof or personal statement." These are normally functionin" sense6 or"ans8 "and in addition the mind or intellect or 9hate3er one likes to call it8 by 9hich" ;recall Ptolemy?s third criterial aspect< "9e reco"niCe the consistent and inconsistent8 and other thin"s 9hich belon" to them8 includin" di3ision and collection8 similarity and dissimilarity" ; e plae. :ipp. et Plat .8 3ol. 48 L7M<. This recalls Ptolemy?s procedures for the scientific discrimination of obGects ;028 line 076018 line K<. Galen8 thou"h more philosophically ambitious than Ptolemy8 constantly underlines their common interest in assertin" an a"reed tradition on the criterial contributions of reason and sense6perception. R41S ,y ad3ancin" this tradition a"ainst the Skeptics8 or @uibblin" do"matists for that matter8 Galen is e.plicit on the strate"y that Ptolemy @uietly adopts. The effecti3eness and earlier history of this tactic can be assessed by comparin" Se.tus Empiricus?s do.o"raphy 9ith his critical reGoinders. :is unpolemical reports of the criterion8 especially those of Plato and the Peripatetics8 seem to re3eal the lea3enin" hand of !ntiochus8 9hich has smoothed out most of the ori"inal differences.RK5S Thus these "ancients" can be associated 9ith the :ellenistic consensus8 outside Skepticism8 on the criterial roles of sense6perception and intellect. %t 9ould be misleadin"8 ho9e3er8 to imply that either Ptolemy or Galen adopted similar strate"ies to !ntiochus?s for precisely similar reasons. !ntiochus?s interpretation of the philosophical tradition8 9hich 9e call his eclecticism8 9as chiefly moti3ated by his dissatisfaction 9ith the Skeptical interpretation of Plato that had been current in the !cademyD he tried to "i3e an account of R41SRK5S

A 757 A Plato8 and of the Peripatetics too8 that 9ould incorporate much of Stoicism8 the leadin" doctrinaire philosophy of his day. Skepticism8 thou"h still ali3e in the time of Ptolemy and Galen8 9as not an issue they felt called upon as practicin" scientists to confront head6 on. Their broadly based epistemolo"ies could be used to respond to Skeptics8 as 9e see in GalenD but their most immediate purpose has more bearin" on the history and philosophy of science than on philosophy construed more narro9ly. Galen8 as is becomin" dear from recent studies8 steers a careful middle course bet9een the e.tremes of the Empiricist and the 'ationalist schools of medicine.RK0S :e finds the Empiricists? account of medical kno9led"e defecti3e in their reliance on non6rational e.perience ;peira < and in their efforts to base cures on memory of obser3able treatments and symptoms8 to the total e.clusion of in3esti"ation of underlyin" causes by analo"ical inference from the e3ident to the none3ident ;Subfi". emp . 0678 L600 X eich"rPber8 Empirikerschule 8 B78 BB8 K762K<. The 'ationalists8 ho9e3er8 9hile correct in combinin" e.perience 9ith a rational method8 turn out to make claims for the latter 9hich they are unable to Gustify8 disa"reein" about their principles8 le"islatin" rather than pro3in" ;Meth. med .8 3ol. 058 M56M7<. Galen himself takes the 3ie9 that medical kno9led"e re@uires an appropriate blend of e.periential and rational methods. :e describes the rational one as the more po9erful8 but also insists that e.perience is the most reliable criterion ;Meth. med .8 3ol. 058 02MD Simpl. med .8 3ol. 008 B4K<. Galen?s middle6"round epistemolo"y ser3es to define his position in re"ard to the medical theory and practice of his day. >ith Ptolemy the case is similar in music. :e be"ins his :armonics 9ith the claim that the criteria of harmony are sound ;as matter and affection< and lo"os ;as form and e.planationD M8 lines RK0S A 75M A M64<.RK7SLo"os determines and completes the appro.imate disco3eries of sense6 perception ;M8 lines K604<. The senses need a rational criterion8 like that of the rule for a strai"ht line8 to settle any apparent discrepancies bet9een obser3ations and the facts ;48 lines 0605<. That need is satisfied by "the harmonic canon"N R%t consists ofS rational hypotheses Rconcernin" musical inter3alsS that ne3er contradict the maGority?s Gud"ment about their sense6perceptions. This corresponds to the astronomer?s task8 9hich is to preser3e the hypotheses about the celestial mo3ementsH hy6potheses 9hich are in a"reement 9ith the obser3ed orbits8 since they 9ere themsel3es taken from 9hat could be seen e3idently and appro.imately8 althou"h they disco3ered by reason the particular details to the "reatest possible de"ree of accuracy. ;48 lines 00675< !s in )n the +riterion 8 Ptolemy 3ie9s scientific kno9led"e in the :armonics as combinin" reason and e.perience. Startin" from sense6perception8 reason disco3ers theoretical principles 9hich8 because they had their basis in e.perience8 ser3e to "round

and control all subse@uent obser3ations. Moreo3er8 Ptolemy had an issue of his o9n to resol3e in music8 e.actly like that of Galen?s adGudication bet9een 'ationalists and Empiricists. The Pytha"orean musicolo"ists8 he complains8 9orked too theoretically. They failed to "i3e necessary attention to the actual e.perience of the ear8 and thus produced theories so discrepant 9ith the actual differences bet9een sounds that they "a3e rationalism a bad name. !risto.enus and his follo9ers8 on the other hand8 made reason 3irtually superfluous by attachin" too much importance to auditory e.perience. Their inappropriate application of numbers to the inter3als of sounds and not to their differences contradicted reason and obser3ation alike ;48 line 7L6K8 line 05<. The epistemolo"y of )n the +riterion is put to 9ork in the RK7S A 75B A :armonics . *irst8 an e.ample of the !risto.eneans? misapplication of the criteriaN This discrepancy Rarisin" from their account of the fourthS is not to be re"arded as a fault of reason Ri.e.8 mathematicsS and sense6perception8 but of their di3er"ent hypotheses ... and "i3in" assent contrary to both criteria. *or sense6perception practically bello9sRKMS its dear and unmistakable reco"nition of the fifth8 in all cases 9hen the canon indicates a ratio of MN78 and of the fourth 9hen the ratio is BNM. These men8 ho9e3er8 do not remain consistent 9ith the canon. ;7M8 line 0167B8 line 0< Second8 an e.ample of usin" both criteria correctlyN )ur present procedure is not one of "eneratin" the characteristics of familiar tones from mere theory8 and then attachin" them throu"h the canon to the e3idence from obser3ations8 but the re3erseN first e.hibitin" the harmonies established throu"h senseperception on its o9n8 and then pro3in" thereby the principles Ri.e.8 mathematical ratiosS 9hich are a conse@uence of the percei3ed identities and differences of tones of each kind. ;B78 lines M6L< This combination of induction and deduction recalls the "scientific disposition?s" practice of collection and di3ision from )n the +riterion ;028 line 0M6718 line K<. $or are the clear echoes of that essay confined in the :armonics to epistemolo"y. Ptolemy also de3elops a scheme of correspondences bet9een musical inter3als and the di3isions of the intelli"ent part of the soulD these di3isions conform e.actly to his analysis of the constituents of thou"ht in )n the +riterion .RKBS This further relationship bet9een the t9o books encoura"es the speculation that Ptolemy adumbrated his position on the soul?s RKMSRKBS A 754 A

"commandin"6faculty" ;he"emonikon <8 follo9in" his discussion of the criterion of truth ;sections 0M60K<8 in order to pro3ide the "round for any psycholo"ical e.cursions in his specialiCed scientific 9ritin"s. The principal points of Ptolemy?s psycholo"y are ;0< the soul?s elemental makeup and relation to the body8 ;7< the di3ision and teleolo"ical si"nificance of its functions8 and ;M< the bodily location of the commandin"6faculty. :e makes the brain the seat of the commandin"6faculty responsible for co"nition and "li3in" 9ell8" and the heart the location of the commandin"6faculty that controls "merely li3in"."RK4S Particular doctrines that he applies in his other books includeN ;B< the theory that bodily and psycholo"ical characteristics are co6determined by the ratio of their constituent elementsD ;4< the subordination of the senses to intellectD ;K< the priority of 3ision and hearin" abo3e the other sensesD ;L< the conception of human rationality and its location as a microcosm of cosmic rationality and its location in the hea3ens. :e in3okes ;4<6;L< in the :armonics ;L8 line 04D 1M8 lines 0067B<8 and his treatment of ethnolo"y in the Tetrabiblos presupposes the psychosomatic blendin" specified by ;B<. %n its relation to the philosophical tradition8 Ptolemy?s psycholo"y8 like that of Galen8 can be represented as an eclectic amal"am of Platonic8 !ristotelian8 and Stoic features. More informati3ely8 like that of Galen a"ain8 it in3ol3es an interestin" series of decisions on contro3ersial issues. Ptolemy sides 9ith Plato a"ainst !ristotle and the Stoics in locatin" rationality in the headD yet he a"rees 9ith the latter in locatin" the basic principle of life in the heart. :e is chiefly indebted to the Timaeus for his 3ie9 of the bodily or"ans concerned 9ith emotion and appetite8 but his description of sense6perception8 impulse8 and thou"ht is broadly in line 9ith !ristotle and Stoicism. !s to the 3e.ed @uestion of the soul?s corporeality or incorporeality8 Ptol6 RK4S A 75K A emy 9as skillfully e3asi3e in his first reference to the issue8 9here he ar"ued that it is irrele3ant to the di3ision of functions bet9een body and soulN "E3eryone 9ould a"ree that 9e conduct thou"ht 9ith Rdati3e caseS the soul and not the body. That this also holds "ood for sensory mo3ements and all others8 9e 9ould realiCe if 9e attended to the dissolution of body and soul in respect of @uantity" ;008 line 7M6078 line 7<. >hen he finally plumps for a 3ersion of Stoic materialism8 or psychosomatic blendin" ;018 line 046 758 line 0M<8 a hard6line Platonist or !ristotelian 9ould resist. ,ut Ptolemy modifies his "Stoic" account by includin" "ether" as the e.clusi3ely "acti3e" constituent of soul8 9hich is 9holly responsible for thou"ht ;758 lines L628 04D60K<Ha fascinatin" compromise or concession to !ristotelian cosmolo"y.RKKS Ptolemy?s Eclecticism Ptolemy?s psycholo"y bears out the interpretations % ha3e "i3en of his epistemolo"y. %n recallin" these8 it 9ill be helpful to distin"uish t9o senses in 9hich his approach in both subGects is eclectic. *irst8 like most of his contemporaries8 Ptolemy 9orks from 9ithin a tradition that is irreducibly composite8 if 3ie9ed 3ia its antecedents8 but broadly unified in the perspecti3e of its o9n members. >e mi"ht call this una3oidable or undeliberated

or cultural eclecticism. %n another sense8 Ptolemy is self6consciously eclectic8 practicin" the methodolo"y % ha3e called optimum a"reement. This should be re"arded as a dialectical strate"y to "i3e ma.imum credibility to the position he holds on the proper balance bet9een empiricism and rationalism. :e states his o9n con3ictions in a form that resists identification 9ith any one school8 9hile at the same time makin" it difficult for any school e.cept Skepticism to ar"ue a"ainst them8 and implicitly poolin" the do"matists? resources a"ainst the Skeptics. :is psy6 RKKS A 75L A cholo"y is more ob3iously a compromise than his epistemolo"y8 but this 9as due to the nature of the in@uiry. Ptolemy had to make choices o3er such contro3ersial issues as the mind?s location8 pans8 and relation to the body. :ere too8 ho9e3er8 his decisions are calculated to restrain disa"reement as far as possible. *or most of them8 like Galen8 he could cite the authority of the ancients. $either sense of eclecticism8 ho9e3er8 is ultimately satisfactory as an account of )n the +riterion and +ommandin"6*aculty . The first makes the patroniCin" point that Ptolemy 9as Gust a man of his time. The second8 thou"h much more informati3e8 is limited to sho9in" ho9 and 9hy he presented his thou"hts in 9ays that could command "eneral assent. >hat eludes eclecticism here8 and perhaps any9here else8 is Ptolemy?s e3ident commitment to the doctrines he presentsHdoctrines 9hich still contain much that seems a reasonable appro.imation of the facts. That is 9hat appealed to ,ullialdus in the se3enteenth century8 and 9hat source6criticism of Ptolemy?s essay has tended to obscure. )n the +riterion is the 9ork of someone 9ho has made up his mind on t9o issues of "reat comple.ity8 but prefers to "i3e us his decisions ;the third aspect of the criterion of truth< rather than the instruments ;the second aspect< he applied in reachin" them. A 752 A

2 isco3erin" the ima"ination Platonists and Stoics on phantasia

2 isco3erin" the ima"ination Platonists and Stoics on phantasia G. >atson The history of phantasia in +lassical thou"ht pro3ides many e.amples of eclecticism. )ne of the most interestin" of these in3ol3es the process 9hereby this Greek 9ord 9as e.tended in its meanin" from a term practically confined to technical philosophical debate in Plato8 !ristotle8 and the Stoics into somethin" more like "fantasy" in the modem En"lish sense8 9hich can include in its ran"e of meanin" the notion of the creation of an unreal and e3en ideal 9orld8 3isualiCed by the artist and shared 9ith others for their pleasure and enli"htenment8 the 9orld of the ima"ination. The dearest e.ample of the e.tension8 and indeed transformation8 of the term occurs in a fi"ure 9ho li3ed at the end of the period 9e shall be considerin"8 the Philostratus 9ho 9rote the Life of !pollonius . %t is "enerally a"reed that this Philostratus li3ed from about !. . 0L5 to 745 and that his Life of !pollonius 9as not published until after 70L.R0S There is also "eneral a"ree6 R0S A 751 A ment that Philostratus 9rote8 amon" other 9orks8 one called Eikones 8 9hich contains descriptions of si.ty6fi3e paintin"s and 9hich 9as put into 9ritten form in $aples.R7S !t some sta"e durin" his life he came to 'ome and 9as accepted into the circle around the mother of +aracalla8 Julia omna8 for 9hom he undertook to 9rite the life of !pollonius of Tyana8 a 9onder69orker and philosopher of the first century !. .RMS The Eikones indicates a man 9ho 9as interested in paintin" and the po9er it possessed8 and abo3e all in attemptin" to con3ey this po9er in 9ords. The same interest is abundantly e3ident in the Life 8RBS 9hich8 in spite of some possible historical content8 9e need hardly take as a critical bio"raphy. %t does8 ho9e3er8 allo9 Philostratus to sho9 off his many6sided kno9led"e and skill. This freedom allo9s him to raise the @uestion of the 3alue of paintin"8 throu"h the mouth of !pollonius8 and the discussion de3elops into a consideration of mimesis ;7.77<. >e learn from this that 9hile all human bein"s ha3e the po9er of imitation8 artists ha3e it in a more de3eloped 9ay8 because of the skill that they ha3e learned. %t is because 9e all share in the po9er of imitation that 9e can appreciate the skill of artists8 either in reproducin" 9hat 9e ha3e all seen or in conGurin" up 9hat has perhaps ne3er happened but can be ima"ined8 as8 for instance8 the e.pression on the face of !Ga. emer"in" from his delusion.

%n this 9hole section there is no mention of phantasia 8 e3en thou"h it is difficult to discuss the section in En"lish 9ithout referrin" to the "ima"ination." Later in the Life 8 ho9e3er8 phantasia is specifically contrasted 9ith mimesis ;K.01<. :ere8 in a con3ersation 9ith Thespesion8 an E"yptian6Ethiopian Gymnosophist8 !pollonius ridicules the manner in 9hich the "ods are R7SRMSRBS A 705 A represented in the local temples. Thespesion8 some9hat annoyed8 asks sarcastically if Greeks like Phidias and Pra.iteles 9ere so pri3ile"ed that they could "o to hea3en and look around and use the "ods there as models for the statues they make on earth. )h no8 !pollonius replies8 they relied on somethin" else. ,ut 9hat could that be other than mimesis 8 asks Thespesion. %t is somethin" other8 ho9e3er8 !pollonius repliesN phantasia. Phantasia is a more skilled craftsman than mimesis . "*or mimesis 9ill produce only 9hat she has seen8 but phantasia e3en 9hat she has not seen as 9ellD and she 9ill produce it by referrin" to the standard of the perfect reality." Mimesis is often disturbed throu"h terror8 but nothin" stops phantasia from its production. >hen someone 9ishes to produce Qeus8 he must do it as Phidias did8 and 9hen !thena8 he must conGure up ;ennoein < armies and intelli"ence and the arts and ho9 she spran" from the head of Qeus. !pollonius su""ests finally to his hosts that it 9ould be better to honor the "ods by makin" no representations of them at allN they should lea3e the picturin" of the shape of the "ods to the 9orshippers because he "nome ;mind or ima"ination< makes better pictures and plastic representations than art. >e ha3e8 then8 in this passa"e a mo3ement from the praise of art based on mental 3ision to the e.altation of the mental 3ision itself8 e3en if8 or especially 9hen8 it does not issue in art. This sounds e.tremely Platonic8 and so too does an earlier passa"e in B.L. There !pollonius ad3ises the people of SmyrnaN Pay more attention to your o9n culti3ation than to the appearance of the city8 because a city 9hich is adorned 9ith "ood men "i3es more pleasure than one decorated 9ith colonnades and paintin"s and "old. The cities 9hich are beautiful throu"h their 9orks of art are like the statue of Qeus by Phidias in )lympia8 sittin" there.... ,ut men 9ho "o e3ery9here are like the Qeus of :omer8 9ho is presented in many forms by the poet and so is more 9onderful than Phidias?s Qeus of i3ory. *or he is seen only here on earth8 but :omer?s Qeus can be thou"ht of o3erall in the hea3ens. A 700 A %n other 9ords8 the less earthbound it is the more 9onderful the art8 and that is 9hy literature is superior to paintin" or the plastic artsN it is a product of the mind and not tied to material place or time. The artist is not confined to reproducin" e.istin" realityN the po9er of phantasia 8 9hich is a hi"her one than that of mimesis 8 creates 9hat the eye has ne3er seen but the mind has concei3ed. %t may seem a little un"enerous to cite these passa"es from Philostratus and then immediately start lookin" for the sources of his ideas8 especially 9hen they do look ne9

and e.citin"8 and 9hen he has been credited 9ith "i3in" art a ne9 standin".R4S %t seems necessary to do so8 ho9e3er8 e3en if 9e 9ere to i"nore the doubtful consistency of his 3ie9s on mimesis 8 9hich seems to indicate importation 9ithout assimilation.RKS That not all of Philostratus?s ideas are ori"inal seems to be indicated by a passa"e in +icero?s )rator 8 9ritten more than t9o hundred years before Philostratus8 in 9hich 3ie9s remarkably similar to those of the sophist are put for9ard. The conte.t ;Lff.< is a discussion of the ideal orator. The supreme orator he is paintin" has perhaps ne3er e.isted8 says +icero8 and the elo@uence 9e are seekin" is at the 3ery most su""ested8 no9 and a"ain8 in speeches8 copies as it 9ere of the perfect. >e see 3arious beautiful thin"s8 but none of them is so beautiful as that of 9hich it is a copy. This cannot be percei3ed by eyes or ears or any senseN 9e "rasp it only throu"h thinkin" Rco"itatione tantum et mente complectimur S. *or e.ample8 in the case of the statues of Phidias8 the most perfect of their kind 9hich 9e can see8 and in the case of the paintin"s mentioned Rin 48 by Proto"enes and !pellesS8 9e can8 in spite of R4SRKS A 707 A their beauty8 ima"ine somethin" more beautiful.RLS That "reat sculptor Phidias8 9hile shapin" the ima"e of Jupiter or Miner3a8 did not keep lookin" at some person from 9hom he dre9 the likeness8 but in his o9n mind there d9elt a surpassin" 3ision of beautyD at this he "aCed and8 fi.ed on this8 he directed his art and hand to the production of a likeness of it. !ccordin"ly8 as there is somethin" perfect and surpassin" in the case of sculpture and paintin"8 9ith the 3ision of 9hich in the mind there are associated in the process of imitation those thin"s 9hich are ne3er actually seen8 so 9ith our minds 9e concei3e the ideal of perfect elo@uence8 but 9ith our ears 9e catch only the copy.R2S These patterns of thin"s are called ideai by Plato.... These8 he says8 do not "become"D they e.ist fore3er and are to be found in intellect and reason Rratione et intelle"entia SD other thin"s come into bein" and cease to be8 they are in flu. and do not remain lon" in the same state. :ere8 as distinct from Philostratus8 the reference to Plato is e.plicit8 and the ob3iously Platonic "somethin" perfect and surpassin" ... 9ith the 3ision of 9hich in the mind are associated in the process of imitation those thin"s 9hich are ne3er actually seen ..." corresponds to 9hat Philostratus ;in K.01< says about phantasia and that 9hich has not been seen. ,ut this is precisely our difficultyD the use of the term phantasia in a Platonic conte.t. %f the conte.t 9ere Stoic8 this term 9ould be @uite understandable8 indeed e.pected. ,ut it mi"ht appear unlikely that a Platonist 9ould praise ima"ination as a faculty that 9ould help us to create artHart8 accordin" to Plato8 is an imitation of an imita6 RLSR2S A 70M A tionHor that he 9ould use phantasia as a term of approbation for a hi"her kind of insi"ht.

%t must be emphasiCed that it is 9ith the use of the term in a Platonic conte.t that 9e are concerned. %t is not a matter of denyin" the real e.istence or employment of ima"ination8 as 9e understand it8 by Plato or 9ithin his system. %ndeed8 it mi"ht be maintained ;and8 on occasion8 critically8 as by !ristotle< that it is in this direction that Plato?s theory of *orms leads us. >ith the ima"ination 9e stretch beyond the sensually 3erifiable and reach or create a 9orld 9hich 9e fed should e.ist8 and 9hich satisfies a lon"in" that seems to us reasonable. %t ou"ht to e.ist8 and 9e 9ould like to say that therefore it does e.ist. Plato said that the 9orld of *orms e.ists because it must e.ist. There must be somethin" beyond the buCC of sensation that "i3es 9hat 9e hear and see meanin" and direction. Mind8 too8 "i3es a superior 3ision8 particularly of beauty 9hich8 because beauty has de"rees8 points beyond itself and so creates a desire that cannot be satisfied by the seen. Lon"inus refers specifically to Plato in chapter M4 of )n the Sublime 8 and e3en thou"h he does not purport to be @uotin" him8 he ne3ertheless puts for9ard 3ie9s 9ith 9hich Plato 9ould certainly not disa"reeN $ature has brou"ht us into life8 into the 9hole 3ast uni3erse8 there to be spectators of all that she has created.... Thus from the first she has implanted in our souls an uncon@uerable passion for all that is "reat and for all that is more di3ine than oursel3es. *or this reason the entire uni3erse does not satisfy the contemplation and thou"ht that lie 9ithin the scope of human endea3ourD our ideas often "o beyond the boundaries by 9hich 9e are circumscribed8 and if 9e look at life from all sides8 obser3in" ho9 in e3erythin" that concerns us the e.traordinary8 the "reat and the beautiful play the leadin" part8 9e shall soon realiCe the purpose of our creation. ;trans. orsch8 Pen"uin +lassics< There is8 then8 to repeat8 no @uestion of denyin" that Plato 9as a "reat ima"inati3e 9riter or of disputin" the effecti3e use A 70B A he made of the ima"ination in the e.position of his philosophy. The @uestion is8 9ould a strict Platonist use the term phantasia appro3in"ly8 and 9ould he use it for a faculty that produces e3en 9hat it has not seen= %t 9ould scarcely seem so8 Gud"in" by Plato?s o9n description of phantasia . Let us consider briefly 9hat this is. %t is in Plato that 9e ha3e the first occurrence of phantasia in Greek literature8 in 'epublic M27E. There is some manuscript uncertainty about the occurrence of the 9ord in that passa"e8 and if "enuine8 there is some ambi"uity in its useN it may mean that God does not decei3e us by 3isions8 phantasia bein" "i3en a passi3e sense8 or on the other hand it may mean that 9e are not to blame God for our 9ron" interpretations of sense6e.perience8 an acti3e sense of the 9ord. This acti3e sense is to be found in the Sophist 8 9here the most e.plicit description of phantasia in Plato is "i3en ;7K5E67KB!<. There it is said that 9hen assertion or denial occurs in the soul in the course of silent thinkin"8 it is called do.a 8 and 9hen do.a occurs8 not independently but by means of aisthesis 8 this is called phantasia ;7KB!<8 referred to a fe9 lines later as the "combination of sense6perception and opinion" ;summei.is aistheseos kai do.es <. %n the immediately precedin" dialo"ue8 the Theaetetus 8 9here Prota"oras is represented as playin" a leadin" part8 phantasia is deployed in a discussion of our kno9led"e of the sensible 9orld. Philebus M2,6B5! and Timaeus 7L 6

71 and 47 are also of interest8 because e3en thou"h the 9ord does not occur in these last t9o dialo"ues8 the same process is ob3iously bein" referred to. %n the last6named8 the chan"in" 9orld is the subGect of do.a accompanied by aisthesis . Phantasia 8 then8 in Plato refers to a co"niti3e state that depends directly on sense6 perception and so is sometimes false. The term seems an unlikely candidate for e.altation in a Platonist conte.t such as that of Philostratus or +icero. %f the conte.t 9ere Stoic8 ho9e3er8 there 9ould be no difficulty. *or them8 internal reasonin" and the phantasia "9hich is capable of makin" a transition" are distincti3e of human bein"s. Se.tus Empiricus reportsN A 704 A The o"matists Ri.e.8 the StoicsS maintain that man does not differ from the irrational animals by speech taken simply as uttered Rprophorikos lo"os S ;for cro9s and parrots and Gays produce articulated sounds<8 but by the reasoned speech 9hich is internal Rendiathetos lo"os SD nor does man differ by the simple phantasia only ;for the animals too ha3e phantasia <8 but throu"h the phantasia of transition and composition Rmetabatike kai sunthetike S. ;M 2.7L46LK< This is illustrated else9here. Throu"h 3arious processes8 from somethin" that is actually present to us8 concepts are also formed of 9hat is not directly percei3ed. >e form a concept of Socrates by resemblance8 for instance8 from a likeness of Socrates 9hich is present to us. )thers are formed by analo"yN Tityos or the +yclops8 for e.ample8 by enlar"in" the normal man8 the Py"my by decreasin" him8 and the center of the earth throu"h our e.perience of smaller spheres. Throu"h transformation 9e "et the notion of eyes on the chest8 throu"h composition that of the +entaur8 and throu"h contrariety that of death. Some notions come throu"h transition8 like the lekta ;9hat can be e.pressed<8 and place. The notion of somethin" Gust and "ood arises naturally ;phusikos <. *inally8 a notion mi"ht be concei3ed throu"h pri3ation8 like that of "handless" ; io"enes Laertius L64M<. The likelihood that in a Stoic conte.t phantasia mi"ht be said to be capable of producin" e3en 9hat it has not seen is8 % think8 3ery hi"h8 9hile a conte.t that 9as faithful to Plato?s di3ision of the t9o 9orlds8 the mind and the senses8 9ould be unlikely to use the term. %s it then possible that the presumed common source of +icero and Philostratus has been influenced by Stoic theory8 and that this source introduced8 therefore8 into a Platonic back"round a term8 phantasia 8 9hich in strict Platonism 9ould ha3e been out of place= Passa"es in "Lon"inus8" Quintilian8 and io +hrysostom su""est that this 9as perhaps the case. The "Lon"inus" 9ho 9rote )n the Sublime ;= first century !. . < uses the phantasia on a number of occasions ;M.08 L.08 1.0M8 BM.M< but the central passa"e is chapter 04. There he seems A 70K A

to be usin" Stoic6influenced sources. :e saysN "Phantasiai contribute "reatly to di"nity8 ele3ation8 and po9er as a pleader. This is the name % "i3e themD some call them manufactured ima"es Reidolopoiiai S. The term phantasia is used "enerally for anythin" that in any 9ay su""ests a thou"ht producti3e of speech8 but the 9ord has also come into common currency in cases 9here8 carried a9ay by inspiration and emotion8 you think you see 9hat you describe8 and you place it before the eyes of your hearers." *rom this 9e may conclude that "Lon"inus" 9as a9are of the Stoic technical definition of lo"ike phantasia as one "in 9hich 9hat is presented can be con3eyed in speech" ;Se.tus Empiricus M 2.L5<8 and the associated definition of the lekton as "that 9hich subsists in conformity 9ith a rational impression Rlo"ike phantasia S" ;Se.tus M 2.L5 and io"enes Laertius L.KM<. "Lon"inus" 9ants to discuss phantasia not in philosophy but in poetry and in rhetoric8 9here its primary aim is to mo3e the audience. The speaker has somethin" 3i3idly before his mind8 and throu"h his 9ords he tries to brin" it before his hearers. !s an e.ample of the use of phantasia in poetry "Lon"inus" "i3es the old instance of the *uries in the mad scene in the )restes . This is so familiar because of the constant recurrence of the *uries as an e.ample of delusion in :ellenistic epistemolo"ical discussion ;see Se.tus M L.0L58 7BB8 7B18 2.KM8 KL<. :e praises all three of the "reat +lassical tra"edians for their use of phantasia . >hat he says about Euripides and the *uries is particularly interestin" as a parallel to 9hat Philostratus has to say on picturin" the despair of !Ga. and on phantasia producin" e3en 9hat it has not seen. "Lon"inus" saysN "%n these scenes the poet himself sa9 the *uries8 and the picture in his mind he almost compelled his audience to behold." %f "Lon"inus" is usin" Stoic sources8 9as the notion of phantasia "producin" e3en 9hat it has not seen" to be found in those same sources8 min"led8 perhaps8 9ith the Platonism that 9as also present= That ideas like those of "Lon"inus" 9ere current is indicated by a passa"e from Quintilian8 9ho may ha3e been a youn"er A 70L A contemporary but cannot be sho9n to ha3e read him. :e is e.plainin" that 9e must ha3e the capacity of feelin" somethin" oursel3es before 9e try to mo3e others. :e says ;%nst. or . K.7.71< that the orator 9ho 9ill be most effecti3e in mo3in" feelin"s is the one 9ho has ac@uired a proper stock of 9hat the Greeks call phantasiai and 9e mi"ht call 3isiones 8 i.e.8 "those thin"s throu"h 9hich the ima"es of thin"s not present are so brou"ht before the mind that 9e seem to see them 9ith our 3ery eyes and ha3e them before us." :e "oes on to ur"e us to turn a common 3ice into a rhetorical 3irtue. The 3ice is daydreamin". %f 9e could turn this to our o9n ser3ice8 9e 9ould deser3e to be called people blessed 9ith phantasia 8 people 9ho can present fictitious situations or 3oices or actions as if they 9ere real. The result of all this 9ill be "self6e3idence" ;enar"eia <8 Quintilian says8 usin" the Greek 9ord. This term is further discussed in 2.M.K0ff. Enar"eia someho9 e.hibits itself8 for not merely must a speech reach the ears8 but its contents must stand dearly before the eyes of the mind. )ne kind of enar"eia is 9here the 9hole scene in @uestion is as it 9ere painted in 9ords8 for 9ho is so 9eak in ima"inati3e po9er that8 9hen he reads a certain passa"e from the &errine orations8 he not only seems to be lookin" at the people in3ol3ed8 the place8 and the rest8 but e3en adds further details that are not mentioned=

Quintilian is talkin" about a capacity in the rhetor ;and in his audience or readers<8 the po9er of phantasia8 9hich consists of the ability to present throu"h 9ords 3i3id ima"es to the mind?s eye. (et neither he nor "Lon"inus" is concerned 9ith phantasia as such8 as a psycholo"ical phenomenon8 and certainly not as an epistemolo"ical one. ,oth are interested in it primarily because of its usefulness for effecti3e speech. !nd this emphasis on effecti3e speech mi"ht also e.plain one element in this comple. of ideas so far seen only in Philostratus. This is the passa"e in &ita !p . B.L 9here the Qeus of Phidias is compared unfa3orably to the Qeus of :omer. This is at first si"ht surprisin"8 in 3ie9 of Philostratus?s praise of Phidias else9here. (et it is not the "ra6 A 702 A tuitous sli"ht it mi"ht seemN the ele3ation of literature o3er the 3isual arts can be understood as another statement of the 3alue of the unfettered phantasia . Phidias?s dependence on :omer had become a toposR1S by the time of Philostratus. %t is "i3en full e.pression by io +hrysostom in his T9elfth )ration 8 "i3en in !. . 054 at )lympia8 9here Phidias?s statue of Qeus 9as to be found. %n the oration io concerns himself 9ith the @uestion of 9hat shapes men?s 3ision of the di3ine. There 9e ha3e a lar"e e.tension of the brief passa"e in Philostratus8 but it ob3iously shares a lar"e number of ideas 9ith him. #nder co3er of an e.amination of sculpture io praises his o9n trade8 9ords. !s is only fittin" in a speech supposed to be deli3ered in )lympia8 9hich "loried in Phidias?s masterpiece8 he is more respectful than Philostratus to9ard his achie3ement. ,ut in spite of the proposed Gustification of sculpture8 he is sayin" essentially the same thin" as Philostratus8 and sayin" 9hat 9e 9ould e.pect from a sophistN literature8 prose or poetry8 is superior to the 3isual arts. io8 ho9e3er8 says it in more detail and at much "reater len"th. *or him8 e3en 9hen the 3isual arts make use of symbolism8 they are circumscribed. They ha3e to restrict their obGect to one shape and to one place and time. Such is the tyranny of the eye that they can make little further use of any su""estion or illusion. +onse@uently8 there is an infle.ibility about the 3isual arts 9hich makes them inferior to literature. >ords are not earthboundN they can e.press e3ery shift of thou"ht8 e3ery mo3ement of the soul8 and they can indicate chan"e o3er a period8 instead of bein" tied to one sin"le impression. Literature is more su""esti3e than the 3isual artsN it is not tied to a particular picture. %t can su""est e3en 9hat it does not R1S A 701 A state8 and it is not detected 9hen it is life6enlar"in"8 because the ear is less tied to realism than the eye. The chief points io has in common 9ith the passa"es in Philostratus are ob3ious. ,oth io and Philostratus are concerned 9ith representations of the "ods8 and that raises the @uestion of 9hether it mi"ht not be better to ha3e no representations at all. %t certainly 9ould be if the "ods are to be represented in animal form. %f they are to be represented8 the representations should not be "realistic8" nai3ely imitati3e. Poetry is better than sculpture in su""estin" the nature of the "odsHas can be seen throu"h the comparison of

t9o leadin" representati3es of these arts8 :omer and PhidiasHbecause it is less encumbered 9ith the physical 9orld and 9ith 9hat is ob3ious to the eye. The hi"her reaches of art are concerned 9ith the unseen8 and the less earthbound the medium of e.pression is8 the less controlled by the eye8 the better. !s Philostratus puts it8 the inspiration of the best craftsmen comes from 9hat the eye has not seen8 and that because of the po9er of phantasia . io does not8 indeed8 use the term phantasia 8 but he does8 in B48 speak of somethin" that8 accordin" to "Lon"inus" 048 is for some people an alternati3e to phantasia N he says that in obtainin" a notion of a pro3ident "od8 the 3isual arts for the most part follo9ed the lead of the la9"i3ers and the poets 9hose pictures 9ere the older ;presbuteran ousan ten ekeinon eidolopoiian<. >hat Philostratus has to say8 then8 has been anticipated in one form or another by 9riters in the three centuries before him. Ella ,irmelin has attempted to trace his sources in t9o articles in Philolo"us 22 ;01MM< entitled " ie kunsttheoretischen Gedanken in Philostrats !pollonios." % shall omit any consideration of her 3ie9s on mimesis and confine myself to 9hat she has to say on the sources of Philostratus?s notion of phantasia . This she sees as influenced partly by !ristotle8 but more importantly by an !cademic philosopher8 !ntiochus.R05S %t is said of him in +icero R05S A 775 A that "he 9as called an !cademic8 but in fact if he had made a fe9 little chan"es8 he 9as an absolutely "enuine Stoic R"ermanissimus Stoicus S8" or a"ain8 a little later8 that he ne3er follo9ed his predecessors in the !cademy8 ne3er mo3ed a foot from +hrysippus ;!cad . 7.0M78 0BM<. Se.tus tells us that he tried to sho9 that the do"mas of the Stoics are already present in Plato ;P: 0.7M4<. These three remarks come from opponents of !ntiochus but must be taken seriously8 especially 9hen 9e also find in +icero a source friendly to !ntiochus puttin" for9ard the 3ie9 that "the Peripatetics and the !cademics differ in name but a"ree in substance8 and from these the Stoics differed more in terms used than in actual positions" ;!cad . 7.04<. ,irmelin8 ho9e3er8 for the most part i"nores the possibility of Stoic influences8 lar"ely8 % suspect8 because she o3erreacted to Sch9eitCer?s article in 9hich he asserted that Philostratus?s notion of phantasia 9as Stoic but "a3e his reasons for this assertion in such "eneral terms that the ar"ument is not con3incin" e3en for one 9ho 9ishes to a"ree 9ith Sch9eitCer.R00S >e must no9 try to see 9here the truth may lie. *rom 9hat conte.t may Philostratus ha3e taken his 3ie9s on phantasia= % su""est that it 9as from a conte.t like that 9hich 9e find at such "reat len"th in io8 a conte.t 9here the @uestion of our kno9led"e of the "ods and of 9hat shapes our 3ision of the di3ine 9as discussed. The philosophers of the 'oman period R00S A 770 A 9ere e.tremely interested in theolo"y8R07S and both Philostratus and io had an e.tensi3e literature to dra9 on. >e need only "lance at +icero?s e natura deorum to realiCe ho9 far back the tradition 9ent. ,ut ho9 did phantasia come into the conte.t=

'ele3ant passa"es in Ma.imus of Tyre and Philo of !le.andria su""est that it happened in a discussion or commentary on the Timaeus . )ne of the topics on 9hich the philosopho6theolo"ical tradition d9elt 9as anthropomorphism8 a @uestion 9hich had been at the center of theolo"ical debate since Ienophanes. There 9as8 ho9e3er8 a point of 3ie9 other than that of Ienophanes or Plato8 represented notoriously by the Epicureans8R0MS but certainly not confined to them. :ere Ma.imus is of interest. :e 9ished to be kno9n as a Platonikos philosophos but8 like io before him8 9ould ha3e kno9n and used other systems.R0BS :is second speech concerns the @uestion of settin" up ima"es to the "ods. Ma.imus is a tolerant man. :e concedes that if men 9ere really "ood8 they 9ould need no reminders of the "ods. ,ut men are 9eak8 and 9ise la9"i3ers ha3e realiCed 9hat has to be pro3ided. %n this situation it is reasonable that the "ods should be presented in man?s shape8 althou"h Ma.imus is a9are that the Persians8 E"yptians8 %ndians8 and so on do not share that 3ie9. The true "od8 the father and demiour"os of all thin"s8 is unseen by our eyes8 and 9e cannot "rasp his essence. >e 9ish to catch a "limpse of him8 but since in our 9eakness 9e cannot8 9e fall back on 3arious aids to his presence8 and the thin"s 9e find beautiful remind us of him. Therefore8 Ma.imus concludes8 "%f the art of Phidias stirs up the Greeks to the memory of the "ods8 and the honor done to animals the E"yptians8 % shall find no fault in this 3ariety." Ma.imus here makes an ob3ious reference to the famous passa"e in the Timaeus on the father and maker of allD and e3en R07SR0MSR0BS A 777 A much stricter Platonists than Ma.imus belie3ed that God did re3eal himself as an artist by the 9orld he had made. The anti6anthropomorphic Plato and the StoaR04S a"reed on this pointN the Stoa dre9 "ratefully on Plato in their lon" e.positions of God?s concern for the 9orld he had made.R0KS God?s makin" of the 9orld 9as e.plained on the analo"y of the human artist. !n elaborate e.ample of the process is pro3ided by Philo in his e opificio mundi . Philo says ;0K< that 9hen God 9ished to create this 3isible 9orld of ours8 he first formed the intelli"ible 9orld ;noetos kosmos < so that from this incorporeal model he mi"ht brin" into bein" the corporeal 9orld. %t is 9ron"8 ho9e3er8 to suppose that the intelli"ible 9orld8 formed from ideas8 is in any place ;en topoi tini D cf. Timaeus 47,<. ! parallel from our o9n e.perience 9ill e.plain ho9 it has been or"aniCed. >hen it has been decided to found a city8 an architect first desi"ns in his o9n mind all the parts of the city to be. Then8 9hen he has en"ra3ed in his o9n soul8 as it 9ere in 9a.8 the outlines of each part8 he carries about 9ithin himself an intelli"ible city ;noete polis <. :e keeps the models ali3e in his memory and en"ra3es e3er more deeply on his mind the outlines. Then8 like a "ood craftsman ;demiour"os <8 he starts to build a city of stone and 9ood8 his eyes fi.ed on his model ;paradei"ma <8 shapin" the corporeal realities to each of the incorporeal ideas. %n some9hat the same 9ay 9e must picture God 9hen thinkin" of foundin" the "reat city8 the me"alopolis. :e first concei3ed the outlines ;tupoi <D from these he set to"ether the intelli"ible 9orld and8 usin" this as a model8 he completed the sensible 9orld.

%t is not surprisin" to find Philo here usin" the lan"ua"e of the Timaeus . The Timaeus 9as one of the best6kno9n and most R04SR0KS A 77M A popular of Plato?s dialo"ues.R0LS )ne of the @uestions raised by it8 9hether or not the 9orld 9as created in time ;Tim . 7L 671 <8 had been discussed interminably since the time of Plato?s immediate successors and had by the second century !. . 8 as *estu"i\re says8 become a classic in the schools.R02S +ommentaries on the Timaeus 9ere multiplied8 R01S and e3en 9hen it 9as not a @uestion of formal commentaries8 its authority 9as constantly in3oked on problems of creation8 both by the ordinary Platonists and by those8 such as Philo8 $umenius8 and the +hristians8 9ho kne9 the Je9ish 3ersion.R75S The passa"e that 9as of interest for creation also contained an e.position ;in 7L 672!D cf. 47!< of the doctrine of the t9o "9orlds8" the "9orld" that al9ays is8 to be "rasped by intellection and reasonin"8 and the other that is al9ays in a state of becomin" and ne3er really e.istin"8 9hich is the obGect of opinion accompanied by unreasonin" sensation ;do.ei met? aistheseos alo"ou do.aston <. This 9as ob3iously useful as a concise summary of the core of Platonism and as such kno9n8 like the picture of the demiour"os 8 9here3er Platonism had penetrated.R70S R0LSR02SR01SR75SR70S A 77B A The Stoics 9ould not a"ree 9ith a t9o69orld theory in this form8 but that 9as not to pro3e an insurmountable obstacle. The notion of God as an artist shapin" the 9orld 9as entirely acceptable to themN for e3idence 9e need only look at S&* 7.00M76B5 under the headin" $aturam ease artificem . They held8 like !ristotle8 that art imitates nature.R77S %f God is like the artist8 that the artist is like God seems a natural conclusion8 e3en if our stricter s9ains mi"ht strain a little at it. %t follo9s that in the discussion of human artistic creation in the 'oman period the same authorities8 especially the Timaeus 8 9ere used as in the discussion of di3ine creation. The comparison of different forms of artistic creation8 especially the art of the 9ord and 3isual art8 had been "oin" on since the time of Plato at least8R7MS and 9e ha3e seen the continuation of the tradition in the authors of the 'oman period. %t is not surprisin"8 "i3en the interest in theolo"y in the period8 that special attention 9as paid to the presentation of the "ods8 9hether throu"h the 3isual arts or 9ords. >hat has come do9n to us of this debate has been presented by the artists in 9ords8 and they cannot be e.pected to be neutral. >hat they 9ere upholdin" 9as the superiority of lo"os 8 9ith all the resonance8 and ambi"uity8 of that 9ord in Greek. )nce a"ain8 it 9as a theme on 9hich both Stoics and Platonists could unite. The Stoics said that God 9as the spermatikos lo"os 8 the seminal principle of the uni3erse ; io"enes Laertius L.0MK<. :e contains 9ithin himself the spermatikoi lo"oi 8 in accordance 9ith 9hich he produces all thin"s. The history of the 9ord lo"os in Greek meant that 9hen a Platonist heard God described as lo"os 8 9hat R77SR7MS A 774 A

9as su""ested to him 9as that God 9as reason. Philo once more pro3ides a "ood e.ample of ho9 the syncretism mi"ht be continued. :e tells us ;Spec . M.75L<N "The soul of man is somethin" precious.... The human spirit is "odlike because it has been modeled on the archetype %dea 9hich is the supreme lo"os. " %t is easy to see ho9 the noetos kosmos 8 the 9orld of ideas8 can become the 9orld of the lo"os and the lo"oi .R7BS The combination of Platonist and Stoic on this topic 9as also assisted by the special ambi"uity of lo"os in the Stoic system. The Stoics8 of course8 held that only bodies e.isted. Lo"os 8 the lan"ua"e 9hich 9e speak and hear8 is also material. >hen asked by their opponents 9hat 9as the difference bet9een a parrot and a man8 they replied8 as 9e sa98 that it depended essentially on "internal lo"os and the phantasia 9hich is capable of makin" a transition." The t9o notions are 3ery closely linked8 and this link e.plains 9hy the lekton is described as "that 9hich subsists in conformity 9ith a rational impression Rlo"ike phantasia S8" and a rational impression as "one in 9hich 9hat is presented can be con3eyed in speech" ;Se.tus Empiricus M 2.L5<. The lekton pro3ided an easy opportunity for a link 9ith the Platonists. %t may be translated "9hat can or is to be e.pressed8" i.e.8 9hat is meantN it is neither the 9ord nor the obGect nor the thou"ht8 all of 9hich are for the Stoics material bodies8 but somethin" connected 9ith the e.ternal 9orld8 and bet9een it and oursel3es8 because of the lo"os throu"h 9hich 9e can articulate reality. %t is the connection 9e humans e.press throu"h lan"ua"e. The lekton adds special ambi"uity to lo"os in the Stoic system8 because it is said to be incorporeal8 one of the asomata ;Se.tus Empiricus M 2.00607<. %t is easy8 then8 to concei3e ho9 a PlatoniCin" Stoic ;or Sto6 R7BS A 77K A iciCin" Platonist< could ar"ue for the superiority of lo"oi to the plastic arts8 since a statue8 ho9e3er ma"nificent8 is material and literally earthbound8 9hereas lekta 8 the meanin"s e.pressed by speech8 are incorporeal8 or8 as the Platonists 9ould say8 spiritual8 noeta . ,ut 9hat is perhaps most remarkable in a series of authors in the period is the insistence on the 3ision 9hich the "reat artist8 literary or plastic8 must possess. +icero in the )rator and Philo in e opificio mundi 9e ha3e seen. The elder Seneca contrasts 9hat the eyes see and the 3ision in the mindN "Phidias ne3er sa9 Jo3e8 but he ne3ertheless represented him as thunderin"D Miner3a did not stand before his eyes8 but his mind8 that matched such superb techni@ue8 formed a concept of "ods and put them on 3ie9" ;+ontr . 05.4.28 trans. >interbottom8 Loeb +lassical Library<. The youn"er Seneca8 in a discussion of the "causes" ;Ep . K4.Bff.<8 mentions the 3ie9s of the Stoics and !ristotle and then saysN To these Plato adds a fifth causeHthe pattern Re.emplar S 9hich he himself calls the "idea"D for it is this that the artist "aCed upon 9hen he created the 9ork 9hich he had decided to carry out. $o9 it makes no difference 9hether he has his pattern outside himself8 that he may direct his "lance to it8 or 9ithin himself8 concei3ed and placed there by himself. God has 9ithin himself these patterns of all thin"s. ;trans. Gummere8 Loeb +lassical Library<

The "reat dramatist and orator must ha3e the po9er of 3isualiCin" a scene and then placin" it before the mental 3ision of his audienceN that is 9hy he must ha3e phantasia8 accordin" to "Lon"inus" and Quintilian.R74S *or io ;07.K1ff.< the sculptor and the R74S A 77L A poet may ha3e the same 3isionN it is only the intractability of his material that hinders the sculptor. %n these passa"es8 Philo and Seneca the (oun"er are ob3iously speakin" from a Platonist back"roundN if Philostratus?s 3ie9s on phantasia belon" to the same back"round8 a back"round 9here 9e do not e.pect the 9ord phantasia as a term of commendation ;for reasons already "i3en<8 ho9 do 9e e.plain its introduction= >e may be able to "ain some hint from a consideration of a fe9 other authors. Let us take a"ain Ma.imus of Tyre8 the "Platonist philosopher8" as 9e remember. %n the ele3enth discourse8 9here he discusses the @uestion of Plato?s "od8 he raises the @uestion of the importance of 3ision. :e says ;:obein8 3ol. 008 M< that e3en :omer?s famous description of Qeus in %liad 0.472 ;the description 9hich is constantly @uoted in the comparison of :omer and Phidias< is ridiculously inade@uate. !ll such pictures are due to 9eakness of 3ision8 dullness of mindN the painters8 sculptors8 poets8 and philosophers merely present their 3ision of "od after 9hat seems to be the most beautiful8 as best they can8 borne up by phantasia ;e.airomenoi tei phantasiai <. Ma.imus?s usa"e is ob3iously 3ery dose to that of Philostratus. %t occurs in a Platonist conte.t. %t is particularly 9orth notin" that as a form of insi"ht phantasia is inferior to the perfect 3ision of perfect beauty. $e3ertheless8 phantasia bears us up9ard8 ha3in" a role that is closer to the Stoic phantasia metabatike than to Plato?s usa"e. Ma.imus?s usa"e does not8 ho9e3er8 indicate e.actly ho9 phantasia is introduced into the conte.t. ! second possibly helpful passa"e occurs in the e spiritu sancto of St. ,asil8 9here8 talkin" of the craftsman ;technites <8 he says ;LK!<N ":e either desi"ns the product in his mind beforehand and then applies his creati3e 3ision Rphantasia S to the 9ork of art8 or lookin" at an already e.istin" model Rparadei"ma S he directs his acti3ity in accordance 9ith its likeness." ,asil li3ed a lon" time after Philostratus ;from about !. . MM5 to ML1<8 so 9e can use 9hat he says here only as a possible source of enli"htenment. ,asil seems to be usin" the 9ord primarily of the 3ision 9hich the A 772 A artist retains in his head to "uide the e.ecution of the 9ork he has mentally desi"ned for himselfHnot a Platonist 3ie9 of phantasia . %t is easy to see ho9 this 3ision could be concei3ed as assumin" an acti3e directi3e character 9ithin him8 becomin" the creati3e ima"ination. Gronau8 thou"h not at all concerned 9ith phantasia 8 9ished to see Posidonius as the ultimate source of much in ,asil8 includin" this8R7KS and Theiler dra9s attention to the parallel 9ith Seneca Ep . K4.L62 in his attempt to connect a number of doctrines 9ith !ntiochus.R7LS ;%t is interestin" also to note that :imerius Rca. M056M15S8 the rhetorician and eclectic "Philosopher" 9ho tau"ht ,asil and Gre"ory of $yssa8 also 9rote ;a< on the superiority of the 9ord to the plastic arts8 ;b< on anthropomorphism and

:omer8 and ;c< on Phidias and the inability of the hand to follo9 the 3ision of the artist.< R72S ,ut the passa"e that8 in my opinion8 thro9s most li"ht on ho9 a Stoic phantasia mi"ht be introduced in a Platonic back"round is to be found in +alcidius?s commentary on the Timaeus . ;+alcidius8 too8 li3ed some time after Philostratus8 in the fourth century8 but 9e may use him as an indication of sources 9hich he and Philostratus possibly had in common.< +alcidius comments on Timaeus 47!8 9here Plato is talkin" of the t9o "9orlds"N the second is that perceptible by the senses8 9hich comes into bein" and is al9ays in mo3ement8 comes about in a specific place and is to be "rasped by belief accompanied by sensation ;do.ei met? aistheseos <. +alcidius comments that here Plato 9ants to "i3e us an idea of the second species 9hich comes into bein" 9hen the artist concei3es in his mind the outlines of the 9ork that is to come8 and8 9ith the likeness of this fi.ed 9ithin him8 on its model shapes 9hat he has started onD it is therefore said to be in some place. . . . R7KSR7LSR72S A 771 A :e says that this species is to be kno9n throu"h the senses8 because the shape 9hich is impressed on the 9ork is seen by the eyes of the people 9ho look at itD and to be kno9n by belief8 because the mind of the artist does not make this appearance come into bein" from a firmly e.istin" model but he takes it as best he can from his o9n mind. ;chap. MBMN P. MM4 >asCink< The artist8 then8 accordin" to +alcidius8 has a 3ision like that of God lookin" at the *orms8 but in the case of the artist the 3ision is conditioned by the limitations of human capacity. :e dra9s from his o9n mind as best he can8 that is8 he relies not on perfect kno9led"e but on "belief." The result of his artistic acti3ities is percei3ed by the senses8 of course. Therefore8 says +alcidius8 9hen Plato talks of the kind of co"niti3e state that is the combination of perception and belief8 he is thinkin" of the type of 3ision that is to be found in the acti3ity of the artist. >hat +alcidius does not point out here is that the combination or mi.ture of belief and sense6perception is ho9 Plato e.plained the 9ord phantasia in the Sophist and Theaetetus . %t is easy to ima"ine a commentator much earlier than +alcidius pointin" out that Plato?s do.a met? aistheseos is called by him else9here phantasia . %f he 9ere a strict Platonist8 he 9ould hesitate to e.pand the term beyond its Platonic meanin" of fallible co"nition. ,ut by the first century ,.+. 8 and certainly by the third century !. . 8 fe9 Platonists 9ere as strict as that. %f he 9ere a StoiciCin" commentator follo9in" the line that +alcidius does here8 it is easy to ima"ine him pointin" out that there 9as no serious di3er"ence of opinion bet9een Plato and the Stoics on the @uestion of the artist?s 3ision. %n both schools it is due to phantasia 8 9hat Plato is referrin" to in the Timaeus 8 he 9ould say8 e3en thou"h he does not use the 9ord. The 9ord8 he 9ould say8 refers in Plato to the 3ision 9e ha3e throu"h the senses8 the type of 3ision that comes second after that of "od. :e 9ould

e.plain that the Stoics too say that our sense6kno9led"e comes throu"h the phantasia aisthetike and that the kno9led"e deri3ed A 7M5 A from sense6e.perience is e.tended throu"h other phantasiai 9hich are not aisthetikai . The latter are to be thou"ht of as makin" a transition and are8 indeed8 9ith the "internal reason" ;lo"os endiathetos <8 the abilities 9hich distin"uish human nature. The commentator 9ould add that in the Stoic system also8 it is phantasia that is responsible for human 9orks of art. *or it is phantasia that enables us to transform 9hat 9e ha3e seen and to create e3en 9hat has ne3er e.isted8 like the +yclops or the +entaur. The philosophers also say that it is throu"h phantasia that 9e can see "od8 and8 also8 that the best pictures of "od are in 9ords or thou"hts8 lo"oi . That the transformation of phantasia into a term for the creati3e ima"ination 9as due to Platonic6Stoic syncretism of this type hardly admits of doubt8 althou"h obGections ha3e been raised to both philosophies in this connection. ,irmelin8 as 9as remarked before8 plays do9n the influence of Stoics because of their alle"ed lack of interest in artN there at least she a"rees 9ith Sch9eitCer8 9ho also holds that they ha3e no theory of art and are e3en hostile to it.R71S This mistaken 3ie9 is the result of an o3erliteral interpretation of Stoic moraliCin"8 9hich must not be taken at face 3alue. That a man must culti3ate his soul before all else is a theme common to Plato and the Stoics. That such a commonplace 9ill be de3eloped by certain 9riters does not mean as a result that they 9ill not be interested in theory of art. >e sa9 Philostratus himself combinin" this sort of moraliCin" ;&ita !p . B.L< 9ith an interest in art. The consciousness of the comparati3e 9orthlessness of all thin"s 9hen set a"ainst the soul no more stopped Stoics ;and Platonists< from ha3in" an interest in art than the consciousness of the ineffability of "od stopped Middle Platonists and $eoplatonists from talkin" about him. There is one final point. Solmsen reGected ,irmelin?s su""estion that Plato?s theory of *orms 9as applied to art in Philostra6 R71S A 7M0 A tus.RM5S )n this issue % 9ould side 9ith ,irmelin rather than Solmsen8 e3en thou"h her thesis cannot be accepted in its entirety8 and it 9ould be un9ise to be too do"matic on the matter. She felt sure that !ntiochus?s theory of art underlay &ita !p . B.L8 particularly because of the parallel bet9een Phidias?s Qeus appearin" on earth ;en "ei phainesthai < and the phrase in Timaeus 47! ;"i"nomenon teen tini topoi < contrastin" the second order of reality 9ith the 9orld of *orms. She @uotes Timaeus 47!8 endin" 9ith the phrase about ho9 this second order of reality is kno9nN do.ei met? aistheseos perilepton . !s the Platonic source for "he RPlatoS denies that they Rthe *ormsS are "enerated" ;eas@ue "i"ni ne"at <8 etc.8 in +icero )rator 05 she also @uotes Timaeus 72!8 9here 9e are also told ho9 the second order of reality is kno9nN do.ei met? aistheseos alo"ou do.aston . She fails8 ho9e3er8 to point out that both contain the formula for phantasia . %f !ntiochus really 9as the source8 it is not unlikely that he 9ould ha3e pointed this outN his Latin

readers 9ould ha3e translated phantasia here as co"itatio .RM0S There are t9o main ar"uments in fa3or RM5SRM0S A 7M7 A of her su""estion. *irst8 the t9o Timaeus passa"es 9ere 3ery 9ell kno9n. Second8 the notion that the ideal 9orld is not tied to a place had become a 3ery popular themeN an instance is ho9 Philo fastens onto this point at the be"innin" of his e.position in e opificio mundi 0K. The link bet9een the phrases may appear too tenuous for us to feel certain that &ita !p . B.L should be associated 9ith a commentary on the Timaeus 8 in spite of ,irmelin?s ar"uments. )ne further consideration may be adduced8 ho9e3er8 and it brin"s us back to Philostratus?s statement on phantasia . There8 in K.018 he says that phantasia 9ill produce e3en 9hat it has not seen as 9ellN "it 9ill produce Rthe 3ision of the 9ork of art to beS by referrin" to the standard of the perfect reality" ;hupothesetai "ar auto pros ten anaphoran tou ontos <. ,y the time of Philostratus pros ho 9as listed as one of the causes to be considered in the makin" of anythin"8 especially in the sense of "9ith reference to the *orm."RM7S !nd tou ontos here in Philostratus seems to be a deliberate echo of Timaeus 7LE 9here "the e3erlastin" reality" ;to on aei <8 9hich is to be "rasped by intellection and reasonin"8 RM7S A 7MM A is contrasted 9ith the 9orld of chan"e8 9hich is approached throu"h do.a 9ith aisthesis 8 the formula for phantasia . >e cannot be sure 9ho Philostratus?s ultimate source 9as or8 indeed8 9hether Philostratus himself 9ould ha3e been able to name him. :e seems8 9hoe3er he 9as8 to ha3e taken elements from Platonism and Stoicism and combined them. :e seems to "o back to at least the first century ,.+ . The present state of the e3idence does not allo9 us to decide 9hether it 9as !ntiochus or Posidonius or some unkno9n third person. >hat is undoubted is the importance of the idea he set in motion. A 7MB A

1 isco3erin" 9ill *rom !ristotle to !u"ustine

1 isco3erin" 9ill *rom !ristotle to !u"ustine +harles :. Eahn %t is clear that there is a problem about the 9ill in ancient philosophy8 but it is not so dear Gust 9hat the problem is. !t one time it seemed that there 9as "eneral a"reement that the notion of the 9ill 9as lackin" in Greek philosophy. ,ut then there appeared a book entitled L?idJe de 3olontJ dans le sto]cisme ;by !. J. &oelke8 Paris8 01LM<8 and soon after9ard there 9as one on !ristotle?s Theory of the >ill ;!. J. P. Eenny8 $e9 :a3en8 01L1<. !ctually the authors of these t9o books 9ould probably accept the 3ie9 that the ancients did not ha3e "our" concept of the 9illN their books describe ancient theories that co3er the same "round that 9e 9ould think of as belon"in" to the topic of the 9ill. ,ut The bulk of the research on 9hich this paper is based 9as carried out in 01L160125 9hen % held a Gu""enheim *ello9ship and 9as &isitin" *ello9 at ,alliol +olle"e8 ).ford. Tony Eenny 9elcomed me to ,alliol 9ith a presentation copy of !ristotle?s Theory of the >ill . % offered the tentati3e results of my 9ork at a ,alliol research consilium in June 0125. ,ut % could not really formulate my conclusions until !lbrecht ihle?s book appeared in 0127. % 9ant to e.press here my "ratitude to the Gu""enheim *oundation8 to ,alliol8 to Professor ihleHand not least to Tony Lon" for or"aniCin" the ublin collo@uium on eclecticism in 012B that "a3e me the happy occasion to "ather all these threads to"ether. A 7M4 A 9hat is our concept of the 9ill= That is a point 9hich needs to be clarified before 9e start lookin" for traces of the 9ill in anti@uity8 or lookin" for the "aps that sho9 that this concept is lackin". *or if 9e do not kno9 9hat 9e mean by the 9ill 8 9e 9ill not kno9 9hat 9e are lookin" for. #nfortunately8 there is no sin"le concept desi"nated by the 9ill in modern usa"e. :ence the historical problem of the emer"ence of the 9ill is not a sin"le problem8 but a labyrinth of problems 9here different threads lead in different directions. !s a first step to9ards unsnarlin" these threads8 % 9ill propose four different perspecti3es on the concept of the 9ill8 each of 9hich mi"ht lead to a different account of the history of this concept. The first three perspecti3es are defined by different families of philosophical theories of the 9illD the fourth is defined by the special problem of "free 9ill" as opposed to determinism.

0. The first classical theory of the 9illHor8 rather8 the first family of theoriesHis one that be"ins 9ith !u"ustine and culminates in !@uinas and the medie3al "3oluntarists." %n this tradition the theory of the 9ill of God precedes and "uides the analysis of the human 9illD the human 9ill is thou"ht of as modeled on8 or respondin" to8 the 9ill of God. % call this the theolo"ical concept of 9ill. 7. The post6+artesian notion of 9ill is the one most familiar to philosophers ;and to nonphilosophers as 9ellD for e.ample8 to Gurists< in the En"lish6speakin" 9orld. This essentially in3ol3es the notion of 3olition as an inner8 mental e3ent or act of consciousness 9hich is the cause8 accompaniment8 or necessary condition for any outer action8 that is8 for any 3oluntary mo3ement of the body. )f course there is some connection bet9een this and the older8 theolo"ical concept of 9illD escartes is in touch 9ith the theolo"ical tradition8 and his links to !u"ustine are clear. ,ut 9ith escartes somethin" ne9 comes into the 9orld. Theories of 3olition from :ume to >illiam James ;and do9n to the contemporary doctrine of 3oluntary action in the la9< are fundamentally conditioned by the +artesian dichotomy bet9een the mental and the physicalN a 3olition is the mental cause ;or ante6 A 7MK A ceden< of a physical act. This is the 3ie9 that 9as ridiculed by ,yle in The +oncept of Mind ;01B1<8 and 9hich has had a bad press in the last "eneration of !n"lo6!merican philosophy8 thou"h it may currently be under"oin" a re3i3al. M. ! @uite different philosophical tradition be"ins 9ith Eant?s notion of the 9ill as self6 le"islation and hence as the dimension 9ithin 9hich 9e become a9are of oursel3es as noumenal8 non6empirical entities. *or this leads in post6Eantian philosophy to 3ery stron" theories of the 9ill8 notably to Schopenhauer?s 3ie9 that the 9ill represents inner reality and 3itality8 "the thin" in itself8" 9hereas our rational co"nition has access only to appearance8 the outer mirrorin" of the 9ill as an obGect for kno9led"e. $ietCsche?s conception of the 9ill to po9er belon"s of course in this post6Eantian tradition. B. *inally8 there is the special topic of free 9ill 3ersus determinism8 9hich cuts across all three of the traditions Gust distin"uished and in fact precedes them all8 since it can be dearly traced back to !ristotle and Epicurus. :o9e3er8 and this is parado.ical but ne3ertheless true8 the @uestion debated by Luther and Erasmus8 9hether the 9ill is sla3e or free8 9as ori"inally discussed by Greek philosophers 9ithout any reference to the 9ill at all. >e shall come to this in due course. $o9 the historical emer"ence of the concept of 9ill looks 3ery different dependin" on 9hich of these perspecti3es the historian takes as his "uidin" thread. Thus in his recent and e.tremely 3aluable Sather Lectures8 !lbrecht ihle has adopted the perspecti3e of the theolo"ical tradition.R0S :is thesis is that the concept of the 9ill as a factor or aspect of the personality distinct from8 and irreducible to8 intellect and desire or reason and emotion is completely absent from the Greek tradition but implicit from the R0S A 7ML A

be"innin" in the biblical notion of obedience to the commands of God. To obey God is to do as :e 9ishes8 to comply 9ith :is 9ill8 althou"h this 9ill may be entirely inscrutable ;as in the command to !braham to sacrifice his son<. The appropriate human response is to be seen neither in terms of rational understandin" nor in terms of emotion and desire8 but as a commitment of the 9hole person that calls out for the concept of 9ill for its articulation. ihle notes that neither in :ebre9 nor in $e9 Testament Greek is there any clear6cut terminolo"y for this concept. ,ut in 9hat is for this nonspecialist a 3ery persuasi3e readin" of the biblical te.ts8 and more "enerally of the Je9ish and +hristian literature do9n to !u"ustine8 ihle sho9s ho9 the fundamental contrast bet9een +lassical Greek and biblical thou"ht8 in cosmolo"y as 9ell as in the analysis of human action8 is first reco"niCed by 9riters like Galen and +elsus in the late second century !. . but "ets its full philosophical articulation only in the fourth centuryHfirst in the Trinitarian debates8 9hich pro3ide a coherent doctrine of the di3ine 9ill8 and then in !u"ustine?s theoretical reflections on his o9n e.perience of con3ersion and on the conse@uent need for clarifyin" his notion of the human 9ill ;3oluntas < in the face of Manichean dualism. ihle?s book is a rich treasury of scholarship and insi"htD it could only be 9ritten by someone 9ho is not only an outstandin" classicist but 9ho also has an intimate familiarity and deep sympathy 9ith :ebraic and +hristian literature from the inside. !t the same time8 his deliberate ali"nment on the theolo"ical perspecti3e "i3es ihle?s picture of the intellectual de3elopment an :e"elian8 e3en a pro3idential structure8 as if the history of Greek thou"ht from Plato to St. Paul8 from Philo to Plotinus8 amounted to the "radual accumulation of a set of problems to 9hich !u"ustine?s theory of the 9ill 9as to offer the definiti3e solution. *rom the point of 3ie9 of the history of philosophy8 there is a serious disad3anta"e in stoppin"8 as ihle does8 9ith !u"ustine. *or !u"ustine be"ins but does not complete the task of 9orkin" out a +hristian theory of the 9ill. !u"ustine 9as a A 7M2 A reli"ious "enius8 but he 9as not a professionally trained philosopherN he had neither the inclination nor the technical e@uipment to formulate his conception of the 9ill 9ithin the frame9ork of a systematic theory of human action. '. !. Gauthier is no doubt unGust to say that "if no one has e3er defined the !u"ustinian conception of the 9ill8 that is simply because this conception does not e.istN of all the traits of the ?9ill? in !u"ustine8 there is not a sin"le one that is not found earlier in the Stoics."R7S !nd it is surely eccentric of Gauthier to assi"n the ori"inality in this domain to Ma.imus the +onfessor in the se3enth century ;or to John of amascus in the ei"hth<8 so that Gauthier is able to calculate that it took "ele3en centuries of reflection after !ristotle to in3ent the 9ill."RMS ;%f !u"ustine had done the Gob8 it 9ould only ha3e taken se3en centuriesZ< Gauthier may be e.a""eratin"8 but he is makin" a serious point. The point is that !u"ustine?s concept of the 9ill does not "et a fully philosophical de3elopment until it is inte"rated 9ithin a theoretical model for the psyche8 namely8 !ristotle?s. This synthesis of !u"ustinian 9ill 9ith !ristotelian philosophy of mind is the 9ork of Thomas !@uinas. Gauthier?s point about Ma.imus and John of amascus is that the "eneral lines of !@uinas?s synthesis are indicated in a sketchy 9ay by the t9o earlier theolo"ians.

*or the history of philosophy8 then8 in contrast 9ith the history of reli"ious ideas and >eltanschauun"en 8 it 9ill be more enli"htenin" to compare t9o fully articulated theoriesN on the one hand !ristotle?s8 on the other !@uinas?s8 9hich is a3o9edly based on !ristotle?s doctrine yet unmistakably contains a theory of the 9ill that is not to be found in !ristotle. Such a comparison R7SRMS A 7M1 A 9ill permit us to specify8 in a 3ery precise 9ay8 Gust 9hat is in3ol3ed in the claim that !ristotle does not ha3e a concept of the 9ill. >ithout attemptin" to compare the t9o theories in detail8 let me briefly summariCe the principal points of contrast bet9een them and then sketch some of the maGor sta"es in the inter3enin" de3elopment from !ristotle to !@uinas. !ristotle?s e.planation of human action relies on t9o basic parts or faculties of the psycheN the rational and the nonrational8 or the intellect and 3arious forms of desire. *ollo9in" Plato8 !ristotle reco"niCes three kinds of desireN epithumia or sensual appetite8 thumos or an"er8 and boulesis 8 usually mistranslated as "9ish8" a rational desire for 9hat is "ood or beneficial. The position of boulesis is ambi"uousN as part of the orektikon or faculty of desire it should belon" to the nonrational part of the soulD but in its essential directedness to the concept of the "ood or happiness ;eudaimonia < it is intrinsically rational. )ther forms of desire are nonrational in that they may either obey or disobey the commands of reason. %t seems that there is no correspondin" possibility for boulesis to de3iate from 9hate3er "oal one?s reason Gud"es to be "ood. ,ut this is a point that is ne3er fully discussed by !ristotle and remains to be specified in later theories of the 9ill. ! human bein" may act under the "uidance of passion8 that is8 under the direct influence of an"er or appetiteD and for !ristotle such action is 3oluntary ;hekousion < but not deliberate or "chosen." eliberate action is the result of prohairesis 8 a rational choice or decision in3ol3in" some deliberation as to the best manner of achie3in" one?s "oal. >e can think of deliberation rou"hly as practical reasonin" in :ume?s senseN the selection of means for pursuin" a desired end. ,ut accordin" to !ristotle the end in 3ie9 is al9ays rationally ackno9led"ed as "ood or 9orth pursuin". :ence8 in a formula that is probably o3ersimplified but con3enient8 !ristotle says that boulesis sets the end and prohai6 A 7B5 A resis determines the means to this end.RBSProhairesis thus marks the point of confluence bet9een our desire for a "oal and t9o rational Gud"mentsN first8 our Gud"ment that the "oal is a "ood one8 and8 second8 our Gud"ment that this action is the best 9ay to pursue it. :ence8 says !ristotle8 prohairesis is "desiderati3e reason or rational desire8 and it is as such a principle that the human bein" is the source and ori"in Rarche S of his actions" ;$E K.7. 00M1bB<. >e can be held responsible for all our 3oluntary doin"s8 for these are al9ays "up to us" ;eph? hemin < to perform or to omit. ,ut as rational a"ents 9e ha3e

assumed full responsibility only for the more limited class of deliberate actions8 for those actions 9hich include a rational moment of choice or derision ;prohairesis <. Thus !ristotle?s theory of action in3ol3es four distinct concepts8 in additon to the notion of intellect or reason ;nous8 lo"os <N ;0< the notion of an action that is "up to us" ;eph? hemin <8 in our po9er to do or not to doD ;7< the notion of an action that is 3oluntary ;hekousion <8 i.e.8 done spontaneouslyD on our o9n initiati3e and intentionally8 done neither in i"norance nor under compulsion. ;These t9o domains8 the 3oluntary and 9hat is "up to usD? are in principle coe.tensi3eD but they are defined from different points of 3ie98 since the desi"nation "3oluntary" specifies the intentional attitude of the a"ent.< ;M< The narro9er ran"e of actions that are chosen8 i.e.8 that result from prohairesis D and ;B< the notion of boulesis or desire for the end as the desiderati3e component in choice. To say that !ristotle lacks a concept of 9ill is to say8 first of all8 that these four notions ;or at least the last three< are conceptually independent of one anotherN there is no one concept that ties to"ether the 3oluntary8 boulesis or desire for the end8 and prohairesis 8 deliberate desire for the means. ,ut it is precisely the role of 3oluntas in !@uinas to perform this 9ork of conceptual unification. % list some of the principal respects in RBS A 7B0 A 9hich 3oluntas for !@uinas represents "the 9ill" in a 9ay that boulesis 8 the correspondin" term in !ristotle8 does not. 0. &oluntas is established8 since +icero8 as the standard Latin renderin" for boulesis .R4S !nd that seems both ine3itable and correct8 since 3oluntas is the 3erbal noun from 3olo "% 9ant8" Gust as boulesis is the nominaliCation for the correspondin" Greek 3erb8 boulomai . ,ut the secondary connections of the Latin noun are @uite different8 and these differences 9ill 9ei"h hea3ily on the philosophical career of 3oluntas . Thus in pre6philosophical Latin8 to do somethin" 3oluntate sua is to do it spontaneously8 of one?s o9n accordD and the adGecti3e 3oluntarii is the normal term for "3olunteers" in the army.RKS :ence +icero naturally translated the Greek term hekousion as 3oluntarium 8 and as a conse@uence 9e today still call it "the 3oluntary." ,ut this lin"uistic fact has important philosophical ramifications. !@uinas is simply thinkin" in Latin 9hen he says "somethin" is called 3oluntarium because it is accordin" to the inclination of the 9ill R3oluntas S" ;Summa theolo"ica %a.%%ae.K.4D cf. K.L<. The mere translation of Greek terminolo"y into Latin ser3es to link the 3oluntary in an essential 9ay to 3oluntas 8 9hereas nothin" in Greek connects hekousion 9ith boulesis . %n fact8 !ristotle e.plicitly reGects this as an analysis of 3oluntary action.RLS ;*or him8 an action is also 3oluntary if it proceeds from passion or appetite8 9ithout the inter3ention of boulesis . !@uinas is a9are of this doctrinal difference and tries to account for it by reco"niCin" a broader use of 3oluntarium N %a.%%ae.K.7 ad 0.< 7. +orrespondin" to !ristotle?s notion of "9hat is up to us" ;to eph? hemin < !@uinas has the cate"ory of "thin"s in our po9er" ;in nostra potestate < either to do or to refrain from doin"8 R4SRKSRLS

A 7B7 A and this is 9hat he calls the domain of liberum arbitrium 8 "free choice" ;ST %.2M.M<. ,ut !@uinas partially identifies liberum arbitrium 9ith 3oluntas or "the 9ill" as the po9er to make decisions ;ST %.2M.B<. :e thus establishes a dose connection bet9een the 9ill and the concept of freedom that is unparalleled in !ristotle or in any :ellenistic Greek discussion of boulesis . M. Strictly speakin"8 it is not the "eneral faculty of 3oluntas that is free in !@uinas8 since 3oluntas as the rational desire for "ood8 or for 9hate3er is belie3ed to be "ood ;!ristotle?s boulesis <8 is a necessary feature of human nature and is not subGect to free choiceN 9e can 9ill to do e3il only if 9e belie3e that it is in some 9ay "ood for us ;%a.%%ae.05.7 and 0M.KD cf. 0.27.067<. >hat belon"s to liberum arbitrium is not the selection of ends as such but the choice of contin"ent means leadin" to a desired end. ,ut this is Gust !ristotle?s notion of choice or decision8 prohairesis . :ence8 says !@uinas8 "the proper act of free choice Rliberum arbitrium S is electio 8" his Latin renderin" for prohairesis ;%.2M.M<. %f 9e look back no9 from !@uinas to !ristotle8 9e see that somethin" 3ery remarkable has occurred. !ristotle analyCed the process of derision6makin" on the basis of three or four concepts that 9ere only loosely connected to one anotherN the 3oluntary8 9hat is in our po9er or up to us8 boulesis 8 and prohairesis . %n !@uinas all four concepts are defined by reference to 3oluntas 8 the 9ill. )f course !@uinas kno9s the Ethics inside out8 and he retains all of !ristotle?s distinctions in his o9n terminolo"yN thus boulesis as selection of the end ;for Thomas this is 3oluntas narro9ly concei3ed< and prohairesis as choice of the means ;i.e.8 electio < are t9o different "acts" of the sin"le po9er that is 3oluntas broadly concei3ed ;%.2B.BD cf. %a.%%ae.2.7<. ,ut 9here !ristotle?s theory of action relies on a net9ork of independent concepts8 !@uinas presents a ti"htly unified account focused on a sin"le facultyN 3oluntas 8 the 9ill8 9hich includes an essential reference to freedom of choice. B. !nd there is more. %n !@uinas 9illin" ;3elle < stands ne.t to A 7BM A understandin" ;intelle"ere < as the t9o intrinsic operations of the soul as such8 both of them capable of bein" performed 9ithout any bodily or"an ;%.LL.4<. :ence these po9ers remain in the soul after the destruction of the body ;%.LL.2<. $eedless to say8 there is nothin" correspondin" to this in !ristotle ;e.cept for his eni"matic remarks about the !cti3e %ntellect<. Thomas?s notion of the soul as an independent substance 9ith its o9n proper acti3ities is influenced by $eoplatonic as 9ell as by +hristian ideas. !nd this notion of 9illin" as a purely spiritual8 incorporeal acti3ity points ahead to the +artesian notion of 3olition as a mental e3ent causin" a bodily motion. So here the contrast bet9een !ristotle?s psycholo"y and the theolo"ical concept of the 9ill represents a point of contact bet9een the theolo"ical 3ie9 and the post6+artesian idea of the 9ill as part of 9hat is mental and non6physical. +artesian dualism is prefi"ured in the Thomistic ;and non6!ristotelian< dichotomy bet9een rational and sensual desireN the latter but not the former is "the po9er of a bodily or"an" ;%a.%%ae. 0L.L<.

4. !@uinas "oes on to describe ho9 the 9ill is cause of motion both in the soul and in the bodyN "&oluntas mo3es the other po9ers of the soul to their o9n acts. *or 9e use these other po9ers 9hen 9e 9ill" ;cum 3olumus 8 %a.%%ae.1.0<. The 9ill and the intellect act causally upon one another in a comple. 9ay that need not concern us here. ,ut a 9ord on ho9 the 9ill causes bodily motion 9ill sho9 ho9 in this respect a"ain !@uinas partially lays the basis for the post6+artesian notion of 3olition. The details are obscure8 since they depend both on the notion of an act "commanded" by the 9ill and also on the interaction bet9een sensory desire and bodily mo3ements. ,ut it seems dear that the 9ill does not "i3e orders directly to the bodyD it issues its commands to other psychic po9ers . ;To this e.tent 9e a3oid any head6on confrontation 9ith the problem of mind6body interaction<. *or Thomas the 9ill controls bodily mo3ement by inducin" and inhibitin" the emotions or "passions of the soul8" the psycho6 A 7BB A physical processes 9hich he describes as "mo3ements of sensory appetite."R2S %n other animals8 bodily mo3ement follo9s directly upon sensiti3e appetiteD but a human bein" "a9aits the command of the 9ill .... The lo9er appetite is not sufficient to cause RbodilyS mo3ement unless the hi"her appetite consents" ;%.20.M<. This is the point at 9hich human freedom and responsibility are lootedN "actions are called 3oluntary from the fact that 9e consent to them" ;%a.%%ae.04.B<. %n this act of consent ;in 9hich the 9ill and the reason collaborate< lies the control of the 9ill o3er the body. ,ut the direct efficient cause of bodily motion must be the sensiti3e appetite8 9hich is itself a psychophysical phenomenon. The 9ill inter3enes only by its control o3er such appetite. K. *inally8 the 9ill may also produce positi3e chan"e by its effect on the emotionsN ">hen the hi"her part of the soul is mo3ed intensely to9ard some obGect8 the lo9er part follo9s its mo3ement" ;%a.%%ae.7B.M<D "it is not possible for the 9ill to be mo3ed to anythin" intensely 9ithout a passion bein" aroused in the sensiti3e appetite" ;%a.%%ae.LL.K<. %n this Thomistic notion that the stren"th or intensity of 9illin" can physically increase our control o3er our emotions8 9e can see the point of ori"in of the modem concept of stron"69illed and 9eak69illed persons. This becomes dear in Thomas?s discussion of akrasia ;incontinence< and "sins 9hich arise from passion8" 9hich he also calls "sins of 9eakness." %n all such cases the 9ill is in3ol3ed8 since "sin consists chiefly in an act of the 9ill" ;%a.%%ae.LL.M<. Thomas is speakin" of "9eakness of soul8" not 9eakness of 9ill8 but it is some failure on the part of our 9ill that is responsible for our 9eakness R2S A 7B4 A in such actions. :ence althou"h !@uinas does not actually use the phrase "9eakness of 9ill8" it is easy to see ho9 this formula could come to be applied to his analysis. There is nothin" remotely comparable in !ristotle?s description of akrasia 8 for 9hich the term "9eakness of 9all" is 9holly inappropriate.

This comparison bet9een !ristotle and St. Thomas permits us to identify half a doCen 9ays in 9hich !@uinas has8 and !ristotle lacks8 a concept of 9ill. !nd % ha3e not mentioned 9hat is perhaps the most profound difference of all bet9een them8 the point that is brou"ht out most dearly in ihle?s book on the 9ill. !@uinas?s theory of the 9ill is presented in his Summa theolo"ica 8 and this theolo"ical orientation affects his treatment in a fundamental 9ay. The theory of the human 9ill stands in the shado9 of a theory of di3ine 9ill and an account of the di3ine creation of nature8 includin" human nature. Thus 9e encounter the theory of the human 9ill only in Q. 27 of Part )ne8 after a lon" discussion of the 9ill of God ;in Q. 01< and the 9ill of an"els ;in Q. 41<. !@uinas?s theory of the 9ill is fundamentally conditioned by this fact that the 9ill is8 9ith the intellect8 one of the t9o principles 9e share 9ith God and 9ith the an"els. %t is this "transcendent" status of the 9ill and the intellect in !@uinas that makes it natural for him to claim that the soul can e.ercise these po9ers alone8 9ithout any bodily or"an. ;God and an"els also en"a"e in acts of 9illin"8 but they ha3e no bodies.< This theolo"ical orientation for St. Thomas?s philosophy of mind points to one more source for the +artesian dichotomy bet9een the mental and the physical. %f 9e turn back no9 to the historical de3elopment that takes place in the centuries bet9een !ristotle and the rise of +hristian theolo"y8 9e can mark four maGor sta"es or landmarks in the emer"ence of this concept of the 9ill as an essentially spiritual po9er e.ercisin" decisi3e control o3er our 3oluntary actions. 0. The first maGor inno3ation is the Stoic theory of action as 9orked out by +hrysippus in the third century ,.+ .8 in 9hich the notion of consent or assent8 sunkatathesis 8 plays a decisi3e role. A 7BK A Sunkatathesis is not the act ;as in escartes< of the mind as an entity e.istin" @uite independently of the body8 because the Stoics are materialists and all psychic acti3ity is also corporealN our assent occurs as some kind of chan"e in the tension of the soul6 pneuma located in the heart. ,ut once the Stoic concept of "assent" is taken o3er into $eoplatonic and +hristian 3ie9s of the soul as an immaterial entity8 +hrysippus?s doctrine of assent 9ill become the focal point of the concept of 3olition or "9illin"" that 9e find in !u"ustine8 !@uinas8 and escartes. *or sunkatathesis in the Stoic theory of human action plays e.actly the same role that consensus and "the command of the 9ill" play for St. Thomas. The three essential factors in the Stoic theory of action are "presentation" or "impression" ;pliantasia <8 assent8 and impulse ;horme <.R1S %t is impulse or horme that is the direct cause of an e.ternal action8 that is8 of a 3oluntary mo3ement of the body. ,ut of course there is no problem at this point of mind6body interaction8 since the horme or impulse is a physical mo3ement of the soul6pneuma in the heart8 pointin" us to9ard or a9ay from a specific action. *or the Stoics the inner "impulse" causes the outer mo3ement in the same sense as today 9e 9ould say the motion of our limbs is caused by ner3e impulses from the brain. *reedom and responsibilityH9hich 9as essential for the StoicsHmust be

located further back8 at the point 9here the impulse itself is determined. This is 9here assent comes in. R1S A 7BL A %n animals an impulse is the automatic response to a phantasia 8 to an impression or "presentation" from the en3ironment 9hich su""ests some appropriate action8 for e.ample8 a "limpse of dan"er or the prospect of food. ,oth humans and animals 9ill respond to such hormetikai pkantasiai 8 presentations that stimulate impulse. ,ut there is a differenceN animal impulses proceed directly from presentations8 9hile in humans an act of assent must inter3ene.R05S 'ecall St. ThomasN "%n other animals mo3ement follo9s at once the Rsensiti3eS appetites ... but a human bein" a9aits the command of the 9ill" ;ST %.20.M<. *or +hrysippus as for !@uinas8 this is the locus of freedom. >e are not masters of our phantasiai 8 the emotional and sensual impressions made upon us by the en3ironment or by the condition of our body. ,ut our sunkatathesis is a rational action that is entirely "up to us"N as lon" as our beha3ior is controlled by the mechanism of rational assent8 our beha3ior is in our o9n po9er.R00S E3ery 3oluntary action in3ol3es this moment of assent8 a moment at 9hich 9e could rationally criticiCe the response su""ested by the phantasia and refuse our consent to the proposed impulseN in human bein"s8 impulse 9ill not occur 9ithout at least an implicit act of assent. This is the moment 9hen reason inter3enes8 or could inter3ene8 to "uide our conduct. eliberation is not re@uired8 and for the Stoic Sa"e8 deliberation 9ould be superfluous. *or !ristotle8 man is the animal that deliberates and hence acts by choice ;prohairesis <. *or the Stoics8 man is the animal that acts from assent. They thus point the 9ay to St. Thomas8 9ho saysN "!cts are called 3oluntary because 9e consent to them8" and "+onsent belon"s to the 9ill."R07S 7. The second maGor landmark in the emer"ence of the 9ill is R05SR00SR07S A 7B2 A the translation of Greek philosophy into Latin. %t has sometimes been claimed8 most dramatically by Ma. PohlenC8 that the 9ill 9as essentially a 'oman in3ention8 reflectin" the fact that the 'omans 9ere such a stron"69illed people.R0MS More recently it has been obser3ed that 'oman ori"inality in this domain is less a si"n of national character than a reflection of certain peculiarities of the Latin lan"ua"e and the terminolo"y it made a3ailable for translation from the Greek. Thus Gauthier speaks rather unkindly of the maladresse and mistakes of +icero in renderin" hekousios as 3oluntarius .R0BS ihle refers more "enerally to "a lack of psycholo"ical refinement in the Latin 3ocabulary."R04S )ne is reminded of Lucretius?s complaint about the po3erty of his nati3e ton"ue. ,ut 9hether it reflects lin"uistic po3erty or stren"th of character8 the6fact is undeniable that 3oluntas and its co"nates play a role in Latin thou"ht and literature for 9hich there is no parallel for any term in +lassical or :ellenistic Greek. The best e.ample of this is also the earliest occurrence of 3oluntas in philosophical Latin8 in the famous discussion of the s9er3e of soul atoms in Lucretius ,ook 7. There are t9o 3ery strikin" features of this

te.tN ;7a< %t focuses on the term 3oluntas 8 9hich appears four times in forty6three lines8 9hile there is no trace of any correspondin" term in the rele3ant te.ts either of Epicurus or of any Greek Epicurean8 and ;7b< 3oluntas is described as libera 8 "free8" in an apparent anticipation of the modem phrase "free 9ill8" 9hereas most ancient discussions of moral freedom8 both in Greek and in Latin8 do not present the 9ill as the direct subGect of freedom.R0KS R0MSR0BSR04SR0KS A 7B1 A 7a. !lthou"h 9e do not ha3e Epicurus?s o9n discussion of the s9er3e8 9e ha3e t9o passa"es8 one in the Letter to Menoeceus and one in papyrus fra"ments from a book )n $ature 8 in 9hich he is ar"uin" a"ainst determinism ;more e.actly8 a"ainst the fatalism of #ni3ersal $ecessity<. %n the Menoeceus passa"e Epicurus contrasts "bein" a sla3e to the *ate of the natural philosophers" 9ith the role of "9hat is up to us8" 9hich is "not subGect to a master" ;to par? hemas adespoton 8 io"enes Laertius 05.0MM<. %n the papyrus fra"ments the latter notion is referred to as "9hat 9e call the causal responsibility due to oursel3es" ;di? hemon auton ten aitian onomaContes < and "9hat 9e someho9 perform throu"h our o9n a"ency" ;to e. hemon auton pos prattomenon <.R0LS !ll these phrases are only sli"ht 3ariants on !ristotle?s formula "9hat is up to us" ;to eph? hemin < in contrast to the outcome of chance or necessityD and +hrysippus seems to ha3e used the same terminolo"y in discussin" human freedom and responsibility for our actions.R02S These are the phrases +icero renders as in nostra potestate 8 "9hat is in our po9er." $o9here8 as far as % can see8 does a noun correspondin" to 3oluntas appear in the Greek discussions of freedom and responsibility in :ellenistic philosophy8 thou"h of course the 3erb "to 9ant" ;boulesthai < is sometimes used to"ether 9ith other specifications of 9hat it means for us to decide 9hat is up to us.R01S 7b. >e must 9ait a lon" time to find a strict parallel to Lucretius?s description of the 9ill as free ;libera... 3oluntas <. The e.pressions "free 9ill" and "freedom of the 9ill" are much more common in modern discussions of this topic. !lthou"h !u"ustine does occasionally speak of libera 3oluntas 8 the technical for6 R0LSR02SR01S A 745 A mulations both in anti@uity and in the Middle !"es follo9 a different 3ocabulary8 and for "ood reasons. !ccordin" to !@uinas8 it 9ould simply be a mistake to describe 3oluntas as free. %n its narro9 use as a translation for !ristotle?s boulesis ;the desire for an end Gud"ed to be "ood<8 3oluntas is not freeN 9e desire necessarily8 in 3irtue of our nature8 9hate3er 9e Gud"e to be "ood for us. %t is only in re"ard to prohairesis 8 the deliberate selections of contin"ent means8 that 9e enGoy liberum arbitrium 8 free Gud"ment or free decision. ;Similarly8 God 9ills necessarily the "ood 9hich is his o9n essenceD but he 9ills freely8 by liberum arbitrium 8 9hate3er he creates.< !lthou"h !u"ustine?s doctrine is less fully 9orked out and less carefully e.pressed8 his standard terminolo"y is that adopted by St. ThomasN our freedom and moral responsibility lie in liberum arbitrium 3oluntatis D not in "freedom of the 9ill8" but in the e.ercise of "free choice" by the 9ill.R75S

!s far as % can see8 Lucretius?s phrase "free 9ill8" libera 3oluntas 8 found little or no echo in anti@uity8 e3en in Latin. ;!u"ustine 9as certainly not follo9in" LucretiusZ< % kno9 of no detailed study of this terminolo"y8 but here are a fe9 obser3ations. >hen8 in 'oman times8 Greek philosophy de3eloped a technical e.pression for free 9ill that 9ent beyond phrases like "9hat is up to us8" the term most "enerally employed is to aute.ousion 8 9hich simply means "9hat is in one?s o9n po9er8" as in +icero?s in nostra potestate . Just 9hen this term 9as introduced8 % do not kno9.R70S >e find it8 e.".8 in EpictetusR77S and in Plotinus. Tertullian8 9ritin" shortly after !. . 7558 reports aute.6 R75SR70SR77S A 740 A ousion as a technical term 9hich he translates as libera arbitrii potestas 8 "the free po9er of decision."R7MS The metaphor of freedom8 9hich 9as implicit as early as Epicurus?s reference to our o9n responsibility in action as adespoton 8 "subGect to no master8" seems ne3er to ha3e hardened into a technical e.pression in Greek. Plotinus8 in his famous essay on "the 9ill Rthelema S of the )ne8" uses the terms "9hat is up to us" ;to eph? hemin <8 "9hat is in one?s o9n po9er" ;to aute.ousion <8 and "9hat is free" ;to eleutheron < as rou"hly interchan"eable.R7BS %t seems that it 9as only in Latin8 and abo3e all in !u"ustine8 that the terminolo"y of freedom ;libertas < became fi.ed as the standard formula for the human po9er of decision in 3irtue of 9hich 9e are responsible. for our actions. M. :a3in" mo3ed ahead from Lucretius to !u"ustine by follo9in" the terminolo"y of libera 3oluntas 8 9e must return to the Stoics for our third sta"e. The first landmark8 as 9e sa98 9as the focus on the 3olitional element of choice in the early Stoic theory of assent. The second landmark 9as the introduction of 3oluntas in the Latin translation of Greek theories by +icero and Lucretius. The third sta"e 9ill mark the con3er"ence of these t9o influences in later Stoicism8 to be illustrated first by the Greek of Epictetus and then by the Latin of Seneca. !lthou"h Epictetus 9as born about ten years before Seneca died8 % take him first in order to distin"uish the "eneral atmosphere of late Stoicism from the special influence of Seneca?s Latin 3ocabulary. Epictetus is faithful to the orthodo. Stoic 3ie9 of assent as the decisi3e moment of rational control o3er action8 but instead of e.poundin" the classical theory of sunkatathesis ;9hich 9as probably too technical for his taste<8 he prefers to de3elop t9o R7MSR7BS A 747 A e@ui3alent or closely allied notions 9hich he can formulate in a personal 9ay. The first is 9hat he calls the rational "use of impressions8" chresis ton phantasion 8 9hich is Gust a more 3i3id phrase for the rational testin" of impressions to see 9hether or not they deser3e our assent. The other concept is prohairesis . This !ristotelian term apparently played no si"nificant role in early Stoic theory but has become central for Epictetus. ! fe9 @uotationsN

R iscourses M.4.LS May death find me en"a"ed in no other concern than 9ith my moral choice Rprohairesis S8 that it may be serene8 unhampered8 unconstrained8 free. R0.77.05S Some thin"s are up to us Reph? hemin S8 some thin"s not. #p to us are moral choice Rprohairesis S and all the 9orks of choiceD not up to us are body8 possessions8 family... R0.07.1S :e is free for 9hom e3erythin" happens in a"reement 9ith his moral choice Rprohairesis S. R0.0.7MS RThe tyrant says8S "% 9ill put you in bonds." ">hat are you sayin"= put me in bonds= (ou 9ill fetter my le"8 but not e3en Qeus can con@uer my prohairesis. " %t seems dear that Epictetus has used this rather old6fashioned term to e.press a fundamentally ne9 idea8 much the same idea that Seneca had recently e.pressed by 3oluntas .R74S Epictetus?s use of prohairesis ser3es to e.pand the notion of consent into the broader notion of moral character and personal "commitment" as shaped in our day6 to6day8 moment6to6moment decisions on ho9 to deal 9ith our inner feelin"s and outer relationshipsD and R74S A 74M A this notion is presented not only as the decisi3e factor in practical e.istence but as the true self8 the inner man8 the "%" of personal identity. ,y contrast8 for Plato and !ristotle the "%" or true self 9as nous 8 the principle of reason most fully e.pressed in theoretical kno9led"e. This shift is a momentous one for the e3olution of the idea of person and selfhood. *or theoretical reason is essentially impersonal8 and the Platonic6!ristotelian identification of the person 9ith his intellect offers no basis for a metaphysics of the self in any indi3idual sense. Epictetus8 on the other hand8 identifies himself 9ith somethin" essentially personal and indi3idualiCedN not 9ith reason as such but 9ith the practical application of reason in selectin" his commitments8 in keepin" his emotional balance8 his serenity8 by not e.tendin" himself to "oals and 3alues that lie beyond his control. This is a delicate operation of e3ery 9akin" moment8 to be carefully monitored by periodic scrutinies of conscience8 by steady application of the rule 9ith 9hich his :andbook opensN Some thin"s are in our po9er Reph? hemin S8 some thin"s are not. %n our po9er are Gud"ment8 impulse8 rational desire8 a3ersion8 and8 in one 9ord8 our o9n business. $ot in our po9er are the body8 property8 reputation8 political office8 and in one 9ord8 9hat is not our o9n business. >hat is in our po9er is by nature free and unobstructedD 9hat is not in our po9er is 9eak8 ensla3ed8 obstructed8 and alien .... Test e3ery phantasia by these rules8 and if it concerns somethin" 9hich is not in our po9er8 be ready to say8 "this is nothin" to me." The life of the committed Stoic is thus a continual process of self6definition8 of identification 9ith the inner 9orld that is "in our po9er8" of deliberate detachment from the body and from the e.ternal 9orld that lies beyond our control. Traditional Greek terminolo"y offers no appropriate term for this intense preoccupation 9ith the inner life8 the late Stoic parallel to a +artesian co"ito or focus on consciousness.

So Epictetus takes an old 9ord and fills it 9ith his personal meanin". Perhaps if he 9rote Latin he 9ould ha3e used 3oluntas 8 as Seneca did. A 74B A The official Greek e@ui3alent for 3oluntas 8 namely8 boulesis 8 9ould ha3e been much too narro9ly technical and also too intellectual. ,y adoptin" prohairesis Epictetus locates the focus of his personal concern 9ithin the domain of choice8 freedom8 and responsibility. More detailed study 9ould sho9 that in many respects Epictetus anticipates the spiritual attitude of a +hristian like !u"ustine. :e has ne3er read the Gospel prayer ")ur *ather8 thy 9ill be done8" nor heard the cry in Gethsemane8 "$ot my 9ill8 but thine be done8" not to mention the !u"ustinian line from anteN in sua 3oluntat? J nostra pace 8 "in :is 9ill is our peace." ,ut Epictetus?s 3ersion of the Stoic creed has mo3ed surprisin"ly far in that direction. The old cosmic notion of estiny and Pro3idence as the la9 of $ature8 the causal principle of the 9orld order8 is concei3ed by him as a personal "9ill of $ature" ;boulema tes phuseos < or "9ill of Qeus"D and his o9n prohairesis is described as "a part of God 9hich he has "i3en to us" ;0.0L.7L<. ;:ere a"ain the principle of moral decision plays the role that reason plays for Plato and !ristotle8 the di3ine element in human nature.< :ence Epictetus can find his o9n peace of mind in acceptin" the 9ill of God as his o9nN %n e3ery case8 % 9ant and prefer Rmallon thelo S 9hat God 9ants. *or % think 9hat God 9ants is better than 9hat % 9ant. % attach myself to him as ser3ant and follo9er8 % share his impulse8 his desire Rsunhormo8 sunore"omai SD % simply share his 9ill Rhaplos sunthelo S. ;B.L.75< This is not the place to study the literary and lin"uistic nuances that differentiate Seneca?s use of 3oluntas from Epictetus?s doctrine of prohairesis . There are so many points of contact bet9een the t9o that it almost seems that the Greek moral teacher is translatin" from the 'oman essayist. *or e.ample8 Seneca saysN The body re@uires many thin"s for health8 the soul nourishes itself.... >hate3er can make you "ood is in your po9er. >hat do you need in order to be "ood= To 9ill it R3elle S. ;Ep . 25.M6B< A 744 A !nd Epictetus saysN There is nothin" easier to mana"e than a human soul. >hat is needed is to 9ill Rthelesai dei SD and the deed is done8 success is achie3ed. ;B. 05. 0K< The conception of spiritual e.ercise and trainin" is so similar that one is tempted to think of direct influence8 9hich is after all not out of the @uestion8 since Epictetus 9as educated in 'ome immediately after Seneca?s death. >ith or 9ithout direct contact8 ho9e3er8 these

t9o Stoics bear Goint testimony to the de3elopment of introspecti3e consciousness and its articulation in 3olitional terms in the last half of the first century !. . ,ut 9hereas the Greek philosopher8 9ho is the more earnest and con3incin" of the t9o8 articulates his doctrine around prohairesis 8 9hich echoes in the history of philosophy as a rather @uaint term from the classical past8 the 'oman author launches his comparable messa"e on the po9erful 3ehicle of the futureN 3oluntas 8 "the 9ill."R7KS B. % conclude 9ith a brief "lance at !u"ustine?s doctrine of the 9ill8 9here $eoplatonic and +hristian le3els of spirituality are added to the Stoic and 'oman conceptions of 3oluntas 9e ha3e traced so far. *rom the $eoplatonists !u"ustine "ratefully accepted the notion of a purely intelli"ible8 noncorporeal domain of reality8 to 9hich the human 9ill belon"ed to"ether 9ith the intellect. *rom St. Paul and his o9n e.perience of con3ersion he deri3ed the sense of the di3ided selfN "% do not do the "ood % 9ill Rthelo S8 but % do the e3il 9hich % 9ill not Rou thelo S" ;'omans LN04<. %t 9as by meditation on these 9ords of St. Paul that !u"ustine de3eloped the notion of 9ill that Eierke"aard found lackin" in SocratesN Socrates e.plains that he 9ho does not do the ri"ht thin" has not understood it8 but +hristianity "oes a little further back and says8 R7KS A 74K A it is because he 9ill not understand it8 and this in turn is because he does not 9ill the ri"ht .... So then8 +hristianly understood8 sin lies in the 9ill8 not in the intellectD and this corruption of the 9ill "oes 9ell beyond the consciousness of the indi3idual.R7LS The spiritual Gourney 9hich !u"ustine reports in his +onfessions is to a lar"e e.tent his e.ploration of the concept of the human 9ill and its responsibility for e3il8 and his o9n analysis is presented as commentary on the climactic episode of this narrati3e8 in the con3ersion scene in the "arden in Milan. R% lon"ed to imitate &ictorinus butS % 9as held fast not by the iron of another but by the iron of my o9n 9ill R3oluntas S. The enemy held my 9ill R3elle meum S in his po9er and from it he had made a chain and shackled me. *or my 9ill 9as per3erse and passion Rlibido S had "ro9n from it8 and 9hen % "a3e in to passion habit 9as born8 and 9hen % did not resist the habit it became a necessity.... ,ut the ne9 9ill R3oluntas no3a S 9hich has be"un in me8 so that % 9ished R3ellem S to ser3e you freely and enGoy you8 my God8... 9as not yet able to o3ercome the earlier 9ill8 stren"thened as it 9as 9ith a"e. So my t9o 9ills8 one old8 one ne98 one carnal8 one spiritual8 9ere in conflict and bet9een them they tore my soul apart.R72S % 9as frantic8 o3ercome by 3iolent an"er 9ith myself for not acceptin" your 9ish and enterin" into your co3enant .... *or to make the Gourney8 and to arri3e safely8 no more 9as re@uired than an act of 9ill R3elle S. ,ut it must be a resolute and 9holehearted act of the 9ill8 not some lame 9ish R3oluntas S 9hich % kept turnin" o3er and o3er in my mind ... as % tore my hair and hammered my forehead 9ith my fistsD % locked my fin"ers and hu""ed

my kneesD and % did all this because % made an act of 9ill R3olui S to do it .... % performed all these actions8 in 9hich the 9ill R3elle S and the po9er to act Rposse S are not the same. (et % did not do that one thin" 9hich % should ha3e been far8 far better pleased R7LSR72S A 74L A to do than all the rest and could ha3e done at once8 as soon as % had the 9ill to do it Rmo. ut 3ellem8 possem S8 because as soon as % had the 9ill to do so8 % should ha3e 9illed it 9holeheartedly. *or in this case the po9er to act 9as the same as the 9ill R3oluntas S. To 9ill it 9as to do it. (et % did not do it. ;2.2< >hy does this occur=... The mind Ranimus S orders itself to make an act of 9ill Rimperat ut 3elit S8 and it 9ould not "i3e this order unless it 9illed to do so Rnisi 3ellet SD yet it does not carry out its o9n command. ,ut it does not fully 9ill to do this thin" Rnon e. toto 3ult S and therefore it does not fully "i3e the order.... *or the 9ill commands that an act of 9ill should be made8 and it "i3es this command to itself8 not to some other 9ill. The reason8 then8 9hy the command is not obeyed is that it is not "i3en 9ith the full 9ill Rnon plena imperat S .... So there are t9o 9ills in us8 because neither by itself is the 9hole 9ill8 and each possesses 9hat the other lacks. ;2.1< % 9ill call attention only to three points in this doctrine. Ba. The sense of psychic conflict8 9hich Plato captured by distin"uishin" three different factors in the soul ;reason8 thumos 8 appetite<8 is here described in terms of the fra"mentation of a sin"le principle8 the 9ill. The di3ided self is a di3ided 9ill. Bb. The sense of alienation from one?s true self8 the frustration of not bein" able to realiCe one?s deepest desire8 is e.pressed in terms of a command of the 9ill to itself8 9hich the 9ill itself does not obey. $ote that 9hereas for Plato it is reason ;lo"os8 to lo"istikon < 9hich should issue commands in the soul8 here it is 3oluntas that "i3es the orders. )nce a"ain8 one?s "identification" 9ith the positi3e aspect of oneself is e.pressed in terms of 9ill. Bc. *inally8 the 9ill cannot be made 9hole8 the self cannot be unified8 by its o9n resources. Peace of mind comes only from reliance upon the 9ill of the +reatorN in@uietum est cor nostrum donec in te re@uiescat . :istorically speakin"8 the theoretical status of the i3ine >ill had been 9orked out earlier8 by !thanasius8 A 742 A Gre"ory of $aCianCus8 and Marius &ictorinus.R71S !u"ustine?s o9n doctrine of human 9ill is profoundly marked by this theolo"ical orientation8 in t9o respects. )n the one hand8 the 9ill of man8 9ith its freedom of choice8 pro3ides the e.planatory cause for e3il and sin. ;That is the theme of e libero arbitrio .< )n the other hand8 the 9ill of man is the sta"e on 9hich the drama of God?s "race is to be acted out8 as the +onfessions aim to

sho9 usN "!ll you asked of me 9as to deny my o9n 9ill and accept yours8" nolle @uod 3olebam8 et 3elle @uod 3olebas ;160<. !nd so8 at the end8 9e return to ihle?s thesis about the biblical and theolo"ical ori"ins of the concept of 9ill. That does not apply8 ho9e3er8 to 9hat 9e found in +hrysippus?s theory of assent8 in Lucretius?s and Seneca?s discussions .of 3oluntas 8 or in Epictetus?s doctrine of prohairesis . *or e3en if Epictetus?s conception does ha3e some distinctly theolo"ical o3ertones8 his basic notion of achie3in" moral in3ulnerability by restrictin" our concerns to 9hat is in our po9er is essentially an ideal of rational autonomy that is man6centered rather than God6centered. The Stoic notion that the la9s of nature represent the commands of God and that 9hate3er happens follo9s from the 9ill of Qeus must remain essentially fi"urati3e in a reli"ious tradition 9here the philosophers do not belie3e that God speaks to man in any literal 9ay. ,ut of course the God of !braham and Moses8 of Jesus and St. Paul8 issues his commands to mankind in no uncertain terms. :ence it is in this tradition that 9e naturally find a 3ie9 of human 9ill ;as distinct from reason or desire< emer"in" as an o3erall attitude of obedience or disobedience to the 9ill of God on the part of the 9hole person. !nd it is this 3ie9 9hich is first fully articulated by !u"ustine and then inte"rated into a "eneral theory of human psycholo"y by !@uinas. The architectonic structure of !@uinas?s Summa 8 9here the psycholo"ical theory is presented 9ithin an account of God?s creati3e action8 R71S A 741 A re3eals the e.tent to 9hich this 3ie9 of the 9ill has remained profoundly theolo"ical. $e3ertheless8 there is another story to be told8 as 9e ha3e seen. >hen !u"ustine and !@uinas "o to 9ork8 they dra9 not only on the theolo"ical tradition but also on the Stoic theory of assent8 the Latin 3ocabulary that links 3oluntas to 3oluntarium and free choice8 and the late pa"an preoccupation 9ith our inner life of self6e.amination and the effort to9ard self6perfection that 9e ha3e illustrated from Seneca and E@ictetus. !@uinas makes liberal use of !ristotle?s psycholo"y. !nd both authors rely on the $eoplatonic construal of psychic acti3ity as the 9ork of an immaterial substance. MaGor historical de3elopments are al9ays o3erdetermined. ihle has documented in detail 9hat 9e al9ays suspectedN that the concept of the 9ill as 9e find it de3eloped in !u"ustine and !@uinas presupposes biblical reli"ious e.perience as one of its indispensable conditions. ,ut there 9ere other conditions as 9ell. The accounts of the 9ill "i3en by !u"ustine and !@uinas ha3e pro3ed to be t9o of the most po9erful and durable e.amples of eclecticism in >estern intellectual history.

%nde. of Greek and Latin philosophical terms

%nde. of Greek and Latin philosophical terms A 7K0 A adelos none3ident8 nonmanifest8 1 8 04B 8 0 8 4L 6L4 aisthesis sense6perception8 00 8 010 8 70B 8 7MM akrasia 9eakness of 9ill8 incontinence8 7BB 6B4 anamnesis recollection8 14 8 1L apatheia freedom from passion8 004 apathes impassible8 0BM apodei.is proof8 0B2 8 044 8 0K1 aporia difficulty8 0L1 arbitrium liberum free 9ill8 0M 8 7B7 8 745 640 arche principle8 source8 ori"in8 04M 8 0LL 8 7B5 arete 3irtue8 1L aute.ousion 9hat is in one?s po9er8 745 640 boulesis 9ish8 07 8 7M1 6B78 745 8 74B

diadosis transmission8 01M dianoia thou"ht8 015 diaphonia disa"reement8 L0 8 21 6108 0BL 8 045 6408 0K7 8 0KK 8 01L do.a opinion8 00 8 022 8 010 8 01B 8 70B 8 771 8 7MM ekle"ein8 ekle"esthai to choose8 make a selection8 B 8 0K eklektikos eclectic8 M4 6MK enar"eia self6e3idence8 4B 8 027 62M8 01M 8 011 67558 70L enar"es manifest8 self6e3ident8 04B 8 04L 8 0L5 6L4 enkuklia standard curriculum8 2K ennoia ;koine < conception ;common<8 045 8 04B 8 027 8 755 epechein to suspend Gud"ment8 12 nB2 A 7K7 A epikrisis decision8 0K1 epimarturesis attestation8 027 epinoia conception8 045 640 episteme kno9led"e8 14 8 0LL 8 02M 8 010 8 01B

epithumia sensual appetite8 7M1 epoche suspension of Gud"ment8 055 8 0B1 eudaimonia happiness8 7M1 "enetos "enerated8 00L hairesis sect8 MK 8 001 he"emonikon commandin"6faculty8 02K 8 754 hekousios 3oluntary8 7M1 6B0 horme impulse8 7BK kanon ruler8 s@uare8 0LM katalepsis co"nition8 054 6408 0KM 8 0L0 8 027 8 02K kataleptikos See phantasia kataleptike kosmos noetos intelli"ible 9orld8 777 8 774 kriterion criterion8 1 6058 0B4 6L48 021 lekton meanin"8 774 67K lo"os reason8 ar"ument8 07 8 1L 8 054 8 02L 6178 01L 8 757 67M8 77B 67K8 7B5

lo"os endiathetos internal speech8 015 8 704 8 7M5 lo"os prophorikos uttered speech8 704 lo"os spermatikos seminal principle8 77B metriopatheia moderation in passion8 004 metron measure8 0KM 6K4 noeis conception8 040 nous intellect8 true self8 005 8 0K 8 0B7 6BM8 02K 8 7B5 8 74M oikeiosis appropriation8 054 orektikon faculty of desire8 7M1 paradei"ma model8 777 8 77L peira nonrational e.perience8 757 peritrope re3ersal8 10 phantasia mental impression8 0K0 8 02K 8 021 61M8 01L 8 752 6MM8 7BK 6BL8 747 phantasia kataleptike co"niti3e impression8 054 8 020 8 02M phusikos natural8 0KB pneuma

breath8 7BK probabilis plausible8 KM 6KK prodelos immediately e3ident8 1 8 04B 8 0KK 8 0L0 prohairesis deliberate choice8 moral character8 07 60M8 7M1 6B78 747 6448 742 prolepsis preconception8 0B2 8 045 8 027 prosbole application8 0K5 6K08 021 prosmenon a9aitin" confirmation8 0LB 6L4 semainomai indicate by a si"n8 07B A 7KM A stasis stance8 ri3al party in a dispute8 BB 8 0K7 sumplerotikos formin" an essential part8 004 sunkatathesis assent8 027 8 7BK 8 740 technikos technical8 0KM 6KL thumos passion8 7M1 8 74L 3oluntas 9ill8 0M 8 7ML 8 7B5 6BM8 7B2 641 A 7K4 A