Ben Lorentz October 29, 2011 Discussion Questions Humes Moral Distinctions Not Derived from Reason 1) Hume

claims that morality is supposed to influence our passions and actions and to go beyond the calm and indolent judgments of the understanding (11-12). Is this the case? Does moral understanding precede moral action? If so, how are we to come to know what is morally right and morally wrong? Hume rejects that reason alone is capable of producing moral conclusions. How might we reach these conclusions either without reason or with reason in conjunction with some other process? What might this other process be? 2) Hume claims that reason alone cannot produce morals since reason cannot directly influence actions and morals can influence actions (12TR). What, if any support is provided for this argument? Is it necessary for reason to be action-influencing in order for it to produce morals? Later, Hume says that reason can influence action by discover[ing] the connection of causes and effects (13BL). Does this contradict Humes previous claim? What are the differences in each claim? the distinctions between what we commonly take morality and causal relations to be? Is discovering a casual connection meaningfully different from producing a set of morals? 3) Hume claims that a mistake of right cannot be the source of immorality since it supposes a real right and wrong (13TR). Is Hume rejecting that there is a real right and wrong? If so, on what grounds? Can a mistake of right still be immoral without being the source of immorality? If a mistake of right is not the source of immorality, then what might be its source? 4) For morality to be produced by demonstrative reasoning, it must consist in certain relations (resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity). Hume then presents a relation between trees. One tree drops its seed below; this seed grows up and eventually overtakes and destroys the parent tree (15MR). This relation is not considered to contain any moral content; yet, human parricide is considered a heinous crime. One might, says Hume, distinguish between each case: the tree has neither a choice nor will while humans have both. This does not satisfy Hume, as, regardless of their causes, the relations are the same. This example is only evaluated in terms of resemblance. But is there not another relation, i.e. degrees in quality, which factors into this example? Is choice not a qualitative difference between humans and trees? Is choice not commonly considered a necessary constituent of morality? How might Hume reply? 5) If emotions and sentiments are the source of morality, does it follow that whenever you are angered by someones actions, those actions are wrong or contain any moral content? Is an objective set of morals feasible? What are the juridical implications of morality derived from sentiments? Is reason a necessary constituent in the juridical deliberation process, or should one only express her sentiments?