G.R. No.

L-16096

March 30, 1921

ANICETO G. MEDEL vs. TIBURCIO MILITANTE FACTS: Medel is the owner of the land which is the subject matter of the unlawful detainer case. He appointed Lorenzo Resera as his agent with respect to the parcel of land in question and directed him to procure materials and cause a granary to be erected thereon. To this end Resera purchased a house in the vicinity for the sum of P50, intending to have the granary constructed from the materials thus obtained. However, upon attempting to occupy the parcel of ground where the granary was to be erected Resera encountered obstruction from the defendants, and was given to understand that the granary could not be put there. As a result materials, to the value of about P60, which had been brought to the spot for building purposes were left on the ground, and no further attempt was made to proceed with the construction. The defendants alleged that they are the owners of the property and refused to surrender possession and permit the granary to be built. ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiff may recover possession under Rule 70 (Unlawful detainer). RULING: Yes. "Any xxx person against whom the possession of any land, or building, is unlawfully withheld after the determination of the right to hold possession xxx shall, at any time within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, be entitled xxx to restitution of the land," etc. In the case, the right of possession which had been exercised by the defendant in the character of tenant and agent of the plaintiff was determined the instant he denied the plaintiff's title and began to exercise dominion over the land upon the false pretext that he himself was the owner. It is not permissible to anyone to occupy inconsistent positions; and when the defendant began to assert ownership in himself, this necessarily operated as a renunciation of his right to possession as tenant. From the moment the character of his occupation was changed, and his possession became illegal. It would make no difference in this connection whether the defendant's occupation was merely permissive on the part of the owner, and terminable at his option as we may assume to have been the case or was fixed by contract for a definite term. The denial of the landlord's title and the assertion of an adverse interest precludes the defense that the lease had not terminated. In regard to the remedy adapted to the case, there can be no doubt that the action of unlawful detainer, under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is appropriate; and it is not necessary that the plaintiff should resort primarily to ejectment in the Court of First Instance. Under section 80, the possessory remedy is given to the landlord whenever the right of the tenant to retain possession is ended, and no good reason occurs to us why the plain intent of the statute should not be given effect in a case like that now before us. As will be seen from the language of the complaint, the plaintiff seeks to recover possession only, without raising the question of title; the right to have possession is proved; and it cannot be permitted that the defendant should defeat this action merely by inserting in his answer a claim of ownership in himself. Whether the court of a justice of the peace has jurisdiction to entertain an action of this character must be determined from the form in which the complaint is drawn not from the allegations of the answer.

G.R. No. L-48940

June 22, 1943

MATEO MADDAMMU vs. JUDGE OF MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA, Fifth Judical District, NICASIO SANCHEZ, and the SHERIFF OF MANILA FACTS: On January 8, 1943, plaintiff Nicasio Sanchez, filed with the Municipal Court of Manila a complaint against defendant Mateo Maddammu, alleging that on or before December 5, 1942, plaintiff bought from Alejandro Calipayan and Maura Manalo a house; that before plaintiff could take possession of and occupy said house, defendant surreptitiously and maliciously occupied same without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff. After trial, respondent Court rendered judgment declaring that Nicasio Sanchez became the owner of the house formerly belonging to Alejandro Calipayan; and that by virtue of his ownership; Nicasio Sanchez has the right to the possession of said house at the time the sale was consummated. ISSUE: Is the complaint filed one of forcible entry? Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over the case? RULING: Plaintiff's complaint in the respondent Court purports to be one for forcible entry, but the facts alleged therein fail to show that such is the nature of the action. In forcible entry cases, the only issue is physical possession or possession de facto of a real property. To confer jurisdiction upon the respondent Court the complaint should have alleged prior physical possession of the house by plaintiff or by his vendors and deprivation of such possession by defendant through any of the means specified by the Rule. (Rule 72, sec. 1). Had plaintiff alleged that defendant unlawfully turned him out of possession of the property in litigation, the allegation would have been sufficient, because plaintiff's prior physical possession may then be implied therefrom. But no such allegation has been made. Undoubtedly, plaintiff based his action upon the ownership of the house by virtue of a deed of conveyance to him. The alternative reliefs be prayed for are all predicated upon such right of ownership. Respondent Court was, therefore, without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and all of its proceedings thereon are accordingly null and void.

G.R. No. 80638 April 26, 1989 GABRIEL ELANE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and INOCENCIO V. CHUA FACTS: Private respondent Inocencio V. Chua filed an action for forcible entry for the eviction of petitioner Gabriel Elane from a portion of a parcel of land which was the subject of a permit to occupy issued to private respondent by the Bureau of Forestry. Private respondent alleges that while visiting the property, he discovered that petitioner was constructing a semiconcrete building on a portion thereof, without his knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Elane claims that he was granted a permit by the Bureau of Forest Development over a parcel of land; that he has been in possession and occupation of that parcel of land continuously and uninterruptedly since 1970, having originally erected a hut thereon which was later replaced by a bungalow; and that the land has been declared for taxation in his name and the real property taxes thereon paid by him for the years 1970 to 1979. Respondent court held that private respondent was granted a residence permit over a lot by the Bureau of Forestry on August 16, 1961, and a permit to construct a warehouse and gasoline station thereon by the then municipal government of Olongapo.This residence permit, which was renewable every year, was not renewed after June 30,1969 because it was stopped by then Vice-President Fernando Lopez, although private respondent continued to pay rental fees for the land until 1973. Upon application by private respondent, the said lot was declared alienable and disposable public land and released by the Bureau of Forest Development to the Bureau of Lands in March 1973. Thereafter, he filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands on January 19, 1977 for the purchase of the said lot. It likewise appears that private respondent declared the warehouse and gasoline stallion for taxation purposes and paid taxes thereon in 1970 and 1971. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not respondent court gravely erred in adjudicating the case on the basis of priority of physical possession instead of legal possession. 2. Is there a prescriptive period if forcible entry is done through stealth? RULING: 1. The Court is convinced that private respondent has priority of possession over petitioner whose entry into the subject lot may be reckoned only as of 1979. There is no merit in the suggestion that petitioner was authorized by the Bureau of Forest Development to occupy the land by virtue of an alleged permit issued by said bureau. A cursory examination of said document readily shows that it is a mere certification that the lot claimed by petitioner is part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Nowhere is it stated therein that petitioner is allowed to take possession of the subject lot. Furthermore, it is uncontroverted that private respondent was issued a residence permit way back in 1961 which entitled him to possession of the disputed land starting in the same year. 2. The respondent court expressly observed that while private respondent's permit to occupy the land may have expired in 1969, he remained in physical possession thereof. Since the decisive issue is priority of possession and private respondent had been in actual and continuous possession of the land since August 16, 1961, his material possession must be protected in this ejectment case until a competent court in an appropriate case determines which of the contending parties has the better right of possession. In sum, private respondent was in earlier possession of the contested lot; his sales application preceded that of petitioner; his warehouse and gasoline station already existed long before petitioner took possession of the parcel of land in question; and he has been paying taxes and rental fees thereon since 1968. As provided by the Civil Code Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the case of copossession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; Having been in prior continuous possession, private respondent is preferentially entitled to occupy the land. Petitioner's intrusion upon the disputed premises can properly be categorized as one effected through stealth. Where

forcible entry was thus made clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive period should be counted from the time private respondent demanded that the deforciant desist from such dispossession when the former learned thereof.

G.R. No. L-22984

March 27, 1968

MARGARITO SARONA, ET AL.,vs. FELIPE VILLEGAS and RAMONA CARILLO FACTS: Plaintiffs filed a complaint of Unlawful Detainer. They aver that they are the absolute owners and in possession of a parcel of land in Paligue, Padada. That on April 1, 1958, thw defendants constructed their residential house thereon and up to date remain in possession thereof, unlawfully withholding the possession of the same from the plaintiffs. That on December 28, 1962, plaintiffs demanded of defendants to vacate the premises and to pay the rentals in arrears but then defendants failed to do so; that defendants' possession thus became clearly unlawful after said demand; Defendants met the complaint with a motion to dismiss on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction of the municipal court. They say that the case is one of forcible entry, and the reglementary one-year period had elapsed before suit was started. ISSUE: Whether or not the case is one of an unlawful detainer or forcible entry? RULING: Section 1, Rule 70 states that a person deprived of possession of land "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth," or a person against whom the possession of any land "is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied," may at any time "within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper inferior court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession." The next legal precept, Section 2 of the same Rule, provides that the landlord may not sue his tenant for ejectment "for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease, unless the tenant shall have failed to pay such rent or comply with such conditions for a period of fifteen (15) days, or five (5) days in the case of building, after demand therefor If entry is illegal, then the cause of action which may be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, entry is legal but thereafter possession became illegal, the case is one of illegal detainer which must

be filed within one year from the date of the last demand. Defendants' alleged entry into the land is not characterized whether legal or illegal. It does not say how defendants entered the land and constructed their residential house thereon. It is silent, too, whether possession became legal before plaintiffs made the demand to vacate and to pay rentals. Failure to specifically aver in the complaint facts which definitely show that plaintiffs' action is for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, is not to be lightly treated. Jurisdiction here challenged in a motion to dismiss depends upon, factual averments. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. Clearly, plaintiffs' case fits in the jurisprudential precept of forcible entry. Because the entry is forcible. In order to constitute the use of "force," as contemplated in this provision, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even necessary that he should use violence against the person of the party in possession. The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. Under the statute entering upon the premises by strategy or stealth is equally an obnoxious as entering by force. The foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right. The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession, therefrom. But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be made. If right at the incipiency defendants' possession was with plaintiffs' tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate. Because, from the date of demand, possession became unlawful. And the case is illegal detainer. A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. NO DIGEST YET: Bayog v Natino Arthur Baranda, et al versus Norberto Padios, et al G.R. No. L-61371 October 21, 1987 Yap, J. Facts: Plaintiff Padios filed a complaint for ejectment against the defendant Sorioso in the municipal trial court of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo. The plaintiffs were tenants in a land belong to Philippine National Bank and each of the plaintiffs occupied and

cultivated a certain portion of the land each. Such possession was recognized and sanctioned by the Court of Agrarian Relations. In April 1982, the defendants by force and intimidation dispossessed the plaintiffs of the area cultivated by them. The court issued an exparte termorary restraining order enjoining the defendants. Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the case involved agricultural tenancy and therefore not within the jurisdiction of the municipal court. Issue: Whether or not the Municipal Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case? Held: The Court of Agrarian Relations has exclusive and original jurisdiction to take cognizance of and to try the case. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by petitioners, Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that said rule shall not apply to cases covered by the Agricultural Tenancy Act.

LU VS. SIAPNO A.M. NO. MTJ-99-1199. JULY 6, 2000. 335 SCRA 122 PONENTE: GONZAGA-REYES FACTS: On appeal, MTC-judgment was modified by deleting the paragraph "(I)n accordancewith the Rules, let a Writ of Execution be issued." Lu filed a petition for review with the Court ofAppeals, while petitioner's counsel filed a Motion for Execution which was granted byrespondent judge. Writ was issued without notice and hearing. An ex-parte Motion to Withdrawdeposit was filed and granted. A Motion for Special Demolition was likewise granted withoutnotice and hearing. Hence, this complaint for gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law,abdication of official function and gross misconduct. RULING: Respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he rendered judgment providing, in the dispositive porti VBon, for its immediate execution. It should be noted that the RTC modified the MTC-decision to the effect that it should not be immediately executed. Basic is the rule that a judge may not order the execution of judgment in the decision itself. Section 21 of the Rules of Summary Procedure likewise provides that the decision of the RTC is immediately executory. Even if immediately executory, there must be notice and hearing. Also, mere suspicion that the judge is partial to a party is not enough; there should be adequate evidence to prove the charge.

Andres Dy and Julia Dy versus Court of Appeals G.R. No. 93756 March 22, 1991 Gancayco, J. Facts: A complaint for ejectment of petitioners from his property was filed in the MTC of Makati. Summons was issued requiring defendants to answer within ten days from notice pursuant to the Rules on Summary Procedure.Defendant filed their

answer thereto to which plaintiff filed a reply. At the preliminary conference the issues were defined and the parties were required to submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence together with their position papers. The MTC the rendered judgement in favour of plaintiff and ordered defendant to vacate the property and pay rent. An appeal was made to the RTC and it rendered judgement affirming the the decision appealed from and it also said that considering that the case is governed by summary procedurethe Decision shall be immediately executory in accordance with Section 18 of the Rule on Summary Procedure. An ex-parte motion for immediate execution of judgment was filed by the private respondent in the inferior court on February 23, 1990. It was granted on the same day. At 11:30 p.m. on the following day, respondent sheriff, assisted by several policemen and other persons, ejected petitioners from the premises by throwing out all their belongings into the street and turning over possession of the premises to private respondent. On February 26, 1990, petitioners, through counsel, filed an urgent ex- parte motion to quash and/or recall writ of execution and nullify all proceedings had therein on the ground they have not been served a copy of the decision of the trial court. The motion was denied by the inferior court on the same day. Issue: Whether or not prior notice is required before an immediately executor order of the RTC can be effected? Held: Yes, the Supreme Court held that in a civil case which was decided under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the immediate execution of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court may not be effected unless prior notice of the judgment or order had been served on the losing party and proof of such service accompanies the motion for execution of the judgment. This will enable the losing party to take any appropriate steps to protect his interests when warranted. The losing party is entitled to such notice as an essential requirement of due process; otherwise, the entire proceedings leading to the execution of the judgment may be nullified and set aside. HOWEVER, in the case at bar the petitioners were not able to file an appeal on time they said that it was futile because they have already been dispossessed of the property. A petitioner cannot takeplace of an appeal. The judgement has lapsed into finality and no further relief can be afforded to the petitioners.

Kaw vs. Anunciacion A.M. No. MTJ-93-811 Mendoza, J.: Facts: For more than twenty (20) years, George Kaw had leased from Margarita Manalo a unit of a building located at 648-650 Padre Rada Street, Tondo, Manila where he conducted his business under the name "PocketSaver's Mart and Bakeshop." On May 20, 1989, IMC sent a letter to Kaw, informing him of its acquisition of the building and demanding that Kaw vacate the premises. Several demands followed, the latest of which was made on February 15, 1990. As Kaw refused to leave, IMC filed on May 2, 1990 an ejectment suit. IMC prayed that Kaw be ordered to vacate the premises and to pay "reasonable rents from the period covering April, 1989 to the present," attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00 plus P500.00 every hearing; and the cost of suit.The summons, with a copy of the complaint, was served on Kaw on May 9, 1990. Kaw nonetheless filed a motion for extension of 15 days from May 18, 1990 within which to file his answer on the around that he had not yet engaged the services of an attorney. On June 1, 1990, he filed, through counsel, another motion for extension of ten (10) days to file his answer. Respondent judge did not act on the two motions. On June 1, 1990; he rendered a decision ordering Kaw to vacate the premises and to pay IMC P1,500.00 a month beginning April 1989 until he (Kaw) had March 1, 1995

actually vacated the premises; P5,000.00 as attorney's fees; and costs. His decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and later by the Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether or not the MTCs inaction on George Kaw's motions for extension to file answer was improper? Whether or not notice is necessary even the judgement is immediately executory? Held: No. Complainant does not dispute the fact that the summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was duly served on her husband, George Kaw, with a warning that he should file his Answer within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice under the Rule on Summary Procedure. A motion for extension is in fact a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure. Yes. The respondent judge was liable for issuing an order of execution when no prior notice of the motion for execution had been given to complainant's husband. The record shows that IMC filed an "Ex Parte Motion for Execution" on June 7, 1990 and that the same day respondent judge granted it. The following day (June 8, 1990) complainant and her family were ejected. The appellate court upheld the RTCs finding that George Kaw had been denied due process. This Court 7 later affirmed, holding that in an ejectment case the adverse party is entitled to notice before execution can be ordered. The Court reiterated the ruling in Angel Jose Realty Corp. v. Galao the writ of execution may only be issued by the court in ejectment cases after notice to the adverse party and if the rents have not been paid or deposited by him. Indeed, that the MeTC's decision in ejectment cases is immediately executory does not mean that notice of the motion for execution to the adverse party is unnecessary.

Bienvenido Once vs. Hon. Carlos Y. Gonzales G.R. No. L-44806 Aquino, J.: March 31, 1977

Facts: The city court of Iloilo City, in a decision dated April 29, 1976, ordered Bienvenido Once to vacate an apartment in a building owned by Juanita Pea and to pay a monthly rental of P290 until the premises have been vacated, plus P1,000 as attorney's fees. It was not indicated in the decision when the payment of the monthly rental should commence. No back rentals were adjudged. Bienvenido Once filed a motion for reconsideration. The city court denied the motion in its order of June 2, 1976. Bienvenido Once appealed. He deposited in the city court on June 17, 1976 P580 as rentals for April and May, 1976, Official Receipt No. 4763496. In the Court of First Instance, he deposited P290 on July 16, 1976 as rental for June, 1976, Official Receipt No. 1257740; P290 on August 11, 1976 as rental for July, 1976, Official Receipt No. 1977508, and P290 on September 9, 1976, as rental for August, 1976, Official Receipt No. 198832. Juanito Pea, the owner of the apartment, filed in the Court of First Instance a motion dated July 9, 1976 for immediate execution of the city court's judgment. He invoked, as grounds, Once's alleged failure to file a supersedeas bond and the supposed untenantable condition of the apartment. Executive Judge Valerio V. Rovira granted the motion for execution

stating that Once failed to file a sepersedeas bond. Bienvenido Once filed a motion for reconsideration. He reiterated his contention that the execution was improper because he had deposited in court the current rentals. He cited the rule that a supersedeas bond is not necessary in case the tenant had deposited in court the rentals due. The lower court denied the motion. It issued a writ of execution dated September 21, 1976. Bienvenido Once filed a motion for suspension of the execution. He offered to file a supersedeas bond. He stressed that he had occupied the apartment for ten years and that his ejection was in contravention of Presidential Decree No. 20. The motion was denied. On October 14, 1976 Bienvenido Once, through three CLAO lawyers, filed in this Court the instant special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition in order to set aside the order and writ of execution. A temporary restraining order was issued by this Court but before it could be implemented Bienvenido Once was constrained to vacate the apartment in litigation. Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering execution of the city court's judgment pending appeal. Held: Yes. The lower court committed a patent error in ordering execution of the city court's judgment on the ground that Bienvenido Once did not file a supersedeas bond. No such bond was necessary because no back rentals were adjudged in the city court's judgment. The attorney's fees of P1,000 need not be covered by a supersedeas bond. Once's timely deposit of the rentals for April, May, June, July and August, 1976 stayed the execution of the judgment pending appeal. In such a situation, no supersedeas bond was required to stay execution of the city court's judgment. Consequently, the order of execution was groundless. It was not justified under section 8, Rule 70 of the Rule of Court. Section 8 requires a supersedeas bond only if there are accrued rentals in arrears. It dispenses with that bond if the defeated tenant deposits in court the rentals due from time to time. The execution proceeding already mentioned is void.

Jesus C. Jakihaca versus Spouses Lilia Aquino and Apolonio Aquino, Jose Toralde, and Hon. Emma CenidozaOna G.R. No. 83982; January 12, 1990 Paras, J.: Facts: On September 10, 1986, petitioner Jesus Jakihaca filed an ejectment suit against respondents-spouses Lilia Aquino and Apolonio Aquino, and Jose Toralde before the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal on account of the latter's refusal to remove their houses which they have allegedly illegally constructed without the knowledge and consent and against the will of the former on a residential land situated in Ampid, San Mateo, despite verbal demand. On December 22, 1987, the respondent trial court found that the private respondents are not agricultural tenant-farmers of the land in question, either through its former owner Gloria Gener or through the present owner-petitioner Jesus Jakihaca that private respondents entered the premises some 10 to 20 years ago and built their houses thereon by tolerance from the former owner Gloria Gener and as such they are bound by their implied promise that they will vacate the land upon demand. Private respondents were ordered to: (1) remove their respective houses on the portion of the land occupied by them and surrender possession thereof to the petitioner; (2) pay the petitioner jointly and severally the amount of P 3,000.00 for attorney's fees; and (3) reimburse the petitioner for the cost of the suit. Their claim for moral and exemplary damages was dismissed for lack of merit.

On appeal by the private respondents to the Regional Trial Court, said appellate court on April 8, 1988 dismissed the case on the ground that the lower court acted without jurisdiction as the complaint shows no verbal demand to remove the houses on the lot of the petitioner was made on the private respondents. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal on April 21, 1988 which was denied on June 25, 1988. Not satisfied, this petition was filed. Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court as the complaint shows no verbal demand to remove was made? Whether or not the motion for reconsideration filed with said Regional Trial Court did not stop the running of the period within which to validly file his appeal? Held: Yes. The records show that the complaint explicitly alleged that "plaintiff verbally asked the defendants to remove their houses on the lot of the former but the latter refused and still refuse to do so without just and lawful grounds." Such is sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirements. An allegation in an original complaint for illegal detainer that in spite of demands made by the plaintiff the defendants had refused to restore the land, is considered sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of previous demand. No. The Rule on Summary Procedure applies only in cases filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Trial Courts, pursuant to Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Summary procedures have no application to cases before the Regional Trial Courts. Hence, when the respondents appealed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, the applicable rules are those of the latter court. Hence, a motion for reconsideration filed with said Regional Trial Court will stop the running of the period within which to validly file his appeal.

Spouses Mamerto Refugia and Feliza Payad-Refugia, et al versus Court of Appeals G.R. No. 118284. July 5, 1996 Regalado, J.

Facts: Spouses Refugia are the registered owner of a duplex apartment building in Valenzuela. It was reported that the elder Refugia advanced to his son the amount of Php 20,000 to be used to pay for the property when the deed of sale was executed. The younger Refugia used the lot as collateral to obtain a housing loan from SSS to be used to build the duplex. After completion the plaintiff younger Refugia and defendant elder Refugia each occupied a door in the duplex. The elder Refugia was told to vacate the duplex by her daughter in law because it will be used by the latters child. The elder Refugia refused to leave claiming that he owned the unit he was occupying by the reason that he is the one who bought the lot. The matter was brought before barangay conciliation and no amicable was reached and hence an action for ejectment ensued in the MTC of Valenzuela . MTC dimissed the case on the finding that the elder Refugia is lawful occupant. The case was appealed to the RTC and was affirmed with modification that the elder Refugia was a co-owner. A petition for review to the CA was filed and it reversed the decision and order the elder Refugia vacate the premises. The CA ruled that the RTC in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over an ejectment case, had no authority to resolve the issue of ownership and to

declare herein petitioners as co-owners because its power is limited only to a determination of the issue of possession; that petitioners bare allegation of ownership cannot prevail over the transfer certifica te of title and deed of sale in favor of private respondents; and that petitioners have been occupying the subject premises by mere tolerance. Issue: Whether or not the MTC can resolve the question of ownership? Whether or not the RTC in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction decide on question of title to or ownership? Held: Yes. The MTCs have the power to resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident of an ejectment case where the determination thereof is necessary for a proper and complete adjudication on the issue of possession. The power is based on the express mandate set forth in sec. 33 par. 2 of the judiciary law. However, such pronouncements made in regard to ownership shall only be provisional and it will not bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. No. The RTC overstepped its bounds in ruling that petitioners and private respondents are co -owners of the property, which issue should be finally determined in the separate action for specific performance reportedly pending between the parties.

Wilmon Auto Supply Corp. vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 97637 10 April 1992 Facts: Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation (or Ramon Que), Iloilo Multi Parts Supply Corporation (or Ramon Que), Virgilio Ang, Henry Tan, Southern Sales Corporation, and Chang Liang, Jr. were lessees of a commercial building and bodegas standing on a registered land in Iloilo City owned in common by Lucy A. Solinap, Fr. Jerry R. Locsin, Lourdes C. Locsin, Manuel C. Locsin and Ester L. Jarantilla. The leases were embodied in uniformly worded deeds executed by the individual petitioners, as lessees, and Lourdes C. Locsin, representing the lessors-co-owners. The lease contracts, among others stipulated fixed terms or periods, provided for a deposit of an amount equal to two months' rents, provided that the lessee should give the lessor 30 days prior notice of the intention to terminate or renew the contract, and that if no such written notice were given, the lessor would consider the contract terminated on the expiration of the term and contained a "reservation of rights". On September 18, 1989, after the expiration of the period fixed in the lease agreements, the lessors executed a public instrument entitled "Deed of Absolute Sale" in virtue of which they sold the leased property to Star Group Resources and Development Inc. (Star Group). The deed provided inter alia that the "Vendee shall henceforth deal with the lessees and occupants of the properties herein sold without any further warranty or obligation on the part of the Vendors." On November 22, 1989, the buyer, Star Group, brought separate actions of unlawful detainer in the Municipal Trial Courts in Iloilo City against the lessees. The lessees refused to concede, and indeed impugned, Star Group's right to eject them. Petitioners filed a case in the RTC to enforce their leasehold and pre-emptive rights, which include the declaration of the sale null and void, their right of redemption, and to recover their two-month deposits against the respondent in the dispute premises. Subsequently they filed a motion to dismiss the ejectment case because of the case they filed with RTC.

Issue: Whether or not an action of unlawful detainer filed in the MTC against a lessee grounded on the expiration of the lat ters lease should be suspended by an action filed in the RTC by the defendant lesse on the claim that he is entitled to a right of preemption of the premises in question and wishes to have said right judicially enforced Held: No. The question of whether or not the lessor's unlawful detainer suits in the Municipal Trial Court against the lessees should be abated by the actions filed in the Regional Trial Court by the latter based on the contention that they are entitled to a right of preemption or prior purchase of the leased premises has been resolved by this Court in numerous cases and one to which a negative answer has invariably been given. The underlying reasons for the above rulings were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved. Thus, as regards the seemingly contrary ruling in Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendao, 79 SCRA 135 (1977), this court observed, in Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167, 172-173 (1983), that "the exception to the rule in this case of Vda. de Legaspi is based on strong reasons of equity not found in the present petition. The right of the petitioners is not so seriously placed in issue in the annulment case as to warrant a deviation, on equitable grounds, from the imperative nature of the rule. In the Vda. de Legaspi case, execution of the decision in the ejectment case would also have meant demolition of the premises, a factor not present in this petition."

Felipe Nacorda versus Nicasio Yatco G.R. No. L-19520 Makalintal, J. August 12, 1966

Facts: J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., sued Fernando Castro to recover possession of a parcel of land with an area of about 100 square meters, included within a larger parcel covered by a transfer certificate of title in the plaintiff's name. It was said that defendant unlawfully entered possession of the property and prayed to vacate and pay Php 30 for every month. CFI rendered judgement in favour of plaintiff and became final and a writ of execution was issued and also a order of demolition. The Nacordas the filed a petition to have writs be lifted because they are the owners of the said property by acquisition. The Nacordas filed a separate civil action asking the court to declare them as owners and issue a writ preliminary injunction to restrain the execution of judgement in the other case. Issue: Whether or not a petition for injunction is the proper remedy? Held: The petition for injunction, as the principal remedy sought here, is not proper. Injunction is an ancillary writ and cannot be resorted to for the purpose of preventing the enforcement of a judgment that has already become final, except possibly in a

proper action to annul such judgment. The validity of the judgment in the previous case, insofar as the parties therein are concerned, is not and has never been questioned. What petitioners seek is to prevent its execution on the ground that they are the owners of the property involved therein. This question of ownership is not litigated before Us in the instant petition; and the bare claim of petitioners on this point is certainly no reason to obstruct the judgment duly rendered in a case against another party, especially considering that the question in that case was merely one of possession. Indeed, petitioners have filed the proper reivindicatory action, and they should pursue their remedy there to its logical conclusion.

Lim Si vs. Isabelo P. Lim G.R. No. L-8496. April 25, 1956 Labrador, J:. Facts: Plaintiff occupies two doors of an accessoria situated on Misericordia Street belonging to the defendant. Plaintiff was an old lessee, and upon the reconstruction of the building Defendant allowed him to occupy two doors beginning July 15, 1953, without fixing any definite amount of rent, except that it was to be the same as what other lessees have been paying. In the month of January, 1954, plaintiff proposed to pay P300 for each door, or P600 for both, which is the rent paid by another lessee occupying better quarters, but as defendant could not make up his mind as to the amount of rent, it was agreed upon between them that plaintiff should deposit the sum of P1,000, which shall be applied for the payment of the rents from the month of January, 1954. From that time on, Plaintiff had been offering a monthly rental of P600 for both doors, but defendant refused to accept this offer. On April 2, 1954, defendant demanded the payment of P700 as monthly rental from January 1, 1954. As the plaintiff is not willing to pay his rent and he fears that defendant would bring an action of unlawful detainer to eject him and to recover said rents for the premises plaintiff had been depositing the monthly sum of P600 a month as rentals, first with the defendant, later with the court. On the basis of the above facts, plaintiff prays that the court fix a monthly rent of the premises at P600 beginning January 1, 1954, and that he be authorized to continue occupying said premises. The defendant promptly presented a motion to dismiss, alleging that plaintiffs action is one of consignation, whic h is not the proper remedy, because the question involved should be decided in an action of forcible entry and unlawful detainer under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Before the court could pass upon this motion to dismiss, counsel for defendant notified the court that he had filed a case against plaintiff herein for ejectment in the Municipal Court of Manila. The plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, alleging that his action was for the determination of the rental to be paid by him. After hearing the arguments the court dismissed the action on the ground that the question of the rentals will necessarily be involved in the pending action for ejectment.

Issue: Whether or not the action filed by Lim Si which prays that the court fix a monthly rent of the premises is proper?

Ruling: No. The plaintiff has no cause of action against defendant under the facts alleged in his complaint. It is the defendant who has the right or cause of action against the plaintiff because the latter refuses to pay the rents fixed but does not leave the property. The disagreement between a lessor and a lessee as to the amount of rent to be paid by a lessee cannot be decided in an action of consignation but in that of forcible entry and unlawful detainer that the lessor institutes when the lessee refuses to pay the lessor the rents that he has fixed for the property. It may also be added that consignation is proper when there is a debt to be paid, which the debtor desires to pay and which the creditor refuses to

receive, or neglects to receive, or cannot receive by reason of his absence. The purpose of consignation is to have the obligation or indebtedness extinguished. In the case at bar, plaintiff seeks to have the obligation determined and fixed, hence his action should not be one of consignation. He may set forth it as defenses in the action of ejectment filed by the defendant against him.

Ramirez vs. Bleza G.R. No. L-45640 : July 30, 1981 Concepcion, Jr., J:. Facts: Pablo Quijol, Abediano Gaanan, and Constancio Bondal, filed an action for forcible entry against Felomino Ramirez and Rustico Valdez with the Municipal Court of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, to recover possession of a portion of Lot 654 of the Bongabong Cadastre, situated in Barrio Anilao, Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. The defendants, petitioners herein, filed an answer thereto, asserting that Felomino Ramirez is the owner of the land occupied by them while the defendant Rustico Valdez is his tenant thereon; and counter-claimed that the plaintiffs had illegally usurped a portion of Lot 654, with an area of about 6.2399 hectares and refused to vacate the same notwithstanding demands. Wherefore, they prayed that the plaintiffs be ordered to vacate that portion of Lot 654 unlawfully occupied and possessed by them and to pay the defendants reasonable damages. On September 15, 1973, the defendants filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which the court granted upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P1,000.00. The defendant also filed a case for accion publiciana against the plaintiff in the ejectment case. It is now being raised that the ejectment case cannot proceed with execution without the disposition of the accion publiciana case, the same being sine qua non to the resolution of the ejectment case Issue: Whether or not the resolution of the accion publiciana case necessary before execution in the ejectment case? Held: No. The accion publiciana and the ejectment case are independent of each other even if the same deal with the same parties and properties. The accion publiciana is an action dealing with ownership while ejectment deals only with material possession. Further a decision of a case can only be directly be attacked and not collaterally via an undecided case particularly if the issue in that case does not involve a prejudicial question.

Heirs of Guballa vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 78223; December 19, 1988 Paras, J:.

Facts: The late Francisco Guballa, Sr. was the registered owner of a parcel of land, located at 1002-1004 R. Hidalgo St., Quiapo, Manila under TCT No. 15638 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, together with improvements existing thereon, consisting of

a building known as the Bulaklak Building. Guballa Sr. used to own and operate Bulaklak Publications housed in the ground and mezzanine floors of said building. After cessation of Guballa Sr.'s business operations Buscope labor union, instituted a complaint for non-payment of separation pay against Bulaklak publications and/or Francisco Guballa, sr. After hearing, judgment was rendered in favof Buscope and against Bulaklak publications, et al., ordering the latter to pay the sum of P139,123.75 as collective Separation Pay of the complainants' union. The NLRC issued a writ of execution and levied upon Gubalia's property covered by TCT No. 15638 and subsequently sold the same at public auction on July 8, 1975 in favor of BUSCOPE as highest bidder, the corresponding certificate of sale was issued to it by the Sheriff of Manila and annotated on the back of said title on July 11, 1975. Rentals of said building were delivered to Buscope starting November 1975 and the succeeding months. On July 7, 1976, and within the period of redemption, a motion for the annulment of the certificate of sale issued in favor of Buscope was filed in NLRC Case No. 014 and in connection therewith, a Notice of Lis Pendens was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. 1563. However, despite the pendency of said motion, a Final Deed of Sale was issued by the Sheriff of Manila on November 4, 1976 in favor of BUSCOPE over subject property. The subject property is subject to both a writ of possession and an unlawful detainer case. The unlawful detainer case is already on the execution stage but is repeatedly being forestalled by multiple motions citing the pendency of the writ of possession case. Issue: Whether or not the motions to forestall the execution of the ejectment case proper? Held: No. The court underscored the nature of summary proceeding cases which are designed to deliver expeditiously the redress prayed for. Allowing such delay to the disposition of reliefs by multiple dilatory motions is an abuse of technicality and run contrary to the ends of justice. The writ of execution case is independent to the ejectment case the former dealing with ownership while the latter is only concerned with material or de facto possession.

Jose Quimpo vs. Catalino Dela Victoria G.R. No. L-31822 Reyes, J:. Facts: On 28 June 1968, plaintiffs-respondents filed another case against defendant-petitioner with the City Court of Davao City for forcible entry over the same parcel of land, subject-matter. Plaintiffs-respondents prayed in the later case for the court to order defendant-petitioner to vacate the premises and deliver the possession thereof to the former, and ordering defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P500.00 a month as rental and the same to begin from the later part of March, 1968 until possession thereof shall be delivered to the plaintiffs, and the amount of P500.00 as attorney's fees. In a motion to dismiss dated 13 July 1968, defendant-petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry alleging the pendency of the case; but the City Court, in its order of 29 November 1968, denied the said motion "for the reason that there is no identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for and for the further reason that it does not appear that any judgment which would be rendered on the other action will amount to res adjudicata in the herein case." The same court order set the case for hearing on 12 December 1968. The execution of the ejectment case was being sought to be delayed and to be subject to the decision of the quieting of title case. The subject land was previously occupied and had July 31, 1972

improvements on it. Quimpo in his claim to be the owner entered into the property and forcibly removed Dela victoria, the previous occupant and removed the improvements upon the land thus this case. Issue: Whether or not the resolution of the quieting of title case necessary before the ejectment case is executed? Whether or not the immediate execution in the forcible entry case should not have been granted pending a resolution of the issue of the pendency of another action between the same parties over the same subject matter? Held: No. The court succinctly pointed out that the action to quiet title was ownership, if the pasture permit covers the subject property while the forcible entry was a question of whether or not the owner was correct in taking the law on law on his hands in removing the prior occupants. No. Section 8, Rule 70, of Revised Rules of Court not only authorizes but also requires the immediate execution of a judgment in plaintiff's favor. The said provision, taken in relation to that of section 10 of the same Rules, is mandatory, the only exception being when the delay is due to fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence. The purpose of the law is to prevent further damages to him caused by the loss of his possession. However, defendant may stay execution (a) by perfecting his appeal and filing a supersedeas bond; and (b) by depositing from time to time, with the Court First Instance, during the pendency of the appeal, the amount or rents or the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property as fixed by the justice of peace or municipal court in its judgment. Commander Realty, Inc versus Court of Appeals G.R. No. 77227, May 9, 1988 Melencio Herrera, J. Facts: On September 4, 1975, respondent Rudy Velayo, Inc., leased from Francisco Villanueva a portion of a building located at 878-F Aurora Boulevard, Cubao, Quezon City, for a period of five years, renewable for another like term at the option of the lessee at a rental of P 10,000 per month. Subsequently, petitioner Commander Realty, Inc., apparently a Villanueva family business, acquired the entire premises. Velayo was notified of such change of ownership. On August 9,1980, Velayo wrote Villanueva seeking renewal of the lease contract. On August 14, 1980, Villanueva replied that he could not renew the lease as the property rights over the building will already be leased, to Commander. On September 8,1980, Velayo wrote Commander confirming the exercise of his option to renew the lease. In reply, Commander reiterated that the contract between Velayo and Villanueva expired on September 4, 1980, without possible renewal since the object of the lease was no longer the property of Villanueva and should Velayo so desire, a new contract with Commander would be "imperative." On April 26, 1981, Velayo filed a complaint for consignation and registration of lease contract before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Said court rendered a decision ordering that the contract of lease be renewed for another five years beginning September 4, 1980 and that plaintiff is ordered to pay a monthly rental, as stated in the Decision. Velayo sought reconsideration of the Decision only insofar as it ordered a graduated increase in rental, but to no avail.

Velayo appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which, on October 15, 1986, rendered judgment deleting that portion of the Trial Court judgment providing for a graduated annual increase in rental and reverting to the original rent of P10,000. Issue: Whether or not Unlawful Detainer is the right action to file Ruling: Yes. In the interim, on November 7, 1985, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Commander filed a complaint for damages of at least P65,000 a month from September 4, 1985, against Velayo, for the latter's alleged wrongful usurpation and deprivation of its property. Commander further prayed for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and a Writ of Injunction restraining Velayo from further usurping the leased premises. Velayo traversed with a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the nature of the suit contending that Commander should have instituted, instead, an action for Illegal Detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over this kind of action. An urlawful detainer is the act of unlawfully withholding the possession of the land or building against or from a landlord, vendor or vendee or other person after the expiration or termination of the detainer's right to hold possession by virtue of a contract express or implied. The right of a lessee to occupy the land leased as against the demand of the lessor should be decided in a case of Ejectment or Detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In the case at bar, notwithstanding contentions to the contrary, the basic issue is the right or lack of right of Velayo to the continued possession of the leased premises. Commander charges it with "wrongful usurpation and deprivation of the use by plaintiffs of its property." These are core issues in an Unlawful Detainer Suit. The damages of P65,000 monthly demanded by Commander actually represent rentals, the reasonableness of which is also properly cognizable in a Detainer action. The amount of damages of P65,000 per month demanded is not determinative of jurisdiction. In ejectment, it is not the amount of rentals or damages for occupancy that confers jurisdiction on the inferior Court but the nature of the action. Where the question relates to the relation between landlord and tenant, the nature of the leased premises involved, the reasonableness of the rentals demanded, the right or lack of right of the tenant to continue occupying the premises against the will of the landlord, the applicability of the rental law, etc., a case for ejectment is proper

Estelita Rosales, et al versus Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch 111 G.R. No. L-62577, September 21, 1987 Cruz, J. Facts: The petitioners and the respondent entered into a contract of lease over the former's property for the expressed period of three years beginning March 1, 1977. On January 12, 1980, the petitioners advised the private respondent that he would have to vacate the leased premises on March 1, 1980, not only because of the lapse of the agreed term but also because he had subleased the property in violation of their agreement. The private respondent objected, claiming that his verbal agreement with them was for a period of ten years, which was the reason he had introduced permanent and costly improvements in the building, and moreover they had also consented to his sublease of the property.

As no agreement between the parties appeared in sight, the private respondents beat his adversaries to the draw, so to speak, by filing on February 21, 1980, with the Court of First Instance of Iligan City an action for the continued enforcement of the lease contract and for damages. The said court on February 28, 1980, one day before the expiration of the lease, issued a restraining order that maintained the status quo between the parties. Ten days later, the petitioners filed their own complaint, this time for unlawful detainer, with the City Court of Iligan City. This was followed two days later with a motion to dismiss the private respondents' complaint before the Court of First Instance on the ground inter alia of the pendency of the ejectment case, and for the lifting of the temporary restraining order. For his part, the private respondent moved to dismiss the ejectment suit also on the ground of lis pendens, his argument being that the case he had filed earlier should be decided first before the petitioners' complaint could be entertained. Issue: Whether or not the contract of lease between the petitioners and the private respondent has already expired according to their stipulations which of two cases involving the same parties and the same subject shall have precedence over the other Ruling: Yes. The facts of this case are practically the same as those of Pardo vs. Encarnacion, which is itself a reaffirmation of several earlier decisions. The present case must be examined in accordance with these precedents. In Pardo, the lessor and the lessee had stipulated on an initial period of twelve years for their lease, subject to extension by another eight years upon subsequent agreement of the parties. Negotiations for this purpose having failed, the lessee filed in the Court of First Instance of Cavite an action for the renewal of the lease at a reduced rental. This the lessor sought to dismiss by questioning the jurisdiction of the court and the venue of the case. One day after the expiration of the lease, the lessor commenced an ejectment case in the City Court of Quezon City, and this time it was the lessee who moved to dismiss, on the ground of the pendency of his own complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cavite. The City Court ruled it had jurisdiction. However, in a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued a temporary restraining order that maintained the status quo between the parties pending action on the petition on the merits. Eventually, the Court of First Instance of Cavite, resolving the challenge to its own jurisdiction, declared it was competent to proceed with the specific performance case filed by the lessee. The lessor then came to us. The provision of the lease contract entered into between petitioner and respondent is apparently clear that unless the lessor and lessee agreed to a renewal thereof at least thirty days prior to the date of expiration, the lease shall not be renewed. The facts on record show that despite the exchange of communication, proposals and counter-proposals, between the parties regarding a renewal of the lease, they were not able to arrive at an agreement within said period for while the lessor wanted an increased rental the lessee, on the other hand, proposed for a reduction. With this failure of an agreement, it is to be presumed that the lessee was aware that an ejectment case against him was forthcoming. Whether or not the case filed before the Cavite Court of First Instance, just one day before the expiration of the lease contract, was an anticipation to block the action for ejectment which the lessor was to take against the lessee, the fact, however, is that the lessee was not disposed to leave the premises. At any rate, while the said case before the Court of First Instance of Cavite appears to be one for specific performance with damages, it cannot be denied that the real issue between the parties is whether or not the lessee should be allowed to continue occupying the land as lessee. It has been settled in a number of cases that the right of a lessee to occupy the land lease as against the demand of the lessor should be decided under Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court. There is no merit to the contention that the lessee's supposed right to a renewal of the lease contract can not be decided in the ejectment suit. In the case of Teodoro vs. Mirasol, supra, the Court held that "if the plaintiff has any right to the

extension of the lease at all, such right is a proper and legitimate issue that could be raised in the unlawful detainer case because it may be used as a defense to the action." In other words, the matter raised in the Court of First Instance of Cavite may be threshed out in the ejectment suit, in consonance with the principle prohibiting multiplicity of suits. And the mere fact that the unlawful detainer-ejectment case was filed later, would not change the situation to depart from the application of the foregoing ruling. It is to be noted that the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending action. They provide that there is pending action, not a pending prior action. The fact that the unlawful detainer suit was of a later date is no bar to the dismissal of the present action. Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano versus Demetrio Encarnacion G.R. Nos. L-28170 and L-28200, February 17, 1968 Angeles, J. Facts: Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land situated in Quezon City, she leased the said lot to respondent Demetrio Encarnacion for a period of twelve years, at a monthly rental of P0.60 per square meter, or P120 monthly. At the end of the stipulated 12-year lease period, there was no agreement reached between the parties as to the renewal of the contract, although it appears from the record that before the expiration of the period of the lease, the parties tried to negotiate for a renewal. On February 17, 1966, one day before the expiration date of the aforesaid contract of lease, the lessee filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for specific performance with damages, seeking to obtain a renewal of the lease at a reduced rental of P80 a month. The lessor, on March 1, 1966, instead of answering the complaint, countered with a "Special Appearance Attacking Jurisdiction and Venue with Consequent Dismissal of the Case." A few days after the expiration of the contract of lease, or on March 10, 1966 the lessor instituted unlawful detainer ejectment proceedings against the lessee in the City Court of Quezon City. The lessee moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of the pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause, but said court declared itself with jurisdiction over the same. In his answer, the lessee raised the same issues which he brought out in his complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cavite. On January 14, 1967, the lessee filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction, seeking a declaration that the City Court of Quezon City has no jurisdiction to try the ejectment case. On February 10, 1967, the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal issued an order, as prayed for, advising the parties to maintain the status quo pending the resolution of the aforesaid petition for certiorari and prohibition. By virtue of this order, the city court refrained from proceeding with the trial of the ejectment case. Issue: Whether or not the contract of lease between the petitioners and the private respondent has already expired according to their stipulations which of two cases involving the same parties and the same subject shall have precedence over the other Ruling: Yes. The provision of the lease contract entered into between petitioner and respondent is apparently clear that unless the lessor and lessee agreed to a renewal thereof at least thirty days prior to the date of expiration, the lease shall not be renewed. The facts on record show that despite the exchange of communication, proposals and counter-proposals,

between the parties regarding a renewal of the lease, they were not able to arrive at an agreement within said period, for while the lessor wanted an increased rental, the lessee, on the other hand, proposed for a reduction. With this failure of an agreement, it is to be presumed that the lessee was aware that an ejectment case against him was forthcoming. Whether or not the case filed before the Cavite Court of First Instance, just one day before the expiration of the lease contract, was an anticipation to block the action for ejectment which the lessor was to take against the lessee, the fact, however, is that, the lessee was not disposed to leave the premises. At any rate, while the said case before the Court of First Instance of Cavite appears to be one for specific performance with damages, it cannot be denied that the real issue between the parties is whether or not the lessee should be allowed to continue occupying the land as lessee. It has been settled in a number of cases that the right of a lessee to occupy the land leased as against the demand of the lessor should be decided under Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court. There is no merit to the contention that the lessee's supposed right to a renewal of the lease contract can not be decided in the ejectment suit. In the case of Teodoro v. Mirasol, supra, this Court held that "if the plaintiff has any right to the extension of the lease at all, such right is a proper and legitimate issue that could be raised in the unlawful detainer case because it may be used as a defense to the action." In other words, the matter raised in the Court of First Instance of Cavite may be threshed out in the ejectment suit, in consonance with the principle prohibiting multiplicity of suits. And the mere fact that the unlawful detainer - ejectment case was filed later, would not change the situation to depart from the application of the foregoing ruling: It is to be noted that the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending action. They provide that there is a pending action, not a pending prior action. The fact that the unlawful detainer suit was of a later date is no bar to the dismissal of the present action. Rose Desamito versus Trinidad Casas Cuyegkeng G.R. No. L-19173, December 27, 1966 Reyes, J. B. L., J. Facts: On February 10, 1959 Trinidad Casas-Cuyegkeng instituted ejectment proceedings against her tenant, Rose Desamito, in the Municipal Court of Manila to recover possession of premises at 474 Isaac Peral, Manila, operated by said tenant as a dress shop named "Fifth Avenue". Plaintiff averred that the defendant had failed to pay rental for November and December, 1958 and January, 1959 totalling P1,300; that the plaintiff needed the premises for her own use and that of her family, but the tenant refused to vacate. In her answer to the complaint for ejectment defendant, on September 13, 1959, by way of special defenses, alleges, among others, that for a period of 8 years she has been occupying the premises in question, paying the corresponding monthly rental, firstly, at the rate of P430 monthly and subsequently at the rate of P400 a month, with the assurance given by the plaintiff that defendant could continue occupying the aforesaid premises as long as she wants at the same monthly rental of P400, which might be reduced later in consideration of the long occupancy of the premises by defendant; that on or about October 31, 1958, in violation of the agreement, plaintiff notified defendant she wanted to raise the monthly rental from P400 to P500, effective January 1, 1959, to which proposition defendant objected; that in view of the insistence of plaintiff in increasing the rental of the premises in question, the defendant told the plaintiff that she would sell her business situated in the premises to any interested buyer, provided that plaintiff would consent to the transfer to the prospective buyer of the defendant's lease or right to the premises, to which proposition the plaintiff agreed with the condition that the new occupant or buyer of defendant's dress shop would pay a monthly rental of P500; that relying on this agreement the defendant looked for a buyer and, as a matter of fact, found one Mr. Federico Gomez who offered to buy the dress shop

business and to pay the agreed rental of P500 monthly on the premises in question; that defendant consequently transmitted to the plaintiff the offer of the buyer to purchase defendant's business for her conformity in writing; that upon learning that Mr. Gomez was purchasing defendant's business for P10,000 plaintiff demanded that the monthly rental for the premises should be increased to P600, or that the defendant should pay to plaintiff the sum of P2,400 out of the proceeds of sale, to which proposition defendant naturally refused; that by reason of plaintiff's actuation, Mr. Gomez cancelled his offer to purchase the dress shop of defendant resulting in "pecuniary, moral and other damages suffered by defendant in the amount of over P125,000" for which she reserved action in the court of first instance; and by way of counterclaim, defendant alleged that she was entitled for improvements in the premises in the amount of P2,000 together with attorney's fees in the sum of P500 and an additional averment that, having stayed almost 8 years in the premises, defendant was entitled to ask the court to fix a longer period for the lease, which she prayed to be set at 5 years from the filing of the complaint. While the ejectment case was pending in the Municipal Court, Rose Desamito as plaintiff this time, filed the present action against her lessor Casas and her husband in the court of first instance, averring three causes of action on practically the same facts pleaded in Desamito's answers. Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance in the appealed case could take cognizance of the issue of damages in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, and resolve it adversely against appellant Desamito Ruling: Yes. In both cases in the Court of First Instance between the same parties the appellant Desamito pleaded the same facts and sought the same remedies. No error was, therefore, committed by the Court of First Instance in refusing to proceed with civil case, since the issues laid before it had already been tried and decided in Court of First instance. Appellant stresses that the parties had agreed in 1959 to have the Municipal Court decide on the term of the lease, while the matter of damages would remain in the Court of First Instance in the civil case. But when the Municipal Court decided against appellant in the ejectment case, and she appealed to the Court of First Instance in the ejectment case, she repleaded the facts already averred in her complaint for damages in civil case. Thus, it was appellant herself who, in violation of the agreement, submitted the identical issue in two different cases. Upon this state of facts, appellees CasasCuyegkeng had the right not to be required to litigate the same issue in two different courts; and as the question was submitted and tried in the ejectment case of the Court of First Instance and was there decided before the trial of the civil case, said appellees may not be required to thresh out the issue once more in the latter case.

Teresita Judith Lozada, et at versus Melchor Abragan and Conchita Abragan G.R. No. L-41162, September 5, 1975 Martin, J. Facts: On October 27, 1964, plaintiffs acquired by virtue of a deed of sale, a building and two lots for the sum of P12,580. After buying the property, they in turn leased it to the defendants; that after sometime the defendants failed to pay the corresponding monthly rentals; and that despite repeated demands, they refused to vacate the premises. On August 23, 1965, plaintiffs filed before the City Court of Cagayan de Oro, a complaint for illegal detainer against the defendants. In their answer, defendants interposed the following affirmative defenses: that plaintiffs' complaint states no cause of action against the defendants; that there is a case now pending before the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental involving the same subject matter, the same parties and the same issue; that the document, Annex "A" of plaintiffs' complaint, does not express and/or reflect the true intention, covenants, terms and conditions previously agreed upon by the defendants and the

plaintiffs because the real agreement of the parties was either a Real Estate Mortgage, or Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase and not a "Deed of Absolute Sale of Lots and House" and that the defendants have always been in actual and physical possession of the properties described in the plaintiffs' complaint up to the present. On March 7, 1966, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint on the ground that the main issue in the case is that of ownership of the properties in question and another action is pending in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental involving the same deed of sale. After trial, the City Court on October 21, 1966 rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. In due season, defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental. During the pendency of the appeal, defendants filed a motion to suspend the hearing thereof on the ground that there is another case between the same parties pending in Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, the issue of which involves a question of ownership over the same properties. The motion was denied and the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case. After the plaintiffs have rested their case, defendants filed a Demurrer to the Evidence and/or Motion to Dismiss. Issue: Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case on the merits in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction Ruling: The resolution of the issue depends on the nature of the action filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants before the City Court. Was the suit filed in the City Court one for unlawful detainer or one that necessarily involves the question of title to the property in litigation? Settled is the rule that in determining whether an action of this kind is within the original jurisdiction of the municipal court or Court of First Instance, the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought should be the one to consider, that the defendant cannot defeat the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace or municipal court by setting up title in himself; and that the condition which defeats the jurisdiction of said court is the necessity to adjudicate the question of title. In their complaint filed with the City Court plaintiffs alleged that they bought the property in question from the defendants on October 27, 1964 with the latter delivering possession thereof to the former on the same date; that upon verbal agreement, they leased the premises to the defendants for the monthly rental of P100 with the condition that upon their failure to pay even one monthly rental, they shall be entitled to evict them; that defendants have paid the rentals up to February 1965, but defaulted in subsequent payments corresponding to the month of February and up to the filing of the complaint. Plaintiffs prayed that defendants be ordered to vacate the premises and to pay the uncollected rentals, plus attorney's fees. Implicit in the foregoing allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint is the fact that plaintiffs do not seek to be declared owners of the property. The allegations and the prayer in the complaint, unmistakably disclose that the suit is for unlawful detainer. It cannot be permitted that the defendant should defeat this action merely by inserting in his answer a claim of ownership in himself. Whether the justice of the peace court has jurisdiction to entertain an action of this character must be determined from the form in which the complaint is drawn not from the allegations of the answer." The mere allegation in the answer that the deed of absolute sale which the defendants executed in favor of the plaintiffs does not express or reflect the true intention, covenants' terms and conditions of the parties, will not change the nature of the action from one of unlawful detainer to that of a suit involving title or ownership of the property in question. This does not mean that the defendant will not be permitted to prove the allegations of his answer to rebut or destroy the proofs that the plaintiff may offer in support of the allegations of his complaint. Without necessarily having to decide whether

or not plaintiff's title to the property in question is valid, the respondent Judge may, after hearing the evidence of both parties, determine, whether or not the complaint is true. If he finds that the complaint is not true because he believes that the proofs adduced in support thereof are overcome by the proofs of the defendant, he may dismiss the complaint, not because he has no jurisdiction over the case but because the plaintiff has failed to prove his complaint. Moreover, the fact that defendants have previously filed a separate action in the same Court of First Instance for the reformation of the deed of absolute sale into one of pacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage, "is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment afforded by law to the plaintiff." This move of defendants to reform the aforesaid deed of sale only lends credence to the fact that the ejectment case filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants did not involve question of title, a situation that finally puts an end to the pretensions of the defendants that the issue of ownership is necessarily involved in the unlawful detainer case. Indeed, the unlawful detainer case and the case for reformation of the deed of sale are separate and distinct and can proceed independently of each other. The issue in the action for reformation of the instrument of sale is one of title which is not prejudicial to the issue of summary possession. Accordingly, the action filed by the plaintiffs with the City Court is one of possession, and therefore falls within the original jurisdiction of said court in accordance with Section 88, par. 1, Republic Act No. 296, as amended, which provides: in forcible entry and detainer proceedings, municipal or judge of the city court shall have original jurisdiction, but said municipal or city judge may receive evidence upon the question of title therein, whatever may be the value of the property, solely for the purpose of determining the character and extent of possession and damages for detention. In forcible entry proceedings, he may grant preliminary injunctions, in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff, which was then the law prevailing when the instant case was filed, unlike at present when under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5967 which further amended Section 88 of Republic Act No. 296, it is only city courts that are granted concurrent jurisdiction with the Courts of First Instance to resolve question of ownership in ejectment cases. Consequently, it was erroneous for the lower court to dismiss the appeal from the decision of the City Court for it has still the power to review said decision in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Pilar del Rosario, et al versus Damian Jimenez G.R. No. L-17468, July 31, 1963 Makalintal, J. Facts: This case is on appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dated June 4, 1960, dismissing appellants' petition for certiorari and mandamus to review four orders of the municipal court of Quezon City entitled "Sancho R. Jacinto, et al. vs. Pilar T. del Rosario, et al." That case was one of forcible entry under Rule 72, involving two parcels of land of which the plaintiffs, Sancho R. Jacinto and Domingo C. Bascara, now respondents - appellees, are the registered owners under transfer certificates of title Nos. 26531 and 26532, both issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. These lands had been acquired by them through purchase from the previous registered owner, J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. In their answer to the complaint the defendants, now petitioners - appellants, claimed ownership of the same properties by purchase from one Macaria Fulgencio and her husband Carlos Javier and alleged that they were and had been in actual physical possession thereof even before the purchase from J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. by appellees. Appellants, after a second amended complaint had been filed by appellees, submitted their answer thereto dated October 2, 1958, including a "third-party complaint" against the plaintiffs themselves as well as against J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc., from both of whom they prayed for an award of damages.

In the meantime, after the action of forcible entry was filed, herein appellants commenced a suit for "reconveyance and/or recovery" of the same properties against appellees in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and on November 4, 1958, filed a motion in the municipal court to suspend proceedings in the summary action before it until after the termination of the case in the Court of First Instance. On October 7, 1958 the municipal court denied admission of the third-party complaint; and on the following November 6 it likewise denied the motion to suspend proceedings. In both instances appellants moved to reconsider and were turned down in two other separate orders, dated October 24 and November 27, 1958, respectively. These are the four orders subject of appellants' petition for certiorari and mandamus, which was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Rizal and now on appeal. Issue: Whether or not there was abuse of discretion in the order of denial complained of Ruling: The third-party complaint was improperly brought against appellees Jacinto and Bascara, since they were themselves the plaintiffs in the forcible entry case, as to whom a mere counterclaim would suffice. Insofar as J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. was concerned, the allegation against it is that it had entered into a compromise agreement with a certain Deudor in four civil cases in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, whereby it agreed to give priority to occupants of lands involved therein including those now in dispute, in the matter of their purchase and that the ejectment suit filed by herein appellees was a violation of that compromise agreement. We fail to see how such "agreement to which appellees were strangers, could have anything to do with their right of action to recover the material possession of the lands in question. The prayer in the third-party complaint that J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. be sentenced to pay damages should be the subject, if at all, of a separate action so that matters extraneous to the issue of possession may not unnecessarily clutter the forcible entry case. The admission of a third-party complaint is discretionary with the court, and in the present instance there was no abuse of discretion in the order of denial complained of. With respect to the other order that denying appellant's motion to suspend proceedings it is enough to point out, first, that the action for "reconveyance and/or recovery" in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which appellants claim should take precedence, was filed by them when the forcible entry case was already pending, and was obviously intended to delay the proceedings therein; and secondly, that the issue involved in the later action, which is one of title, is not prejudicial to the determination of the issue of summary possession. The very petition for mandamus and certiorari the dismissal of which is the subject of this appeal is likewise dilatory in nature, as shown by the fact that it is only one of the numerous actions previously resorted to by appellants and decided unfavorably to them.

LEOPOLDO SY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 95818. August 2, 1991 Regalado, J. FACTS: Private respondents, as petitioners therein, alleged that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in applying the Rule on Summary Procedure, despite the fact that the issue of ownership is being litigated in a pending suit between the same parties involving the right of private respondents to repurchase the property from petitioner, and in denying the former's appeal. Private respondents accordingly prayed the regional trial court to declare all the questioned orders and decision null and void, and to direct the trial judge of the metropolitan trial court to give due course to their appeal. ISSUE:

Whether or not the filing an action to determine ownership will stay the summary remedy of ejectment. HELD: The rule is that the pendency of an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance may not be successfully pleaded in abatement of an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry. It is provided that, in ejectment cases, when the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. But this rule is not even involved in the present case since the determination of the question of ownership is the subject of another case and is reposed in another court. Thus, the fact that the tenant had previously filed a separate action in the former Court of First Instance involving the ownership of the land is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment. Such action filed by the tenant only lends credence to the fact that the ejectment case filed by plaintiffs against the former does not involve the question of title. This is so because the judgment rendered in an ejectment suit shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession. Furthermore, in ejectment cases the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint, not by the defenses raised by defendant. By any standard, the delay in the resolution of the unlawful detainer case and the enforcement of the decision therein is anathema to the summary nature of unlawful detainer proceedings. This is especially true under the Rule on Summary Procedure streamlining the proceedings in forcible entry and detainer cases to achieve a more expeditious and less expensive determination thereof. The pendency of the action for reconveyance does not constitute a compelling reason to delay the termination of an ejectment case, for it gives rise merely to an expectancy that the documents assailed therein may be nullified and the subject properties may be ordered reconveyed to private respondents, as compared to the clear, actual and existing legal right of petitioner to the possession of the subject property as the registered owner.

FLORENTINO SALINAS and MILAGROS C. SALINAS vs. HON. MIGUEL R. NAVARRO, ARSENIO DE LEON and ESTRELLA A. DE LEON G.R. No. L-50259. November 29, 1983 Gutierrez, Jr., J. FACTS: This is a petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus filed by spouses Florentino Salinas and Milagros Salinas to set aside the orders of the respondent court denying motions for immediate execution in an ejectment case pending before it on appeal. During the pendency of the ejectment case before the City Court of Manila, the private respondents filed Civil Case No. 95731 in the Court of First Instance of Manila entitled "A. DE LEON, ET AL. vs. F. SALINAS, ET AL." for the annulment of the said deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and/or to declare the same as an equitable mortgage. On June 27, 1978, the De Leons perfected an appeal to the Court of First Instance of Manila. On January 10, 1979, the petitioners prayed that an order of execution be issued. The respondent court denied the motion in an order dated January 25, 1979 ISSUE: Whether or not writs of execution can be stayed in ejectment cases. HELD: The rule is explicit. In ejectment cases, the judgment must be executed immediately when it is in favor of the plaintiff in order to prevent further damages to him arising from the loss of possession. However, the defendant may stay execution (a) by perfecting an appeal and filing a supersedeas bond and (b) by paying from time to time either to the plaintiff or to the Court of First Instance the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property as may be fixed by the

justice of this peace court in its judgment. Thus, in an eviction case where the defendant did not file a supersedeas bond and did not make any monthly deposit of the rentals, we ruled that the lessor is entitled as a matter of right to the immediate execution of the municipal or city court's judgment for the restoration of possession and the payment of the accrued rentals, or compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. In such a case, the duty of the court to order immediate execution is ministerial and imperative GEORGE V. BENEDICTO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. CHUA G.R. No. 157604. October 19, 2005 Quisumbing, J. FACTS: Chua appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 43. In its Decision, dated August 30, 2002, the RTC modified the MTCC judgment. It dismissed the case for consignation, for lack of tender of payment and prior notice; ordered Chua to immediately vacate or peacefully surrender possession to Benedicto; ordered the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court in the City of Bacolod to turn over to Benedicto P46,500 and P18,000 upon presentation of the original receipts; ordered Benedicto to pay Chua P6,136.39 representing the remaining value of the improvement constructed by the former, which is the perimeter hollow block fence, and deliver to Chua P4,672.64 deposited by the latter with the aforementioned judicial authorities in the excess of the rental of the property as computed by the Court; and ordered Chua to pay Benedicto the P10,000, attorney's fees and P5,000 for cost and other expenses. The RTC also denied all other claims and counterclaims of the parties. On November 19, 2002, Chua filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review with prayer for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, on November 22, 2002, in Civil Case No. 02-11643, the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 43 issued a Writ of Execution. However, in view of the aforesaid petition for review, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order on December 23, 2002, enjoining the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 43, from enforcing its Decision in Civil Case No. 02-11643. On April 4, 2003, Benedicto filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Dissolve/Quash Temporary Restraining Order on the ground that the TRO had already become moot and academic. In his Comment to the said Manifestation and Motion, Chua replied that the writ of execution issued by the RTC had not been fully implemented because his properties and the improvements were still within the subject premises. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned writ of preliminary injunction, despite the immediately executory character of RTC judgments in ejectment cases? HELD: Rule 70, Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Court on Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer states: Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. This section presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with the judgment of the Regional Trial Court and decides to appeal to a superior court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course. It is our opinion that on appeal the appellate court may stay the said writ should circumstances so require. In the case of Amagan v. Marayag, we reiterated our pronouncement in Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendao that the proceedings in an ejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be found. We further drew a fine line between forcible entry and unlawful detainer, thus: Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession,

whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts. Patently, even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted. There need only be clear showing that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed violate said right. CO TIAC vs. FELIPE NATIVIDAD, Judge of First Instance of Manila, JOAQUIN GARCIA, Sheriff of City of Manila, and DOMINGO LAO G.R. No. L-1457. January 28, 1948 Tuason, J. FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to review an order of execution and to restrain the Honorable Felipe Natividad as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the City Sheriff, and Domingo Lao, from carrying out that execution, issued in case No. 71052 of that Court entitled "Domingo Lao, plaintiff, vs. Co Kay, defendant." The antecedents of the case as disclosed by the record are as follows: Under date of June 26, 1945, Domingo Lao brought an action in the municipal court for unlawful detainer of a warehouse (bodega) said to be located at 528 Elcano Street, Manila, alleging that the property had been leased prior to February, 1945, to a certain Co Fiac on a month-to-month basis at a monthly rental of P40 payable in advance. It was further alleged that on or about the month of February 1945, Co Fiac, without giving any notice to the plaintiff, left the premises, and his whereabouts were unknown at the time of the filing of the complaint; that in the same month, the defendant, without obtaining the prior permission of the plaintiff, began to live in the said premises, telling the plaintiff that he was Co Tiac's relative; that the defendant, notwithstanding repeated demands, refused to vacate said premises. There are other allegations, under a second and a third cause of action, which have no bearing on the case. ISSUE: Whether or not a person not in possession of the land can be held liable for actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. HELD: Except as otherwise provided by statute, an action of forcible entry and detainer may be maintained only against one in possession at the commencement of the action, and not against one who does not in fact hold the land. This rule does not require that the lessee or the person who committed the forcible entry should be made a party even though his whereabouts be unknown. Forcible entry or unlawful detainer is a summary proceeding, intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. Title is not involved. This aspect of the action the pretended death or absence of the petitioner differentiate the instant case from Omaa vs. Gatulayao and other decisions cited by the petitioner. The theory of the plaintiff is inconsistent with the special, summary character and purposes of an unlawful detainer proceeding. Under such theory, a lessee who unlawfully withholds possession of the leased property, or one who has taken possession of a property by force, could defeat or retard the recovery of such possession by hiding. Summons by publication would not fully satisfy the object of the law.

AYALA Y COMPAIA vs. JOSEPH ARCACHE

G.R. No. L-6423. January 31, 1956 Concepcion, J. FACTS: Plaintiff agreed to sell to defendant, and the latter agreed to purchase from the former four lots. The agreement provided among other things, that upon payment of the first annual installment, with interest on the balance, title to the property would be transferred by the plaintiff to the defendant, who, simultaneously, would secure and guarantee the payment of the balance due and the interest thereon with a first mortgage on said lots sold. Defendant did not pay the first installment when it fell due; nor was it paid within the extended period granted by the plaintiff upon request of said defendant. Hence, plaintiff instituted the present action for rescission of the agreement to purchase and sell. Defendant maintains that upon payment in the lots, plaintiff was bound to convey the lots in question to him; that having failed to do so, plaintiff was in default in the performance of said obligation, and that consequently, defendant cannot be compelled to pay the first annual installment. ISSUE: Whether or not defendant did not pay the first installment of P100,000, originally due on August 9, 1949, and subsequently extended to February 9, 1950, due to the alleged prior default of plaintiff herein. HELD: The express acknowledgment made by the defendant of the fact that he was unable to pay the first installment and his request for an extension of time within which to settle the obligation which eventually was not satisfied clearly show that he did not regard the plaintiff in default in the performance of its undertaking to convey the lots to the defendant and strongly corroborate the evidence for the plaintiff to the effect that, although it has prepared, and was ready to sign, the deed of conveyance, in favor of the defendant, the same was not executed upon the latter's request, for fear that his creditors may step in and deprive him of the lots in question. GENARO PRADO vs. APOLINARIO CALPO, ET AL. G.R. No. L-19370. April 30, 1964 Paredes, J. FACTS:

On May 24, 1957, plaintiff Genaro Prado, filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of San Jacinto, Pangasinan, a forcible entry case against the defendants. On June 6, 1957, defendants presented their Answer, and interposed special and affirmative defenses, among which was the claim that defendant Dalmacio Cabrera was the owner of the property allegedly occupied by said defendants, having purchased the same from one Marciana Calpito, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, and for which he (Cabrera) was issued a TCT No. 23006 for said land in his name. The Answer also averred that the Justice of the Peace Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case, because it involved question of title over the property. A counter-claim in the sum of P500.00 for damages and P300.00 for attorney's fees, was also interposed. Before trial, defendants filed a Petition for Dismissal dated July 25, 1959, on the principal ground that since the question of title and/or ownership was necessarily involved, the JP Court had no jurisdiction thereof, for to determine who had the right of possession (the issue in forcible entry cases), a finding as to the title or ownership was imperative. Plaintiff opposed, claiming, among others, that the ground on which the same was based could only be resolved in a trial on the merits, for, whether title is necessarily involved in an action for forcible entry or not is a question of fact. On August 28, 1957, the JP Court denied the Petition for Dismissal and set the case for trial on the merits. Upon denial of defendants' Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial, they perfected their appeal to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Instead of presenting their Answer, defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, again raising the same issue of jurisdiction of the inferior court. On December 17, 1958, the CFI without any hearing, handed down an Order dismissing the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not forcible entry and unlawful detainer can lie against the owner of the property. HELD: The CFI erred in quashing the case, upon a mere motion to dismiss. The findings of the JP Court clearly show that the plaintiffs had prior physical possession of the disputed property and the alleged circumstance that the defendant Cabrera was the registered owner of the property, did not detract from the fact that plaintiffs had a right of possession thereof which should be protected. Incidentally, We note that the Certificate of Title in the name of Cabrera was issued only on February 17, 1956; whereas the plaintiffs' right to occupy the premises was evidenced by a Deed of Sale of the property to them, dated November 28, 1947, executed by Ventura Garcia and his wife Maria Consuelo Frianeza, who bought the same property from Gonzalo Sandoval, by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated May 2, 1938. When possession is the issue, an action for Forcible Entry and Detainer is the proper remedy. The CFI should have heard the case on the merits, and find out whether the findings and conclusions of fact of the JP, regarding the prior possession of the plaintiffs and their subsequent dispossession by the defendants are correct or not. Insofar as the appeal with the CFI is concerned, the latter did not have to delve into the issue of ownership, which could be threshed out in an action, to quiet title. Forcible entry and detainer lies even against the very owner of property.

FLORENDA ARIEM vs. HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IV; PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION and THE CITY SHERIFF G.R. No. L-32164. January 31, 1973 Esguerra, J. FACTS: In Civil Case No. Q-12775, the court above-mentioned rendered judgment on December 4, 1969, in favor of the plaintiff therein, respondent People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, and against the defendant therein, Nicasio Barles, ordering the latter to vacate Lot No. 16, Block 15, Psd-57771, situated in Project 6, Quezon City, which is the registered property of said respondent. After the judgment had become final and executory, respondent Judge ordered the issuance of the writ of execution to carry it into effect. The writ of execution was issued by the Clerk of Court on February 16, 1970, ordering the Sheriff of Quezon City to cause the defendant Nicasio Barles to remove his house and other construction built on said lot which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34802 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued in the name of the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation. On May 14, 1970, petitioner Florenda Ariem filed in the same case a petition to lift the writ of execution, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, or any other persons acting under its command and/or behalf, from executing the judgment of eviction. The petition was denied by the respondent Judge in his order of June 24, 1970, and from this order petitioner has come to this Court praying that it be nullified and set aside and that respondents and/or any person acting in their behalf be enjoined from executing the judgment in Civil Case No. Q12775. Basis of the petition is Florenda Ariem's claim that she is the bona fide occupant of the land involved in said case and not defendant Nicasio Barles who was merely left as her caretaker when she left for the provinces. On July 6, 1970, this Court required the respondents to answer the petition and issued a restraining order to prevent the execution of the judgment, including the demolition of the house and improvements on said land under the order of June 24, 1970, until further orders from this Court. ISSUE: HELD: Petitioner's contention is devoid of merit. Nicasio Barles is the real party-in-interest as he was actually occupying the lot in question and had constructed his house thereon. He was duly summoned to answer the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-12775 but, instead of answering the complaint, he moved to dismiss the same on the ground that he has no interest Whether or not Florenda Ariem is the real party-in-interest.

in the premises and the filing of the complaint against him was erroneous. Accordingly, he prayed that he should not be made liable for the outcome of the Civil Case No. Q-12775. Having failed to answer the complaint after the denial of his motion to dismiss, Nicasio Barles was declared in default and respondent People's Homesite & Housing Corporation was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, judgment was rendered against Nicasio Barles ordering him to vacate Lot No. 16 and remove his house and other construction thereon. Even granting that petitioner Florenda Ariem is occupying the land involved, nonetheless, she is bound by the judgment against Nicasio Barles who is her relative. The family, relatives, and other privies of the defendant are as much bound by the judgment in an ejectment case as the party from whom they derive their possession. PAZ S. BAENS vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CHUA SENG G.R. No. L-57091. November 23, 1983 Gutierrez, J. FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari seeking to review that portion of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which merely reduced the award of damages in favor of private respondent Chua Seng instead of eliminating them entirely as well as that portion affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing petitioner's complaint for unlawful detainer. Both parties appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila with the petitioner assailing in toto the decision while the private respondent questioned only that portion which denied his claim for damages against petitioner. On November 5, 1979, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision affirming the City Court's decision relative to the restoration of Chua Seng to possession of the premises and dismissing petitioner's complaint for unlawful detainer, but reversing the decision insofar as it only awarded said private respondent the sum of P1,000.00 for attorney's fees and dismissed his other claim for damages. On March 31, 1981, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision annulling the order of the Court of First Instance granting immediate execution and modifying the appealed. ISSUE: Whether or not the damages awarded should be limited to the ones caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property. HELD: Although Section 1 of Rule 70 uses the word "damages", the authors of the Rules of Court, in drafting Section 6 of Rule 70 on the judgment to be pronounced, eliminated the word "damages", placing in lieu thereof, the words "reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises." We also had occasion to explain the meaning of damages in Ramirez v. Sy Chit, (21 SCRA 1364) where we held: "The trial court held defendant liable `to pay plaintiff the sum of P25.00 a day for every day of delay as damages until he finally vacates the premises, in addition to the agreed current rental that may accrue.' This is an error. The damages recoverable by the plaintiff under section 1, Rule 70 (formerly Rule 72) are those which correspond to the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property, which in this case is the agreed monthly rental of P230.00. The award, therefore, of P25.00 as damages for every day of delay in addition to the agreed monthly rentals is without basis in law." The damages which a plaintiff expects to obtain from his business to be located in the premises, or for material injury caused to the premises cannot also be claimed in connection with or as incidental to an action of illegal detainer or forcible entry. (Torres v. Ocampo, 80 Phil. 36) Since moral, exemplary, and actual damages are neither "rents" nor "reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises", nor "fair rental value" as abovestated, we are constrained to deny the P3,000.00 moral damages and P2,000.00 exemplary damages awarded by the respondent Court of Appeals and the P1,000.00 actual damages awarded by the City Court of Manila.

LAO SENG HIAN, CHENG TO, and Y.S. WOO vs. NATIVIDAD ALMEDA LOPEZ, Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, and JOSE M. OCAMPO G.R. No. L-1950. May 16, 1949 Tuazon, J. FACTS: The sole question presented in this appeal is whether the money claim at the rate of P5,250 a month, made in the complaint in action for unlawful detainer, removes the case from the jurisdiction of the municipal court. The Court of First Instance, on an application for certiorari to the municipal judge, ruled against the petitioner, defendant in the case for unlawful detainer and appellant herein. The allegation in question reads: "That in view of the refusal of the defendants leaving the land and House or barong-barong built therein, the plaintiff suffered damages of P5, 250 per month, which is the amount that currently can farm (can) produce or monthly as commercial site." ISSUE: Whether or not the money judgment demanded is relevant in determining which court has jurisdiction over the case. HELD: The amount whose recovery is sought in this paragraph is obviously intended to represent reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. This intention is manifest from the allegations, allegations which, following the injunction of section 2, rule 1, and section 17, Rule 15, are to be construed liberally. It is not necessary to use the precise language of the law or rule to give a pleading the effects intended by the pleader. This point being settled, the quantum of the money judgment demanded is immaterial to the court's jurisdiction. Any amount for rents or in the nature of rents is allowable in an action of forcible entry or unlawful detainer. This is so because rents or compensation for the use and occupation of the premises is only incidental or accessory to the main action for the restitution of possession unlawfully withheld. This rule is too familiar and too well settled to require citations of authorities. MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. G.R. No. 116665. March 20, 1996 Francisco, J. FACTS: Under a one (1) year lease contract commencing on July 1, 1992 and ending on June 30, 1993 but renewable upon agreement, herein petitioner Azcuna, Jr., as lessee, occupied three (3) units (C, E and F) of the building owned by private respondent Barcelona's family. Came expiration date of the lease without an agreed renewal thereof and coupled by petitioner's failure to surrender the leased units despite private respondent's demands, private respondent filed before the Municipal Trial Court an ejectment case against petitioner. Judgment of that inferior court, affirmed in its entirety by the Regional Trial Court and herein public respondent Court of Appeals on subsequent appeals taken by petitioner, favored private respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not the municipal trial court's award of P3,000.00 per day as damages is warranted. HELD: It is petitioner's claim that such award, in addition to the fair rental value or reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, is improper in the light of the doctrine enunciated in the cases of "Felesilda v. Villanueva" , "Shoemart, Inc. v. CA" and "Hualam Construction and Development Corp. v. CA" cited by petitioner, that "the only damages that can be recovered in an ejectment suit are the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the real property. Other damages must be claimed in an ordinary action."

Petitioner's reliance on such doctrine is misplaced, inasmuch as the "Felesilda," "Shoemart" and "Hualam" cases dealt with additional damages and charges other than liquidated damages, defined as ". . . those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof". Here, the municipal trial court, in making the "P3,000.00 per day" award, was merely enforcing what was stipulated upon in black and white by private respondent-lessor and petitioner-lessee appearing in the lease contract. This is clearly an agreement for liquidated damages entitling private respondent to claim a stipulated amount by way of damages (correctly totalling P3,000.00 per day as there were three [3] units being leased by petitioner) over and above other damages still legally due him, i.e., the fair rental value for the use and occupation of the property as provided for in Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The freedom of the contracting parties to make stipulations in their contract provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy is so settled, and the Court finds nothing immoral or illegal with the indemnity/penalty clause of the lease contract which does not appear to have been forced upon or fraudulently foisted on petitioner. Petitioner cannot now evade further liability for liquidated damages, for "after entering into such an agreement, petitioner cannot thereafter turn his back on his word with a plea that on him was inflicted a penalty shocking to the conscience and impressed with iniquity as to call for the relief sought on the part of a judicial tribunal."

JOSEFINA S. DE LAUREANO vs. HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and ONG CU G.R. No. L-43345. July 29, 1976 Aquino, J. FACTS: In an ejectment suit, judgment was rendered by the City Court in favor of the registered owner of the lots occupied by the lessee. The latter appealed to the Court of First Instance, but instead of filing a supersedeas bond based on the findings of the city court in its decision, he asked the city court ex-parte to approve his supersedeas bond in the sum of P22,000 and a fix the rental value of the lots at P1,200 a month, which motion as granted. Thereafter, the record was elevated to the CFI. Whereupon, the owner filed a motion in the CFI praying for a preliminary mandatory injunction to restore her to the possession of the lots, alleging that the appeal was frivolous and dilatory; and for immediate execution of the city court's judgment on the ground that the supersedeas bond was inadequate. The Court of First Instance however upheld the city court's orders so that when its attention was called to its failure to resolve the motion for mandatory injunction, it ruled that it could not do so for the reason that it would be absurd to stay execution and the same time restore possession to the plaintiff by granting the mandatory injunction. ISSUE: Whether or not the execution of a judgment can be stayed by filing a supersedeas bond. HELD: Where defendant-lessee's supersedeas bond was inadequate and his deposit not in conformity with the city court's judgment, execution of judgment cannot be stayed. In such a case the execution is mandatory. The only exceptions are the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which prevented the defendant from posting the supersedeas bond or making the monthly deposit, or the occurrence of supervening events which brought about a material change in the situation of the parties and which would make execution inequitable. In the case at bar there was a supersedeas bond and monthly deposits made but the bond and the deposit were inadequate or were not in conformity with the city court's judgment. The defendant-lessee committed a mistake because he followed the erroneous order of the city court which fixed the supersedeas bond and the monthly deposit in contravention of its own decision and consequently, in violation of Section 8 of Rule 70. Because of that mistake, immediate execution under Rule 70 would not be warranted.

G.R. No. L-32642 November 26, 1973 DOMINADOR STA. ANA, vs. HON. DELFIN VIR. SUNGA FACTS: In an action to quiet title to a residential parcel of land located at Camarines Sur referred to as Lot B filed by Victor Dasal and Maria Pecunio as plaintiffs against Pelicula Sabido and Maximo Rances as defendants said defendants prevailed in their contention that Lot B was but a strip of land forming part of their property of over two hectares which they had entrusted to plaintiff Maria Pecunio as their encargada but which she later tried to claim as her own. In their amended answer, however, respondents avered that if plaintiffs are referring to that portion of land adjoining the defendants' property on the west and belonging formerly to Antonio Amator as their alleged second parcel of land then defendants allege herein that they have made no pretense whatsoever of ownership over the same much less have they occupied the same or taken possession thereof. Respondent court found that the land in dispute was only the northern strip of the land the defendants described in their amended answer. It found that plaintiffs failed to show that they are the owners of said Lot B and declared the defendants owners of the land in question and further sentenced plaintiffs to vacate the said Lot B and deliver its possession to the defendants Its decision having become final and executory, responds court issued a writ for its execution. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that as a total stranger in the case, he could not be bound by the judgment therein. Petitioner insisted on his right to a hearing wherein he could show to respondent court that he is the lawful owner and possessor of a bigger parcel of land of which bigger parcel land, the land in question in this case, is only a part. Petitioner averred that he had acquired the land by absolute sale Petitioner thus took pains to show that he had no privity with either of the parties-litigants in the case nor relation as successor in interest of any of them, but claimed ownership on his own and rights adverse to both of them since he acquired by purchase the bigger portion of land, of which Lot B is but a part. Respondent court in its order denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration as devoid of merit. Respondents filed their motion for issuance of a writ of demolition. Petitioner filed the present action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. The Court required respondents to answer the petition and ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction against execution of respondent court's order its ordering the demolition of petitioner's house upon a injunction bond. ISSUE: Whether or not on the nature of the case, petitioner may be a privy thereto. RULING: The Court held that movants-appellants therein who were never made parties to the proceedings wherein appellees were adjudged owners of the land in question nor do they sustain any relation of privity with said appellees cannot, therefore, be bound by the judgment rendered therein in favor of the said plaintiffs, and the enforcement of said judgment against them is in excess of jurisdiction. Judgment rendered in actions in personam, as in the instant case, are enforcible only between the parties and their successors in interest, but not against strangers thereto. There may be cases when the actual possessor may be claimed to be a privy to any of the parties to the action, or his bonafide possession may be disputed, or where it is alleged, as in the instant case, that such possession has been taken in connivance with the defeated litigant with a view to frustrating the judgment. In any of these events, the proper procedure would be to order a hearing on the matter of such possession and to deny or accede to the enforcement of a writ possession as the finding shall warrant. But in the absence of any such hearing or any proceeding of similar character,

every person in the actual possession of the land has a right to be respected therein (art. 446, Civil Code) and his ejectment would constitute a deprivation of a property right without due process of law. This point of petitioner being entitled to a hearing and his day in court since he was a stranger to the case below is decisive of the case at bar. Petitioner's assailing the judgment because it was rendered after plaintiff Victor Dasal's death without his having been formally substituted by his heirs is of no consequence, since his widow and only son and heir duly defended their interests and testified at the trial, as held by respondent court. The boundaries and limits of the areas respectively claims by petitioner and respondents have to be delineated and specified, so that it may properly be determined whether they are litigating over the same parcel of land as petitioner claims, or whether petitioner's claimed purchase from Prudencio Lagarto covers an entirely different parcel of land as claims by respondents, or whether as is likely judging from their conflicting sketches and assertions there is an overlapping boundaries of their respective lands. Still, since petitioner claims that the disputed portion of land belongs to him and that although his house is concededly not constructed thereon respondents are asking for its demolition as ordered by respondent court's order of demolition, which it has not revoked at all, notwithstanding its admission that petitioner's inclusion therein was a "palpable mistake" and petitioner admittedly was not a party to the case below and a relation of privity with the losing parties has not been shown, petitioner as the actual possessor of the disputed portion of the land (as acknowledged even in the sheriff's return) has a right to be respected therein until and unless otherwise determined by respondent court in a hearing at which petitioner shall have been given an opportunity to be heard and to present his side for otherwise his summary ejectment without hearing would constitute a deprivation of a property right without due process of law.

G.R. No. L-11146

April 22, 1957

MARIETA VIRGINIA CRUZCOSA and REMEDIOS CRUZCOSA vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE HERMOGENES CONCEPCION FACTS: On April 28, 1949, respondent Efren Mendoza filed in the Municipal Court of Manila two separate complaints for ejectment against Catalino Cruzcosa and Catalino Cruzcosa, Jr., claiming to be the owner of Lot No. 115, Block No. 3068 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila, located in Velasquez, Tondo; that defendants are occupying the same at a monthly rental of P24; and that defendants had failed to pay the rentals since July, 1948 and he (plaintiff) needed the premises for his own use. Judgement was rendered for plaintiffs in both cases. Defendant Catalino Cruzcosa moved to reconsider the judgment against him on the ground that he was not the real party in interest because the building on the lot in question belonged not to him but to his children of the first marriage, Catalino Cruzcosa, Jr., Remedios Cruzcosa, and Virginia Cruzcosa. Reconsideration was denied. Upon there turn of the records to the court a quo, plaintiff Efren Mendoza filed a motion to execute the judgment and, issued a writ of execution. Later, plaintiff moved for the demolition of defendants house on the lot in question, which defendants opposed mainly on the argument that said house did not belong exclusively to defendant Cruzcosa, Jr., but was owned by him jointly with his sisters Virginia and Remedios Cruzcosa, who had not been made parties in the entire proceedings and who could not be deprived of their property without due process of law. Notwithstanding defendants' opposition to the motion for demolition, the court granted the same and ordered the Sheriff of Manila to demolish the house in question if defendants did not remove it from plaintiff property within twenty days.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners should have been made parties to the case. Whether or not petitioners are estopped due to laches. RULING: Yes. Petitioners were conclusively found by to be co-owners of the building in question. Having an interest therein, they should have been made parties to the ejectment proceedings to give them a chance to protect their rights, and not having been made parties thereto, they are not bound and cannot be affected by the judgment rendered therein against their coowner. To execute, then, said judgment against their interests in the house in question would be to divest of their property without due process of law. On the issue on laches: Respondent forgets that neither the Municipal Court nor the Court of First Instance acquired jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners since they were never at any time made parties to the proceedings; and it is fundamental that jurisdiction is conferred only by law and can not be acquired through, or waived by, any actor omission of the parties. Besides, petitioners had no duty to intervene in the proceedings, intervention in an action not being compulsory or mandatory but only optional and permissive; they had the right to rely on their legal and constitutional rights not to be deprived of their property without previous hearing. And what is more, there is no proof that petitioners had knowledge, previous to the order of demolition, of the pendency of respondent's ejectment actions, so that their failure to intervene therein can not in any case have the effect either of waiver or estoppel.

G.R. No. 128743 November 29, 1999 ORO CAM ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Private respondent Angel Chaves, Inc. is the owner of a commercial building in Cagayan de Oro which he leased to several business establishments for a period of one year. He filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities. The complaint further alleged that, before the leases expired, private respondent sent forms for new lease contracts to the lessees, indicating increased rentals. Thereafter, private respondent made a demand upon the lessees to pay the increased rent or, otherwise, vacate the premises. The failure of the lessees to comply with the demand of private respondent led to the filing of the suit for unlawful detainer. MTCC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint against three defendants, including petitioner, but ordered the ejectment of the fourth defendant Alfred Co. On appeal, the Regional Trial Courtreversed the MTCC and ordered the four defendants ejected from the premises. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not, the Court of Appeals erred in holding Oro Cam Enterprises Inc. privy to the contract of lease between private respondent and defendant Constancio Manzano. 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion in declaring null and void the order granting the writ of preliminary injunction as an interlocutory order issued by the RTC

RULING: The petition has no merit. It is noteworthy that the existence of the lease agreement was never denied in the answer filed on behalf of Constancio Manzano and petitioner. What the answer questioned was amount of monthly rentals. Throughout the proceedings in the MTCC, RTC, and in the SC, petitioner never questioned the jurisdiction of the court over it. Only when the order of ejectment was sought to be executed did petitioner raise this argument. Petitioner is thus estopped from asserting that the MTCC had not acquired jurisdiction over it. It did not question the failure of private respondent to implead it as a party defendant. On the contrary, evidence clearly showed that petitioner had knowledge of the existence and the pendency of the unlawful detainer suit filed against Constancio Manzano. It would be unjust to private respondent to allow petitioner to put in issue at this late stage the jurisdiction of the court over it. Moreover, petitioner admits that it has been the actual occupant of the leased premises since 1980 and it has authorized Constancio Manzano to pay the rents for and in its behalf. In fact, it claims to have been paying the rent religiously, effectively implying that it is a co-lessee or sub-lessee of the property. Thus, it is still bound by the ejectment suit even if it was not named a party thereto. It is well-settled that a judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not only upon the defendants in the suit but also against those not made parties thereto, if they are: a) trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; b) guests or other occupants of the premises with the permission of the defendant; c) transferees pendente lite; d) sublessee; e) co-lessees; or f) members of the family, relatives and other privies of the defendant. 7 Consequently, the appellate court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the trial court's order granting the writ of preliminary injunction.

Santiago vs. Sheriff 1947 cannot be founf Gozon vs. De la Rosa 1947 text in Spanish Planas vs. Madrigal 1954 cannot be found King et al. vs. De los Angeles, et al. cannot be found Ariem vs De los Angeles repeated case

Levi Ledesma versus Benjamin Javellana G.R. No. L-55187 April 28, 1983 Vasquez, J. Facts: In 1968 the plaintiff, registered owners of seven parcels of land in Iloilo entered into a lease contract with the defendant as lessee. The contract stipulated that it shall be for 10 years and for Php 30,000 every year and it can be renewed for another 10 years if lessee would decide so. In 1976 the lessee expressed his desire to renew the lease contract. Lessor expressed conformity to the renewal but refused to do it on the same terms as the 1968 contract. Issue: When the previous contract does not indicate a provision for new terms when the contract is renewed will the old terms govern the new contract? Held: The rule is well-established that a general covenant to renew or extend a lease which makes no provision as to the terms of a renewal or extension implies a renewal or extension upon the same terms as provided in the original lease. As a general rule, in construing provisions relating to renewals or extensions, where there is any uncertainty, the tenant is favored, and not the landlord, because the latter, having the power of stipulating in his own favor, has neglected to do so; and also upon the principle that every man's grant is to be taken most strongly against himself.

Ramona Reyes versus Maria Villaflor G.R. No. L-15755, May 30, 1961 FACTS: The plaintiff has been in the possession of the said land since 1936 by virtue of RPA Permit No. 5260 (R-4155) issued by the Bureau of Lands in favor of Ramona Reyes. On the other hand, the defendant was able to obtain her original possession of the said premises by virtue of a verbal contract with the plaintiff to occupy the same on a lease of month to month basis at the rate of P50.00, at the same time that she was considered a member of the Samar Cooperative. The defendant was paying these rentals up to 2 or 3 months before the fire that razed Catbalogan on April 1, 1957, which fire also burned down the building of the Samar Cooperative Store managed by the defendant and which was built on the premises on question. After the fire, the plaintiff prevented the defendant to construct a building in the said premises but the defendant insisted in constructing the temporary shed. On June 24, 1957, a formal demand to vacate the land in question was made by the plaintiff to the defendant but the defendant did not heed this demand. The basis in which the said demand was made was due to the act that plaintiff was about to construct thereon her own building. On April 26, 1957, the defendant had filed her own application for the land in question. The Honorable Fidel Fernandez, Judge, rendered judgment for plaintiff and required defendants to vacate the premises, without damages but with costs. Defendants appealed, and in their printed brief insist (a) that plaintiff's right to the possession of the land has expired upon cancellation of her permit during the Japanese occupation; (b) that the question should be submitted to the Bureau of Lands and Department of Agriculture; and (c) that plaintiff should be required to return to them the rentals they had paid. ISSUE:

Whether or not a tenant may deny the title of the landlord HELD: No. Indeed one of the conclusive presumptions prohibits the tenant from denying the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them 1. The defendants here would claim that plaintiff had no right to sublease to them this parcel of land when, sometime in 1957, they agreed verbally to take it at P50.00 a month. They rest this denial on the alleged cancellation of her lease permit in April, 1944. But as the law says, the lease may not deny the title of his or her lessor etc., these defendants may not now assert that in 1957 plaintiff had no title or right to lease such foreshore land to them.

Marietta Dakudao versus Francisco Consolacion G.R. No. L-54753 June 24, 1983 Gutierrez, Jr., J. Facts: Plaintiffs are co-owners of a parcel of land in Davao. On this land stands the house of defendant Francisco Ang Singco who had a verbal lease contract with herein plaintiffs. The monthly agreed rental is P25.00. Ang Singco without constent from the owner sold the house to the laurencios and left the premises withpout paying his back rentalks. When dakudao found out he demanded that the property be vacated and rentals paid. The unlawful detainer case against the Laurencios was dismissed and the case againt Ang Singco was converted to a collection case. It was said that an unlawful detainer case cannot lie against the defendant because they did not have a contract with the plaintiff. Issue: Whether or not an unlawful detainer case is proper? Held: Since there was no contract between the lot owners and the Laurecios, the latter's occupation of the land is only as successors of Ang Singco from whom they purchased the house built on the lot. If Article 1649 had been followed and the consent of the owners to the sale secured, the Laurecios would be more than mere successors-in-interest. They would have become the new lessees. The unlawful detainer case was proper. If we view the failure of the petitioners to file an ejectment case from February, 1978 when they first learned of the respondents presence on their land up to June 1, 1978 when the letter demanding that they vacate the lot was sent, as tolerance or permission by the owners, the unlawful detainer case is still proper.

Munoz versus Court of Appeals G.R. No. 102693. September 23, 1992 FACTS:

This case has its origin from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by Nicolas P. Garcia (herein respondent) on August 15, 1988 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court wherein he alleged that he is a co-owner of an agricultural land identified as Lot No. 2790 and that he and his co-owners acquired the lot by succession from their deceased father, Pedro B. Garcia who died on April 6, 1939. The said lot is tenanted by Loreto Garcia. The defendants (herein petitioners) constructed their houses on a portion of the lot without the knowledge and consent of the owners after which the latter sent letters of demand on June 6, 1988 asking the defendants to remove their houses from the lot within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the letters and that despite the demands made by him, the defendants refused to vacate their houses. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The Regional Trial Court reversed the ruling. The Court of Appeals reinstated the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint filed by the private respondent before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court was for the summary proceeding of forcible entry or unlawful detainer HELD: No. The complaint subject of this case was captioned as "unlawful detainer." However, the private respondent alleged therein that from the start, the possession of the petitioner was unlawful as it was stated that the defendants have constructed their houses on the questioned premises stealthily, that is, without the knowledge and consent of his co-owners. This allegation clearly characterized the complaint as one for forcible entry and not for unlawful detainer. The questions to be resolved in an action for forcible entry are: First, who had actual possession over the piece of real property? Second, was the possessor ousted therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint by force, threat, strategy or stealth? And lastly, does the plaintiff ask for the restoration of his possession? There was no mention in the complaint nor in the position paper of the private respondent that he or his co-owners were in prior possession of the property. There was an allegation that the property "is presently tenanted" but did not state when the tenant started to possess the property. While it is true that possession of the tenant is possession of the owner, the complaint failed to state that Loreta Garcia was in prior possession of the property at the time of entry by the petitioners. And, while the complaint stated that the petitioners obtained possession of the premises through stealth, it failed to aver when this entry was accomplished or when the private respondent learned of such entry. The failure of the private respondent to allege the time when unlawful deprivation took place is fatal because this will determine the start of the counting of the one year period for the filing of the summary action of forcible entry. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the action should either be accion publiciana or reivindicatoria in the Court of First Instance.

***Jakihaca vs Aquino repeated ***

G.R. No. 75676 August 29, 1990 MANUEL CO KENG vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PLAZA ARCADE, Inc. FACTS: KIAN

A complaint for ejectment against petitioner Manuel Co Keng Kian was filed by private respondent Plaza Arcade, Inc., alleging that despite the expiration of the written contract of lease over a portion of the ground floor of the former Manila Times Building, petitioner refused to vacate the premises and to pay the monthly rentals notwithstanding receipt of several letters of demand, the last of which was sent to petitioner by registered mail. During the pendency of the trial before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila , the petitioner voluntarily vacated the disputed premises, turning over the key to the clerk of court but without paying the accrued rent. The inferior court rendered its judgment dismissing the ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction. It refused to give probative value to the three letters of demand to vacate which were all sent to petitioner and which he refused to receive. The court held that since none of the demand letters was served (1) personally, or (2) by written notice of such demand upon a person found on the premises, or (3) by posting such notice on the premises if no person can be found thereon pursuant to the provisions of Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, there was no valid demand. Plaza Arcade, Inc. appealed to the Regional Trial Court which initially reversed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, but on motion for reconsideration by petitioner, affirmed the dismissal of the ejectment. A petition for review was filed with the then Intermediate Appellate Court. In its decision the Appellate Court overturned the appealed order of the trial court which had earlier sustained the dismissal of the ejectment case. ISSUE: Whether the notice to vacate required to be served on the lessee in order to confer jurisdiction on the Metropolitan Trial Court in an action for ejectment, may be served by registered mail? HELD: In conclusion, we stress that the notice to vacate the leased premises, required by the Rules to be served on the tenant before a forcible entry or unlawful detainer action can be commenced against him, may be served by registered mail. This is a substantial compliance with the modes of service enumerated under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court. At this juncture it bears repeating that actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature because they involve a disturbance of social order which must be abated as promptly as possible without any undue reliance on technical and procedural rules which only cause delays. In the ultimate analysis, it matters not how the notice to vacate was conveyed, so long as the lessee or his agent has personally received the written demand, whether handed to him by the lessor, his attorney, a messenger or even a postman.

Enrique Zobel versus Eligio Abreu G.R. No. L-7663, January 31, 1956 Labrador, J Facts: Petitioner Zobel sought to eject Mercado from a fishpond which the latter had leased from the former on April 15, 1950 at a yearly rental of P239.03. In the complaint filed by petitioner, he alleged that prior to and within one year from date hereof, plaintiff has been unlawfully deprived of the possession of the property in question, and despite the former's

repeated demands on the latter to vacate the same, defendant has failed to do so, the last demand having been made on October 9, 1953 and that the defendant has repeatedly failed to pay his annual rent and continued to occupy the property in question notwithstanding the repeated demands of the plaintiff to return the leased premises and for the payment of the annual rents from April 1, 1951 up to the present time, at the rate of P239.03 per year. It is also alleged in paragraph 2 of said complaint that the lease was for a term of one year from April 1, 1950 to March 31, 1951, and renewable thereafter on a year to year basis. Respondent Mercado promptly filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the justice of the peace court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter, for the reason that when the action was filed more than one year had elapsed from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of the possession. The Justice of the Peace court held that the cause of action accrued from April 1, 1952, because the plaintiff would naturally have made a formal demand to return the property on that date, for failure of the defendant to pay the rents from April 1, 1951 to March 31, 1952. The respondent judge, therefore, decided that his court lacks jurisdiction to try the case and dismissed the action. Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the action is proper Held: No. The claim that the rights of respondent Mercado to retain possession of the property expired on April 1, 1952 is not justified by the allegations of the complaint as there is no statement to that effect, nor evidence submitted on which to base such conclusion. The claim is, furthermore, contrary to the express allegation that the petitioner was deprived of the possession of the land in question "prior to and within one year from the date hereof" of the complaint. This is so because mere failure to pay rents, or a breach of contract to pay rents, does not render the possession of the lessee per se unlawful, nor may the action for his ejectment from the land accrue upon such failure or breach. In accordance with Section 2, Rules 72 of the Rules of Court, the right to bring the action of ejectment or unlawful detainer must be counted from the time the defendant has failed to pay the rent after demand therefor. It is not the failure to pay rents as agreed upon in a contract, but the failure to pay the rents after a demand therefor is made that entitles the lessor to bring an action of unlawful detainer. Furthermore, even if the lessee had failed to pay the rent after a demand had been made upon him therefor, the lessor still had the privilege to waive his right to bring the action, or to allow the lessor to continue in possession, thereby legalizing such possession.

NO DIGEST YET: Co Tiamco v Diaz

Angelina Canaynay, et al versus Feliciano Sarmiento G.R. No. L-1246, August 27, 1947 Perfecto, J. FACTS: Feliciano Sarmiento is the lawful owner of the parcel of unregistered and unsurveyed residential land which Canaynay and Asprec leased under an agreed rental of P3 a month, payable at the end of each month. By virtue of the contract of lease

referred to in the preceding paragraph, the defendants, Canaynay and Asprec bought and acquired a residential house erected on the said lot from a former lessee, Atty. Manuel Jose where Pedro O. Jose is presently the occupant of the house mentioned. Canaynay and Asprec have so far paid to Sarmiento the amount of P130 corresponding to the rentals. Sarmiento has several times verbally demanded of the defendants to pay the unpaid rentals and to vacate the premises in question, the last demand having been made on them personally and in writing on August 3, 1946, but they failed and refused and still continue to fail and to refuse to pay the rentals now amounting to P828 and to vacate the premises described above to the prejudice of Sarmiento since he is now in need of the premises subject of this complaint for the construction of his own house. On Aug. 28, 1946 Sarmiento filed an unlawful detainer case against Canaynay before peace of justice (MTC). Canaynay filed a motion to dismiss alleging that justice of peace had no jurisdiction because the cause of action accrued more than 1 year ago (1923) and that Canaynay already acquired ownership over said property by prescription (1923-1946). Motion was dismissed. Canaynay filed an action for a writ of certiorari before CFI which ruled in favor of Canaynay. Sarmiento appealed and obtained a favorable decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint was filed within the one-year period prescribed by section 1 of Rule 72 HELD: Yes. Section 1 of Rule 72 provides that the one-year period provided therein must be reckoned from the date of the "unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession." In paragraph 7 of the complaint, it is alleged that plaintiff has several times verbally demanded the defendants to pay the unpaid rents and to vacate the premises, the last demand having been made on them personally and in writing on August 3, 1946. Under the said paragraph, it is evident that the "unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession," mentioned by section 1 of Rule 72, started on August 3, 1946, when formal demand for vacating the premises was made. This position is strengthened by the allegation in paragraph 8 of the complaint to the effect that "plaintiff is now in need of the premises subject of this complaint for the construction of his own house." The fact that it is alleged in the complaint that defendants failed to pay the rents since after August 25, 1923, does not make unlawful defendant's withholding of possession of the property. Mere failure to pay rents does not ipso facto make unlawful tenant's possession of the premises. It is the owner's demand for tenant to vacate the premises, when the tenant has failed to pay the rents on time, and tenant's refusal or failure to vacate, which make unlawful withholding of possession. There is no legal obstacle for the owner to allow a defaulting tenant to remain in the rented property one month, one year, several years, or even decades. That consent, no matter how long it may last, makes lawful tenant's possession. Only when that consent is withdrawn and the owner demands tenant to leave the property is the owner's right of possession asserted and the tenant's refusal or failure to move out makes his possession unlawful, because it is violative of the owner's preferential right of possession.

Dominga De Santos versus Andres Vivas G.R. No. L-5910 February 8, 1955 Paras, C. J. Facts:

Plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract where in the former allowed the latter to work as tenants cultivate his land located in Digos Davao. The defendants were able to harvest 30 piculs or cavanes each. Said defendants refused to deliver to the plaintiff his share of 10 cavanes from the harvest. In violation of their contract plaintiff instituted an action against defendants praying that they vacate the land, deliver his share in crops harvested, be awarded damages and attorneys fees. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss due to lack of jurisdiction for lack of previous demand to vacate and the motion was denied and the court later on ruled in favour of the plaintiff. Defendants then appealed to the CFI of Davao still alleging the lack of jurisdiction due to the absence of previous demand. Issue: Whether or not previous demand is necessary for the court to acquire jurisdiction? Held: A demand to vacate is indispensable in order to determine whether the tenant's possession has become illegal and the complaint is filed within one year after said demand. No landlord, or his legal representative or assign, shall bring such action against a tenant for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease, unless the tenant shall have failed to pay such rent or comply with such conditions for a period of fifteen days, or five days in the case of building, after demand therefor, made upon him personally, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no persons be found thereon.

Horacio Guanzon versus Ang Ban G.R. No. L-186 August 6, 1946 Perfecto, J. FACTS: On February 24, 1941, Epifania Vda. de Guanzon and defendant Tan Kue entered into a written contract of lease of the former's property located at Nos. 1008 and 1010 Lavezares, Binondo, Manila, at a monthly rental of P130, effective March 15, 1941, up to March 15, 1946. Tan Kue abandoned the property in December, 1944, because he evacuated with his family to Batangas, failing to pay the monthly rental from January, 1945. Finding defendants Ang Chung occupying, without any legal ground at all, the premises abandoned by defendant Tan Kue, the original complaint was filed on April 28, 1945, for the ejectment of said two defendants. By amendments in type pleadings, Tan Kue was later included among the defendants in this case. Horacio A. Guanzon testified that Ang Ban and Ang Chung transferred to the premises in question because their house was burnt; that he required that to move out of the premises; that on May 4, 1945, Tan Kue asked him for another lease upon the premises, with the premise to use Ang Ban and Ang Chung, but Tan Kue did not offer payment of the rents due for the first months of 1945. Ang Ban alleged that he was left in the premises by Tan Kue to take care of the latter's belongings, and that Ang Chung is a mere host from the province. Judge Mariano L. de Rosa of the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision, declaring terminated the lease contract between Efifania Vda. de Guanzon and Tan Kue and ordering defendants to move out of the premises and to pay jointly and severally the sum of P130 per month from January, 1945, until the property is vacated, and the costs. ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition can be dismissed for plaintiffs failure to serve the notice required by Sec. 2 of Rule 72 of Rul es of Court HELD: Yes. Section 2 of Rule 72 is not applicable in the prevent case. Defendant Tan Kue can not invoke if because he was and is not sued for ejectment in accordance with Rule 72. In the amended complaint of May 21, 1945, Tan Kue is sued only for a sum of money, consisting of unpaid rents, liquidated damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Defendant Ang Ban and Ang Chung can not also invoke section 2 of Rule 72, because they are not tenants of plaintiffs, but are mere intruders. G.R. No. 106573 March 27, 1995 ANTONIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and STAR GROUP RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT, INC.

CHUA

FACTS: Petitioner is one of the lessees of Lot No, 180-I located at corner Iznart and Ledesma Streets, Iloilo City and formerly owned by and registered in the names of Lourdes Locsin, Manuel Locsin, Ester Locsin Jarandilla, Maria Locsin Vda. de Araneta and Jose Locsin. It appears that petitioner had been leasing Said property since 1938 by virtue of a written lease contract which had been continuously renewed for a two-year term per renewal. The latest written contract of lease covered the period from September 1, 1987 to August 30, 1989. Meanwhile the Locsin executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 18, 1989 conveying the subject premises to the herein private respondent Star Group Resources and Development. Subsequently, petitioner admittedly received private respondent to file a complaint of Unlawful Detainer on the ground of expiration of termination of the lease, before the Municipal Trial Court of Iloilo City. The court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff, STAR GROUP RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT INC., and against the defendant ANTONIO CHUA, ordering the latter or any person or persons acting in his behalf to vacate the premises and to pay plaintiff the amount of P9,500.00 per month from September 1, 1989 with an increase of 20% every September of each year, as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, until the same are completely delivered to the plaintiff. ISSUE: Whether or not the notice of demand is needed despite the agreements embodied in the contract of lease? HELD: The contract is.emphatic that if "no written notice is received from LESSEE of its intention to renew the contract," the contract terminates at the end of the lease period. It is also stipulated therein that upon termination of the period of lease and "unless LESSEE has indicated its intention to renew the contract," the lessee has to surrender the leased premises to the lessor.e The act of the lessor in renewing a lease even without the prior notice to renew on the part of the lessee, is not a waiver as to a notice for renewal as required by a subsequent lease contract. For such a result, there must be such conduct on the part of the lessor as to make the lessee reasonably believe that said requirement of notice for renewal prior to the termination of the lease will not be insisted on in the future. Some other acts or representations were needed to show that

the lessor had waived the notice requirement stipulated in each of the series of lease contracts. The circumstances attendant to the instant case are not enough, standing alone, to induce such a belief Assuming further that an implied lease arose, the lease would only be month-to-month since the rentals were paid monthly and not for the period of the original contract (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 1670 in relation to Art. 1687). A month-tomonth lease under Article 1687 is a lease with a definite period and is terminable at the end of each month upon demand to vacate by the lessor.

Gamboas Incorporated versus Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-23634, July 29, 1976 Makasiar, J. Facts: Respondent Progressive Development Corporation was the owner of the offices located at 878-F, G and H, Aurora Boulevard, Quezon City. These offices were leased to petitioner at the agreed rental of P850.00 a month, payable in advance within the first five days of each month. Consequently, respondent Progressive Development Corporation instituted Civil Case No. 9586 to eject the petitioner and to recover overdue rentals with the City Court of Quezon City, Branch III, presided over by respondent City Judge Damian Jimenez, now deceased. At the hearing, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts. In an ejectment case filed by the latter, judgment was rendered against the petitioner pursuant to which he paid all the rentals in arrears pronounced against him. Despite this payment, the respondent corporation, nevertheless, applied for an alias writ of execution which was granted and issued by the city judge. By virtue of the said writ, the city sheriff turned over the premises in dispute to the corporation. In the Court of First Instance, petitioner was able to secure a writ of preliminary injunction which, however, was lifted upon a motion to quash filed by the corporation. Thereafter, the city sheriff levied upon petitioner's personal properties. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction, with the Court of Appeals. Although the said appellate court granted the preliminary writs prayed for, it, thereafter, rendered a decision dismissing the petition and upholding the alias writ of execution in view of the unpaid rentals not covered by the judgment. Issue: Whether or not there is no more judgment to speak of and nothing else to execute Held: Yes. A writ of execution must conform with the judgment and if it is different from or exceeds the terms of the judgment, it is a nullity (Villoria vs. Piccio, 95 Phil. 802). The judgment, upon which the alias writ of execution in question was issued, simply states that "in case of failure on the part of the defendant (petitioner herein) to pay one installment due, an immediate execution shall issue upon motion of the plaintiff's (respondent Progressive Development Corporation herein) counsel." (Emphasis supplied). The installment referred to is the amount of P1,700.00 every month from May, 1962 until the total unpaid rentals of P8,500.00 "up to and including April, 1962" is fully paid. There is nothing in the judgment of April 25, 1962 which orders execution in the event petitioner defaults in the payment of future rentals at P850.00 a month after April, 1962. Even if it did, the same would be of doubtful validity, as will be discussed later. There is no doubt at all that the rentals under the judgment were fully paid by petitioner as early as November 30, 1963. Payment thereof was acknowledged by respondent Progressive Development Corporation when it issued a memorandum (Annex E of the Petition) signed by its counsel requesting the withdrawal of its security guard detailed at petitioner's offices, "as full payment of the unpaid rental has been made already." Even respondent Court of Appeals explicitly stated in its decision now under review, that the petitioner " paid the accrued rentals in installments so that by November 20, 1963, the accrued rentals under the judgment was fully paid." If the judgment has been completely satisfied, as indeed it has been, then, respondent Judge Damian Jimenez clearly exceeded his authority when he issued the alias writ of execution.

G.R. No. 89307 May 8, 1992 DR. MA. WENDELYN V. YAP, EVELIA H. BADIAGAN, TERESITA A. BALADAD and FLORENCIA C. DE VERA vs.DR. VERGEL G. CRUZ FACTS: Dr. Vergel G. Cruz, the private respondent in this case was the bonafide tenant of Amado Q. Bugayon, Jr. for almost five years. He religiously paid the monthly rentals of P1,400.00, introduced several improvements and operated a veterinary clinic known as Malate Veterinary Clinic. Sometime in the latter part of July, 1985, he offered for sale the goodwill of the veterinary clinic and some of its equipment to Dr. Wendelyn V. Yap, Evelia H. Badiagan, Teresita A. Baladad and Florencia C. de Vera, the petitioners herein. During the period of negotiations, private respondent Cruz introduced to the landlord Dr. Wendelyn V. Yap at the person interested in taking over the clinic. However, the negotiations did not materialize but the petitioners managed to enter into a contract of lease for the said premises at a monthly rental of P1,800.00 with the landlord. As a result, private respondent Cruz brought an action for "Forcible Entry with Damages" with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila rendered its decision in favor of private respondent Cruz and all the defendants are ordered to vacate the premises in question and surrender peaceful possession of the premises to plaintiff. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 44 affirmed the aforesaid decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review of petitioners and affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the action for unlawful detainer with damages was proper despite the absence of demand? HELD: We rule in favor of private respondent. When the petitioners and the landlord executed a new contract of lease, the lease of private respondent was still valid and subsisting. There is no question that private respondent has not effectively relinquished his leasehold rights over the premises in question in view of the failure of negotiations for the sale of the goodwill. Clearly, the transfer of the leasehold rights is conditional in nature and has no force and effect if the condition is not complied with. In the case at bar, however, the lack of proper notice or demand to vacate upon the private respondent is clearly evident. In the absence of such notice, the lease of private respondent continues to be in force and cannot be deemed to have expired as of the end of the month automatically. Neither can the non-payment of the rent for the month of August, 1985 be a ground for termination of the lease without a demand to pay and to vacate.

G.R. No. 112734 July 7, 1994

SPOUSES NAZARIO P. PENAS, JR. represented by ELPIDIO R. VIERNES, ATTORNEY-IN-FACTvs. COURT OF APPEALS and LUPO CALAYCAY FACTS: A written lease contract executed by the late Nazario Penas in favor of [private respondent] Lupo Calaycay at an agreed monthly rental. Nazario Penas, Sr. died on February 5, 1976 and, thereafter, on June 15, 1976, an extra-judicial settlement of his estate was executed by his surviving heirs, one of whom is his son, Nazario Penas, Jr. As time went on, the monthly rental on the subject premises had been gradually increased by the petioners, the latest of which (P691.20) Pesos. In a letter of January 18, 1990, spouses Penas, through counsel notified the private respondent that effective March 1990, they were terminating the written month to month lease contract as they were no longer interested to renew the same and demanded from the latter to vacate the premises in question on or before February 28, 1990. Private respondent failed to abide by the demand of the petitioners. However, he continued staying on the leased premises and effective March 1990, he deposited the monthly rentals in the subject premises with the PNB in his name ITF (in trust for) spouses Lucila and Nazario Penas, Jr. On August 10, 1992, plaintiffs through counsel sent another letter to the defendant to vacate the subject premises and to pay back rental arrearages which defendant failed to satisfy. Petitioners filed the present suit for unlawful detainer on the grounds of termination of the month to month lease contract and failure of the defendant to execute a new lease agreement with increased rentals. Metropolitan Trial Court rendered a decision dated dismissing herein petitioners' complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court based its decision on the finding that the complaint was filed more than one (1) year after private respondent began unlawfully occupying the premises. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, the trial court decision was upheld, the RTC ruling that herein petitioners' remedy was converted from an actio de mero hecho to an accion publiciana since more than one (1) year had elapsed from the demand upon defendants to vacate. Respondent Court of Appeals in a decision upheld the RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that since herein petitioners were not collecting the rentals being deposited by private respondent, there no longer was any lease contract between the parties for two (2) years since the first letter of petitioners to private respondent. The Court of Appeals thus agreed that the proper remedy of the petitioners is to file an action for recovery of possession in the Regional Trial Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is not the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases?

HELD: In the present case, it is of note that the first demand letter addressed by petitioners to private respondent gave the latter the option to either vacate the premises on or before 28 February 1990 or agree to execute a new lease contract for one (1) year at an increased rental rate of P2,500 per month. In Vda. de Murga v. Chan 4 we held that: The notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is not the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases. When after such notice, the lessee elects to stay, he thereby

merely assumes the new rental and cannot be ejected until he defaults in said obligation and necessary demand is first made. The facts of this case do not warrant a departure from said settled doctrine. It should be noted that even if the private respondent was depositing rentals in trust for the petitioners, what was being deposited were rentals at the old rate, which petitioners were not bound to accept or withdraw. When private respondent elected to remain in the premises after petitioners had sent him the letter of 18 January 1990 giving him the option to vacate by 28 February 1990 or to sign a new lease contract for one (1) year at an increased rental rate of P2,500.00 (later reduced to P2,000.00) a month, he assumed the new rental rate and could be ejected from the premises only upon default and by a proper demand from the petitioners. Felipe Crisostomo versus Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-43427, August 30, 1982 Vasquez, J. Facts: Defendants are occupants of the land in question, having allegedly leased separate portions thereof from Dorotea Gonzales whose title and ownership was registered. On December 4, 1964, on the basis of a deed of sale supposedly executed by Dorotea Gonzales and her children, Certificate of Title No. 69623 was placed in the name of a certain Apolinario Castillo who, in turn, executed a deed of transfer in favor of Felipe Crisostomo, herein plaintiff-appellee. As a result, Certificate of Title No. 169446 was issued in the name of the plaintiff, replacing Castillo as the registered owner. After the execution of the sale, herein plaintiff - appellee, sent notice to all the defendants to vacate the premises. When the defendants refused to heed plaintiff's letter, he filed the instant action for ejectment on November 28, 1967, praying that said defendants vacate the premises and surrender the same to the plaintiff. On November 11, 1966, Dorotea Gonzales and her children Manuel Cruz and Orlando Cruz filed Civil Case No. 9616 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking the annulment of the deed of sale executed by Dorotea Gonzales and her children in favor of Apolinario Castillo as well as the deed of transfer executed by said Apolinario Castillo in favor of the herein plaintiff appellee, Felipe Crisostomo. The Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissed the complaint but Dorotea Gonzales and her children appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision promulgated on October 3, 1973, the records of Civil Case No. 9616 were ordered remanded to the lower court for trial and decision on the merits. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the right of the private respondents to occupy the parcels of land in question Ruling: Yes. On the uncontroverted assumption, therefore, that the private respondents are lessees of the particular portions of the subject land occupied by each of them, even as of the time that the property was owned by its former owner Dorotea Gonzales, the petitioner is bound to respect such lease in view of the provision of the first paragraph of Article 1676 of the New Civil Code. The petitioner has admitted that he knew of the occupancy of the land by the private respondents when he purchased the same. He should therefore be charged with notice that the land he bought was in the possession of third parties who could in all probability be leasing the same from the former owner. If he made no inquiry as to such fact, he is deemed to have taken it for granted that he bought the property subject to existing leases of the occupants thereof.

At the time the petitioner bought the land and filed the ejectment suit in the Municipal Court of Pasig, petitioner could have validly ejected the private respondents from the land in accordance with the provisions of Article 1687 of the Civil Code, it appearing that there is no fixed period of the lease, and the same accordingly terminated at the end of every month, the agreed rental having been paid monthly. However, subsequent enactments, prompted by the desire of a New Society to alleviate the plight of the lower income group of our people, have effectively infringed the petitioner's right to eject the private respondents from the land they are occupying as lessees of the former owner thereof. However, Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 20, issued on October 12, 1972, provides: SEC. 4. Except when the lease is for a definite period, the provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code of the Philippines insofar as they refer to dwelling unit or land on which another's dwelling is located shall be suspended until otherwise provided; but other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court of the Philippines on lease contracts, insofar as they are not in conflict with the provisions of this Act, shall apply. This prescription is reiterated in Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 approved on April 10, 1979, in these words: SEC. 6. Application of the Civil Code and Rules of Court of the Philippines. Except when the lease is for a definite period the provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code of the Philippines insofar as they refer to residential units covered by this Act shall be suspended during the effectivity of this Act, but other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court on lease contracts insofar as they are not in conflict with the provisions of this Act shall apply. Under existing legislation, therefore, a lessor may not eject a lessee of a "residential unit" covered by Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 if the ground for ejectment is the expiration of the period "fixed for the duration of the lease under articles 1682 and 1687 " of the New Civil Code Article 1673 (1). The private respondents come under the protective mantle of this provision. They are lessees of a residential unit" referred to in said law is defined therein in this wise: A residential unitrefers to an apartment, house and/or land on which another's dwelling is located used for residential purposes and shall include not only buildings, parts of unit thereof used solely as dwelling houses, except motels, motels rooms, boarding houses, dormitories, rooms and bedspaces for rent, but also those used for home industries, retail stores or other business purposes if the owner thereof and his family actually live therein and use it principally for dwelling purposes: Provided, That in the case of a retail store, home industry or business, the capitalization thereof shall not exceed five thousand pesos: and Provided further, That in the operation of the store, industry, or business, the owner thereof shall not require the services of any person other than the immediate members of the family. Their rental does not exceed three hundred pesos a month. This is shown by the fact that the complaint filed by the petitioner in the Municipal Court demanded only a monthly rental of P50 which the Court of Appeals even reduced to P10 a month. There is no fixed period for the duration of the lease. Hence, the expiration thereof is governed by Article 1687 of the New Civil Code which reads: Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may

likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month. The right of the lessor to eject a lessee upon the termination of the lease in accordance with the above-quoted provision has been suspended by the express mandate of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, such suspension to last for five years from and after the effectivity of said Act. Until and unless the said suspension shall have been lifted, the ejectment of the private respondents may not be judicially decreed on the ground alone that the petitioner had given them notices or demands to vacate to render the lessees liable for eviction under Article 1673 (1) of the New Civil Code. The petitioner has not shown, nor even alleged, that the private respondents may be evicted for any of the other causes prescribed in Articles 1673 of the New Civil Code or Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25. In his complaint, petitioner relied merely on his being the purchaser of the land in question and on the notice to vacate which he served on the private respondents and posted in conspicuous places in the premises. Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 expressly provides in its last paragraph that: In no case shall the lessor be entitled to eject the lessee upon the ground that the leased premises has been sold or mortgaged to a third person.

G.R. No. 78538 October 25, 1989 BELLA S.D. UY assisted by her husband HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and NICANOR PADILLA FACTS: On October 12, 1979, the private respondent, as owner of the building consisting of 14 doors, filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioner Bella S.D. Uy in the then City Court of Manila, alleging that the latter failed to pay her monthly rental of P150.00 from September 5, 1978. On November 19, 1979, the petitioner filed her answer denying the material allegations stated in the complaint and by way of affirmative allegations alleged, among others, that sometime in the early part of 1961 the private respondent entered into a verbal contract of lease with the petitioner covering one door of the building,owned by the private respondent, at the agreed monthly rental of P60.00, which was subsequently increased to P65.00, then to P70.00 and finally to P80.00 rental a month; that sometime in the first week of September 1978, the petitioner tendered to private respondent's collector the sum of P80.00 by way of payment of the rental for the month of September, 1978, but the latter refused to accept the same claiming that the monthly rental has already been increased to P150.00 a month; that all the proffered payments made by the petitioner for the months of October 1978, November 1978, December 1978, January 1979, February 1979, March 1979, April 1979 and May 1979 were refused by the private respondent's collector based on the same ground that the sum of P80.00 as payment for the monthly rental cannot be accepted because the same was already increased to P150.00 a month. On May 16, 1980, the City Court of Manila rendered a decision in favor of the private respondent and against the petitioner. Petitioner Bella S.D. Uy appealed from the decision of the City Court of Manila to the then Court of First Instance of Manila, rendered a decision affirming the decision of the City Court of Manila. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner incurred arrears in payment of rent which fault is one of the grounds for judicial ejectment? BENJAMIN REYES UY, SR vs.

HELD: One of the grounds for judicial ejectment under B.P. Blg. 25, Section 5 (b), is Arrears in payment of rent for three (3) months at any one time: Provided, That in case of refusal by the Lessor to accept payment of the rental agreed upon, the lessee shall either deposit, by way of consignation, the amount in court, or in a bank in the name of and with notice to the lessor. It cannot be denied that the petitioner in this case incurred arrears in payment of rentals for eight (8) months. If private respondent's collector refused to accept the proffered payments, as claimed by her, she should have deposited the amount, by way of consignation, in court, or in a bank in the name of and with notice to the private respondent. From the foregoing facts, it is clear that the lessor was correct in asking for the ejectment of the delinquent lessee. Moreover, he should be granted not only the current rentals but also all the rentals in arrears. This is so even if the lessor himself did not appeal because as ruled by this Court, there have been instances when substantial justice demands the giving of the proper reliefs.

Velez versus Avelino G. R. No. L- 48448 Facts: Five parcels of land located in Cebu City with an assessed value of Php 17,000 was formerly owned by Rodrigo Velez the father of the petitioners. The lands were adjudicated to the petitioners in an extrajudicial partition. In 1970, Petitioners made a demand to vacate upon the respondents and the latter asked for a one year extension but later on changed his mind and refused to vacate. In 1973, petitioners again advised respondents to vacate the property because they needed it for their own use. In July 1976 an extrajudicial demand to vacate was made to the respondents for the petitioners will be using the property for their own purpose. In august of 1976 a complaint for recovery of possession of property was filed alleging that the respondents have no other property except for Velez and they are living on other persons premises and that respondents are using the property for commercial purposes and that respondents have maliciously, defiantly and abusively refused to accede to petitioners lawful demands. Respondents admitted that petitioners are the owners of the property but their defense is that they are occupying by lease based on an oral agreement for an indefinite period and that the present action is barred by prior judgement and should be an action for unlawful detainer because last demand was made less than a year ago. The court ruled that respondents are lessees and personal use of the owner is not a valid ground for ejectment. Issue: Whether or not possession of a land by another by tolerance of the owner the action for ejectment should be accion publiciana or forcible entry or unlawful detainer? Held: It should be accion publiciana, the purpose of which is to determine who has a better right to possess. There is no allegation of forcible entry in the complaint. Neither is it unlawful detainer because evidence shows that occupancy of respondents to the property in question is due to the tolerance of the owner and against his will.

Soledad Soco versus Francis Militante, et al.G.R. No. L-58961, June 28, 1983 Guerrero, J. FACTS: The plaintiff-appellee-Soco lessor, and the defendant-appellant-Francisco lessee, entered into a contract of lease on for commercial building and lot for a monthly rental of P800 for a period of 10 years renewable for another 10 years at the option of the lessee. One time, Francisco noticed that Soco did not anymore send her collector for the payment of rentals and at times there were payments made but no receipts were issued. Soon after Soco learned that Francisco sub-leased a portion of the building to NACIDA, at a monthly rental of more than P3,000 which is definitely very much higher than what Francisco was paying to Soco under the Contract of Lease, the latter felt that she was on the losing end of the lease agreement so she tried to look for ways and means to terminate the contract. Taking into account the factual background setting of this case, the Court holds that there was in fact a tender of payment of the rentals made by Francisco to Soco through Comtrust and since these payments were not accepted by Soco evidently because of her intention to evict Francisco, by all means, Francisco was impelled to deposit the rentals with the Clerk of Court of the City Court of Cebu, Soco was notified of this deposit. She was further notified of these payments by consignation. The City Court declared the payments of rentals valid and effective. ISSUE: Whether or not the lessee may be judicially ejected HELD: Yes. In order that consignation may be effective, the debtor must first comply with certain requirements prescribed by law. The debtor must show: (1) that there was a debt due; (2) that the consignation of the obligation had been made because the creditor to whom tender of payment was made refused to accept it, or because he was absent or incapacitated, or because several persons claimed to be entitled to receive the amount due (Art. 1176, Civil Code); (3) that previous notice of the consignation had been given to the person interested in the performance of the obligation (Art. 1177, Civil Code); (4) that the amount due was placed at the disposal of the court (Art. 1178, Civil Code); and(5) that after the consignation had been made the person interested was notified thereof (Art. 1:78, Civil Code). Failure in any of these requirements is enough ground to render a consignation ineffective. Without the notice first announced to the persons interested in the fulfillment of the obligation. The consignation as a payment is void (Limkako vs. Teodoro. 74 Phil. 313). In this connection, the purpose of the notice is in order to give the creditor an opportunity to reconsider his unjustified refusal and to accept payment thereby avoiding consignation and the subsequent litigation. This previous notice is essential to the validity of the consignation and its lack invalidates the same. The Court, therefore, finds and rules that the lessee has failed to prove tender of payment except that in Exh. 10; he has failed to prove the first notice to the lessor prior to consignation except that given in Exh. 10; he has failed to prove the second notice after consignation except the two made in Exh. 12; and he has failed to pay the rentals for the months of July and August, 1977 as of the time the complaint was filed for the eviction of the lessee. The Court holds that the evidence is clear, competent and convincing showing that the lessee has violated the terms of the lease contract and he may, therefore, be judicially ejected.

Florentino Cursino versus Pedro Bautista G.R. No. L-50335, August 7, 1989 Bidin, J. Facts: Plaintiff is the lawful owner and lessor of a property in Baclaran, Paranaque that is being leased by the respondent for Php100 every month payable within the first 5 days of every month. Defendant defaulted for the payment of rent for the months of October, November and December of 1977. On December 21, 1977 defendant sent two money orders in the amount of Php200 and Php100 respectively to cover the arrears. On December 14, 1977 plaintiff demanded to pay back rental and vacate the premises despite demand defendant failed and refused to vacate the property. Plaintiff was forced to institute action for unlawful detainer and incur expenses. Defendant alleged that he did not default but it was plaintiff who refused to accept the back rentals. The Municipal Court of Paranaque rendered a judgement in favour of the plaintiff Issue: Whether or not the refusal of the plaintiff to accept back rentals constitutes as a defense in unlawful detainer cases Held: No, the defendant violated the terms of the contract and as such it was a ground for the plaintiff to terminate the contract and demand for back rentals and demand from the defendant to vacate the premises. Even though the defendant was able to pay back rentals that does not automatically restore the contract of lease without the consent of the lessor-owner. It is the land lords demand for tenant to vacate premises when tenant has failed to pay rents on time or failure to vacate which make the unlawful withholding of possession.

Emiliana Medina versus Court of Appeals G.R. No. 104615, August 24, 1993 Davide, Jr., J. FACTS: In 1974, Dominga Hipolito, petitioner's mother, leased from Rosa Laqui, the private respondent's mother, an apartment unit. The agreement, which was orally entered into, called for the payment of rent on a monthly basis. Dominga and her family continuously occupied the premises and paid Rosa Laqui the monthly rentals thereon. Even after Dominga's death in February of 1990, her family continued to stay in the apartment. On 15 May 1990, Rosa, through her agent Menchie P. Abanilla, notified the petitioner that effective June 1990, the monthly rental of P729.35 "will be increased to One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos a month," and that the "20 per cent increase which started last January up to the month of May will be deducted to your June monthly rental." The petitioner was then provided "with the Lease Contract" for her signature. Insisting that the said increase violated the prevailing Rental Law, the petitioner refused to pay the same; she instead tendered payments of the current rentals with a 20% increase, an amount she claims is allowed by the law. Rosa refused to accept these payments. Consequently, petitioner deposited the rentals for the months of August, September and October 1990 with the Barangay Treasurer and, on 2 November 1990, filed before the MTC of Manila an action for consignation. On 27 November 1990, Ruben Laqui wrote the petitioner a letter to vacate the apartment because his brother would occupy the place. The latter disregarded the letter, prompting the private respondent to file against her on January 7, 1991 a complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTC of Manila which was later on dismissed for lack of cause of action and ordered

the private respondent, as plaintiff therein, to pay the petitioner P1,000 as attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent can eject the petitioner HELD: No. The Court agrees with the petitioner's contention that a brother is not among those granted preference for the use of the premises as against a lessee under B.P. Blg. 877. A brother is not an immediate member of the family for purposes of B.P. Blg. 877. However, the public respondent chose to disregard this point and decide the case solely on the basis of nonpayment of rentals for more than three months. It must be emphasized that while the private respondent's November 27, 1990 letter also speaks of the non-payment of rentals by the petitioner since the death of the former's "lessee, Mrs. Dominga Hipolito," the demand to repossess the property was principally anchored on his brother's need for a place to live in. Nevertheless, the ineffective deposit is not fatal to the petitioner's cause. While it may be true that under the aforesaid paragraph (b), "arrears in payment of rent for a total of three months" or "failure to deposit rentals for three months" is a ground for ejectment, the private respondent's notice to vacate was based not on the failure to pay rentals for such period but on his alleged need for the premises for the use of his brother. Private respondent studiously avoided using the nonpayment of rentals as a ground for ejectment because it would clash with his theory that the petitioner was not his lessee. Fabiana Vda. De Salazar versus Court of Appeals G.R. No. 121510, November 23, 1995 Hermosisima, Jr., J. Facts: In 1970 the respondents Nepomucenos filed a complaint for ejectment against the petitioners deceased husband on the ground of personal cultivation and conversion of the land for useful non agricultural [purposes in the Court of agrarian Relations in Malolos. A decision was rendered by the trial court in favor of respondents. Petitioners assailed the ruling stating that the court did not have jurisdiction over them since there was no substitution that was effected upon the death of her husband. Issue: Whether or not the ruling is binding upon the heirs Held: The trial held by the court without the appearance of deceaseds legal representative or substitution of heirs shall be null and void and not binding upon the heirs. However, in the case at bar substitution is not necessary since the heirs voluntarily appeared and participated in the defense of the case of the deceased. The action involving recovery of real property is a real action, as such is not extinguished by the death of the defendant. A judgement in an ejectment case is conclusive between parties and their successor in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action.

The Incompetent Carmen Caniza versus Court of Appeals G.R. No. 110427, February 24, 1997 Narvasa, C. J. FACTS: On November 20, 1989, being then ninety-four years of age, Carmen Caiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent by

judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. Amparo was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate. Caiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City. On September 17, 1990, her guardian Amparo commenced a suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. The complaint was later amended to identify the incompetent Caiza as plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian, Amparo. The amended Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caiza was the absolute owner of the property in question; that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Caiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that through her guardian, Caiza had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do. Also alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one year from the date of of first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990." Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC on April 13, 1992 in Caiza's favor. The Regional Trial Court reversed the decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not an ejectment action is the appropriate judicial remedy for recovery of possession of the property in dispute Whether or not Evangelista may continue to represent Caiza after the latter's death. HELD: Yes. Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been adequately set out. It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Caiza's act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Common sense, and the most rudimentary sense of fairness clearly require that that act of liberality be implicitly, but no less certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on the Estradas of returning the house to Caiza upon her demand. More than once has this Court adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. Yes. An ejectment case survives the death of a party. Caiza's demise did not extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her guardian. That action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal at bar.

CONTEMPT RULE 71
Heirs of Vda de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, et al G.R. No. 138660 February 5, 2004 422 SCRA 101 CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: This petition stems from a case filed by Trinidad de Leon Vda. De Roxas to set aside the decree of registration over two unregistered parcels of land granted to Maguesun Management and Development Corporation ("Maguesun") before the Regional Trial Court on the ground of actual fraud. The trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court of

Appeals denied the petition for review and affirmed the trial court. This Court reversed the appellate court's decision and awarded registration to herein petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas and her heirs, herein substituted as petitioners and directed the Land Registration Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title. Meycauayan filed a Petition for Intervention in G.R. No. 118436. Meycauayan alleged that it purchased three parcels of land from Maguesun which form part of the property awarded to the heirs of Trinidad de Leon Vda. De Roxas ("Roxas heirs"). This Court denied the Petition and also further denied the Motion for Reconsideration until it became final. The Land Registration Authority ("LRA") submitted a Report to the Regional Trial Court and prayed to cancel the decree in the name of Maguesun in order to issue another decree in favor of the Roxas heirs. Meycauayan filed with the land registration court a "Motion For Leave To Intervene And For Period Of Time To File Opposition To The Report Filed By The LRA And To File Complaint-in-Intervention." The Roxas heirs filed a Motion for Clarification with this Court which ordered LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title and the cancellation; and to further issue in the name of petitioners. The land registration court issued an order denying the LRA Report and the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Meycauayan since the Supreme Court Resolution of 29 July 1998 had rendered them moot. The Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City then canceled Transfer certificate Titles already in the name of Meycauayan. Roxas heirs filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession with the land registration court. Meycauayan filed a Complaint for reconveyance, damages and quieting of title with the trial court which is almost an exact reproduction of the Petition for Intervention filed by Meycauayan before this Court. Meycauayan filed a "Special Appearance Questioning Court Jurisdiction and Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession Against Meycauayan Central Realty Corporation" with the land registration court. The Land registration court issued a Writ of Possession against Maguesun Management and Development Corporation and deferred motion filed by movants insofar as Meycauayan Central Realty is concerned, until the Supreme Court had resolved with finality the petition for contempt of herein movant in G.R. No. 138660. The trial court dismissed Meycauayan's complaint for reconveyance and motion of reconsideration. Meycauayan filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Roxas heirs filed this petition to cite for indirect contempt the officers of Meycauayan. ISSUE: Whether or not Meycauayan's act of filing with the trial court a complaint for reconveyance, damages and quieting of title involving parcels of land, which were the subject of this Court's Decision and Resolution in G.R. No. 118436, constitutes indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. HELD: YES. Meycauayan's refusal to abide by the Court's Decision in G.R. No. 118436 has no basis. The fact that this Court ordered the cancelation of Meycauayan's titles to the disputed parcels of land in the Resolution dated 29 July 1998 should have laid to rest the issue of whether the Decision and Resolution in G.R. No. 118436 is binding on Meycauayan. Clearly, Meycauayan's defiance of this Court's Decision and Resolution by filing an action constitutes indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice. Meycauayan's persistent attempts to raise issues long laid to rest by a final and executory judgment of no less than the highest tribunal of the land constitute contumacious defiance of the Courts authority. Section 5 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that "if the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be a ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions." Despite Meycauayans mention in its certification of non -forum shopping of its attempt to intervene in G.R. No. 118436 does not negate the existence of forum shopping. This disclosure does not exculpate Meycauayan for deliberately seeking a friendlier forum for its case in which this Court had already decided with finality. A corporation and those who are officially responsible for the conduct of its affairs may be punished for contempt in disobeying judgments, decrees, or orders of a court made in a case within its jurisdiction.

CAROLINA QUINIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, TOYOTA BEL-AIR, INC., ROBERT L. YUPANGCO, LEONARDO BAHIA AND ATTY. RUDY B. CANAL, respondents G.R. No. 113867. July 13, 2000 PURISIMA, J.:

FACTS: Toyota Bel-Air, Inc. (TOYOTA) commenced before the Regional Trial Court, a case for recovery of damages with prayer for replevin of Toyota cars purchased by Manila Construction Development of the Philippines, Austria Fil-Homes, Inc. and Atty. Honor P. Moslares. The lower court issued a Writ of Replevin for the seizure of the vehicles and allowed the seizure of the vehicles wherein one was that of Carolina Quinio (Quinio), herein petitioner. Petitioner Carolina Quinio, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action but the trial court deferred resolution of subject motion until trial on the merits pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner then f iled a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals annulled the challenged Writ of Replevin and ordered the private respondents claim for damages and for recovery of the purchase price of the subject vehicles to proceed. Toyota failed to appeal, the same became final. Petitioner Quinio then filed before the Regional Trial Court a Motion to Order Plaintiff to Comply with the Court of Appeals Final Resolution. Petitioner then further filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Direct the Deputy Sheriff Honorio Santos and Plaintiff thru its President and General Manager to comply with the Court of Appeals Decision. The Makati Regional Trial Court directed the President and General Manager o f TOYOTA to return petitioner Quinios motor vehicles within five (5) days from receipt of said order. TOYOTA, failed to comply with the said Order which resulted to Motion by Petitioner to cite Bahia, Yupangco and their counsel, Atty. Rudy Canal, in contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court for failing to comply with the said order. The trial court held private respondents guilty of indirect contempt pursuant to Section 3 Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Denial of her Motion for Reconsideration prompted petitioner Quinio to bring a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the petition and also further denied motion for reconsideration was also similarly. Hence, Petitioner filed this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents, after having been declared guilty of indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71, should have been indefinitely incarcerated pursuant to Section 7, Rule 71 until the act ordered by the court has been obeyed, and not merely fined. HELD: YES. Under the rules, the penalty for contempt is prescribed by Section 6, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which gives the court the power to decide whether a fine of not exceeding One Thousand Pesos or imprisonment of not more than six (6) months, or both should be imposed. Section 7 of the same rule provides for indefinite incarceration in civil contempt proceedings to compel a party to comply with the order of the court. This may be resorted to where there is no other recourse but to use its coercive power. The reason for indefinite incarceration in civil contempt proceedings, in proper cases, is that it is remedial, preservative, or coercive in nature. Its object is to compel performance of the orders or decrees of the court, which the contemnor refuses to obey although able to do so. Applying the foregoing principles of Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 71 of the Rules of court, in the present case, the Court finds that private respondents did show a clear and contumacious behavior warranting their indefinite incarceration, as prescribed by Section 7, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. They blatantly disregarded the orders of the trial court to return the same despite their ability to comply with said orders. To enforce said decision in CA-G.R. SP. No. 25796, entitled Farida Tanedo and Carolina Quinio vs. Hon. Zosimo Angeles, et al., the court a quo issued an Order dated July 1, 1992, directing private respondent Toyota Bel-Air, Inc., thru its officers, to return the vehicle of petitioner but, private respondents refused to comply therewith. Having failed to show any justifiable reason why they have repeatedly ignored the trial courts orders, private respondents should be indefinitely incarcerated for disobeying orders, until such time that they are able to comply with the same. The Court cannot therefore uphold the imposition below of a fine of Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos. This will set a precedent, long avoided by the Court, for its orders to be easily disregarded and rendered inutile when the only sanction for their refusal to comply with the same, without justifiable reason, is an imposition of measly fines.

MEMORIA G. ENCINAS and ADOLFO A. BALBOA, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL BOOKSTORE, INC., respondent. G.R. No. 162704 November 19, 2004 TINGA, J.: FACTS: In the Resolution dated 6 April 2005, the Court required Atty. Ricardo T. Calimag, counsel for Roberto P. MadrigalAcopiado and his attorney-in-fact Datu Mohaldin R.B. Sulaiman, to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt of court for his participation in the submission of a fake judicial decision to this Court. This concerns his compliance therewith entitled Motion to Show Cause (Re: Compliance to Resolution Dated 6 April 2005). Counsel explains that he filed the Motion for Intervention with Leave of Court and Petition-In-Intervention (to which was appended a copy of the fake decision) on behalf of his clients to seek the truth in order that justice will prevail. Counsel contends that he was misled in the appreciation of the evidence (referring to the forged judicial decision) made available to him at the time of submission of the Motion and Petition-In-Intervention. Counsel asserts that there was an honest mistake in the appreciation of the documents and that there was never any malice intended in the submission of the questioned documents. ISSUE: Whether or not counsel may be charged with direct contempt.

HELD: YES. Direct contempt, or contempt in facie curiae, is misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge so as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, and can be punished summarily without hearing. It is conduct directed against or assailing the authority and dignity of the court or a judge, or in the doing of a forbidden act. It is insulting to assert a claim before this Supreme Court based on an obvious and incompetent forgery and conceived by one with so primitive a sense of what normative standards would pass judicial muster. This court rejects counsels declarations of good faith and honest mistake since, as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court, he is presumed to know better. The minimum he could have done was to verify with the appropriate authorities the documents upon which his clients based their claims, and not have relied on his clients assertions. Counsels act of filing the Motion and Petition -In-Intervention based on a spurious judicial decision constitutes direct contempt of court.

TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY INCORPORATED, ALMA PEALOSA, KIMIO HOSAKA, SUMITOMI NISHIDA, TERESITA H. QUIAMBAO and ANTONIO B. LAPID, petitioners, vs. JORGE VALDEZ, respondent. G.R. No. 150107 January 28, 2008 G.R. No. 150108 January 28, 2008 TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY INCORPORATED and TERESITA H. QUIAMBAO, petitioners, vs. JORGE VALDEZ, respondent. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: For our resolution are two (2) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated September 13, 2001 in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP No. 52914 and CA-G.R. SP No. 56579. FACTS: Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Company Incorporated (Tokio Marine), petitioner in these cases, is a domestic corporation engaged in the insurance business. The individual petitioners are its corporate officers, except Antonio B. Lapid, one of Tokio Marine's consultants. Jorge Valdez, respondent in these cases, was a former unit manager of Tokio Marine pursuant to a Unit Management Contract entered into between them. Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages against petitioners for violation of the terms of the Unit Management Contract by refusing to pay him his "commissions". Petitioners filed their separate motions to dismiss the complaint. Respondents manifested before the trial court that he filed various criminal complaints against petitioners with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City. The trial court denied petitioners' motions to dismiss. Petitioners then filed motions for reconsideration, but they were likewise denied. Petitioners filed their "Answer Ad Cautelam" in Civil Case No. 98-91356. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals assailing the Order of the trial court dated January 20, 1999 denying their motions to dismiss, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52914. The Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the trial court from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 98-91356 during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 52914. Respondent filed with the

Court of Appeals an "Urgent Notice of Taking of Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Private Respondent Jorge Valdez For Purposes of the Above-Captioned Pending Case And For Such Other Legal Purposes As May Be Warranted By Existing Law and Jurisprudence." It appears that respondent was already 75 years old and sickly. Peitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to cite respondent in contempt of court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 56579. Petitioners alleged therein that in filing with the appellate court an urgent notice of taking his deposition, respondent violated the preliminary injunction issued by the said court. The Court of Appeals consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP No. 52914 and CA-G.R. SP No. 56579 and dismissed the petitions and further lifting and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, the instant consolidated petitions. ISSUE: Whether or not deposition of respondent taken on December 14, 1999 violated the injunction issued by the Court of Appeals on October 15, 1999 is tantamount to indirect contempt of court. HELD: NO. Pursuant with Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure the following are indirect contempt: (a) Misbehavior of an officer of court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions; (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or rejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the process or proceeding of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;(d) Any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as such without authority;(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of any person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him. The taking of respondent's deposition is not a part of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 98-91356, hence, not covered by the writ of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANNY GODOY, * accused-appellant. G.R. Nos. 115908-09 March, 1995 REGALADO, J.: FACTS: Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. filed a complaint filed to cite for indirect contempt Mauricio Reynoso, Jr., a columnist, and Eva P. Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman of the editorial board, respectively, of the Palawan Times. The complaint was based on an article written by respondent Reynoso, Jr. in his column, On the Beat, and published in the July 20, 1994 issue of said newspaper which is of general circulation in Puerto Princesa City. The pertinent portions of the article complained of are hereunder reproduced: Isang maalab na issues pa ay ang DEATH THREATS laban kono kay Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. ng mga pamilya ng kanyang sinentensiyahan ng Double Death Penalty. Sinabi ni Wilmar Godoy sa DWRM programa na wala silang pagbabantang ginawa umano, at hindi nila ito kailan man isinaisip. Umaasa na lamang sila sa magiging resulta ng review ng Korte Suprema. Ayon naman kay Gacott sa kanyang interview sa DYPR ay totoong pinagbabantaan siya ng mga Godoy. Kaya ayon marami siyang Security na armado, in full battle gear. Kung totoo ito, bakit hindi niya kasuhan ang mga ito? Ito rin ang katanungan ni Mr. Tony Omaga Diaz, ang station manager ng DYPR. O bale ba gumawa siya ng sariling MULTO Pagkatapos ay takot na takot siya sa multong kanyang ginawa.

Usap-usapan pa rin ang kaso ni Godoy. Ito raw ay isang open book maging sa kanyang mga co-teachers sa Pulot na naglilive in si Godoy at ang babaing si Mia Taha. Matagal na ang kanilang ugnayan. Meron ding balita ewan kung totoo, na noong si Godoy daw ay nasa Provincial Jail pa ay dinadalaw siya ni Taha At kumakain pa sila sa labas kasama ang isang Provincial Guard. Ito rin ang dahilan kung bakit ipinagpilitan ni Judge Gacott na madala kaagad sa Muntinlupa sa National Bilibid Prisons si Godoy kahit na ang kaso ay naka-apela pa. Pero mayroon payo si Atty. Telesforo Paredes, Jr. sa mga mamamayan ng Palawan, mag-ingat kayo sa paglalakad at baka kung hindi kayo madapa ay madulas daw kayo. Dahil ayon daw kay Judge Gacott, base sa kanyang interview sa Magandang Gabi Bayan, Tagilid na raw and mundo. Maraming nagpapatunay daw dito, maski sa kapitolyo. Joke lang. Pero isang warning din sa may mga nobya, na mag-ingat sa pag-break sa inyong girlfriend, dahil baka mademanda kayo at masentensyahan ng double death penalty, lalo na kung kay Judge Gacott, dahil alam na ninyo, tagilid and laban diyan. The complaint avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the administration of justice contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous, insulting, offensive and derogatory; and also is an imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed before him making the article sub judice because it is still pending automatic review. Respondent Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. contends that his article does not intend to impede nor obstruct the administration of justice because the same was: (a) published after promulgation of the decision in the case; (b) it will not influence the review by the Supreme Court of the criminal case, considering that the Palawan Times is circulated only in the City of Puerto Princess and some parts of Palawan; (c) comments were made in good faith and in the exercise of the freedom of expression and of the press; (d) the unfavorable comments is not to degrade or impede the administration of justice; and (e) that the complaint erroneously filed with the Supreme Court contrary to Section 4, Rule 71 of the rules of Court. Respondent Eva P. Ponce de Leon, asserts that: (a) the article is merely in reaction to the television interview given by complainant in the show, Magandang Gabi Bayan, even defended his decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 11640 -41, entitled People vs. Godoy; (b) not sub judice as the same was published only after complainant had rendered his decision and had already lost jurisdiction over the case; (c) not defamatory in the absence of a clear and present danger that it will tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or ridicule the administration of justice; (d) is a valid exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press; (e) merely fair criticism which did not intend to malign in the performance of his functions; and (f) cannot be held liable for contempt because she did not have either actual knowledge of the publication since she had just returned from the United States when the same was published. ISSUE: 1) Whether or not statements constitute contempt in nature. 2) whether or not there can be contempt of court in case of post-litigation statements. HELD: 1) NO. The statements does not even deal with the merits of the case, but with the public accusations being made by complainant that he is being given death threats by the family of the accused, Danny Godoy. The article only makes a justifiable query as to why Complainant does not file the appropriate charges if his accusations are true. It merely report rumors regarding the accused Danny Godoy and do not present as facts by respondent Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. He even goes to the extent of acknowledging that he himself does not know if the rumors are true or not.

The statements are mere fair analysis of the outcome of the case. For indeed, if the Honorable Court affirms the Decision of Complainant, the accused Danny Godoy would be meted the death sentence. On the other hand, if the decision is reversed, this may adversely affect the aspirations of Complainant to be promoted to the Court of Appeals, and eventually to the Honorable Court. Again, the subject article merely reports what Atty. Telesforo Paredes, Jr. allegedly said. But more importantly, the foregoing is merely a reaction not so much to Complainants Decision, but to the public statements made by Complainant in the national television show Magandang Gabi Bayan. Sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that level of contumely which is actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Neither did the publication in question was intended to influence this Court for it could not conceivably be capable of doing so. Besides, it has not been shown that there exists a substantive evil which is extremely serious and that the degree of its imminence is so exceptionally high as to warrant punishment for contempt and sufficient to disregard the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press. 2) IT DEPENDS. Justice Moran rationalized that there two kinds of contempt by reason of publications relating to courts and court proceedings. A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by courts. This is the rule announced in the cases relied upon by the majority. In the language of the majority, what is sought, in the language of the majority, what is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influenced of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first, there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN PERFECTO R. YASAY, JR., ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONERS FE ELOISA C. GLORIA, EDIJER MARTINEZ and ROSALINDA U. CASIGURAN, petitioners, vs. MANUEL D. RECTO, PELAGIO T. RICALDE and CESAR P. MANALAYSAY, respondents. G.R. No. 129521 September 7, 1999 PARDO, J. FACTS: SEC Chairman Yasay upon request of certain stockholders of Interport Resources Corporation, directed respondent Ricalde to submit to the SEC a list of stockholders and to set a definite time and place for the validation of proxies and nominations for directors of the firm. SEC then issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the Interport Resources Corporation from holding the July 9, 1996 scheduled annual meeting of the stockholders. Despite SEC's TRO, the stockholders proceeded with the July 9, 1996 meeting presided over by respondent Manalaysay. The SEC declared the stockholders July 9, 1996 meeting null and void and directed respondents to appear before the SEC to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them or why they should not be cited in contempt. At the hearing respondent Manalaysay questioned the validity of the TRO as well as the contempt proceedings. SEC then issued an order declaring Atty. Cesar Manalaysay, Manuel D. Recto and Atty. Pelagio T. Ricalde GUILTY OF CONTEMPT and are correspondingly ORDERED to pay a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) Pesos each upon finality of this Order.

Atty. Cesar Manalaysay barred from practicing his law profession before this commission for a period of sixty (60) days from date hereof and Mr. Recto and Atty. Ricalde are prohibited and barred from acting as President/Chairman and Secretary respectively of Interport Resources, Inc. Respondents appealed before Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the SEC order declaring respondents guilty of contempt. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but Court of Appeals denied the motion. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred, as a matter of law, in setting aside the order of the SEC finding respondents guilty of contempt for disobeying its temporary restraining order to desist from holding the annual stockholders meeting of the Interport Resources Corporation scheduled on July 9, 1996. HELD: NO. In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. If the contempt is initiated by the court or tribunal exercising the power to punish a given contempt, it is criminal in nature, and the proceedings are to be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases. The State is the real prosecutor. In this case, the contempt is not civil in nature, but criminal, imposed to vindicate the dignity and power of the Commission; hence, as in criminal proceedings, an appeal would not lie from the order of dismissal of, or an exoneration from, a charge of contempt." At any rate, the SEC order directing respondents to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt was highly improper. The Court of Appeals issued on July 8, 1996, a temporary restraining order against the order of the SEC of June 28, 1996 directing the Interport Resources Corporation to desist from holding the stockholders' meeting on July 9, 1996. Contrary to the view of petitioners, the effect of the temporary restraining order of the Court of Appeals directing the SEC to desist from enforcing its own TRO was to allow such meeting to proceed as scheduled. The Court of Appeals in its final decision nullified the SEC's order. Hence, there was no willful disobedience to a lawful order of the SEC. Respondents were not guilty of contempt. The courts and other tribunals vested with the power of contempt must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise. In this case, the SEC issued the citation for contempt sua sponte. There was no charge filed by a private party aggrieved by the acts of respondents. Strictly speaking, there was no disobedience to the SEC's temporary restraining order. The Court of Appeals enjoined that order. Consequently, respondents' act in proceeding with the scheduled stock-holders' meeting was not contumacious as there was no willful disobedience to an order of the SEC. 22 The disobedience which the law punishes as constructive contempt implies willfulness. For, at bottom, contempt is a willful disregard or disobedience. 23 The SEC was rather hasty in asserting its power to punish for contempt. The chairman and commissioners of the SEC must exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint. 24

COMMISSIONER RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE RODOLFO R. BONIFACIO, RTC, Branch 151, Pasig City, respondent. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510. November 6, 2000 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. FACTS: Ma Jing was one of the 20 Chinese nationals with no valid employment documents, and was apprehended on May 7, 1999. Confined at the Bureau of Immigration (BI) Detention Center, she filed a petition for habeas and was granted by the

respondent Judge Rodolfo Bonifacio. The BI submitted a Return of the Writ alleging that a Charge Sheet was filed on May 13, 1999 against Ma Jing for violation of Sec. 37(a) of the Phil. Immigration Act No. 1940, as amended. Judge Bonifacio issued an Order for the immediate release of Ma Jing to which the BI filed a motion for reconsideration the very next day. As the BI did not release Ma Jing pursuant to the Order, Ma Jing filed a Motion to Declare BI Commissioner Rufus Rodriguez and his co-respondents guilty of contempt. Judge Bonifacio denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the BI and reiterated its Order to immediately release Ma Jing. On the same day, BI also issued a summary deportation order to Ma Jing. The BI filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals of the Orders of Judge Bonifacio. Commissioner Rodriguez and his co-respondents were found guilty of indirect contempt for non-compliance of the Orders and was then arrested and detained. ISSUE: Whether or not charge of contempt was proper. HELD: NO. In this case, respondent judge displayed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp of the basic principles governing contempt. There is no question that disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge constitutes indirect contempt. Complainant is not guilty of indirect contempt. First to be stressed is the fact that, the indirect contempt proceedings allowed by the respondent Judge was commenced by Ma Jing not through a verified petition as required by Sec. 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court but through a motion. This is in complete disregard of the explicit provision of the law. Second, the Return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus stated that there was already a Charge Sheet filed against Ma Jing. Hence, it was grievous error for respondent judge to give due course to the petition for habeas corpus despite the pending deportation case against Ma Jing.

ATTY. ERNESTO A. TABUJARA III, Complainant, vs. JUDGE FATIMA GONZALES-ASDALA, Respondent. A.M. No. RTJ-08-2126 January 20, 2009 CARPIO MORALES, J. FACTS: Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara III (complainant), by Complaint-Affidavitt, charged Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala (respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, with gross ignorance of the law and procedure, gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, graft and corruption, knowingly rendering an unjust order, and culpable violation of the Constitution. Complainant was a party to cases which were originally raffled to different branches but which were ordered consolidated and assigned to Branch 86 presided by Judge Teodoro Bay (Judge Bay), they having involved the same parties. The habeas corpus case was raffled to Branch 102 which issued on May 23, 2006 a Writ directing Deputy Sheriff Victor Amarillas to "take and have the body of . CARLOS IIGO R. TABUJARA before this Court on 25 May 2006, at 10:00 A.M. and [to] summon the respondent-[herein complainant] to appear then and there to show cause why he should not be dealt with in accordance with law." During the hearing of the habeas corpus case before Branch 102, on complainants information that there were two pending cases before Branch 86 presided by Judge Bay, Branch 102 directed the consolidation of said habeas corpus case with the other cases pending before Branch 86. After hearing was conducted on the habeas corpus case, Branch 86 Presiding Judge Bay issued an order which: 1. the child Carlos Iigo R. Tabujara shall continue to be under the custody of the respondent Ernesto Tabujara III until the Court shall have resolved the issue of custody of said child. 2. GRANTED the Temporary Protection Order dated April 19, 2006 is hereby extended until the prayer for Permanent Protection is resolved. And 3. The respondent Ernesto Tabujara III is hereby ordered to bring the child Carlos Iigo Tabujara to this Court during the hearing of these cases on July 14, 2006 at 8:30 in the morning.

Complainants wife filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order Respondent to Comply with the Writ of Habeas Corpus with Urgent Motion For Partial Reconsideration. The motion contained no notice of hearing and no copy was furnished herein complainant, albeit a copy was sent to his counsel via registered mail. Respondent Presiding Judge of Branch 87 acted on the motion of complainants wife and amended Judge Bays order by advancing the production of the parties child from July 14, 2006 to June 1, 2006. Complainant having failed to appear at the rescheduled date (by respondent) for him to produce the minor child, declared him in contempt of Court for defying the order directing the production of the minor, in which case, a bench warrant was ordered against respondent, who is likewise ordered imprisoned until such time that he is willing to appear and comply with the order of this Court. The appellate granted a Temporary Restraining Order and ordered complainants wife to submit a Comment on the petition. complainant filed before the appellate court an urgent ex-parte motion to set aside respondents Order and bench warrant and the appellate court granted the motion. Hence, arose the present complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not contempt charge of respondent was proper. HELD: NO. Under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, complainants alleged disobedience is an indirect contempt the punishment for which requires that a respondent should be first asked to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. If at all, complainant was guilty of indirect contempt and not direct contempt. Indirect or constructive contempt is committed "outside of the sitting of the court and may include misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice." For not affording complainant the opportunity to explain why he should not be cited in contempt, she blatantly disregarded Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

LUZVIMINDA V. LIPATA, petitioner, vs. JUDGE EDUARDO C. TUTAAN, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch V (Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, Branch 84), JOCELYN O. AGCAOILI and JOSE J. AGCAOILI, respondents. G.R. No. L-61643. September 29, 1983 AQUINO, J FACTS: That decision became final and executory. Judge Tutaan dismissed the appeal of Luzviminda and her stepmother because their record on appeal, due on December 26, 1981, was filed on January 4, 1982. Their two petitions for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, assailing the disallowance of their appeal, were dismissed. In a 2nd indorsement to Deputy Court Administrator Arturo B. Buena dated June 17, 1982, Judge Tutaan justified his decision and the writ of execution. In an unverified motion, the Agcaoili spouses prayed that Luzviminda and her stepmother be cited or declared in contempt of court and committed to prison until they complied with the decision because, they failed to obey the decision of Judge Tutaan. It was resolved in Judge Tutaan's order adjudging Luzviminda in contempt of court because she failed to comply

with the writ of execution. She was "sentenced to be confined to the city jail of Quezon City until she shall have complied with the decision" that she should vacate her Pandacan residence and surrender the same to the Agcaoili spouses. She was arrested but released allegedly upon her oral request for an extension. She was re-arrested on September 1, 1982 and confined in jail. Luzviminda filed her petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court. ISSUE: Whether or not contempt order is proper. HELD: NO. A contempt order which it not sanctioned by the Rules of Court is void. It is not contempt of court for a judgment debtor to disobey the writ of execution for it is the sheriff's duty to enforce the writ. He did not perform, his duty as ordained in Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which requires him to deliver the property to the party entitled thereto. Thus, "a person cannot be punished for contempt because of his alleged disobedience of an order of court not addressed to him. A writ of execution issued by a justice of the peace to the sheriff, directing the latter to place the plaintiff in possession of property held by the defendant, is not an order addressed to the defendant." The delivery of the real property pertains to the sheriff alone to whom the law entrusts the execution of judgments.

G.R. No. L-35333 July 20, 1982 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF FELIX M. SULIT. FELIX M. SULIT, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JOEL P. TIANGCO, Judge, Circuit Criminal Court of Batangas, and JOSE AQUINO, Chief of Police of Batangas City, respondents. G.R. No. L-35333 July 20, 1982 FERNANDO, CJ.: FACTS: The use of language characterized as "insolent, disrespectful, and contemptuous," resulting in respondent Judge, now deceased, being compelled to suspend the session, but not deterring, so the order for contempt recited, petitioner Felix M. Sulit, a member of the bar and private prosecutor in the case, from continuing to address the people present in Court "in a very loud voice," charging the presiding judge with proceeding in utter disregard "of the rules and law," was the basis for petitioner being "summarily adjudged in contempt of court." The penalty imposed was imprisonment of ten (10) days." Hence this application for the writ of habeas corpus, the principal allegation being that such order of incarceration was without legal basis. There is some conflict in the testimony given by petitioner and respondent Judge as to the precise nature of the incident that led to the contempt citation. It is clear, that there was resentment on the part of petitioner when respondent Judge praised the other private prosecutor, Attorney Beloso, which is obvious from his memorandum submitted to this Court. Thus: "It is to be noted that the Honorable respondent Judge, for four (4) times had embarrassed Your Petitioner without justification. First, when the Judge took from Atty. Sulit the right to re-direct the witness for the prosecution without the authority of the Fiscal; the Honorable Respondent Judge in this instance became the Fiscal and the Judge at the same time; second, when he declared "that is why we need good lawyers like Atty. Beloso, at the outset I thought that it was Atty. Beloso who would conduct the direct examination, but it was Atty. Sulit who conducted the direct examination;" third, when it required Atty. Sulit to confirm Atty. Beloso as a competent lawyer; and fourth, when the Court prevented Atty. Sulit several times from finishing what he is saying but cutting him short in his statement by means of the court's interference. It is more than highly probable, therefore, that the tone which he addressed respondent Judge was less than courteous. Moreover, on the next

day, at his radio program, Tayo'y Magsiyasat, he used language intemperate and disrespectful which led to his citation for indirect contempt. The probability, thus becomes well-nigh a certainty. ISSUE: Whether or not charge of contempt proper. HELD: YES. The challenged order for direct contempt was not vitiated by jurisdictional infirmity. As held in a case where contempt in facie curiae could be summarily punished without hearing. However, the punishment of ten days is impressed with a severe character. It cannot be denied either that unless exercised with restraint and judiciousness, this power lends itself to manifestations of whim, caprice, and arbitrariness. There is a compelling and exigent need therefore for judges to take the utmost care lest prejudice, innate or covert hostility to personality of counsel, or previous incidents lead them to characterize conduct susceptible of innocent explanation as slights on the dignity of the court. It is ever timely to remember how easy it is to overstep the dividing line that should separate the prosecutor from the judge, when both roles are merged in the same person. It is important that public confidence in judicial impartiality and fairness be not impaired. 'The power to punish for contempt,' as was pointed out by Justice Malcolm 'should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindicative principle. Only occasionally should the Court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.' The lower court, it clearly appears, failed to meet such a rigid but commendable test." It does appear, therefore, that the incarceration of petitioner Sulit by virtue of the order for direct contempt lasted until this Court issued its resolution granting him liberty upon the posting of P200.00 bail, such resolution having been issued the day after this petition was filed. This detention ceased on the fifth day, the bail having been filed. That was more than enough punishment for such direct contempt.

PEDRO GAMBOA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. JOSE TEODORO, SR., JOSE AZCONA, Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental GERONIMO R. FLORES, as receiver, respondents. G.R. No. L-4893 May 13, 1952 BENGZON, J. Facts: In Civil Case No. 1328 of the Court of Negros Occidental instituted by Catalino Galang and Micaela Aggabao against Manuel Uytiepo for the recovery of land where the respondent judge rendered judgement for plaintiffs. The court appointed Geronimo R. Flores as receiver of the land. The record of appeal submitted by the defendant was duly approved. The receiver filed a motion in the same case alleging that "Pedro Gamboa, who claims to be a lessee of Manuel Uytiepo cut or caused to be cut the standing sugarcane" on the land the under receivership, and asking that said Gamboa be summoned to explain why he should not be punished for contempt. Pedro Gamboa filed an urgent petition for postponement asserting that as secretary-treasurer of the Planters Association of the Central Azucarera del Danao he had to attend the meeting of the association as being designated to distribute cars to the planters adhered to the sugar Central, which could not be postponed without previous notice to the planters. The respondent judge considered non-appearance of Gamboa of contempt issued an order for his arrest. Pedro Gamboa called the attention of the court that he was not a party to the litigation hence could not have committed contempt. Judge Eduardo Enriquez, allowed Gamboa to file a bond for his temporary liberty. Respondent Judge ordered Pedro Gamboa to appear "to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court." Gamboa submitted his explanations; but the Court rejecting the same, found him guilty of contempt and sentenced him to

pay a fine of P200 within 24 hours. On June 27, 1951, Pedro Gamboa filed a notice of appeal from said order to the Court of Appeals. The receiver filed an urgent motion asserting that Gamboa had not complied with the order of the court on June 25, 1951 and requesting that Gamboa be again booked for contempt. Gamboa replied that he had appealed the order of June 25, and had asked the court to fix a bond. Respondent ordered Gamboa to appear to give his reasonswhy he should not be again cited for contempt. Gamboa appeared and reasoned that having appealed from the order of June 25, 1951 he thought he was excused from compliance. Judge Teodoro issued two orders, one allowing Gamboa to appeal only "from the portion of his order sentencing him to pay a fine of P200" and another of the following tenor. Hence, Gamboa filed this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in sentencing Gamboa for contempt even as his appeal from that part was turned down, without giving him a chance to make amends for his erroneous belief. HELD: YES. The petitioner should have been given a reasonable time, after his appeal had been denied, to comply with such portion of the order. The man believed he was not duty bound to comply because he had appealed. Courts should be slow in jailing people for non-compliance with their orders. Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised. A bona fide misunderstanding of the terms of the order of the procedural rules should not immediately cause the institution of contempt proceedings. The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. Such power being "drastic and extra ordinary in its nature should not be restored to unless necessary in the interest of justice.

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents. G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 MALCOLM, J. FACTS: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute closed. The city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. The police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The vessels reached their destination at Davao and the women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women

married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila. The attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao. The court warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the nonproduction of the persons were far from sufficient. Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this connection remains to be done. The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila. ISSUE: Whether or not charge of contempt is proper. HELD: Yes, but only against Justo Lukban. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the court. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government. The official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court. NO DIGEST YET: Villavicencio v Lukban MAXIMO GALVEZ, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC., defendant-appellee. ATTORNEYS RAQUIZA, SUPNET, DE GRACIA and ASUNCION, respondents-appellants. G.R. No. L-12581 May 29, 1959 LABRADOR, J. FACTS: In C.A. G.R. No. 15437-R, entitled "Maximo Galvez, plaintiff-appellee vs. Republic Surety and Insurance Co., defendant-appellant," the Court of Appeals awarded costs to appellee Galvez. Thereupon, the attorneys of Galvez, namely, Raquiza, Supnet, De Gracia and Asuncion, filed with the Clerk of Court of Manila a bill of costs, in the total amount of P502.35. The bill was received by the office of the clerk of court and attorney for defendant-appellant received copy thereof. As no opposition was forthcoming, counsel for Galvez filed an ex-parte motion for execution but the following day the motion for execution was withdrawn and another filed. A writ of execution was issued, but on the previous day, attorney for the

Republic Surety filed an opposition to the bill, claiming that as the judgment of the Court of First Instance appealed from made no finding as to costs and only the decision of the Court of Appeals granted costs to appellee. In view of the difficulty on the part of the court to determine what was meant by the grant of the cost in general terms by the Court of Appeals, Judge Narvasa issued an order dated February 2, granting the defendant-appellant five days within which to seek clarification of the decision of the Court of Appeals as to costs. Judge Narvasa ordered the sheriff to deliver the amount to said counsel. Counsel for appellant moved to reconsider the order. The writ of execution issued on January 25 had been carried out and funds of the appellant in the Philippine Bank of Commerce were garnished to the amount of P472.67. The amount was collected by the clerk of the Court of First Instance amd same was received by Atty. De Gracia of the law firm which is the counsel for appellee. The motion filed by appellant in the Court of Appeals to clarify the grant of costs ordered effect that the costs are those incurred in the appellate court only. Counsel for appellee filed an opposition to reduce the costs to P20, and to return the balance of the costs already paid to them and court granted. The court was informed by the sheriff that the amount ordered to be returned, P473, to the appellant, had already been received by Atty. De Gracia of the law firm of Raquiza, et al., counsel for the appellee. As the court found out that the writ of execution for the payment of costs had already been executed, the court set aside its order for the return (by the sheriff) of the excess in the costs to the appellant. The court ordered the appellee's counsel to return to the appellant the amount of P473. Thereupon counsel for appellant asked for the issuance of a writ of execution against the properties of counsel for appellee, to enforce payment of the amount of P473. Opposition to this motion was presented but court directed counsel for the appellee to comply with the order to return the sum of P473 within 10 days from notice, copy of this order was served on said counsel. Appellant's counsel moved the court to declared appellee's counsel in contempt, and the court issued an order requiring said counsel to show cause why they should not be declared in contempt. On June 26, after hearing the explanations given by appellee's counsel, the court issued the order in question. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the action of appellee's counsel is contemptuous, where Republic Surety itself had delayed presentation of motion for clarification because it did so only on February 7, the last day. HELD: YES. A cursory reading of the order would show that it only requires compliance with a simple order of the court to return the excess cost paid to them, and this order dates back as early as April 16, 1957. The order appealed from was issued only after the lapse of 70 days from the first order requiring the return. Certainly, courts should not tolerate this unjustifiable delay in returning sums obtained under doubtful conditions. It is only by a threat of imprisonment that a court can compel respect for it and obedience to its orders. The order is expressly in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which provides as follows: SEC. 7. Imprisonment until order obeyed. When the contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it. 'In a "civil contempt" the proceeding is remedial, it is a step in the case of the object of which is to coerce one party for the benefit of the other party to do or to refrain from doing some act specified in the order of the court. Hence, if imprisonment be ordered, it is remedial in purpose and coercive in character, and to that end must relate to something to be done by the defendant by the doing of which he may discharge himself. As quaintly expressed, the imprisoned man "carried the keys to his prison in his own pocket."

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO PERALTA, JR., (Accused) SOTERO NAVARRO, respondent-appellant. G.R. No. L-36506. April 28, 1983 RELOVA, J

FACTS: Francisco Peralta, Jr., alias Boy Peralta, who has been found guilty and sentenced to reclusion perpetua was seen, two days after the promulgation of the judgement, at the Majestic Restaurant with some companions in civilian clothes. CFI Judge Amador E. Gomez out about such which then he issued an order requiring the Provincial Warden, Major Sotero Navarro, to appear before his sala for examination under oath with respect to that incident. Major Navarro called up Judge Amador Gomez and requested that he be allowed to file an explanation to the court by telephone but was denied as the matter involved public interest Major Navarro then informed Judge Gomez of the Provincial Governor's instructions that he should submit to the latter to an investigation first before going to the Court. Judge Gomez warned Navarros f ailure to appear would result to an order for his arrest for contempt of court. Major Navarro declared that he was submitting a written manifestation, where he questioned the jurisdiction of the court to issue the Order. The court declared him in contempt of court and his arrest was immediately ordered. But it was unserved as Major Navarro warned the servers that if they insisted on serving the order of arrest they would face charges of illegal arrest. Major Navarro sought to set aside the questioned Order, and to quash the warrant of arrest alleging lack of jurisdiction. His motion was set for hearing for its reconsideration but Navarro refused to appear in court. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to cite Major Navarro in contempt. HELD: YES. While it is true that the trial in the case of People vs. Peralta had already been terminated and was appealed, the trial court, pursuant to Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, has jurisdiction "to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal." The order was intended for the protection of complainant and witnesses. Appellant was required in an order to appear in court in order that he may be examined under oath since the incident was a matter of public interest, and, if true, puts in serious jeopardy the personal safety and security of the witnesses. His failure to appear involve not only disobedience if a court's lawful orders but deliberate acts tending to degrade the court. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgment, orders and mandates of the courts, and consequently, to the due administration of justice. The reason behind this power to punish for contempt is that respect of the court guarantees the stability of its institution. Without such guarantees, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation. ATTY. FABIAN GARDONES, complainant, vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE ANDRES MA. DELGADO, respondent. A.M. No. 120 July 23, 1974 Makasiar, J.

FACTS: Atty. Gardones failed to obey the subpoena issued by the respondent requiring him to appear in the morning of September 8, 1969 as a witness in the preliminary examination of a criminal case of homicide through reckless imprudence, which subpoena was duly received by complainant. During the said preliminary examination complainant repeatedly drove his jeepney back and forth along the road fronting the court session hall between the hours of 10:00 and 11:00 in the morning of September 8, 1969, and repeatedly blew its horn, interrupting for at least three times the preliminary examination then being conducted by the respondent. Respondent judge found complainant Gardones guilty of direct contempt for: (1)

having failed to obey the subpoena directing him to appear in court; and (2) having driven his jeep to and from along the highway fronting the municipal building which tended directly to impede, obstruct and delay the administration of justice. ISSUE: Whether or not charge of contempt was proper. HELD: NO. The failure to obey subpoena constitutes indirect, not direct, contempt, for which the complainant could not be adjudged guilty without hearing him or without due process of law. The respondent judge therefore gravely erred in so ordering the arrest of the complainant for such indirect contempt without giving him his day in court, which is grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law. While it is true that the complainant committed direct contempt for having disturbed the preliminary examination then being conducted by the respondent judge by repeatedly driving his jeep and honking its horn in the vicinity of the court session hall, for which the complainant was ordered arrested and confined in jail, the respondent should have issued a separate order for such direct contempt, and another order requiring complainant to show cause why he should not be punished for disobedience to its process, to give the complainant a chance to explain his failure to appear as witness.

Ayo v Cusi G.R. No. L-46729 AQUINO, J

November 19, 1982

FACTS: The Director of Lands, after a bidding, awarded to Bian Development Co., Inc. the Sales Application of a lot located at Barrio Tamugan, Guianga (Baguio District), Davao City. Some occupants of the lot protested against the sale. The Director of Lands dismissed the protests and ordered the occupants to vacate the lot and remove their improvements. No appeal was made. The Director found that the protestants (defendants in the 1961 ejectment suit, some of whom are now petitioners herein) entered the land only after it was awarded to the corporation hence are not bona fide occupants but are squatters. He issued a writ of execution but the protestants defied the writ and refused to vacate the land. Because the alleged occupants refused to vacate the land, the corporation filed against them on an ejectment suit which delayed the issuance of the patent. The trial court found that the protests of twenty defendants were among those that were dismissed by the Director of Lands. During the pendency of this case, or at about four o'clock in the morning of December 12, 1978, Ciriaco Tebayan, Domingo Nevasca, Rogelio Duterte and Sofronio Etac, employees of the Crown Fruits and Cannery Corporation, plowed or bulldozed with their tractors a portion of the disputed land which was occupied by Melquiades Emberador, one of the petitioners herein. The disputed land was leased by Bian Development Co., Inc. to the canning corporation. The four tractor drivers destroyed the improvements consisting of coffee, coconut and banana plants. Emberador was in the hospital at the time the alleged destruction of the improvements occurred. However, it should be noted that Emberador was not expressly named as a defendant in the ejectment suit. Apparently, he is not included in the trial court's decision although he was joined as a co-petitioner in this prohibition case. The petitioners asked that the four tractor drivers and Honesto Garcia be cited in contempt of court for having disregarded the restraining order enjoining specifically Judge Vicente N. Cusi and the provincial sheriff from enforcing the decision in the ejectment suit, Civil Case No. 3711.

ISSUE: Whether or not contempt was committed. HELD: NO. The temporary restraining order was not directed to Bian Development Co., Inc. its officers, agents or privies. Emberador was not named specifically in the trial court's judgment as one of the occupants to be ejected. Emberadors remedy is not in a contempt proceeding but in some appropriate civil and criminal actions against the destroyer of the improvements. There is no merit in the instant prohibition action. The constitutional prohibition relied upon by the petitioners as a ground to stop the execution of the judgment in the ejectment suit has no retroactive application to that case and does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to enforce that judgment. DESA ENTERPRISES, INC., and LUIS N. LOPEZ, petitioners, vs. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION and EMILIO PANTOJA, respondents. G.R. No. L-45430 September 30, 1982 EMILIO PANTOJA, BENJAMIN VERGARA and ELEUTERIO LAGRISOLA, petitioners, vs. HON. JESUS ARLEGUI and DESA ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents. G.R. No. L-45644 September 30, 1982 FACTS: Emilio Pantoja sent a letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) asked for the revocation of the certificate of registration of the Desa Enterprises, Inc., upon the ground that his signature, as well as that of his wife, in the articles of incorporation of said corporation, was obtained by Dionisio Chua Kang Hay, one of the incorporators of said corporation, by means of fraud and false representation. The complaint was docketed as SEC Case No. 1201 and pursuant thereto, SEC Commissioner Arcadio E. Yabyabin issued an order appointing auditors to examine and audit the books of account of the corporation, The SEC further decreed that, no sale, transfer, disposition of, or encumbrance upon the assets of the said corporation shall be made without the written consent of both of the parties and copy of any such agreement and consent of both of the parties and a copy of any such agreement and consent submitted to this Commission. In the latter part of 1975, Gen. Alfredo Montoya of the II PC Zone suggested to Emilio Pantoja and Dionisio Chua Kang Hay the resumption of operations by the Lian Ice Plant while SEC Case No. 1201 was pending. The parties agreed a Memorandum Agreement was executed by Emilio Pantoja and Dionisio Chua Kang Hay giving "their conformity to the lease of the Lian Ice Plant by Luis N. Lopez. On that same day , Desa Enterprises, Inc., entered into a contract of lease with Luis Lopez whereby the corporation leased to the latter the Lian Ice Plant and the land on which it stands. The Chief of Staff and Deputy Zone Commander of the II PC Zone verbally ordered the immediate resumption of the operations of the Lian Ice Plant under the management of Luis Lopez. Emilio Pantoja requested that he be given a period of five (5) days within which to seek the advice of his counsel but was denied. As a result, Emilio Pantoja filed an urgent petition with the SEC for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, to restrain the 11 PC Zone Command or their subordinates from interfering with the intra-corporate controversy and was granted. Emilio Pantoja filed an urgent manifestation with the SEC that the Lian Ice Plant had resumed commercial operations in utter and wanton violation and disregard of the Commission's order. Upon verification, the SEC found that the ice plant was indeed in operation. Hence, SEC Associate Commissioner Julio A. Sulit, Jr. ordered in contempt the respondent and its agents, including Luis Lopez, for deliberate disregard of, and disobedience to the lawful order of this Commission and was directed to appear before the Commission to show cause why they should not be dealt with and punished for contempt of this Commission. Luis Lopez filed a special appearance and manifestation alleging that he is not a party to the case and is

not aware of the proceedings in this case. Luis Lopez, without waiting for any action that may be taken thereon, and the Desa Enterprises, Inc., filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners, Desa Enterprises, Inc. and Luis Lopez further contend that they are not parties in the case before the SEC, the parties being Emilio Pantoja and Dionisio Chua Kang Hay, and were not furnished copies of the orders, violation, of which they charged so that the SEC cannot cite them for contempt. HELD: NO. The fact that the petitioners may not be parties in SEC Case No. 1201 does not preclude the SEC from citing them for contempt. The rule is settled that "persons who are not parties in a proceeding may he declared guilty of contempt for wilful violation of an order issued in the case if said persons are guilty of conspiracy with any of the parties in violating the court's order." In pursuant wit Section l(b) of Republic Act No. 1143, the SEC has power to penalize any violation of or non-compliance with any terms or conditions of any certificate, license, or permit issued by the Commission, or of any order, decision, ruling or regulation thereof. In any event, the respondent Commission, in its questioned order of December 29, 1976, has directed Luis Lopez and Desa Enterprises, Inc. to appear before it and to show cause why they should not be dealt with, and punished for, contempt, for violating the Commission's order dated July 23, 1976, The arguments presented here could be introduced in said hearing. LIM SE and BENITO LIM, petitioners, vs. HON. MANUEL A. ARGEL, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch XXXV, JUANA SAN PEDRO-OCAMPO, FRANCISCO SAN PEDRO, GENARO BULOTANO and THE SHERIFF OF BAGUIO CITY and/or his deputy/deputies or DEPUTY SHERIFF ESTEBAN S. PAR, respondents. G.R. No. L-42800 July 30, 1979 AQUINO, J.

FACTS: Lim Se and Benito Lim alleged that from 1965 to 1970 Lim Se leased from Venancia Chiombon through her attorney-in-fact, Francisco San Pedro, the ground floor, mezzanine and basement of the Venancia Building. When that lease expired in 1970, Lim Se leased the same premises from the Estate of Florencio Reyes, Sr. until June, 1973. It was also alleged in the petition that in Civil Case No. 2143 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, an interpleader action instituted by Lim Se and the other tenants of the Venancia Building against Francisco San Pedro and the estate of Florencio Reyes, Sr. (which is the owner of the lot and which claimed to have become the owner of the Venancia Building), it was settled in the court's order of March 16, 1972 that the lessees would pay the rentals to the said estate and not to San Pedro. Without awaiting the outcome of the Cavite case, Genaro Bulotano in May, 1975 filed in the Caloocan City Branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Juana San Pedro-Ocampo and Francisco San Pedro an action to recover possession of Door No. 72 of the Venancia Building, its mezzanine floor and basement, the premises leased by Lim Se and Benito Lim (as already stated above), and rentals and damages amounting to P94,800 (Civil Case No. C-3547). In Civil Case No. C-3547 defendants Juana San Pedro and Francisco San Pedro in June, 1975 (or about a month after the main action was brought) filed against Lim Se and Benito Lim an unverified third party complaint (which in reality was an ejectment suit), praying that they be ordered to vacate the ground floor, mezzanine and basement of the Venancia Building and to pay rentals.

Juana S. Ocampo and Francisco San Pedro filed an urgent motion for summary judgment. They attached thereto Bulotano's affidavit, stating that on December 19, 1970 he bought the Venancia Building from Juana San Pedro-Ocampo. In the deed of sale, it was stated that the building was constructed on two lots registered in the name of Florencio Reyes but which were under litigation in Civil Case No. 2043 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio entitled "Pedro Carantes, et al. vs. City of Baguio, Florencio Reyes, et al." Court ordered Lim Se and Benito Lim to vacate Door No. 72 of the Venancia Building. Juana and Francisco filed a motion for execution that Lim Se and Benito Lim had been withholding possession of the premises in litigation for the last five years without paying rentals. Lim Se and Benito Lim filed a "motion for reconsideration and to hold case in abeyance". The lower court or the Court of First Instance denied the motion of Lim Se and Benito Lim for reconsideration and to hold case in abeyance. Lower court declared its summary judgment final and executory. No appeal was perfected, hence the lower court ordered that a writ of possession should be issued against Lim Se and Benito Lim. Instead of giving petitioners the usual period of at least five (5) days within which to vacate the premises peacefully, said deputy sheriff gave petitioners only two (2) hours to do so.And when petitioners failed to comply with said impossible demand, Deputy Sheriff Esteban S. Par with the aid of able-bodied men physically threw out of the premises into the streets some of petitioners' personal properties forced petitioner Benito Lim, his eight-month pregnant wife, and one year old son, out of the premises into the street, together with the petitioners' other family members and padlocked the premises with most of petitioners' properties still inside the same. The "Writ of possession" was consummated even before their counsel had received a copy of the order of execution. The petitioners underscored that the lower court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering summary judgment in an ejectment case, where the venue was improperly laid, and in ordering execution pending appeal. They prayed for an injunction to restrain the lower court from further hearing the ejectment case and to order the sheriff to restore to them the possession of the premises in question. They asked for the annulment of all proceedings in the lower court. ISSUE: Whether or not contempt charge is proper. HELD: YES. In an ejectment suit, where the petitioners had been ejected by the trial court, this Court in a certiorari action issued ex parte a writ of mandatory injunction to restore them to the possession of the houses from which they had been ousted. It is obvious that Atty. Adaza's characterization of the mandatory injunction as "unjust and a miscarriage of justice" and as devoid of factual and legal basis is unfounded and unwarranted. He treated a resolution of this Court as if it were a pleading of an adversary which he could assail in unrestrained and abrasive language. His unjustified and disrespectful characterization carries with it obvious derogatory implications or innuendos which clearly constitute direct contempt or contempt facie curiae.

ARMANDO ANG, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO, Regional Trial Judge, Branch LXXXIV and HON. JUDGE JOSE P. ARRO, Branch CIII, both of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, and ASSISTANT FISCAL NARCISO T. ATIENZA of Quezon City, respondents. G.R. No. L-66371 May 15, 1985 RELOVA, J. In the supplemenal petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Armando Ang seeks to set aside the order, dated February 9, 1984, of respondent Judge Jose P. Castro of the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXXIV in Quezon City, denying his appeal from an order holding him in contempt of court. FACTS: Petitioner, through the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, filed an administrative complaint against respondent judge for ignorance of the law, gross inexcusable negligence, incompetence, manifest partiality, grave abuse of discretion, grave misconduct, rendering unjust decision in Civil Case No. Q-35466 and dereliction of duties in not resolving his motion for reconsideration of the adverse decision in said civil case. Respondent judge ordered petitioner to appear before him on December 29, 1983 at 8:30 in the morning, and to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court, for malicious, insolent, inexcusable disrespect and contemptuous attitude towards the court and towards him. Respondent judge found petitioner guilty of contempt of court, sentenced him to suffer five (5) days imprisonment and ordered his arrest for his failure, despite notice, to appear on the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge against him. Petitioner filed his notice of appeal but was denied. Thereafter, respondent judge instituted before the Office of the City Fiscal of Quezon City a criminal complaint for libel against herein petitioner before this Court. ISSUE: Whether or not malicious imputations wer uttered in the presence or so near respondent as to obstruct or interrupt proceedings before him. HELD: No, they were contained in the pleadings and/or letters-complaint filed by petitioner before the Office of the Presidential Assistant on legal Affairs and before this Court in the aforementioned administrative case filed by petitioner against him. Section 3, particularly paragraphs (b) and (d), Rule 71 of the New Rules of Court, provide: SEC. 3. Indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing. After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt: (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto (d) Any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; The Rules of Court cannot be any clearer. The use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Considering the aforecited

provisions, petitioner's conduct constitutes indirect contempt and, if found guilty may appeal pursuant to Section 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. which reads: SEC. 10. Review of judgment or order by Court of appeals or Supreme Court; bond for stay. The judgment or order of a Court of First Instance made in a case of contempt punished after written charge and hearing may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, but execution of the judgment or order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the person in contempt, in an amount fixed by the Court of First Instance, conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or order. The appeal may be taken as in criminal cases.

EDILBERTO DELIMA, NENITA DACILLO, and ATTY. QUIRINO N. ORIEL, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE PEDRO P. GALLARDO, in his capacity as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court of 13th Judicial District, Tacloban City, respondent. G.R. No. L-41281-82 May 31, 1977 MARTIN, J. Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the order of respondent Hon. Pedro P. Gallardo, then Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court of the 13th Judicial District, Tacloban City, dated August 8, 1975, denying petitioners' motion to inhibit respondent Judge from further hearing Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-XIII-12 and 13-L s. '75 and his order dated August 12, 1975, in the same criminal cases, declaring petitioner Atty. Quirino N. Oriel in contempt of court, and sentencing him to pay a fine of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) and an imprisonment of twenty (20) days. FACTS: Petitioner Edilberto Delima is the incumbent Barrio Treasurer of Zone I, Poblacion, Capoocan, Leyte; petitioner Nenita Dacillo was a former high school teacher of the Capoocan Community High School, who during her incumbency was assigned by District Supervisor Mabini Madriaga as teacher-collector to collect dues from students of the Capoocan High School. Barrio Council of Zone I, Poblacion, Capoocan, Leyte, promulgated Resolution No. 6, requiring District Supervisor Mabini Madriaga and his wife, Elementary School Principal Angeles Madriaga, both of the Capoocan Elementary School, to deposit all collections pertaining to the Capoocan Community High School, and render an accounting of all collections, funds and expenditures, and disbursements made by said spouses. Because of the failure of the Madriaga couple to comply with Resolution No. 6, the Barrio Council of Zone I filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte a complaint against them for malversation of public funds. After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte filed a complaint for malversation of public funds against the Madriaga couple and against petitioners Edilberto Delima and Nenita Dacillo. Executive Judge Borromeo ordered transfer of said Criminal Cases Nos. 500 and 501 to the Circuit Criminal Court of the 13th Judicial District. Respondent Judge dismissed the criminal cases for malversation of public funds against Mabini Madriaga and Angeles Madriaga but not against petitioners Edilberto Delima and Nenita Dacillo. After the cases against the Madriaga couple were dismissed, Barrio Captain Jesus Near filed a complaint action against respondent Judge for knowingly rendering an unjust decision.

During the pendency of the criminal complaint and the administrative complaint against respondent Judge, he called for hearing Criminal Cases with respect to petitioners Edilberto Delima and Nenita Dacillo, whose charge for malversation of funds remained pending. It was during said hearing when petitioners Edilberto Delima and Nenita Dacillo, thru their counsel, petitioner Atty. Quirino N. Oriel, filed a motion to inhibit respondent Judge from further hearing the two criminal cases against them on the ground that: Respomdent Judge denied the same and ordered petitioner, Atty,. Quirino N. Oriel to submit a written explanation within a period of three days from August 8, 1975, why he should not be dealt with for direct contempt of court. Petitioner Atty. Quirino N. Oriel filed an urgent motion for the respondent Judge to reconsider his order so that the 3-day period given to him to submit his written explanation would commence from the day he received said order but was denied. Petitioner Atty. Quirino N. Oriel filed a manifestation stating that the contents of his motion for inhibition are not contumacious and therefore he cannot be held liable for direct contempt but respondent Judge, in his order dated August 12, 1975, declared Atty. Quirino N. Oriel guilty of direct contempt and sentenced him to pay a fine of P200.00 and an imprisonment of 20 days. Said order was, however, modified later by reducing the imprisonment to 10 days, instead of 20 days. ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to inhibit respondent Judge filed by petitioner Atty. Quirino N. Oriel is contumacious as to make him liable for direct contempt HELD: NO. There is nothing in the motion for inhibition of the respondent Judge that will cast disrepute, disrespect or contempt against the respondent Judge. Petitioner Atty. Quirino N. Oriel in a respectful manner, simply stated in his motion for inhibition that the accused Edilberto Delima being a principal witness of Jesus Near in the criminal case filed against respondent Judge pending appropriate action by the City Fiscal of Tacloban he honestly believed that respondent Judge would be prejudiced against him and therefore cannot be expected to decide the case with "objectivity and dispassion." Contempt of court may be either direct or constructive. It is direct when committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt proceedings before the same (Section 1, Rule 71, Rules of Court) and constructive or indirect contempt is one committed out or not in the presence of court. It is tantamount to misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of Justice. In the motion for inhibition filed by petitioner Atty. Quirino N. Oriel, We find no disrespectful language or phase containing offensive personalities against the respondent Judge. What is stated in the motion is simply a motion of the petitioner for the judge to inhibit himself from further trying the aforementioned criminal cases because he believed that the judge could no longer decide the case with impartiality because of a criminal complaint Jesus Near filed against respondent Judge. NO DIGEST TEY: Yasay v Recto Crucillo v IAC G.R. No. 65416. October 26, 1999 PURISIMA, J. FACTS: Balbino A. Crucillo was married to Juana Aure. They were blessed with eight (8) children. Balbino A. Crucillo died intestate in 1909 and also Juana Aure on November 19, 1949. Balbino A. Crucillo left, among other things, two (2) parcels of unregistered land. He was survived by his heirs, who became co-owners of the aforesaid lots and thereafter, entered into the possession thereof. The case was commenced by the only surviving children of Balbino A. Crucillo were Adelaida

Crucillo, Miguel Crucillo, and Rafael Crucillo. The other children above-named died, and were survived by their respective heirs. Soon after the death of Balbino A. Crucillo, the heirs occupied and possessed portions of subject parcels of land. Respondent Rafael A. Crucillo executed and entered into a Patuluyang Bilihan Ng Isang Lagay Na Lupa with the co respondents, spouses Felix Noceda and Benita Gatpandan-Noceda, whereby Rafael A. Crucillo, sold and conveyed to the spouses Noceda a parcel of land formed part of the estate of Balbino A. Crucillo. Petitioner Conrado Crucillo, wrote the Register of Deeds of Cavite requesting to hold in abeyance the registration of the said land transaction for the reason that the same was done without the knowledge, consent and authority of the co-owners of subject property and consequently, null and void. Respondent Rafael Crucillo presented to the office of the Provincial Assessor of Cavite, Trece Martires City, Cavite, a Kasulatan Sa Partihang Labas sa Hukuman executed by and between petitioners Primitiva Mendoza, Carlomagno Crucillo, Adelaida A. Crucillo, and respondent Rafael Crucillo; dividing the estate into 5 equal parts. Respondent Rafael A. Crucillo and the co-respondents spouses, Felix Noceda and Benita Gatpandan-Noceda, executed a Kasulatan Sa Ganap Na Bilihan whereby Rafael A. Crucillo conveyed and sold to his said co -respondents a parcel of land. The respondent Provincial Assessor of Cavite cancelled Tax Declaration in the name of Balbino A. Crucillo and issue new tax declarations. Subsequently, the respondent spouses, Felix Noceda and Benita Gatpandan Noceda, started possessing the property sold to them by Rafael Crucillo, occupied the ancestral house standing on the property, and introduced improvements thereon. Petitioner Carlomagno Crucillos lawyer, Abraham Sarmientowrote the Provincial Assessor of Cavite, Trece Martires City, to request the latter to withhold any future transactions on or transfers of the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 5417 until the question of ownership of the land involved shall have been settled by judicial adjudication. Petitioners counsel wrote respondent Felix Noceda, asking the latter to stop from continuing any construction to vacate the portion of land that you have occupied without the consent of all the heirs of Balbino Crucillo. Petitioners brought a complaint against the respondents for Annulment of Extrajudicial Partition, Deed of Sale, and Tax Declaration of the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Cavite, with Damages, but the same was dismissed for plaintiffs failure to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise, as required by Article 222 of the New Civil Code. Petitioners filed a substantially similar Complaint which implead as co-plaintiffs, the petitioners, Felicidad Crucillo and Miguela Crucillo. The petitioners, were declared non-suited for failure to attend the pre-trial conference on October 2, 1972. Trial court declared deed of partition null and void. The petitioners and respondents interposed Motions for Reconsideration but the same were both denied. Petitioners appealed the trial courts Decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. Private respondents presented a Motion for Reconsideration and the appellate court sustained the validity of the deed of sale. Hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not there contempt is proper. HELD: NO. As the existence of the oral partition of the estate of Balbino A. Crucillo by his heirs has been well established, it stands to reason and conclude that Rafael Crucillo could validly convey his share therein to the spouses Felix Noceda and Benita Gatpandan-Noceda who then became the true and lawful owners thereof, including the ancestral house existing thereon. Petitioners have, therefore, no right to redeem the same property from the spouses Noceda because when the

sale was made they were no longer co-owners thereof, the same having become the sole property of respondent Rafael Crucillo.

LEE YICK HON, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-16779 March 30, 1921 STREET, J. FACTS: Lee Yick Hon filed a petition for habeas corpus before Court of First Instance alleging he had lately arrived from China at the port of Manila with a view to entering the Philippine Islands, but was detained for deportation by the Insular Collector of Customs. The court cited the Collector of Customs to show cause in writing why the writ of habeas corpus should not be issued. The result was that Lee Yick Hon was deported within two or three hours after the Insular Collector had been served with the citation to show cause in the habeas corpus proceeding. Thereupon contempt proceedings were instituted against the Insular Collector. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ACTION FOR CONTEMPT WAS PROPER. HELD: NO. The conditions under which a person can be punished for contempt are precisely defined in sections 231 and 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The first of these sections contemplates misbehavior in the presence of the court or so near the court of judge as to obstruct the administration of justice. It is declared that any person may be punished as for contempt who is guilty of "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of the court or injunction granted by a court or judge." In this case before us there was no lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of the court or judge below was disobeyed for the citation was literally complied with when, on July 30, 1920, the Attorney-General, on behalf of the Insular Collector, filed his answer, wherein it was in effect stated that the case of Lee Yick Hon had been regularly passed upon by the special Board of Inquiry, and that it had been found that he had entered the Philippine Islands in contravention of the Immigration and Exclusion Acts, wherefore the Insular Collector had ordered his deportation. The order served in the case before us was merely a preliminary citation requiring the respondent to appear and show cause why the peremptory writ should not be granted. Nevertheless in a case like that now before us, it is necessary to take account of the difference between the preliminary citation and the real writ of habeas corpus; and when advertence is had to this point, and the actual terms of the citation are considered, it is at one obvious that the appellant did not put himself in contempt by allowing Lee Yick Hon to be deported. In re AMZI B. KELLY. G.R. No. 11715 December 21, 1916 Johnson, J. FACTS: Attorney-General for the Philippine Islands filed a petition before the Supreme Court requiring Amzi B. Kelly to appear on a day to be named, and show cause, if any he have, why he should not be punished for a contempt of the court, in respect of a publication of a certain letter or communication published in The Independent, on the 24th of February, 1916. Said petition alleged:1) that an information was filed charging of contempt; 2) That after due notice and hearing defendant was found guity of contempt and sentenced him for imprisonment for 6 months and pay 1,000 pesos fine and was duly

imprisoned; 3) That defendant by his counsel amend a motion before the Supreme Court for rehearing of the contempt proceeding and the order of contempt be set aside; 4) That during the pendency of the proceeding for contempt, defendant wrote, composed and caused to be published in a weekly newspaper regularly published once each week in the city of Manila and circulated in its issue of the 4th day of March 1916, concerning this court and its supposed action with reference to the pending contempt proceeding; 5) that the said letter was intended to obstruct with and tends directly to obstruct and interfere with and impede the administration of justice in the contempt proceeding as to affect and influence the action of the court in the pending matter. The court ordered Amzi B. Kelly to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt. did appear and filed written answer. He contended that no law in the Philippines which authorize the Supreme Court with the power to punish him for contempt. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPREME COURT HAS POWER TO PUNISH DEFENDANT IN CONTEMPT. HELD: YES. The power to fine for contempt, imprison for contumacy, or enforce the observance of order, are powers which cannot be dispensed with in the courts, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others. Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum in the presence and submission to their lawful mandates, and as corollary to this provision, to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach of insults and pollution. In re HERACLIO ABISTADO, Editor of the "Union". 57 Phil 996 December 10, 1932 VICKERS, J.

FACTS: Paz Luzan filed in this court charge of malpractice against Attorney Ramon Sotelo and the court ordered Attorney answer the charges within ten days. Ramon Sotelo called the attention of the court to the fact that there had been published in the weekly newspaper, the "Union', on October 24th, a statement as to the filing of the charges, with the notice that in subsequent issues the complete charges and the exhibits attached thereto would be published. Sotelo requested the court to take action against the newspaper on the ground that it was contrary to a resolution of this court providing that administrative charges against attorneys and judges of first instance should be confidential until finally disposed of. It appears that Ramon Sotelo, accompanied by Alberto Kauffman, went to the office of the "Union" and asked for the editor, and was shown to the office of the respondent Abistado. Sotelo informed the respondent personally of the Court order and told him that he was committing contempt of court in publishing the article. Nothwithstanding the Court order, the respondent published in the issue of October 31st the charges under the heading. "Una Dama Acusa al Abogado Ramon Sotelo; Texto intergo de la Queja presentada a la Corte Suprema". Attorney-General filed a petition in this court setting forth the publications of October 24th and 31st, and prayed that the respondent be cited to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. The respondent explained that he assumed the duties of editor only after November 1st, and had nothing to do with the articles in question published prior to that date and that the publication does not consitute contempt against this court being freedom of the press under the Constitution. Also, he published the documents concerning Attorney Ramon Sotelo honestly believing that he was rendering service to the public and to the courts of justice and his copies of documents not owned by the Supreme Court. Lastly, the

resolution has never been published in the Official Gazette, or any local newspaper hence he did not have any notice of such resolution. In the meantime the respondent continued the publication of the exhibits. On November 7th, under the heading, Pruebas Decumentales Contra El Abogado Ramon Sotelo; Otra Demanda y Otra Queja", the respondent published what formed part of the complaint presented by Paz Luzan against Attorney Sotelo; and on November 14th the respondent published the remainder of the exhibits of Pas Luzan under the heading, "Mas Pruebas Documentales Contra el Abogado Ramon Sotelo; Nueva Demanda y Nueva Queja". The Attorney-General filed another petition stating that the respondent had published on November 7th the exhibits of the complaint notwithstanding receipt of copy of the resolution of this court of November 9, 1932, citing him to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, he had persisted in publishing other exhibits on November 14th, in violation of the resolution of January 26, 1922. The Attorney-General prayed that the respondent be cited to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. Copies of the newspaper, the "Union", show that the respondent was the editor of said paper on October 31st and during the subsequent issues in question, and it appears from The affidavits of Ramon Sotelo and Alberto Kauffman that the respondent was already the editor of said paper when the first announcement, of the charges against Sotelo was published on October 24th.lawphil.net ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION OF RESPONDENT IS PUNISHINABLE AS CONTEMPT. HELD: YES. The evidence shows that the resolution of this court of January 26, 1922, providing that all proceedings looking to the suspension or disbarment of lawyers, and all proceedings looking to the suspension or removal of judges of first instance, shall be considered confidential in nature until the final disposition of the matter was published in "La Vanguarida", "El Ideal,", and the "Manila Times" on January 27, 1922, and in the "Manila Daily Bulletin" on January 28, 1922. There can be no question as to the right of this court to adopt such a resolution and to violations of it by contempt poroceedings. That the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and press must be protected in its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense; that as important as is the maintenance of an ummuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. The purpose of the rule is not from any enable this court to make its investigation free only extraneous influence or itnerference, but also to protect the personal and professional reputation of attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of disgrutneled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and litigants. It was falsely stated in the issue of the "Union" for October 24th that the charges against Attorney Sotelo had been referred to the Attorney-General for investigation. NO DIGEST YET: People v Godoy FRED M. HARDEN, petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent. G.R. No. L-2349 October 22, 1948 TUASON, J. FACTS: The proceedings for contempt arose in a civil case between Mrs. Harden as plaintiff and the petitioner and another person as defendants, commenced on July 12, 1941, and involving the administration of a conjugal partnership, payment of

alimony, and accounting. In that case, a receiver was appointed and a preliminary injunction was issued restraining Fred M. Harden and his codefendant, Jose Salumbides, from transferring or alienating, except for a valuable consideration and with the consent of the court first had and obtained, moneys, shares of stock, and other properties and assets, real or personal, belonging to the aforesaid partnership, and which might be found in the names of said defendants or either of them. On various dates in 1946, Fred M. Harden transferred to the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, both in Hongkong, over P1,000,000 in drafts or cash; to Virginia Recreation Center, Long Beach, California, P20,196.80, and to an unknown person, P50,000. Mrs. Harden moved the court to order Harden to return all these amounts and to redeposit them with the Manila branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China. Judge Pea granted the motion. After a petition for certiorari was instituted by Harden in the Supreme Court, Judge Pea directed Harden "to deposit with the Manila Branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China within five days from receipt of a copy of this order the money and drafts that he has actually in Hongkong, without prejudice to passing upon later on the different amounts that the defendant has spent according to his attorney, after he has submitted to the court an itemized account of those expenses. The receiver appointed in the main case prayed that the certificates of stock of the conjugal partnership be ordered turned over to him so that he might have them registered in pursuance of the provisions of Republic Act No. 62. The court "authorized" Harden "to register not later than June 30, 1947 the stock certificates in his possession, notifying the court afterwards of such action. Mrs. Harden complained that her husband failed to comply with the above order and prayed that he be ordered to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt. Harden filed a perfunctory compliance, and required to "make a detailed report of the stock certificates which have been duly registered in accordance with Republic Act No. 62." Harden stated that he had been granted an extension until December 31, 1947, within which to register the Balatoc Mining Co. shares under Republic Act No. 62. The receiver informed the court that, notwithstanding the expiration on December 31, 1947, the records of the Balatoc Mining Co. showed that the certificate had not been registered. Mrs. Harden prayed that defendant Harden "be ordered to deliver the certificates covering the 368,553 Balatoc Mining Co. shares either to the Clerk of this Court or to the Receiver herein for safekeeping, immediately after registering them pursuant to Republic Act No. 62." Harden filed a motion stating that the registration of shares of stock under Republic Act No. 62 had been extended until June 30, 1948, and prayed that he "be allowed to register the stock certificates in question within such period as by law or regulations is or may be provided." It was at this stage of the case that the present petitioner was committed to jail. ISSUE: Whether or not contempt was proper. HELD: YES. In a "civil contempt" the proceeding is remedial, it is a step in the case the object of which is to coerce one party for the benefit of the other party to do or to refrain from doing some act specified in the order of the court. Hence, if imprisonment be ordered, it is remedial in purpose and coercive in character, and to that end must relate to something to be done by the defendant by the doing of which he many discharge himself. As quaintly expressed, the imprisoned man "carries the keys to his prison in his own pocket." The failure of the order of commitment to state that the acts which the contemner fails to do are still in his power to perform, does not void the order of imprisonment. Section 7 of Rule 64 does not require such finding to appear in the order, unlike

section 1219 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California on which the petitioner's contention is rested. Petitioner is in error in saying that section 237 of the former Philippine Code of Civil Procedure, from which section 7 of Rule 64, supra, has been copied, was of California origin. Former Justice Fisher is authority for the statement that section 237 of Act No. 190 was borrowed from section 1456 of the Ohio Code of Civil Procedure. The exact similarity in substance though not in language between the two provisions is a confirmation of this statement. The order of commitment contains the alleged missing element if it is taken, as it should be taken, in connection with the orders of October 7, 1947, and March 27, 1948, and with the charges for contempt. It expressly gives non-compliance with the two last mentioned orders as the grounds for the warrant of commitment. The orders of October 7, 1947, and March 27, 1948, in turn clearly specify the acts with the petitioner was commanded to fulfill. It is equally clear from these orders that in the opinion of the court the petitioner is in a position to bring back to the Philippines from Hongkong part of the cash and the Balatoc shares he had remitted to that colony.

ATTY. ROMEO B. IGOT, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), respondents. G.R. No. 150794. August 17, 2004 CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS: Petitioner and the respondent executed a service contract wherein the latter would provide electricity to the petitioners house. The petitioner compiled all his electric bills and discovered that his Meralco statement amounted to only P18.20 for the period of September 24, 1998 to October 26, 1998. Suspicious of the figure, the petitioner inspected the electric meter and discovered that the Meralco seal was still intact but that the meter had stopped rotating. He requested that respondent to check his electric meter checked however respondent did not reply and even sent him a Meralco electric consumption bill from the period of December 23, 1998 to January 25, 1999, as amounting to P12,100.30. Petitioner received a notice of disconnection from the respondent, which the latter threatened him should he fail to pay the amount of P123,282.35 within the day. Petitioner filed a complaint for damages with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondent with the Regional Trial Court. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO). During the hearing the counsel of the respondent, manifested that it would not disconnect the petitioners electric supply until the trial court sha ll have resolved the issue on the preliminary injunction. The petitioner, in turn, manifested that he was withdrawing his plea for the issuance of a TRO. However, the electric supply to the petitioners house was disconnected which urged the petitioner to pay on the same day hoping to be reconnected the next day. But to no avail, it was not restored. However, the respondents employees disallowed the reconnection unless the petitioner tendered the amount of P12,100.30. The petitioner personally tendered PNB Check accompanied by a formal request for the restoration of his electric supply. Rolando Dela Paz made a notation on the petitioners letter stating that payment of arrears would be accepted, but without the reconnection. Still, the respondent restored the petitioners electricity in the afternoon of July 13, 1999. The trial court granted the writ of preliminary injunction upon posting and approval of the required bond to answer for the damages that the respondent may incur if the writ would later on be found to have been wrongly issued. The petitioner filed a supplemental complaint impleading Atty. Alfonso Lacap, Atty. Angelito Aguila and Rolando Dela Paz, for their alleged

refusal to cause the reconnection of the electricity to his house. In the Order dated January 4, 2000, the trial court admitted the supplemental complaint. For the petitioners repeated failure to appear during the hearings set for the presentation of his evidence, the trial court dismissed the complaint on January 11, 2001. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but was denied. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA ordered trial court from further proceeding with the case and, likewise, ordered the respondent to cease and desist from enforcing its threatened act to disconnect the petitioners electric supply. The petitioner filed an urgent motion for the reconnection of the electric s upply to his house within twenty-four hours. The CA, granted petitioners request. Responden t filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. for the reversal of the decision of the CA. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 149913. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the omnibus motion of the petitioner filed with the CA to cite the officers and lawyers of the respondent in contempt of the CA. HELD: No. The pertinent rules on the matter are Sections 4 and 5, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. SEC. 5. Where charge to be filed. Where the charge for indirect contempt has been committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such court. Where such contempt has been committed against a lower court, the charge may be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place in which the lower court is sitting; but the proceedings may also be instituted in such lower court subject to appeal to the Regional Trial Court of such place in the same manner as provided in section 11 of this Rule. Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides, in effect, that a charge for indirect contempt must be filed with the court contemned. Although this provision is permissive in nature, in the event of concurrent jurisdiction over cases of contempt of court, it would be a good practice to acknowledge the preferential right of the court against which the act of contempt was committed to try and punish the guilty party.The court that granted the preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order preserving the status quo is vested with the power to hear and determine the sufficiency and merit of the contempt charge. Only the court which issued the injunction can impose a sanction for contempt of that injunction, and a court without subject matter jurisdiction cannot transfer the case to another court.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO LISTANA, SR., respondent. G.R. No. 152611 August 5, 2003 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS: Respondent Severino Listana is the owner of a parcel of land he voluntarily offered to sell the said land to the government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), under Section 20 of R.A. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). The DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03 but respondent rejected resulting to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sorsogon commence summary administrative proceedings for determination of just compensation. The DARAB rendered a decision which held new valuation and ordered The Land Bank of the Philippines to pay the same to the landowner. A Writ of Execution was issued by the PARAD directing the manager of Land Bank to pay the respondent. Respondent filed a Motion for Contempt with the PARAD, alleging that petitioner Land Bank failed to comply with the Writ of Execution and such failure of the petitioner to comply with the writ constitutes contempt of the DARAB. Petitioner Land Bank then filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), for the determination of just compensation, as provided for in Section 16 (f) of the CARL. The PARAD granted the Motion for Contempt thus ALEX A. LORAYES, as Manager of respondent LAND BANK, and is cited for indirect contempt directed his imprisonment until he complies with the Decision of the case. Petitioner Land Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by PARAD. Thus, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the PARAD but was denied. The Special Agrarian Court dismissed the petition for the determination of just compensation filed by petitioner Land Bank and likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. PARAD Capellan, in a resolution, denied due course to petitioners Notice of Appeal and ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the payment of the adjudged amount of just compensation to respondent. He then directed the issuance of an arrest order against Manager Alex A. Lorayes. Petitioner Land Bank filed a petition for injunction before the Regional Trial Court. The trial court issued an Order, which enjoined from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before RTC Branch 52, Sorsogon upon the posting of a cash bond by the Land Bank. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Hence, respondent filed special civil action with the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: THE PARAD ORDER OF CONTEMPT WAS PATENTLY NULL AND VOID, AS IT ATTEMPTED TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PARAD DECISION THAT WAS ADMITTEDLY NOT FINAL AND EXECUTORY, AS THE MATTER OF JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT WAS ON APPEAL WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS. HELD: YES. The order of contempt was null and void for there are only two ways a person can be charged with indirect contempt, namely, (1) through a verified petition; and (2) by order or formal charge initiated by the court motu proprio. In the case at bar, neither of these modes was adopted in charging Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt. In pursuant with Rule 71, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, referring to indirect contempt against quasi-judicial entities, provides: Sec. 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply to contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory effect to

such rules as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by law to punish for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over such charges as may be filed therefore. Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt. Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion for Contempt" filed by the respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following reasons:24 First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent. Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proce edings that stemmed from respondents "Motion for Contempt," specifically the Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.