UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI'I LIBRARY

ISLAM, CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIZATION:

THE CASE OF MUHAMMADIY AH AND NAHDLATUL ULAMA
IN POST-SUHARTO INDONESIA
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAW Al'I IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ART
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE
AUGUST 2008
By
Pramono Ubaid Tanthowi
Thesi s Committee:
Ehito Kimura, Chairperson
Manfred Henningsen
Benedict J. Kerkvliet
We certifY that we have read this thesis and that, in our opinion, it is satisfactory in
scope and quality as a thesis for the degree of Master of Art in Political Science.
Thesis Committee:
Chairperson: Ehito Kimura
Member: Manfred Henningsen
Member: Benedict J. Kerkvliet
ABSTRACT
Mnhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) are two largest Islamic organizations in
Indonesia. Long active as both religious and political organizations during 1950s and 1960s,
they withdrew from formal political arena and declared their disengagement from any political
parties in the 1970s and 1980s that enabled them to survive under the repressive Suharto regime
and consequently develop nascent civil society movements.
This thesis examines the relation between those Muslim civil society organizations
and democratization in the post-Suharto Indonesia: how they defend their positions as
autonomous entities beyond state and simultaneously intensely involve in political arena. It
also studies their roles in the process of democratization.
The study reveals a great deal ahout their participation in the political system, where
they are now an important part of the political leadership and their interests are now well
represented. However, the problem is that, in reality, there is a significant degree of overlap
between civil society and political society as well as between civil society and the state.
This study also shows the role of those Muslim civil society organizations in the
democratization process. These mass-based religious organizations seemed to be
consequential in all stages of democratization: they sought to broaden the free public sphere
and combined their efforts, along with other pro-democracy movements, in de-legitimating
and bringing the authoritarian Suharto regime down. They also join forces in encouraging
political participation, monitoring the elections, forcing the government to be more
accountable and transparent, and spreading the ideas of religious tolerance.
1
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This thesis is the product of two years of study and research on the dynamic
relationship between Islam, civil society, and democratization in post-Suharto Indonesia. It also
flows from over a decade of my personal involvement both in discourse and activism with
Muhammadiyah, the second largest Islamic organization in Indonesia.
There are so many people who have helped me along the completion in one way or
another; they encouraged me, provided guidance, and never lost faith that I would complete this
effort. The warmth and generosity of all of those who helped me during my two years of
research and writing continually amazed me, and I apologize to anyone I fail to mention here.
While I cannot list all those that I am grateful to, several deserve special recognition.
I would like to thank first of all the member of my wonderfully supportive committee:
Ehito Kimura, Manfred Henningsen, and Ben Kerkvliet. They always gave me valuable
comments, challenged me with provoking insights, provided unique perspectives on my
research, and went above and beyond the call of duty to accommodate me in their bnsy
schedules. Their meticulons readings of my thesis also saved me from many errors (any
remaining ones are my own responsibility). I have greatly enjoyed my interactions with my
committee, and am honored to have had the opportunity to work with them.
My study in the Department of Political Science at the University of Hawaii at
Manoa, including my Graduate Certificate in International Cultural Studies, was made possible
by the East-West Center Graduate Degree Fellowship. I was fortunate to receive financial
support during my years of graduate study from the East-West Center, which was also greatly
instrumental to my fieldworks in Indonesia. In the East-West Center, lowe thanks to Charles
i
Morison, Terry Bigalke, Mendl Djunaidy, and Stella Kolinski for their supports. My graduate
study was also supported by some other institutions and individuals. In the Asia Foundation
which provided me with additional funding during my first year lowe thanks to Douglas
Ramage and Robin Bush. During the second year I received additional financial support from
the American Indonesian Cultural and Educational Foundation (AICEF). I was also fortunate to
receive valuable financial supports from the Central Board ofMuhammadiyah, Pusat Studi
Agama dan Peradahan (pSAP), Kak Din Syamsuddin, Mas Jerne Geovannie, and Mas Rizal
Sukma.
Special thanks also to all who gave me their time and shared their insights in
interviews and other conversations throughout my fieldworks in Indonesia. They not only
infonned me about the political and social activities of the NU and Muhammadiyah in recent
years but also provided me with many of the crucial perspectives and interpretatious ofIslam
and civil society relations in Indonesia on which this study is based. Among those to whom I
owe particular tbanks are Buya Syafii Maarif, Kak Din Syamsuddin, Kyai Hasyim Muzadi, Mas
Haedar Nashlr, Kyai Masdar Mas'udi, A.S. Hikam, Mas Rizal Sukma, Eunsook Jung, Sukidi,
Izzul Muslimin, Gunawan Hidayat, Ahmad Rofiq, Raja Jull Anthoni, Syaiful Bahri Anshori,
Ahmad Suaedy, Syafiq Hasyim, Adung Abdurrahman, Zuhairi Misrawi, Muhamad Ali,
Achmad Ubaedillah, Saiful Umam, and Lance Nolde.
Above all, I want to thank my parents who always supported me with their advices
and prayers. Finally, and the most importantly, an enonnous thank you to my wife Herawaty
and my son Risyad Mahdavi Tanthowi who made immense gifts oflove throughout the years I
had been leaving them and simultaneously brought me happiness on even the hardest days. It is
to my wife and my son that I dedicate this work.
ii
Anshor
Bughat
DPR
Fatwa
Golkar
HMI
Jjtihad
IMM
IRM
Istoghotsah
JPPR
GLOSSARY
The youth wing ofNU.
A tenn in Islamic law referring to rebellion against a
legitimate ruler who thus deserves the death sentence.
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives).
Religious edict.
Golongan Karya (Functional Groups), the political
vehicle of the New Order Regime which was established
in 1973 and survives the reform era.
Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (The Islamic Student
Association), the Masyumi-inspired stodent organization.
Vigorous inquiry. The term is then adopted in Islamic law
referring to legal reasoning in response to the newly-
emerged problems.
Ikatan Mahasiswa Mubammadiyah (The Muhanunadiyah
Stodent Association).
Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah (The Muhammadiyah
Adolescence Association).
A public prayer gathering which is mostly held by the NU
organization.
Jaringan Pendidikan Pernilih untuk Rakyat (the People's
Voter Education Networks).
i
KAMMI
Khittah
Kyai
Masyumi
MPR
Mill
Muktamar
PAN
Parmusi
PBB
PBR
Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (The United
Action of the Indonesian Muslim Student), the newly
PKS student wing.
Original guideline.
Traditional Islamic scholar which is mostly found in the
NU community.
Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (The Consultative
Council of Indonesian Muslims), the largest Islamic party
in 1950s which was established in 1945 and forced to
dismiss in 1960 by Sukamo.
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (people Consultative
Assembly)
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (The Indonesian Council of
Ulemas).
National Congress which is held in the NU and
Mubammadiyah organizations once in every five years.
Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party), the
party of Amien Rais which draws many of its members
from the modernist Muslim camp.
Partai Muslimin Indonesia (The Indonesian Muslim
Party).
Partai Bulan Bintang (The Crescent and Star Party).
Partai Bintang Reformasi (The Reform Star Party)
ii
PD
PDI-P
Pesantren
PKB
PKl
PKS
PMII
PPP
Tanwir
Wali
Partai Demokrat (The Democrat Party)
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (The Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle).
Islamic boarding school which is mostly run and owned
by kyai ofNU.
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (The National Awakening
Party), the party of Abdurrahman Wahid which draws
many of its members from the traditionalist Islam camp.
Partai Komunis Indonesia (The Indonesian Communist
Party).
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (The Prosperous Justice Party).
Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (The Indonesian
Islamic Student Union), The NU-affiliated student
organization.
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (The Unity and
Development Party).
Annual meeting in the Muhammadiyah organization.
Protege of God, saint.
iii
i
Politics says:
A is a friend
Bisafoe
Dakwah rectifies:
A is a friend
B is a companion
Politics tends to break up and divide
Dakwah tends to invite and unite
(Ahmad Syafii Maarif, 2006, p. 335)
Muslim Civil Society and Democratization:
The Case of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul mama in Post-Suharto Indonesia
Chapter I Introduction
Civil Society, Islam, and Democratization
Literature Review
Methodology
Structure of the Thesis
Chapter II NU, Mnhammadiyah, and the Origin of Civility
Introduction
The Origins ofMuhammadiyah and NU
The Involvement ofMuhammadiyah and NU in Politics
Muhammadiyah, NU and Political Disengagement
Muslim Civil Society: Competing Discourses
Conclusion
1
8
18
20
22
24
25
29
39
44
47
Chapter ill Muslim Civil Society and Political Change: Political Development 1998-2007
Introduction 49
Muslim Civil Society, Political Parties, and the 1999 election
The Rise and Fall of President Abdurrahman Wahid
Muslim Civil Society and the 2004 Presidential Election
National Congress and Leadership Change
Muslims' Approaching the 2009 Election
Conclusion
i
50
60
78
99
114
127
Chapter IV Muslim Civil Society and Democratization
Introduction 129
The Construction of Free Public Sphere 130
The Election Monitoring 155
The Corruption Eradication 162
The Last Bastion of Civic Pluralism 169
Foreign Donor and State Capacity 189
Conclusion 196
Chapter V Concluding Remarks 198
Bibliography 207
Biographical Sketch
ii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Introduction
For a long time numerous observers and experts of Indonesian affairs seemed to
believe that Islam was peripheral importance in modern Indonesian life. They were convinced
that state and society of Indonesia were thoroughly dominated by nominal Muslims (or
abangan) of Javanese ethnicity. The impression was reinforced by the relative scarcity of
academic studies of Islam in Indonesia.! Compared with other Muslim countries, Islam in
Indonesia has been little studied. However, since the last decade of the 20
th
century, it is no
longer tenable to hold such a view. Most observers now agree that a significant change in the
Indonesian Muslim society has been undergoing.
2
They now believe that since that decade
Indonesia has been experiencing a historically unprecendented Islamic political revival.
3
Not
only do many Indonesia's most influential Islamic leaders, such as Abdurrahman Wahid and
Amien Rais, once occupied the highest positions in Indonesia's political system, but Islamic
parties also playa significant role in the political affairs.
Equally important is the significant roles played by Indonesian Muslims in the process
of democratization. The political development in Indonesia since the 1990s has been witnessing
that the Islamic revival and democratization have marched hand in hand under, among others,
the leadership of Muslim democrats. Recent development in Indonesia offers an even more
striking indication of Muslim interest in democracy and civic pluralism. In the final years of the
! Hefner, "Introduction", 1997, p. 8.
2 Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, 1994, Ch. 7, "Islam: Coming from the Cold?"; Yatikiotis, lndonesilln
Politics Under Suharto, 1994, Ch. Y, ''Toward an Islamic Identity?"
3 Tanthowi, Kebangldtan Politik Kawn Santri, 2005.
1
Suharto dictatorship (1996-98), a powerful movement for a democratic Muslim politics took
shape. In alliance with secular Muslims and non-Muslims, the movement succeeded in May
1998 in toppling the long ruling Suharto. No less remarkable, Muslims participants in the
democracy campaign dedicated themselves to devising religious argnments in support of
pluralism, democracy, women's right, and civil society.4
Unfortunately, the general debate now concerning Muslim communities in Indonesia
has been predominantly shaped by studies on development of Islamic radicalization and
political violence.
s
This is largely because the glaring process of democratization was soon
blurred by a rash of sectarian violence. For instance, from 1999 to 2002, battles between
Christians and Muslims in Maluku took some eight thousand lives.
6
During roughly the same
period, the central highlands on the nearby island of Sulawesi saw bloody skirmishes between
Muslim and Christian gangs, causing a thousand deaths.
7
Equally alarming, in the months
following Suharto's fall, radical Islamic groups sprang up in cities across Indonesia.
While political scientists and anthropologists have been much concerned with the
developing some radical Islamic movements, they have paid little attention fur the mainstream
moderate ones, as if they have lost their standing in the Indonesian Muslim community. Although
these extremist groups have been very vocal and active, however, this concern is not relevant,
because they are small and have very little influence. Admittedly, set against the succession of
weak governments that Indonesia has had since the fall ofSuharto, these groups look very
menacing. The fact remains, however, they are insignificant in number and, without support from
4 See Refuer, Civil Islam, 2000; Barton, ''The Origin ofIs1amic Liberalism," 1997; Ramage, Politics in
Indonesia, 1995.
S Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia, 2007; Hasan, Laskar Jihad, 2006; Eliraz, Islam In
Indonesia, 2004; Barton, Indonesia's Struggle, 2004; Side!, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad, 2006; Yunanto at aI., Militant
Islamic Movements, 2003; Marika and Wright-Neville, Terrorism and Islam in Indonesia, 2005.
6 van Klinken, ''The Maluku War," 2001, p. 1-26.
7 Aragon, "Communal Violence in Poso," 2001, p. 44-79.
2
certain element in the army, they will not be able to go very far with their threats. Therefore, rather
than studying certain groups of Indonesian Muslim which are considered as anti-democratic forces
- threatening progress and clashing with the liberal democratic ideals, this thesis nonetheless
examines other groups which are adopts a positive outlook about the role of Islam in Indonesian
society instead.
By analyzing the broader phenomenon within Indonesian Muslim community, this
study indicates that the growing religiosity among Indonesia's Muslim will not lead to
significant change in their political attitudes: vast majority of them are personally tolerant and
moderate in their outlook and very few Indonesian Muslim are attracted to Islamism in the
democratic election of 1999 and 2004.
In studying Indonesian politics, the Muhammadiyah and NU organizations are
important for some reasons. They are two largest Indonesia's Islamic organizations, with
approximately 25 and 35 million members respectively. Both organizations represent very
different segments of the Indonesian Muslim population - from a sociological, theological,
socio-economic, and political perspective. In fact, the cleavage between them represents the
primary cleavage in Indonesian Islam, although not mutually exclusive. With a little
simplification, it is said that the NU represents traditional Islamic stream, which is mainly
active in the rura1 areas. Meanwhile, the Mubammadiyah represents modernist Islamic stream,
which plays their roles in urban areas. Given their strong and overarching organizational
structures, the NU and Mubammadiyah have been playing their important roles in society, but
they do focus primarily on their own constituencies.
The significant of the NU and Muhammadiyah also lies in their political role since
their early developments. Both organizations playa significant role in developing a sense of
3
nationalism among native peoples; they also played their role as political forces during the
liberal democratic era in the 1950s: the NU once became a political party when it divorced
from the Islamic Masyumi party in 1952 (until 1984), within which the Muhammadiyah
remained one of (and subsequently became the dominant one among) its special organizational
members from 1945-1959; they also played a crucial role during the political crisis in 1965-
1967; and finally both played a significant role in the political change that ended the
authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998. In sum, the Muhammadiyah and NU organization have
been, and remain, important participants in Indonesia's political affairs.
Equally surprising, in studies of civil society in Indonesia during the 1990s and early
20oos, little attention has been shown to these associations. In the growing volume of studies on
Islam and civil society, they may be mentioned in passing but seldom appear to be thought of as
part of civil society themselves, unlike say students' associations, ICMl and issue-oriented
NGOs. Although there are quite a few recent studies ofMubammadiyah and especially ofNU,
most of these focus on their religious discourse, system of religious education, their national
leaders, or their role in national politics. There has hardly been any comprehensive inquiry on the
specific role these associations play in the intermediary entity, standing between state and society
as a whole, or their roles in the process of democratization.
This thesis presents a study of the Muhammadiyah and NU movements during the
political reform in Indonesia. To begin with, I am going to present a more thorough account on
their roles in "practical politics": how they keep their relationships with political parties,
particularly the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the National Awakening Party (PKB), two
parties which not only were established by the Muhammadiyah and NU leaders respectively,
but also whose mass bases largely come from both organizations. It seems to me that both
4
organizations sought to steadfastly assert their independence from both parties, at least
formally. Although both parties incorporated non-Muhammadiyah and non-NU as well as non-
Muslim figures into their leaderships, many people, however, see both political parties are
invariably inseparable from both organizations.
It is also important to study how they played their roles in the 1999 and 2004 elections
as well as the subsequent tensions and co-operation between both organizations. For example,
prior to and during the 2004 presidential election, NU and Mnharnmadiyah played similarly
significant roles. Out of five pairs running for presidential election, two president candidates,
Amien Rais and Harn71lh Haz, came from Muhammadiyah and NU backgrounds respectively, and
two vice-president candidates, Hasyim Muzadi and Shalahuddin Wahid, came from NU
organizations. Ahead of the election, not only did both organizations provide a remarkably large
number of votes whose loyalty is relatively guaranteed, they also formed a tacit alliance with
political parties during the election campaign. This further reflected their ambiguity between retreat
from ''practical politics" and keep equal distance to all political parties.
Beside their roles during the political reform, the second aspect I would like to study
is the contribution of these organizations in the process of democratization, a highly overlooked
subject in scholarly works of Indonesian politics. In a society where religion plays an important
role in public life, as in Indonesia, the role of religion, of religious institutions, and of social
movements that either had a religious identity or were influenced by religion was prominent
since the early democratization process.
Despite the coercive and strict control of the Suharto regime, for example, since early
in the 1990s Mnhammadiyah and NU are not predicated on the privatization of Islam and the
secularization of society, but rather on the self-organization of an autonomous Muslim public
5
civil society, able to counteract and countervail state power and willing to promote and defend
a public culture of pluralism, political participation, and social justice.
8
Both also played a
predominant role in the pro-democracy movement that forced President Suharto to step down
in May 1998. While they provided a large number of students and members in mass protests,
their leaders, along with secular and non-Muslim leaders, were especially crucial in mobilizing
them for peaceful protests and demands for democratization.
After the fall of Suharto, both organizations also function to support the development
of political parties by stimulating political participation and increasing the political efficacy and
skill of democratic citizenship. Moreover, their young generations worked in concert, along
with other NGOs, in the People's Voter Education Network (JPPR) not only in monitoring the
1999 and 2004 general and presidential elections in order to ensure their fairness, but also in
promoting an appreciation of the obligations as well as rights of democratic citizenship by
carrying out a massive civic education program.
In a new democracy, both organizations widen their functions to promote the more
substantive dimensions of democracy: increasing the transparency and accountability of
government. From 2003 to 2006 both worked hand in hand to carry out anti-corruption
programs. As social-religious organizations, however, they do not focus on investigation and
advocacy. They systematically addressed corruption issues by emphasizing their moral
persuasion; developing theological interpretations ofQur'an and Smmah concerning anti-
corruption verses; media campaigning; drafting integrity pacts for candidates running in
regional elections; increasing the awareness of regional members of parliament in pro-poor
budgeting; as well as establishing corruption watch dogs in regional level.
8 See Hefuer, "A Muslim Civil Society," 1998.
6
The most important one, both organizations have been working in maintaining the
pluralistic and tolerant nature of Indonesian society. Many studies affirmed that Indonesia's
largest Muslim social organizations are significant obstacles to the further growth of Islamism.
9
Not only are their leaders' tolerant and pluralistic views, but their broader memberships also
seemed immune to Islamism's allure. These organizations have grown from the same soil as
Indonesian Islamism, but their roots run considerably deeper, and they have in turn been
enormously successful in entrenching political moderation in Indonesia. Their strength is one
of the great causes for hope in Indonesian democracy.
There are two questions I would like to answer from this thesis. Firstly, how the
Mllhammadiyah and Nahdlatul mama organizations maintain their positions as autonomous
entities beyond state and simultaneously intensely involve in politics. Secondly, what role have
these two organizations been playing in the democratization process.
By ''politics'', I refer in the course of this thesis both to political society and state, that
are political parties, election campaign, and government. By democratization, I refer to the
process of political change took place in Indonesia which comprises of three major phases:
liberalization, transition, and consolidation.
This thesis is an in-depth case study ofMuhammadiyah and NU, and their relations with
political society and state in Indonesia. This is not a study about the theological discourse within the
Mllhammadiyah and NU communities. Instead, it is all about the behavior, choices, policies, and
strategies adopted by the Mllhammadiyah and NU organizations in their interactions with political
society and state over a period of post-Suharto era. Therefore, this thesis offers a political-historical-
9 See Mujani and Liddle, "Politics, Islam, and Public Opinion," 2004.
7
anthropologiCal perspective on the Muhammadiyah and NU movements: their relations with
politiCal parties and state during the reform era.
Nor is this thesis a comparative study between them; I am not going to compare the
differences and similarities between Muharnmadiyah and NU in their dealing with politics.
Instead, I am going to put them together in this study: how both have been cooperating and
competing each other, how they have been going through their tensions and fraternities, and
how they have been both dealing and instigating their rivalries and cordialities.
B. Civil Society, Islam, and Democratization
Central to this thesis are some conceptual frameworks regarding the concept of civil
society, democratization, the relation between civil society and democratization, of Islam and
civil society, as well as of religious organization and democratization. In doing so, I may not
propose new definitions and understandings; I am rather going to borrow them from able
theorists and political scientists whose works are prevalent in the field of political science.
There are several ways in which political scientists use and define "civil society" since
the concept is rather ambiguous and means different things to different people. As Lehmbruch
puts it, "Quite often, when 'civil society' is used in the politiCal literature or the media, it is no
longer clear what exactly the respective author has in mind. The denotations of "civil society"
have undergone significant changes over time and in different contexts. As a consequence, the
meaning in the contemporary discourse is franght with considerable ambiguity". 10
Despite its long intellectual and political history, in this thesis I am largely following
Larry Diamond and his colleagues in defining and distinguishing the concept of civil society. In
his seminal article published more than a decade ago, Diamond defines the concept as ''the
10 Lehmbruch, "Gennany", 2001, p. 230.
8
realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, and
autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. "II In a similar
vein, according to Linz and Stepan, civil society is "arena of the polity where self-organizing
and relatively autonomous groups, movements, and individuals attempt to articulate values, to
create associations and solidarities, and to advance their interests."12
According to Diamond, civil society is distinct from "society" in general in that it
involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions,
preferences, and ideas, to exchange infonnation, to achieve collective goals, to make demand on the
state, to improve the structure and functioning of the state, and to hold state officials accountable.!3
Similarly, it is also important to distinct civil society from political society. According to Linz and
Stepan, "political society" is an "arena in which political actors compete for the legitimate right to
exercise control over public power and the state apparatus."14
Therefore, according to Diamond, civil society is distinct from political society, which
encompasses all those organized actors whose primarily goal is to win control of the state or at
least some positions for themselves within it.
15
Organizations in civil society, according to
Diamond, may indeed form alliances with parties, but if they become captured by parties, or
hegemonic within them, they move their primary locns of activity to political society and lose
much of their ability to perform certain unique mediating and democracy-building functions.
16
After defining the concept of civil society, it is important to understand the concept of
democratization. In this study several terms are used in similar ways: democratization, political
II Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society," 1994, p. 3-17.
12 Linz and Stepan, ''Toward Consolidated Democracies," 1996, p. 14-33.
13 Diamond, Developing Democracy, 1999, p. 221.
14 Linz and Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," 1996, p. 14-33.
15 Diamond, Developing Democracy, 1999, p. 221.
16 Diamond, Developing Democracy, 1999, p. 221.
9
change, and political reform. While many will take issue with the impreciseness of using these
terms interchangeably, what I am interested in here is the process of political change toward a
more open, accountable, fair political system, and to me this is the essence of democratization.
There are many scholarly works on democratization. The literature that has the most
relevance to this thesis are works that came out in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as scholars
offered explanations of the wave of countries undergoing democratization.
17
While terminology
often differs, there are some common elements in much of this work. In a simplest way, the
democratization process involves three processes: liberalization, transition, and consolidation.
By liberalization, I refer to measures which entail a significant opening of the previous
anthoritarian regime. This process could result from either split in the authoritarian regime or
popular mobilization, or could be a result of an interaction between them. Meanwhile, by
transition, O'Donnell and Schmitter define it as "the interval between one political regime and
another. "18 They go on to explain that transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching
of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of
some forms of democracy, the return to some forms of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a
revolutionary alternative. Finally, consolidation, according to Diamond, is ''the process by which
democracy becomes so broadly aud profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very
unlikely to break down."19 In a similar vein, Linz and Stepan note that consolidated democracy is
a political regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned
incentives and disincentives has become, ''the only game in town."20 It involves behavioral and
17 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule, 1986; Huntington, The Third Wave,
1991; and Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 1991.
18 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 1986, p. 6.
19 Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society," 1994, p. 3-17.
20 Linz and Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," 1996, p. 14-33.
10
institutional changes that nonnalize democratic politics and narrow its uncertainty. This
nonnalization requires the expansion of citizen access, development of democratic citizenship
and culture, broadening ofleadership recruitment and training, and the like.
It is important to note that there does not seem to be any logical sequence to these
processes. Democracy activists do admit that it is not inevitable that transitional countries will
move steadily on this assumed path from opening and breakthrough to consolidation.
Transitional countries, they say, can and do go backward or stagnate as well as move forward
along the path. Of the nearly 100 countries considered as "transitional" in recent years, even
only a relatively small number-probably fewer than 20-are clearly en route to becoming
successful, well-functioning democracies or at least have made some democratic progress and
still enjoy a positive dynamic of democratization.
21
Most of the ''transitional countries,"
however, are neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy. They have entered what
Carothers calls "a political gray zone."22
Keeping these definitions of civil society and democratization in mind, the next
theoretical task is to understand the relation between both concepts. Needless to say, theories of
democratization seek to understand the factors influencing the emergence and success of the
formal properties of modem democracy in particular society. Many scholars come to a
conclnsion that the dynamics of the democratization are not just a matter of political elite. Such
theories are increasingly inclined to attribute a role in democratization to civil society,23 and
this trend is discernible in many part of the world.
24
However, this does not mean that civil
21 See Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" 1996, p. 20-37.
22 Carothers, "The End of the Transition PIII8digm, " 2002.
23 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 48-56; and Diamond, Developing
Democracy, p. 218-260.
24 Alagappa, Civil Society, 2004; and Feinberg alai. (eds), Civil Society, 2006.
11
society alone can produce democracy. Thus, what seems to be important is a balance between
civil society, political society, economic society, and the state, especially on the development
of cultures of social trust and respect for the rule oflaw. Civil society, then, is just one factor in
the process of democratization.
Schmitter and Diamond theorize the role of associations in society as contributing to
or articulating the demands and interest of various sectors of the population.
2s
In such a
position, civil society is poised to advance democracy in two generic ways: by helping to
generate a transition from authoritarian rule to electoral democracy and by deepening and
consolidating democracy once it is established.
In fact, Diamond outlines the ten democratic functions of civil society: (1), providing
the basis for the limitation of state power; (2), supplementing the role of political parties in
stimulating political participation; (3), serving as a crucial arena for the development of other
democratic attributes, such as tolerance, moderation, a willingness to compromise, and a
respect for opposing viewpoints; (4), creating channels for the articulation, aggregation, and
representation of interests; (5), generating a wide range of interests that may cross-cut, and so
mitigate, the principal polarities of political conflict; (6), recruiting and training new political
leaders; (7), monitoring elections: deterring fraud, enhancing voter confidence, affirming the
legitimacy of the result, or demonstrating an opposition victory despite gove=ent fraud; (8),
disseminating information and aiding citizens in the colIective pursuit and defense of their
interests and values; (9), supporting economic reform; and (10), strengthening the democratic
state by giving citizens respect for the state and positive engagement with it. 26
2S Schmitter, "Civil Society East and West," 1997; and Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society," 1994.
26 Diamond, ''Rethinking Civil Society," 1994, p. 7-11.
12
Given these theories of civil society, democratization, and the relation between them,
thus, what kind of cultural variation can be accommodated within the scope of civil society and
democratization? Is Islam uniquely different in its resistance to the conditions of civil society
and democratization? Islam is perhaps the prime example of a religious tradition that is widely
considered in the West to be in tension if not outright conflict with the normative tradition of
civil society,27 and contemporary perceptions are now further shaped by the events of
September 11, 2001. In his influential book, Ernest Gellner concludes that Islam is
incompatible with civil society, both normatively and empirically, since Islam is fundamentally
unsecularized.
28
Gellner understands secularization as the declining social significance of
religion. He says that in industrial or industrializing societies religion loses much of its
erstwhile hold over men and society. Where religion remains socially important, argues
Gellner, the development of individual autonomy is constrained. This in turn constrains the
development of civil society because, as Ozda1ga explains, ''individuals, who are not able to act
independently of the community of believers, cannot become the building-stones of the kind of
intermediary organizations on which civil society is built."29
In the same token, the eminent Turkish Scholar, Serif Mardin, begins by answering ''the
question of whether the ideals of democracy and civil society are genera1isable to the Muslim
world," with the response that "civil society is a Western Dream, a historical aspiration," and as
such, "does not translate into Islamic terms."30 Therefore, in spite of the appearing of aspects of
pluricentric social organization that undexpinned the historic development of civil society in the
West elsewhere in the world, including in Muslim societies, as part of the modernization process,
27 Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation, 1996.
28 Gellner, The Condition of Liberty, 1994, p. 15.
29 Ozdalga, "Civil Society and its Enemies," 1997, p. 74.
30 Mardin, ''Civil Society and Islam," 1995, p. 278-279.
13
Mardin warns that Westem and Muslim "dreams" have not converged, because Muslim societies
have inherited a "collective memory of a total culture which once provided a 'civilized' life of a
tone different from that of the West.''3!
There are empirical as well as conceptual reasons to believe that those arguments are
grounded in dubious assumptions. It is interesting to put here the three most relevant of four
challenges to Gellner's arguments proposed by David Herbert in his comprehensive study,32
Firstly, Herbert argues that Muslim have generated a wide range of responses to the discourses
of democracy and civil society. Indeed, normatively, Muslims have taken up a full range of
positions on the compatibility or incompatibility of the relationship between Islam and both
democracy and civil society. Each position seeks to justify itself in relation to the primary
sources of Islamic law: the Qur'an and Sunnah. This reality contradicts the simplistic integraJist
position-the view that Islam insists that all aspects of life should directly governed by its
unchanging precepts-that Gellner attributes to Islam.
Secondly, Herbert argues that the historical model on which Gellner bases his
argument applies only to a minority of historic Muslim societies and that the historically
predominant model of Muslim society has been characterized by institutional differentiation. It
is important to note that what is generally conceived of as the Islamic or Muslim countries in
the Arabian Peninsula is in fact home to a small minority of the ummah. Out of the more 1.3
billion Muslim population in the world today, the majority inhabit South and Southeast Asian
regions. There are also a significant number of Muslim populations in Central Asia, West and
North Africa, and, surprisingly, Europe.
3! Mardin, "Civil Society and Islam, 1995, p. 290.
32 Herbert, Religion and Civil Society, 2003, p. 76-79.
14
Political scientists and journalists sometimes misleadingly equate Islam with Arab
culture. They then assert correctly that there are no democracies in the Islamic countries of the
Arab world, leaving the false impression there are no Muslims living under democratic
regimes. In fact, as Stepan points out, a case can be made that about half of all the world's
Muslims, over 600 million, live in democracies, near-democracies, or intermittent
democracies.
33
It seems that Gellner bases his generalization on his studies of Muslim countries
in North Africa. AI; a matter of fact, what he claims about that region cannot necessarily be
generaIized to all Muslim countries.
FilUllly, Herbert argues that in practice in many parts of the Muslim world today Islam
has proven itself capable of mobiIization as a public discourse without stifling but rather
contributing to democratic pluralism. Religion, as Esposito points out, has been a significant
factor in the reassertion of civil society in many Muslim societies.
34
He argues that Islamic
history provides examples of many non-state actors, institutions, and organizations that served as
intermediaries between the ruler/gove=ent and the people. Meanwhile, in the contemporary
Muslim world, NGOs, professional associations, social welfare agencies, as well as educational
and financial institutions have proliferated not only in the most populous Muslim region of
Southeast Asia, 35 but also across the Muslim world.
36
The last theoretical task necessary to this thesis is to understand the relationship
between religious organization and democratization. The literature of democratization mostly
focuses on the role of the middle class, labor unions, election monitoring groups, and other
33 stepan, ''Religion, Democracy," 2000.
34 Esposito, "Islam and Civil Society," 2003, p. 70.
35 Nakamura, at al. (eds.), Islam and Civil Society In Southeast Asia, 2001.
36 Sajoo (ed.), Civil Society in the Muslim World, 2002; Kubba, "Arab and Democracy, 2000.
15
NGO institutions in the regime change. However, little attention has been paid to how religious
organizations are affecting democratization.
In his provocative book, Huntington gives primacy of place to Christianity as the
distinctive positive influence in the making of Western civilization: ''Westem Christianity, first
Catholicism and then Catholicism and Protestantism, is historically the single most important
characteristic of West em civilization."37 For Huntington, Westem culture's key contribution has
been the separation of church and state, something that he sees as foreign to the world's other major
religious systems (Confucianism and Islam).
In this regard, Stepan and Casanova warn us not to be trapped in major
misinterpretations.
38
Such a point of view is based on the assumption ofunivocality. We, as
Stepan notes, should beware of assuming that any religion's doctrine is univocally pro-
democratic or antidemocratic. Westem Christianity has certainly been multivocal concerning
democracy and the twin tolerations. At certain times in its history, Catholic doctrine has been
marshalled to oppose liberalism, the nation-state, tolerance, and democracy.
Secondly, such a perception falls into the fallacy of ' 'unique founding conditions."
This fallacy involves the assumption that the unique constellation of specific conditions that
were present at the birth of such phenomena as electoral democracy, a relatively independent
civil society, or the spirit of capitalism must be present in all cases if they are to thrive. To put
it differently, one can hardly make the argument that Catholicism is intrinsically, that is,
"essentially", democratic or has elective affinities with democracy or with civil society.
Finally, Catholicism was not the only religion that played a positive role in civil
society formation and democratization throughout the third wave. Other religious groups
37 Huntington, The Clash o/Civilizations, 1996, p. 70.
38 Stepan, "Religion, Democracy," p. 44; Casanova, ''Civil Society and Religion," 2001, p. 1042-1043.
16
played equally positive roles in various places: Lutherans in East Gennany, Protestants as well
as Catholics in South Korea, Episcopalians and various other churches in South Africa, and in
Romania, a Hungarian Unitarian minister, who triggered that country's revolution.
Casanova argues that religions have potential roles in civil society fonnation. He
proposes a three-step reconstruction of the transfonnation of religions that make possible their
roles in democratization.
39
Firstly, religion in general can serve as autonomous public spaces
and as a countervailing power to state power. Secondly, religions have to give up their
monopolistic claims and recognize religious freedom and freedom of conscience as universal
and inviolable human rights. Thirdly, not only should religions voluntarily disestablish
themselves from the state, but they also should disengage from political society proper. This
does not necessarily mean the privatization of religions. Contrarily, this relocation is the very
condition for the possibility of a modem public religion.
As shown by Cheng and Brown, some religious organizations have played a decisive
role in democratic transition in Asia, while others have been donnant, and still others have
acted in alliances with conservative politicians and business interests to block democratic
development.
40
They contend that religious doctrines do not predetermine the involvement of a
religious organization in the politics of democratization. Doctrines may constrain or inspire, but
they do not preclude or determine. They go on to say that most religions are multivioced; their
doctrines could be and have been interpreted in ways that permit, if not encourage, political
action for the cause of democracy.
39 Casanova, "Civil Society and Religion," 2001, p.1045-1047.
40 Cheng and Brown, "Introductioo," 2006. p. 3.
17
As far as religious organizatious' involvement in the process of democratization is
concerned, according to Cheng and Brown, it is shaped and influenced by three key factors.
41
Firstly are their ties to preexisting regimes. Secondly are their ties to political opposition. And
finally is how they define (or redefine) their role in civil society. In this seuse, religious
doctrines do not explain the variations on the calculations of religious organizations about
whether to directly engage themselves in the democratization process.
c. Literature Review
Although many authors have studied political Islam and the state in Indonesia, not much
attention has been given to specific Muslim civil society organizations, namely Mllbammadiyah
and Nahdlatul Ulama and their interplay with politics and their role in the process of
democratization. Douglas Ramage gives an emphasis on the centrality of the Pancasila ideology
and the contrasting views of it in four political groupings: Abdurrabman Wahid and NU, the
Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), the armed forces, and secular nationaIists.
42
Other authors have emphasized the centrality of the transformation of political ideas and practices
within Muslim communities during New Order,43 the Subarto regime's specific strategies to
structure state-Islamic relations,44 the emergence of civil pro-democratic Muslim in the process of
democratization in Indonesia, 45 and the compatibility of Islam and democratic values in Indonesian
Muslim community in the reform era. 46
A large number of scholars have studied in detail particular major Islamic organizations,
including their relationship with larger political structure of the state. While studies by van
41 Cheng and Brown, "Introduction," 2006, p. 14-17.
42 Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, 1995.
43 Effendy, Islam and the State, 2002.
44 Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, 2002.
45 Hefiter, Civil Islam, 2000.
46 Mujani, Rellglaus Democrats, 2003.
18
Bruinessen, Fei1lard, FeaI1y, Kadir, and Bush emphasize the centrality of the NU on their studies,47
some other authors, such as AIfian, Nakamura, Peacock, and Syamsuddin emphasize the centrality
of the Muhammadiyah in their inquiries.48
Among these scholarly wOIks, Kadir and Bush's dissertations as well as Bruinessen and
Fei1lard's books have some similarities with my own thesis, particularly in term of their approaches
to studying NU. So does Syamsuddin's dissertation on Mnharnmadiyah. Their studies, by and
large, provide extensive discussions of particular NU or Mnbammadiyah' s political activities
dIning the New Order and aftermath (Bush's Dissertation), despite their formal disengagements
with political parties and their foci on non-political (cultural and social) activities since the 1970s
and 1980s. They, to large extent, give their works an emphasis on elite discourse, with a special
attention to their relationships with the New Order regime (Bruinessen, Kadir, and Syarnsuddin),
the army (Feillard), and the Habibie and Wabid's presidencies (Bush).
The first distinction between my thesis and these scholarly works is that none of them
studying both the Mnharnmadiyah and NU. fuamining both organizations altogether, I will present
a more comprehensive picture of Indonesian Mnslims and underscore that, despite several different,
even rival, varieties of political expression within Muslim co=unity, they have been working in
concert to support the democratic change in Indonesia. While one organization seems to be more
willing to submit to the state control than the other, broader picture will show us that neither is less
democratic than the other.
Secondly, some of these scholarly works already deal with the roles played by the Islamic
community and the NU particularly in the incipient process of political IIbera1ization (Kadir) and in
47 van Bruinessen, NU. 1994; Feillard, NU Vis-a-vis Negara, 1999; Featy, Ulama and Politics in
Indonesia, 1998; Kadir, Traditional Islamic Society, 1999; Bush, Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia, 2002.
48 Alfian, Muhammadiyah, 1989; Nakamura, The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree, 1983; Peacock,
Purifying the Faith, 1978; Syamsuddin, Religion and Politics in Islam, 1991.
19
the long process of political transition in Indonesia (Refuer and Bush). However, their studies by
and large give their emphasis on the relationship between Muslim civil society and the state. While
I am also studying the relationship between the Muslim civil society organization and the state,
however, I expand my inquiry into their further contribution, as civil society movements and as
religious organizations, in the process of democratization.
Finally, as most of their time-period coverage is the New Order era, except Bush's
dissertation which extends to 2002, there was no a comprehensive account of the involvements of
both NU and Mllbammadiyah during the democratization era until the SBY's presidency. The
extension of the time-period coverage will in turn lead to the further interpretation of the
significance ofMllbammadiyah and NU's political activities for the full-fledge democratization, not
simply in the state-civil society relations during the liberalization and transition era.
D. Methodology
To address this topic, I will conduct a qualitative study. I am going to employ
ethnographic methods to explore conceptions and practices of two Muslim civil society
associations in Indonesia: Muharnmadiyah and NU. Therefore, the first sources of data
collection are semi-structured interviews, discussions, and participant observation. I have a
close relation with both institutions. I was born into a NU family. My father is still an important
figure ofNU in my sub-district. When I studied my Islamic senior high school in Jogjakarta, I
was also involved in the NU Students Association (IPNU).When I moved to Jakarta to continue
my undergraduate study in the State Institute of Islamic Studies (lAIN, currently urN) in
Jakarta, I was involved in the Muharnmadiyah Students Association (IMM). I was a vice
president of that organization in 1999-2001 and 2001-2003. I have also been the Executive
Director of the Center for the Study of Religion and Civi1ization, a research center under the
20
Central Board ofMuhammadiyah in 2001-2006. This center is incorporated in the People's
Voter Education Network (JPPR), a consortium of numerous youth wings ofMuhammadiyah
and NU and other NGOs working in civic education and election monitoring. Finally, when
Muhammadiyah and NU launched anti-corruption programs in 2003, I was also appointed to
lead the Muhammadiyah Institute for Good Governance Program, the Muhammadiyah's task
force of the program. All these activities enabled me to have a close relationship with almost all
leaders ofNU and Muhammadiyah. Such a personal background has SP3!ked my interest in
studying both Mllbammadiyah and NU, and has enabled me to have a closer look into the
"soul" and inner feeling of these organizations.
My fieldwork of study was effectively carried out during summer 2007. I was
primarily based in Jakarta, where the NU and (one of) Muharnmadiyah headquarter is located.
However, I was also able to attend numerous discussions held by both Mllbammadiyah and NU
organizations. Beside this fieldwork, I had another fieldwork in Indonesia during December
2007-January 2008 to carry out a more detailed and extensive interviews with leaders of
Muhammadiyah and NU. These interviews ask resource persons not only the facts they knew,
but also their interpretations of those facts.
In addition, sources of data include documents, reports, resolutions, speeches,
magazines, internal publications, and other Mllbammadiyah and NU materials not available
outside Indonesia or, in many instances, not available outside both organizations. I also make
extensive use oflocal Indonesian newspapers and magazines.
Finally, I use secondary sources. In addition to the more genera1literature concerning
state-civil society relations and on religion and politics, this thesis draws on writings focusing
on the dynamic interplay between state and Muslim civil society organizations in Indonesia.
21
The analyses of the Indonesian state are quite extensive. So do the analyses of political Islam in
Indonesia. The existing writings on the relations between Muslim civil organizations and the
state provide a general but important background of both organizations. Finally, existing
studies of the Muhammadiyah and NU are heavily referred to throughout the thesis as a means
to provide additional historical data othexwise unavailable in the primary documentations.
E. Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is organized into five chapters but is not rigidly set out in a chronological
order. My first task is to establish the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of the study.
Therefore, this chapter not only reviews the discourse of Islam, civil society, and
democratizations, but it explains the significance of this study as well. Chapter II is an
overview of the relationship between political Islam and the state during roughly fifty years of
Indonesian independence in which Mnbammadiyah and Nahdlatul illarua (NU) had been
transforming from political to civil.
Chapter ill deals with the political roles played by these two organizations during the
transition period. First of all, it presents a comprehensive account on how they keep their
relationships with political parties. This chapter also deals with the roles played by the
Muhammadiyah and NU in the 1999 and 2004 legislative and presidential elections as well as
the subsequent tensions and co-operation between both organiz.ations. It also analyzes the
leadership changes within both organizations in 2004 and 2005 respectively and their
implication for both organizations in the near future political and societal affairs. Finally, it
examines the possible roles played by Indonesian Muslim civil society organizations and their
leaders in the 2009 election.
22
Chapter IV examines the contribution of both organizations to the democratization
process. It looks first at their roles to sustain their position as independent civil organizations
during the last decade of the New Order regime and subsequently transform themselves into
movements clamoring demands for democratization. It also studies how their young members
worked in concert, not only in the election monitoring but also in a massive civic education
program. Equally important, it deals with how both organizations widen their functions to
promote the more substantive dimensions of democracy: increasing the transparency and
accountability of govermnent. It also studies how both organizations have been working to
maintain the plura1istic and tolerant nature of Indonesian society. Finally, this chapter studies
not only the interconnection between intemational funding received by most Islamic NGOs and
the internal democratization, but the state-society relation in post-Suharto period as well.
The final part of the study, at one level deals with the questions of Muslim civil
society organizations and democratization as well as Muslim civil society and the state in
Indonesia. More genera11y, the chapter will reflect upon larger question about the relationship
between Islam and civil society in the Muslim world.
23
CHAPTER II
MUHAMMADIYAH, NU, AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVILITY
A. Introduction
Indonesia is a home to the world's largest Muslim population of approximately 200
million people. However Indonesia is not an Islamic state. Nor Indonesia is a secular state. It is
not an Islamic state in a sense that the 1945 Constitution rejects the superiority of any religion
over the other. It is also not a secular state in the conventional sense of relegating religion to the
private sphere, and enforcing a strict separation between religion and state. The philosophical
basis of the state, Pancasila (five principles) begius with a declaration of the beliefin one God,
and the state recognizes six major religions. AIl a matter of fact, religion in Indonesia occupies
an important, and also ambiguous, position in the public affairs.
This ambiguity has in part been the result of the position of Islam in Indonesian
history and society. Having aware of their overwhelming majority, organized Muslims have
been unwilling to limit their activities to the nonpolitical realm. This refusal sterns not only
from adherence to doctrinal principle-there is no separation between religion and politics in
Islam-but also from fear of being marginalized from political arena. Unfortunately, within a
numerical majority, political Islam in Indonesia is an active minority. Therefore, political
organizations committed to explicitly Islamic goals have never been able to garner sufficient
mass support to control the goverument and establish a state based on Islamic principles.
This chapter will first present a historical overview of the origin of the ideological
pluralism within Indonesian Islam, of which political Islam has become a minority within a
numerical majority. Secondly, this chapter will present an overview of several critical moments
24
in the political development of Indonesian Islam during the roughly fifty years of the
independence period in which Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) had been playing a
significant role. This is purported to explore the organizational precedents for non-state social
associations for civil society in the majority Mnslim nation of Indonesia.
B. The Origins of Muhammadiyah and NU
Indonesia has the largest Muslim population of any country. Nearly 88 percent of its
approximately 220 million people identify themselves as Muslims. This country, along with
other Southeast Asian countries, has long been at the center of Asian maritime trade networks.
Hence, the global connection of religious and cultural systems to Indonesia existed long before
the present stage of globalization. Since the coming of Islam to Southeast Asia, Islamic
worldwide models for religious life have combined with distinctive local Indonesian patterns,
supporting the development of vibrant regional Muslim CUltures.! Today, these cultures
continually shape and are shaped by the changing conditions of life in contemporary Indonesia.
Moreover, Indonesia is also the largest archipelagic nation, spanning all or parts of five large
and thousands of smaller inhahited islands, each one ecologically and ethno-linguistically
distinct.
2
Within these diverse "indigenous" ethnic groups, there is a small (around 3 percent of
the population) Chinese population widely seen as non-indigenous (non-pribumi), and resented
by many because of its disproportionate ownership of middle and large-scale private enterprise,
thank to the Dutch colonial policy. In addition to its Muslim majority, there is a substantial
number of Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and tribal animists.
Complicating matters even further, as Hefuer says, despite its Sunni majority in
theological orientation, these Muslims have been deeply divided along ethnic, regional, and
I See Hefuer, "Religion: Evolving Pluralism," 1999, pp. 205-236.
2 See Cn'bb, ''Nation,'' 1999, pp. 3-38; Emmerson, "What Is Indonesia?" 2005, pp. 7-73.
25
ideologicallines.
3
The fissures are of two main inextricably linked kinds, so far as their political
effect is concerned: one is based on the extent to which the religion itself is regarded as a valid
motive force, and the other on the division between the "modernist" and "traditionalist"
interpretation of it. The spread of Islam in the archipelago, particularly in Java was uneven. The
religion went from the coast to the interior. Its spread reflected trading networks, the rivalry
between coastal and interior states, and the competition of different cultural groups. In some other
islands, the religion penetrated smoothly. Examples include Sumatera and South Sulawesi. In
there places, the spread of Islam did not contend with the cultural legacies of animism, Hinduism,
and Buddhism. Historically, therefore, many Muslims from the nation's largest ethnic group, the
Javanese, have been of syncretic or nominal Islamic persuasion (abangan), as opposed to strict
Muslim (santri), and thus resistant to the demands of Islamic orthodoxy.4
In the social structure of Indonesian Islam there is also an historical fault line between
two relatively distinct (though also in some ways blurry and now fading) religious-social-
economic-political orientatious, namely the "modernist" and "traditionalist". The modernist (or
reformist) movements,S which had their inspirations from the Islamic reform in the Middle East
during the second half of the nineteenth century, were both backward and forward-looking in
that it aimed to cleanse Islam of allegedly non-Islamic accretions acquired during the centuries
since the age of the Prophet Muhammad and, at the same time, sought to demonstrate that the
Muslim faith was based on rationality and thus not in conflict with the scientific spirit of the
modern world. The influence of reformist ideas spread in Indonesia as more and more
3 Hefiler, "A Muslim Civil Society?" 1998, p. 290.
4 The variants of Javanese Islam and their social significance are descnoed in Geertz, The Religion of
Java, 1960; and Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java, 1963.
S The standard accowrt on the modernist movemeots in the late colonial Indonesia, see Noer, The
Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942, 1973.
26
Indonesians visited the Middle East (Saudi Arabia and Egypt) as pilgrims or students and
returned as bearers of the new approach.
6
By the beginning of the twentieth century, several modernist organizations were
established, the most influential of which was the Muhammadiyah (the followers of
Muhammad).? Founded in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta, Java, the Muhammadiyah
soon established itself at the forefront of the movement to reorient Islam and society. Its main
principles are derived from the Koranic dictum, "arnar rna 'ru! nahy rnunkar" (calling to do
good and refrain from evil deeds). The main impetus for its establishment was to challenge
what they perceived as the two main weaknesses in Javanese society: on the one hand they
regarded traditional Islamic education as backward and incapable of coping with the challenge
of the modem world, and on the other, they rejected the non-Islamic accretions to Islamic
practice and urged a return to the basic purity of Islam as found in the Koran and Hadith.
8
Similarly, they observed with bitterness and resentment how the Dutch had ruled over the
country and had built a colonial educational system dedicated almost entirely to the preparation of
people to work as colonial administrators and clerks.
9
Facing these real challenges, The
Muhammadiyah thus concentrated its energies mainly on education, health services, and care for
the poor, and eschewed fonnal politics. For example, in contrast to traditional Islamic education,
Mnhammadiyah schools combined the model of European school and Islamic education, and thus
taught science, math, history and geography along with traditional Islamic subjects.
6 On the origin of Islamic refornrism in the Middle East and its impact on Sontheast Asian Islam, see
Azra, The Transmission of Islamic Reformism to Indonesia, 1992. On the comparative study between the
Mubammadiyah and Abduh's ideas, see Lubis, Pemikiran Muhamnuuliyah don Muhammad Abduh, 1993.
1 See Nakamura, The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree, 1983; Pescock, PurifYing the Faith, 1984;
A1fian, Muhammadiyah, 1989.
8 On the Mubammadiyah's theology and ideology, see Saleh, Modern Trends in Islamic Theological
Discourse, 2001; Federspiel, "The Mubammadiyah," 1970, pp. 57-79; Nakamnra, "The Reformist Ideology of
Mubammadiyah," 1980, pp. 273-286.
9 On the encounter between Mubammadiyah and Christian mission, see Shihab, The Muhammadiyah
Movements, 1995.
27
In response of the proliferation of the modernist, reformist organizations, more
traditionally uIama organized themselves into the Nahdlatul Ulama (the Awakening of Islamic
scholars-NU) in East Java in 1926.
10
Challenging the modernist's emphasis on self-study and
individual responsibility, the traditionalists defended the privileged role of religious scholars by
pointing out that religious scholars (ulama) were heirs of the Prophets (al-ulama waratsatul
anbiya) in that they were part of the chain ofIslamic knowledge leading back to the Prophet
Muhammad. Given their anthority on Islamic law and its classical commentaries they served,
through their pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), as centers for the dissemination of Islamic
knowledge in the interior, rura1 area of Javanese society. While the Muhammadiyah tended to
be more successful in attracting better-educated followers from urban areas, the NU generally
retained the loyalty of the network of these religious scholars (ulama) who, through their
pesantren, had great influence among the students and ordinary people of the peasantry.!! As
far as the organizational style is concerned, the NU also emphasized on these relatively
autonomous and dispersed charismatic religious scholars, in contrast to the Muhammadiyah
which developed organizations with rule-governed bureaucracies and open election.
Although the NU and Muhammadiyah have grown closer together, the tension
between these two orientations has remained a key feature of Indonesian politics and society to
this day. Despite their rivalry, however, both organizations have experienced the similar
tendencies, being a large organization. While the NU established strong roots in East and
Central Java and South Kalimantan, the Mubammadiyah gradually became more of a
10 On the standard account for the NU, see Anam, Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul
Ulama1985; van Bruinessen, NU, 1994; Feillard, NU Vis-a-vis Negara, 1999.
II Dhofier, The Pesantren Tradition, 1999.
28
nationwide organization, spread out in cities throughout the country derived its support largely
from Sumatera, South Sulawesi, West Java and the north coast of Java
Ai; illustrated above, there was a ubiquitous precedence of autonomous and
independent institutions during the late colonial period. Furthermore, there was also a deep
tradition of pluralism and diversity within Indonesian society, not only between Muslims and
non-Muslim, but also between devout and nominal Muslim as well as between the modernist
and traditional Islam. The next part will examine tension and cooperation among and between
these diverse groups in the course of 50 years of Indonesian independence.
c. The Involvement of the Muhammadiyah and NU in Politics
The proclamation of Indonesian Independence in 1945 was soon followed by the
establishment of a provisional parliament and the commencement of political activities by a
large number of competing parties. Among these parties-religious, secular, and even
communist-Masyumi was one of the most significant.
12
The Masyumi (Majelis Syuro
Muslimin Indonesia-Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) was created in the Japanese
period and transformed into a political party on November 7, 1945 in a Mubammadiyah's
boarding scbool in Yogyakarta 13 This party was comprised not only of individual members but
of corporate ones as well, namely, Muslim political, religious, social, and educational
organizations, as what so-called "special members", that are NU, Muhammadiyah, and some
other smaller and regional organizations.
Therefore, Muslim politicians have had powerful positions since the early days of the
Independence period. The Masyumi was a leading member of most coalition governments
12 See Noer, Partai Islam dalam Pentas Nasional, 1987.
13 A comprehensive account on the political relation between the Masyumi and Muhammadiyah, see
SyaifuIIah, Gerak Politik Muhammadiyah dalam Masyumi, 1997.
29
during the Parliamentary Democracy period (1949-1956) and on several occasions had led the
governing coalitions.
14
Early in the revolution, in exchange for giving up their claim to an
Islamically defined state, which would have alienated Christian and other religions minorities,
Islamic groups were granted their demand for a ministry of religion. From this base, largely
controlled by the NU but shared by a contingent ofMuhammadiyah educators, the Islamic
bureaucracy was expanded outwards throughout the archipelago.
But these gains coopted and divided political Islam. The Ministry became not a salient
but an enclave, while political competitions among Muslims, particularly between the
modernists and traditionalists, reinforced theological differences. The Masyumi, as has been
mentioned, was a federation of many organizations, each one with its own policies. Soon the
strain began to show. First, in 1948, the Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesian (pSI!) withdrew, to
campaign in its own right and under its own emblem. Then, in 1952, the NU broke away also to
campaign under its own emblem. IS This left the Masyumi to become the political vehicle of the
reformist movement, which took over the name virtually by default.
Throughout the 1950s, when political struggle was profoundly colored by ideological
battie,16 the Islamic parties and organizations, including the NU and Mubammadiyah, favored the
creation of a state based upon Islamic law. They believed in the holistic nature ofIslam as Islam
constitutes more than theological or ritual systems. Moreover, they argued, Islam does not
recognize the separation between the spiritual and temporal; rather it governs all aspects oflife.
14 On the rise and fall of the governments during this period, see Herbert Feith, The Decline of
Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 1962.
" There were two reasons for the NU to withdraw. Firstly, as the reformists continued their efforts to
dominate the federation, the NU sought to get a greater role by establishing its own party. Secondly, there was a
dispute between Mnbammadiyah and NU as to which organization would control the Ministry of Religion in the
next Masyumi-Ied coalition. For a comprehensive account for the political activities of the NU during this period,
see Fealy, Ulama and Politics in Indonesia, 1998.
16 Feith concluded that there were five major political streams involved in the political battle during this
period: Islamic traditionalism, Islamic modernism, socialism, oonmumism, and mdical nationalism. See Feith,
"Introduction", in Feith and Castles (eds.), Indonesian Political Thinking, 1970, p. 1-24.
30
They also argued that Islam was the first basis on which Indonesia established a modern political
organization which attracted mass support. In this regard, they contended that Islam was the one
which first paved the way for political actions aiming at independence and which first planted the
seed of Indonesian unity. As a matter of fact, many of the Muslim leaders believed that
Indonesia's nationalism should be Islamic in nature. 17 Meanwhile, nationalist and non-Islamic
parties supported the retention ofPancasila and found the concept of an Islamic state distasteful.
Only Pancasila, they affirmed, could appeal to the varied, ethnic, regional, and religious groups
that comprised Indonesia. They contended that Islam, insofar as it entered politics qua Islam, was
a divisive element.
1S
Ideologically and intellectua11y, this tension was paralyzing for Islam so
long as it was directly engaged politically.
In the first general election of 1955, six parties campaigned under the barmer of Islam.
They expected to win an outright electoral majority and subsequently go on to establish an
Islamic state. To the surprise of almost everyone, however, six Islamic parties took at best
43.9% of the vote for parliament, indicating clearly enough that a large number ofMus1ims had
opted for non-Islamic parties. From an electoral field of more than thirty parties, the Sukarno-
led Indonesian National Party (PNI) won 22.3 percent of the vote; Masyumi, 20.9 percent; NU,
18, 4 percent; and the Indonesian Communist Party (PIG), 16.4 percent. 19
After the 1955 elections, when Sukarno started to promote his idea of Guided
Democracy, power moved to the presidency, the army, and the PKI.
20
Other political parties
steadily lost strength, and therefore the ideological rivalries were increasing. Sukarno sought to
17 On the competing discourses between the Islamic group and nationalist group concerning the nature of
Indonesian nationalism and the place of Islam during this period, see Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia,
2005, Cha,pter 2.
1 On the dynamics of political Islam during this period, see Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modem
Indonesia, 1982.
19 Feith, The Indonesian Electians of 1955, 1957, pp. 58-59.
20 See Feith, "President Sukamo, the Army and the Communists," 1964, pp. 969-980.
31
submerge these ideological differences in a single national belief. He called it Nasakom
(NasionaIisme, Agama [religion], Komunisme). Unfortunately, this new country could not be
simultaneously Marxist, Islamic, and developmentaIist, except perhaps in the mind of Sukamo.
As the Guided Democracy period came in 1959, the distinct political attitudes of
Islamic parties were discernible, to some extent reflecting differences in regional-cultural
backgrounds.
21
The NU, culturally closer to the Javanese value system of the ruling elite and
following a long tradition of Sunni political conservatism, was always accommodative towards
the government of the day. To the NU, any government that allowed (and preferably facilitated)
its citizens the exercise of their religious obligations was acceptable. Its chief concrete
objective seemed to be to secure as much patronage from the government as possible.
22
Meanwhile, the Masyumi, culturally closer to the Outer islands' value system of egalitarianism
did not shy away from open confrontation with Sukamo. The Masyumi never formulated ideas
about a specifically Islamic political system; it basically demanded western-style parliamentary
democracy with a greater say for committed Muslims in matters of government policy.
In political terms, this meant on the part of the NU a readiness to legitimize Sukamo's
presidency, to tolerate Sukamo's increasingly radical nationalism and left-wing sympathies,
and to participate in successive coalition governments that shared his views.
23
By doing so, of
course, they ensured that they were in position of strength vis-a.-vis the reformists. The
Masyumi, on the other hand, would not compromise. It refused, on principle, to have any
association with a government that included Communist fellow travelers, and it resented
Sukamo's broad religious sympathies, his policies, and his personal lifestyles.
21 van Bruinessen, "Islamic State or State Islam?," 1996, p. 22.
22 For religio-political interpretation of the NO's political behavior during this period, see Haedar,
Nahdlatul Ulama dan Islam di Indanesia, 1994; Fea1y, "Rowing in a Typhoon," 1994.
23 See Federspiel, ''Sukarno and His Muslim Apologists," 1976.
32
The Masyumi's political power started to wane since the outbreak of the PRRI
rebellion in 1958. Masyumi did not officially support the rebellion but three of its top leaders
joined them. Given its ambivalent attitude toward the rebellions, it was labeled the party of
separatism and revolt.
24
The Masyumi was forced to dissolve in 1960 for its supposed
complicity in the rebellion and its continuing opposition with Sukamo. Its leaders were placed
under political arrest; their supporters either joined NU or other small Islamic parties, i=ersed
themselves in religious or cultural activities, or remained silent. Prior to the dissolution,
Muha=adiyah dismantled its special membership to Masyumi in 1959 and devoted itseifto
educational, social, and religious activities.
25
Islamic political activity during the Guided
Democracy period was therefore essentially dominated by the NU, whose freedom of action
was also circumscribed.
26
Like all other parties, the NU was forced to give uncritical support to
Sukamo while hoping his goodwill would protect its interests.
The failed Communist coup of 1965 was a watershed in modern Indonesian history. It
brought about the fall ofSukamo and his Guided Democracy idea, and in its wake caused
terrible bloodshed.
27
The PKI, the largest Communist party outside the Communist countries,
and its sympathizers were eliminated and the Suharto-Ied New Order regime came to power.
Both Muha=adiyah and particularly NU followers took active parts in the suppression of the
24 Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, 1966, p. 185.
25 It was during that time that Mubammadiyah formulated "Kepnoadian Muhammadiyah (The Character
ofMuharomadiyah)", which declared its identity as "an Islantic movement whose activities revolves around
Islantic propagation (dakwah) both within Muslim community and society as a whole." This concept began to be
deliberated in the 1956 Muhammadiyah Congress in PaIembang, South Swnatera, and was formaIly ratified in the
35
th
Muhammadiyah Congress in 1962 in Jakarta. The objective of this concept was that the Mubammadiyah
sought to clear itself from any complicity in the Masyumi's political rivalry with the Sukarno, and therefore
avoided any ensuing consequent of the Masyumi's dissolntion.
26 On political Islam during the Guided Democracy period, see Maarif; Islam dan Politil< di Indonesia
Pada Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin, 1988.
27 There is no reliable figures exist for the number of people who were killed. A scholarly consensus has
settled on a figure of 400-500,000, but the correct figure could be half or twice as much. See, Cnob (ed.), The
Indonesian Killings 1965-1966, 1990; Cnbb, "Genocide in Indonesia, 1965-1966," 2001.
33
PKI (Le. in killing thousands of alleged members and activists), particularly in strongly Muslim
areas such as East Java and Aceh.
As reward for their assistance in forcing Sukarno from power and liquidating the PKI,
Muslim leaders at first expected to be welcomed into the new regime or, at very least, allowed
to play an active political role. Gradually Islamic political leaders began to feel that Islam was
the most important civil force in society, as its major antagonist, the PKI and Sukarno, had
been eliminated. Members of the Masyumi had high expectations that their party would be
rehabilitated, on the assumption that they were the very people who had adamantly resisted
Sukamo's regime.
28
As early as December 1965, a "Coordinating Body of Muslim Activities"
(Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin) was formed, uniting 16 Islamic organizations which
worked toward a rehabilitation of the Masyumi. From June 1966 onwards, many of them, and
in the first place the Muhammadiyah, openly began to advocate the return of the Masyumi.
The political rewards they expected never materialized. The impression in the Suharto
and military regime was that, with the Communists destroyed and the nationalists discredited,
the Muslim's political opportunity would be simultaneously obstructed. Early in 1967 Suharto
made it clear that the army would not countenance the revival of the Masyumi party. The
Suharto regime did allow a formation of a Masyumi successor by the name ofParmusi (partai
Muslimin Indonesia) while refusing to allow Masyumi senior leaders to playa leadership role
in this party.29 The party at first rejected this condition but eventually gave in and obtained
legal recognition in February 1968. Led by Djarnawi Hadikusumo (Chairman) and Lukman
Harun (General Secretary), moderate Muhammadiyah leaders, the party executive contained
many Muhammadiyah figures as well as some other representatives of various Islamic groups.
28 Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," 1968, p. 1004.
2'J See Ward, The Fowulation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia, 1970.
34
The Parmusi ran into next trouble with the army when it held its first party congress
early in November 1968 in Malang, East Java.
30
At this congress Parmusi elected Muhammad
Roem, a very senior Masyumi leader who in the 1950s had served as Foreign Minister and
Deputy Prime Minister but had not participated in the PRRI revolt, as the new party chainnan.
However, the government could not agree to the newly-selected leadership of the Pannusi.
Relations became increasingly tense in the two years after the congress. Despite a series of
meetings held between fonner Masyumi leaders and the anny leaders, in order for the later to
give consent, however, Suharto maintained his refusal. Moreover, the government sought to
prevent former Masyumi leaders to participate in the election planned for July 1971.
It was in response to this growing tension that in October 1970 Djaelani Naro and
Imron Kadir, members of the executive party who was considered close to Suharto's right-hand
man, Ali Murtopo, announced that they had unilaterally taken over the leadership of the party.31
This coup allowed Suharto to intervene, as he announced that he was changing the Parmusi
leadership and appointing Mintaredja and Sulastomo as party chairman and general secretary, a
decision which met with approval from Naro group and caused extreme chagrin among
Masyumi loyalties. Mintaredja was a member of the cabinet and was identified with
Muhanunadiyah although he was unpopular with the rank and file ofMuhammadiyah
membership because of his lack of commitment to the Masyumi ideal. By launching these
policies, the government sought to make the Pannusi always lacked credibility as a Muslim
party and was never able to mobilize popular support in elections.
30 On the tension between the army and the supporters of the Masyumi, see Samson, "Army and Islam in
Indonesia, 1971-1972, pp. 545-565.
3J CrOIWb, "Indonesia, 1981, p. 202.
35
A series of political turbulences during 1965-1971 created a confusion and internal
conflict within the NU leaders.
32
Although the NU had given the anny vigorous support in the
extermination of the PKI, its senior leaders initially hesitated to join the anny leaders in their
moves against Sukarno, while its young generation rallied in streets demanding Sukamo's fall.
Many of the NU leaders were personally close to Sukamo and had benefited at the expense of
their Masyumi rivals during the Guided Democracy period. It was only in early 1967 when it
was clear that Sukarno was about to be deposed that the NU leaders reversed their position and
began to call not only for Sukarno's dismissal but also his arrest and trial. Clearly, the initiative
was in the hands of junior NU leaders while senior leaders were at first wary of making the
wrong steps in a confused political situation. Swinging its support behind the Suharto, the NU
leader, Idham Chalid., retained his post in the cabinet and the party continued to control the
Department of Religion, its main source of patronage to its supporters throughout the nation.
These undemocratic tendencies since the inception of the Suharto regime exacerbated
the very conflict between senior and junior leaders of the NU.
33
While the former sought to
ingratiate themselves with the military leaders rather than confront them in the style of the
modernist, there was much frustration within the younger leaders, and the later began to be the
most outspoken opponents of the new regime.
The open conflict between the anny and the radical wing of the NU took place during
the 1971 election, when finally violence erupted between them. In the coercive and fraudulent
election, the government political vehicle, Golkar (Golongan Karya-Functional Groups),
succeeded in attracting a few ulama to its camp, while the NU proved to be the most formidable
rival. The young and controversial leader Subchan Z.E. set the tone for a campaign in which
32 See FeiIIard, ''Tmditiona1ist Islam and the Army in Indonesia's New Order," 1996, pp. 42-67.
33 vanBruinessen, "Indonesia's UIama and Politics," 1990, p. 55.
36
the party was uncharacteristically confrontative. The dirty methods wielded by the regime
during this election had forced the NU to playa role it had previously always avoided: the role
of an opposition. But there was another, rival tone. The senior leaders, seeking to sustain their
cordial relationship with the new regime, appealed to NU sympathizers to increase participation
and cooperation with government agencies and to make the election "a success".
The 1971 election were contested by eleven political parties. The vast majority of votes
(62.8 percent) went to Golkar. The Pannusi, after a series of government interferences, polled only
5.3 percent of the vote. The NU maintainoo its previous strength and won 18.7 percent - slightly
more than its gain in 1955. The total Muslim vote amounted to only 27 percent. 34 The result was
acceptOO distressfully by the NU particularly. The next blow came when the only major source of
patronage, the Ministry of Religion, was taken away from the NU, and the government appointed
Mukti Ali, a modernist Muslim scholar. These consecutive disappointments were deernoo by many
senior NU leaders as results of the fierce opposition of the NU young leaders. Early in January
1972 Subchan was dismissed from the party's executive board, paving the way for the senior NU
leaders to reestablish cordial relationship with the new regime.
The govermnent's next step toward the further political demise of ideology consisted
in the "simplification" of the party system; all the parties (except Golkar) succumbed to
government pressure to merge into two new parties, one (pOI-the Indonesian Democratic
Party) for nationalists and Christian parties, and another, the Unity and Development Party
(PPP) for four existing Muslim parties. The PPP, whose name neither denoted nor connoted
Islam, was deliberately designed by the regime to weaken it by exploiting internal conflicts and
rivalries, and it was quite successful in this respect.
34 See Ward, The 1971 Election in Indonesia, 1974.
37
During the 1970s, the NU was numerically the largest component within the PPP, but
it was not given a corresponding proportion of the party's parliament seats, thanks to the
continuing government interference in favor of the handpicked party leader, Naro. Prior to the
1982 election, Naro unilaterally drew up his own list of candidates without consulting the NU
leaders, aimed at blocking the NU's most vocal spokesmen from reelection. Depite NU's
protest, the government approved Naro's list ofPPP candidates.
The last, but not least, strategy used by the regime to tame potential opposition was
the compulsion for all political and mass-based organizations to adopt the state ideology
Pancasila into their constitutions as the "sole basic principle". This was no problem at all for
the PPP while initial difficulties were quickly resolved by the NU, but the Mubammadiyab and
other modemist-refonnist organizations offered strong resistance and ouly succumbed when it
became clear that they would lose their legal existence if they failed to conform.
3s
The series of restriction ofIslam under the New Order reflected, on the one hand, the
proclivities of state leaders influenced by both technocratic and pre-Islamic ideas and fearful of
any institutions they do not control. They also, however, continued the experience of
Indonesian Islam over a far longer time: politically, the religion has characteristically been on
the defensive, and since the independence it has fought for an ever-narrowing range of claims
on the state. Therefore, Ruth McVey has rightly noted that the history ofIslamic struggle in
Indonesian politics seemed to be a "faith as the outsider". 36
3S The Masyumi ideologically-related student union, HMl (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam) split into two
organizations, as one group strongly resisted the bill and the other one complied. Meanwhile the Masyumi
affiliated high-school students' union PIT (pelajar Islam Indonesia) lost its existence for its fierce resistance. See
Karim, HMI MFO dalam Kemelut Modernisasi Politik di Indonesia, 1997; Sitompu!, Nahdlatul Ulama dan
Pancasila, 1989; Harun, Muhammdiyah dan Asas Pancasila, 1986.
36 McVey, "Faith as the Outsider," 1983, pp. 199-225.
38
Despite these restrictions, however, there was not only one-way traffic. As seen in the
next part, politically restrained, Islam broke out saliently in remarkable ways, surprising any
whose views of it were formed in the parliamentary and Guided Democracy periods, and the
most important one was that the Muhammadiyah and NU retreated from "practical politics".
D. Muhammadiyah, NU and Political Disengagement
It became clear that in the course of its first twenty years period, the New Order
gradually capable of limiting the influences of both political and mass-based Islamic
organizations in Indonesian politics. On the other side, however, it is difficult to ascertain the
convergence response from the Muslim society.37 Different responses and divergent interests
revolved around disagreement within Muslim society over the appropriate way they should go
in defending their interests and fearing a political backlash.
Different approaches have been taken by the Islamic groups to respond to such a
challenge. They varied widely, ranging from open opposition to accommodationist moves
toward the regime. Five major trends can be seen in this respect. The first trend was
accommodative to the regime. Certain wings within the Parmusi, PPP, and NU were out-and-
out collaborators and they were successfully maneuvered into key positions within those
parties, thank to their close relationship with the military and the regime. The second trend was
intra-parliamentary opposition. In this regard, some other Muslim leaders within those political
parties inclined to be confi:ontative, and they responded the state policies both by nuanced
criticism and by attempts to exert pressure through their membership in the parliament. 38
37 On the awkward relationslrip between Islam and the New Order regime, see Raillon, "The New Order
and Islam," 1994, pp. 197-217; Liong, ''Indonesian Muslim and the State," 1988, pp. 869-896.
38 On these first two groups, see Samson, ''Conceptions of Politics, Power, and Ideology in Contemponii)'
Indonesian Islam," 1978, pp. 196-226; Samson, "Religious Belief and Political Action in Indonesian Islamic
Modernism," 1973, pp. 116-142.
39
The third one was extra-parliamentary radical confrontation. A small number of
radical Islamist groups kept on voicing their criticism toward Suharto's policies on Muslim
community. In many cases, however, open oppositions from Islamic groups were relentlessly
repressed by the state apparatus, whose prominent example was the killing of hundreds of
Muslim demonstrators in Jakarta's port ofTanjung Priok, in 1984.
39
Not all responses to the state policies, however, were negative. There was evidence of
vigorous discussions among young Muslim intellectua1s on religious matters as well as
attempts to rethink the position of Islam in a pluralistic state, abandoning the triumpha1ist
ambitions of the past. This is thefourth trend, which is sometimes called intellectual and social
transformative approach. 40 Some of the most prominent young intellectua1s were individuals
such as Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Amien Rais, and Dawam Rahardjo.
Tantamount to the mushrooming of young Muslim intellectuals, there was another,
and for the purpose of this thesis the most, significant trend within the Indonesian Muslim
communities, which sought to reevaluate their strategy within the new, authoritarian political
system. This last trend was adopted by the Muhannnadiyah in 1971 and the NU in 1984, when
both organizations retreated from "practical politics".
As indicated in the previous part, by the late 1960s it was obvious that Islamic hopes
in the New Order were misplaced, and that political Islam had little opportunity. It became
clear as well that the regime would intervene at will in the affairs of Islam if seen necessary for
the sake of stability, development, and purposes of state, all to be defined by the regime itself.
3. See Kolstad, "Enemy Others and Violence in Jakarta," 1996, pp. 357-380.
40 See Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, 2003; Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia,
1995; Ali and Effendy, Merambah Jalan Baru Islam, 1986; Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New
Order" Modernization in Indonesia, 1980.
40
The modernist Muslims came first to realize such challenges. They saw that all parties
have been SUbjugated to restrictions, manipulations, and pressures, but the modernist Muslims
have been the most greatly affected. They came to a conclusion that political parties were
highly susceptible of state control, and therefore, no longer deemed as effective means to
pursue their political interests. In other words, one way of confronting the vulnerability of
political parties is, of course, eschewing them. Therefore, one result of the restriction of
political Islam has been to turn Muslim leaders away from formal political activities.
There were many roads taken, however. A small group of refurmists/modernists
around Muhammad Natsir founded the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah (DDI-Islamic Missions
Council) in 1967. Natsir was one of the most prominent Indonesian modernist Muslim
intellectual and politician in the twentieth century.41 Their turn from politics to dakwah was
probably not simply due to the only available alternative, but was also inspired by political
experiences. They seemed to come to realize that many, ifnot most Indonesian Muslims were
not interested in Islamic political parties and their agendas. It must have seemed an obvious
conclusion that the way to change lay not in parliament but in a change in attitude and
awareness of the Muslim community, which could be brought about by interISive dakwah.
Meanwhile, the larger part of the modernists, of course, continued to be active within
the Muhammadiyah which in the 38
th
Congress in Makassar, North Sulawesi in 1971 officially
stated that the organization is, "an Islamic dakwah movement devoting itselfto working in the
entire aspects of human and societailives, and has not any organizational affiliation with
41 See Uddle, "Media Dakwah ScripturaJism," 1996, pp. 323-356. In the colonial period Natsir engaged
in a tiunous debate about the relationship between religion (Islam) and the state with the secu1ar nationa1ist leader
Sukamo. He bad been prime minister in 1950-1951 and remained chairman of the Masyumi in the succeeding
years. Under his leadership the Masyumi increasingly enunciated a policy of opposition to wbat it felt was the
attempt of President Sukamo to bypass constitutional democracy. In the late 1950s be supported the PRRI
rebellion, for which he was arrested and imprisoned unti11966.
41
particular political parties or organizations." Since 1971 on, the Mubammadiyah have been
focusing their energies on the ideas of social welfare and education programs. In response to its
members' demands that the Mubammadiyah be more politically active, it advises them to join
or not join any of the existing political parties on an individual basis.
The Muhammadiyah's decision to halt its political engagement preceded by thirteen
years the same decision made by the NU in 1983. In its national deliberation ofulama in
Situbondo, East Java in 1983, the NU decided to return to its "original guideline" (khittah)
stated by its founders in 1926. This decision was then ratified in the following year in its 27
th
congress in the same place.
42
Of the many resolutions passed during the congress, as the
consequence of the Khittah 1926, was that ''the NU as an organization (jam 'iyah) is
independent from any political and societal organizations.'043 The other decision passed was,
among other things, the acceptance ofPancasiia as the sole foundation of the NU.
The decisions, made by the Muhammadiyah and NU to move in this similar direction,
have been largely prompted by the political impasse for the supporters of the Muhammadiyah
and NU. For the supporters ofMuhammadiyah, the regime's objection to revive the Masyumi
was not too disappointing them. Nor was the regime's objection to the return of the senior
Masyumi leaders to the Parmusi's leadership. It was the unilateral action taken by Naro and
Kadir, thanks to the regime's backing, to the Parmusi's leadership, whose both the chairman
and the general secretary were the Muhammadiyah's prominent figures, that rendered the
Muhammadiyah to realize that there was no longer opportunity in the political realm. The
Mubammadiyah's leaders once considered to transform itseifto a political party. But they
realize as well that it would have met the similar restrictions and manipulations.
42 See Nakamura, "NU's Leadership Crisis and Search for Identity in the Early 198080" 1996, pp. 94-109.
43 See PBNU, Hasil Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama Ire 27 Situhondo, 1986, p. 107.
42
Similarly, the series of the state's political manipulations directed toward the NU had
been gradually increasing their resentment. The NU lost its post in the ministry of religion; it
suffered from state's coercion during the elections; and its intra-parliamentary opposition to the
state's issuance of several bills supposedly offending the Islamic sensitivity was paid offby its
under-representativeness in the PPP's parliamentary seats. As a result, the NU's major sources
of patronage gradually dried up and they came to realize that there was no longer benefit in
further participation in parliamentary politics. Although there were a small number of the NU
leaders who fought to keep the NU inside the PPP, however, its vast majority leaders took the
line not only of withdrawing from the PPP but from politics altogether and returning to its
original guideline of 1926, becoming once again a socio-religions organization with no longer
interest in active political affairs.
44
To those leaders who decided to remain in the PPP in order
to keep their seats in national and local parliaments, the NU forced them to resign from the NU.
The messages behind their disengagements from political parties were clear. On the one
hand, the Ml1hamm
a
diyah, the largest component within the Parmusi, no longer supported it
Compounded with the rejection of such Masjumi elder statesmen as Natsir and Roem, who still
commanded widespread respect and affection, to the Parmusi' s claim to be the heir to their old
(Masyumi) party, the Muhammadiyah's decision was fatal for the Parmusi's perfonnance in the
1971 election. The Parmusi, no longer representing any readily identifiable constituency, polled
only 5.3 percent of the vote--a quarter of the Masyumi's strength in 1955. On the other hand, the
NU, comprising the largest component within the PPP, departed from it. While in previous
elections the NU leaders had issued fatwas obliging their followers to vote for the PPP, in the 1987
44 See, Irsyam, Ulama dan Partai Politik, 1984; Karim, Metanwrfosis NU dan Politisasi Islam
Indonesia, 1995; Jones. "The Contraction and Expansion of the Umat ... 1984. pp. 1-20; Ida, Anatomi Konjlik
NU. Elit Islam dan Negara. 1996.
43
the NU explicitly told its members that any political party would do. As a result, the PPP's electoral
showing drastically declined. While in the 1977 and 1982 elections it had received 29 percent and
28 percent of the vote, respectively, it was reduced to 16 percent in the 1987 election.
The lost votes of the Parmusi in the 1971 election and of the PPP in the 1987 election
surprisingly went to the regime's political machine, Golkar. This decline was in part because of
military's intimidation, coercion, and cooptation prior to and during the election, and in the
other part because many voters had been lured away by various forms of persuasions: subsidies
for mosques and schools, free tickets to Mecca for locally influential Muslims, promises of
local development funds and other forms of patronage. While the ministry of religion, as major
source of patronage for Muslim society, was totally under the state's control, its projects and
funds would be easily available to Muslim leaders who had gone over to Golkar. For them,
pragmatically, there were no longer incentives to be out of the mainstream.
The retreat of political Islam during this period has not really meant depolitization,
rather removal of Muslim political activity from the vulnerable and by now pointless arena of
party politics to the more salient one of broad social action. An able Indonesian expert, Donald
Emmerson, once noted that although the Indonesian Muslims had been experiencing a
"political impasse", however, they finally found a "cultural opportunity',.45 The further
implication of the political disengagement decided by the Muhammadiyab and NU for the
rejuvenation of cultural Islam will be detailed below.
E. Muslim Civil Society: Competing Discourses
Another important motivation behind the withdrawal of the Muhammadiyah and NU
from party politics was that they began to realize that their long-decade involvements in
45 See E=erson, "Islam in Modem Indonesia, 1981, pp. 159-168.
44
practical politics had prevented them from devoting sufficient attention to their religious and
social functions. Many Muslim leaders felt that the political struggle had diverted too much
attention from what they saw as the real tasks of both organizations: the spiritual guidance and
education of the Muslim community. It was felt also that the Muhammadiyab and NU had got
off the right track a long time ago and that they should attempt to regain their original purity by
reemphasizing their identity as religious organizations.
This political retreat was a hallmark epitomizing their effort to abandon their
propensity to enforce piety from the ''top-down'' and a milestone of their endeavors to make a
cultural virtue of the necessity of political retreat by strengthening, from the "bottom up", the
piety of the base on which their long-run political strength must rest. By doing so, the
Muhammadiyah and NU incrementally changed their foci from the political arena to the civil
one. Their retreat from the political arena led them to pay more attention to cultural
movements, such as education, societal empowerment, community services, intellectual
discourse, and religious inquiries.
While there was a consensus between the Muhammadiyah and NU that their nature,
instead in the political realm, was in the society, they disagreed on the mode of relationships
between state and society in Indonesia. The role of religion and religious groupings in relation
to the state was then highly debated.46 In discussing and analyzing the contested nature of the
concept of civil society and the plurality of its empirical manifestations, we should keep in
mind that their different motivations and approaches led in turn to different models.
47
The retreat ofMuhammadiyah from party politics, compounded with the upsurge of
the new Muslim intellectuals since 1970s, was eventually not only capable of reducing political
46 Schulte Nordholt, "Introduction," 2002.
47 Tanthowi, ''Mnbammadiyah dan NO dalam Kompetisi Makna Civil Society," 2001.
45
hostility between Islam and the regime, but it also made the regime accommodate some
(modernist) Muslim's political and economic interests. The modernists' motivation, to be
accommodated in the development process during the New Order period, unwittingly prompted
them to adopt a Hegelian approach of civil society, in which they give an emphasis on: first,
their supplementary and complementary function to the state. Therefore, the Muhammadiyab
has been concentrating primarily on educational program, health services, social cares, services
the state supposedly deliver. Second is the necessary of the middle class, of course, which were
more or less dependent to the state.
Under this Hegelian approach, the civil society model constructed by the
Muhammadiyab resulted in: first, independency in various aspects, particularly in the fields of
education, social and health services.
48
For example, up until 2000, the Muhammadiyab run
more than 9.000 schools, 190 universities and colleges, 241 hospitals and clinics, and 322
social service institutions. Second is middle class who flourished largely because of educational
ladder, instead of their roles in economics and business. They have been mostly working in the
fields of education and bureancracy. Therefore, most of the Muhammadiyab supporters are
school teachers, university professors, state employees and state bureaucrats.
Slightly different from the Muhammadiyab which adopted the Hegelian approach, the
NU seemed to prefer the Tocquevillian model of civil society. According to the NU, civil
society should function as countervailing forces to the political monopoly of the state, by
nurturing independent institutions in society and cultivating civic culture in order to develop
democratic civility.49 The motivation behind this approach is that the NU had been supposedly
marginalized in the development process during the last decade of the New Order regime. This
48 See Fuad, "Civil Society in Indonesia, 2002, pp. 133-163.
49 See van Bruinessen, "KonjlDlgtur Sosial Politik di Jagat NU Paska Khittah 1926," 1994, pp. 61-86.
46
marginalization was because the state only accommodated Islamic community who appeared to
support the modernization process, and the one of course come from the modernist camp. The
traditional Islam was even further perceived by the state as obstacles to the Indonesia's
development and modernization.
Prompted by such motivation, from the late 1980s the NU's activities were directed to
broaden free public sphere by empowering grassroots institutious, advocacy for lower class
society, and strengthening various types ofNGO. They contended that civil society can be
developed inasmuch as the society has self-reliance in its ultimate meaning and free from state
intervention and cooptation. The fina1 result of civil society constructed by the NU was the
mushrooming of new activists within NU since the mid 1990's, whose professions are mostly
NGO activists, independent intellectuals (non-university), and journa1ists. For the NU, they are
believed in capable of performing their ultimate function: agents of change.
F. Conclusion
As the above discussions illustrate, there was a powerful organizational precedent for
extra-state, society reinforcing, and power dispersive associations in the course of the Indonesian
history. The emergence of the Mllhammadiyah and NU epitomized this precedent, which were
characterized by a self-regulating associationallife and a countervailing balance of power. Hefner
once said that although "a vigorous tradition of non-state social associations is not sufficient to
generate encompassingly civil values,',so there were indeed invaluable seeds of self-regulating
and autonomous organizations within Indonesian Islamic society. Similarly, there has been also a
long tradition of diversity and pluralism, between Muslims and non-Muslims, between devout
and nominal Muslims, and between modernist and traditionalist groups. This fragmented setting
so Hefner, "A Muslim Civil Society?" p. 298-9.
47
has thwarted the hopes for ideological unifonnity across space and for consistency of belief and
behavior overtime, and finally proved that Indonesian Muslim politics is not monolithic.
We have a conclusion, however, that in the course of the roughly fifty years of
Indonesian independence, Islam and Muslims had been playing significant roles in politics and
society alike. Founded in the period of awakening of Indonesian nationalism as nonpolitical
organizations, the Muhammadiyah and NU had been intensely involved in varying degree in
party politics during the late 1940s until the early 1 980s. Under the ultimate authoritarian
period of the Suharto regime, both organizations swiftly return from political realm to their
original mandate as social religious organizations. This political impasse, surprisingly enough,
was a blessing in disguise, as they have been able to preserve their independency and provide
social capital for Indonesian Muslim at the end of the last century.
No end is in sight. Yet it is probably true that any real hope for fundamental political
change in Indonesia depends in part on the mobilization of Islamic support. The question now
is how to mobilize such support, around which claims, and with what moral direction. There is
no obvious answer to this question, largely because Indonesian Islam, to repeat, is hardly
united, but asking it opens up a number of issues worth pondering. Under what conditions will
Indonesian Islam mobilize and for what purposes? What are the strategies that these competing
religious organizations resort to in dealing with one another? Are there distinctions among the
major groups with respect to their propensities for political action? These are among some
questions that I would like to discuss in the next chapter.
48
CHAPTER III
MUSLIM CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL CHANGE:
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1998-2008
A. Introdnction
With the fall of the New Order regime, there were changes in Indonesian politics and
society alike. Considerable change occurred also in the Muslim associations. The
Muhammadiyah, the NU, and other associations akin to them, have become more energized in
political affairs with their cadre and members actively recruited for the newly formed political
parties-nearly all having some sort of Islamic identity. In this respect we find a re-
politicization-returning these associations to the role that they enjoyed prior to their political
disengagement, when they were politically active.
Long suppressed under authoritarian rule, Indonesian Islamic groups are now
enjoying space granted them by democratic freedom. Since the early days after Suharto's
overthrow, a diverse range of parties and organizations, particularly the Muhammadiyah and
NU. are debating what role Islam should play in governance: is Islam always a means to
achieve political ends? Or can the relationship function the other way around? And how should
they combine their political activism and their commitment to stay away from practical
politics? They are also debating whether the diverging approaches to the state adopted by the
Muhammadiyah and NU during the New Order era (between the Hegelian and Tocquevillian
frameworks) remain suitable after the fall of Suharto. Those puzzles of where Islam fits into
politics and vice versa are among some necessary questions I would like to answer in the
following discussions.
49
B. Muslim Civil Society, Political Parties, and the 1999 Election
One of the phenomena punctuated the Indonesian transition-or so-called the
Reformasi era-was the mushrooming ofIslamic or Muslim-based parties. Their emergence was
largely helped by the political freedom proclaimed by President Habibie in August 1998, which
gave impetus to the birth of new political parties in general. The lifting of the ban on Islam as
the foundation for political party meant the green light for Islamic or Muslim-based parties.
Their emergence is thus without doubt a distinctive feature of political reform.
Among 141 new political parties in the early Reformasi era, 42 were Islamic, defined
here as parties that either explicitly claim Islam as their ideology or draw support mostly from
Islamic organizations. This total later declined, since only 20 Islamic parties (out of 48 parties)
qualified to compete in the 1999 election.! As far as Islamic political parties are concerned,
many observers believed that the mushrooming of so many Islamic parties has been motivated
more by the lust for power of the Muslim leaders than by genuinely religious motives.
2
If the
Muslim leaders were more concerned about religious interests, of course, they would have
established fewer Islamic parties-preferably only one for each the traditionalist and the
modernist camp. Unfortunately, the contest for power among Muslim leaders led in tum to a
wider fragmentation ofIslamic-oriented political grouping. This is discernible in the division
among the supporters of both traditionalist and modernist Islam.
The NU and Muharnmadiyah did not transform themselves into political parties, but
in spite of calls from various sides not to weaken the Islamic community by the establishment
of too many parties, Islamic leaders could not resist the temptation to found numerous of
I Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia," 2004, p. 672.
2 Azra, ''The Islamic Factor in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," 1999, p. 311. See also Haris, "Politicization of
Religion," 2004, p. 61-76.
50
parties. Among the NU circles, the most important initiative was the establishment of Partai
Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB-The National Awakening Party), which was proclaimed in
Abdurrahrnan Wahid's house on July 23.1998.
During the process of the PKB's establishment, the role of the NU organization was
decisive. As many NU politicians within PPP and senior kyai across regions began to clamor
for NU to form a party, on June 6, 1998, around seventy NU senior leaders and politicians met
at a pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in Rembang, Central Java, to deliberate these growing
demands. During the meeting. the NU leaders undoubtedly lamented the marginal position of
the NU in Indonesian politics during the New Order regime. One NU leader expressed his
frustration that "it is now the time for NU to 'break the fast' after been fasting for more than 32
years." Another leader noted that for more than 30 years the NU members had been dispersed
everywhere. "Regretfully, they had always been marginalized in their respective places." The
meeting decided to form an eleven-member team comprising senior NU leaders, which was
charged to formulate the next-party's vision, mission, platform, and charter, whose results
would be submitted to the central board ofNU (pBNU).3
Responding to the mounting demands, two weeks later PBNU formed its own team
comprising five members assisted by a nine-member team, whose task was preparing necessary
steps to form a new party. They were drawn mainly from members ofthe PBNU.
4
When the
new party was declared, the PKB was chaired by former PPP General Secretary, Matori Abdul
Djalil. The party had also Muhaimin Iskandar. Abdurrahrnan's nephew as its general secretary,
and Imam Churrnain, a former GoIkar leader, as its treasurer. Meanwhile, Ma'ruf Arnin was
3 The subjects of the discussion during the meeting and the members of the team of eleven, see Choirie,
PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU, 2002, p. 173-182.
4 On the detailed tasks of both teams, see Asmawi, PKB Jendela Politik Gus Dur, 1999, p. 24-25.
51
appointed as the chair of the advisory council (Dewan Syuro). Abdurrahman held no executive
position, since he sustained his chainnanship of the PBNU. However, this did not impede him
to command the central authority within the PKB, as almost all decisions within the party
should be based upon his initiative or consent. For instance, not only did Abdurrahman succeed
in installing Matori as the PKB's chainnan despite disagreement from numerous NU leaders,
but he was also the one who created the entire line-up of PKB leadership prior to its
declaration.
s
In order to draw the line between the NU and PKB, Abdurrahman in his remarks
during the PKB declaration pointed out that the NU officials who had dual leadership in the
PKB should step down from the NU leadership.
While the PKB expected to garner its votes from the strong NU community and its
leadership was drawn largely from NU activists, the PKB was presented as a party sensitive to
the interests of all Indonesians. Hence the party used the word 'nation' and not, for instance,
'ummat' (Islamic community). The party aimed, in fashionable political jargon, at being an
inclusive party, not an exclusive one. It was presented as a nationalist, 'red and white' party,
not a 'green' Islamic one. Although it had no official counection with the NU, the PKB was
without doubt the brainchild ofa few keyNU leaders from the organization's central board.
6
The introduction of the PKB party platfonn plausibly emphasizes its NU identity referring to
two most basic NU treaties, and its constitution stated explicitly that the party originated from
the "womb of the NU" and that it represented the aspirations of the NU community.
PKB was the party officially endorsed by the PBNU, but this by no means that NU's
leadership was unifonn in its political outlook. Several NU leaders openly opposed
Abdurra1unan and established their own parties. The most important ones were Partai
5 Bush, Islam and Civil Society, 2002, p. 219.
6 Kadir, "Contested Visions of State and Society in Indonesian Islam," 2000, p. 320.
52
Kebangkitan Umat (PKU) which was led by Abdurrahman's uncle, YusufHasyim; Partai
Nahdlatul Ummat (PNU) which was led by Syukron Makmun and Idham Chalid; and Partai
Solidaritas Nasional Indonesia (partai SUNI) with Abu Hasan as its chainnan. The birth of
these rival parties was triggered by two main factors. First was the political orientation of the
new party.7 Many senior NU leaders opposed the adoption ofPancasila, instead ofIslam, as the
basis for the PKB. Secondly, some ofthe leaders of the rival parties had long been
Abdurrahman's bitter rivals for control over NU leadership during the past period. While
Idham Chalid had been the chainnan ofNU until 1984 when Abdurrahman took the NU
leadership, Abu Hasan was his rival in the bitter battle of the 1994 NU congress.
While the role ofNU in the establishment ofPKB was decisive, the role of
Muhammadiyah in the establishment ofPartai Amanat National (pAN-the National Mandate
Party) was less instrumental. Various groups contributed to the establishment of the PAN. They
worked separately to prepare any necessary steps to establish a new political party. First was
MARA (Majelis Amanat Rakyat - Council of People's Mandate), a broad based cabinet
watchdog organization founded on May 14, 1998 by Amien Rais and other intellectuals and
prominent figures. Second was Tebet Group which was comprised of some Muslim
intellectuals and NGO activists. Third was PPSK (Pusat Pengkajian Strategi dan Kebijakan -
Center for Strategic and Policy Studies), a research center under the University of Gadjah Mada
at Yogyakarta, of which Amien Rais had been the director. At last, on August 5,1998 those
groups held a meeting in Wisma Tempo, Simagalih, West Java, to formulate the party's
platform and form a nine-member team whose chainnan was Amien Rais.
8
7 Mietzner, ''Nationalism and Islamic Politics," 1999, p. 177.
Najib, Melawan Arus, 1999, p. 147.
53
Despite the efforts of these diverse groups, the role of Muhammadiyah was not
insignificant. A month before, on July 5-7, 1998 the Muhammadiyah held an annual national
meeting (Tanwir) in Semarang, Central Java whose participants were members of the central
board (PP) ofMuhammadiyah and four delegates from each its provincial board. Despite the
fact that the vast majority of the participants demanded to form a new political party, the final,
official resolution stated that neither the Muhammadiyah transform itself into a political party
nor it facilitate (membidani) the establishment of a new party. The Tanwir, however, delegated
an authority to the PP Muhammadiyah to carry out a political ijtihad (vigorous inquiry) to form
a new political party. Since Tanwir is the second most authoritative decision-making forum
within the Muhammadiyah organization next to congress, any form of the new party resulted
from the political ijtihad would be considered legitimate by the Muhammadiyah members.
During this period, Amien Rais had been taking ambiguous stances.
9
In the closing
ceremony of the Tanwir, Amien mentioned the possibility of the establishment of a new party
which would be chaired by his close companion and the vice chairman of the Muhammadiyah
Syafii Maarif. In the subsequent days, various political groups were trying to woo Amien to
lead their parties. Amien once gave a signal to accept the bid offered by some PPP leaders to be
the next chairman of the PPP. He was also said to agree to lead a new party which was prepared
by various groups representing the spirit of the Masyumi. Meanwhile, he also went on to let the
MARA, Tebet Group, and PPSK respectively prepare the establishment of a new party. It was
also reported that in a PP Muhammadiyah meeting he would like to devote himself to the
Muhammadiyah, instead of continuing his political career. However, almost all other members
of the PP Muhammadiyah did not agree; they rather endorsed his endeavor to form a new
Rais, Putra Nusantara. Son oflhe Indonesian Archipelago, 2003, p. 105.
54
political party. After much speculation, Amien admitted that he was keen to be part of a new
political movement that could bring together the various elements of reform movements.
Eventually, the new party PAN was proclaimed during a mass meeting at the Senayan Stadium
on August 23, 1998.
A day before the PAN declaration, during the meeting in the Muhammadiyah
headquarter which was attended by thirteen members of PP Muhammadiyah and the chairman
of all provincial board ofMuhammadiyah all over Indonesia, Amien decided to step down from
the Muhammadiyah leadership, concentrated on his duties in the next-day new party and he
was replaced by Syafii Maarif. In order to further keep the Muhammadiyah away from politics,
at the end of September 1998 the central board ofMuhammadiyah issued a resolution no.
480/1998 which prohibited dual leadership between the Muhammadiyah and political party and
the use ofMuhammadiyah facilities for political activities.
Amien took great pains to stress that PAN was a nationalistic organization, and did
not cater exclusively to Muhammadiyah or Masyumi circles or to the wider Islamic
community. He described PAN as a ''miniature Indonesia", aiming at as many segments of
Indonesian society as possible. An able scholar whose interest is mostly on Indonesian Islam
and particularly NU testifies that, the PAN's platform "showed greater sophistication and
understanding than found in any other party. The party's directions were unambiguously
reformist and democratic. It opposed sectarianism and championed the development of a
modem secular state that was home to all people, groups, and faiths."l0
As a consequence of its secular, nationalistic platform, the PAN could not maintain
the modernist community as a united front. Some other parties also emerged from the
10 Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, 2002, p. 253.
55
modernist camp, and, by and large, they exerted the Islamic identity of their party. On July 17,
1998 various group, which claimed representing the spirit of Masyumi founded the Partai
Bulan Bintang (pBB--Crescent and Star Party) with Yusril Ihza Mahendra as its chairman. In
this regard, one should also add the Partai Ummat Islam (pUI-Islamic Community Party)
which was led by a notable political scientist Deliar Noer; and the Partai Keadilan (pK-Justice
Party) which was led by Nur Mahmudi Ismail.
Based on the aforementioned explanation, the central board ofNU showed its more
immediate reactions, compared to Amien's long ambiguous reaction, to the demands both from
regions and from its senior leaders which called the establishment of a new NU-based political
party. With the formation of a party connected to the official structure ofNU, the NU figures
opposing it were left behind. Three rival NU-based parties were established, but they lacked the
momentum that central board had seized. On the other hand, Amien failed to react in a similar
way. Amien had obtained a more nationalist profile for his roles during the economic and
political crisis leading to Suharto's downfall. Riding on the wave of public sympathy, Amien
had provided the very intellectual leadership that the highly diversified student movement and
middle-class pro-democracy movement so desperately needed. Thus during the ensuing
liberalization era, Amien faced a dilemma: ifhe chose the establishment of an explicitly
modernist Islamic party, he would have almost certainly emerged as the sole leader of the
camp, but at the same time he would have lost the support of the secular reform groups with
which he had worked in concert during the anti-Suharto movement. On the other hand, the
formation of a nationalist party would have allowed him to develop the moderate image
appropriate for his emergence in national politics, but would also have alienated him from his
56
modernist constituency. In contrast to the traditionalist camp, Amien seemed highly unlikely to
succeed in maintaining a certain extent of homogeneity within the modernist groups. I I
It seemed that in the traditionalist camp both senior leaders and the PBNU were
directly involved in the formation of the PKB. It was apparent in the formation of several
teams, whose members were mostly senior leaders and activists of the NU, which were charged
to take necessary steps to prepare the establishment of the new party. On the other hand, the PP
Muhammadiyah other than Amien himself was almost absent in the PAN formation. The
Muhammadiyah's attachment to the PAN was simply because the 1998 Semarang Tanwir
recommended the PP Muhammadiyah to carry out a political ijtihad, which was finally left to
Amien himself, and the fact that Amien once headed the Muhammadiyah during the reform
movement, of which the Muhammadiyah members and leaders alike so proud.
12
These different
involvements would in tum lead to different connections between both sides in the near future.
Although during the 1998-1999 more than 150 political parties were founded, much
attention focused on President Habibie's Golkar party and the parties of the three most
respected opposition figures of that day: Abdurrahman, Amien, and Megawati ostensibly
receiving more public acclaim than Habibie. The three represented respectively the
traditionalist Muslims with their bulwarks in Central and East Java; the modernist Muslims,
many living in non-Javanese regions and in urban centers; and the secular nationalist camp in
and outside Java. Bali was also Megawati territory.
During the election campaign, politicians, in order to attract voters to their parties, are
waging an ideological battle for the soul of the nation, much of it over the fault line of religion-
II On the comparison between the traditionalist and modernist camps in forming new parties, see
Mietzner, "NationaIism and Islamic Politics," 1999, p.173-199.
12 Maarif, "Hubungan Mllbammadiyah dengan Amien Rais dan PAN," 2000, p. 14.
57
to be precise, the extent to which Islam will guide the affairs of the country, how it would do
so, and which Muslims will do the guidance.
I3
During the campaign period, the NU and
Muhammadiyah respectively played a different role in their relations to the PKB and PAN.
Abdurrahman, while sustaining his leadership in the PBNU, had come to fully embrace the
PKB "as his own". 14 He, along with other senior NU leaders, campaigned for votes in the
traditional NU strongholds of Java and Madura. This was a clear message that the PKB was the
political arm of the NU, while three other NU-affiliated parties had a tough time competing
against the organizational advantages enjoyed by the PKB. In contrast, the PP Muhammadiyah
hardly worked in the election campaign for the PAN. Instead, it insisted to apply its resolution
no. 480/1998 while stressing that the Muhammadiyah members, according to the resolution of
the 1971 Makassar congress, were free to votes any political parties they wished.
Table 1
The 1999 Legislature Election Result
PartL Percentage No. of Seats
PDI-P 33.7 153
Golkar Party 22.5 120
PKB 12.7 51
PPP 10.7 58
PAN 7.1 34
PBB 1.9 13
PK 1.3 7
During the last days of the election campaign, both Abdurrahman and Amien.like
other political party leaders, had optimistic poll expectations since their massive rallies in the
campaign. IS While Abdurrahman told journalists that he expected the PKB would get more
than 30 % of the national votes, Amien spoke confidently of getting 90 % of all modernist
13 Zenzie,'1ndonesia's New Political Spectrum," 1999, p. 246.
14 Kadir, "Contested Visions of State and Society in Indonesian Islam," 2000, p. 328.
15 Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, 2002, p. 272.
58
votes and maybe as much as 30 to 40 % of the total. Unfortunately, this extravagant optimism
has not been translated into votes. In June 1999, when Indonesia held its democratic election,
seven parties out of 48 participants won significant percentages of the vote. The most
successful parties were Megawati's secular Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P),
with 33.7 % of the vote and Golkar, the former president Suharto's political vehicle, with 22.5
%. Five others are Islamic or Muslim-based: the PPP, with 10.7 %; the PKB, with 12.7 %; the
PAN, with 7.1 %; the PBB, with 1.8 %; and the Justice Party (PK), withjust 1.3 %.16
Beside the good performance of the PDI-P, to which many Islamic leaders during the
election campaign had been pointing out as the party that did not clearly commit to Islam, the
poor result of Islamic parties in the 1999 election "worried many Muslims, who believed that it
marked the end of political Islam" in Indonesia.
17
Worse still, the high hope of the PKB and
PAN did not come true as they gained only nearly one third of their expectation.
The small share gained by these two parties was a result of manifold factors. First is
the fragmentation of Muslim voters into twenty Islamic parties compared to ten parties in the
1955 election. Even worse is the fragmentation within the traditionalist and modernist
communities into several parties, something that did not happen in the past. However small
shares were gained by those tiny splinter parties, the total was more than fifteen percent of the
votes. Second is the relative strong showing of the old PPP party, which was previously
predicted by many to be uprooted in the Islamic community after the establishment of the PKB
and PAN. Due to its experience of serving for twenty five years as the only party representing
Muslims' interests, the PPP was able to maintain its loyalists both within traditionalist and
16 On the detail result of and discussion on the 1999 election, see Suryadinata, Election and Politics in
Indonesia, 2002; and Blackburn, Pemilu: The 1999 Indonesian Election, 1999.
17 Azra, "Political Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia," 2004, p. 142. On the sorrows bemoaned by Islamic
community, see Basyaib and Abidin (eds.), Mengapa Partai Islam Kalah?, 1999.
59
modernist communities. Similarly, the Golkar survival in the second place also contributed to
the defeat of the Islamic parties, particularly the PAN and PKB. Since its extraordinary
congress in July 1998, the Golkar party was demonstrating some movement toward Islam by
appointing many Islamic figures, mostly from modernist camp, to its central leadership.I8
Third, closely related to the first one, were the new experimentations of Abdurrahman
and Amien respectively to design the PKB and particularly PANas inclnsive parties. The PAN
did worse than many had expected, given that its leader was often portrayed as the
"locomotive" of the reform movement. The time limit since their establishments to the election
-less than one year- was insufficient for Abdurrahman and Amien to convince the public to
rely on their parties. An Indonesian expert notes that Amien's message "was in many ways a
new one, both for Indonesia and indeed for Amien Rais" himself.
I9
Finally, different policies
adopted by the PBNU and PP Muhammadiyah in dealing with the PKB and PAN have led to
the different results for both parties. Despite the aforementioned three factors above, the full
supports of the PBNU and its senior leaders have defended the PKB from its worse showing. In
contrast, the PAN lacked similar support from the PP Muhammadiyah during the election.
The poor result of Islamic parties, particularly the PKB and PAN, prompted many
Islamic leaders to look for another opportunity in order to sustain their existence in the political
arena. The next part will examine the rise and fall of President Abdurrahman and its ensuing
volatile relationship between the NU and Muhammadiyah.
C. The Rise and Fall of President Abdurrahman Wahid
18 See Nakamura, "Prospect for Islam in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," 1999, p. 90; Baswedan, "Political
Islam in Indonesia," 2004, p. 674-678.
19 Bourchier, "Habibie's Interregnwn," 2000, p. 22.
60
Ahead of the presidential election, with so many parties and none having decisive
majority, it was highly likely that a coalition needed to be formed to create a majority in the
MPR in order to elect a new president and vice-president.
2o
The election results apparently
showed that the most likely frontrunners were either the PDI-P candidate Megawati or the
Goikar candidate Habibie. For Megawati, the PAN and particularly PKB seemed to be her
natural partners, as she, Abdurrabman, and Amien have agreed three weeks before the election
to form a common front among their three parties, which was known as the "Paso
communique", to work together to overcome Goikar. Habibie, on the other hand, seemed
highly likely to draw enormous supports from his party Golkar, the military, and the functional
representatives whose appointment were in his authority.
Megawati was understandably thrilled with the PDI-P showing in the polls and began
to feel as if she was destined to win the presidency. Despite the clear message sent by the
election result, however, Megawati stubbornly refused to build a broad-based alliance to win a
clear majority in the presidential election. It was partly because of her political inability, and
partly because of her overconfidence, she refused to respond to Abdurrabman and Amien's
offers to initiate the coalition. Abdurrabman was stunned when, after requesting four cabinet
positions for PKB and NU, Megawati offered him only one, no more than that.
21
Amien was
similarly disappointed when he urged Megawati to take necessary steps to form a stable
20 The MPR consisted of the entire 500 members of the People's Representative Council (DPR) and 200
other representatives. The 500 DPR members consisted of 462 elected members and 38 appointed members for the
military and police forces. The other 200 members consisted of 135 regional representatives who were elected by
the provincial-level parliament and 65 functional group representatives who were elected by the president.
21 Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, 2002, p. 275. Despite this disappointment, Abdurrahman continuously
stated that he and his PKB would support Megawati for the post.
61
coalition among the signatories of the Paso communique, she saw no urgency to make
arrangement with the parties that could help her to gain an absolute majority in the MPR.22
There were so many pro-reform Indonesians who ardently hoped for a united anti-
GoIkar front comprising Megawati, Abdurrahman, and Amien. These hopes were fading,
however. The presidential election was not simply about division between pro-reform and anti-
reform groupings. It was also about religion. Since the election campaign, many Islamic leaders
had been campaigning to disqualifY Megawati because of her gender. They stated that Islam did
not allow a woman to be a head of state, despite the fact that this subject is still debated in Islamic
discourse.
23
The tension between both sides was getting worse. Megawati's supporters were
deadly serious in their resolve to ensure her election by every possible means. They began to put
a thumbprint in blood on large cloths. The practice, which had started in East Java, spread and
was immediately copied elsewhere. They also put their signatures on huge banners carrying texts
such as 'Megawati or revolution'. They flocked to do so in the thousands.
24
Amien began to look for an alternative presidential candidate to avoid an outright
choice between Megawati and Habibie. Without a third candidate who was acceptable to both
sides, he contended. a dangerous situation began to cast a long shadow over future stability.
The chance was great that whatever the outcome of the presidential election, violent protests
would be the result. Amien announced on July 20, 1999 that he and the leaders ofthe PPP,
PBB, and PK parties agreed to form a central axis (paras tengah).25 This agreement originated
to the "Kartika Chandra communique" signed by Amien, the PPP leader Hamzah Haz, and the
22 Mietzner, "The 1999 General Election," 2000, p. 42.
23 See Platzdasch, "Islamic Reaction to a Female President," 2000; Van Dorn-Harder, "The Indonesian
Islamic Debate on a Woman President," 2002.
24 Van Dijk, A Country in Despair, 2001, p. 446.
25 See Suharsono, Cemerlangnya Poros Tengah, Jakarta: Perenial Press, 1999.
62
PK leader Nurmahmudi several days after the Paso communique signing. Amidst the growing
tension between the Megawati and Habibie supporters, the central axis appeared to offer the
potential of drawing those Islamic parties away from an otherwise inevitable coalition with
Golkar.
26
The logic was that with a combined total of nearly 200 seats in the MPR, they could
match Golkar or PDI-P and therefore be in position either to put their own candidate in the
palace or at least to avoid an outcome in which Muslims became minor political players.
27
However, the central axis was unable to find a single viable presidential candidate to
unite them. Amien rated his own chance too little because ofP AN's poor showing in the
legislature election. Other Islamic party leaders, such as Harnzah or Yusril, had even narrower
bases of support. Faced with a dearth of candidates, Amien surprised many people and the
central axis alike by blurting out the possibility of supporting a candidacy by, of all people, his
arch-rival: Abdurrahman Wahid.
28
But few took Amien seriously. As Mietzner points out, there
were three major problems.
29
First, many politicians in the PPP and PBB either openly or
tacitly backed Habibie for another term in office. Second, Abdurrahman had maneuvered the
PKB into Megawati's camp. Now that he was about to change the strategy, the party was
reluctant to follow this policy shift. Third, even if the first two problems were overcome, the
alliance would still have been far away from an absolute majority in the MPR.
Many people still wondered about the future of this alliance. Other Islamic party
leaders immediately dismissed Amien's suggestion as a "personal opinion" which they did not-
and would not--support. On the other hand, Amien's suggestion to nominate Abdurrahman
brought the latter into serious conflict with his own party, which had earlier decided early in
2. Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, 2002, p. 275.
27 Bourchier, "Habibie's Interregnum," 2000, p. 23.
28 O'Rourke, Reformasi, 2002, p. 251.
29 Mie1Zner, "The 1999 General Election," 2000, p. 43.
63
August 1999 to support Megawati. Mietzner goes on to note that Amien was well aware that
the only way to convince Abdurrahman and the PKB to join the central axis was offering the
nomination to the NU chainnan. He correctly assumed that the nomination would be an
irresistible temptation for Abdurrahman. Amien also realized that PKB delegates in the MPR
would have tum their back on Megawati if their patron ran against her.
3o
To cement the new-found bond between Amien and Abdurrahman, a rally joining
Muhammadiyah and NU leaders and supporters alike was held in the front yard of the
Muhammadiyah headquarter on September 26, 1999 in Jakarta. It was the first of its kind ever
held. The central axis and the cooperation between both organizations were greeted as a new-
found unity within the Islamic community. Some even hailed it as an indication that Indonesian
Muslims had re-found its strength. This new cordiality between NU and Muharnmadiyah was
also bolstered mostly by a growing friendship between their youth organizational wings: Ansor
ofNU and Muhammadiyah Youth Movement. During this critical period, Ansor leader
SyaifuIIah Yusuf (Abdurrahman's nephew) and Muhammadiyah youth leader Imam
Addaruqudni arranged many public gatherings, public seminars, and meetings. Their
cooperation revealed a sense that the modernist and traditionalist camps could work together.
Mostly because of their vigorous endeavor, personal relations between Amien and
Abdurrahman were steadily becoming more intimate and warm.
31
When the new MPR convened on October 2,1999, however, no convincing prediction
on how the rival groups would mobilize supports in the presidential vote. It was clear that three
broad groupings would compete in the assembly: PDI-P whose support was assured, Golkar
30 Mietzner, "The 1999 General Election," 2000, p. 43.
31 Barton, Abdurrahman Wah/d, 2002, p. 268.
64
which suffered a deep internal division, and the central axis whose solidity was widely
questionable. The central axis, compared to two other groupings, was the most unlikely winner.
The political balance of those three groupings was soon swinging, when the MPR
members, before deciding on who would become president and vice-president, elected two
important positions in the Indonesian political structure: chairpersons ofMPR and DPR. Amien
was elected chairperson of the MPR on October 3, 1999. He defeated the PKB chairman Matori
by a small margin of26 votes. It was surprising that Amien's nomination was also backed by
the Islamic modernist wing of Golkar, while Matori's nomination was backed by PDI-P. In the
second round, the Golkar chairman Akbar Tanjung, once headed the Masyumi-affiliated
Islamic student organization (HMI), was elected as the DPR chairperson. He received an
overwhelming 411 of the 491 votes.
32
PDI-P supported his nomination, but afterwards it
became clear that PDI-P got nothing in return for its support.
In the presidential vote, the political strength and fortune of the central axis were more
apparent. Habibie's accountability speech was rejected by the MPR members by 355 to 322 in
a vote on October 19,1999 amidst massive demonstrations outside the MPR. With this blow,
Habibie withdrew his candidacy in the early morning of October 20, 1999. The real drama, the
presidential election was due to commence only nine hours later. While reportedly Megawati,
following the rejection of Habibie's speech, went home to sleep, all other party leaders
commenced a frantic, marathon session oflobbying and politicking. Kingsbury describes it
eloquently that, "there was a flurry of political activity as promises were made and broken,
deals were done, and political dreams were shattered and, in one case, realized.,,33
32 Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia, 2002, p. 144.
33 Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, 2005, p. 287.
65
After he withdrew his candidacy, Habibie recommended nominating the PBB
chairman Yusril, the PPP chairman Hamzah, the military commander Wiranto, and the Golkar
chairman Akbar. One by one, these possible candidates declined to run against Megawati.
Eventually, the President and several central axis leaders decided to support Amien into the
race. Habibie thought that, whatever commitment Amien had made to Abdurrahman, in the
final analysis most of the central axis would give their support to him rather than the physical
infirm Abdurrahman.
34
Amien firmly rejected, however. He explained that he would lose his
credibility and ruin the newly established NU-Muhammadiyah relationship should he accept
the bid. Syafii Maarif, current Muhammadiyah chairman, was on hand to help Amien. He
argued that the NU-Muhammadiyah relationship had improved since Amien supported
Abdurrahman, but to withdraw that support might trigger unrest. Go1kar had eventually no
other alternative than supporting Abdurrahman.
Abdurrahman defeated Megawati in the vote for the presidency on October 20, 1999.
He received 373 votes, Megawati 313. Megawati was humiliated by her defeat. Even worse
were her supporters. Almost immediately riots broke out in Jakarta and several other cities.
Largely because of these uncontrollable unrests, Abdurrahman and many party leaders agreed
to offer Megawati the vice-presidency. In the vice-presidential election on October 21, 1999,
Megawati defeated Harnzah by 396 votes to 284.
35
Her election restored peace, but mutual
distrust remained among political leaders. It seemed as if the sophisticated and complicated
election was a climax, but in fact the more deadly game was just only beginning.
34 Crouch, "Indonesia," 2000, p. 119.
35 Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia, 2002, p. 148-150.
66
Relief,jubilation, and renewed optimism accompanied Abdurrahman's election to the
presidency. For years Indonesians had been clamoring for reform, and now nothing seemed to
stand in this way. Cronies notwithstanding, public generally regarded the Abdurrahman-
Megawati pair as the ideal outcome to the prolonged transition. Ideologically speaking, the
executive branch included the immensely popular nationalist, secular leader Megawati, but the
presidency itself went to a figure regarded as a respected Muslim scholar, Abdurrahman. The
high optimism was further fueled by the formation of the National Unity Cabinet comprising 35
ministers. As expected, as an inclusive government, it incorporated not only representatives from
the parties which had made his own election possible (PKB, PAN, PPP, PBB, PK, Golkar), but
the PDI-P and military obtained several influential seats as well. Having long espoused pluralism,
Abdurrahman included representatives from each official religion and most major regional and
ethnic groups. Looking at the other posts, the cabinet also included one minister from the NU
(Minister of Religion) and Muharnmadiyab (Minister of National Education) respectively.36
Given its number and diversity, unfortunately, this rainbow cabinet "was also disunited, often
with little ability or experience, reflecting its origius as a political compromise.,,37
The Abdurrahman govermnent enjoyed a broad popular mandate. The question was
whether it can use that window of opportunity to take measures to overcome the crisis, restore
public trust in the political system and get Indonesia back to a new pattern of political stability
and economic growth. Despite its popular mandate, however, the new govermnent was
unfortunately overwhelmed by numerous challenges. They were, among other things, economic
36 From this cabinet on, a new pattern of relation between the government and these Islamic civil society
organizations was set up, as at least one ministry position has been each allocated for the NU and Mnba1l111ladiyah,
apart from seats allocated for the PKB and PAN.
37 Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, 2005, p. 290.
67
recovery, national integration, law supremacy, and military refonn.
38
But very early in his
presidential career, both supporters and opponents began to view Abdurrahman's progress with
dismay. Within his twenty-one months of holding power, Abdurrahman had to face a
fonnidable host of antagonists and hostile actions. On July 23, 2001, the MPR in tum
impeached and sacked him, and elected Megawati to be the new leader.
It was widely contended that his impeachment resulted from long-deadly political
conflict among elite politicians in Jakarta. The political conflict was not apparently provoked by
his failure to address the problems. Rather, his failure to address the problem was largely caused
by the very intra-elite political conflict. As far as Abdurrahman progresses are concerned, the
analysis of political developments during his administration suggested that while he had enjoyed
modest success in certain areas, such as military reform, freedom of the press, and separatist
movernents,39 there was little progress made in the institutional modernization of the political and
legal frameworks, the basis of which was laid by the reforms of the Habibie administration.
According to Mietzner, "the high level of political conflict among the elite has prevented
significant progress in the major sectors of institutional, legal and military refonn.'.40 His
commitment to address fundamental issues of constitutional changes seemed to be subordinated
to the main focus of the intra-elite power struggle-the political survival of his own presidency.
If the political conflict was not triggered by elite disappointment of his progress, what
went wrong? Why did Abdurrahman lose support from elite politicians so soon? There are three
interrelated explanations. First the Indonesian constitution (DUD 1945), before being amended
during the Megawati presidency, provided insufficient explanation for inter-institutional relations
38 Mietzner, "Abdurrabman's Indonesia," 200 I, p. 29-44. See also Gorjao, "Abdurrainnan Wahid's
2003, p. 13-43.
3 See Barton, "A Fair Measure," 2001, p. 33-46.
40 Mietzner, "Abdurrabman's Indonesia," 2001, p. 43.
68
between the president, DPR, and MPR, leaving it unclear whether Indonesia adhered to a
presidential or parliamentary system, or a chaotic mixture of them. Based on the constitution, the
Indonesian system gave both the DPR and MPR unspecified powers to demand the president's
accountability and removed him ifhe was deemed guilty of violations of the constitution, the law,
or the state policy guidelines. Second is related to his dearth of political support within the DPR
and MPR. While his election was supported by numerons parties, however, his real political
backing was only PKB. Its minority seats in the DPR (12 %) and MPR (8 %) rendered
Abdurrahman position in a susceptible to any political opposition.
While these two factors were instrumental to Abdurrahman's impeachment, however,
emphasizing simply on both factors is misreading. Had both factors become the most crucial
factors to intra-elite conflict, Megawati would have faced similar political opposition.
Megawati sustained her presidency until the end of her term in 2004 without major political
opposition from both the DPR and MPR. Megawati surely inherited a similar constitution
granted the parliament sufficient power to sack her. However, the constitution was successfully
amended during her presidency, thanks mostly to the vigorous efforts of the MPR under
Amien's leadership. Similarly, while PDI-P controlled slightly more seats in the DPR and DPR
than PKB did, PDI-P was still a minority. However, Megawati succeeded to maintain support
from political parties needed to sustain her presidency. If the constitution and political balance
were insufficient to explain the Abdurrahman impeachment, what did matter?
An able scholar on Middle East politics Daniel Brumberg offers an interesting but
misleading explanation. In his comparative study on Iranian and Indonesian politics, he points
out that the intra-elite Indonesian conflict exemplified "multipolar competition between and
within competing Islamic and secular groups." He goes on to note that the competition was
69
between the moderate, secular vision ofIslam embodied in Abdurrabman and his PKB and the
Islamist groups within the central axiS.41 Indeed, there were competing visions on Indonesian
Islam among moderate and Islamist groups. But taking this division into account as the sole
explanation for the elite conflict was too bold. Did not those Islamic PPP, PBB, and PK parties,
putting aside their theological differences with the traditionalist PKB/NU, voluntarily support
Abdurrahman in a time when the PKB had formed a political alliance with the PDI-P to support
Megawati? Did not also both groups eventually work in concert to help Abdurrahman's win in
the presidential election against the nationalist candidate Megawati?
Many interpretations also deduced that the fall of Abdurrabman represented a return
to political authoritarianism. However, according to Edward Aspinall, this drew heavily on the
views of Abdurrahman and his supporters. Therefore, Aspinall goes on to argue, it is important
not to exaggerate this argument. 42 A third reason, and the most important one, as to why
Abdurrahman faced unbearable political opposition was related to his behavior and leadership
style. ''He had been always unpredictable and erratic," says one observer.
43
Not only did his
eccentric style frequently damage his credibility,44 but democratic transformation, on which so
many had pinned their hopes, was also stymied by his own eccentric, unpredictable, and
autocratic behavior.''''5 This ran in tandem with other negative reports on his capacity as
president, including reneging on political deals, sacking cabinet ministers for unspecified
reasons, promising and then refusing to devolve authority to the vice-president, having
41 Bromberg, "Dissonant Politics in Iran and Indonesia," 2001, p. 381-411.
42 Aspinall, "The Downfall of President Abdurrahman Wahid," 2002, p. 30-31.
43 GOljao, "Abdurrahman Wahid's Presidency," 2003, p. 14.
44 Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, 2002, p. 300.
45 Conceicao, Indonesia's Six Years of Living Dangerously, 2005, p. 44.
70
considerable shifts of outlook from day-to-day, and his heavy reliance on a small and shrinking
coterie of confidants whose political or administrative ability was questionable.
46
He frequently spoke or joked before fully considering the implications of what he was
about to say. His constant jokes about his political opponents also did not help to mend fences,
and sometimes offended people, which for instance happened during his speech in the
parliament meeting on the closure of Information Ministry and Social Affairs Ministry. At the
meeting, members of parliament criticized his policy which they thought was taken without a
proper consideration and review. Abdurrahman defended his policy and made a strong
comment, "I guess my explanation was not really understood by you all since there was no
difference between talking to you and talking to kindergarten kids.'.47 Such unnecessary
statements, combined with accusations of corruption and scandals, had become quite common
during Abdurrahman administration.
48
His methods of doing business, deciding issues, and bestowing favors all reflected more
Abdurrahman's penchant fortraditional-NU style ofpatrimonialism than the formal decision
making and management processes of state policies.
49
For his fanatic followers, as Fealy says,
Abdurrahman was not just a kyai (traditional Islamic scholar) but a venerated wali (protege of
God, saint). The actions of wali often fall outside normal social conventions, but because wali are
seen as a divinely gifted, they are above human criticism. The fact that he was nearly blind and
that his party only controlled 8 % of the MPR seats, but he finally could become president, has
strengthened the belief among his followers that he possessed a somewhat super-human power.
46 Kingsbury, The Politics ojlndonesia, 2005, p. 302-303.
41 Dwidjowijoto, Can He Manage? 2000, p. 102.
4S On the detailed accusations of corruption and scandals agaInst Abdurrahrnan, see Budiman,
"Indonesia," 2001, p. 146.
4' On the comprehensive account of his traditional leadership style, see Fealy, "Abdurrahman Wahid and
the al-Khidr Question," 2001, p. 5-14; Budiman, "Will Gus Dur Survive?" 2001, p. 47-51.
71
Although his followers were also often surprised and confused by his actions, they sought to
understand what he stood for. Even if they did not know what he sought to achieve, because he
never gave any explanation, they simply believed that it was because they did not yet understand
his goal, and therefore it was still admirable and deserving support. Abdurrabrnan as president,
sadly, has behaved much as he did before he was elected. Just like any kyai, he simply makes
decisions without firstly asking approval from others, particularly his followers, who will
automatically obey his decisions. In addition, he is accustomed to a culture where it is not
necessary for him to explain what he did. Unfortunately, he also led the nation this way. His
ineffectiveness is the fact that he did not transform himself into a real president.
Complicated even matters, having understood his minority support from the DPR and
MPR, Abdurrabrnan "has been unwilling to act like a politician in a democracy, that is, to build a
broad base of support and adopt a set of policies responsive to the interests of this constituency,"
says a veteran Indonesian observer William Liddle.
5o
He fired numerous ministers from PPP,
Golkar and PDI-P without consultation with their original parties. It should not be surprising that
his cabinet, whose members were not sure whether they will retain their positions next month,
had not worked as it should. 51 In August 2000, he crated a new cabinet that seemed to be "all the
president's men" rather than representing political parties in the DPR.
52
Moreover, despite the growing criticism, he seemed to be insensitive to the Muslim
concerns. He proposed an idea of opening trade relation with Israel, which in his mind would
be a shortcut to revive the national economy. This idea was strongly opposed by many of
Muslim leaders, because it contradicted the constitution, which was clearly against any form of
'0 Liddle, "Indonesia in 2000," 2001, p. 208.
" Shiraishi, "Indonesia," 2000, p. 138.
52 "All the Wahid's Men," Tempo, August 28-September 3,2000.
72
foreign invasion and because of their solidarity with their fellow Muslims in Palestine which is
invaded by Israel. He also proposed an idea to lift the ban on communism, based on his long
idea of pluralism and democracy. This idea was even more controversial and provoked stronger
opposition from his political enemies from Islamic community, nationalist parties and the
military. As Abdurrahman became more erratic and unpredictable, his popularity plummeted
and whatever sense oflegitimacy he had gained through the election process quickly diruiuish.
Those parties that had supported him, let alone his rival, in the 1999 presidential election now
turned against him, and eventually he was unseated after twenty-one months at the office.
The intra-elite political conflict, particularly between the parliament and the President
bore awkward relationship between the NU and the President. S3 Although there was a small
number of young NU-affiliated NGO activists debating an appropriate way to balance between
loyalty and criticism of Abdurrahman's presidency, the moves to unseat Abdurrahman created
a profound shock within the NU leaders. They deemed such efforts as a political conspiracy by
a majority of the MPs whose interests were only in power and in serving their own interest.
S4
On the eve of Abdurrahman's dismissal, the feeling in the NU community was that he had been
maltreated (didzaliml), an Arabic tenn with a profound religious connotation.
In a more spontaneous response, pro-Abdurrahman demonstrations flourished in
November 2000, but intensified in February 2001 when the first memorandum would be issued
against the President. All the eleven parliamentary factions but the PKB voted against him. In
response, Abdurrahman' s supporters staged their own protests, cutting down all the trees in
streets, including the sacking of regional Golkar offices in some cities of East Java, the
53 See Van Bruinessen, ''Back To Situbondo?" 2002, p. 15-46; FeiUard, ''Indonesian Traditiona1ist Islam's
Troubled Experience with Democracy," 2002, p. 117-144.
54 Anam, Seandainya Aku Jadi Malon, 2002, p. 63.
73
heartland ofNU. They also staged attacks on schools and buildings linked to Muhammadiyah.
It seemed that they could not distinguish between the political conflict between the parliament
and the President with the conflict between the DPR chairperson who became the Golkar
chainnan and the MPR chairperson who once headed the Muhammadiyah. While there was a
concern about such a violent response, the real threat seemed to come from an extreme (but
loosely affiliated) wing of the NU known as Pasukan Berani Mati (pBM-the Ready-to-Die
Forces), new militias set up in East Java with men who vowed to die for Abdurrahman.
Members of this group undertook special training in several cities of East Java.
55
Three months later, when the DPR issued the second memorandum against the
President, the situation continued to worsen. Unfortunately, the NU followers felt that Amien
was the man behind the drive to shake up Abdurrahnlan in the parliament. The Abdurrahman
supporters not only resumed to attack Golkar and Muhammadiyah buildings but also to spread
terror to the Muhammadiyah activists by painting their houses with X-red signs. This has
reminded people of events surrounding the 1965 communist coup. At the time, the red lines on
the door signaled death for its inhabitants. The sign had made it easier for the NU-paramilitary
force Banser to kidnap allegedly members of the PKI and massacre them. 56 The political
violence between the first and second memorandum in East Java, according to Muhammadiyah,
damaged 5 universities, 12 schools, 5 clinics, 4 mosques, 9 local offices linked to
Muhammadiyah, and the houses of at least 18 Muhammadiyah localleaders. All this political
violence was detailed in a white book compiled by the Muhammadiyah provincial board which
simultaneously refused any financial compensation offered by the NU.
57
55 "Into the Valley of Death," Tempo, April 16,2001, p. 14-16.
56 "Terror Politics," Tempo, April 16, 2001, p. 20-21.
"Sopbiaan, Tase\an, Hamid, Muhammadiyah Korban Kekerasan Politik, 2002.
74
Tantamount to this spontaneous, violent response, there was a debate within the NU
leaders on what should be done. All appeared to feel that the efforts to unseat Abdurrahman
also concerned themselves. A veteran NU observer describes the growing resentment:
"It was not only President Gus Dut who was being humiliated; it was the NU and its subculture,
it was the kyais, it was the entire, relatively backward segment of the population represented by
the NU who were being humiliated. With Abdurrahman's election to the presidency, the NU
had for the first time known itself to be a fully accepted element of the nation, as worthy of
leading it as any other. His imminent ousting was a blow to self-respect.""
Several NU kyai held a religious meeting (Bahtsul Masail) in Sukabumi, West Java on
April 2, 2001 discussing whether moves to oust a democratically elected president should be
fought with forces as being" bughaf', a term in Islamic law referring to insurgents against a
legitimate ruler who thus deserves the death sentence. 59 The meeting unanimously decided that
opponents of the President were definitely guilty of bughat if two conditions were met: they are
Muslims and they have the mass mobilization capacity to oppose the government. This resolution
however was not backed by the PBNU which decided to avoid using any violent means to defend
the president. Rather, the PBNU, in a meeting held in Cilegon, Banten, stated that the PBNU will
not tolerate any physical violent action by anyone, because violence is forbidden by religion and
also brings damage to the nation. This decision was a relief since many began to feel that there
seemed to be an imminent clash between the pro-Abdurrahman militia (including the PBM) and
the anti-Abdurrahman militias coming from various hard-liner Islamic groups. Worse still,
religious arguments were used by both groups in almost different ways.
In the eve of the second memorandum, the PBNU organized a massive istighotsah, a
public prayer gathering, on April 29, 2001 in Jakarta which was attended by more than twenty
5. Van Bruinessen, "Back To Situbondo?" 2002, p. 38.
59 "Flexibility", Tempo, April 16, 2001, p. 19.
75
thousand NU members. This event was purported as another political tool of the President and
the NU in the ongoing power struggle against their adversaries. While many people feared the
outbreak clash between the pro and anti-President, however, the event proceeded peacefully,
and eventually the attendants also dispersed peacefully.
The elite political conflict also exacerbated conflict among student organizations.
While they were relatively united during the long protest against Suharto, those student
organizations were divided by the dismissal of the President Abdurrahman. The Masyumi-
inspired student organization HMI (Hirnpunan Mahasiswa Islam), the newly Partai Keadilan
student wing, KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia), the Muhammadiyah
student organization (!MM), and most students from universities marched in streets demanding
the Abdurrahman dismissal. Meanwhile, the NU-affiliated student organization PMII
(Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia), along with some smaller leftist organizations, did not
directly defend Abdurrahman's presidency, they rather demanded the dismantling of the heir of
the New Order regime, the Golkar party.
In addition to the defense strategy based on religious and streets fronts, the NU
chairman Hasyim Muzadi also made another effort to defend the Abdurrahman presidency. He
toured many political figures to call for a political compromise instead of conflict. His
objective was to gamer political support from political leaders.
6O
He first of all visited President
Abdurrahman to convey the message from several NU kyais from East and Central Java
pleading him to calm down. Hasyim then visited Vice-President Megawati and the
Muhammadiyah chairman Syafii Maarif separately. Hasyim told them his concern about the
imminent conflict in grassroots level and the urgency to take necessary actions to subside the
60 "Tak Cukup Bersafari," Gatra, 25 November 2000, p. 74-75.
76
tension. Hasyim also visited some political party leaders such as Harnzah Haz ofPPP and
Ahmad Sumargono ofPBB.
While the NU have made many efforts to defend Abdurrahman's presidency, the
Muharnmadiyah's response was not insignificant. During the outbreak of terror and threat
against Muhammadiyah figureheads in some towns of East Java, the Muharnmadiyah leaders
and members have not made any move. Since early March 2001, however, the Muhammadiyah
leaders had sent clear messages that they supported the impeachment of President
Abdurrahman. In the inaugural speech of his professorship, the deputy chairman of
Muharnmadiyah, Din Syamsuddin, also pointed out that in Islamic political thought there is a
possibility to impeach a president during his tenn, had he deviated from justice, lost one of his
five-senses or vital organs, or engaged in a sexual affair; the cases that had allegedly happened
in Abdurrahman's presidency and personality.61
Two days later the Muhammadiyah leaders made a clearer statement when they met
with Vice President Megawati. The PP Muharnmadiyah stated that the national leadership had
lost all moral and social legitimacy, and this indicated that the president should resign. They
went on to state that wisdom, sincerity and statesmanship were necessary to save the national
leadership in a constitutional manner. They also appealed to Megawati to prevent national
disintegration and to conduct measures to save the nationalleadership.62 The Muhammadiyah's
support to the dismissal of Abdurrahman had inevitably exacerbated the worse relationship
between the NU and Muharnmadiyah organizations and their supporters.
The NU had made vigorous extra-parliamentary efforts to defend Abdurrahman's
presidency. However, they could not prevent his dismissal when the MPR held an extraordinary
61 Syamsuddin, "Antara yang Berkuasa dan yang Dikuasai," 2005, p. 85-112.
62 "Opportunity Knocks," Tempo, March 12, 2001.
77
session on July 23, 2001 impeaching him and electing Megawati as the new president. But the
NU did not lose everything. The MPR also elected Hamzah Haz, the PPP Chairman, as the new
vice-president (hirnselfthe NU background, but has not shared Abdurrahman's political views).
The ministry of religion was also granted to an NU academician, Said Agil Munawwar
(meanwhile, Muhammadiyah kept the ministry of education). After the NU lost the
Abdurrahman's presidency, at least the lesser gains remained. The next part wiII examine the
roles played by the Muhammadiyah and NU in the 2004 presidential election.
D. Muslim Civil Society and the 2004 Presidential Election
The ascension of Megawati to the presidency was welcomed with relief because the
drama and chaos of21-months under President Abdurrahman had eventually come to an end.
Many people hoped at least that Megawati would preside over period of stability that would
enable her ministers to tackle the massive challenges that had largely been neglected during
Abdurrahman presidency.63 Inheriting a state tom by a long constitutional crisis, indeed, this
hope was met during her presidency as the political turbulence had subsided and the
government had been stable. Unlike her predecessor, she aptly avoided provoking the anger of
her political rivalries and maintained cordial relationship with all major political parties.
While many considered Megawati a failed president in term of providing an effective
leadership,64 however, a major break from the past representing an attempt to foster a more
mature democracy occurred during her term. For example, under Amien's leadership, the MPR in
November 2001 amended the constitution requiring for the first time direct election of all
members of the DPR and the Regional Representative Councils (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah-
DPD), as well as the president and vice-president. According to the MPR consensus, the new
63 Crouch, "Political Update 2002," 2003, p. 15.
64 See Lanti, "Indonesia: The Year of Continuing Turbulence," 2002, p. 111-129.
78
system would encompass a number of new features. First, all 550 seats of the DPR would be
filled by election. Neither military nor police would have any longer appointed representation as
in the previous DPR. Second, all 128 DPD members would also be directly elected. Each of the
country's 32 provinces has four seats in the DPD, which replace the appointed representatives of
regional and functional groups. Third, the DPR together with the DPD formed a bicameral MPR.
Fourth, as the presidential election would be held after the legislature election, a political party or
a coalition of political parties which won a threshold either 3% of the DPR seats or 5% of the
nationwide vote could nominate the pairing candidate. Furthennore, unless a pairing candidate
won a simple majority and garnered the majority of votes (50 + 1 %), a second round will be held
between the two leading pairs to decide the winner.
65
While this period was punctuated by political stability as no major conflict occurred
among elite political leaders, however, some Islamic political parties were inflicted with deep
internal division. The PKB was divided into two parties. This was an ensuing conflict of the
previous political chaos, where the PKB chairman Matori and his supporters eventually voted
for Abdurra1unan's impeachment in order to secure his own seat in Megawati's cabinet as the
Minister of Defense. In 2002 attempts to reconcile Matori's rebel faction with Abdurra1unan
failed, and since both factions operated as two entities with the same emblem. However, the
PKB-led by Matori was fading out when Matori suffered an acute stroke in 2003 and his party
was then disqualified by the election commission to contest for the 2004 election. The PPP
experienced a similar internal conflict. Some young PPP politicians, mostly from the modernist
camp, led by a renowned Islamic preacher Zainuddin M.Z., had demanded to speed up the PPP
congress before the 2004 election in order to accelerate the political regeneration within the
" See Enunerson, "A Year of Voting Dangerously," 2004, p. 104; Smith, "Indonesia in 2002: Megawati's
Way," 2003, p. 101.
79
party. Meanwhile, some others PPP politicians under vice-president Hamzah adamantly
defended the congress to be held after the 2004 election. This was deemed by the former as a
trick for the later to secure their tickets in the 2004 legislature and presidential elections. AB no
consensus was reached, the young group split and formed the new PPP Reformasi, and later on
participated in the 2004 election as the Partai Bintang Reformasi (pBR, Reform Star Party).
In the meantime, during the period between the two year-long political turbulence and
ahead of the 2004 election, the relationship between the Muslim civil society organizations and
political parties was ambiguous. This was partly because of the remnants from difficult political
relationship during the Abdurrahman's presidency, where the NU leaders strived to defend him
in his palace. On the other hand, this was also because of political competition for the
presidential election among leaders of political parties and Muslim civil society organizations.
More than 200 political parties registered to take part in the 2004 elections but only 24
parties were qualified to contest, including 5 leading parties which had taken part in the 1999
election: the PDI-P of President Megawati; the Golkar Party, the former party of the Suharto
regime; the PKB of Abdurrahman; the PPP of Vice-President Hamzah Haz; and the PAN of
Amien. Out ofthe 24 parties running for legislative seats, 7 Islamic parties participated in this
second democratic election during the reform era.
66
In this election, only seven parties emerged
as meaningful vote getters. Leading the field was GoIkar with 2 1.6 % of the vote, followed
closely by the PDI-P with 18.5 %. The PKB ran a distant third with 10.6 %, while the PPP
tallied 8.5 %, the new Democrat Party took 7.5 %, a freshly renamed Islarnist formation called
the PKS took 7.3 %, and the PAN took seventh place with a 6.4 % showing.
67
66 On the prevalence of political aliran during this election, see Lanti, "Outlook on the Indonesian
Parliamentary Election 2004," 2004 .
7 Qodari, "Indonesia's Quest," 2005, p. 78.
80
Table 2
Results of the Parliamentary Elections (1999 and 2004)
Election PDI-P Golkar PKB PPP PAN PBB PKJPKS PD
1999 33.7% 22.5% 12.7% 10.7% 7.1% 1.9% 1.4% -
2004 18.5% 21.6% 10.6% 8.2% 6.4% 2.6% 7.3% 7.5%
In fact, support declined for all five major vote-getter of 1999, a decline no doubt
attributable to the fact that both Abdurrahman's and Megawati's post-1999 governments had
been based on grand coalitions of all the major parties. The people have apparently shown their
displeasure with these ruling parties which had not done much for the people.
68
Indonesia's
economic malaise had entered its seventh year, but economic growth remained too low to
absorb the growing labor force.
69
Such political disillusionment is common in countries
experiencing a protracted democratic transition, where politics was punctuated by instability
and economic reform has not yet delivered its promise of welfare. It seemed that the 2004
parliamentary election functioned well for people to punish the failed ruling parties.
The main beneficiaries of the popular disillusionment were the Partai Keadilan
Sejabtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party) and Partai Demokrat (PD, Democrat Party) which
during the electoral campaign both aptly sought to dissociate themselves with the government
of the preceding five years while they were indeed parts of them. Moreover, the PD's strong
performance can be attributed solely to the popularity of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)
whose profile soared in the wake of his marginalization within Megawati's cabinet and
subsequent resignation from his ministerial portfolio, which elicited widespread media
attention and considerable public sympathy. Meanwhile, the PKS in particular shifted its
strategy from direct advocacy of the syariah to the fight against corruption, collusion and
68 Wanandi, "The Indonesian General Elections 2004," 2004, p. 117.
69 Aspinall, "Elections and the Normalization of Politics in Indonesia," 2005, p. 123.
81
nepotism, issues the big parties had to struggle with as they attempted to overcome public
perception of their complicities in such activities. 70
As far as the performance of Islamic political parties is concerned, if the total votes
received by all the Muslim parties are tallied excluding the PAN and the PKB, in the 2004
parliamentary election they received 23 percent of the vote, or 127 of the 550 seats in the DPR.
If the PAN and the PKB are included, then they gained 42 percent or 231 seats this year. In
1999 they got 34 percent of the vote or 171 seats (out of500).
From the results of this parliamentary election, it was clear that the multi-party system
of 1999 remained in place. In fact, the parliament became more fragmented than in 1999 as
major parties gained lower percentages in 2004. This led to the conclusion that the government
would once again be formed by a coalition and power-sharing arrangements as part of
concessions might be given by presidential candidates to secure office. The likely implication
was that the desire for strong government might be elusive, reflecting the failure of the election
to produce a decisive result thereby making the outcome for the presidential polls uncertain.
When the results of the parliamentary election were announced, it became clear that
only seven parties were qualified to propose their candidates. Other parties could only do so
when they combined their votes. In addition, during the presidential election, candidates for
both president and vice-president should be proposed as a pair. Therefore, the pairing mostly
depended on the results of the parliamentary election, as it enabled the potential candidates to
find their running mates or conversely other candidates prefer to serve as vice-presidential
candidates in order to share power and attract more votes. However, political parties are also
70 Sebastian, "The Paradox ofIndonesian Democracy," 2004, p. 264-265.
82
allowed to nominate a person who is not originally a party member. This will offer a chance to
some respected non-politician figures to be presidential or vice-presidential candidates.
Both religion and ethnicity played a significant role in the pairing process. All of the
presidents of Indonesia, except Habibie who assumed office by default, were Javanese. This
divide between Javanese and non-Javanese constituted a crucial factor in the pairing process.
Thus, if the proposed president was a Javanese, then it might be prudent to have a running mate
who was non-Javanese (or vice versa) in order to gamer the necessary votes from outer islands.
In this regard, the new leaders would be able to project themselves as a truly "Indonesian team"
rather than fueled what was increasingly perceived as a perpetuation of Javanese domination.
7l
Similarly significant was the divide between Islam and nationalist political outlooks.
While all of the Indonesian presidents were Muslims, however, except Abdurrahman they came
from the nationalist camp. Therefore, if the proposed presidents were nationalist, they tended to
look for their running mates from Islamic political parties or organizations and vice versa. In a
largely Islamic populace, the winner would be one that was able to appeal to the majority of the
Muslim voters. It was in this context that the NU and Muharnmadiyah organizations and their
leaders plausibly played a significant role.
Since long before the parliamentary election, there were a number of presidential
hopefuls. The PDI-P had nominated Megawati, the incumbent. Similarly, the PAN had also
nominated Amien Rais, while the PKB had nominated Abdurrahman. Apart from these three
candidates, there was also Gen. (ret) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBy), coordinating minister
of security under the Megawati government who was proposed by the PD; Akbar Tanjung (the
Golkar Party Chairman and speaker of the DPR); Gen. (ret.) Wiranto (former coordinating
71 Singh, "The 2004 Presidential Elections in Iodone8ia," 2003, p. 439.
83
minister of security fired by Abdurrahman in 1999); Let. Gen. (ret.) Prabowo Subianto (fonner
Suharto's son in law and fonner chief of the anny special force); Nurcholish Madjid (leading
Islamic scholar), Sultan Hamengku Buwono X (Sultan and governor of Jogjakarta); JusufKalla
(coordinating minister for people's welfare under Megawati); Aburizal Bakrie (businessman);
and Surya Paloh (Head of Metro-TV and daily newspaper Media Indonesia).
While the PDI-P, PAN, PKB, and PD had openly declared their respective candidates,
the Golkar party as the winner of the parliamentary election held a convention in order to select
their presidential nominees. In the convention, aimed at increasing internal democratization and
attracting extra-voters, the last eight aforementioned candidates vied for the Golkar ticket.
72
By
the time of the Golkar convention on April 20, Wiranto extraordinarily won in the convention
designed by Akbar Tanjung in the hope that he would be the main beneficiary. While Wiranto
had supposedly the most effective electoral machine in Golkar, it was questionable whether he
could manage full support from the Golkar voters since it was rumored that Akbar did not
support Wiranto's nomination wholeheartedly,73 and the fact that JusufKaIla's nomination as
SBY's vice-presidential candidate might split the Golkar voters.
Similarly problematic was Arnien's nomination. After securing the PAN's support for
his nomination in its Jogjakarta congress on February 2000, he began to push the
Muhanunadiyah leaders to declare its fonnal support since 2002. It was also reported that there
had been repeated pressure put on Muhanunadiyah leaders from PAN supporters within the
organization to endorse Arnien through a fonnal declaration. However, Muhanunadiyah leaders
such as the Chainnan Syafii Maarif and the Secretary General Haedar Nashir repeatedly
72 Three candidates dropped their candidacies for different reasons. Nurcholish could not afford a large
sum of money needed to run up to the convention; JusufKalla accepted SBY's bid to become his running mate;
and Sultan argued that it would be morally incorrect to compete with Akbar, after the later was freed by the
Supreme Court from the Bulog scandai.
73 Ananta at.ai., Emerging Democracy in Indonesia, 2005, p. 79.
84
refused the pressure and said that the formal support would be an inappropriate political move
since Mubammadiyah was not a political party and that it would jeopardize the impartial
character of the organization.
74
The first collision between both factions took place in the Mubammadiyah annual
meeting (Tanwir) in Bali on January 2002. During the meeting, the pro-Amien faction insisted
Mubammadiyah to explicitly mention Amien's name as the presidential nominee. On the other
hand, the pro-impartiality faction defended that such declaration would violate the natural non-
political character of the organization. Amien and his supporters were further shocked by the
Mubammadiyah's invitation to President Megawati to open the Tanwir. This was deemed by
Amien as Mubammadiyah leaning to support Megawati rather than himself. Worse still, in her
remarks, Megawati stressed that Mubammadiyah was not a strange entity to her, since she was
brought up in a Mubammadiyah family. She recalled that her father the late Sukarno, was a
member of the Mubammadiyah, and once even served in the movement's executive body.
Megawati's mother was also the daughter ofMubammadiyah's top executive in Bengkulu,
Sumatra. "And I believe that it is for the first time in history that a woman from a
Mubammadiyah family is leading this country as its president," she said, to huge applause from
the participants.
75
The compromise was eventually reached, however, and the final
recommendation stated that "the Mubammadiyah will support its best cadres to become the
national leader," without naming who "the best cadres" are.
The next political battle between both factions took place in the Mubammadiyah
Tanwir on June 2003 in Makassar. As the presidential election was getting closer, the demand
for Mubammadiyah to declare its support for Amien had also mounted. Ahead to the Tanwir,
74 See Tanthowi, "Mnhammadiyah dan Pencalonan Amien Rais," 2003.
7S "Megawati Opens Mnhammadiyah Annual Meeting in Denpasar," The Jakarta Post, January 25, 2002.
85
the national media was embellished by a dispute between Amien and Syafii concerning
Muhammadiyah's appropriate standpoint on Amien's candidacy. While the Tanwir participants
were discussing Muhammadiyah's stance, a meeting between members of the PP
Muhammadiyah with Amien and his supporters was held in order to reach consensus. It was
reported that in the meeting Amien did not conceal his anger with Syafii's open rejection to
endorse his nomination. It was also reported that some Muhammadiyah leaders went out of the
meeting infuriated by Amien's belligerence. The consensus was eventually reached stating:
''The Tanwir 'comprehended the participants' aspiration concerning the nomination of the
Muhamrnadiyah's best cadre in the 2004 presidential election, in the framework of the refonn
continuation and country's salvation ... The Tanwir entrusted to the central board of the
Muhamrnadiyah to follow lIP this aspiration and in a proper time issue an instruction for all
Muhamrnadiyah members.,,'6
The awkward relationship between Amien and the Muhammadiyah was exacerbated
by the issue heard by Amien that Syafii was on the top ofMegawati's list of vice-presidential
nominees. Depite Syafii' s persistence that between two buses would not overtake each other,
meaning that he would not vie for the Muhammadiyah's support,77 Amien increased his
pressure on Muhammadiyah to endorse his candidacy before the parliamentary election, hoping
that the endorsement will simultaneously increase the support of the Muhammadiyah members
for his party. As the pressure was unstoppable, the Muhammadiyah eventually "fully endorsed
Amien as the best cadre and former Muhammadiyah chairman to strive for the reform
continuation and the country's salvation in the 2004 presidential election.,,78 In a political
statement to conclude its plenary session on February 9-10, 2004 in Yogyakarta,
76 See Tanfidz Tanwir Muhammadiyah Tahun 1424 W2003 M, Berita Resmi Muhammadiyah, No.
04/2003'j? 21-22.
Interview with A. Syafii Maarif on December 24, 2007 in J ogjakarta. In his words, he said "sesarna bus
kOla tidak boleh saling rnendahului."
78 See Keputusan Sidang Pleno Pimpinan Pusat Muharnrnadiyah Bersarna Ketua-Ketua Pimpinan
Wilayah Muhammadiyah tentang Kebijakan Mubarnrnadiyah Menghadapi Pernilu 2004. The open debate on the
Muhammadiyah's support for Amien was detailed in Siandes, Muhammadiyah, 2004.
86
Muharnmadiyah emphasized that Amien was the country's best hope and the refonnist figure
who still committed to fuIIy implementing the ideals of reformasi. To the dislike of some of
Amien's supporters who sought a side effect of the declaration for their party's benefit, Syafii
reiterated that the endorsement had nothing to do with the PANas Muharnmadiyah members
were free to choose any political party. It was widely circulated that, for Muharnmadiyah
members, ''whatever their political parties, their president would invariably be Amien."
Partly because of such unbinding dictum, the PAN saw its vote share dropped from
7.1 to 6.4%. During the first week after the parliamentary election, it was reported that Amien
was shocked by the PAN's poor perfonnance and began rating his own chance was threatened.
There had been a number of rumors circulating in Jakarta that Amien would quit the
presidential race or would simply be the ruuning mate. Many Muharnmadiyah members were
also nervous and demoralized. They began to realize that ''whatever their political parties, their
president would invariably be Amien" fonnula at last decreased Amien's chance in the ensuing
presidential election. Finally, a week after the parliamentary election, Amien announced in the
Muhammadiyah office that he remained runuing for president. This particular place was not
insiguificant for such announcement. According to Amien's political advisor Rizal Sukma, it
would send a strong message that Amien was still the indispensable Islamic leader without
having to say so. It would give also the impression that his decision was not without a clear
power base. Finally, it would also send a clear reminder to those Muharnmadiyah members
who did not vote for the PAN that in the presidential election they should vote for him.79
A similar awkward relationship developed between the NU and Abdurrahman during
the Megawati presidency. Along with the PKB chainnan Matori who decided to join the
79 Confidentiallet!er from Rizal Sukma for Amien Rais, April 8, 2004.
87
extraordinary MPR session unseating Abdurrahman, the NU Chairman Hasyim Muzadi disagreed
with the planned violence to defend Abdurrahman's presidency. Seeing the powerful movement
toppling Abdurrabman, the NU priority, according to Hasyim, was to save what could be saved
for the NU's interests. The PPP chairman Harnzah was thus elected vice-president and the
ministry of religion was granted to the NU leader, Said Agil Munawwar. Hasyim's maneuver was
criticized by Abdurrahman, accusing Hasyim of doing little to prevent the special session of the
MPR. The rift between the NU and Abdurrahman increased after the fall of Abdurrahman,
involved the attitude to be taken toward the new Megawati government.
80
While Abdurralunan
refused any contact with Megawati in the months following his impeachment, Hasyim and other
NU leaders have kept regular contact. The rivalry between Abdurrahman and Hasyim surprised
many people, since Abdurrahman backed Hasyim's election in the 1999 NU congress.
The ensuing tension intensified concerning the presidential issue. The PKB had
declared its support for Abdurrahman to run in the presidential election. Many PKB leaders
also stated that the party would nominate Hasyim as PKB's presidential candidate if
Abdurrahman resigned from the race either for health or other reasons. Seeing this chance,
early in February 2004 Hasyim called on the NU members to vote for the PKB with former
president Abdurrahman as its presidential hopeful. Tantamount to the Muharnmadiyah
endorsement to Amien's candidacy, Hasyim said that PKB was NU's political vehicle and NU
members and supporters should fully support the party. Despite strong criticism from some NU
supporters from the PPP saying that such a call could cause conflict among the grass roots,
Hasyim said ''the political support will come not from the NU institution but from NU
80 Feillard, "Indonesian Traditiona1ist Islam's Troubled Experience with Democracy," 2002, p. 139.
88
members. NU members will be obliged to cast their votes for PKB and the latter should
recognize the NU membership of those who give their support to other parties. ,,81
However, Abdurrahman did not allow Hasyim diminishing his chance with pleasure.
He insisted that he was the only possible PKB candidate. In mid February 2004 Abdurrahman
began his campaign to unseat Hasyim from the NU's leadership through an extraordinary NU
congress. Hasyim himself admitted that there had been an undeclared war between him and
Gus Dur for the impeachment reason.
82
Hasyim also admitted that Abdurrahman was
disappointed after he refused to support Alwi's PKB over Matori's in the PKB conflict. Hasyim
argued that he did it to preserve the NU's impartiality.
After it became clear for Hasyim that his prospect in the PKB was slim and
Abdurrahman's assault on his NU post intensified, Hasyim began his campaign that the NU
refused to support the PKB in the parliamentary election. When a number of the PKB leaders
met him at the NU office to ask for the NU's support due to the fact that "the party was born
from the NU's womb", Hasyim asserted that he would prevent the NU becoming involved in
politics. "Both the PKB and NU must keep their own institutions healthy. Although the PKB
was born from us (the NU), we are different institutions. The NU is a religious organization
while the PKB is a political organization, so just don't mix them up," Hasyim said.
83
At the same time, Megawati had been seeking a prominent national figure who could
revive her beleaguered image and boost her chances of winning. In an earlier meeting, PDI-P
had considered a Muslim leader to complement the party's broad support from grassroots
members with its nationalist/secular orientation. As mentioned above, there was a tendency for
81 "Mnbammadiyah Backs Amien," The Jakana Post, February II, 2004.
82 ''Hasyim Challenges Move to Unseat Him from Post," The Jakana Post, February 28, 2004.
83 ''NU Refuses to Support PKB in 2004 Polls," The Jakana Post, March 6, 2006.
89
nationalist leaders to team up with the Muslim leaders and vice versa. For Megawati, in
particular, this was aimed at complementing her lacking Islamic credentials, as some Islamic
leaders using religious arguments had been campaigning to disqualify her bid because of her
gender. With this criterion, after the reluctance of the Muhammadiyah chairman Syafii Maarif,
the chance remained wide open for the PDI-P to pick one of the NU figures, either Hasyim
Muzadi or vice-president Hamzah Haz of the PPP.
Complicating the matter, Wiranto, after winning the Golkar ticket, was also eyeing his
running mate from the Muslim camp. With Muhammadiyah declaring its support for Amien, a
struggle ensued to secure the NU figures. However, the NU ticket was not easy to secure. On
the one hand, Hasyim, fearing Wiranto's record of human rights abuses, opted instead to
partner with Megawati. Wiranto keen on securing a presidential running mate from the NU and
considering Abdurrahman's opposition to Hasyim's candidacy, turned his attention to
Abdurrahman's younger brother Solahuddin Wahld. The latter was Hasyim's deputy chairman
of the NU and was endorsed by the PKB, the main party representing the NU. Meanwhile,
Harnzah, after Megawati had chosen Hasyim as her running mate, decided to run for the
presidency. Actual1y, the PPP was divided about his decision to run, but in the end they
relented, even though they knew his chance was slim. Worse still, Abdurrahman initially also
continued his candidacy and chose Marwah Daud Ibrahim, a Golkar female leader coming from
Sulawesi, as his partner. However, this pair was barred by the election commission (KPU) from
taking part in the presidential election as Abdurrahman failed the medical check-up test.
As far as Amien's partner was concerned, Amien was keen to take a nationalist figure
as his running mate. Amien had earlier mul1ed on running with SBY, but it turned out that the
latter's party got more votes in the parliamentary election than PAN. Amien then turned his
90
attention to the military commander Endriartono Sutarto, but the latter refused his offer. After
weeks of uncertainty, Amien announced on early May former minister Siswono Yudo Husodo
as his running mate for the July 5 presidential race. Siswono said he hoped his candidacy would
create a solid and harmonious duo between Amien, "a nationalist, religious" figure and himself,
a man who always "tries to be religious, and a nationalist".84
Finally, when the campaign for the presidential election began, only five pairs took
part in the race: Wiranto-Solahuddin Wahid (proposed by Golkar), SBY-JusufKalla (proposed
by the PD), Amien Rais-Siswono (proposed by PAN), Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi (proposed by
the PDI-P), and Harnzah Haz-Agum Gumelar (proposed by the PPP).
Looking at their ethnic backgrounds, among the presidential candidates, all but one
(Hamzah) were Javanese. Among the vice-presidential candidates, three of them were Javanese
(Hasyim, Solahuddin, and Agum) while the other two were non-Javanese (Siswono and Jusuf
Kalla). Looking at the religious backgrounds of the candidates, it is obvious that all were
Muslim. In terms of their political outlooks, however, out of all presidential candidates, three
were nationalists (Megawati, Wiranto and SBy), while the rest were Islamic (Amien and
Harnzah). Among the vice-presidential candidates, three were Islamic (Hasyim, Solahuddin,
and JusufKa\la) while the rest were nationalists (Siswono and Agum).
It was clear that in the presidential election, the Muhammadiyah support was
relatively unified behind Amien's bid since there was only one candidate from the modernist
camp. While the Muhammadiyah itself did not officially set up a campaign team, a number of
its leaders have listed themselves in the official campaign team for Amien-Siswono. The
Muhammadiyah deputy chairman Din Syamsuddin, who is not officially included in the
84 "Amien Names Siswono as Running Mate in July 5 Race," The Jakarta Post, May 10, 2004.
91
Anllen-Siswono team, has also set up the Refonn-Minded People's (MPR) movement, which
works to garner support for the pair. At the same token, the regional leadership of
Muhammadiyah throughout the country as well as its youth and woman wings has initiated
respectively to set up similar campaign teams.
Relatively significant for Anllen's bid was the support from several small parties. At
the end of May 2004, six minor political parties-the Marhaenisme Indonesian National Party
(PNI Marhaenisme), Social Democratic Labor Party (PBSD), Freedom BuB National Party
(pNBK), Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party (pPDI), Indonesian Unity Party (pSI) and the
Refonn Star Party (pBR)-announced their supports for the Amien-Siswono pairing. With PAN
and Muhammadiyah as the main sponsors, additional votes from these parties were expected to
increase the estimate votes for Anllen-Siswono to 17 millions.
Somewhat problematic was the support from the PKS. Despite its good showing in
the parliamentary election, the PKS did not propose any presidential candidates, nor did any
presidential candidates seek their partner among the PKS leaders. Although the PKS has been
weB-known for its cohesive network, meaning that the existing presidential candidates from the
nationalist camp could secure this Muslim voting bloc, they were highly unlikely willing to be
identified too Islamic, as the PKS had been considered to be the most conservative Muslim
party, along with the PBB and PPP. Rather, they preferred Muslim leaders from a pluralist
Islamic party and organizations, such as PKB, NU, or Muhammadiyah.
During the campaign period, a strenuous tug-of-war between two camps within the
party had prevented it to take a swift decision over whom it should endorse: Wiranto or
92
Amien.
85
The official reason was their confusion about the candidate who had a greater chance
of beating Megawati. Most party officials appeared to prefer Wiranto, but they had a problem
with the Golkar Party which was seen as a legacy of the New Order, a regime which suppressed
Muslims' political expression. However, Wiranto's strength was that he had a greater chance of
beating Megawati because he was backed by the Golkar which won most votes in the April
poll. As for Amien, the latter's chances of even surviving the first round was considered small.
Therefore their aim of replacing Megawati would likely fail. His strength, however, was that
Amien had a long record ofIslamic leadership and once regarded as a "locomotive of reform".
Despite this formal reason, people had rumored that this division was based on a reason as
trivial as the grooming of a head scarf ofa candidate's wife.
86
Five days before the voting, the PKS decided late in the game to throw its support
behind Amien-Siswono. This late decision was seen by many as "playing it safe" and the most
likely consensus reached by both camps. Despite Wiranto' better chance, supporting him might
risk the PKS's pro-reform image. This decision was also aimed at debunking an allegation that
they were controlled by Wiranto and his money. Therefore, rather than merely speculating on
victory, it was far better to remain close to Amien, since the members of the PKS and Amien's
PAN basically came from the same circles: the urban Muslim middle class, campuses and
politically enlightened communities. The decision would enhance its identity as a Muslim-
based party that opted to back candidate who will strive for its members' interests. However,
both camps delayed endorsing Amien until the last days in order to absolve themselves from
endorsing the secular candidates without having to work hard to campaign for Amien.
8S "PKS is Tom between Wiranto, Amien," The Jakarta Post, June 5, 2004. The party bas pledged not to
support the incumbent president because of her failure to achieve significant progress during her administration.
86 Sukanto, ''What's Taking the PKS So Long to Make up Its Mind?" 2004. Many PKS concerned
Amien's wife which bas not really covered her hair. Neither does one ofhis daughters. Meanwhile, Wiranto's wife
and two daughters wear the Islamic head scarf, and another family member is a supporter of the PKS.
93
Therefore, the PKSs support for Amien did not necessarily mean that the candidate would
expect the votes of all of the party's members, meaning that Amien's chances have not
automatically been enhanced to a significant degree. This late support left an indelible effect in
the following years in the strained relationship between the Muhammadiyah and the PKS.
Unlike the relatively united Muhammadiyah support for Amien, the emergence of
several NU candidates divided and confused its members as they would have to choose one of
the figures. The conflict among NU grassroots supporters was unavoidable as the elite tried to
influence the NU members to win their votes. Some believed that the emergence of some NU
candidates was wittingly orchestrated to put a foot in all pairs.
87
According to the acting NU
chairman Masdar Mas 'udi, however, that was not the case.
88
The 2004 presidential election saw
the open fight among NU leaders to woo the NU members' support. On the one hand, the PKB
executive board unanimously decided to fully support Wiranto-Solahuddin. The decision,
however, was made without a clear endorsement from Abdurrabman, as he had earlier pledged
to abstain in the July 5 polls in protest over the KPU's decision to disqualify him from the race.
Abdurrabman had given his blessing to Solahuddin to run as Wiranto's running mate, although
it did not mean that he altogether supported the pair.
89
Intemal division was unavoidable when
NU decided to let Hasyim became Megawati's running mate. Although Hasyim was less
influential within the NU community than Abdurrahman, however, he was the formal NU
leader who commanded the NU structures.
This internal conflict was punctuated by the split among NU leaders. As a traditional
Islamic community, NU members depend upon kyai not only in their religious life, but also in
87 Staff, "Some Lessons from the Democratization Process," 2004, p. 132.
88 Interview with Masdar F. Mas 'udi on December 27, 2007 in Jakarta.
89 "PKB Divided over Candidate Choice," The Jakarta Post, May 14, 2004.
94
social and political fields. Each time, prior to the general election, NU leaders delivered a
statement that told them who to vote for. Such statement had been usually strategic and
powetful, but not this time. Most kyai and bigpesantrens such as Pesantren Lirboyo Kediri,
Genggong Probolinggo and Sukorejo Situbondo, were supporters ofHasyim, and the kyai
delivered a statement to NU members and santri (pesantren pupils) to vote for the Mega-
Hasyim pairing. Similarly, the Wiranto-Solahuddin pairing was supported by Abdurrahman and
Abdullah Faqih, the most influential kyai of the PKB, and the leader ofPesantren Langitan
Tuban. This internal conflict was not only in Jakarta. It was also the case on local levels. Each
local kyai pursued their own interests and took side with one of the candidates and sought to
influence their santri to vote for their candidates. Many kyai were now busy supporting one of
the candidates while neglecting the educational process in pesantren. 90
In order to minimize the impact of conflict on the NU organization, the supreme
(Syuriah) NU council during its meeting on May 17 in Rembang, Central Java, finally, decided
that all NU candidates and their official campaign team members could not be active in the
organization. The meeting was attended by numerous Syuriah members such as Fachrudin
Masturo, Mustofa Bisri, Fuad Hasyim, Said Agil Siradj, Tholchah Hasan, Masdar, Manarul
Hidayat, Fahri Toha and Chotibul Umam Wiranu. The syuriah also decided to appoint Masdar
the acting NU chairman, replacing Hasyim, who was declared non-active by NU's Syuriah
Council. Aside from Hasyim, Solahuddin had earlier resigned voluntarily from his post in NU.
In addition to these decisions, Masdar also prohibited all NU leaders, including those
of affiliated bodies, from making statements on behalf of the organization supporting any
presidential or vice presidential candidates in the upcoming election. The decision to suspend
.. uNU, Mubammadiyah Involvement in Politics May Weaken Them," The Jakarta Post, May 12,2004.
95
Hasyim and other NU leaders who were involved in the presidential campaign was made to
maintain the neutrality ofNU.
91
Masdar said the ban applied to leaders ofNU and autonomous
organizations, including Ansor, Muslimat, IPNU, IPPNU, and Lakpesdam NU, from their
central boards down to the grassroots level. He stressed that NU would not issue a political
edict as suggested by a number ofNU leaders, saying that NU had decided not to support or
reject any presidential and vice presidential candidates in the upcoming election.
While some presidential candidates vying for political support from Islamic political
parties and organizations alike, the support was not the only significant factor dominating the
people's decision-making. It was theoretically true that the backing of a considerable party
mechanism which would be able to convert the advantages of popularity into votes at the ballot
booth. Here, networks and organization would be essential to concretize popular support, thus
the critical role of the political party.92 Similarly insignificant was the solid platform for a
presidential bid. Many people had yet to take the candidates' platform and programs into
account when they went into the polls. It is important to note that the presidential election was
the election of individuals rather than parties. Therefore, the 2004 presidential election proved
that personal image and popularity were more important than party affiliation.
93
In the first
round presidential election held in July 5, The SBY-Kalla pairing obtained 33.57% of the vote.
The pair was followed by Megawati-Hasyim (26.61 %), Wiranto-Solehuddin (22.15%), Amien-
Siswono (14.66%), and Harnzah-Agum (3.01 %). Although during the first round candidates
with major party support tended to gain some advantage, it was not that crucial. The result
91 ''NU Leaders Banned from Taking Side," The Jakarta Post, May 18, 2004.
92 Sebastian, "The Paradox of Indonesian Democracy," 2004, p. 274.
93 Suryadinata, "Indonesia: The Year ofa Democratic Election," 2005, p. 138.
96
showed that popularity and personal image mattered; otherwise, Yudhoyono would have
obtained only 11.33% (the PD, PBB and PKPI votes).94
The period between the first and second rounds of the presidential election was a busy
time in Indonesian politics. As there were only two candidates, new alliances were formed and
new strategies were set Up. Major and medium-sized political parties began to eye the likely
winning pair in order to reap post-election benefits. During this period, Megawati appeared to
be more active to invite partners into new alliance. The Golkar chairman Akbar drove his party
to support Megawati, despite strong opposition from a number of Golkar leaders. The PPP also
joined the Megawati camp. These three major political parties, supplemented by four small
other political parties (the PBR, PDS, PKPB, and PNI Marhaenisme) formed the Koalisi
Kebangsaan (National Coalition) on August 19, 2004 which was chaired by Akbar. Based on
their gain in the parliamentary election, they expected to gain at least 55.8% total votes.
On the other hand, SBY -Kalla had also expanded their coalition. During the first
round they were backed only by three political parties (pO, PBB, and PKPI). Ahead to the
runoff they had received additional support from the PKS. These four parties formed the
Koalisi Kerakyatan (People's Coalition) on August 26, 2004. In total, the People's Coalition
would have secured only 21.4% total votes. Meanwhile, both the PKB and PAN decided to
remain neutral and advised their constituencies to decide themselves on who to be voted.
95
On a party coalition basis, Megawati had the upper hand, but the direct presidential
election was based on personality, and party support was not as crucial as personal image and
perceived capability by the voters. When the second round presidential election was held on
94 On the losing and winning pairs in the first round presidential election, see Ananta alai., Emerging
Democrafl, in Indonesia, 2005, p. 74-89.
, Staff, "Challenges to the New Government," 2004, p. 329.
97
September 20, SBY -Kalla received 60.62% votes, while Megawati-Hasyim received 39.38%
votes. The second round presidential election confinned that the party machinery, upon which
Megawati-Hasyim had relied, flunked the elections. The election results proved that the use of
party machinery in generating party loyalties was ineffective.
96
This, however, needs further
evidences from local elections and the coming 2009 presidential election.
On October 20, 2004, SBY assumed office as Indonesia's sixth president. On that day,
the cabinet was announced and a new administration established. There were last minute
negotiations and bargaining. The cabinet was not entirely the professional cabinet that SBY
promised. Rather, it was a compromise cabinet, made up of political appointees and
professionals.
97
Out of36 posts, 16 ministers represented political parties. Apart from political
parties backing him in the runoff (PD 2 posts, PKS 3 posts, PBB 2 posts, and PKPI 1 post),
SBY also incorporated some ministers representing splinter groups from political parties which
did not support him. They were included Alwi Shihab and SyaifuIIah Yusuf of the PKB,
Bachtiar Chamsah of the PPP, and Aburizal Bakrie and Fahmi Idris ofthe Golkar party. He was
aware of the potential opposition coming from the National Coalition had he neglected them in
the cabinet line-up. By doing so, SBY sought to make the best use of the division for his own
gain. While he could exploit those internal divisions, he could also enhance the inclusive image
of his new administration to garner more public legitimacy.
Looking at the other posts, there were some ministers representing the NU and
Muharnmadiyah. The ministry of religion was granted to the Indonesian ambassador to Egypt
Maftuh Basyuni, himself from NU. The PBNU had never recommended anyone for a
96 On the discussion about personality and political machinery as the key to political success in the 2004
Indonesian presidential election, see Aspinall, "Politics," 2005, 20-23.
97 On the complete cabinet line-up, see Shiraishi, ''Politics in Indonesia," 2005, p. 25-39.
98
ministerial post, since its chainnan in tandem with Megawati were the rival ofSBY-Kalla in
the run-off. The Maftuh's appointment was thus the SBY's own initiative. When SBY assigned
his entourage to open contact with Hasyim in order to ensure that the path was paved for
Maftuh to assume the ministry, Hasyim was more than happy that the NU was still awarded the
desired ministerial post although the man had not any record in the NU leadership.98
Unlike the appointment of the ministry of religion from the NU, the Muharnmadiyah,
that appeared to be neutral before the second round, began to prepare three ministerial
candidates after it became clear that SBY-Kalla won the run-off. They were the ministry of
defense, ministry of national education, and ministry of health. During the cabinet fonnation,
the national media began to name the Muharnmadiyah candidates Rizal Sukma to assume the
ministry of defense. In the final process, however, SBY -Kalla asked the Muhammadiyah to
nominate a female figure for the ministry of health, while Muhammadiyah had prepared the
male one. During the last hours, the Muharnmadiyah eventually offered Siti Fadilah Supari, the
daughter offormer chairman of the Central Java Muharnmadiyah provincial board and a senior
doctor in the Jakarta Muhammadiyah hospital, as the minister of health.
While SBY government succeeded to minimize a growing opposition threatening his
presidency, as all major political and social organizations have been represented in the cabinet,
the major political battles after a year-long 2004 elections were among rival groups in major
political and social organizations. The next part will study the leadership changes in Islamic
organizations and their further relationship with political parties.
E. National Congress and Leadership Change
.. "Why Mega Stayed Away," Tempo, November 1, 2004, p. 27.
99
The following months after the presidential elections saw the intensified conflict
between the NU and Abdurrahrnan Wahid and to some degree between the Muharnrnadiyah
and Arnien Rais, when both organizations held their congress. Surprisingly, the outcome of
these conflicts was similar in term of the declining influence of both Abdurrahrnan and Arnien
in those Islamic organizations where they once headed.
Ahead to the NU congress scheduled to take place in Surakarta, Central Java on
November 28-December 3, 2004, Abdurrahrnan sought to prevent Hasyirn's re-nomination for
the NU chairman, despite Hasyirn's intention to re-nominate himself. Abdurrahrnan saw
Hasyirn dragging the NU into practical politics as he politicized the NU during the presidential
election when he stood as Megawati's running mate. On the other hand, Hasyirn replied that
those people who accused him dragging the NU into politics were (the PKB) politicians. In
fact, this conflict was the continuation of the previous rift within the NU during the presidential
election. The Abdurrahrnan's camp consisted of many NU leaders and kyai who supported the
Wiranto-Solahuddin pair, while Hasyim's camp consisted of those kyai who supported him and
Megawati. Abdurrahrnan and his PKB supporters feared that the NU would be a political
vehicle again, should Hasyim be re-elected to lead the NU, just like when he teamed up with
Megawati in the 2004 presidential election. For Hasyirn and his supporters, Abdurrahrnan's
efforts were simply aimed to control the NU leadership and prevent its use to support any
candidate contradicting the PKB's candidate in the 2009 presidential election.
The kick offhad been given during the first week after the presidential election, when
Hasyirn resumed his position in the NU leadership. A number ofNU leaders supporting him
during the campaign had also their suspension lifted. While officially this enabled Hasyim to
100
prepare for the NU congress, it also enabled Hasyim to wield his influence as the NU chairman
to re-nominate himself.
Meanwhile, Abdurrahman used many ways to block Hasyim's road to the NU
chairman. He nominated himself for the supreme (Syuriah) NU council,99 while persuading the
current Syuriah chairman Sahal Mahfudz, himself Abdurrahman's uncle, not to accept his re-
nomination for the post. In order to extend the support, he ordered the PKB politicians and MPs
as well as mobilized a large number of senior kyai to persuade the delegates from provincial
and local branches. He also tried to lobby Sahal to council Hasyim not to nominate himself
again. However, Sahal did not comply. Rather, he left the decisions entirely to the congress
participants. "IfI were to obstruct him from nominating again, it would mean I was declaring
something haram (illegal) that is actually halal (legal) under law," he said.
lOO
For the candidate
for the Tanjidziyah ( executive) chairman, Abdurrahman cited many names. Initially he named
Cecep Syarifuddin, one of the deputy NU chairman. Not long after, he changed his candidate to
Tolchah Hassan, former minister of religion during his presidency. Later on, he mentioned
Mustofa Bisri, a well respected kyai-cum-poet. Unfortunately, they eventually refused to
contest. Finally, the Abdurrahman's camp threw its support for Masdar Mas'udi, the acting NU
chairman during the presidential elections.
Hasyim and his supporters did know, of course, that those entitled to vote at the
congress were the executives of provincial and local branches. Since the beginning he seemed
to have confidence that most provincial and local branches supported him. Hasyim was known
99 In the NU constitution, the Syuriah council holds the highest authority over the Tanfidziyah. However,
since the Abdurrahrnan's Tanfidziyah leadership (1984-1999) the Syuriah had been overshadowed by the
Tanfidziyah, because he is the grandson of the NU founder and his intellectual capacity exceeded anyone in the
organization. In the congress, the nomination for the Tanfidziyah chainnan is possible as long as they were approved
by the elected Synriah. In this regard, should Abdurrahrnan won the Synriah chairman, he could block Hasyim's re-
nomination, or restore the Synriah position over the Tanfidziyah regardless of the elected Tanfidziyah chairman.
"""A Threat fromKrarnat Raya," Tempo, December 13, 2004, p. 14.
101
for his generosity to "look after" (Javanese, ngopeni) those branches and pesantren. He
frequently visited those branches and pesantren during his term and donated funds for their
activities. Moreover, during the campaign for presidential election more and more branches and
pesantren received funds from Hasyirn. In terms of funds, which have been the main problem
for the NU executives to run the organization, Hasyim has been well known for his craft to
accumulate them. "I have no idea the source. But he obviously could mobilize it easily as long
as for the NU interest," one NU branch executive from East Java said.
1ol
Having aware that Hasyim enjoyed strong support from provincial and local branches,
his supporters planned to increase the criteria for support for the candidates. While the existing
draft for procedural rules at the congress required the candidates for chairman of both the
Syuriah and Tanfidziyah must have at least 60 local branches support, Hasyim's supporters
attempted to increase the required number to 125. The compromise was then achieved in the
number of99. This move indicated that the congress began to be a zero sum game. 102
On the election day, the organizing committee recorded 455 votes from 465 delegates
(30 province and 435 local branches) with voting rights. In the nomination for the Syuriah
chairmanship, Sahal emerged as the single candidate, as no other contenders could garner
minimum support (99 votes). Abdurrahman failed to enter the race, since he secured only 75
votes, while others garnered less support. In conformity with the meeting procedures, as there
was no other candidate with significant vote, the congress participants unanimously ordained
Sahal as the Syuriah chairman for the 2004-2009 period. Sahal's triumph meant that
Abdurrahman failed to block the reelection bid of Hasyirn. In the nomination, Hasyim received
293 votes, Masdar 103, Mustofa Bisri 35, while other contenders got less support. Under the
101 "Hasyim Dibendung, Hasyim Didukung," Forum Keadilan, No. 30,28 November 2004, p. 89.
102 "Let Battle Connnence," Tempo, December 6, 2004, p. 29.
102
meeting procedures, Hasyim and Masdar had won the right to take part in the second round. In
the second round, however, Hasyim defeated Masdar with 346 to 99 votes.
There was no doubt that Hasyim took control of the NU structurally and
organizationally, thus allowing him to win the chairmanship election during the congress.
Abdurrahman, meanwhile, had lost a lot of his influence in the organization he chaired for 15
years until he became the fifth president in 1999. This defeat signaled the beginning of the end
of his political authority in the NU community. His ouster as president in 2001 was the turning
point for his popularity. During the congress, Abdurrahman only received the backing of young
intellectuals and many senior kyai, all of whom are outside the NU's structure, meaning that
they did not have voting rights. Therefore, their support was not enough to defeat Hasyim.
The depth of the division reflected not the cleavage between the kyai and politicians
as in the 1984 NU congress. Nor did it reflect the rivalry between the opposition figure and the
state-supported one as in the 1994 NU congress. It instead merely reflected the rivalry between
two politicians which vied for the NU support for their political gain during the next five
years.
103
This battle revealed how profound their exposure to political affairs was during the
earlier five years. Both camps seemed to playa political game skillfully. Therefore, the
congress was unsurprisingly surrounded by allegations of both slander and vote buying.
Hasyim's triumph has shocked not only Abdurrahman but numerons senior kyai
supporting him as well. They began to feel that their words, which until then "commanded
obedience," seemed to be no longer heeded.
104
When it became clear that their candidates were
about to fail to gamer sufficient support in the congress, some respected kyai ordered
Abdurrahman to set up a rival NU organization. "We, the kyai, leave it fully to Gus Our
103 "Pertarungan Dua Kiai Politik," Forum Keadilan, No. 31, December 5, 2004, p. 13-14.
104 "When Senior Kiai Are No Longer Heeded," Tempo, December 13, 2004, p. 20.
103
(Abdurrahman) to set up a correct PBNU," one kyai red a decision signed by 29 senior kyai. It
was not clear what ''to set up a correct PBNU" really meant.
For Abdurrahman, this was clear enough. After his failure to assume the Syuriah post
and prevent Hasyim's re-election, he had resolved to keep control of the PBNU offices. The
PBNU office was built during Abdurrahman's presidency when PBNU was under Hasyim
leadership. Abdurrahman did not simply seek to occupy the building, but he also warned
Hasyim that he would form a contending PBNU management. Apparently, Abdurrahman was
very serious about his plan to form the alternative PBNU. He said that there would be two
PBNUs at the same address. Both would use the same building, facilities, and name. But the
identifying numbers on their correspondence would be different.
IOS
Hasyim's response seemed to be caIrn. He said that contending organizations never
last long. He gave the example of his experience with kyai Sahal and kyai TIyas Ruchiyat in
defending Abdurrahman against the Abu Hasan camp, which had formed a rival NU
organization after the 1994 NU congress at Cipasung, Sukabumi. Because they had sided with
Abdurrahman, who did not have President Suharto's support, they were repeatedly summoned
by police.
I06
Despite his deep disappointment, however, finally Abdurrahman did not continue
his plan. He came to realize that he would have lost much wider respect not only from the NU
supporters but also from other Indonesians people should he continue his plan. While the
emergence of the rival NU organization appeared to subside, the bitter rivalry between
Abdurrahman and Hasyim seemed to continue, however.
After Abdurrahman's defeat in the NU congress, his charisma would be put to the test
again during the PKB's congress on April 16-18, 2005 in Semarang, Central Java The PKB
lOS "Benang Kusnt Konflik NU," Gatra, December 18, 2004, p. 34-37.
106 ''Kok Sekarang Gus Dur Man Bikin Tandingan," Farum Keadilan, No. 31, December 5, 2004, p. 19.
104
congress saw a showdown between Abdurrahman's two rival nephews: Abdurrahman protestor
Syaifullah Yusuf and his supporter Muhaimin Iskandar. On the one hand, Syaifullah, the
chainnan of the NU youth wing Ansor and the State Minister for the Development of
Disadvantaged Regions, received support from senior NU kyai, including those who backed
Abdurrahman in the NU congress. On the other hand, Muhaimin, the deputy DPR speaker,
along with two other candidates, Mahfud and AIi Masykur Musa, was backed by Abdurrahman.
Abdurrahman had also rejected Syaifullah's bid. When pressure from numerous kyai had
mounted for Abdurrahman to let Syaifullah vie for the PKB leadership, he then allowed
Syaifullah to join the race under one condition: he had to qnit the Cabinet and relinquish his top
job in the Ansor Youth Organization should he be elected PKB leader.
Syaifullah, along with AIwi Shihab, was dismissed as the party's secretary-general
(and chainnan respectively) after he took up a ministerial post under President SBY's Cabinet.
The official reason behind this ban was that the party would ban its executives from serving as
government officials to prevent conflict of interests and abuse of power. Many people believe,
however, they were suspended because President SBY appointed them without Abdurrahman's
approval, meaning that President SBY was deemed trespassing his authority within the PKB.
Therefore, Alwi and Syaifullah were suing the party's central board over the suspensions,
which they said have violated the party's statutes. They argued that the party's statutes do not
say anything about executives holding dual positions. They recalled that during Abdurrahman's
presidency, many senior PKB executives simultaneously served as ministers, such as Alwi,
Mahfud, AS Hikam, and Khofifah.
While the lawsuit was still undergoing, Syaifullah ran for the PKB chainnanship.
S yai fullah' s influence within the party should not be underestimated. In an extraordinary PKB
105
congress in January 2002, he looked certain to win the leadership, with a majority backing from
regional branches and senior kyai. However, Abdurrahman's risky end-game strategy of
threatening to quit ifhis rebellious nephew was elected paid off, and the meeting chose
Abdurrahman's close aide Alwi Shihab, after senior kyai backed down from confrontation with
their chief patron. However, friends are not friends forever, and on October 2004, Alwi was
suspended from his post after joining SBY's Cabinet along with Syaifullah.
Similar to the meeting procedures in the NU congress, the PKB standing orders also
required all candidates for the party's leadership to receive approval of the elected chairman of
the party's powerful board of advisor (Dewan Syuro). Therefore, Syaifullah teamed up with a
little-known kyai and co-founder of the PKB Ma'ruf Amin as the candidate for Dewan Syuro
chainnanship. The pair received strong support from a number of senior kyai and many
delegates from the PKB strongholds ofCentrai and East Java.107
Fearing that Abdurrahman would lose face as happened in the earlier NU congress,
his supporters made many efforts to guarantee his success. Abdurrahman was then elected
Dewan Syuro chainnan when the congress was still in the initial phase and without the process
of nomination. When the congress was still undergoing, the meeting chair and Abdurrahman
supporter, Misbach Hidayat, unilaterally pounded the gavel deciding Abdurrahman as the
elected Dewan Syuro chainnan.
This decision triggered protests not only from the Syaifullah and Ma'ruf pair as well
as their supporters, but also from numerous senior kyai and senior party executives such as AS.
Hikam, Khofifah, and the East Java PKB Chairman, Choirul Anam. After Syaifullah withdrew
his candidacy, the East and Central Java regional executive boards also took leave. They
107 "Wahid's Way," Tempo, April 25, 2005, p. 24-25.
106
claimed that they were accompanied by several other regions and 256 out of 465 branches.
Hikam even appealed to the congress participants to boycott the continuing congress, because
"This congress has been flawed." He said, "Many congress regulations have been tinkered with
to achieve personal goals."I08
While the continuing congress elected Abdurrahman loyalist nephew Muhaimin as the
executive chairman without any substantial contender, AIwi and Syaifullah considered the
result ofthe congress was not legitimate. They even still considered themselves the legitimate
chairman and general secretary of the PKB. The following day after the Muhairnin election,
numerous senior kyai asked them to convene another congress. Four months after the Semarang
congress, another PKB congress was held early in October 2005 in Surabaya, East Java. On this
congress, the East Java PKB chairman, Choirul Anam won the executive PKB party and senior
kyai Abdurrahman Chudori won the powerful Dewan Syuro chairman. Meanwhile, Alwi and
Syaifullah seemed to have abandoned their bitter conflict, realizing that their prolonged
complicity in the PKB conflict would not only jeopardize their own political career, but also
backfire for the government as if they were ordered to interfere in the party conflict.
The emergence of two PKBs in 2005 illustrated further decline of Abdurrahman's
charisma within the NU community after his defeat in the NU congress. When he lost in the
NU congress, he was still backed by numerous influential kyai. When the PKB split into two
factions, however, he also lost most support from those kyai who supported him during the NU
congress. Compounded with his bitter conflict with the current PBNU, it would be no wonder if
the PKB will lose significant votes in the 2009 elections.
108 "Chaos Awakened," Tempo, May 2,2005, p. 29.
107
While the NU and PKB congresses left indelible marks in the split within the NU
community, the leadership change within the Muharnrnadiyah community was marked by less
conflict. Arnien's defeat in the first round presidential election led him and his supporters in the
PAN to blame the Muharnrnadiyah for its ambiguous support. He noted that it was the
Muharnrnadiyah halfhearted endorsement that he could not secure the support of the whole 30
millions of its members and supporters. The Muharnrnadiyah leaders replied that it was the
PAN's responsibility to have Arnien win in the race, since it was his main political vehicle, not
the Muharnrnadiyah. They said that the Muharnrnadiyah was only endorsing him when the
PAN perfonnance in the parliamentary election was poor.
There was also a growing resentment within the Muharnrnadiyah community over the
PAN. Many Muharnrnadiyah leaders, particularly the youth generation, felt that the PAN had
failed to accommodate the aspiration ofMuharnrnadiyah members, despite the fact that PAN
was led by fonner Muharnrnadiyah chairman Arnien. They gave some examples that prior to
the 2004 parliamentary election, many Muharnrnadiyah youth cadres were put in the unlikely-
winning-numbers of the PAN candidate list. They also said that the decision-making process
within the PAN was dominated by a non-Muharnrnadiyah faction, meaning that they would not
do any favor for the Muharnrnadiyah aspiration.
The Muharnrnadiyah youth leaders began to discuss how to solve such a problem.
Through a marathon discussion, they came up with three alternative steps. The Muharnrnadiyah
leaders should take over the PAN leadership in its congress scheduled to take place on April
2005 in Semarang, a week before the PKB congress. The Muharnrnadiyah leaders could also
endorse the likely-win faction in the congress and then share the new PAN leadership. Ifboth
108
choices had failed, the Muhammadiyah leaders could initiate the establishment of new party
representing the Muharnmadiyah aspiration.
When the Muharnmadiyah held its national meeting (Tanwir) in Mataram, West Nusa
Tenggara, on December 2004, a number of youth Muhammadiyah activists began to sound the
plan to set up a new party. The final decision concerning this issue was that
"The Tanwir could apprehend the emerging aspiration from the Muhammadiyah members,
particularly the youth Muhammadiyah generation, to establish a new political party. Tanwir
perceived that this idea should be reviewed carefully, since the establishment of a new political
party should be based on a deep consideration, not disappointment nor merely lust for power.
Therefore, Tanwir authorized the youth Muhammadiyah generation to follow up and review this
idea further, while taking the Muhanunadiyah principles into account and without plunging the
Muhannnadiyah into practical politicS."I09
While they began discussing the possibility to establish a new political party, in the
months leading to the PAN congress, the Muhammadiyah circle concluded that the most likely
possible candidate to take over the PAN leadership was the Muharnmadiyah deputy chainnan
Din Syamsuddin. He matched Amien's criteria needed to lead the PAN. While Amien holds his
Ph.D. from Chicago University, Din from UCLA. Both were also well known for their Islamic
knowledge. Din was not only supported by the Muhammadiyah circle, but initially some
provincial boards of PAN supported him as well. When the East Java PAN provincial board
held a meeting to gamer support for Din, 19 out of 33 provincial boards were reported to
support him. It was reported that Din agreed to run for the PAN chainnanship under two
conditions: he had to be elected unanimously and Amien should invite him to run. Despite the
remarkable support from 19 provincial boards, however, no one could assure him that all
participants would elect him in the upcoming PAN congress, since some other contenders had
109 Surat Keputusan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah No. 116/2004 tentang Tanfidz Keputusan Tanwir
Muharnmadiyah Tahun 1425 Hl2004 M, Lampiran No.5 tentang Rekomendasi Tanwir III Muhammadiyah 2004.
109
also nominated themselves such as Fuad Bawazier, an MP from the PAN; Hatta Rajasa, the
minister of transportation under the SBY cabinet; and Sutrisno Bachir, a businessman.
Even more complicated was the second condition: Amien's invitation. Din's relation
with Amien had been up and down. Since early in the 1990s, their relation had been strained
when Amien was in the forefront of opposition against the Suharto regime while Din was a
high rank official of Suharto' s political vehicle Golkar. During the campaign for the 2004
presidential election, however, Din established a campaign body working to garner support for
Amien from the Muhammadiyah community. Ahead to the PAN congress, Amien simply
mentioned that Din would be a good candidate without explicitly inviting him to advance.
Before the PAN congress started, Din retreated from the race. He seemed to
unwillingly risk his chance in the PAN congress, while he was the most possible winning
candidate in the Muhammadiyah congress scheduled to take place three months later. Without
Din in the race, the remaining strong candidates were Fuad, Hatta, and Sutrisno. Should these
three candidates continue to run, Fuad would be likely the wiuner since he was reported to
secure most support from the delegates by vote-buying. Fuad is the former Director General of
Taxation and minister of finance during the Suharto era.
In order to increase the support for Sutrisno, Amien was reported to ask Hatta to
withdraw his candidacy warning that he "could very well call President SBY asking him to pull
Hatta from the cabinet" should Hatta forge ahead.
110
Amien seemed to fear that Fuad would
succeed him as the PAN Chairman. It was reported that the more adroit Fuad's maneuvers, the
clearer Amien's support for Sutrisno.1t was as if Amien would not let go of PAN to be led by
Fuad; it would be very disappointing should the PAN, which was established to strive for
110 "Amien's Choice," Tempo, April 18, 2005, p. 22.
110
reform and rectifY the remnants of the New Order authoritarianism, be led by a former minister
during the New Order era. The PAN congress eventually elected Sutrisno the PAN Chairman,
while Amien was elected chairman of the symbolic advisory board.
Sutrisno's election into the PAN leadership did not abate the resentment within
Muhammadiyah circles. Although Sutrisno sought to incorporate some youth Muhammadiyah
activists in the PAN leadership, however, it was perceived too little. Despite Sutrisno's claims
that he was born in the Muhammadiyah family, however, he was also deemed to have no record
of involvement in the Muhammadiyah leadership. Therefore, some youth Muhammadiyah
activists continued their efforts to establish a new political party.
Ahead to the Muhammadiyah congress scheduled to take place in Malang, East Java
on July 3-8, 2005, the rift between Amien and Muhammadiyah intensified. Amien was reported
trying to prevent Din's election for the Muhammadiyah chairmanship. Amien's biggest concern
was that Din would use the Muhammadiyah as a political vehicle in the upcoming 2009
presidential election, and that would contradict the PAN's interest. Many believed that Amien
toured several regional and local Muhammadiyah branches campaigning that those
Muhammadiyah elites who were involved in the Bank Persyarikatan affairs were improper to
re-nominate themselves in the congress. I I I During the congress, Amien held a number of
meetings to garner support from provincial and local branches. However, the impact of his
campaign was very limited, due largely to the election procedures deciding that the delegates
t t t In 2002, the Muharnmadiyah took over the Bank Swansarindo through acquisition aod then renamed it
to the Bank Persyarikatao. While it has no direct link with the Bank, however, seven figures of the organization
became its shareholders. Because ofits decline in the bank's solvency (its capital adequacy rstion [CAR] dropped
to less thao 8 % required by the centrsl Bank Indonesia), the Bank was included by the BI in the special
monitoring unit. Should it failed to solve the problem, the BI could freeze the Bank's operstion. While
Muhammadiyah leaders sought to solve the problem, including through seversl political lobbies, Amien made use
the affair as his weapon to prevent the re-nomination of those seven figures who was involved in the Bank affairs,
including Din. See "When Muharnmadiyah Bears the Brunt," Tempo, Jaouary 3, 2005, p. 70-71.
111
would elect 13 members of the executive appointment committee, instead of one figure as the
chairman. The election procedures within Muhammadiyah seem to automatically delimit the
possibility of blocking a certain name from the candidacy. 112
Amien's campaign had larger impact only in the Tanwir session held-one day before
the congress-to select 39 names. The Tanwir was attended by 159 delegates consisting of
members of the central board, 4 delegates from each provincial board, and two from each
autonomous organization. At the Tanwir, Din's name came in third, just after Haedar Nashir
(general secretary) and Rosyad Sholeh (one of deputy chairman). When Amien came to realize
that Din's popularity was unstoppable on the local level, he turned his campaign from blocking
Din's candidacy to promoting some candidates which were supposedly under his control,
including the minister of education under the SBY's cabinet, Bambang Sudibyo, former
minister of education under Abdurrahman's cabinet, Yahya Muhaimin, and the chairman of
Central Java Muhammadiyah provincial board, Dahlan Rais, himself Amien's younger brother.
In the congress, however, Din's popularity was apparently unstoppable. In the
election session, which was attended by all nearly 2000 delegates (all Tanwir delegates
combined with two delegates from each district leadership board and one delegates from each
sub-district leadership board), Din won the most votes with 1718, Haedar won 1374 votes,
Muhammad Muqoddas 1285, Malik Fajar 1277, Yunahar Ilyas 1264, and Rosyad Sholeh 1209.
112 Unlike in the NU, the election process in the Mubamrnadiyah is under the authority of the election
committee which is appointed by the central board severnl months before the congress. Its main task were (I)
distnouting nomination forms to the provincial boards and all autonomous organizations. They are asked to
nominate 13 candidate names. (2) The committee then review all requirements, including administmtive and
substantive ones (among others are ID number, 5-year long membership). (3) The committee also presides the
election session, both in the Tanwir to elect 39 names out of all candidates and in the congress to elect the 13-
member executive appointment committee out of39 names. Those 13 names then select the new chairman and
other positions in the central board ofMubammadiyah.
112
Dahlan came in seventh with 1135 votes, whereas Bambang came in eleventh with 881 votes.
Meanwhile, Yahya failed to secure sufficient votes to advance in the big thirteen.
The fact that Din came in third in the first round but won in the second round
indicated two different things. On the one hand, the Bank Persyarikatan affairs had larger
impact in a more elite circle (the Tanwir delegates were mostly from the provincial boards)
whose exposures to such an affair were more profound. On the other hand, Din's popularity in
grass-root level was indeed irresistible. Din is a figure with plenty of public exposure outside of
Muhanunadiyah. His popularity is also a result of his frequent visits to the provincial and local
boards since he had served as the chairman of the Muharnmadiyah youth movement (1989-
1993). It was not surprising that at the 2000 Muhanunadiyah congress he already came in
second in the election after the elected-chairman Syafii Maari
This was not the end ofthe game, however. The chairman would be elected through
the meeting of those 13 names, and there is no rule requiring the one with the most votes must
become the chairman. Din's supporters were perplexed by the composition of those 13 people:
Din secured only two votes while others were controlled by the Jogjakarta camp which was at
odds with him. His supporters from Jakarta camp began fearing Din's slim chance. Therefore,
they held a press conference urging the 13-member committee to choose the candidate with the
most votes as the chairman. This action disappointed the members of the committee, accusing
them which interfered with the committee's prerogative rights. Many Muhanunadiyah activists
began to fear that the old-rivalry between the Jakarta and Jogjakarta camps, which had abated
during previously five years since the 2000 congress in Jakarta, would resurface. I 13
III Since the 1980s, the Jakarta camps bad been comprised many politicians, while the Jogjakarta camp
had been comprised many ideologists and administrators figures.
113
This concern did not materialize, however. Rosyad Sholeh, the election committee
head for the 45
th
Muhammadiyah congress announced after three hours meeting that the 13-
member committee unanimously elected Din the new chairman of the PP Muhammadiyah for
the 2005-2010 period. Rosyad divulged that Din was elected without voting. Rosyad also
described the meeting as one full of smiles, good cheer, and benevolent feelings.
1
14 Aware of
Din's remarkable popularity in grass-root level, they appeared to avoid confronting the
majority's choices. It seemed that those 13 people were self-consciously unwilling to push their
interests to the point of risking imminent conflict on a scale so deep as to endanger the future of
their beloved organization. The fear of further rift between Amien and the Muhammadiyah was
also minimized by Din himself when in his speech during the closing ceremony he unilaterally
asked Amien and Syafii to sit on the newly-formed advisory council.
1
15
While major Islamic organizations were by far deeply involved in the political
struggle, it is also important to study current political development within the Muhammadiyah
and NU and how they approach the upcoming 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections.
F. Muslims' Approaching the 2009 Election
One year from the 2009 elections, some important features regarding Muslim political
development are worth examining. First is the further relationship between the NU and
Muhammadiyah on the one hand with political parties on the other. The 2009 election will
likely see the emergence of two new political parties linked to the NU and Muhammadiyah:
The Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama (pKNU-Ulama National Awakening Party) and the
114 "Mufakat di Lantai Dna," Gmra, July 16, 2005, p. 42.
II' The composition of the advisory council for the time being has yet to be discussed by the 13-memher
executive appointment committee. Din was also aware that he ought to have their approval before aonouncing his
invitation. Considering the necessity of Din's move in the public eyes to minimize. the ensuing conflict, however,
no objection raised from one of the 13 people.
114
Partai Matahari Bangsa (pMB-National Sun Party). While they are now stiIl undergoing
verification, they are likely to be eligible for the polls.
PKNU is the transfonnation of the PKB resulting from the Surabaya congress whose
establishment was supported by a faction opposing the results of the PKB Semarang congress
which elected Abdurrahman Wahid and his nephew Muhaimin Iskandar. After inflicted in a
long, bitter fight with the PKB-Ied by Muhaimin, the conflict ended when early in the 2006 the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Muhaimin-Abdurrahman camp. The loss of the Surabaya
PKB-congress faction means it could not contest the 2009 elections unless it changed its name
and party attributes. The newly found PKNU is now led by Choirul Anam.
The PKNU establishment did not receive any specific response from the NU chairman
Hasyim Muzadi. However, its estahlishment unwittingly benefited Hasyim in his rivalry with
Abdurrahman, as it will likely decrease the PKB's showing in the 2009 elections and thus
reduce Abdurrahman's charisma within the NU community. Responding to the existence of
several political parties claiming themselves to be born by the NU, Hasyim in his speech during
the commemoration of the NU 82
nd
anniversary in Jakarta, on February 3, 2008, said that they
will not necessarily be supported by the NU members unless they pay sufficient attention to
fight for the NU aspirations. During the commemoration, the PPP, PKB and PKNU seemed to
vie for the NU sympathy. Hasyim pointed out that the party which wiIl likely be supported by
NU members in the 2009 election is one that apparently fights for their aspirations. Hasyim
also firmly rejected to drive the NU members to support certain political party. I 16
Meanwhile, the PMB was resulted from the long discussion of a number of
Muhanunadiyah youth activists. The party is now headed by Imam Addaraqutni, former
116 Interview with Hasyim Muzadi on January 10, 2008 in Jakarta.
115
chairman of Muhammadiyah youth movement and former MP from the PAN (1999-2004).
Meanwhile, Ahmad Rofiq, a former chairman ofMuhammadiyah Students Association (lMM),
now serves as the general secretary. The PMB, declared in Jogjakarta on December 11,2007,
was aimed to accommodate the aspirations ofMubammadiyah, which they claimed were left
unheeded by the PAN under the leadership of Sutrisno Bachir. Seeing the PAN's pluralist
brand was somewhat problematic for certain Muhammadiyah followers, the PMB therefore
uses Islam as its ideological base. Fearing the conservative image for their new party, however,
the Islam that the PMB will promote is a progressive, substantive one.
While many PMB's supporters have been insisting the close relationship between this
new political party with the Muhammadiyah, the Muharnmadiyah chairman Din Syarnsuddin
has said that his organization has no connection with the PMB, even though it was established
by its young activists. When several PMB leaders met him, Din pointed out that the
Muharnmadiyah's stance as social-religious organization that eschews practical politics should
be maintained. "The cadres ofMuharnmadiyah and political parties based on Muhammadiyah
mass do not need to plunge the organization into politics," he warned. 1 17
Din's reluctance to acknowledge the PMB's claim to be the proper party for the
Muhammadiyah members is understandable. The PMB's prospect in the 2009 election is
palpably slim and less rewarding. The 2009 elections will see for the first time a head-to-head
fight between two parties vying for a similar electorate in the modernist camp, meaning that
both have to share support from the Muharnmadiyah followers. Another disincentive for the
PMB is that it is supported in local level by mostly the young Muharnmadiyah activists whose
political experiences and influences are limited, while the PAN has secured support from more
117 "Sikap Mubammadiyah dalam PoUtik Praktis," Kompas, February 21, 2008.
116
senior ones. Therefore, according to an able observer on Indonesian Islam Mitsuo Nakamura,
such a party will be smaller than the present PAN in terms of the number of cadres and the
scale of popular support. Moreover,
"If the idea behind such a move is only to produce a political arm of the Muhammadiyah in the
sense of expressing the political aspirations of the Muhammadiyah, the attempt is likely to face
an extreme difficulty. That is the impossibility of formulating an integrated program expressing
political aspirations of the Muhammadiyah members. This derives from the simple fact that the
Muhammadiyah is not a political organization, and there has been, is and will be a variety of
political orientations within the organization. In this regard, the Muhammadiyah has been, is
and is likely to be larger and more heterogeneous than the PAN or any its substitution.,,118
In this regard, Din's reluctance to welcome warmly the PMB's establishment thus is
also plausible. The poor performance of the PMB will jeopardize Din's chance ifhe eyes the
presidential or vice-presidential bid in the 2009 presidential election, since it will likely
diminish the Muhamrnadiyab grandeur claiming to represent nearly 25 or 30 millions people.
In addition to the relationship between the NU and Muhammadiyah with new political
parties, it is also important to examine the role of the NU and Muhammadiyah in the regional
head elections. Tantamount to the direct presidential election in 2004, local head (that is,
governors and mayors) direct elections have also been implemented since June 1,2005.
Whereas the candidates for local head should be nominated by a political party or coalition of
several political parties, however, they could nominate candidates either from within their
political parties or from outside. In this regard, the local leaders of the NU and Muhammadiyab
in the provincial and local boards are significant, since they are frequently recruited by political
parties in the direct local head election in order to gamer extra votes.
In the Muhamrnadiyah camp, a number of its cadres were reported to contest in the
local head elections. However, these were not big deals for the Muhammadiyah, since they
were for the time being no longer holding any executive position in the organization. During
1\8 Nakamura, "Mubammadiyah Faces the Challenge of Democracy," 2005, p. 221.
117
the local head election, they already served in the political party leaderships. In the Riau
province, for instance, the current vice-governor Wan Abu Bakar is fonner chainnan of
Muhammadiyah youth movement provincial board ofRiau. However, he is now serving as the
chainnan ofPPP provincial board. In the upcoming local head election expected to take place
at the end of this year, he is reported to contest for the governor position, despite the fact that
he has not yet secured both the PPP support and his running mate. Another example is current
mayor in Bojonegoro district of East Java, Suyoto. He is fonner deputy chainnan of the central
board ofMuhammadiyah youth movement. During the election in November 2007, however,
he had been the chainnan of the PAN provincial board of East Java.
Unlike the Muhammadiyah's insignificant participation, the NU's involvement in the
local head election is even worth worrying.
1
19 A number of the NU leaders, mostly in the NU
heartland of East and Central Java provinces, were nominated in the local head elections, either
for vice-governor or mayor and deputy mayor. Interestingly, their bids have been different from
the candidates nominated by the PKB, meaning that the old conflict between Hasyim and
Abdurrahrnan as well as the NU and the PKB remained within the traditionalist community.
The current local head election for govemors of East and Central Java provinces
provide the strong indication for the intensifying rift between them.
120
In Central Java local head
election scheduled to take place on June 22,2008, the current chainnan ofNU provincial board
Mohammad Adnan accepted to be the mnning mate of the Central Java Golkar chainnan
Bambang Sadono. Meanwhile, the PKB has nominated fonner Central Java military commander
Agus Suyitno and current Wonosobo mayor Kholiq Arlef for the governor and vice-governor
candidates. Another example is the East Java local head election scheduled to take place on July
119 Interview with AS. Hikamon January 10, 2008 in Jakarta.
120 ''Makin Banyak Pengurus NU TeJjun ke Politik Praktis," Kompas, February 20, 2008.
118
23, 2008. The current NU regional chainnan Ali Maschan Musa accepted to be the running mate
for Golkar governor candidate, Soenmjo. Meanwhile, the PKB has also nominated the current
Mojokerto mayor Achmady as the candidate for East Java governor. Complicated even matter,
Abdurralunan's rebellious nephew Syaifullah was nominated by the PAN to be the running mate
of the PD governor candidate Soekarwo, while the chairwoman of the central board of the
Muslimat (women wing of) NU, Khofifah, was nominated by PPP to be governor candidate.
Similarly alarming conflict has been in the West Java local head election scheduled to take place
on April 13, 2008.
121
The West Java NU board has declared its support for the Danny Setiawan-
Iwan Sulanjana pair, which was nominated by the Golkar and PD, while forbidding its members
from choosing other pairs. Meanwhile, the PKB has also declared its support for the Agum
Gumelar-Nu'man Abdul Hakim pair, which was nominated by the PDI-P and PPP. These
examples of political competition between the PKB and the NU might not only generate
confusion within their mernbers in the same traditionalist community but consequentially also
diminish their own chances in the local head elections.
In addition to the relationship between the Muslim organizations and political parties
and the ensuing conflict between them, it is also important to foresee the key potential
candidates for the 2009 presidential election and the chances of the Muharmnadiyah and NU
leaders to play significant roles. While much of the presidential election will be determined by
the preceding parliamentary election, there are a number of presidential hopefuls: President
SBY, former President Megawati, former President Abdurrahman, Vice-President JusufKalla
(the chainnan of Golkar), Gen. (ret.) Wiranto (the chainnan of new Hanura Party), Let. Gen.
(ret.) Sutiyoso (former governor of Jakarta), and Sultan Hamengku Buwono X.
121 "PBNU Cerna. Terhadap Nasib NU," Kompas Online, February 18, 2008, see
http://www.kompas.comlread.php?cnt=.xm1.2008.02.18.23431299&Channe!=1&rnn=l&idx=!
119
President SBY, while reported to announce his re-nomination six month before the
2009 presidential election, is believed to be re-nominated by the PD. According to most
opinion polls SBY by far remains the most popular candidate, despite the drastic decline
compared to the early months of his presidency. The decline is largely due to the poor
performance of his administration. Now that the absent of new powerful candidates in the race,
SBY's chance of at least reaching the runoff highly likely remains high.
Megawati was officially re-nominated by the PDI-P. While SBY's popularity is
declining, according to most opinion polls, Megawati's popularity is ominously increasing,
although did not yet surpass that ofSBY. Aware of her failure during the 2004 election, she has
now increasingly become pro-active to garner more support for her candidacy. She was
frequently reported to visit her constituents in the remote provinces and districts. She has also
concurrently begun criticizing the failure of current govermnent, something which has been
absent in her long political career. If Megawati keep going on this right track, it seems that we
will highly likely see a rematch between her and the incumbent President SBY.
Along with Megawati, Sultan is considered to be the most likely comparable
contender for SBY in the 2009 presidential election. While he is now serving for the governor
of Jogjakarta, his popularity is believed to reach larger segments in Indonesian society,
particularly in predominant Javanese ethnicity. Unlike SBY and Megawati, his weakness is that
he is not yet supported by major political party, although a number of political parties, such as
the PAN and other smaller parties were reported to nominate him as the presidential candidate.
Wiranto is another candidate considered to have a fair chance to contest in the 2009
presidential election. While in the 2004 presidential election he was nominated by the Go1kar
party, to contest in the next presidential election he has established his own political vehicle the
120
Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura, the Party of People's Conscience) on December 2006.
However, according to most opinion polls, his party will gain only a small share in the 2009
parliamentary election. Without support of such strong political machinery as Golkar in the
2004 election, the chance of this man of action is predictably slim.
Sutiyoso, after finishing his second term as the Jakarta governor in 2007, has been
preparing to contest in the 2009 presidential election. To vie for public support, he began
presenting himself as a decisive, resolute leader which contrasts SBY's hesitant and indecisive
image in the public eyes. Even though he was reported to back the establishment of numerous
new political parties, however, his chance in the 2009 presidential election may even be
slimmer than that ofWiranto, since the chances of his newly-established political parties to
qualify the 2009 parliamentary election is also predictably small.
Abdurrahman also tried hard to join the presidential race. His PKB party had also
declared its strong support for his candidacy. His presidential ambition, however, is placed in
doubt since the election commission will likely re-issue health requirement for presidential and
vice-presidential candidates requiring good eyesight. Moreover, his PKB party is now
increasingly inflicted by acute internal conflict. Recently, Abdurrahman dismissed the PKB
chairman Muhaimin, whose loyalty has long been unquestionable, after Muhaimin was accused
of disloyalty and arranging the PKB extraordinary congress, which were strongly denied.
122
\22 Muhaimin is the third PKB chainnan fired from the post, after Matori and Alwi Shihab. Malori was
dismissed because he attended an MPR plenary session impeaching Gus Dur as the fourth president In 2001. After
beIng ousted from the party, Malori and his loyal supporters then established a splinter PKB faction, but did not
qualify to contest In the 2004 election. Alwi, along with Syaifullah, was fired In 2004 as PKB chairman after
accepting ministerial post In the SBY cabInet. After their contending PKB faction lost the case at the court, many
more PKB senior figures were dismissed, such as AS. Hikam and Khofifah. In 2007, three other senior PKB
executives were also dismissed. The PKB general secretary Lukman Edy was dismissed from his post In May
2007 after he was appoInted the ministerial post In the SBY cabInet replacIng Syaifu\lah Yusuf. On July 2007, two
PKB deputy general secretaries Eman Hermawan and HanifDhakiri were dismissed for disloyalty reason.
121
Another ambiguous presidential candidate is the Golkar chainnan and vice-president
JusufKalla. Although having the seemingly best political machinery in his hand, KaIla's
chance wiIl also be predictably slim. According to most opinion polls, his popularity is not
comparable to Megawati, let alone SBY. Another disincentive for his chance is the fact that he
comes from the outer Buginese ethnicity of South Sulawesi, not from the predominant Javanese
one. He is also contained in a difficult position to nominate himself while he is currently still
serving as the vice-president. Worse still, within his Golkar party, there are also many other
figures eyeing the presidential bid such as current DPR speaker Agung Laksono, former Golkar
chairman Akbar Tanjung, the current coordinating minister of social welfare Aburizal Bakrie,
and media tycoon Surya Paloh. Although many figures have emerged to contest, the Golkar
party decided to abolish the convention system to select the presidential candidate. Rather, the
Golkar candidate will be selected in a national coordination meeting and based on a national
survey. Therefore, the outcome is even more unlikely predictable.
The perennial black horse candidate, Amien Rais has also yet to signal his intension to
run for presidency. He was reported to contest for presidency provided his main political
vehicle the PAN could garner sufficient support for his candidacy, at least 15% in the 2009
parliamentary election and no younger candidates run for the post. In addition, his bid will also
reportedly depend on "the divine guidance" (petunjuk yang di atas). This ambiguous decision is
seemingly a result of his awareness that the 2009 presidential election will be an uphill battle
because in terms of organization, budget, and popularity, he has never really gotten off the
ground. He has an obvious political ambition. However, he is also perplexed by his doubt on
the PAN performance in the 2009 parliamentary election.
122
There are not too many potential vice-presidential candidates capable of attracting
extra supports. The majority of those who supposedly feel themselves attracting a broad base of
support usually opt to run for the presidency. Therefore, it is possible that some of the above-
mentioned presidential hopefuls, such as Sutiyoso and Sultan, in the last minutes, might be
willing to serve as vice-presidential candidates in order to gain a ticket in the race. The pairing
may depend on the results of the 2009 parliamentary election, as the larger parties will tend to
nominate its leader for the presidency and figures from smaller parties will tend to be the
running mates. However, the result of the 2004 presidential election, whose winner was
supported by a medium-sized party beating the pair supported by a coalition of major political
parties, mirrored the fact that there has been a certain degree of depreciation of the importance
of political parties in the presidential election. Although political parties remain important to
nominate the pairs of president and vice-president, however, personal image and popUlarity are
more important than party affiliation. It is thus plausible that some senior Golkar officials have
preemptively announced that the party will re-nominate the winning pair of SBY -Kalla in the
2009 presidential election, despite the fact that the Golkar will predictably gain more votes than
the SBY's PD in the upcoming parliamentary election.
As aforementioned above as well, there is a simple logic to presidential pairings; they
are mostly combinations formed from the following: Javanese-outer province; nationalist-Islam
or Islam-military. Therefore, it is highly likely that Hidayat Nur Wahid (the MPR speaker and
former PKS chairman), Suryadharma Ali (the PPP Chairman), Yusril Ihza Mahendra (former
PBB chairman), Hasyim Muzadi (the NU chairman), Din Syamsuddin (the Muhammadiyah
chairman), and Jimly Asshiddiqie (head of the Constitution Committee) will be the favored
running mates. Surprisingly, those names are considered to be the Muslim representatives. Out
123
of those names considered suitable for vice-presidency, four names are worth further
mentioning: Hidayat, Suryadharma, Hasyim, and Din. As the leaders of the large mass-based
Islamic organizations and political parties, they are considered the most suitable partners for
candidates who are backed by strong party machinery, or candidates from nationalist camp.
Since the 2004 presidential election, Hidayat was fervently supported by the PKS as
its presidential candidate. However, the party had earlier pledged not to nominate its candidate
unless it gained more than 20% of votes. Nor did Hidayat run for vice-presidency, since no
presidential candidate signaled any willingness to team up with him. Similar conditions
appeared to be re-applied by the PKS in nominating its presidential candidate in the 2009
presidential election, while waiting for bids from larger political parties to forge an alliance on
a nationalist-religious line. However, his weakness is his etlmicity, as most presidential
hopefuls are also ethnically Javanese.
Suryadharma Ali, the current Minister of Cooperatives and Small Medium Enterprises
in the SBY cabinet, has also yet to decide whether he will contest in the 2009 presidential
election. He signaled his political ambition when he, along with a number of senior PPP
executives, visited Megawati's residence on September 2007, a week after the PPP held a
national coordination meeting. To a large extent, Suryadharma resembled his predecessor
Harnzah Haz in terms of his lack of confidence and thus his leaning to place himself as a junior
partner in the political bargaining to form a pair in the 2009 presidential election. In response to
a question on his visit to Megawati's residence, he replied that his PPP and Megawati's PDI-P
has been maintaining close ties during the New Order era and the Reform era. He went on to
say that it was not by accident that Megawati took Harnzah to be vice president between 2001
and 2004. However, he immediately dismissed the image that the PPP is merely attracted to
124
forge an alliance with the PDI-P. "What we are doing now is enhancing friendship and strategic
cooperation with all parties and building a common understanding on serious problems the
. . f:' "h 'd 123
nation IS acmg, e once Sal
Many wonder whether Hasyim will run in the 2009 election either as presidential or
vice-presidential candidate, since his pairing with Megawati was defeated in the 2004 runoff.
Moreover, a day before the election of the NU chairman in the 2004 NU congress, he, along
with his rival Masdar, has signed a contract requiring that he will not drag the NU in political
activities. The contract also mentioned that he will not accept nominations for political
positions, whether legislative or executive.
124
Will he comply with the contract? Anything
could happen. Many instances indicated the opposite. Although the chairman of East Java NU
provincial board Ali Maschan has signed a similar contract before his election, he eventIially
could not help accepting to be the running mate of the Golkar governor candidate Soernujo in
the 2008 local head election. So did the chairman of Central Java NU provincial board
Mohanunad Adnan in the 2008 Central Java local head election. Both were simply suspended
temporarily from their position during the election process. Hasyim could similarly do so, if
there is an interesting bid for him. The fact that he defeated Abdurrahman's camp in the 2004
NU congress indicated that Hasyim took control of the NU structIirally and organizationally.
A comparably new comer in national politics to Hidayat and Hasyim, Din
Syamsuddin is considered to have a fair chance in the 2009 presidential election. His ascension
in the Muhanunadiyah chairmaI1Ship in its 2005 congress despite Amien's opposition indicated
his considerable popularity within the organization. The growing demands in Indonesia for
regeneration of the leadership from old figures to new and younger ones seemed also to benefit
123 "PPP Maintaining Decades of Close Ties with PDI-P," The Jakarta Post, September 24, 2007.
124 ''Paper Promises," Tempo, December 13,2004, p. 16-17.
125
him. Elected as chairman in the 2005 Muhammadiyah congress, Din has taken a different
approach in his observation of the Muhammadiyah-political party relationship. Unlike former
Mnhammadiyah chairmans Amien and Syafii Maarifwhich conformed the Mnhammadiyah's
stance to keep equal distance from all political parties, Din is positioning Mnhammadiyah at an
equal propinquity with them. Therefore, he has not been reluctant to develop a cordial
relationship with major political parties. Early in 2006 he was intensely involved in the
establishment of Baitul Mus1imin Indonesia, an Islamic-organizational wing of the secular,
nationalist POI-Po He was also frequently invited to deliver his remarks in the PAN national
assembly. Similarly, he invited President SBY to deliver his speech in the 2007
Mnhammadiyah annual national meeting (Tanwir) in Jogjakarta. In so doing, Din seemed to
maintain all possibility for his political benefit in the 2009 presidential election.
These moves surely raised big question marks within the Mnhammadiyah community,
as it has been uncommon to see such a blunt political ambition within the Mnhammadiyah
tradition. However, Din has officially dismissed speculation that his ties with those political
parties have led him to being nominated as a running mate in the 2009 presidential election. "I
have never been requested by PDI-P or Megawati to be the party's vice presidential candidate
... It's only a misunderstanding which has been widely reported in the media," he once said.
125
Sure, he has to rhetorically say so, because he has also signed a political contract before his
election as the chairman in the 2005 Mnhammadiyah congress.
126
By far, Din seemed officially to honor the contract. When a survey even said he had
the opportunity to run for the vice presidential post, Din replied he would not be affected by
125 "Muhammadiyah Sees Party Equally: Din," The Jakana Post, June 4, 2007. The PDI-P will announce
Megawati's partner in the 2009 presidential election in its national coordination meeting expected to take place on
November 2008 in Surakarta, Central Java.
12' "MuhammadiyahMencoba Lari darlPolitik," Forum Keadilan, No. 12, July 17, 2005, p. 88-89.
126
such public opinion. In response to questions on his readiness to participate in the 2009
presidential election, he instead reaffirmed that it was time to enjoy his chairmanship in
Muhammadiyah. "It is important to know that I have not yet thought of being active in joining
government affairs," he said.
127
While he did not seemingly diminish his own chance in the
upcoming presidential election, Din pointed out that he himself had yet to make a decision on
whether he would participate in the 2009 general election. According to him now was not the
right time for him to respond to issues on his nomination for presidential pOSt.1
28
It is still too early to predict who will win in the 2009 presidential election, since even
the pairing has yet to be forged to contest in the race. However, it is almost certain that Muslim
leaders will be once again significant factors in the overall 2009 presidential election.
G. Conclusion
This chapter by and large indicates that Muslim civil society organizations in
Indonesia have been highly diverse in composition, resource endowment, and goals; they are
arenas of power, struggle, cooperation, and contestation. The composition and dynamics of
these civil society organizations have altered dramatically over time in Indonesia, and more
change is in sight. While in the previous era the diverging feature of Muslim civil society
organizations had embodied the difference between the Hegelian and Tocquevillian
frameworks, the post-New Order regime reveals the resembling feature of both the modernist
and traditionalist camps in term of their relationship with the state and political society alike.
The interaction between the state and Muslim civil society organizations in post-
Suharto Indonesia has not been necessarily confrontational. Rather, there is much overlap
between Muslim civil society organizations on the one hand and political society and the state
127 ''Din Syamsuddin yet to Decide Whether to Run for Presidency," Antara News, October 29, 2007.
12. Interview with M. Din Syamsuddin on January 9, 2008 in Jakarta.
127
on the other; in different degrees, the boundary separating them has been porous. Moreover, the
development ofMusIim civil society organizations has not been necessarily detrimental to the
development of political society. There was much synergy between them. For instances, the
NU and Muhammadiyah, in a different degree, were instrumentals to the establishment of the
PKB and the PAN. The representatives of the NU and Muhammadiyah have also been
incorporated in every cabinet of post-New Order administrations. Several leaders of those
Islamic organizations also took part in the 2004 presidential elections as candidates of both
presidency and vice-presidency. Several local leaders of both organizations took part in local
head elections (pilkada).
The politics of post-Suharto Indonesia has also been marked by no single dominant
party, volatile coalitions and political alliances, and power-sharing arrangements constituting
the post-New Order administrations. These power-sharing arrangements surely incorpomted
major political powers whose legitimacy was necessary for the resilience of those governments
vis-a.-vis political opposition in the parliament and civil society alike. In this regard, the post-
Suharto cabinets incorpomted not only the representatives of major political parties, but also
such Muslim civil society organizations as the NU and Muhammadiyah. Suffice to say that,
based on the above-mentioned explanation, the Muhammadiyah and NU organizations will
continue to play significant roles not only in the Indonesia's political development, but also in
many other areas to foster the democratization process.
128
CHAPTER IV
MUSLIM CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIZATION
A. Introduction
In the course of the last ten years or more, the political landscape of Indonesia, the
world's most populous Muslim country, has been transformed almost beyond recognition. In
May 1998, Indonesia still had a highly centralized authoritarian regime. From 1999 on,
however, Indonesia has staged a series of free, fair and extremely peaceful elections for the
country's legislature and - for the frrst time in 2004 - president and had several rotations of
government. Indonesians now enjoy extensive political freedoms as numerous political parties,
among them Islamic, compete freely for popular support. In brief, Indonesia has made in a
short time a remarkable transition from an authoritarian to a democratic political system. This
transition, surely, has not been risk-free. Many people initially seemed to be pessimistic that the
Suharto's downfall, who ruled Indonesia with an iron hand for more than 32 years, will lead to
anarchy, chaos, and even the breakup of this nation of more than 17,000 islands.! Moreover, to
the extent that the political crisis was compounded by a protracted economic crisis, many
people had begun to believe that the democratization would fail and Indonesia would fall apart
in an accelerating spiral of inter-ethnic or inter-religious violence.
Such pessimistic impression, however, is not the case in Indonesia now. Many people
now see that the demise of the New Order regime has led to the birth of a new and more
democratic Indonesia, with a far more developed civil society. Indonesia's new democracy, in
I See, Emmerson, ''Will Indonesia Survive?" 2000; Cribb, ''Not the Next Yugoslavia," 1999; Armstrong,
"The Next Yugoslavia," 2004; Aspinall and Berger, ''The Break-up of Indonesia," 2001; Rohde, "Indonesia
Unraveling?" 2001.
129
many respects, has become considerably more stable in the last four years. While Indonesian
Muslims appeared to benefit much from the political freedom brought about by the democratic
transition, whither Islam in a democratized Indonesia? Do Indonesian Muslims have something
positive to contribute to deepen social support for substantive democracy, or will they largely
be the impediment and threat to the emergence of an open and plural society? These are some
daunting questions which I would like to answer.
B. The Construction of Free Public Sphere
Indonesia's national priorities under the New Order regime were defined in terms of
economic development. Suharto's economic tasks seemed clear enough, as he suggested in a
speech to a Bogor economic seminar shortly after his appointment as acting president in 1966:
stabilizing the economy, curbing inflation, and ironing out pricing problems.
2
The requisites for
this, from Suharto's point of view, were political stability and social order. To achieve them,
the New Order regime generally relied on three pillars of control.
3
First, New Order extended,
formalized, and consolidated military control over political life. The dWifungsi (dual function)
doctrine legitimated a socio-political function for military, as well as a defense and security
role. Army officers were appointed to posts in the legislature and bureaucracy; a formidable
intelligence apparatus was developed, as was the military's "territorial structure" which
shadowed civilian government structures all the way down to the village level.
Second, the government restructured the chief institutions of political and civil
society. The inherited infrastructure of parties, legislature, and elections survived, but it was
transformed by a combination of intervention, manipulation, and blunt coercion. The regime
refashioned Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups) as its electoral vehicle. Enforcement
2 Elson, R.E. Suharto, p. 160.
3 Aspinall, Opposing Suharto, 2005, pp. 22-23.
130
of "mono-loyalty", by which civil servants were obliged to vote for Golkar, massive
mobilization of state resources, and widespread intimidation, delivered Golkar more than 60
percent of the vote in 6 elections (once every five years since 1971 until 1997). The strategy of
creating a government-sponsored political party was accompanied by the establishment of
corporatist interest groups incorporated in the Golkar networks, whose objective was "to suppress
class and group conflicts and instill hannony, solidarity, and cooperation between state and
society. ,,4 Complementing its strategy, the first target of corporatization was the association
representing government employees (KORPRI). The subsequent target was then labor, business
sector, press, Muslim scholar, national youth, peasants, women, and national sports.
Finally, the government sought to constmct a comprehensive ideological justification
for authoritarian rule. Government agencies fashioned a revived "Pancasila ideology", which
stressed social harmony and the organic unity between state and society.s According to the
"family principle" (asas kekeluargaan), individuals and groups were expected to subordinate
their own interests to those of the society as a whole. According to the official view, there was
no place in Indonesia for conflicting interests either within society or between society and
state;6 political opposition is officially declared illegal. Instead, both state and society were
deemed as an integrated unity, where deliberation and consensus (musyawarah dan mUfakat)
replaced the divisive and conflictual politics of the past.' To establish the political stability and
ensure that there was no dissent challenging the New Order,
"Heavy surveillance and severe censorship operated in the administration of formal
education at all levels, in the mass media, religious rituals, and artistic productions.
Most curricula needed to be approved by local authorities. No electronic media were
allowed, at least in theory and, until recently (in 1988), in practice, to produce and
4 Mas'oed, "The State Reorganization of Society under the New Order," 1989, p. 18.
S Momt, "The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government," 1981.
, Aspinall, "The Broadening Base of Political Opposition in Indonesia," 1996, p. 217.
7 Sanit, "Pembuatan Keputusan Politik Musyawarah dan Mnfakat di DPR RI," 1992.
131
broadcast their own news. Reporters and editors from print media received regular
threats. To make the threats effective, actual closure of selected media without due legal
process occurred from time to time. In certain areas or periods religious leaders had
been banned from giving sermons. Theatrical productions, academic seminars, and
poetry readings were all vulnerable to attempt by the police and local military
authorities to control the content oftexts before they can be delivered in public.',s
Based on the explanation above, the New Order hegemonic state power was
obviously achieved through a combination of both the apparent and celebrated consent on the
one hand, and the perceived but undiscussed coercion on the other. In that hegemonic position,
the New Order regime was able to hold authoritarian control over major political, economic,
and cultural institutions. It has also managed to reproduce the conditions for its hegemonic
power by the use of occasional political violence, witch-hunts, and propaganda.
Despite this hegemonic power, resistance movements and oppositional forces
regularly emerge from time to time. They have come and gone in the course of Suharto
administration, some with more consequences than others, but-until the middle of the 1990s--
none has succeeded even just nearly toppling the regime, let alone radically transforming the
existing political system. While its sustainable economic growth impressed many people, the
Suharto regime remained one of the most durable in the world.
The experiences of years ofliving under the authoritarian regime, surely, provided an
impetus for pro-democracy dissent. Having aware of the growing demand of democratization,
the regime began raising hopes by calling for a new era of keterbukaan (opeunesS).9 This era
saw a loosening of the censorship of the press, the release and subsequent reinstatement of
certain dissidents, as well as the toleration of political protests, demonstrations, and criticism of
the government. The government also created a National Commission for Human Rights
Heryanto, "Indonesian Middle-Class Opposition io the 1990s," 1996, pp. 243-244.
9 Heio, "Indonesia io 1989: A Question of Openness," 1990; Lane, "Openness, Political Discontent and
Succession in Indonesia," 1991.
132
(Komnas HAM), allowing for the existence of institution that could potentially limit the
government's abuse of power. 10 The immediate effect was to open previously restricted areas
of debate and stimulate a freer press. Seminars on political issues proliferated. Government
ministers and officials commented more liberally on topical issues. Parliamentary hearings
were occasions to grill ministers and demand change.!! In addition, under this Indonesian
glasnost with relaxed political and social controls, poets, unionists, and religious leaders voiced
thoughts and grievances long bottled up. With almost unprecedented bluntness, the press
tackled taboo subjects ranging from the business interests of the president's family to the
rustlings in some Muslim groups eager for more political power. Satirical plays poked fun at
the dynastic ambitions of the First Family.!2
The debate about openness was since 1990 inextricably linked to the issue of
succession, the inescapable but unpredictable replacement of President Suharto by someone
else-name, manner, timing, and consequences unknown. Discussed in the media, debated in
meetings, performed onstage, succession in the early 1990s elaborately foreshadowed the real
things as officials, journalists, politicians, artists, students, and others in the elite or middle
class tried to open or preempt the term on which the transfer of p,ower would occur.!3
Despite the mushrooming discussions about succession, however, this issue was all
about Suharto himself. So long as the president did not explicitly declare his intention to step
down, the succession would not happen, as everyone was discouraged to run against him. By
that time, unfortunately, he had not made his intention clear, claiming pretentiously that his re-
nomination and re-election were not his own choice but that of the MPR. For Suharto, power
10 Bertrand, "False Start, Succession Crisis, and Regime Change," 1996, p. 325.
II Vatikiotis, "Indonesia: A Guide to Succession," 1997, p. 193.
12 Schwarz, "Indonesia after Suharto," 1997, p. 121.
13 Emmerson, "Indonesia in 1990: A Foreshadow Play," 1991, p. 182.
133
was a matter of personalities, not institutions-an approach to managing power derived from the
Javanese culture. In this regard, "Whoever heard of a Javanese Sultan retiring?,,14
It was in this period of openness that the growing demands of reform took place.
Various pro-democracy movements continued voicing their disenchantment with the regime,
although the era of openness ended almost immediately after Suharto's re-election in 1993
when the government maneuvered political opponents out of power, closed important
publications, imprisoned labor leaders, outspoken politicians, and other activists. Broadly
speaking, the pro-democracy actors during the late 1980s and early 1990s, according to Anders
Uhlin, consisted of four categories: elite dissident and intellectuals, the old generation of
NGOs, student activists, and the new generations ofpro-<lemocracy and human rights NGOS.
15
Among these diverse actors, there were many Indonesian pro-democracy activists who were
more than nominally Muslims and they frequently use Islamic discourses instead of West em
ideas to motivate their struggle for democracy. Among those Muslim intellectuals who
demanded democratization during this period were leaders of the NU and Muhanunadiyah.
16
The growing resentment within Muslim camps was somewhat surprising, because
since the late 1980s, after two decades of denying Islamic interests, Suharto had begun to
integrate Islamic organizations into the New Order's institutions. Regardless ofSuharto's
precise intention, he decided to approve the formation of the Association of Indonesian Muslim
Intellectuals (ICM!) in December 1990.
17
He gradually side-lined the secular Javanese Muslim,
abangan and Christians who had long formed the core of the regime's power base, thereby
allowing a renewed sense of confidence among Muslims. Despite few skepticism and
14 Crouch, "An Ageing President, An Ageing Regime," 1992, p. 44.
IS Uhlin, Indonesia and Ihe "Third Wave of Democratization, 1997, p. 87.
16 Tanthowi, "Islam dan Reformasi," 2002, p. 58-74.
11 Anwar, "Islam, Negara, dan Formasi Sosial dalam Orde Barn," 1992; Hefner, "Islam, State, and
Society," 1993.
134
oppositions, IeMI offered Muslim intellectuals and activists alike the first opportunity to
organize a political platform in more than 20 years-an opportunity they were quick to grasp.
Muslim leaders, mostly from the modernist camp, thereafter enjoyed a strong position during
the last five years of the New Order regime.
Many Western observers saw Suharto's action was only a momentary effort to woo
Muslim support in advance of the 1992 election in the time when he faced a growing challenge
from segment of the military. IS For most pro-democracy Muslim intellectuals such as Amien
Rais, Nurcholish Madjid, Dawam Rahardjo, and Adi Sasono, however, Suharto's intension was
much less important than the benefit IeMI might provide for themselves, the Muslim
community, and the whole nation. Rather, they saw it was the time for them to make use of the
organization to playa vital role in the demilitarization of the Indonesian political system. Many
Muslim intellectuals were aware ofSuharto's motives and they feared that he might succeed in
co-opting their independency. They were also aware that the opportunity for the Muslim
community was highly limited and circumscribed, particularly when the IeMI chairmanship
was awarded not to one of the independent Muslim intellectuals, but to the Minister of
Research and technology B.J. Habibie, one ofSuharto's proteges. Despite the limited
opportunity, the opening nonetheless provided Muslim intellectuals with a platform for political
discussion. Independent Muslim reformers began working hard to sponsor seminars on human
rights, economic reforms, and constitutional law: initiatives by that time were unimaginable.
These opportunities reassured many pro-democracy Muslim intellectuals that IeMI could
18 See Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, 1994; Liddle, "The Islamic Turn in Indonesia," 1996; Vatikiotis,
Indonesian Politics under Soeharto, 1998.
135
continue to play in the cause of democratization and justice, despite the fact that the
organization was flooded with influence-seeking-bureaucrats and Habibie's close aides.
19
Not all Muslim intellectuals were comfortable with the accommodation between
Muslims and the state through the ICMI establishment. Among those few intellectuals who
refused to join the ICMI was Abdurrahman Wahid. He accused ICMI as sectarianism;20
Abdurrahman believed that ICMI legitimized Islamic exclusivism and eroded social tolerance
for non-Muslim Indonesiaus.
21
He also saw those who joined ICM! as "legal-formalist"
activists, meaning that for them political organization of Islamic nature was necessary. For him,
such approach was not valid in a highly pluralistic society such as Indonesia, in which another
approach, namely "the moral, educational and persuasive approach to Islamic teachings" would
be more beneficial to the majority and minority alike.
22
His critique was based on his
perception of the "Trojan Horse" theory: he saw many Muslim intellectuals involved in the
ICMI simply as a way to enter the govemment and Islamize politics from within.
Abdurrahman's rejection ofICMI was greatly influenced by his perception of his own
position and the NU within the emerging power struggle early in the 1990s. He considered that
the NU was locked in competition with ICMI-which was largely supported by the modernist
camp-for political predominance. He was also acutely aware ofNU's marginal position in the
political structure relative to Muslims from the modernist camp. He expressed his
disappointment at being excluded from the political mainstream: "Look at how [the regime]
tries to block NU people from entering the key positions in ICMI. Influential mass
\9 On the serious tension between these two groups, see Hefner, "Is1arnization and Democratization in
Indonesia," 1997.
2() Feillard, "Traditionalist Islam and the State in Indonesia," 1997, p. 151.
21 Ramage, "Democratisation, Religious Tolerance and Pancasila," 1996, p. 236.
22 Wahid, "Islam, Politics and Democracy in the 1950s and 1990s," 1994, p. 153.
136
organizations [NU] are neglected and given peripheral positions in ICMI.,,23 Abdurrahman's
rejection to join the ICMI was thus plausible since the NU was less represented in the newly-
established association.
24
Since that time, Abdurrahman's relation with Amien Rais, who supported the ICMI,
started to strain. Abdurrahman explains "I quarrel with Amien Rais who would like to establish
an Islamic society. For me an Islamic society in Indonesia is treason against the Constitution
because it will make non-Muslims second class citizens. But an 'Indonesian society' where the
Muslims are strong-and strong means functioning well-then I think that is good. ,,25 On the
other hand, many modernist Muslims accused him as a heretic, an intellectual prima donna and
a friend to Christian, ethnic Chinese, and the military. "Wahid is not only exaggerating
differences among Muslims but he is distorting our positions and sowing disinformation ... I
believe in Islam and democracy too, a democracy that guarantees freedom of religion, press and
speech," says Arnien RaiS.
26
Abdurrahman made his agenda clear after he, along with some other secular and
Christian intellectuals, established a nondenominational coalition and discussion group known
as the Democracy Forum in March 1991. Although the coalition was not banned, however,
Suharto made clear his displeasure with Abdurrahman's move. Abdurrahman explains, the
Democracy Forum "is not an action-oriented group. It is just a group of people from different
constituencies ... we made it clear that we seek a common platform. We would like to discuss
and reflect on the parameters of democracy, the limits of power, and how we could promote the
23 Cited from Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, 2002, p. 111.
24 Van Bruinessen, "Konjunctur Sosia! Polilik eli Jagat NU paska Khittah 26," 1994, p. 82.
25 Cited from Ramage, "Democmtisation, Religions Tolemnce and Pancasila," 1996, p. 241.
26 Cited from Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, 1994, p. 190.
137
democratization process in a satisfying way.'.z7 Abdurrahman's opposition was widely featured
in the media, catapulting him to open opposition with the regime.
Abdurrahman's move was also received with ambivalent responses within the NU.
Some NU leaders, such as the acting chairman of the powerful Syuriah council llyas Ruchiyat,
former vice-chairman of Syuriah council Ali Yafie, and Abdurrahman's uncle YusufHasyim
joined the rCMI. They worried that Abdurrahman's activities on behalf of democratization
would damage NU by too closely associating it with democratic critics of the regime.
28
Therefore, despite his harsh criticism both ofICMI and the regime, Abdurrahman did not
forbid NU leaders and members to join rCMr, and many did join.
Abdurrahman's opposition intensified when he refused to support Suharto's re-
nomination for another term in office. From late 1991 and early 1992 there were considerahle
indirect pressures for all major organizations to endorse his re-nomination. Many organizations,
groups, and individuals had already done so, including the Muhanunadiyah and some senior
NU leaders who joined the rCMI. However, Abdurrahman refused to do so, arguing that the
NU was no longer a political organization, therefore such endorsement would be
inappropriate.
29
This move thus provoked Suharto's wrath since his opposition was construed
as an attempt to undermine Suharto's patronage of the Muslim mainstream.
Soon after being re-elected president in the MPR session in March 1993, Suharto was
subsequently determined to unseat Abdurrahman from the NU chairmanship and replace him
with a more pliable figure. The campaign was underway at the NU congress in Cipasung, West
Java, in December 1994. In a determined campaign to unseat him, state officials and military
21 Wahle!, ''The 1992 Election," 1992, p. 127-128.
28 Ramage, "Democratisation, Religious Tolerance and Pancasila," 1996, p. 237.
29 Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, 1995, p. 57.
138
combined their efforts both to induce and to intimidate the congress delegates in order to garner
sufficient support against the incumbent.
30
Surprisingly, Abdurrahman survived the tumultuous
event by winning re-election to the NU chairmanship by a slim margin (174 to 142) against
Abu Hasan. Robert Hefuer believes that the effort ultimately failed because a segment of the
military which had been hostile to Suharto indicated that they had no interest in seeing
Abdurrahman overthrown.
3
! They regarded Abdurrahman as a valuable ally in the struggle
against Suharto's accommodative strategy to the Muslim camp and the concomitant growth in
power ofICMI and its chairman, Habibie. Few months later, the regime also failed to block the
candidacy of another potential political opposition, Megawati, in the 1993 PDI congress in
Surabaya. Megawati was also said to have similar support from a segment of the military.
It would be a mistake to conclude that the commitment to democracy and political
reform was limited to those intellectuals who opposed the "honeymoon" between Islam and the
state. Despite the accommodative relation, however, some Muslim leaders sustained their
independence by keeping their distance away from the regime's cooptation. They continued to
make use of the limited space provided by the ICMI to clamor for justice, democratization, and
political reform. One such example was Amien Rais. Since the 1990 Muharnmadiyah congress
in Jogjakarta, he was appointed the deputy chairman of the Muharnmadiyah. He also supported
the ICM! establishment and served in itS high rank position.
Despite his proximity with Habibie, he distinguished himself in the media as a vocal
opponent ofSuharto. He regularly criticized Suharto's long period presidency and called for the
establishment of a reliable mechanism for presidential succession. In December 1993, nearly
nine months after Suharto was sworn in as president for his sixth term, Amien raised an issue of
30 See Feaiy, "The 1994 NU Congress and Aftermath," 1996.
31 Heiher, "Islam and Nation in the Post-Suharto Era," 1999, p. 54.
139
succession in the annual national meeting (Tanwir) in Surabaya, East Java. He said that the
succession must take place in 1998 and that it was necessary for the country to begin discussing
the various criteria that would be needed to select the next president.
32
While the ensuing intense debate on the succession issue broke out, however, senior
government officials and President Suharto himself responded negatively. During February and
March 1994, President Suharto frequently issued statements meant to deflect criticisms and to
end the succession debate launched by Amien. Suharto said that there was no need to discuss
the matter any further as the country already had a mechanism in the MPR to deal with the
succession. While he said that he would step down in time and that he was not president for
life, he also pointed out that ''we have to abide by the established procedure that we have been
using. Don't make your own rules because this might spawn friction and disputes.'033
Despite the president's indirect but firm response, Amien even increased his criticism
and began taking pains to relate the political and social injustice that was happening around the
country. While admitting that Indonesia under Suharto's administration had achieved
remarkable economic growth and political stability, however, says Amien,
"Poverty and unemployment remain cyclical. The number of people living below the
poverty mark could be perhaps twice or thrice the official figure of 27 millions ... There
has not been a regeneration ofleadership in our democratic process. Unlike monarchies
where the leadership renewal only occurs with the death of the monarch, a democratic
system ensures a rotation of the elites via a constitutional process ... With no limitation
to the period in office, the incumbent tends to veer away from the democratic
institutions and defend the unreasonable and irrational vested interests of political
supporters ... Leaders who have held the reins of government for too long tend to see
themselves as the personification of stable governance and hence crucial to the survival
of the nation. This complacency is a threat to democracy. The situation worsens when
the leader takes on the attitude of Louis XIV of France. His concept of"L'eta c'est
32 See Rais, Moralitas Politik Muhamrnadiyah, Yogyakarta: Dinamika, 1995, p. 47-60.
33 Singh, Succession Politics in Indonesia, 2000, p. 16-17.
140
moi" treats any personal criticism of his leadership as a personal assault to the nation
and the core ideological values of the state ... ,,34
President Suharto was reported to be uncomfortable with Amien's criticism. Hence,
the regime sought to prevent Amien's election at the Muhammadiyah congress taking place in
Aceh in July 1995. Amien could not disguise his fear that there was no way he would be
elected as he was most critical of Suharto and had made strong statements about political
succession. Suharto also attended the opening ceremony of the congress and during his speech
he mentioned that he was educated in Muhanunadiyah schools and attributed his success as the
President to the ability to "breathe the air of Muhanunadiyah". Suharto claimed that his
indebtedness to Muhanunadiyah was invaluable. By delivering such tacit hint, Suharto,
according to Amien, wanted Amien to stop criticizing him as they shared the same
background.
35
Similar to the earlier unsuccessful efforts to block Abdurrahman and Megawati,
however, the government also failed to prevent Amien's popularity within the organization.
The consecutive failures of government efforts to prevent the elections of
Abdurrahman, Megawati and Amien displayed in varying degree the regime's continued failure
to keep control of domestic discontent. The three outlined developments indicated a decline of
what had thus far looked as a very strong authoritarian regime. On the other hand, they also
showed success for public confrontation against the otherwise apparently very powerful state
apparatus. They were made possible by the strengthening of civil society movements and the
blossoming of urban middle-class politics.
Two years ahead to the 1997 election had been marked by numerons events indicating
the escalation of the regime coercion toward its political opponents. In the meantime,
34 Rais, Suksesi & Keajaiban Kekuasaan, 1997, p. 3-38; Gaffar, ''Indonesia 1995," 1996, p. 51-55.
3S Rais, Putra Nusantara, Son of the Indonesian Archipelago, 2003, p. 61.
141
Abdurrahman began working hand in hand with Megawati. Now that Megawati's abangan
religious outlook, Abdurrahman and many traditionalist Muslims felt comfortable, of which
many modernists such as Amien found it difficult to establish a point of contact.
The regime subsequently attempted to undennine the popularity of its political
opponents. During October 1996 and January 1997 Muslim rioting occurred sporadically in
East, Central and West Java. Targets of the violence included not only government offices,
police stations and churches, but also factories and shops belonging to non-Muslims and
Chinese people. The cities affected included Situbondo, Tasikmalaya, Pekalongan and
Surabaya. 36 Abdurrahman suspected that the incidents had been "engineered" (direkayasa),
since many local people reported seeing 'muscular young men with short haircuts' speaking
with 'out-of-town' accents asking for directions. While precisely who had been organized these
campaign remained unclear, most people assumed that provocateurs from outside of the towns
had played a decisive role in iustigating violence.
37
Abdurrahman had also been warned by
contacts in the military in August and September 1996 that the regime was planning a new
round of attacks against him. Abdurrahman and many NU leaders suspected that the unrest was
intended to show that Abdurrahman could not control his membership and that Abdurrahman's
claim that the NU was a force for tolerance and democratization was a fraud.
38
Their suspicion
was based on the fact that those cities affected by violence such as Situbondo, Surabaya,
Pekalongan are well known as NU strongholds. Meanwhile, Tasikmalaya, although not an NU
stronghold, is regarded as a santri (pious Muslim) city.
3. Forrester, "Towards March 1998, With Determination," 1998, p. 56.
37 Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, 2002, p. 219.
3S Hellier, Civil Islam, 2000, p. 191-192.
142
Several months earlier, a similar campaign was launched against the chairwoman of
the POI Megawati. Unlike Abdurrahman and Amien, Megawati was not an intellectual and had
no thought-out political platform or clearly political vision, but she inherited many aspects of
her father's charisma. Nor was Megawati remarkably confrontational towards the government
and her political statements were always within the boundaries of what was tolerable in the
political construction of the New Order.
39
Her increasing popularity, however, was seen as a
potential threat for Suharto's sole candidacy in the next 1998 MPR session. It was widely
believed that Suharto always wanted to be elected unanimously and without any contender.
On July 27,1996, the expulsion ofMegawati supporters from the POI headquarter led
to the worst rioting in Jakarta for many years. The violence affected not just the POI office, but
many shops and offices along several main roads in Central Jakarta were looted and burned.
The government responded savagely to the unrest. Several hundred of Megawati's supporters
were arrested, and hundreds "disappeared". Many people believed that this riot was also
"engineered" by certain element of the military. Many people witnessed that the perpetrators
were unloaded from trucks; many of the men were well-built and with short crew-cut hair,
leading many to suspect that they were in fact soldiers out ofuniform.
40
Meanwhile, Amien also intensified his criticism against Suharto and his
administration. Since his ascension to the chairman of the ICMI Council of Experts (Dewan
Pakar) in 1995, he tried to bring the succession issue into ICMI's discourse as he believed that
Suharto would re-nominate himself for his seventh term in 1998. However, in line with the
regime's stance that rCMI should not make political statements of any kind, Habibie ensured
that the succession issue remained outside onCMI's formal pronouncement. In addition, early
39 Eklof, Indonesian Politics in Crisis, 1999, p. 25.
'" Eklof, Indonesian Politics in Crisis, 1999, p. 42. This tragedy is well-known as the "Gray Saturday".
143
in January 1997 Amien gained growing fame for his courage to identify publicly what was
wrong with the New Order regime. His blunt comments and speeches earned him a reputation
as a courageous person, and also pejoratively as somebody (he was born in Surakarta) who was
not 'Javanese' enough.41 Amien spoke openly about the 'nepotism' which was invariably
involved in the selection of electoral candidates, the 'collution' of high officials and civil
servants with members of the business community, and the control of foreign investors over the
country's natural resources, of which the position of Freeport Indonesia and Busang were
glaring examples.
42
All a consequence of his frankness, Amien lost his position in rCMr as
chairman of the Council of Experts in February 1997.
43
Suharto had ordered Habibie to take
this action, but publicly the pretence was upheld that all was peace and amity. Amien himself
spoke about his feeling of being guilty because he was 'too vocal' and did not want rCMr to
suffer from his moves. Such words clearly indicated that, as had indeed been the case, Amien
was forced to withdraw.
In contrast to Amien, who had escalated his opposition even since the tragedy Gray
Saturday occurred, Abdurralunan made a sudden political reversal and began reconciliation
with Suharto. Early in November 1996, when the President opened a national NO meeting in
East Java, both publicly shook hands and their pictures received wide coverage. Abdurralunan
inunediately expressed his support for the re-election of Suharto in 1998. In the months leading
to the 1997election, Abdurralunan went even further. He began opening his constituency for
Golkar's campaign, escorting the president's daughter Tutut around NO pesantrens. In return to
41 Van Dijk, A Country in Despair, 2001, p. 57.
42 See Basyaib and Abidin, Ada Udang di Balik Busang, 1997. The extent to which he succeeded in
attracting public attention was such that, at the end of 1997, the Islamic-oriented magazine Ummat elected him the
"Man of the Year". This had been done, it was said, partly because it had been Amien who had made the most
'news' in 1997.
43 In July 1998, after the fall of Suharto, he was reinstated as chairman of the Council of Experts.
144
the inclusion of many NU leaders in the Golkar candidate list, Abdurrahman also effectively
backed Tutut's vice-presidential candidacy, repeatedly suggesting that she was a 'future leader'
with whom it was important for the NU to develop links.
44
Abdurrahman offered several explanations for his political reversal toward the New
Order regime. It seemed most likely, however, that the shift was driven mostly by his
conclusion of Megawati's removal, of violence in his NU base, and ofthe fact that his previous
allies in a segment of the military were getting weaker. Aware of the intensifying campaigns
against himself and the NU membership, he came to realize that he had no choice but to
negotiate a truce with Suharto.
45
The events had forced him to put aside his democratic
engagement so as to protect his NU base. By doing so, he also hoped to prevent his
modernistfICMI rivals from monopolizing access to Suharto.
Meanwhile, Amien continued along the path he had chosen. Startling and delighting
his audience, in late September 1997, soon after the inauguration of the new DPRIMPR
members, he caused some commotion when, prompted by a question-during a discussion about
national leadership-in his readiness to be nominated as presidential candidate, he professed his
willingness to stand. This move was, by the standards of prevailing Indonesian politics, overtly
courageous. Some Muharnmadiyah leaders were afraid it might reflect negatively on the
organization, as Amien had stepped into a very sensitive field by entering Suharto's own
preserve. According to Amien himself, well aware that he stood no chance at all of being
elected in the presidential election scheduled to take place in March 1998 during the MPR
session, his willingness to be nominated was an act of political education directed to the
Indonesian people. By his nomination Amien wanted to de-"sacralize" the presidential post and
44 Aspinall, Opposing Suharto, 2005, p. 197-198.
4S Hefner, Islam and Nation, 1999, p. 59; Barton, Abdurrahman Wahid, 2002, p. 221.
145
to make people aware that it was incorrect to assume automatically that only Suharto was
entitled to become the sole presidential candidate.
46
The final months of 1997 also saw the consolidation among major oppositional
leaders: Amien, Megawati, and Abdurrahman. When Indonesia's economic crisis had escalated
since the mid-I 997 , Abdurrahman began calling for reform, in a time when Amien had been on
the move. Abdurrahman seemed to be determined to clear his name and correct the image that
he had quit from the pro-democracy movement. Abdurrahman also frequently met with
Megawati to demand further economic and political reforms. While there was a growing
relation between Abdurrahman and Megawati, Abdurrahman's campaign also indirectly
aligned him with Amien. In public, however, Abdurrahman refused to consecrate the alliance
with a formal declaration, maintaining the chill that has long marked his relationship with
Amien.
47
In January 1998, unfortunately, Abdurrahman was debilitated by a stroke sidelining
him thereafter from political events during the peak of the reform movement. Despite his
survival in the following several months, however, in the eyes of the general public, he was off
the scene.
Since February 1998, student activists on campuses allover the country had begun
refusing Suharto's reelection in the MPR session scheduled to be held in early March 1998. As
most MPR members were already under Suharto's control, however, no wonder that Suharto
was re-elected president for his seventh term and Habibie was also appointed vice president.
Many Muslim leaders, particularly from the modernist!ICMl camp, had ambivalent feeling of
Habibie's election. While being thrilled as they at last won what they had long been admiring,
however, they were also disappointed by the new cabinet formation. The cabinet did contain a
46 Rais, Demi Pendidikan Palilik, 1997.
47 Hefiter, Civil Islam, 2000, p. 199
146
number ofIeMI members, but no leading IeM! reformists were included. The feeling was that
Habibie had been powerless to champion reMI interests. No doubt, Suharto instead opted for
cronies and uninspired loyalists, such as his daughter Tutut and timber tycoon Bob Hasan.
While this move seemingly indicated Suharto's capability to ignore the Muslims'
interests, however, its effect was so clear that Suharto lost his last support remaining in his hand
from the Muslim camp. Disappointed by the new cabinet, Amien and some ICMI leaders such as
Adi Sasono, Dawam Rahardjo, and Nurcholish Madjid took their organization on a track that
would clearly lead the confrontation with Suharto. With Abdurrahman sidelined by a stroke and
Megawati adopting a more retiring public role (a curious strategy, disappointing many of her
followers), leadership of the anti-Suharto movements now passed into the hands of Amien.
48
Pointing out that many of the ministers were not the right person in the right place, he ridiculed
them that such persons would not be able to differentiate between the interests of the state and
their own private ones, or those of their family and companies. Amien appealed to the wider
audience to give the new govermnent six months to prove its worth. If the crisis had not been
resolved, an extraordinary session of the MPR should be convened to call Suharto to account.
Otherwise, Suharto should be unseated with a peaceful 'people power'. Amien also toured
campuses where he addressed rallies and urged students to continue their struggle. By mid-April,
he began talking openly of 'people power', telling student audiences "if democratic means to
bring about change have reached a dead-end, there is no other way except a mass movement.''''9
At the same time, Abdurralunan lost his control of the NU. so While he was recovering
from his stroke, the central board of the NU effectively overruled him and underlined NU's
48 Hefher, Islam and Nation in the Post-Suharto Era, 1999, p. 60.
" Aspinall, Opposing Suharto, 2005, p. 230.
"Mietzner, "From Soeharto to Habibie," 1999, p. 75.
147
support for the students' demands. With Muhammadiyah, NU, and rCM! standing in the forefront
in the confrontation against the govenunent, Suharto, in addition to his last remaining resource in
the military, began to seek support from the conservative Muslim camp.
Suharto, through his loyalists within the military, seemingly succeeded to court the
conservative Muslim camp. At the same time, however, the larger segment of the military started
to build contacts with pro-democracy leaders. The mounting opposition from students and people
caused a split within the military. A segment of the military under Prabowo, himself Suharto's
son in law and commander of the army special forces (Kopassus), sought to defend Suharto's
presidency at any cost and they built an alliance with conservative Muslim camp. Another camp
under the military commander Wiranto eventually seemed to be more responsive in its approach
to the pro-reform demands. Anticipating possible political configuration after the fall of Suharto,
both camps played high-risk games.
Suharto made another blunder when he, conforming to IMP prescription, announced
rises in electricity and fuel prices on May 4, 1998. This triggered larger and more violent protests
allover the country. The most alarming riot broke in Medan, South Sumatera, when destructive
rioting engulfed the city and surrounding areas for several days. In the days following the Medan
riots, the major Muslim organizations intensified their opposition. Amien called for the president
to step down immediately, and he sensed that the military was obviously wavering in its support
for Suharto. rCMr leaders also echoed similar demand, saying that an extraordinary MPR session
was needed to solve the leadership problem. The NU leaders also announced that the organization
was preparing its own reform proposal.
The climax of the crisis began with the shooting of four students during the
demonstration at Jakarta's Trisakti University on May 12,1998, which was speculated to be
148
"engineered" by anny units loyal to Prabowo. On the next two days, on May 13-14, 1998, one
of the most serious rioting in modern Indonesian history took place. Speculation about the
mastermind also pointed out to Prabowo's special forces anny unit. Many of the commercial
centers such as shopping malls, banks, markets, shop houses were looted, destroyed and
burned. Many citizens, mostly of Chinese descent, were robbed, beaten, or raped. More than
1000 people lost their lives, most of whom were looters trapped in burning shopping malls.
Similar rioting occurred in Surakarta, Central Java and Palembang, South Sumatera.
The Trisakti killings and the ensuing riots had a profound political impact. On the one
hand, it fueled the mounting grievance and resentment among people, middle and lower class
alike. On the other hand, they undermined Suharto's long-established credibility in maintaining
security and order. Pressure on Suharto to step down increased greatly. Some hundred thousand
students began occupying the DPRIMPR buildings, pushing the DPRIMPR members to
convene the extraordinary MPR session as soon as possible. Similar huge student
demonstrations also took place in many cities allover the country.
Shocked by the violence, pro-reform leaders then echoed the reformasi damai
(peaceful reform) as their slogan. Prominent critics of the government, along with their
supporters, wore head bands, bearing the text. The violence also prompted elite opposition to
get more organized. On May 14, 1998 Amien announced the formation of a kind of cabinet
watchdog organization named Majelis Amanat Rakyat (the People's Mandate Council, or
MARA). In founding it, great care had been taken to avoid any suspicion of sectarianism and
therefore it included representatives from the various religious communities. It combined a
range of ICMI and other Muslim figures, former ministers, intellectuals and senior journalists,
149
dissidents, and leaders ofNGOS.
51
On the next day on May 15, another organization initiated
by Abdurrahman, Forum Ketja Indonesia (Indonesian Working Forum) was set up. It included
many NU and PDI-P leaders.
It was Amien who then called for an alliance with Abdurrahman and Megawati
against Suharto. Since Abdurrahman's distrust of Amien was well known, Amien's appeal was
indicative of his determination to put aside personal disagreements in the interest of the pro-
democracy struggle. Amien noted that he realized that the movement could not win without a
broader base. In this instance, however, it was Abdurrahman who refused. Abdurrahman
declined to join formally with Amien because he thought Amien had not sufficiently distanced
himself from those who wanted a more formal institutionalization of Islam in state and
society.52 Although a form of collective leadership to replace Suharto was necessary by that
time, elite opposition continued to be deeply divided and was far from being in a position to
form an emergency government.
Pressure for Suharto to step down was added by the unremitting student
demonstrations, particularly those who occupied the parliamentary buildings, and the constant
stream of delegations by much respected people and groups visiting parliament pushing the
DPRIMPR members to convene an extraordinary session to call for Suharto's resignation. The
parliament compound thus became the focus of political attention. It was the place where
students, academic staff, public figures, former cabinet ministers, artists, and retired officials
flocked to voice their demands and suggestions. Critics finally made the DPRIMPR
spokesperson Harmoko and his deputies suddenly realize that the institutions they headed
" Aspinall, Opposing Suharto, 2005, p. 233.
'2 Hefner, Islam and Nation in the Post-Suharto Era, 1999, p. 60-61.
150
represented the people; now they had to do something. In the afternoon of May 18, Harmoko
and his deputies made up their minds, calling on Suharto to step down.
In response, Suharto attempted to reach a compromise and retain power, while he also
sought to deepen the division within Islamic opposition. During his meeting with a mild-
mannered Muslim scholar Nurcholish Madjid on May 19, Suharto mentioned that he first
wanted to consult with a number ofIslamic leaders. He named Nurcholish and Abdurrahman.
State Secretary Saadillah Mursyid cited the names of several others who would be suitable for
the occasion. But when Saadillah was finished, Nurcholish asked, "What about myoid
classmate?" Suharto asked whom he meant. "Ami en Rais," was the reply. "Well," said Suharto,
"Let's hold off on that." On the surface, Suharto got he wanted. Playing the NU off against
Amien, four of nine participants were the NU leaders (Abdurrahman, Ali Yafie, Ahmad
Bagdja, and Ma'ruf Amin). Only two represented the Muhanunadiyah (Malik Fadjar and Yusril
Ihza Mahendra). The other three were Nurcholish, Cholil Baidowi, and Emha Ainun Najib.
However, Suharto's effort to split Amien from the Muslim community failed. Amien had
previously given instructions to some of the participants in Malik's house.
53
Amien had insisted
on elections within six months and Suharto's resignation or Suharto should hand over his
mandate.
Suharto's effort to co-opt those Muslim leaders also failed. As Emmerson describes it,
the Muslim leaders attending the meeting were numerous and diverse enough to be of use to
Suharto. They had a moral status that Harmoko, in Suharto's eyes and the eyes of the public,
lacked. If Suharto could generate the impression that these Muslim notables supported his plan
for political survival through limited reform, he might be able to rescue his chance of staying
53 Mietzner, "From Soebarto to Habibie," 1999, p. 82. Nurcholish, Amien, and the Mnbammadiyah
deputy chairman Syafii Maarif got their Ph.D. from the Chicago University early in the 19808.
151
on. However, the Muslim leaders refused to support him. But, by agreeing to meet with the
president precisely when he was being vilified by students around the country, they did foster
an impression that the Muslim leaders greatly preferred peaceful change from inside the New
Order to its violent overthrow from without. 54
The following day provided further evidence that democrat Muslims were unwilling
to press their opposition to the point of risking violence on a scale so large as to endanger
democratization. On May 20, 1998, which is National Awakening Day, a number of cities
around the country were braced for a massive show of force by students, Islamic groups, and
other pro-reform demonstrations. The epicenter, of course, was Jakarta, where Amien had been
working assiduously since March to mobilize a 'people power' on the National Monument
square, which is located right in front of the presidential palace. Military commanders had been
preparing feverishly. Main arteries began to be sealed off and by early morning on that day all
roads leading to the square were heavily barricaded with multiple rows of coiled barbed-wire.
Thousands of troops guarded this perimeter with assault rifles. Around 160 tanks and armored
vehicles were stationed at major intersections and strategic buildings, while some 40.000 troops
were deployed throughout the city. 55 After viewing by midnight the overwhelming presence of
troops, Amien by now had called off the rally at three in the morning that day in a speech
broadcasted on TV and radio. Amien was also warned by senior military commander that the
military was prepared to tum the sprawling grounds of the National Monument into a sea of
blood, comparable to Beijing's Tiananmen square crackdown. Amien was loathing to risk
major loss oflife. He was unwilling to risk what could have turned into a bloody confrontation
with security forces. Jakarta residents heeded Amien's call and stayed off the streets, so the city
54 Emmerson, "Exit and Aftermath," 1999, p. 304.
55 O'Rourke, Reformasi, 2002, p. 131.
152
was like a ghost town. Amien then moved to the MPRIDPR buildings, to lead student
demonstration urging the parliament to set up the procedure ofSuharto's impeachment.
May 20 turned out to be the last full day ofSuharto's presidency. His final efforts to
postpone his resignation by composing both a new cabinet and a Reform Committee failed
when some 14 ministers were asking not to be included again for any new cabinet and when
some major opposition leaders, which were contacted, refused to join the Reform Committee.
By eleven o'clock, Suharto finally caved in. "That's it," he said, "I'll just resign." On the
morning of May 21, Suharto resigned and Habibie was sworn in as Suharto's successor.
The fall of Suharto, unfortunately, did not lead to total reform as demanded by pro-
democracy movement. This was partly due to the fragmented and weakly organized nature of
opposition.
56
Instead of taking profit from Habibie's weakness and challenging him with a
credible civilian reform alliance, civil society seemed to be more divided than even before.
Every oppositional leader, including Megawati, Amien and Abdurrabman, was busy
repositioning themselves, consolidating their support, and forming new parties. Although
pluralism is the essence of civil society, in many countries where communist or authoritarian
regimes fell civil alliances were quickly formed and usually took over at the first general
election following the regime change. But Indonesia was heading in the opposite direction. 57
Their failure to form a broad-based alliance underlined the fact that civil society movements in
Indonesia have been deeply divided along religious fault lines. Their volatile relationship
during years-long of opposition has thus also been colored by distrust among them.
Soon after Habibie's ascension. it seemed that pro-democracy movements were
divided between those who supported, or at least accepted, Habibie because they viewed him as
56 Hadiz, "Contesting Political Change after Suharto," 1999, p. 109.
"Mietzner, "ABRI and Civil Society in the Post-Suharto Era," 1999, 149.
153
an Islamic president, and those who rejected him because they viewed him as a Suharto look-
alike. Their diverging opinions were based on the nature of the transfer of power from Suharto
to Habibie. The first group viewed that the transfer of power was legitimate since it was in
accordance with the constitution. In contrast, the second group viewed the transfer of power
was illegitimate since both Suharto and Habibie were elected in pair, so that both had to step
down altogether. While the pro-Habibie alliance comprised many groups coming mostly from
Muslim conservatives, the anti-Habibie front comprised many secular groups.
In this regard, the three main opposition reformers, namely Megawati, Amien, and
Abdurrahman, seemed to take a moderate stance. This was evidenced when those three leaders,
along with Sultan Hamengku Buwono X ofYogyakarta, held a meeting at the home of
Abdurrahman in Ciganjur, Jakarta on November 10. The meeting was made possible by
students who demanded Habibie's replacement by a presidium consisting of those four leaders.
This total reform was firmly refused. In a joint statement known as the Ciganjur Declaration, it
was clear that these popular leaders preferred an evolutionary transition to democracy. 58 They
made it clear that they were not interested to replace the legislature or Habibie. They instead
accepted Habibie as a transitional president and urged him to speed up the electoral process. On
the abolition of the military's dual functions, they only agreed that it had to be done gradually
over a six year period. Only in term of investigating Suharto's wealth did these leaders agree
with the students. They also spoke of the need of decentralization of governance and the need
for a fair share of funding between the central government and the regions. 59
The importance of the Ciganjur declaration was not simply because it punctuated the
willingness of major oppositional leaders to work in concert during the precarious events. It
,. Budirnan, "The 1998 Crisis," 1999, p. 47.
,. Young, "Post-Suharto," 1999, p. 96-97.
154
was significant, as Bourchier puts it, because it instead marked a parting of the ways between
those demanding total reform and those oppositional leaders who favored only incremental
change. In retrospect it also appears to have been important step in a process of accommodation
between pro-democracy leaders and the status quo forces.
5O
Civil society in Indonesia, as elsewhere, is an arena of power, ineqUality, struggle, and
cooperation that is populated by a wide array of voluntary and non-voluntary groups whose
political orientations, interests, resources, capacities, and methods span a wide spectrum. These
non-state groups, operating in urban and rural areas and at times in foreign countries, function
independently or in small networks to advance specific causes and interests that may diverge
and conflict with one another. However, in the following sections, I will show other evidences
where the Muhammadiyah and NU forge an alliance to foster a democratization process.
C. The Election Monitoring
Indonesian democracy has been restored since 1998 after four decades of
authoritarian rule under President Sukamo (1959-1965) and President Suharto (1966-1998).
Within a week of taking over from Suharto, President Habibie allowed the formation of more
political parties. Tantamount to the formation of hundreds of new political parties, new
enthusiasm had also been explosively growing among Indonesian people to participate in the
electoral process. Sirnilar eagemess also emerged within the Islamic community, the modernist
as well as the traditionalist camp. While many within the organizations supported the
establishment of new political parties (as described in Chapter III), in the meantime, some other
groups within the NU and Muhammadiyah instead opted to organized a remarkable, extensive
non-partisan domestic voter education and election monitoring network. Since the 1999
00 Bourchier, ''Habibie's Interregnum," 2000, p. 19.
155
election, youth wings of and numerous NGOs affiliated to the NU and Muhammadiyah,
combined with mass-based Christian, interfaith, and Islamic university groups, have been
working in concert through Jaringan Pendidikan Pemilih untuk Rakyat (the People's Voter
Education Networks, JPPR).61 The JPPR, financially supported by the Asia Foundation, was
established in 1998.
In 1999 Indonesia held its second free and fair elections after the 1955 election. As
reform era began after the fall of Suharto, the early years of transition had been colored by
sectarian conflict and regional disintegration. Many feared that the 1999 election would
intensify the conflict leading to massive violence. Such concern was plausible since the election
took place only two years after the last election during the Suharto era. The 1997 election was
marked by the massive eruption of campaign violence, more than any campaign violence
during the New Order time. More than 250 people were killed in campaign-related incidents
and rioting throughout the country.62 Such violence, however, was not the case during the 1999
election. With the notable exception to the several outbreaks of violence between the supporters
of the PKB and PPP in towns along the north coast of Java, there was a high turnout and
minimal violence. The success of the election, according to David Bourchier, was attributable
61 Groups representing Mllbammadiyah are the Muhammadiyah Youth Movement (PM), the
Mllbammadiyah Students Association (!MM), the Mllbammadiyah Adolescent Association (IRM), the
Mllhammadiyah Young Women Movement (NA), the Society Empowerment Council (MPM), the
Mllhammadiyah Women Movement (Aisyiyah), the Center for the Study of Religions and Civilizations (pSAP),
the Mllhammadiyah University ofYogyakarta (LP3 UMY), and the Mllhammadiyah Higher Education Council
(Dikti Mllbammadiyah). Groups representing the NU are the NU Youth Women Movement (Fatayat NU), the NU
Family Welfare Institute (LKK NU), (The NU Institute for Research and Development of Human Resources
(Lakpesdarn NU), the Center for Development ofPesantren and Society (P3M), the Institute for Social Institutions
Studies (ISIS). Other institutions are Ahimsa, Elsham Papua, Fabmina, ICCE UIN, JIL, LABDA Yogyakarta,
LAPAR Makassar, LK3 Banjarmasin, LKlS Yogyakarta, LKPMP Makassar, MADIA, Percik Salatiga, PPSDM
UIN, PSW UIN, Radio 68 H, and Rahima. Accessed from the official JPPR website
http://www.jppr.or.idlcontentiview/14/29/onApriI15.2008.This section is mostly based on interviews with two
national coordinator of the JPPR: Gunawan Hidayat (2003-2005) and Adung Abdurrahman (2005-2007)
separately on January 2 and 12, 2008 in Jakarta.
62 Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia, 2002, p. 32-34.
156
to the management of the election commission and the neutral stance of the military. But, he
goes on to say, it had just as much to do with the commitment of ordinary Indonesians to the
process.
63
Moreover, the contrast between the non-violent campaign and the previous two
years' rioting reinforced beliefs that previous elections were manipulated with restrictions on
free campaign and coercion on electoral process. The 1999 election demonstrated that when
Indonesians marched and assembled of their own accord they tended to do so peacefully.
The JPPR has been significant because it helped to ensure free and fair elections in
Indonesia. Needless to say, during the New Order regime, six elections were organized whose
results were not really interesting or important since the outcomes were more or less
determined in advance. As various kinds of pressures, intimidation and threat had been applied
to the voters,64 therefore elections during the Suharto period had very little to do with
democracy; they were aimed simply at serving as a legitimizing factor for the regime and
providing a degree of international recognition. Learning from previous elections, it was
necessary to ensure that the 1999 election would not be tainted with similar manipulations.
Therefore, a new election law was issued. Many regnlations were in contrast to the
ones that were applied during the New Order era. The election was organized by an election
commission comprising political party representatives, instead of the government body. Civil
servants were not allowed to join political parties but they were free to choose any political
party. This literally signified the end of mono-loyalitas of civil servants and their compulsory
support for Golkar. The regulation also applied to the military. There were 119 accredited
national organizations and twenty international election monitoring institutions in the 1999
63 Bourchier, "Habibie's Interregnum," 2000, p. 20.
64 See Haris, "General Election under the New Order," 2004, 18-37. See also Callahan, Pollwatching,
Elections and Civil Society in Southeast Asia, 2000, p. 145-150.
157
election.
65
Tens of thousands of independent election observers monitored the election in
almost every single polling station. Despite few minor flaws in the system and cheating in the
process, no doubt, all international and domestic election monitoring groups praised the overall
process, caIling them 'the first free and fair elections in over 44 years'.
Robin Bush, deputy representative of the Asia Foundation in Jakarta, points out that it
is not necessarily surprising for a Muslim majority nation to have successful elections. What is
surprising, and what is to her knowledge unprecedented in the Muslim world, is that Muslim
organizations and activists were directly responsible for ensuring the success and validity of
these elections.
66
In both the 1999 and 2004 elections, the JPPR implemented one of the largest
and most comprehensive civil society voter education campaigns ever conceived. In 1999 they
trained and deployed 117 community-based voter education volunteers, and distributed over 23
million pieces of voter education materials (leaflets, stickers, and posters). In 2004 they
deployed over 140,000 voter education and election monitoring volunteers, and produced as
weIl as distributed over a million pieces of voter education materials in 350 districts. As
regional head elections (Pilkada) have been implemented since 2005, the JPPR kept
performing the voter education and electoral monitoring; it has already deployed more than
60.000 election monitors in nearly all regions.
The JPPR activities are divided into two different functions.
67
First is voter education:
the JPPR provides information about the candidates and their policies as well as the procedures
of the election. Information about the candidates and their policies is often difficult or
impossible to obtain, as there has been no tradition of candidates having to articulate policy
os See Bjomlund, Beyond Free and Fair, 2004, Chapter 12 "Foreign Support for Domestic Election
Monitorin; in Indonesia," p. 256-278.
See Bush, "Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia," 2005.
67 The Asia Foundation, Democracy and Elections in Indonesia, Newsletter, September 2006.
158
platfonns to an electorate. To encourage candidates to develop clear policy statements and
increase the amount of infonnation available to voters, JPPR undertake activities that address
both these critical issues. For example, in certain districts JPPR develops candidate
questionnaires which require candidates to make specific, quantifiable policies. The results are
printed in voter education brochures that are mass produced and widely distributed to the local
popUlation. JPPR has also been active in organizing and hosting candidate debates, providing
an opportunity for candidates to respond directly to voters and answer questions about
important local issues. Usually, these candidate debates are also broadcasted live on local radio,
so allowing many voters to benefit from the debates. In addition, the JPPR has also been
working to provide clear guidance on the procedure of the election, not only through brochures
and leaflets but also through public meetings and workshops. As the election processes are
complicated, particularly for less-educated people, the failure to provide such guidance will
lead to the high number of invalid ballots.
The second function of the JPPR is the election monitoring. In this regard, the JPPR
deployed monitors which have two functions. First, their presence at the polling station
provides a visible deterrence to those who may try to intimidate voters or subvert the election
process. A second role of the monitors is to complete a checklist about their observations from
their polling station. This checklist, once complete, is submitted to the district coordinator who
can then comment publicly to election officials and the media about JPPR's perception of the
quality of the election. Volunteers of JPPR ensured that the electoral process at national and
regional levels run peacefully and freely.
The other important aspect of the JPPR is concerning the most basic criteria for all
monitors: political neutrality. The JPPR has been trying its best to maintain its neutral position,
159
even though the network is composed primarily ofNU and Muhammadiyah members. The
JPPR requires all its monitors not being registered as party officials or members of official
campaign teams, let alone being candidates for legislative or executive bodies. The interesting
example was when the Muhammadiyah declared its support for Amien Rais in the 2004
presidential election. During the process leading to the declaration, many Muhammadiyah
youth organizations affiliated with the JPPR, opposed the Muhammadiyah plan to endorse
Amien's presidential bid. Their opposition, unfortunately, could not stop the plan. When it
became clear that the Muhammadiyah fully endorsed Amien's presidential bid, all
Muhanunadiyah youth wing organizations formally abandoned their membership in the JPPR,
fearing that their continuing involvement would jeopardize the JPPR neutrality. In order to
maintain the proportional membership balance between the NU and the Muhammadiyah within
the JPPR, all networks and their volunteers which had earlier been developed by those
Muhammadiyah youth wing organizations were thus taken over by other institutions which are
closely associated - but without formal affiliation - with the Muhammadiyah.
Compared to other monitoring election groups, the JPPR has obviously many
advantages. First, as its institutional members are composed mostly by organizations affiliated
with the NU and Muhammadiyah, their broad constituencies provide the JPPR with enormous
advocacy power and unparalleled access to ordinary grassroots voters. Second, as the JPPR
recruit its volunteers from local people, the JPPR not only cost efficiently but it also able to
easily understand the dynamics oflocal politics and culture. In regard to election monitoring,
their volunteers supposedly have better understanding about the candidates and their track
records. Meanwhile, in regard to voter education, their volunteers would not have any cultural
barriers to provide information for the electorate. For example, they could provide information
160
in local languages. Third, as the JPPR is supported mostly by many youth wing organizations
of the NU and Muhammadiyah, their volunteers supposedly have more political weight to
prevent any fraud in the electoral process, either from political parties, candidates, members of
campaign teams, or the election committees.
After serving in the election monitoring and voter education for ten years, I find some
remarkable findings about the JPPR phenomenon. First, the fact that this voter education and
monitoring group is made up primarily of Muslim organizations; it indicates the commitment
of the Muslim majority to the most basic and fundamental of democratic processes that is free
and fair elections. Second, and really the indicator of the depth of the Muslim civil society in
Indonesia, is the fact that the JPPR represents an unprecedented instance ofNU and
Muhammadiyah members collaborating and working in concert in Indonesia. Within the JPPR
these two organizations not only coexist, but work hand-in-hand, sharing responsibility, credit,
and political leverage. This is significant for two reasons. First is historical. In many instances,
the NU and Muhammadiyah playa very important role, but they do focus primarily on their
own constituencies. In the case of the JPPR, they were able to effectively transcend those
affiliations, and work to ensure the democratic process for all Indonesian citizens.
68
Second is
that because they could mitigate the potential conflict between both organizations since at the
same time there had been political conflict between Amien Rais and Abdurrahrnan Wahid as
well as between the President and the parliament whose impact pervaded into the grassroots
level. Third is that the JPPR can contribute both to the better elections and to the strengthening
of civil society, thereby contributing to long-term democratic development. Election
monitoring provides civil society organizations the opportunity to build networks and
68 Bush, "Islam and Civil Society in Iodonesia," 2005.
161
relationships that will enable them to continue to press for democracy after elections. It gives
them a chance to learn how to build coalitions and advocate public policy reforms in a more
democratic political system. The next section will provide another instance how Indonesian
Muslim civil society institutions contribute to the process of democratization.
D. The Corruption Eradicatiou
Indonesia has been in a historic period of transition from the authoritarian regime of
Suharto to laying the foundation for constitutional liberalism and a democratic political
structure. Ten years after the Reformasi started, governance and corruption continue to be
Indonesia's biggest challenges. Many people commented that the tremendous political,
economic and institutional changes that have marked Indonesia's transition to a more open,
competitive society provide new opportunities for improving governance and fighting
corruption. But, to date, Indonesia's achievements in promoting transparency and openness
have not been matched by genuine government accountability for dernonstrable results in
restoring integrity to the public sector and reducing corruption.
Corruption in Indonesia has been endemic. No doubt, Indonesia has the unwanted
reputation of being one of the most corrupt countries in the world, although fighting corruption
has been high on the policy agenda since the fall of Suharto. Despite Indonesia scores 2.3 in the
2006 and 2007 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 0.2 higher than that of2005, but together
with countries which score below three, it is still categorized as corrupt countries.
69
Indeed
corruption, or what Indonesians generically call KKN (the Indonesian-language acronym for
corruption, collusion, and nepotism), remains a debilitating disease that infects institutions in
69 See, The 2006 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index,
http://www.infoplease.comiipalA0781359.html; Compare with The 2007 Transparency International Corruption
Perception Index, htlp:llwww.infoplease.comiworldlstatistics/2oo7-transparency-international-corruption-
perceptions.html.
162
aU branches of the Indonesian state apparatus. Worse still, there has been a significant change
in its essential patterns and dynamics. During the Suharto era, a highly centralized,
authoritarian government meant that there was a certain degree of predictability about the
corruption that fed into a greatly personalized, patrimonial system of rule centered on the
presidency. With the unraveling of Suharto's New Order, power has become much more
diffused and decentralized, and the patterns and dynamics of corruption have done likewise.
70
The alarming scale of corruption has apparently made Indonesia difficult to achieve a
consolidated democracy, where the civil and political society must be embedded in, and
supported by the rule oflaw. Democratic consolidation, according to Linz and Stepan,
requires-among other things-all significant actors-especially the government and the state
apparatus--be held accountable to, and become habituated to, the rule ofIaw.71 For civil and
political society alike, a rule of law animated by a spirit of constitutionalism is an indispensable
condition. Moreover, although many concluded that Indonesia's democratization has been
consolidated since the 2004 election, however, according to Merkel and Croissant, Indonesia's
democracy-since its deficient implementation of the rule oflaw and horizontal accountability-
was labeled a defective democracy. Such kind of democracy is usuaUy accompanied by large-
scale abuses of political authority, by corruption and misuse of constitutional enactments, or by
using other legal loopholes for the personal benefit of political stakeholders.
72
In addition to
Indonesia, they go on to say, this kind of defective democracy can be found in aU regions:
Venezuela, Argentina, Russia, Ukraine, and Philippines.
70 Hadiz, "The State of Corruption," 2004, p. 210.
71 Linz and Stepan, ''Toward Consolidated Democracy," 1996, p. 18-19.
72 Merkel and Croissant, "Conclusion: Good and Defective Democracy," 2004, p. 205.
163
The lack of progress in fighting corruption has been widely discussed with fear among
Indonesian people, including the NU and Muhammadiyah leaders. Their concerns departed
from fundamental questions such as why corruption keeps on happening while anti-corruption
regulations and policies are being constantly exercised, at least rhetorically. Religiously
speaking, why is Indonesia as the world's largest Muslim country also among the most corrupt
countries in the world? Now that Muslims constitute the majority of the Indonesian population,
is the high level of corruption also caused by certain Islamic teachings that have been
understood, taught and applied by Indonesian MuslimS?73
Frustrated with the government's lackluster anticorruption measures, the NU and
Muhammadiyah-leaving their ideological differences behind- have signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOV) on October 15, 2003 to initiate a national anticorruption movement. The
MOU, facilitated by the non-governmental organization the Partnership for Governance
Reform, was signed by NU chairman Hasyim Muzadi, Muhammadiyah chairman Syafii Maarif
and Partnership executive director H.S. Dillon. Its significance did not go uunoticed as the two
organizations have rarely collaborated in matters of policy, except in certain adverse conditions
when both felt compelled to put things right. For the two organizations to unite and to take the
initiative in the fight against corruption means that in the eyes ofNU and Muhammadiyah
corruption in this country has already grown to such alarming proportions that it threatens the
future of the nation as a whole.
74
Under the MoU, the NU and Muhammadiyah have done a number of interrelated
endeavors. Among other things,first, in order to raise awareness of the anti-corruption
73 Interview with Saiful Bahri Anshori, the manager program orthe NO anti-corruption taskforce aod
deputy general secretary of the PBNO, on Jaouary 9,2008 in Jakarta.
74 Interview with Rizal Sukma, the deputy coordinator of the Muhannnadiyah aoti-corruption taskforce
aod head of tile international affairs council of the PP Mnbammadiyah, on Jaouary 12, 2008, in Jakarta.
164
movement among their members and Indonesian people alike, the NU and Muhammadiyah
have developed an Islamic interpretation of corruption drawn primarily from Islamic law and
historical precedents.
75
They not only provide extensive examinations of corruption from the
Islamic perspective, in terms of its numerous definitions in Islamic law, they also explain the
devastating impacts of corruption for economic development, public welfare, security,
environmental sustainability, law enforcement and public morality.
These religious interpretations were not simply published in books and thus
distributed widely through organizational networks of the NU and Muhammadiyah. They were
also disseminated through training of Islamic preachers and published in piecemeal Friday
sermon supplements. The potential impact of these efforts should not be underestimated since
the pronouncements of religious leaders are culturally heeded by most Muslims in Indonesia In
a country where the great majority of people are Muslim and the clergy enjoys considerable
respect, certainly the banding together of these two respected organizations can lend
considerable power to the anticorruption drive.
Second, in order to develop a strong civil society able to check the behavior of the
corrupt power-holders and their collaborators, the NU and Muhammadiyah have set up
corruption watchdogs in their branches across the country to monitor possible corruption at the
local level. They were trained to have sufficient capacity to advocate pro-poor budgeting and
monitor corruption in local government. Furthermore, in order to increase the transparency and
accountability in local governments, the Muhammadiyah and NU have also initiated a
breakthrough by facilitating concerned local Parliament members to form an anti-corruption
caucus on local levels. They were not only furnished with sufficient technical assistance to
" See Maje\is Trujih dan Tajdid PP Mnhammadiyah, Fikih Anti Karupsi, 2006 and Naim, Rofiah, and
Rahmat, NU Melawan Karupsi, 2006.
165
improve their capacity in local budgeting, but they are also trained to engage in experts'
meeting in order to find solutions and gather recommendations on the most effective strategies
to improve public participation in the monitoring process of the implementation and efficiency
in the govemment's expenditure. Members of this caucns were recruited not limitedly from
those who become members of the NU and Muhanunadiyah. Instead, they were recruited
nearly from all political parties committed to fight against corruption.
Third, in order to awaken a nationwide anger against corruptors and the practice of
corruption, the NU and Muhanunadiyah have been carrying out many campaign activities
through media, such as advertising the anti-corruption message in newspapers, distributing
stickers, leaflets and banners, hosting talk shows in radio and making movies. The
Muhanunadiyah and NU have also held regular press conferences conveying commentaries on
the state of corruption in Indonesia.
Forth, in order to avoid cynicism accusing them as talking only on corruption, the NU
and Muhammadiyah have also been campaigning the internal good govemance. Both
organizations are determined to implement a modern management system at their organizations
based on the principles of accountahility, transparency, integrity, participation and justice. In so
doing, they sought to improve audit management, estahlish good governance guidelines and
ensure transparency in their reports; all are aimed at minimizing irregularities. Both organizations
have a number of economic activities and strive to attain a prosperous society. The success in
these efforts would promote role models on how to develop good governance internally.
Fifth, in the months leading to the 2004 legislature election, the Muhanunadiyah and
NU also used the momentum to promote their anti-corruption agenda. Amid the growing
campaign of anti-crooked politicians, both published leadership guidelines for candidates of
166
MP and regional representatives. The anti-crooked politicians' desks were also run by student
wings of both organizations. Political contracts with candidates running for the local
parliaments were also signed at the NU and Muharnmadiyah regional chapters shortly before
the 2004 legislature election took place. Both also launched a public campaign, mostly through
religious events, urging people to vote for candidates with clean track record.
While most pilot projects of the NU anti-corruption activities were carried out in
several cities where the NU has strong organizational support, that are Kendal and Magelang of
Central Java and Blitar and Probolinggo of East Java, Muharnmadiyah activities were
concentrated in the provinces of Lampung, Central Java, Yogyakarta and West Sumatera.
Since the signing of the memorandum, many Indonesians have hailed the resolve of
the two organizations to combat corruption. Since neither the executive nor the legislature and
the judiciary have so far shown their political will to end corruption, many people thought, who
better could the public trust to do the job than the two Muslim organizations which together
claim a following of no less than 60 million? In contrast, the campaign has also met with
considerable skepticism almost the moment it became public knowledge.
Such high expectation and skepticism are justifiable concerning the fact that for the
average Indonesian, whose life depends on the services of a corruption-riddled bureaucracy,
there can be no doubt that corruption at present pervades almost every stratum of the
administration, from the top echelons of govermnent down to the district and sub-district levels
and to the neighborhood officials. For as long as can be remembered, govermnent
anticorruption drives have always stalled, mostly due to the reluctance of the authorities to act.
In the light of such a background, the moderate answer may be to encourage all concerned
citizens and groups to partake in these efforts, in their own ways, which could then be sifted to
167
fmd those that are workable?6 It would certainly help for the public to see that something is at
last being done to curb corruption. In this regard, the NU-Mubammadiyah coalition is only a
part of the chain for finally getting the anticorruption drive rolling. As social-religious
organizations, without the authority to execute, they focus their efforts on campaign, advocacy,
and monitoring. If we eventually fail to curb the corruption, therefore, it would be misleading
to scapegoat the NU and Muharnmadiyah.
As the role played by both organizations during the last ten years of the Suharto
regime was remarkable in broadening a free public sphere and opposing the authoritarian New
Order regime, it seemed that after the fall of Suharto both organizations have been continuing
their role to provide "the basis for the limitation of state power, hence for the control of the
state by society, and hence for democratic political institutions as the most effective means of
exercising that control.,,77 In this regard, both civil society organizations are vital for containing
the power of democratic governments, checking their potential abuses and violations of the
law, and subjecting them to public scrutiny. Indeed, says Diamond, a vibrant civil society is
probably more essential for consolidating and maintaining democracy than for initiating it. 78
The potential impact of these anti corruption efforts carried out by the
Muharmnadiyah and NU is enormous. They have relatively loyal and vast constituencies all
across the country that can be mobilized. Unfortunately, within the two organizations, and
particularly within the NU, there are disagreements over the extent to which the organizations
should address corruption.
79
The disagreement seems to be based on the differences between
conservatives and progressives in the NU. Traditionally, NU kyai and their pesantren have
76 Johnston, Civil Society and Corruption, 2005, p. xi.
77 Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" 1984, p. 204. See also Lipset, Political Man,
1981, p. 52.
78 Diamond, ''Toward Democratic Consolidation," 1994, p. 17.
70 Davidaen, Juwono and Timberman, Curbing Corruption In Indonesia 2004-2006, 2006, p. 68-69.
168
been beneficiaries of government funds and the largesse of government officials. These
payments, which often take the fonn of gifts or donations, are not easily differentiated from
corruption. Hence, conservatives are concerned about how NU comes to define corrupt
practices, whereas progressives think that such payments do in fact co-opt NU's kyai and
therefore should not be permitted. As for Muhammadiyah, the new chainnan, Din Syamsuddin,
appears less interested in placing corruption high on his agenda. At best, he seems to be more
interested in using the anti-corruption campaign to furnish his image before the public, as he is
known for his political ambition. As a result, it seems unlikely that NU and Muhammadiyah
will undertake major anti-corruption initiatives in the foreseeable future.
While this section is devoted to examine the anti-corruption campaign carried out by
the NU and Muhammadiyah, the following section will study their role in promoting civic
pluralism against the increasing sentiment of radicalism within Indonesian Muslims.
E. The Last Bastion of Civic Pluralism
Indonesia has been gaining much media coverage through the images of radicalized
Muslims and sectarian conflicts. The foreign affairs' ministries ofa number of western
governments have taken a conservative approach and advised citizens to stay away from
Indonesia or take precautions. Such alarming images are not without evidence. In fact, radical
and dogmatic interpretations of Islam have gained ground in recent years in many Muslim
societies. In Indonesian context, there are many reasons for this, and there are also a large and
growing body of literature continues to be engaged in exploring them. It is clear that the events
of political openness brought about by the democratization, the September 11 attacks and the
ensuing war on terrorism have provided momentum for such radicalization.
169
In the course of the last ten years, there has also been a rise in the number of Islamic
associations that adhere to fundamentalist principles and that are often militant in their
approach to societal problems. They are strongly anti-American and they call for the
conversion of Indonesia to an Islamic state. Laskar Jihad, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI),
the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), Hizbut Iahrir Indonesia (HII) and Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) are the most prominent of these new groups.so Another instance is the
mushrooming ofIslamic parties since the fall ofSuharto which is indicating that Indonesian
Islam was not as apolitical and domesticated as had seemed in the late New Order.
There is widespread concern that the growth ofIslamism may lead to the type of
"identity politics" that contributed to the collapse of Indonesia's first experiment with
parliamentary democracy in the 1950s. Will they support the democratization, or will they lead
to a revival of sectarianism? Although a definitive answer is impossible, we need to raise the
question of whether there is a real danger that radical Islamism may come to disturb the
religious and political freedoms of a moderate majority? By analyzing the broader
phenomenon, however, I will argue that the resurgence of Muslim politics in Indonesia will not
lead to significant change in their political attitudes: a vast majority of Indonesian Muslims are
personally tolerant and moderate in their outlook.
sl
There are several reasons supporting this
conviction. And the role of the NU and Muhammadiyah is potentially remarkable.
Despite the blossoming of numerous Islamic parties since the fall of Suharto, they do
not speak with a single voice. Rather they are intrinsically diverse. Current Muslim parties in
Indonesia constitute a remarkable phenomenon in the Muslim world, where most Muslim
80 Van Bruinessen, "Genealogies ofIslamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia," 2002; leG, "Al-
Qaeda in Southeast Asia," 2002; Fealy, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia," 2004; Hefner, "Muslim Democrats and
Islamist Violence in Post-Soeharto Indonesia," 2005; Hasan, Laskar Jihad, 2006.
81 EliIaz, Islam in Indonesia, 2004, p. 67.
170
political parties are strongly ideological and are not committed to open political dialogue with
others. Significantly, there is no unity on what Islam's role in politics should be. This is marked
by the existence of numerous parties rather than one that is representing all Muslims or one for
each traditionalist and modernist. Equally important, they disagree among themselves about
important matters such as the mentioning of sharia in the constitution.
In fact, during the MPR session in 2000, only the PPP and PBB proposed inserting a
clause demanding the application of sharia law for Muslims, a demand taken as the revival of
the so-called Jakarta Charter, which was once a part of the draft Constitution at the beginning
of the Republic. When it came to an actual debate in the MPR, however, their proposal did not
survive and was soon overwhelmed by opposition coming from inside and outside the MPR.
82
The NU and Muhammadiyab, which favored an Islamic state in 1955, opposed the
agenda of formally adopting the sharia into the Constitution.
B3
Hasyim Muzadi ofNU saw that
the struggle for sharia to be enforced in Indonesia was not realistic. He has urged the
promotion of universal values for the people's prosperity, instead of pushing the idea of sharia.
According to Syafii Maarif of Muhammadiyah, members ofLaskar Jihad (Jihad warriors) in
Solo felt disappointed with Muhammadiyah for not supporting the restoration of the Jakarta
Charter in Article 29. Due to these developments, some Muslim hard-liners have alleged that
Muhammadiyah and NU are no longer Islamic, or are no longer articulating Muslim
aspirations. Syafii was reported to have said: 'I believe that many people within our (NU and
Muhammadiyah) community will condemn our stance, but I have warned them that we must be
committed to promoting unity, which our founding fathers declared when establishing this
82 Azra, "The Megawati Presidency," 2003, p. 65.
83 See Hosen, ''Religion and the Indonesian Constitution," 2005. On the contrasting views between those
who sopported and opposed the sharia, see Zein and Sarifuddin, Syari'at Islam Yes Syari'at Islam No, 2001.
171
nation'. To put it differently, it seemed that the focus is no longer on how to bring Islam into
the foundation of the state, but how to bring Islamic coloration into policies produced by the
state. This reflects a sharia approach from these two Islamic organizations.
Tantamount to the NU and Muhammadiyah opposition, the agenda of adopting the
sharia into the Constitution was also firmly opposed not only by the secular Golkar and PDI-P,
but also the PKB and PAN-that draw their supports mostly from the NU and Muhanunadiyah
members. They took the stand that the national consensus of Pancasila, the five principles of
Faith in One Supreme God, Humanism, Nationalism, Democracy, and Social Justice, should be
continued as the state foundation. As a result, its preamble containing Pancasila and Article 29
guaranteeing the freedom of religious belief and practice were both left intact throughout the
debates on the constitutional amendment.
The opposition ofP AN and PKB as well as the Muhammadiyah and NU is a new
development within Islamic community. This is arguably among the result of the rejuvenation
of cultural Islam during the New Order era: as it thus has been stimulating the emergence of a
new paradigm of Islam adopted by some Islamic parties, which stresses the substantive aspects
ofIslam rather than its legal and formal ones.
84
Unlike the characteristic ofIslamic parties in
the 1950s and 1960s where they attempted to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia, the new
paradigm draws much more attention to the substantive aspects of Islam and the new Islamic
generation is much more interested in establishing inclusive and pluralist political parties.
In light of these developments, any analysis of Indonesian politics should not
overlook these dynamics. nor should one assume that political Islam has been static and united
in focusing on the state ideology. Instead, in the post-Suharto era, an interesting spectrum of
S4 Jamhari, "Islamic Political Parties," 1999, p. 184.
172
political Islam has appeared in Indonesia. Today, the five Islam-friendly parties represent the
transfonnation of political Islam in Indonesia since the 1970s. These parties are not only varied
in their commitment to an Islamic agenda but also strongly divided on this agenda. 85 Among
them, three (the PBB, PPP, and PKS) clearly adhere to Islam as their ideology. They pursue
platfonns somewhat similar to those ofIslamic parties in the 1950s. These three parties are
Islamist and fit what most scholars commonly understand as Islamic parties. In contrast, the
PKB and PAN derive support from Islamic organizations while appearing pluralistic. One can
see that the PAN and PKB are Islam-inclusive parties, as their platforms do not explicitly focus
on pursuing an Islamic agenda. What is unique is that they welcome Muslims' political
aspirations, but they all oppose the fonnal adoption of sharia in the Constitution.
Furthermore, in the 1999 election out of twenty Islamic parties which participated in
the election only ten parties gained one seat or more in the DPR. Put together, they could only
win 37 per cent of the votes (172 seats), including PKB and PAN. Without these last two
parties, however, they gained only 17.8 percent of the votes (87 seats).86 In the 2004 election,
their performance seemed to be better. If the total votes received by all the Muslim parties in
the 2004 election are tallied including the PAN and PKB, they gained 42 percent or 231 of the
500 seats in the DPR. However, if the PAN and the PKB are excluded, then they received 23
percent of the vote, or 127 seats.
87
Moreover, in the 2004 presidential election, the two
presidential candidates running in the second round have secular political outlooks, although
they are Muslims in term ofreligion.
88
" Woodward, "Indonesia, Islam, and the Prospect for Democracy," 2001; Riddell, "The Diverse Voices,"
2002; Fealy, "Divided Majority," 2003. Salim, Partai Islam dan Relasi Agama Negara, 1999.
86 Effendy, Islam and the State, 2003, p. 214.
87 Wanandi, "The Indonesian General Election 2004," 2004, p. 118.
88 Emmerson, "One Nation under God?" 2006, p. 77.
173
The results of the 1999 and 2004 elections were a significant decline compared with
the first democratic election of 1955, when Islamic parties altogether won 43.9 % of the total
votes. They were also united in supporting an Islamic agenda. The results once again reflected
the minority appeal ofIslamism, regardless of both the fact that the majority of the Indonesians
are Muslims and the fact that there has been increasing Islamic revivalism within society.
Analyzing the figures on the basis of the division. it is clear that the greater portion of the votes
was awarded to the secular and pluralistic Islamic parties rather than to the formalistic Islamic
parties. Given the results of these elections, some observers argue that they are an important
indicator of the political moderation of Indonesian Muslims today.89 Other observers note that
the presence of these two political parties seem to be an effective block within the Muslim
community against the growth of any tendency leading to religious communalism.
90
Another instance that the NU and Muhanunadiyah playa significant role in maintaining
the moderate nature of Indonesian Muslims is proven by their stance concerning Islamic
radicalism and terrorism. In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the ever-growing
post-Suharto radical Islamic discourse in Indonesia was increasing and was in itself shaped by
thernes evident in the global sphere, where the rhetoric of a clash between Islam and the West
became a major theme in international relations.
91
The government's response in the aftermath of
the terrorist attacks elicited strong reaction in the country. President Megawati was shocked by
attacks from the Islamist groups and political parties for expressing Indonesia's cooperation in
the U.S-led war on terror, during her visit to the United States only one week after the events.
They even accused her of being a lackey of the United States. However, when President Bush
89 Mujani and Liddle, "Politics, Islam," 2004, p. 112. Hefuer, "Globalization, Governance, and the Crisis
of Indonesian Islam," 2002, p. 13; Barton, "Islamism and Indonesia," 2002; Effendy, "Enforcement ofShar'iab in
Indonesia," 2004, p. 95.
90 Nakamura, Islam and Democracy, 2005, p. 27.
91 Sebastian, "Indonesian State Response to September II," 2003, p. 432.
174
ordered American troops to invade Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, President Megawati, seeking
to calm domestic criticism, criticized the u.s. campaign in Afghanistan. She described it as ''the
spilling of blood to avenge the spilling blood." On October 8, 2001, the Department of Foreign
Affairs also released a statement expressing deep reservations about the military actions
undertaken by Washington in Afghanistan.
92
Domestic reactions to the Government's responses were remarkable. Their anti-
Megawati campaign then turned into anti-Americanism. Demonstrations by Indonesian
Muslims, particularly from hard-liner groups, occurred in Jakarta and other big cities in the
country protesting the u.s. bombing of Afghanistan, demanding President Megawati to
condemn it, and even calling for a holy war (jihad) in defence of Afghanistan. The Indonesian
Council ofUlernas (MUl) also backed the call for jihad by issuing fatwa (religious edict}-
causing great alarm. In addition, hard-liner groups demanded that the government suspend
diplomatic relations with the United States, opened venues for the registration of holy warriors
prepared to go to Afghanistan and threatened to use their pararnilitaries to 'sweep' hotels in the
city of Surakarta in search of American and British tourists.
93
Outside these radical responses and threats, however, the mainstream of Indonesian
Muslims reacted differently. The leaders of the country's two largest Islamic organizations, the
NU and the Muharnmadiyab, repUdiated calls for radical action. The NU Chairman Hasyim
Muzadi said that the NU would not recruit its members as volunteers for such a jihad. He
maintained that jihad does not always mean holy war; efforts to develop Islam and the Muslim
ummah are also called jihad. He also believed that the terrorist attacks of September 11 were a
92 Sirozi, "Indonesian Responses to September 11,2001," 2006, p. 390.
93 Hasan, "September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia," 2005, p. 303. While there
was finally no real 'sweepings' occurred, such threat was widely captured by media--<lornestic and international
alike--which had worsened the image of Indonesian Muslims.
175
tragedy of humanity. As such, the terrorist attacks should not be transformed into religious
conflicts. In a similar vein, the Muhammadiyah chairman Syafii Maarif also indicated that his
organization would not get involved in a radical move. He criticized the MUI's call for jihad,
which he believed had been misunderstood by many Muslims, given the diverging
interpretations of the word. He concluded that it was not wise to use the word jihad as it would
only raise Muslim's anger and provoke radicalism.
94
The MUI's call for jihad was also clarified by the MUI secretary general and vice
chairman of the Mnhammadiyah Din Syamsuddin saying that it was not referring to a violent
jihad; jihad in this call was not an armed war but a serious, peaceful attempt to assist their fellow
Afghan Muslims who would suffer from the U.S. attacks.
95
In order to appease the radical
appeals, the NU and Muhammadiyah in a join statement condenmed the attacks and labeled them
an aggression against non-combatant Afghans. However, they also condenmed the terrorist
attacks stating that violent action was not recommended in Islam against civilian and outside the
battlefield. Such evidence indicated that sentiment among mainstream Muslims were in
accordance with the conciliatory and sympathetic remarks made by President Megawati.
The Bali bombing of October 12, 2002, may have proved a blessing in disguise for
Indonesia in dealing with Islamic radicalism.
96
Prior to the bombing, the government refused to
arrest the allegedly-spiritual leader of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network Abu Bakar Ba'asyir
on the ground that there was no evidence to put the cleric behind bars. Indonesia's removal of
the Anti-Subversion Law (the equivalent of the Internal Security Act of both Singapore and
94 Azra, "The Megawati Presidency," 2003, p. 50.
" Hasan, "September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia," 2005, p. 304. The
government has also issued a ban on Indonesians joining the jihad in Afghanistan-invoking a law which forbids
Indonesians joining foreign armies.
,. Azra, Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy, 2006, p. 173.
176
Malaysia, used to arrest "subversive" elements without trial) was put forward as the reason why
newly democratic Indonesia could not employ authoritarian methods from the past.
97
After the
Bali bombing, however, with the government under intense pressure to prove Indonesia's
commitment to combating terrorism, President Megawati demonstrated decisive leadership by
introducing anti-terrorism regulations, which provided a legal umbrella for counter-terrorist
activities. International cooperation was welcomed to investigate the bombings and two
presidential decrees were hastily drawn up to improve intelligence coordination. The state's
rapid actions put hard-line groups, in the wake of the bombings, now under closer scrutiny of
the security apparatus. As a result, the Indonesian government soon issued an arrest warrant for
Ba'asyir, while the other radical group Laskar Jihad was disbanded after government pressure
and its leadership was put in jail.
At the same token, the NU and Muharnmadiyah had by the end of 2002 gained
enough momentum to jointly criticize the radical fringe groups. The Bali bombing, by and
large, has contributed to a more resolute and stronger attitude among Indonesian Muslims in
general to confront radicalism; more and more Muslims abandon the defensive and apologetic
attitude toward the ruthlessness of the bombing perpetrators. The previous believe among some
people of the so-called 'conspiracy theory' seemed also to decreasing. Virtually, all Muslim
leaders issued statements in strongest terms ever condemning the bombing.
98
According to
Hasyim Muzadi, for whatever reasons, terrorism is the most vulgar and barbaric crime against
humanity. He goes on to say that there is no religion that condones violence, because religion is
a system of belief aimed at creating civilization and, at the same time, a human soul that is full
of divine values including affection for another. Hence, says Hasyim, "in principle, terrorism
97 Smith, "Indonesia in 2002," 2003, p. 103.
98 Azra, Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy, 2006, p. 217.
177
and religion contradict each other.,,99 At the same token, Syafii Maarif states that Indonesia in
recent times has become the victim of terror conducted by misled Muslims due to their
destructive and political interpretation of the Islamic teachings. Syafii goes on to say that they
have wrongly interpreted their religion to achieve their political objectives by misusing it.
Syafii call the terror action as "the brutality demonstrated by these abnormal people."IOO
The September 11 and the ensuing 'war on terror' indicated that international factors
significantly contributed to the escalation ofIslamic radicalism in Indonesia. In an Indonesia no
longer immunized from global Islamic discourse by the once all-pervasive Suharto-era state
security apparatus, transnational Islamic issues resonate in the country through the media
coverage; feel a sense of solidarity with the Palestine cause, or collectively with other Muslims
experience a sense of outrage at the sight of civilian war casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is
true that a majority of Indonesian Muslims neither approved of Tali ban interpretations ofIslam
nor had any liking for Saddam's regime. lOt Most Indonesians also condemned the September
11 attacks and the perversion ofIslam that gave rise to them. In the absence of reliable polling,
it is reasonable to conclude that this is probably a fair reflection of mainstream Indonesians.
They do not support Osama bin Laden, but equally they do not wish to see the United States
intervene in the Muslim world.
to2
In dealing with the growing Islamic radicalism in Indonesia, it is necessary for the
Indonesian government to understand that this issue was partly due to the socioeconomic crisis
and the instability that it brings combined with the absence of state authority in dealing with
militants, particularly those with the tendency to break the law, and partly fueled by
., Muzadi, "Same Faith, Different Names," 2003, p. 91.
100 Maarif, Menggugah Nurani Bangsa, 2005, p. 111.
101 Sebastian, "Indonesian State Response," 2003, p. 433.
102 Smith, "What the Recent Terror Attacks Means for Indonesia," 2001, p. 9-10.
178
international factors. Therefore, the future ability of Indonesia to continue on the path of
economic recovery as well as political reform will determine the future ofIslamic radicalism.
Likewise, the govermnent's decisiveness and consistency, on the one hand, to pay attention to
international Islamic issues in placating Islamic concerns, and to move against domestic
militants on the other, will determine Indonesia's success in dealing with radical movements,
which to some extent have stained the moderate image of Indonesian Muslims.
Another effort carried out by the Muhammadiyah and NU to maintain the moderate
nature of Indonesian Islam is seen in the flourishing networks of smaller NGOs loosely
connected to both organizations. As many people perceived the Muhammadiyah and NU as
large-scale NGOs, the establishment of a number of smaller NGOs within the organizations
indicates the existence ofNGOs within NGOs.
The mushrooming ofNGOs within the NU and Muhammadiyah has its origin in the
establishment of numerous NGOs since early in theSuharto period.
to3
Many former students and
activists who initially supported Suharto' s rise to power and hoped that it would end the
authoritarianism ofSukamo's Guided Democracy became disappointed with the New Order's
leaning to authoritarianism. As the political parties were severely manipulated and opposition
movements were suppressed by the regime, many NGOs were established.
104
Since many
underprivileged groups in society had been marginalized by the accelerated economic
development promoted by the New Order regime, the NGOs began focusing their activities on
specific development-related issues such as ruraI and urban development as well as
environmental and legal issues.
10' On the broader discussions concerning NGOs in Indonesia, see Eldridge, Non-Government
Organizations, 1995; Sinaga, NGOs in Indonesia, 1994, Hadiwinata, The Politics ofNGOs in Indonesia, 2003.
104 UhIin, Indonesia and the "Third Wave of Demacratization ", 1997, p. 97.
179
Ali. old-generation ofNGOs were often driven by dedicated middle class activists,
they tended to adopt a less confrontational strategy against the regime. It was not until late in
the 1980s and early 1990s that a number of new radical NGOs increasingly became issue-
oriented. They targeted the most disadvantaged, promoting self-help projects and empowering
people, politically, economically, and socially.I05 The establishment of this new generation of
NGOs stenuned from their dissatisfaction with the developmental approach giving too much
emphasis to macro-economic growth and its top-down approach.
I06
Among those young activists who supported the old-type ofNGOs were those with an
Islamic modernist and traditionalist backgrounds. Since early in the 1970s, through the
legendary LP3ES (the Institute for Econornic and Social Research, Education and Information)
they had initiated programs that were intended to raise the potential of the pesantren as a
medium and motor of rural and human resource development. By the mid-1980s pesantren-
based development efforts shifted to a new NGO named P3M (the Centre for Development of
Pesantren and Society). The most significant contribution of the P3M was, however, in
challenging and developing traditionalist Muslim discourse. The P3M has long been initiated
important debates on religion and societal affairs including land conflicts, gender relations,
democracy, and corruption.
Since the mid-1990s, while Abdurrahman gradually became an outspoken opposition
leader to the Suharto regime, a number ofNGOs were established by young NU generations. As
the NU's 1984 congress decided that the organization should back to their original guideline
(khittah) and stay away from practical politics, the decision also required the NU to give priority
10' Nyman, Democratising Indonesia, 2006, p. 50.
106 Hikam, "Non-Governmental Organizations and the Empowerment of Civil Society," 1999, p. 219.
180
again to religious and social concerns (syu 'un ijtima 'iyyah). 107 In the meantime, the NU activists
also began controlling the management of the P3M, which had previously been managed by the
modernist camp. Supported mainly by the Ford Foundation and the Asia Foundation (and less
visibly USAID and a range of other foreign agencies), most of the Muslim NGOs in the 1990s
working at the grassroots have some personal or ideological affiliation with NU.
In addition to the P3M, there are many other NGOs closely affiliated to the NU
community which are properly categorized into the old generation ofNGO. The foremost is the
Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia (Research and Development
Institute for Human Resources, LAKPESDAM). Dedicated to community-based development,
it is also NU's official documentation center as well as publishing house. Its original mission
was to work for improvement ofthe poorest masses of the NU supporters. 108
Since the fall ofSuharto, the number ofNGOs loosely affiliated to the NU has been
increasing. By and large, they fit into the new type ofNGOs working on specific issues, such as
human rights, minority rights, pluralism and tolerance, gender, and policy advocacy. The
Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial (Institute for Islamic and Social Studies, LKiS), while
known as a book publisher of critical Islamic thinking, has become more systematic since its
establishment in 1997 in conducting short course on human rights, gender equality and similar
pesantren-based course and trainings. I 09
The trainings organized by the LKiS lead in tum to the establishment of the Lembaga
Kajian Hak Asasi Manusia (Institute for Human Rights Studies, LKHAM) in Tasikmalaya,
West Java in 1999. Given the 1996 sectarian rioting and the rise ofIslamist movements in this
107 Van Bruinessen and Wajidi, "Syu'un Ijtima'iyyah and the Kyai Rakyat," 2006, p. 205-248.
lOS Ramage, "Social Organizations," 1999, p. 209.
109 The Asia Foundation, Islamic Organizations and Development in Indonesia, 2007, p. 2.
181
region, the LKHAM took pains to promote the ideas of tolerant and transformative Islam. It
organizes a number of activities such as public education, relation with non-Muslim groups,
kin d I
ad 110
pesantren networ g, an po ICY vocacy.
Another NGO loosely affiliated to the NU, the Lembaga Advokasi dan Pendidikan
Rakyat (Institute for Public Advocacy and Education, LAP AR), was established Makassar in
1999. Taking a more radical stance toward human rights issues, the Lapar coordinates
initiatives designed to promote reconciliation between victims of the 1965-1966 allegedly
communist massacre killing and Muslim leaders who participated in the violence. In addition to
reconciliation, the Lapar also seeks to change legislations that continue to bar ex-communists
and their children from government services and other state agencies.
Another NGO, the W AHID Institute, was established not only to disseminate
Abdurrahman Wahid's ideas of democracy and tolerance, but also to further his commitment to
minority rights. I I I Established in 2004, The W AHID Institute is committed to the exchange and
dissemination of progressive Muslims thought to promote tolerance and democracy. In
particular, the institute is committed to developing a dialogue between the highest spiritual and
political leaders in the West and the Muslim world. I 12 While Abdurrahman established an NGO
focusing on tolerance and democracy, his wife Sinta Nuriyah has initiated the establishment of
the PUAN AMAL HA YATI, which runs 5 women crisis centers, located in Tasikmalaya and
Indramayu in West Java and Jember, Madura and Malang in East Java. The centers are aimed
to assist traumatized women by providing counseling, legal and medical support and to protect
them from the abuser. In these centers, the NGO uses a religious approach to support the
110 Ali, ''Moderate Islam Movemeot in Contemporary Indonesia," 2007, p. 226.
III Interview with the Executive Director of the Wahid Institute Ahmad Suaedy, on January 9, 2008 in
Jakarta.
112 See in the front page of its website in http://www.wahidinstitute.orglengIishlcontentJview/12140/
182
victims and carries out activities to sensitize the stakeholders, including government officials,
law enforcers, community and religious leaders on gender equality and equity.
Another stunning effort within the NU community on women issues has been carried
out by FAHMINA, apesantren-based NGO in Cirebon, West Java. Led by a traditional and
senior Kyai Hussein, Falunina has been conducting a series of thematic discussions on
democracy, gender equity, and human rights from a deeply Islamic perspective, using classical
texts and teachings within thefiqh (Islamic law) as well as the Hadis (Prophet's utterances) and
Quran, to show that these values come from Islam and are not being imported from the West.
On the issue of women's rights, Fahmina approached the topic by raising local problems, such
as the high numbers of domestic violence victims currently handled by the Fahmina-affiliated
Women's Crisis Center Balqis; rape cases; women trafficking; and girl education inpesantren.
By relating women's rights to these local issues, Fahmina effectively rejected the common
claim that "women's rights" is a Western concept.
ll3
Whereas the involvement of the NU activists and members in the NGOs' activities
has been enormous since the mid-1990s, the involvement ofMuhammadiyah young generation
in such activities has been increasing only after the fall ofSuharto. Activists ofMuhammadiyah
and similar reformist backgrounds previously tended to get involved in a different type of
endeavors than the typical NGO: discussion groups and other forms of adult education, some
charitable work, and co-operatives. They also tended to be less dependent on sponsoring by
foreign agencies. Since the reform era, however, there was a growing anxiety within
Muhammadiyah young activists that deduced the organization has increasingly been trapped in
a routine of activities, tended to become government-like bureaucracy, and lagged in
1\3 Bush, "Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia," 2005.
183
responding religious discourse and other critical issues such as democracy, tolerance, human
rights, and gender equality. These young generations were mostly former activists of two youth
wings ofMuhammadiyah, the Muhammadiyah Adolescence Association (IRM) and the
Muhammadiyah Student Association (IMM); they also espoused religious studies mostly in the
State Islamic University (IAINIUIN) in Jakarta and Jogjakarta during the 1990s.
Some leaders of the IRM, since 1998, started to introduce some programs focusing on
democracy and anti-violence. As a response to growing Islamic radicalism that rejected
democracy as a Western product and being incompatible with Islam, they conducted seminars
and discussions on such issues as the state-religion relation, religion and pluralism, and the like.
In addition, concerned with the outbreak of sectarian violence in some regions, they conducted
massive training in some provinces to raise awareness about harmonious co-existence among
divergent religious adherents. They also brought youths from interfaith backgrounds together to
discuss anti-violence and how Islam and other religions support conflict mitigation. I 14
Another endeavor within the Muhammadiyah to promote democratic civility and
religious pluralism took place early in 2001 when some young Muhammadiyah activists
established the Pusat Studi Agama dan Peradaban (The Center for the Study of Religion and
Civilization, PSAP). The Center has been devoting its activities to build a civil society based on
religious and human values. I IS It conducted extensive research and public discussion on such
issues as religion, democracy, pluralism, and civil society. In order to spread its vision, the
Center also published books and a journal on these issues. The further involvement of young
Muhammadiyah activists in NGO-like-institutions has been organized within the MAARIF
114 Latic, ''Post-Puritanisme Muhammadiyah," 2003, p. 78-80.
I IS See its profile at http://psap.or.idljatidiri.php.
184
INSTITUTE for Culture and Humanity. Established in late 2002, the Institute was aimed at
extending and furthering the ideas and vision of former Muhammadiyah chairman Syafii
Maarif to promote social justice and universal values of humanism. Its activities are focused on
inter-religious dialogue, religious tolerance, and advocacy of public policy. I 16
Another effort within the Muhammadiyah community is promoting civic education
which is organized by the Institute of Research and Educational Development of
Muhammadiyah University ofYogyakarta (LP3 UMY). Its program is focused on the
development of a civic education program based on principles of democracy and human rights.
It produced a book entitled Democracy, Human Rights, and Civil Society in 1999 which is
aimed to be the hand book for the course. Over 500 teachers from more than 80 universities
were trained in teaching civic education and nearly 100,000 students enroll in these courses
each year. The program is intended to replace the authoritarian indoctrination required under
the Suharto regime with courses on democracy, pluralism, and citizenship. I 17
Some other young Muhammadiyah activists also sought to partake in this endeavor by
estahlishing the loosely-bound Muhammadiyah Young Intellectuals Network (JIMM) in
2003.
118
Intended to revita1ize the intellectual tradition within the Muhammadiyah, maintain the
Muhammadiyah's reformist nature, respond to the rise of conservatism within the
Muhammadiyah, and fill the gap of intellectual disparities between the older and younger
generation within the Muhammadiyah, the JIMM takes pains to produce theological discourses
based on three pillars: hermeneutic, critical social sciences, and new social movements. I 19
I" http://www.maarifinstitute.org/
117 USAID, "summary Assessment of the Islam and Civil Society Program in Indonesia," 2006, p. 2.
lIS Burham, "Jaringan Intelektual Muda Mllhamroadiyah (JIMM)," 2006.
'" Boy Z.T.F, In Defence o/Pure Islam, 2007, p. 81.
185
Some influential Muslim NGOs take pains not to appear too closely associated with
either NU or Muhammadiyah, such as RAHIMA the Centre for Education and Information on
Islam and Women's Rights Issues, which was estahlished in 2001. As an NGO focusing on the
empowerment of women with an Islamic perspective,120 Rahima organizes massive and
structured training for Muslim girls and young women, and attempts to develop an Islamic
feminist discourse, critically engaging with estahlished views and current teachings that place
women in a subservient position.
The most unabashedly liberal Muslim organization in Indonesia, but not an NGO
proper, is the Liberal Islam Network (JIL), estahlished in 2001 by young liberal Muslim
intellectuals to counter the growing influence and activism of militant and radical Islam in
Indonesia.
121
It is trying to win back the initiative in setting the terms of debates on Islam and
society from the Islamists. The network started out as with a mailing list and website, soon
adding a radio program, relayed by local stations in many Indonesian cities, and a syndicated
newspaper colunm. Its core members have deliberately sought a high profile in the media
because they feel that Muslim intellectuals have too long been involved in arcane discussions
and left the production of simple and accessible texts on Islam for large audiences to the
Islamists. More than any other group, the Liberal Islam Network sees the struggle against
narrow and intolerant interpretations ofIslam as its chief mission.
As van Brninessen points out, most of the Muslim NGOs flourishing since the 1990s
have shown themselves very open-minded towards non-Muslim minorities and eager to engage
in inter-religious dialogue and joint activities. Most Muslim NGO activists feel as at ease with
120 See its profile in its website http://www.rabima.or.idlEnglishirabima..PI.Ofile.htm.
121 See Ali, ''The Rise of the Liberal Islamic Network (JIL) in Contemporary Indonesia," 2005.
186
their counterparts of Christian background as with fellow Muslims active in Islamist
associations. The relaxed relations with non-Muslims distinguish their activities sharply from
the Islamist groups. Fostering or avoiding inter-religious relations have become matters of
principle for both camps. 122
Despite these enonnous efforts and their invaluable impacts on Indonesian Muslims
and society as a whole, it would be wrong to assume that the NU and Muhammadiyah natures
are discretely moderate or liberal. As both the NU and Muhammadiyah have increasingly
become giant organizations with millions of followers, it would be incorrect to view them as
monolithic, single entities. Rather, their supporters are highly diverse: some of them are
receptive to the ideas ofIslamic liberalism and even secularism; however, some others are
''highly sympathetic to key aspects of the radical outlook and agenda and at times their rhetoric
can be remarkably similar to that of radical groupS.,,123 Indeed, there is not a single
interpretation ofIslam; there are many factions with varying commitments to democracy and to
pluralism. Although both camps share similar religious resources in Quran and Hadis,
however, there are numerous interpretations and conflicting readings. In this regard, it is
necessary to keep in mind that, as described in preceding Chapters, Indonesia particularly since
the 1970s and 1980s saw a pluralization of society and religious authority alike, characterized
by the emergence of new movements and rival visions of what Muslim politics should be.
124
Therefore, profiles the NU and Muhammadiyah "cannot be painted with broad brushes".12s
122 Van Bruinessen, "Post-Suharto Muslim Engagement with Civil Society and Democratization," 2003,
p.7-8.
123 Fealy, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia," 2004, p. 105. Compare to Liddle, "Year One of the
Yudhoyono-Kalla Duumvirate," 2005, p. 2005; Boy Z.T.F, In Defence o/Pure Islam, 2007.
124 Hefiler, "Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization," 2001, p. 509.
125 Khan, "Radical Islam, Liberal Islarn," 2003, p. 421.
187
In Indonesian context, however, many believe that the Islamist faction within the NU
and Muhammadiyah are peripheral to the mainstream, which remains overwhelmingly committed
to tolerance within the Indonesian nation. The Islamist factions are said to have limited influence
in the organizations. In addition, based on aforementioned explanation, civil-democratic Muslims
emerged as the dominant force among these new movements. The ranks of democratic Muslims
were swelled by an influx of young activists disillusioned with the rise ofIslamism and
determined to demonstrate that Islamic values are consistent with democracy, pluralism, and
tolerance. Unlike the unbridgeable division within the Islamist groups in Indonesia, 126 the join
efforts in combating corruption, supporting voter education and election monitoring indicate a
gradual consolidation of Muslim organizations into a cohesive movement; they are determined to
transcend sectarian differences to promote democratic values.
In this regard, the mushrooming ofNGOs within Muslim communities which focus
their activities on issues such as pluralism, tolerance, women rights, and minority rights, can be
a crucial arena for the development of important democratic attributes, such as moderation,
willingness to compromise, and respect for opposing viewpoints. 127 Moreover, their endeavors
to enhance the awareness of gender equality and minority rights are also worth mentioning
since the respect for equality before the law is one of the basic democratic values.
In contrast to the moderate stream, those radical groups share a common character in
a sense that they all adhere to a literal understanding ofIslamic doctrines, which they feel
should be adopted into private and public life. They also bluntly reject democratic political
system as western inventions and incompatible with Islam. Worse still, they also do not
126 leG, "Indonesia Beckgrounder," 2004.
127 Diamond, "Toward Democratic Consolidation," 1994.
188
reluctant to carry out violence activities to exert their agendas. For instance, it was frequently
reported that many of the radical Islamic groups assaulted what they perceiVed as un-Islamic
activities, such as attacking nightclubs, threatening alcohol vendors, as weIl as raiding heretical
sects and closing down churches. Clearly, as Greg Barton says, Islam, like other major world
religions, can both inspire democratic reform and be used to justify the authoritarian repression
of basic freedoms. But there can be no doubt that the endeavors of moderate Islamic
movements will help determine the enduring character of Islam's overall contribution to
democratization and religious reform.
128
As a matter offact, Indonesian Muslims have an extraordinarily large and weIl-
developed structure of Islamic NGO institutions that can be a resource of critical importance in
the ongoing war of ideas within the Indonesian Muslim, as weIl as in the effort to build
moderate Muslim networks.
129
These institutions wiIl help to keep the Muslim communities in
the NU and Muharmnadiyah rooted in their moderate and tolerant values despite the onslaught
of extremist ideology from the Middle East.
F. Foreign Donor and State Capacity
Despite the burgeoning Muslim civil society organizations in Indonesia, particularly
since the fall of Suharto, however, few people, including those Muslims from the radical camp,
react with skepticism or suspicion. Because most activities of those NGOs have been funded by
international funding donors, they are deemed as tools for foreign powers to intervene domestic
political affairs, or worse to ruin the Muslim community from within. In such suspicion, it is
128 Barton, "Islam and Democratic Transition in Indonesia," 2006, p. 239-240.
129 Rabasa at. a1., Building Moderate Muslim Networks, 2007, p. 109.
189
argued that their programs and activities have been detennined by international agencies and
the main priority areas were established before the programs are negotiated. 130
Indeed, the discussion on the democracy promotion or civil society aid has been
prevalent in the domain of democratization since the 1990s.1
31
What is surprising is their
''number, size, and professionalism, and the speed, deusity, and complexity of intemational
linkage among them.,,132 Despite thousands of programs carried out and a large amount of
money spent in over a hundreds countries in recent years, however, the most basic questions
about democracy promotion or civil society aid-what it accomplishes, where and why it fails,
and how it can be improved-have been remained unresolved, at least until now.
In discussing such critique, again, I begin with a statement that for many Muslim
NGO activists, foreign donors' objectives are far less significant than the benefit of this
available financial assistance for their institutions, the Muslim community, and the whole
nation. Many Muslim NGO activists are aware that there might be some hidden agendas behind
such financial assistance. However, they believe that this aid is nonetheless beneficial, so long
as it provides the Muslim activists with opportunity to work for wider the Muslim community
and the nation as a whole.
Furthermore, I, along with many others, contend that international funding may
succeed in contributing to the process of domestic democratization under four conditions. First,
the primary motive for democratization is and must be internal to Indonesian people.
133
In this
seuse, outsiders lend support to a process that is locally driven. Without such intemal motive,
130 Crawford and Hennawan, "Wbose Agenda?" 2002; Crawford, "Partnership or Power?" 2003;
Mallaranll,eng and van Tuijl, "Breaking New Ground or Dressing-up in the Emperor's New Clothes?" 2004.
1 Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 1999, Ottaway and Carothers, Funding Virrue, 2000, Burnell,
Democrag Assistance, 2000.
12 Keck and Sikkink,Activist Beyond Borders, 1998, p. 10.
133 Burnell, Democracy Assistance, 2000, p. 9.
190
the democratization process will fail, or is not fully authentic, or will take root only with great
difficulty. Second, the issues that they promote are both embraced universally around the world
and accepted locally. This means that the issues must be both universal in nature and cultura1ly
specific in this country.134 Without such compatibility, the programs will similarly fail or take a
longer time to be embraced. Third, international donors are likely to contribute to civil society
development when there are sufficient nascent civil society institutions or fledgling non-state
associations. In this respect, foreign donors will occupy the positive terrain by providing
support, incentive, inducement, reward, as well as advice and instruction, training programs,
equipment and other forms of material support to institutional capacity building. Fourth, the
political system of the country where international donor works is determinant to the success of
the democracy promotion. As Sundstrom indicates, it is crucial whether there is support from
the local political structure and elites.
135
Where local elites are supportive of the concept of
autonomous civil society, or at least they do not actively harass it, attitudinal and behavioral
changes brought about by transnational assistance are substantial and thus likely to be long
term. In contrast, in regions where the local political environment is decidedly discouraging
civil society institutions, a typical outcome is superficial.
Tantamount to such suspicion, probably there are some people underestimating the
impact of the aforementioned civil society assistance on overall democratization in Indonesia For
instance, in spite of the anti-corruption campaign carried out by the Muhanunadiyah and NU,
doesn't corruption remain ubiquitous in business institutions, bureaucracy, courts, police, and
other political institutions? In this regard, I argue that democracy assistance or civil society aid is
in fact an insufficient condition for a democratic opening or for building democracy, although it
134 Sundstrom, Funding Civil Society, 2006, p. xv.
'" Sundstrom, Funding Civil Society, 2006, p. xv.
191
could come close to being essential in some countries. As Ottaway and Carothers point out, the
status of civil society is only one of many factors that contribute to the success or failure of
democratization. Even in the most effective case, civil society assistance alone could not be
expected to bring about a highly undemocratic system's transformation into a democracy.136
In addition to the available support from international donor funding, it is also
important for us to look at another factor that enables the mushrooming civil society
movements and NGOs in post-Suharto Indonesia, including those within the Muslim
community: the weak state capacity. The weak states, as Migdal defines, are those with low
capabilities "to penetrate society, regulate social relationship, extract resources, and
appropriate or use resources in determined ways" (emphases are original),137 while the strong
states, in contrast, are those with high capability to complete these tasks. The weak states,
Migdal goes on to illustrate, are punctuated by govermnents which "have been unable to
achieve that which had been so widely assumed inevitable.,,138
As described earlier in this chapter, the New Order regime had exhibited during its
first two decades many of the characteristic of a strong state.
139
Suharto's military-based regime
had been in power and faced no major organized challenge from society. The regime had
occasionally dealt with many outbreaks of rioting while separatist movements persisted in some
remote provinces. However, the political dominance of the regime was never in question. As a
result, the strong state brought about, among other things, a transformation of the Indonesian
economy. The success of capitalist development under the New Order was unwittingly central
to the beginning of the political liberalization since the second half of the 1980s. Capitalism in
136 Ottaway and Carothers, Funding Virtue, 2000, p. 303.
137 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, 1988, p. 5.
138 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, 1988, p. 7.
139 See Crouch, "Indonesia's 'Strong' State," 1998.
192
Indonesia, as elsewhere, has given rise to both a new middle class and a new working class
which in tum had played a decisive role in challenging the authoritarian Suharto regime. Since
the late 1980s, therefore, student and labor protests have been more frequent.
l40
At the same
time, there was a considerable division within the ruling elites, particularly between Suharto
and certain element within the military, when many of senior military officers loyal to (retired)
General Murdani began criticizing Suharto's rule and his families' business. The response from
the regime was clear: since the late 1980s the New Order regime had introduced a new era of
openness and Suharto began wooing Muslims' support.
In this regard, I argue that the politicallibera1ization since the late 1980s and early in
the I 990s had been a combination of the expansion of the notable middle and working classes,
although they remained small compared to more developed countries; and the increasing
disunity and divisiveness in the authoritarian elite. This is starkly in contrast to Bertrand's view
that political liberalization in Indonesia, similar to one in Brazil, was mainly a result of
divisions internal to the political elite and during the absence of real threats from society.141
Bertrand, in order to support his argument, refers to O'Donnel and Schmitter who point out
that, "[T]here is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence--direct or indirect-of
important divisions within the authoritarian regime.,,142
Many of the instances I describe in the first section in this chapter indicate that there
were two processes that took place in concert: the decline of the authoritarian regime and the
rise of the oppositional forces. As Heryanto points out, the two processes are not simply two
\40 Berger, "Old State and New Empire in Indonesia," 1997, p. 346.
\4\ Bertrand, ''False Start, Succession Crisis, and Regime Change," 1996, p. 322.
\42 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 1986, p. 20, and pp. 17-18.
193
sides of the same coin, one necessarily resulting from the other. 143 The regime's waning power
was initially more related to internal divisions, and, to a lesser extent, to international pressures.
However, the decline thus provided more room for the consolidation of the existing opposition.
On the other hand, the rise of the oppositional forces was initially a result of the economic and
social transformation during the New Order era. The oppositional forces in turn could exploit
the regime's decline, since people could openly criticize one faction of the ruling elite and be
protected by the opposite faction.
l44
Against this background, it was no doubt that since the mid-1990s on the civil society
movements and NGOs have been mushrooming in Indonesia, including those which were
supported by young Mnslim activists from the NU and Muhanunadiyah communities. This
phenomenon has been increasing since the fall ofSuharto in 1998 which was preceded by
severe political and economic crises. To be sure, the complicated crises in Indonesia during
1997-1998 had debilitated the state capacity so that the governments, particularly those before
the SBY administration, had demonstrated neither the political will nor the capacity to
overcome its fundamental challenge that is the survival of the nation in its present
configuration. The nationwide breakdown of law and order, according to Donald Weatherbee,
was the major indicator of the state decay symptoms.
145
To be fair, he goes on to say, the
successive post-Suharto governments did not inherit institutional capabilities that could replace
the military as guarantors of political and social stability. Glaringly absent from Indonesia was
a societal commitment to the rule oflaw. With the lifting of both normative and real
constraints, groups and individuals had felt free, and even entitled, to challenge the authority of
143 Heryanto, "Indonesian Middle-Class Opposition in the 1990s," 1996, p. 244-245.
144 Budiman, "Indonesian Politics in the 1990s," 1992, p. 132.
145 Weatherbee, "Indonesia," 2002, p. 25.
194
government-acting outside of the prescribed constitutional and statutory order. AB a result,
secessionist movements as well as sectarian and ethnic conflict had flourished during roughly
eight years after the fall of Suharto. Moreover, the unilateral action by ordinary people to
punish the criminal and the transgression of rules every day by so many people in all types of
situations had compounded the feeling.
l46
Since the proliferation of a large number of civil society movements and NGOs has
been made possible by the weak state, there is a question whether there is any possibility that
once the state succeed to revitalize its capacity and become a strong state-as increasingly
shown by the SBY administration, it will return to an authoritarian state, resuming to exercise
its strict control over the society. In this respect, I will argue that a scrupulous analysis on
recent developments in Indonesian politics will lead to an optimistic prospect for the process of
democratization. The military, once deeply entrenched in Indonesian politics and economy
during the New Order, is no longer able to exercise any political influence, as many measures
have been taken to bring it 'back to barrack' .147 The strong civil society movements which
since the mid-1990s have an increasing sense of confidence will also likely oppose any
authoritarian leaning.
148
The international conununity, whose economic and political support is
heavily needed by the govermnent, will also discourage any consolidation of a coercive regime.
The proliferation of power centers resulted from political pluralism will also block any
possibility of re-authoritarianization. And finally, elite politicians now seem to prefer seeking
power through elections to in-constitutional and unilateral actions. This is an obviously stark
146 See Wanandi, "Indonesia: A Failed State?" 2002.
147 Mietzner, The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia, 2006; Kingsbury, Power Politics
and the Indonesian Military, 2003.
148 Nyman, Democratising Indonesia, 2006.
195
contrast to the fact that there were three extraordinary leadership changes in Indonesian politics
in four years during 1998-2001.
These disincentive factors to the authoritarian leaning at the same time constitute the
haIlmarks of the process of political normalization, and can be viewed as marking the end of
Indonesia's tumultuous political transition, despite the fact that there are some hurdles need
fixing. 149 During roughly the last five years, there has been an increasing belief that democratic
procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern coIlective life. It seems that
democracy has become "the only game in town" and it is unIikely to break down. And
surprisingly, as discussions of this chapter indicate, the contribution of Muslim civil society
organizations in the process ofliberaIization, transition, and consolidation has been remarkable.
G. Conclusion
This chapter by and large indicates that the contribution of the Muslim civil society
organizations to the process democratization is remarkable. Although their role was only
complementary, since the democratization requires many other conditions, it seems that their
contribution is by no means insignificant. The NU and Muhammadiyah seemed to be
contributive in all stages of democratization. In the liberalization phase, they worked in concert
with other secular and non-Muslim groups to broaden the free public sphere and stay away
from the state's corporatist strategy. In the transition phase, they combined their efforts, along
with other pro-democracy movements, in de-legitimating and unseating Suharto from his post,
supporting the development of political parties, stimulating political participation, and
monitoring the elections. In the consolidation phase, the Muhammadiyah and NU expand their
149 Aspinall, "Elections and the Normalization of Politics in htdonesia," 2005; Aspinall, ''Politics,'' 2005;
Freedman, Political Change and Consolidalwn, 2006, Chapter 3 "htdonesia: Democratization but Hurdles Still
Remain," p. 83-106.
196
role by campaigning anti-corruption movements, forcing the govermnent to be more
accountable and transparent, disseminating the hazardous effects of corruption, and spreading
the ideas of religious tolerance and gender equality. As the process of democratization in
Indonesia now is dubbed as being consolidated, therefore, it is important to keep in mind the
undeniable role played by those Muslim civil society organizations, namely the NU,
Muhammadiyab, and a large number NGOs loosely affiliated to them.
197
CHAPTER V
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This thesis has taken a relatively detailed look at how the new relationship between
the civil society organizations, namely the Mubammadiyah and NU, and the state has been
developing in Indonesia since the fall of the New Order regime in May 1998. It has also
examined in detail the contribution of those civil society organizations in fostering the process
of political change since the imminent liberalization process until the fully-fledged
consolidated democracy. This final chapter is aimed at reviewing the findings in the course of
the study and asses their implications for the scholarly field of comparative politics as well as
the further questions on the state-civil society relation, on the relation between Islam and civil
society, and on the relation between civil society and democratization.
In modem Indonesia, as elsewhere, Islam had been politically engaged in several
different ways: as the base for political parties, as an empty slogan in an ideological rivalry, and
as a source of ethical and moral standards and criticism. With the fall of the New Order regime
in May 1999, however, there were considerable changes both in the political system and in the
relationship between the state and Muslim civil society institutious. Islam in Indonesia is now
finding a new place in society and politics following the demise of the New Order. Overall, the
position of Islam and the range ofits activities are ubiquitous. It provides values of
considerable worth to its followers and to the Indonesian republic as well.
By examining the ways in which Muslim civil society organizations exert their
interests and play their role during roughly the last ten years, the study has revealed a great deal
about their participation in the political system, where they are now an important part of the
198
leadership and their interests are now weII represented. However, the problem is that, in reality,
there is a significant degree of overlap between civil society and political society as weII as
between civil society and the state. Indonesia after Suharto provides several examples of this,
one of them being the relationship between political parties and civil society. The establishment
of two political parties, namely the National Awakening Party (PKB) and National Mandate
Party (PAN) soon after the downfall of the New Order regime indicates such overlap since their
mass bases are primarily drawn from the long established Nahdlatu1 Ulama (NU) and
Mubammadiyah constituencies. Indeed, this relationship has always been problematic,
particularly in an empirical sense. Those civil society organizations have often been plunged
into practical political affairs: many Muslim leaders have made use the NU organization and
supporters to defend AbdurraIunan's presidency; the Muhammadiyah had played a decisive
role in Amien's presidential bid; and the direct local head elections have provided more space
for both organizations both in nominating and in supporting candidates.
To a lesser extent, there has also been a blurred relation between those civil society
organizations and the state. While the state decay has been profound since the fall of the
Suharto regime, the consecutive post-Suharto governments have always been incorporating the
representatives of the Muhammadiyah and NU into the cabinet. In so doing, the state seemed
unIikely to co-opt those Muslim civil society organizations, as the authoritarian New Order
regime did. The state instead has sought to extend its political legitimacy among the wider
constituency amidst the political instability during the reform era whose hallmark, among other
things, has been the volatile political coalition within the cabinet and the parliamentary.
The point I wish to make in this study is that boundaries between political parties and
the state on the one hand, and Muslim civil society organizations on the other in post-Suharto
199
Indonesia can be blurred even if we accept the theoretical distinction between civil society and
state, as is connnonly done in most the contemporary democratization literature. Indonesian
politics is not an exception in this respect. The blurred boundaries between political parties,
civil society, and the state appear to be a more prevalent, at least, in the volatile and uncertain
period of transition, where political parties often had to be built from scratch and in atmosphere
of newly-emerging enthusiasm toward the very idea of the political party.
In addition, as what has happened in Indonesia in recent years the study also indicates
that one cannot overlook the contribution of the Muslim public masses to the democratization
process. In Indonesia without the participation of the civil society organizations, including the
NU and Mnhammadiyah, democratization would not have been achieved. Although their role
was ouly supportive, they lent popular weight to the democratic transition and helped deepen
democratization. This is by no means to obscure the siguificance of other domestic and
international actors as well as fissures within the government and the military alike that may
provide an opening for the resurrection of civil society.
Beyond the roles of the NU and Mnharnmadiyah in the political development during
the reform era, this study also shows less visible, yet more fundamental, functions of those
Muslim civil society organizations both before and after the fall of the New Order regime.
These mass-based religious organizations seemed to be consequential in all stages of
democratization. In the liberalization phase, they sought to broaden the free public sphere and
keep away from the state's corporatist strategy. In the transition phase, they combined their
efforts, along with other pro-democracy movements, in de-legitimating and bringing the
authoritarian Suharto regime down, supporting the development of political parties, stimulating
political participation, monitoring the implementation of the democratic elections, and
200
providing alternative political leaders. In the consolidation phase, the Muhammadiyah and NU
expand their foci by forcing the government to be more accountable and transparent,
disseminating the hazardous effects of corruption, and spreading the ideas of religious tolerance
and gender equality.
The empirical results of this thesis by and large show that the strength of these
Muslim civil society organizations before the transition and post-transition not only deepened
freedom and civil liberties, as discovered by Karatnycky and Ackerman,
1
but also, as Tusalem
points out, help enhancing the state's capacity to uphold the rule of law, control the prevalence
of corruption, and promote governmental effectiveness, regulatory quality, voice and
accountability, and political stability.2
Unfortunately, as the involvement of Muslim civil society organizations in practical
politics has been very much in vogue during the last ten years, bitter conflict both between and
within the NU and Muhammadiyah also emerge severely. It should be noted that the tension
between both organizations has long been enduring, but mostly due to minor theological
differences. In this regard, we can conclude that because the newly-forged cordiality between
the traditionalists and modernists in the months leading up to the election of President Wahid
was not genuine, the ensuing conflict between their leaders is more acute. Moreover, it should
also be noted that internal division is not new in those organizations, since their leaderships
have never been entirely united in their political outlooks. Those organizations are always
comprised many leaders and activists with greatly differing backgrounds and widely divergent
interests. What is new in this period is that the scale and intensity of those internal conflicts
seem to be no longer bridgeable.
I Karatnycky and Ackerman, ''How Freedom is Won?" 2005.
2 Tusa1em, "A Boon or Bane?" 2007.
201
In this sense, I cannot help to reiterate what former Mubammadiyah chairman, Ahmad
Syafii Maarif, once said-which I put in the forefront of this thesis-that politics tends to break
up and divide while dakwah tends to invite and unite. They should be aware that their
involvements in practical politics should come in second after devoting sufficient attention to
their religious and social functions. Unless they realize that the power struggle has diverted too
much attention from their real tasks of spiritual guidance and education of the Muslim
community, those organizations and their leaders will be highly likely dragged into severe
divisions which in turn undermine their moral authority within larger society.
In addition, this study also reveals the other fact that, despite bitter conflict among
their political leaders, it is far easier for both organizations to forge a genuine alliance in
carrying out long term and society-oriented agendas. These concerted efforts to support the
democratization process are not only capable of reducing political conflict which took place
several years earlier during the Wahid presidency, but also help overcoming the traditional
rivalry between both organizations.
It is widely believed that the scholarly debate about the compatibility between Islam
and democracy has been perhaps the most passionate at the theoretical level-and probably the
least important. .AI; discussion continued, two broadly opposed positions emerged, one
pessimistic, the other cautiously optimistic. In the former camp, some scholars examine the
Koran, Islamic law and tradition to textually demonstrate that Islam is not only incompatible
with democracy but much more an obstacle to democratization than a facilitator of democratic
reform. Ironically, their views are bolstered by radical Islamists who similarly argue the
incompatibility of these two concepts. They, noting that very few Muslim-majority countries
have democratic governments and the rise of Islamic radicalism is a product of despair and
202
anger caused largely by domestic political oppression, have held that Islam may be
incompatible with open government.
3
Others, however, argue that Islam is not necessarily antithetical to democratization.
4
Recent development in Indonesia (along with Turkey and, to some extent, Iran) offers an even
more striking indication of Muslim interest in democracy and civic pluralism. A meticulous
examination on what the Muhammadiyah and NU have been doing in the course of the last ten
years for society and politics alike provides an important instance on the compatibility of Islam
on the one hand and civil society and democracy on the other.
This finding palpably challenges the prevailing stereotypes that political Islam, as
Gellner pointed out, has been "an inveterate enemy of civil pluralism and liberty," and that
Islam "fails to sanction the existence of countervailing associatious,',5 and underscore that there
are several different, even rival, varieties of political imagination within the Indonesian Islamic
tradition. This instance of compatibility between Islam and civil society in the Indonesian
context, in tandem with one in Turkey, could become the exception to a wider picture of civil
society in the Muslim world where civic activism failed to press the authoritarian governments
for meaningful reforms and bring about any Arab spring of democracy,
6
despite the
mushrooming of civil society movements.
7
Equally important, the case of both institutious provides an important instance on how
Muslim civil society organizations contribute to the process of democratization, not simply
3 See Karatnycky, "Muslim Countries," 2002; Waterlmry, "Democracy without Democrats?" 1994; Fish,
"Islam and Authoritarianism," 2002; Lakoff, ''The Reality of Muslim ExceptionaIism," 2004;
4 Stepan with Robertson, "An 'Arab' more than 'Muslim' Electoral Gap," 2003; Stepan with Robertson,
"Arab, not Muslim, Exceptiona1ism," 2004; Nasr, "The Rise of 'Muslim Democracy'," 2005; Ibrabim, "Universal
Values and Muslim Democracy," 2006;
5 Emest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty, 1994, p. 28.
See Yom, "Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World," 2005.
7 Kubba, ''The Awakening of Civil Society," 2000; Ehtesbami, "Islam, Muslim Politics, and Democracy,"
2004.
203
because of their charismatic leaderships, but also due to their strategic locations and practical
activism in htdonesian civil society. Finally, and most importantly, this study provides an
obvious example on how religious organizations play their roles in a transition from
authoritarian into a more democratic political system without turning the system into a
theocratic state. ht so doing, they do not relinquish their nature as social-religious orgauizations
whose foci are in religious, educational, and social activities. Rather, as this thesis indicates,
they transform their spiritual and ethical vigor into political, social, and intellectual activism
capable of shaking the authoritarian Suharto regime and--during the post-Suharto era-
deepening the process of political change into a more mature and democratic political system.
For roughly the past ten years, most news reports from htdonesia have featured
terrorist attacks, regional insurgencies, and human rights violations. They portray a government
that is dealing ineffectively with these problems and an economy that is falling further behind
its Asian neighbors. Are there grounds for hope in htdonesia? Do we, htdonesians, possess
sufficient cultural resources and social capital to foster the democratization process? Should we
be pessimistic or optimistic about our foreseeable future? Or more specifically, should we be
concerned about the prospect of democracy in htdonesia?
ht my opinion, we do have good grounds for being cautiously optimistic. htdonesia
appears to have all ingredients both to slide into a failed state and for the emergence of virulent
religious fundamentalism. However, htdonesia is not Algeria or Afghauistan, by any measure,
nor even Pakistan. Developments beneath the surface lead to a more hopeful view: htdonesia
has been undergoing a profound political transition. Over the past ten years, its democratic
system has been overhauled quietly but brilliantly, and the foundations for a better system of
204
governance have been put in place. The gove=ent that takes office on 2004 is the people's
choice more than ever before.
No less remarkable, one of the major factors in determining Indonesia's democratic
prospect is Islam. This study shows that Islam has been playing a central role not only in post-
Suharto period, but also in the entire modem Indonesian history. Less widely noted but by no
means no less significant, the long tradition of civic pluralism within Indonesian, particularly
the division of Islam into nominal Muslims of abangan, traditionalist Islam, and modernist
Islam, makes the point that Muslim society in Indonesia differs significantly from those ones in
the Arab world. Indonesia thus offers an excellent example of a plural and contested Muslim
politics. Each group covers a diversity of opinion, political outlook, and religious convictions,
although not mutually exclusive.
Unfortunately, potential danger lies also behind this pluralism. Because each stream
represents very different segments of the Indonesian popUlation - from a sociological,
theological, socio-economic, and political perspective, excessive conflict among them will lead
into a severe co=unal violence. This pluralism will tend to generate a wide range of interests
that exacerbate the principal polarities under two conditions: they are involved in political
conflicts and the state manipulate those conflicts or do not have sufficient capacity to contain
those conflicts. To put it differently, there is a perennial rivalry among those ideological
streams, but political affairs and state manipulation will transform that division into excessive
communal violence. The bloody massacre of communist members in the mid 1 960s involved a
conflict between nominal Muslim of abangan and devout Muslims of santri, while the state
seemed to manipulate it. The series of attacks to many ofMuhammadiyah properties launched
by Wahid supporters during his presidency was a resonance of elite conflict between the PKB
205
and its political rivals, while state also sought to manipulate it and, at the same time, its
capacity was severely paralyzed by a protracted crisis.
Indonesia's democratic transition, known as Refonnasi, began in 1998. Reformasi
may have initially been more of an elite game, but its objectives are to find a viable path to a
just and prosperous society. This study reveals that the results of the 1999 and 2004 elections
showed just how profound an effect Reformasi has had on Indonesia's political system. The
participation of Muslim civil society organizations in the democratization process also reflects
the fact that Reformasi is no longer an elite game. To put it differently, the democratic prospect
in Indonesia will not simply be determined by the state and elite political leaders. The
concerted efforts carried out by those Muslim civil society organizations will also greatly
determine the future of Indonesian society as a whole. While this thesis give emphasis on
Muslim civil society organizations, it calls for further analytical studies with particular
attention to the contribution of Islamic political parties in the democratization process, the role
of Muslim civil society organizations in a decentralized Indonesia, and the relation between
state and Islamic radical groups.
Indonesia has not yet arrived at its hoped-for destination in its democratic transition.
Military, rule oflaw, corruption, economic crisis are among some remaining problems need to
be overcome. Amid all of the miseries and disillusionment of the post-Suharto years, ordinary
Indonesians have shown uncommon good sense and remarkable grace, even when their leaders
have shown neither. The transition to democracy has frequently been clogged up and
frustratingly slow, but by no means stagoant.
206
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Interview:
Interview with Adung Abdurrahman on December 27, 2007 in Jakarta.
Interview with Ahmad Suaedy on January 9,2008 in Jakarta
Interview with Ahmad Syafii Maarif on December 24, 2007 in Jogjakarta.
Interview with Gunawan Hidayat on December 27,2007 in Jakarta.
Interview with Hasyim Muzadi on January 10, 2008 in Jakarta
Interview with Masdar F. Mas'udi on December 27,2007 in Jakarta.
Interview with M. Din Syamsuddin on January 9,2008 in Jakarta
Interview with Muhammad AS. Hikam on January 10, 2008 in Jakarta
Interview with Rizal Sukma on December 27, 2007 in Jakarta.
Interview with Saifu1 Bahri Ansori on December 27,2007 in Jakarta.
222
BIOGRAPIDCAL SKETCH
PRAMONO UBAID TAN1HOWI, he was born on January 17th, 1975, in an NU
family in Central Java, Indonesia. He finished his B.A. in Islamic studies at the State
Institute for Islamic Studies (lAIN1UIN) Jakarta.
During his undergraduate study he was actively involved in the Muhammadiyah
Student Association (JMM). Because Reformasi occurred when he was the chairman of the
IMM provincial leadership of Jakarta (1997-1999), he used to lead junior students in student
movement It was not surprising since students of his generation mllied in street to oppose
Suharto's authoritarianism and clamor for political reform.
From 2000 on, he has published articles widely in the national newspapers,
journals, and books. His publications during these years reflected the diverse array of his
field interests that are Muslim politics, democmtisation, and pluralism. Among his
pUblications are Muslims and Tolerance: Non-Muslim Minorities under Sharia in
Indonesia, (Bangkok: Silkworm Books, 2008) and Kebangkitan Politik Kaum Santri: Islam
dan Demokratisasi di Indonesia 1990-2000, (Jakarta: PSAP Press, 2005). He has also edited
three other books: Begawan Muhammadiyah, (Jakarta: PSAP Press, 2005); Membasmi
Kanker Korupsi, (Jakarta: PSAP Press, 2004); and Muhammadiyah Digugat: Reposisi di
Tengah Indonesia yang Berubah", (Jakarta: Kompas, 2000).
Before studying political science at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, he served
as the Executive Director of the Center for the Study of Religion and Civilization (2001-
2006). He also taught at the Muhammadiyah University of Jakarta (1999-2001). Then, in
2002-2004 he also served as a political advisor for Deputy Chairman of Indonesian
Parliament (DPR). He was also appointed as the Program Manager of the Muhammadiyah
Institute for Good Governance Program (2003-2006).