Dan Sperber The Guru Effect Draft Do not quote

Obscurity of expression is considered a flaw. Not so, however, in the speech or writing of intellectual gurus.[ ! "t is not #ust that insufficiently co$petent readers refrain, as they should, fro$ passing #udg$ent on what they don%t understand. &ll too often, what readers do is #udge profound what they have failed to grasp. Obscurity inspires awe, a fact " have been only too aware of, living as " have been in the 'aris of Sartre, (acan, Derrida and other fa$ously hard to interpret matres penser. )ere " try to explain this *guru effect.+ Believing and trusting ,here are two ways of holding beliefs in one%s $ind. )olding a belief $ay be experienced-to the extent that it is experienced at all-as plain awareness of a fact, without awareness of reasons to ta.e it to be a fact. So are held $ost of our ordinary beliefs. ,hey are delivered by our spontaneous cognitive processes, the reliability of which we ta.e for granted without exa$ination. " believe that it is sunny because " see that it is/ " believe that it rained yesterday because " re$e$ber that it did/ and " believe that you are in a good $ood because this is how " spontaneously interpret the expression on your face. )ere, *because+ introduces not reasons " $ight have weighted in for$ing these beliefs, but the causal processes through which " co$e to have the$. Such beliefs are *intuitive+ in the sense that they i$pose the$selves on us without our being aware of the process through which they do so. Other beliefs " hold because " also believe there is a good reason to hold the$. " believe that it will be sunny to$orrow because so said the weather report, and " find its next0day predictions reliable enough. " believe that you #ust $ade up with your friend on the phone because this is the best explanation " can find for your suddenly i$proved $ood. "n these cases, *because+ introduces a reason for $y belief. Such beliefs are *reflective+ in the sense that we entertain the$ together with the reasons we have to accept the$.[1! 2ntertaining a reason is as $uch a cognitive process as is perceiving, re$e$bering or $ood0sensing. 3onversely, the fact that perception, $e$ory and $ood0sensing are reliable cognitive processes would give us a reason, if we cared for one, to accept the beliefs they generate. ,he contrast " want to draw between *reflective+ and *intuitive beliefs+ is not between beliefs held because of a cause and beliefs held because of a reason, but between beliefs held with or without mentally represented reasons. 4easons to accept a belief $ay be *internal,+ that is, have to do with the content of the belief5 " believe so$e proposition because " accept an argu$ent fro$ which this proposition follows. Such an argu$ent $ay be based on evidence5 " believe that the ca.e in the oven is properly ba.ed because the .nife blade " inserted in it ca$e out dry. ,he argu$ent $ay be purely for$al5 " believe that there is no greatest pri$e nu$ber because, given any pri$e nu$ber however large, " .now how a pri$e nu$ber greater than this one can be co$puted.

4easons to accept a belief $ay also be *external,+ that is, have to do with the source of the belief5 " believe that what " have been told or what " read because " #udge the source to be reliable. " believe $y friend 6ary will co$e to diner tonight because she said she would and " trust her. " believe that there are tensions between the 'resident and the 'ri$e 6inister because so says Le Monde, a newspaper " find reliable on such issues. 3atholics believe that the 7ather, the Son, and the )oly Spirit are one because they trust the priests who tell the$ so. ,he belief that a friend, the newspaper or the priest is trustworthy $ay itself be held intuitively or reflectively. " intuitively trust $y friend 6ary, without having ever reflected on her trustworthiness. 8hen, on the other hand, a belief in a source%s trustworthiness is held in a reflective $anner, it $ay, #ust as other reflective beliefs, be based on internal reasons having to do with the content of the belief or on external reasons having to do with the source of the belief. 3hristian children $ay believe the priest is trustworthy because their parents 9who$ they trust intuitively: told the$ he is -an external reason. " believe that Le Monde is, on the whole, trustworthy because " have had $uch direct evidence of this trustworthiness-an internal reason. 8e $ay initially accept a person%s authority on the basis of her reputation-an external reason-, and then update our degree of trust on the basis of her record-an internal reason. " first went to doctor ; because she was war$ly reco$$ended to $e. Now " .eep going-and " $yself reco$$end her to others-because, in $y experience, her diagnoses and advice have been confir$ed, and have heightened $y confidence in her. Trusting and interpreting <pdating the strength of one%s trust in an authority figure $ay be affected by what, in the psychological literature on reasoning, is .nown as a *confir$ation bias+[=!5 under so$e conditions, confidence in their beliefs cause believers to pay $ore attention to confir$ing than disconfir$ing evidence, thereby increasing their initial confidence. "nternal evidence of trustworthiness is typically interpreted on the basis of prior trust. " followed doctor ;%s prescription and got well in a wee. when " had hoped to be cured in three or four days. Still, " trust her and ta.e the fact that " was cured as further evidence of her trustworthiness. "f $y trust in doctor ; had been wavering, " $ight have ta.en the fact that it too. $e a whole wee. to get well when it see$ed reasonable to hope for a $ore rapid recovery as a reason to question doctor ;%s trustworthiness. ,he $ore the evidence is open to a variety of construals, the greater the ris. of a confir$ation bias. 7ew things better lend the$selves to divergent construals than obscure state$ents. "t is not surprising then often to find that their interpretation is strongly biased by the prior authority granted to their source. Divination practices around the world provide the best illustrations of this .ind of interpretive charity5 consultants interpret pithy state$ents-and the 'ithia%s own, in her ti$e-in a way that is relevant to the$ and confir$s the powers they attribute to the diviner5 Fortune-teller5 " see a tall $an>" see a bird>people you care about are in pain> Consultant5 &$a?ing@ Aes, everybody was sic. after ,han.sgiving, and the guy who sold $e the tur.ey was very tall indeed.

"nterpretive charity is not, however, an odd departure fro$ nor$al interpretive practices, and not only pithy state$ents but all utterances leave roo$ for interpretation. Buite generally, sentences vastly underdeter$ine their interpretation. ,ypically, they contain referring expressions the referent of which is not linguistically deter$ined, they are $ultiply a$biguous, and they are open to a whole range of construals going fro$ literal, to loose, to figurative. &n utterance never fully encodes the spea.er%s $eaning. 4ather, it provides a richly structured piece of evidence fro$ which the hearer 9or the reader: can infer the spea.er%s 9or the writer%s: $eaning. "n this inferential process, hearers are helped by considerations of relevance. <tterances raise expectations of relevance that guide the co$prehension process towards an interpretation that satisfies these expectations.[C! So, for instance, if Dohn arriving late tells $e, *" $issed the bus,+ " understand hi$ to refer to the bus that could have brought hi$ in ti$e, and to $ean *$iss+ in the sense of fail to arrive in time to board and not of feel sad about the absence of, of fail to hit with a projectile. "n fact, typically, " ho$e in on the contextually relevant interpretation without being aware of alternatives. 8e expect what people tell us to be relevant, and we interpret it in a way that confir$s this expectation. ,o the extent that spea.er the$selves expect us to ho$e in on an opti$ally relevant interpretation of their utterances and produces utterances the opti$ally relevant interpretation of which is the very one they intended, what could be seen as an instance of the confir$ation bias is, in this case, a rational way to achieve coordination and understanding. 4elevance itself has two aspects5 everything else being equal, the greater the cognitive effects derived fro$ the processing of an utterance 9or, for that $atter, any other type of infor$ation:, the greater its relevance. 7or instance, if you want to .now at what ti$e is the next train to 6anchester, it would be $ore relevant for you to be told *it is at E5 F+ than to be told *it is so$eti$es after E.+ ,he $ore precise state$ent not only entails all the consequences of the vaguer one, but it also entails further consequences that you are li.ely to pay attention to5 $ore cognitive effect, $ore relevance. ,he second aspect of relevance has to do not with cognitive effect but with processing effort. 2verything else being equal, the greater the effort needed to process an utterance, the lesser its relevance. "t would be $ore relevant for you to be told of the next train to 6anchester, *it is at E5 F+ than to be told, *it is twenty0two $inutes after C5EC+ 9unless, of course, the lapse between C5EC and the departure of the train is of special relevance to you: although the two state$ents are synony$ous and carry exactly the sa$e consequences. ,he second, $ore convoluted state$ent requires greater processing effort5 $ore effort, less relevance. So, we expect what we are told or what we read to be relevant, that is, to carry sufficient effect to be worth our attention and to do so without causing us unnecessary effort of co$prehension. Of course, spea.ers or writers tend to overesti$ate the relevance of what they have to say, and hearers% or readers% expectations of relevance are frequently disappointed. "n particular, when people of no particular authority express their thoughts in an obscure $anner, we often revise down our already $oderate expectations of relevance to a level where trying to $a.e sense of what they say is not even worth the effort. On the other hand, when we trust that what we are told is relevant, the fact that so$e stretch of discourse or text requires $ore effort leads to the expectation it will carry $ore effect 9extra effort being a price paid for extra effect, thus $aintaining the overall level of relevance:.

"n fact, departing fro$ plain and easy for$ulation is often a way of signalling that so$ething other than plain $eaning is intended. " cannot resist using a fa$ous if so$ewhat exaggerated exa$ples of 'aul Grice. )e writes5

3o$pare the re$ar.s5 9a: Miss X sang !ome "weet !ome#$ 9b: Miss X produced a series of sounds that corresponded closely with the score of !ome "weet !ome#$ Suppose that a reviewer has chosen to utter 9b: rather than 9a:. 9Gloss5 8hy has he selected that rig$arole in place of the concise and nearly synony$ous sangH 'resu$ably to indicate so$e stri.ing difference between 6iss I%s perfor$ance and those to which the word singing is usually applied. ,he $ost obvious supposition is that 6iss I%s perfor$ance suffered fro$ so$e hideous defect. ,he reviewer .nows that this supposition is what is li.ely to spring to $ind, so that that is what he is i$plicating:. Grice JKJ5 =L ,his exa$ple illustrates how a deliberately opaque for$ulation directs one towards a richer interpretation. "n other cases, co$prehending an utterance $ay involve extra effort but in a way that was not intended, or at least not overtly intended. "t is as if the spea.er or writer had no easier way to express herself or as if she expected greater ease of co$prehension on the part of her hearers that they are actually capable of. 2ven so, if the spea.er of writer chose to go ahead and express a thought hard for her audience to understand, she is thereby suggesting that the thought in question is relevant enough to be worth the effort. &s children we were often told things that we didn%t quite understand but were clearly intended to. (ittle (ucy is told by her teacher that cucu$bers are JEM water 9an exa$ple " borrow fro$ &ndrew 8oodfield:. She thin.s of water as a liquid. Now, cucu$bers are solid, not liquid ob#ects/ water does not flow out of the$/ so what could the teacher $eanH &ccepting, however, the authority of the teacher, (ucy now believes, without fully understanding it, that, so$ehow, cucu$bers are JEM water. ,he very difficulty of grasping this idea indicates to her that this is a relevant piece of infor$ation, worth re$e$bering and thin.ing about until she can $a.e better sense of it. (ucy was also told by her parents and at Sunday school that God is everywhere. ,his too she believes with only partial co$prehension. 8hereas $any children end up understanding how solid bodies such as cucu$bers can $ostly be $ade of water, the belief that God is everywhere re$ains i$possible to fully co$prehend. ,his $ysteriousness is, if anything, even better recogni?ed by theologians than by children. Given that, for the faithful, the relevance of the belief is beyond question, its very $ysteriousness is a strong indication of its significance. "$penetrability indicates profundity.

"n front of religious $ysteries 9divine o$nipresence, the ,rinity:, believers stand in awe. ,hey $ay derive so$e relatively unproble$atic consequences fro$ these beliefs 9e.g., divine o$nipresence i$plies that there is no place to hide fro$ God: but it ta.es theologians to ai$ at sophisticated interpretations that, anyhow, are never final. 7or $ost believers, the existence of $ysteries is, in fact, $ore relevant than their actual content. Necause of the authority they grant religion, believers are convinced that the content of $ysteries would be extraordinarily relevant to the$ if only they could grasp it. ,he frag$entary interpretations of $ysteries that lay and clerical believers arrive at are wholly guided by this certainty of relevance. ,he existence of barely gli$psed hyper0relevant content is yet another confir$ation of the supre$e authority of religion. ,he writing of $any philosophers, especially but not uniquely in the so0called continental tradition, is full of hard0to0understand passages where difficulty is presented as pertaining not to expression but to content itself, as being not a rhetorical device but a direct and unavoidable aspect of sophisticated thin.ing. )ere are a few characteristic quotes 9which, being cited out of context, are not here to be #udged, let alone sneered at/ still, no contextualisation would $a.e the$ si$ple and easy to understand:5

0 0 0

ONeauty is a fateful gift of the essence of truth, and here truth $eans the disclosure of what .eeps itself concealed.O 6artin )eidegger O3onsciousness is a being, the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothingness of its being.O Dean 'aul Sartre *"n a culture li.e ours, long accusto$ed to splitting and dividing all things as a $eans of control, it is so$eti$es a bit of a shoc. to be re$inded that, in operational and practical fact, the $ediu$ is the $essage.+ 6arshall 6c(uhan *"f diff%rance is 9and " also cross out the PisP: what $a.es possible the presentation of the being0present, it is never presented as such. "t is never offered to the present. Or to anyone. 4eserving itself, not exposing itself, in regular fashion it exceeds the order of truth at a certain precise point, but without dissi$ulating itself as so$ething, as a $ysterious being, in the occult of a non.nowledge or in a hole with indeter$inable borders 9for exa$ple, in a topology of castration:.+ Dacques Derrida

,he point " a$ trying to illustrate is independent of the quality and clarity of what the authors had in $ind when writing these passages. 6aybe, each and every one of the$ had in $ind an i$portant thought that could not be expressed in any si$pler way. 6aybe so$e readers 9including, possibly readers of the present essay: have grasped these thoughts and been illu$inated by the$. ,he fact is that, for $ost if not all readers, the interpretation of such state$ents is highly proble$atic. Still, the very effort required tends to be seen as an indication of high relevance and to favour interpretations consistent with this indication. "f they cannot co$e to any clear and plausible interpretation, readers $ay nevertheless see. frag$entary and tentative

interpretive hypotheses that go in the expected direction. 2ven if these state$ents re$ain hopelessly opaque, readers $ay ta.e their very opacity as evidence of their depth. 7aced with an inordinately recondite state$ent, readers have the choice between a negative #udg$ent5 the author had no good reason to be obscure, and a positive explanation5 the author wanted to convey a thought too deep for plain and si$ple expression. 8ith a prior high confidence in the intellectual worth of the author, negative #udg$ent is al$ost ruled out and depth can be inferred, even if no satisfactory interpretation of the state$ent in question is ever arrived at. 'rior appreciation of an author #ustifies a positive construal of difficult passage. So far, so good. ,hings $ay go wrong if, in a viciously circular $anner, this construal is ta.en as further #ustification for the appreciation. Authority and argumentation Suppose there is a clai$ that you won%t accept #ust on $y authority, " $ay still try to convince you by providing a reasoned argu$ent, starting fro$ pre$ises that you are willing to accept 9because you already believe the$ or because, for the$, $y authority is sufficient:, going through a series of steps the validity of each you can #udge by yourself, and concluding with the clai$ " want you to accept. ,he logical force of an argu$ent does not depend on the authority of whoever puts it forward. & $athe$atical proof expounded by a .nown swindler $ay be convincing all the sa$e. 8hile there is no sure way to tell by $ere inspection a true state$ent fro$ a false one 9unless the false state$ent is self0contradictory or contradicts what is already .nown to be true:, co$petent exa$ination is enough to tell a valid fro$ an invalid argu$ent. ,hus, when authority fails to provide a sufficient external reason for accepting a clai$, argu$entation $ay provide an appropriate internal reason. &uthority and argu$entation see$ to be two quite different paths to persuasion, and, to a large extent, they are. 7ro$ an evolutionary point of view, the capacity to produce and evaluate argu$ents $ight have e$erged as a way of partially overco$ing the ris. of deception and $anipulation involved in accepting the authority of co$$unicators.[E! )istorically, the transition to $odernity can be described as the replace$ent of authority by argu$ent as the $ain basis of #ustified beliefs. "n intellectual style, there is often a clear opposition between those who trust $ore authority than argu$ent, and those who trust $ore argu$ent than authority. Nevertheless, in co$$unicative practices, what we find is not a dichoto$y between appeal to authority and appeal to reason, but a variety of interactions and overlaps between the two for$s. ,o begin with, trivially, authority can be argued for. 7or instance, in Dohn, C5 , Desus says5 *Nelieve $e when " say that " a$ in the 7ather and the 7ather is in $e/ or at least believe on the evidence of the $iracles the$selves.+ Desus gives a reason to accept his authority to those who would not spontaneously do so. 6ore interestingly, trust in authority $ay give us a reason to accept the validity of an argu$ent without exa$ining its steps, or even without quite co$prehending it. Nobby fails to understand the $ath teacher%s de$onstration that there is no greatest pri$e nu$ber, but the very fact that the teacher presents what she clai$s is a proof causes Nobby to accept as a proven fact that there is no greatest pri$e nu$ber-and he is right, of course@ ,his extends to non0de$onstrative argu$ents. 7or exa$ple, people

loo.ing for an effective weight loss progra$ $ay stu$ble on the following argu$ent5 *8here is the scientific evidence that eating the controlled carb way is healthyH Ny adhering to a controlled carbohydrate nutritional approach, an individual who chooses to eat nutrient0dense foods > is $ore li.ely to $eet his nutritional needs, pro$oting good health, than he would by following a calorie0restricted, fat0deficient diet. > 7or studies that support the health benefits of a controlled carbohydrate nutritional approach, clic. here. &ll these studies confir$ that not only is controlling carbohydrate consu$ption effective, it actually results in i$proved health para$eters+ 9http5QQat.ins.co$:. 2ven if they do not fully co$prehend the argu$ent or are not able to weigh its force and cannot be bothered to clic. and loo. at the additional evidence proposed, people $ay be swayed by the fact that what loo.s li.e a forceful argu$ent is being put forward for their consideration. Suppose that you accept on trust so$e argu$ent of $ine as valid and its pre$ises as true. ,hen, of course, you also will accept as true the conclusion of the argu$ent. Given however that you are #ust relying on $y authority, should the fact that " have argued for this conclusion give you a better reason to accept it than if " has $erely asserted itH &fter all, if you are willing to ta.e $y word for the soundness of an argu$ent, why not #ust ta.e it directly for the truth of its conclusionH 8ell, the very fact that " produced an argu$ent, even if you are unable to assess its validity, or cannot be bothered, is of relevance to the evaluation of its conclusion. ,o argue is to $a.e an effort in order to appeal to one%s audience%s reason. "t can be seen as a $ar. of respect for one%s audience 9#ust as to refuse to argue is a $ar. of disrespect:. & valid argu$ent is harder to fa.e than a true state$ent. ,o argue is to expose oneself to critical exa$ination. So, the very fact that " $ade the effort and too. the ris. involved in arguing $ay contribute to the believability of $y conclusion, even if the argu$ent re$ains unexa$ined. 8hen paying with a chec., you $ay offer to present so$e identification5 so$eti$es, this very offer will be seen as evidence of your trustworthiness and will be declined #ust because it was $ade, while, if not spontaneously offered, identification would have been requested. Of course, swindlers .now this too and can use apparent forthrightness to achieve devious goals. Si$ilarly, the apparently honest display of argu$entation can be used to i$press, browbeat, or even deceive one%s audience, and had been developed as a rhetorical technique by the Sophists depicted in 'latonic dialogues. 6y interest here, however, is in honest rather than dishonest gurus. )onest gurus are not trying to deceive their audience. Nevertheless, they $ay produce argu$ents that will persuade $ost of their readers not by their logical force, but by their very difficulty. & recent illustration is provided by &he 'mperor(s )ew Mind by the e$inent physicist 4oger 'enrose. &s su$$ari?ed by the blurb of the boo., 'enrose *argues that there are facets of hu$an thin.ing, of hu$an i$agination, that can never be e$ulated by a $achine. 2xploring a da??ling array of topics-co$plex nu$bers, blac. holes, entropy, quasicrystals, the structure of the brain, and the physical processes of consciousness-'enrose demonstrates that laws even $ore wondrously co$plex than those of quantu$ $echanics are essential for the operation of a $ind+ 9$y italics:. Given the wealth of pre$ises fro$ different fields of .nowledge and the co$plexity of the argu$ent, " doubt that $ost readers are in a position to evaluate what, if anything, 'enrose de$onstrates. Still, co$ing fro$ such an authoritative source, the very elaborateness of the argu$ent is enough to suggest that it can

withstand a level of scrutiny that $ost readers would be quite unable to provide, and that 'enrose is offering a hard0to0grasp but plausible and highly relevant perspective on the relationship between funda$ental physics and hu$an psychology.[F! Runaway trust in authority & possible explanation of the obscurity of a state$ent $ade by an authoritative source $ay be that it expresses so$e i$portant thought that could not be for$ulated in a si$pler way. Si$ilarly, a possible explanation of the difficulty of an argu$ent $ay be that there is no si$pler way to #ustify its conclusion. 8hen $y only alternative is to question the otherwise well0established authority of the source #ust because " have trouble understanding it, these explanations $ay be the best " can co$e up with, and, if so, " should accept the$. Such *inferences to the best explanation+ $ay in turn #ustify $y accepting a state$ent as true or an argu$ent as valid, even though " don%t quite understand the$. On the other hand, how could $y failure to fully understand a state$ent or an argu$ent ever #ustify $e in granting even $ore authority to its sourceH Obscurity need not be held against an author-after all, it $ay #ust reflect the li$its of $y own understanding-, but how could it be held in her favourH &n obvious ris. in upgrading the authority of a source because of the obscurity of its pronounce$ents is that of running into the vicious circle " $entioned5 the favourable interpretation " give of an obscure text is based on the prior authority " grant its source/ if " then use this interpretation to value up this authority, and then this enhanced authority to interpret even $ore favourably the next obscure text fro$ the sa$e source, a string of obscure texts 9or, for that $atter, reinterpretations of #ust one of the$: $ight cause $e to grant near0absolute authority to a source #ust because " don%t understand it. &re individuals on their own predisposed to co$$it this .ind of fallacyH " see no reason to believe they are, or at least, not syste$atically. On the other hand so$ething of the sort happens in the collective recognition of authorities. &uthority is social relationship that involves at least two individuals, and typically $any $ore. &uthority in a group goes with reputation. ,he reputation of a person is the $ore or less consensual view of her co$petence and reliability that spreads through repeated acts of co$$unication across a social group. "ndividuals $ay #ust state that So0and0so is .nowledgeable or wise, or they $ay give exa$ples of this .nowledge and wisdo$. ,hey $ay also discuss the interpretation and the value of specific pronounce$ents. 3lear state$ents and easy argu$ents $ay beco$e the ob#ects of a collective evaluation, but only obscure state$ents and difficult argu$ents are li.ely to beco$e the ob#ects of a collective endeavour of interpretation. &s long as the interpretation of a text is not settled, its evaluation is li.ely to be based on external rather than internal criteria. 8e don%t .now what I $eant in $a.ing so$e obscure state$ent, but, given the authority we recognise hi$, we have reasons to thin. that he was expressing a very i$portant idea. "n fact, if we did not thin. this, we would not be involved in trying to co$prehend that state$ent. 'articipating in a collective process of interpretation a$ounts to publicly vouching for the value of what is being interpreted. 6oreover, it seems sensible to ta.e the a$ount of attention paid to thin.ers and their thought as a rough indication of their i$portance-and it would be sensible if it were not for the fact that these individual evaluations build on one another and together spiral into ever greater devotion.

'articipants in a collective process of interpretation have a double sta.e in the value of the text they are wor.ing on and in the authority of its author. ,he greater this value and this authority, the $ore they are #ustified in #oining the process, and the less the tentative and partial character of their interpretations can be seen as a negative reflection on their own intellectual abilities. 6oreover, participating in such a collective process involves not #ust an intellectual but also- and $ore surely- a social benefit, that of belonging, of getting recognition as a person in the .now, capable of appreciating the i$portance of a difficult great thin.er. Not participating, on the other hand, $ay involve the cost of being $arginalised and of appearing intellectually stale and flat. )ere e$erges a collective dyna$ics typical of intellectual schools and sects, where the obscurity of respected $asters is not #ust a sign of the depth of their thin.ing, but a proof of their genius. (eft on their own, ad$iring readers interprets one recondite passage after another in a way that $ay slowly reinforces their ad$iration 9or else render the$ wary:. Now sharing their interpretations and i$pressions with other ad$irers, readers find in the ad$iration, in the trust that other have for the $aster, reasons to consider their own interpretations as failing to do #ustice to the genius of the interpreted text. "n turn these readers beco$e disciples and proselytes. 8here we had the slow bac.0and0forth of solitary reading between favourable interpretation and increased confidence in authority, now we have a co$petition a$ong disciples for an interpretation that best displays the genius of the $aster, an interpretation that, for this purpose, $ay be #ust as obscure as the thought it is $eant to interpret. ,hus a thin.er is $ade into a guru and her best disciples in gurus0apprentices. <nli.e the people in &ndersen%s tale pretending to ad$ire the e$peror%s non0existent clothes, participants in the collective dyna$ics of guruification need not be, and generally are not in bad faith5 they have strong external reasons for their appreciation -reasons that they provide one another-, which in turn lead the$ to favourable interpretations that provide the$ with further internal reasons. 6oreover they need not even be wrong5 hu$an intellectual history is full of challenging propositions and argu$ents that turned out to be true and i$portant. Still the epide$iological $echanis$[L! " have briefly s.etched explains how $any obscure texts and their authors co$e to be overesti$ated, often ridiculously so, not in spite but because of their very obscurity.

References Dennett, Daniel 9 JKJ:. O6ur$urs in the 3athedral,O 9review of 4. 'enrose, ,he 2$perorPs New 6ind:, &he &imes Literary "upplement, Septe$ber 1J0October E, pp. EE0L. 'enrose, 4oger 9 JKJ:. &he 'mperor*s )ew Mind+ Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of -hysics. Oxford5 Oxford <niversity 'ress. Sperber, Dan 9 JJL:. "ntuitive and reflective beliefs. "n Mind and Language 1 9 :. FL0K=. Sperber, Dan 9 JJF:. '.plaining culture+ / naturalistic approach. Oxford5 Nlac.well.

Sperber, Dan 91RR :. &n 2volutionary perspective on testi$ony and argu$entation. "n -hilosophical &opics. 1J. CR 0C = Sperber, Dan S 8ilson, Deirdre 9 JJE:. 0elevance+ Communication and cognition. "econd 'dition. Oxford5 Nlac.well. 8ason, 'eter 3. 9 JFR:. On the failure to eli$inate hypotheses in a conceptual tas.. 1uarterly 2ournal of '.perimental -sychology, 34, 1J0 CR

[ ! " a$ using here the 2nglish word *guru,+ not the Sans.rit word fro$ which it is derived. [1! 7or the distinction between intuitive and reflective beliefs, see Sperber JJL. [=! See 8ason JFR. [C! ,his is a central clai$ or 4elevance ,heory 9Sperber S 8ilson JJE: [E! See Sperber 1RR [F! 7or doubts that it is so, see Dennett JKJ. [L! See Sperber JJF 3onsultado en5 http5QQwww.dan.sperber.co$Qguru.ht$ el dTa 1E de #unio de 1RRK.