MICHEL

FOUCAULT

"Society Must Be
L E C T U R E S AT T H E C O L L E G E 1975-76

Defended"
DE FRANCE,

Edited b y M a u r o Bertani and Alessandro Fontana General Editors: Francois Ewald and Alessandro Fontana

English Series Editor: Arnold 1. Davidson

TRANSLATED

BY D A V I D

MACEY

PICADOR NEW YORK

"SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED". Copyright 1 9 9 7 by Editions de Seuil/Gallimard. Edition established, under the direction of Francois Ewald and Alessandro Fontana, by Mauro Bertani. Translation copyright '0 2 0 0 3 by David Macey. Introduction copyright 2 0 0 3 by Arnold I. Davidson. A l l rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. For information, address Picador, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 1 0 0 1 0 .

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eight

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FEBRUARY 1 9 7 6

Boulainvilliers continuum. central

and the constitution - Tragedy of history.

of a

historico-politkal right. - The of the four - The their knowledges.

~ Historicism. administration

and public

~ The problematic of knowledges. knowledge and

Enlightenment operations effects.

and the genealogy of disciplinary and science.

~ Philosophy

- Disciplining

W H E N 1 T A L K E D T O y o u about B o u l a i n v i l h e r s , I w a s certainly not t r y i n g to prove to y o u that something r e s e m b l i n g history b e g a n w i t h him, because, after all, there is no reason to say that history b e g a n w i t h Boulainvilhers r a t h e r than w i t h , for e x a m p l e , the s i x t e e n t h century jurists w h o collated the m o n u m e n t s of p u b l i c right, w i t h the pariementaires w h o , t h r o u g h o u t the seventeenth century, searched t h e archives a n d j u r i s p r u d e n c e of the State to d i s c o v e r w h a t the basic l a w s of the k i n g d o m m i g h t be, or w i t h the Benedictines, w h o h a d been great collectors of charters e v e n since t h e l a t e sixteenth c e n t u r y . W h a t w a s in fact established b y Boulainvilliers in the early e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y wasI thinka historico-pohtical field. In w h a t sense? First, in this sense: By t a k i n g the nation, or r a t h e r nations, a s h i s object, B o u l a i n v i l h e r s w a s able to d i g b e n e a t h institutions, events, k i n g s and their power, a n d to a n a l y z e something else, namely those societies, as they w e r e called at the time, that were bound together by interests, customs, a n d l a w s . By t a k i n g t h e m as his object, he c h a n g e d t w o things. One the one hand, he b e g a n to w r i t e ( a n d I t h i n k it w a s t h e

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first t i m e this had h a p p e n e d ) the history of subjects, or in other words, to look at p o w e r from the other side. H e thus began to give a historical status to something that w o u l d , w i t h M i c h e l e t in the nineteenth c e n t u r y, become the history of t h e people or the history of peoples.' H e discovered a certain form of, history that existed on the other side of the p o w e r r e l a t i o n s h i p . But he a n a l y z e d this new form of history not as though it w e r e an inert substance, b u t as a forceor forces; power itself w a s no more than one of those forcesan u n u s u a l k i n d of force, or t h e strangest of all the forces that w e r e fighting one another w i t h i n the social body. P o w e r is the p o w e r of the little grou p that exercises it b u t has no force; and yet, u l t i m a t e l y , this p o w e r becomes the strongest force of a l l, a force that no other force can resist, except violence or rebellion. W h a t B o u l a i n v i l h e r s w a s discovering w a s that history should not be the history of p o w e r , but the histor y of a monstrous, or at least strange, couple whose enigmatic nature coufcl not exactly be r e d u c e d or understood by a n y j u r i d i c a l fiction: the couple formed by the p r i m a l forces of the people, a n d the force that h a d finally been constituted by something that h a d no force, but that w a s p o w e r . By d i s p l a c i n g the a x i s , the center of g r a v i t y , of his a n a l y s i s , Boul a i n v i l h e r s d i d something important. First, becaus e he defined the p r i n c i p l e of w h a t m i g h t be called the relational character of power: p o w e r is not something that can be possessed, a n d it is not a form of might; p o w e r is never a n y t h i n g more than a relationship that can, a n d must, be studied only b y lookin g at the interplay between the t e r m s of that relationship. One cannot, therefore, w r i t e either the history of k i n g s or the history of peoples; one can w r i t e the history of w h a t constitutes those opposing terms, one of w h i c h is never infinity, and the other of w h i c h is never zero. By w r i t i n g that history, by defining the relational characte r of power, a n d b y a n a l y z i n g it in h i s t o r y , B o u l a i n v i l h e rs w a s c h a l l e n g i n g a n d this, I think, is the other side of w h a t he w a s doingthe juridical model of sovereignt y w h i c h had, u n t i l then, been the only w a y of t h i n k i n g of the relationship b e t w e e n people and monarch, or b e t w e e n the people and those w h o govern. Boulainvilhers describes the phenomenon of p o w e r not in

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juridical terms of sovereignty but in historical terms of domination a n d the p l a y of relations of force. A n d he places the object of his historical analysis w i t h i n that field. In doing so, in t a k i n g as h i s object a p o w e r t h a t wa s essentially relational a n d not a d e q u a t e to the j u r i d i c a l form of sovereignty, and by defining a field of forces in w h i c h t h e p o w e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p comes into play, B o u l a i n v i l h e r s is t a k i n g as his object the historical k n o w l e d g e that M a c h i a v e l h a n a l y z e d , b u t only in p r e s c r i p t i ve strategic termsor in terms of a strategy seen only through the eyes of power and the P r i n c e . You might object that M a c h i a v e l h did not just g i v e
2

the Prince a d v i c e w h e t h e r it is serious or ironic is a different q u e s tionabout h o w to manage a n d o r g a n i z e p o w e r , and that the text of The Prince itself is full of historical references. You might say t h a t B u t for M a c h i a v e l h , h i s t o r y is not M a c h i a v e l h also w r o t e the Discorsi.

the d o m a i n in w h i c h he a n a l y z e s p o w e r relations. For M a c h i a v e l h , history is s i m p l y a source of e x a m p l e s , a s o r t of collection of j u r i s p r u d e n c e or of tactical models for t h e e x e r c i s e of p o w e r . For M a c h lavelh, history s i m p l y records r e l a t i o n s of force a n d the calculations to w h i c h they gave rise. For B o u l a i n v i l h e r s , on the other h a n d ( a n d this, I think, is the important p o i n t ) , r e l a t i o n s of force a n d the p l a y of p o w e r a r e the v e r y stuff of history. H i s t o ry e x i s t s , events occur, and t h i n gs t h a t happen can a n d must b e r e m e m b e r e d , to the e x t e n t that r e l a t i o n s of p o w e r , relations of force, a n d a c e r t a i n p l a y of p o w e r operate in r e lations among men. A c c o r d i n g to B o u l a i n v i l h e r s , historical n a r r a t i v e s and political calculations have e x a c t l y the same object. Historical nar ratives and political calculations m a y not have the same goal, but t h e r e is a definite c o n t i n u i t y in w h a t they a r e t a l k i n g a b o u t , and in w h a t is at stak e in both n a r r a t i v e a n d calculation. In B o u l a i n v i l h e r s , w e therefore findfor the first time , I t h i n k a h i s t o n c o - p o h t i c a l con t i n u u m . O ne could also say, in a s l i g h t l y different sense, that Bou l a i n v i l h e r s opens u p a h i s t o n c o - p o h t i c al field. Let me e x p l a i n . A s I have already told y o u a n d I t h i n k t h i s is of fundamental i m p o r t a n c e if w e a r e to u n d e r s t a n d B o u l a i n v i l h e r s ' s s t a r t i n g pointhe w a s t r y i n g to m a k e a c r i t i q u e of the k n o w l e d g e of the intendants, of the sort of

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analysis a n d the projects for government t h a t the intendants or, more generally, the monarchical g o v e r n m e n t w a s constantly d r a w i n g u p for p o w e r ' s benefit. It is t r u e that B o u l a i n v i l h e r s w a s a radical opponent of this k n o w l e d g e , but h e challenges it by r e i m p l a n t i n g it w i t h i n his o w n discourse, and by using for h i s own ends the very analyses that w e find in the k n o w l e d g e of the i n t e n d a n t s. H i s goal w a s to confiscate it and to use it against the system of the absolute monarchy, w h i c h w a s b o t h t h e b i r t h p l a c e a n d the field of a p p l i c a t i o n of this a d m i n i s t r a t i v e k n o w l e d g e , this k n o w l e d g e of the intendants, and this economic k n o w l e d g e . A n d basically, w h e n B o u l a i n v i l h e r s a n a l y z es the historical evolution of a w h o l e series of specific relations b e t w e e n , if you like, m i l i t a r y organization and taxation, he is s i m p l y acclimatizing, or using for his o w n historical analyses, the v e r y form of relationship, the t y p e of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y a n d the model of relations tha t h a d been defined b y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e k n o w l e d g e , fiscal k n o w l e d g e , and t h e k n o w l e d g e of the intendants. When, for example, B o u l a i n v i l h e r s explains the relation b e t w e e n the e m p l o y m e n t of mercenaries a n d increased taxation, or b e t w e e n the debts of the p e a s a n t r y and the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of m a r k e t i n g the produce of the land, he is simply raising the issues raise d by the intendants a n d financiers of the reign of Louis X I V , b u t he is doing so w i t h i n the historical dimension. You w i l l find e x a c t l y the same speculations in the w o r k of people such as, for e x a m p l e , Boisguilbert' a n d V a u b a n . ' The relation between r u r a l indebtedness a n d urban p r o s p e r i t y w a s another important topic of discussion t h r o u g h o u t the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. W e find, then, the same mode of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y in b o t h the k n o w l e d g e of the i n t e n d a n ts a n d Boulainvilhers's historical analyses, b u t he is the first to m a k e t h i s type of relation function in the domain of historical narrative . In other w o r d s , B o u l a i n v i l h e rs m a k e s w h a t had until the n been no more t h a n S t a t e m a n a g e m e n t ' s p r i n c i p l e of r a t i o n a l i t y function as a p r i n ciple for u n d e r s t a n d i n g history. T h a t a c o n t i n u i ty has been established between historical narrative and the management of the State is, I believe, of vital importance. It is the use of the State's model of managerial rationalit y as a g r i d for the speculative u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h i s -

25 February t o r y t h a t establishes t h e histonco-pohtical

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continuum.

that

continuum now m a k e s it possible to use the same vocabulary and the same g r i d of i n t e l l i g i b i l i ty to s p e a k of history a n d to a n a l y z e the m a n a g e m e n t of the S t a t e . I t h i n k , finally, that B o u l a i n v i l h e r s establishe s a historico-pohtical c o n t i n u u m to the extent that, w h e n he w r i t e s history, he has a specific a n d definite project: h i s specific goal is restore to the nobility both a m e m o r y it has lost a n d a k n o w l e d g e t h a t it has a l w a y s neglected. W h a t B o u l a i n v i l l i e r s is t r y i n g to do by g i v i n g it back its memory a n d its k n o w l e d g e is to g i v e it a n e w force, to reconstruct the nobility as a force w i t h i n the forces of t h e social field. For B o u l a i n v i l h e r s , b e g i n n i n g to speak in the d o m a i n of history, r e c o u n t i n g a history, is

therefore not s i m p l y a m a t t e r of d e s c r i b i n g a r e l a t i o n s h i p of force, or of r e u t i h z i n g on behalf of, for e x a m p l e , t h e n o b i l i t y a calculation of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y that h a d p r e v i o u s l y b e l o n g e d to t h e government. H e is doing so in order the modify the v e r y disposition and the current

e q u i l i b r i u m of the r e l a t i o n s of force. H i s t o r y does not s i m p l y a n a l y z e or i n t e r p r e t forces: it modifies t h e m. The v e r y fact of having control over, or the fact of b e i n g r i g h t in the order of h i s t o r i c a l k n o w l e d g e , in short, of t e l l i n g the t r u t h about history, therefore e n a b l e s him to occupy a decisive strategic position. To sum all t h i s u p , w e can say that the constitution of a historicop o h t i c a l field is an e x p r e s s i o n of the fact t h a t w e h a v e gone from a history whose function w a s to establish r i g h t b y recounting the e x ploits of heroes or k i n g s , their b a t t l e s a n d their w a r s a n d so on, t h a t w e have gone from a history that establishe d r i g h t b y telling the story of w a r s to a history that continues the w a r b y deciphering the w a r a n d the s t r u g g l e t h a t are going on w i t h i n all the institutions of r i g h t a n d peace. History t h u s becomes a k n o w l e d g e of struggles t h a t is d e p l o y e d a n d t h a t functions w i t h i n a field of struggles; there is n o w a l i n k b e t w e e n the p o l i t i c a l fight a n d historical k n o w l e d g e . A n d w h i l e it is no d o u b t t r u e t h a t confrontations have a l w a y s been a c c o m p a n i e d b y recollections, memories, a n d v a r i o u s r i t u a l s of m e m o n a h z a t i o n , I t h i n k that from the e i g h t e e n th century o n w a r d a n d it is at this point t h a t p o l i t i c a l life a n d p o l i t i c al k n o w l e d g e b e g i n to be i n s c r i b e d in

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society's real strugglesstrategy , or the element of calculation inherent in such struggles, will be a r t i c u l a t e d w i t h a historical k n o w l e d g e that takes the form of the interpretation an d analysis of forces. W e cannot u n d e r s t a n d the emergence of this specifically modern d i m e n sion of politics unless w e u n d e r s t a n d how, from the eighteenth cent u r y o n w a r d , historical k n o w l e d g e becomes an element of the struggle: it is b o t h a d e s c r i p t i o n of struggles a n d a weapon in the struggle. H i s t o r y gave us the idea that w e are at war; an d w e w a g e w a r through history. H a v i n g e s t a b l i s h e d that, let me m a k e t w o points before w e go b a c k to the w a r that is w a g e d throughou t the history of peoples. M y first point concerns historicism . Evervone k n o w s of course that historicism is the most dreadful thing in the w o r l d . A n y philosophy w o r t h y of the name, any t h e o r y of societv, anv self-respecting epistemology that has anv claim to distinction obviously has to struggle against the platitudes of h i s t o r i c i s m . No one w o u l d d a r e to a d m i t to b e i ng a historlcist. A n d it can, I t h i n k , easily be d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t ever since the nineteenth centurv, all the great philosophies h a v e , in one w a y or another, been antihistoricist. One could also, I t h i n k , demonstrate that all the h u m a n sciences survive, or perhaps even exist, only because they are a n t i h i s t o n c i s t .
5

One could also demonstrate that w h e n his-

tory, or the historical d i s c i p l i n e , has recourse to either a philosophy of historv or a j u r i d i c a l an d moral ideality, or to the h u m a n sciences ( a l l of w h i c h it finds so e n c h a n t i n g ) , it is trying to escape its latal and secret penchant for historicism. But w h a t is this historicis m t h a t everyonephilosophy , the h u m a n sciences, h i s t o r y i s so suspicious of? W h a t is this historicism that has to be w a r d e d off at all cost, a nd that philosophical, scientific, and even political m o d e r n i t y have a l w a y s t r i e d to w a r d off? W e l l , I t h i n k t h a t historicism is nothing other than w h a t I have just been t a l k i n g about: the l i n k , the unavoidabl e connection, between w a r an d history, an d conversely, between historv and war. No matter how far b a c k it goes, h i s t o r i c a l k n o w l e d g e n e v e r finds nature, r i g h t , order, or peace. H o w e v e r far back it goes, historical k n o w l e d g e discovers only an unendin g war, or in other w o r d s , forces that relate to one another

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a n d come into conflict w i t h one another, a n d t h e events in w h i c h r e l a t i o n s of force are decided, b u t a l w a y s in a provisional w a y . H i s tory encounters nothing b u t w a r , b u t histor y can never r e a l ly look d o w n on this w a r from on high; h i s t o r y cannot get a w a y from w a r , or discover its basic l a w s or impose l i m i t s on it, quit e s i m p l y b e cause w a r itself supports t h i s k n o w l e d g e , r u n s t h r o u g h t h i s k n o w l e d g e , a n d d e t e r m i n e s this k n o w l e d g e . K n o w l e d g e is never a n y t h i n g more than a w e a p o n in a w a r , or a tactical d e p l o y m e n t w i t h i n that w a r . W a r is w a g e d throughout historv, a n d t h r o u g h the history that tells the history of w a r . A n d history, for its part, can never do a n y thing more than i n t e r p r e t w a g e d t h r o u g h it. W e l l , then, I t h i n k it is t h i s essential connection b e t w e e n historica l k n o w l e d g e a n d the p r a c t i c e of w a r i t is t h i s , g e n e r a l l y speaking, that constitutes the core of historicism, a core that both is i r r e d u c i b l e a n d a l w a y s has to be sanitized, because of a n idea, w h i ch has been in circulation for the last one thousand or t w o t h o u s a n d y e a r s , a n d w h i c h m i g h t be d e s c r i b e d a s " p l a t o n i c " ( t h o u g h w e s h o u l d a l w a y s be w a r y of b l a m i n g poor old Plato for e v e r y t h i n g w e w a n t to b a n i s h ) . It is an idea that is p r o b a b l y b o u n d u p w i t h the w h o l e W e s t e r n o r g a n i z a t i o n of k n o w l e d g e , namely, the idea that k n o w l e d g e a n d t r u t h cannot not belong to the register of orde r a n d peace, t h a t k n o w l e d g e a n d t r u t h can never b e found on the side of violence, disorder, a n d w a r . I t h i n k t h a t the i m p o r t a n t t h i n g ( a n d w h e t h e r it is or is not platonic is of no i m p o r t a n c e ) about this idea t h a t k n o w l e d g e a n d t r u t h cannot b e l o n g to w a r , a n d can o n l y belong to order a n d peace, is that the modern State has now r e i m p l a n t e d it in w h a t w e might call the e i g h teenth c e n t u r y ' s " d i s c i p h n a n z a t i o n " of k n o w l e d g e s . A n d it is this idea t h a t m a k e s historicism unacceptabl e to u s , t h a t m e a n s t h a t w e cannot accept s o m e t h i n g l i k e an indissociable c i r c u l a r i t y b e t w e e n historical k n o w l e d g e a n d the w a r s t h a t it t a l k s about a n d w h i c h at the s a m e t i m e go on in it. So t h i s is the p r o b l e m , a n d t h i s , if y o u l i k e , is our first task: W e m u s t t r y to be historicists, or in other w o r d s , t r y to analyze this perpetua l a n d unavoidable r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the w a r that is recounted b y history a n d the history t h a t is t r a v e r s ed b y the the w a r it is w a g i n g or that is b e i n g

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w a r it is recounting. A n d it is along these lines that I w i l l now try to go on w i t h the little story of the Gauls and the Franks that I started to tell. So m u c h for m y first r e m a r k , for my first e x c u r s u s on h i s t o n c i s m . To move on to the second: an objection can b e m a d e . There m i g h t be a n o t h e r w a y of a p p r o a c h i n g the theme I touched upon a moment ago, or in other words the d i s c i p l i n a r i z a t i o n of k n o w l e d g es in the eighteenth centurv. If w e make history, the history of the w a r s that go on throughout history, the great discursive a p p a r a t u s that m a k e s possible the eighteenth-centur y c r i t i q u e of the State, a nd if w e m a k e the h i s t o r y / w a r relationship the precondition for the emergence of "poli t i c s " [ . . . ] the function of o r d e r w a s to reestablish a continuity in its discourse.* [ A t the time when the j u r i s ts were e x p l o r i n g the archives in an a t t e m p t to discover the basic l a w s of the k i n g d o m , a historians ' history w a s t a k i n g shape, and it w a s not power' s ode to itself. It should not be forgotten that in the seventeenth century, and not only in France, t r a g e d y w a s one of the g r e a t r i t u a l forms in w h i c h public right w a s d i s p l a y e d a nd in whic h its p r o b l e m s w e r e discussed. W e l l , S h a k e speare's " h i s t o r i c a l " t r a g e d i e s are t r a g e d i e s about right a nd the king, and they are essentially centered on the p r o b l e m of the u s u r p e r and dethronement, of the murder of k i n g s and the b i r t h of the new b e i ng w h o is constituted by the coronation of a king. H o w can an i n d i v i d u a l use violence, intrigue, murder, and w a r to a c q u i r e a p u b l i c might that can bring about the reign of peace, justice, order, an d h a p p i n e s s ? H o w can illegitimacy produce l a w ? A t a time w h e n the theory and history of right are t r y i n g to w e a v e the unbroke n continuity of public might, S h a k e s p e a r e a n t r a g e d y, in contrast, d w e l l s ]
6

on the w o u n d , on the

repeated injury that is inflicted on the body of the k i n g d o m w h e n kings d i e violent deaths and w h e n i l l e g i t i m a te sovereigns c o m e to the throne. I t h i n k that Shakespearean tragedy is, at least in terms of one of its a x e s , a sort of ceremony, a sort of r e m e m o r i a l i z a t i o n of the

*It is difficult to establish the meaning on the basis of the tape recording. The first eighteen pages of the manuscript were m fact moved to the end in the lecture itself.

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problems of public right. The same could be said of French tragedy, of t h a t of C o r n e i l l e and, of course, especially R a c i n e . Besides, in g e n eral terms, isn't G r e e k tragedy too a l w a y s , essentially, a tragedy about r i g h t ? I t h i n k that there is a fundamental, essential k i n s h i p b e t w e e n t r a g e d y and r i g h t , b e t w e e n tragedy a n d p u b l i c r i g h t , just as t h e r e is probably an essential k i n s h i p b e t w e e n the novel and the p r o b l e m of the norm. Tragedy and r i g h t , the novel a n d the norm: perhaps w e should look into all this. Be that a s it may, traged y is a sort of representatio n of p u b l i c r i g h t , a politico-juridical representation of public might, in seventeenthcentury France too. There is, however, one differenceand this ( g e n i u s a s i d e ) is w h e r e it basically differs from S h a k e s p e a r e . On the one hand, French classical tragedy usually d e a l s only w i t h a n c i e n t k i n g s . This coding is no doubt a matter of political p r u d e n c e . But after a l l , it s h o u l d not b e forgotten that one of the reasons for this reference to a n t i q u i t y is this: In seventeenth-centur y France, a n d e s p e c i a l l y u n der Louis X I V , monarchic right w a s , b e c a u s e of its form a n d even the continuity of its history, d e p i c t e d as b e i n g d i r e c t l y descended from the monarchies of a n t i q u i t y . W e find the s a m e t y p e of power a n d the same t y p e of monarchy in A u g u s t u s a n d N e r o, or even P y r r h u s , t h a t
7

w e find w i t h Louis X I V . It is the s a m e m o n a r c h y in both substantive and j u r i d i c a l terms. On the other hand, French classical tragedy contains a reference to a n t i q u i t y , but w e can also see the presence of an i n s t i t u t i o n that a p p e a r s to restrict in some w a y the t r a g i c p o w e r s of tragedy, a n d to m a k e it t i p over i n t o a theater of g a l l a n t r y a n d i n trigue: the presence of the court. A n c i e n t tragedy, a n d courtly t r a g e d y . But w h a t is the court, if notand this is d a z z l i n g l y obvious in the case of Louis X I V y e t another lesson in public r i g h t ? The court's essential function is to constitute, to o r g a n i z e, a space for the d a i l y a n d permanent d i s p l a y of royal p o w e r in all its s p l e n d o r. The court is basically a k i n d of p e r m a n e n t r i t u a l operation that begins again every day and requalifies a man w h o gets up, goes for a w a l k , eats, has his loves and his passions, and w h o is at the same t i m e t h a n k s to all that, because of all that, and because none of all that is e l i m i nateda sovereign. The specific operation of court ritua l a n d court

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ceremonial is to make his love affairs sovereign, to mak e h i s food sovereign, to m a k e his levee a n d his going-to-bed ritual sovereign. A n d w h i l e the court constantly requahfies his daily routine as sovereign in the person of a monarch w h o is the very substance of monarchy, tragedy does the same t h i n g in reverse; t r a g e d y undoes and, if you like, recomposes w h a t court r i t u a l establishes each day. W h a t is the point of classical t r a g e d y , of Racinian t r a g e d y ? Its functionor at least one of its a x e s i s to constitute the underside of the ceremony, to show the ceremony in s h r e d s , the moment w h e n the sovereign, the possessor of p u b l i c m i g h t , is g r a d u a l l y b r o k en d o w n into a man of passion, a man of a n g e r , a man of vengeance, a man of love, incest, a n d so on. In t r a g e d y , the problem is w h e t h e r or not s t a r t i ng from t h i s decomposition of the sovereign into a man of p a s sion, the s o v e r e i g n - k i n g can be reborn a n d recomposed: the death a n d resurrection of the body of the k i n g in the heart of the m o n a r c h. That is the p r o b l e m ( a n d it is much more j u r i d i c al than p s y c h o l o g i c a l ) that is posed b y Racinia n tragedy. In that sense, you can well u n d e r stand that w h e n Louis X I V a s k e d R a c i n e to be h i s historiographer, he w a s simply being true to the tradition of w h a t the historiography of the monarchy had been u n t i l then, or in other words, an ode to power itself. But he is also a l l o w i n g Racine to go on performing the function he h a d p l a y e d w h e n he w r o t e h i s t r a g e d i e s . He w a s basicall y a s k i n g him to w r i t e , as a historiographer, the fifth act of a h a p p y t r a g e d y , or in other w o r d s , to trace the rise of the p r i v a t e manthe courtier w h o h a d a heartto the point w h e r e he becomes at once w a r l o r d , monarch, an d the holder of sovereignty. Entrusting h i s h i s toriography to a tragic poet d i d not d i s t u r b the order of r i g h t , nor d i d it betra y h i s t o r y 's old function of establishing r i g h t , of establishing the r i g h t of the sovereign State. It m a r k e d t h a n k s to a necessity that is b o u n d u p w i t h the absolutism of the k i n g a r e t u rn to the purest an d most e l e m e n t a r y function of royal historiograph y in an absolute monarchy. It must not be forgotten that as a result of a sort of strange lapse into archaism, the absolute monarchy made the ceremony of p o w e r an intense political moment, or that the court, w h i c h w a s one of p o w e r ' s ceremonies, w a s a daily lesson in public right, a d a i l y

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demonstration of public right. W e can now u n d e r s t a n d w h y Racine's appointment a l l o w e d the history of the k i n g to take on its purest form and, in a sense, its magico-poetic form. The history of the k i n g could not but become p o w e r ' s ode to itself. So absolutism, court ceremonial, manifestations of public right, classical t r a g e d y , a n d the h i s t o r i o g r a p hy of the king: I t h i nk they are all par t of the same thing. Excuse my speculations about Racine a n d historiography. Let's s k i p a c e n t u r y ( t h e very c e n t u r y t h a t began w i t h B o u l a i n v i l l i e r s ) a n d t a ke the e x a m p le of the last of the absolute monarchs a n d the last of his historiographers: Louis X V I and J a c o b - N i c o l a s M o r e a u , the distant successor to Racine, of w h o m I have a l r e a d y said a few w o r d s , as he w a s the minister of history a p p o i n t e d by Louis X V I t o w a r d the end of the 1 7 8 0 s . W h o w a s M o r e a u , compared to R a c i n e ? This is a d a n gerous p a r a l l e l , but you might be s u r p r i s e d w h o comes off w o r s e . M o r e a u is the s c h o l a r l y defender of a k i n g w h o , obviously, n e e d e d to be defended on a n u m b er of occasions d u r i n g h i s lifetime. M o r e a u certainly p l a y e d the role of defender w h e n he w a s appointed in the 1 7 8 0 s a t the v e r y time w h e n the r i g h t s of the monarchy w e r e being attacked in the name of history, and from ver y different directions not only by the nobility, but also bv the parlementaires a s well as the bourgeoisie. T h i s w a s the precise m o m e nt w h e n h i s t o ry became the discourse t h at e v e ry "nation"in quotation marksor at least e v e r y order or every class u s e d to lay claim to its right; this is the moment w h e n , if you l i k e , history became the general discourse of political struggles. It w a s at t h i s point, then, that a ministry of history w a s created. A n d at this point, you w i l l ask me: Did history really escape the State, given that, a h u n d r e d years after Racine, we see the emergence of a historiographer who h a d at least equally close links w i t h p o w e r of the State because he a c t u a l l y d i d , a s I have just s a i d , have a m i n i s t e r i al or at least a d m i n i s t r a t i v e function? So w h a t w a s t h e point of creating t h i s central ministry to a d m i n ister h i s t o r y ? Its purpose w a s to arm the k i n g for the political battle insofar as he w a s , after all, no more than one force a m o ng others, a n d was being a t t a c k e d bv other forces. It p u r p o s e w a s also to attempt to impose a sort of enforced peace on those historico political s t r u g g l e s.

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Its purpose w a s to code this discourse on history once a n d for all, and in such a w a y t h a t it could be i n t e g r a t e d into the practice of the State. Hence the tasks w i t h w h i c h M o r e a u w a s e n t r u s t e d : collating the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s documents, m a k i n g the m available to the a d m i n istration itself ( b e g i n n i n g w i t h the financial a d m i n i s t r a t o rs a n d then the o t h e r s ) , a n d , finally, opening u p these documents, this storehouse of documents, to the people w h o w e r e being p a i d by the k i n g to carry out this research. Quite apart from the fact that M o r e a u is not R a 8

cine, that Louis X V I is not Louis XIV, and that all this is far removed from the ceremonial descriptio n of the crossing of the Rhine, w h a t is the difference b e t w e e n M o r e a u an d R a c i n e , b e t w e e n the old historio g r a p h y ( w h i c h w a s , in a sense, at its purest in the late seventeenth c e n t u r y ) an d the k i n d of history the State begins to tak e in h a n d an d b r i n g u n d e r its control in the late eighteenth c e n t u r y ? Can w e say that histor y ceases to be the State's discourse about itself, once we have, p e r h a p s , left court h i s t o r i o g r a p h y ? Can w e say that w e are now involved w i t h an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e - t y p e h i s t o r i o g r a p h y ? I think that there is a considerable difference b e t w e e n the two things , or in any case that it has to be measured. So, a n o t h e r n e w e x c u r s u s , if y o u w i l l a l l o w me. The difference

between w h a t might be called the history of the sciences a n d the genealogy of k n o w l e d g e s is that the history of sciences is essentially located on an a x i s that i s , r o u g h l y speaking, the cognition-truth axis, or at least the a x i s that goes from the structure of cognition to the demand for truth. U n l i k e the history of the sciences, the genealogy of k n o w l e d g e s is located on a different a x i s , namely the discourse-power a x i s or, if y o u like, the discursive practice-clash of power axis . N o w it seems to me that if w e applv it to w h a t is for a w h o l e host of reasons the p r i v i l e g e d period of the eighteenth century, to this domain or this region, the genealogy of k n o w l e d g e must firstbefore it does a n y t h i n g e l s e o u t w i t the problematic of the Enlightenment. It h a s to o u t w i t w h a t w a s at the t i me described ( a n d w a s still described in the nineteenth an d t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s ) as the progress of e n l i g h t enment, the struggle of k n o w l e d g e against ignorance , of reason against chimeras, of e x p e r i e n ce against prejudices, of reason against error, and

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so on. A l l this has been describe d as, or s y m b o l i z e d by, light g r a d u a l l y d i s p e l l i n g d a r k n e s s , a n d it is this, I t h i n k , t h a t w e have to get r i d of [on the c o n t r a r y , ] w h e n w e look at the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y w e have to see, not this r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n d a y and night, k n o w l e d g e a n d ignorance, but something v e r y different: an immense a n d m u l t i p l e b a t t l e , b u t not one b e t w e e n k n o w l e d g e a n d i g n o r a n c e, but an i m mense a n d m u l t i p l e b a t t l e b e t w e e n k n o w l e d g e s in the p l u r a l k n o w l e d g e s t h a t are in conflict b e c a u se of t h e i r v e r y morphology, because they are in the possession of enemies, a n d because t h e y h a v e i n t r i n s i c power-effects. I w i l l t a k e one or t w o e x a m p l e s that w i l l , for a moment, t a k e us a w a y from history. Tak e the p r o b l e m of technical or technological k n o w l e d g e . It is often s a i d that the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y w a s the centur y that s a w the emergence of technical k n o w l e d g e s . W h a t a c t u a l ly h a p pened in the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y w a s quite different. First of a l l , w e have the p l u r a l , polymorphous , m u l t i p l e , a n d dispersed existence of different knowledges, which existed w i t h their differencesdiffer-

ences defined by geographical regions, by the size of the w o r k s h o p s or factories, a n d so on. The differences among themI am s p e a k i n g of technological e x p e r t i s e , r e m e m b e r w e r e defined by local catego ries, education, a n d the w e a l t h of their possessors. A n d these k n o w l edges w e r e s t r u g g l i n g against one another, w i t h one a n o t h e r, in a society where k n o w i n g the secret b e h i n d technological k n o w l e d g e w a s a source of w e a l t h , and in w h i c h the m u t u a l i n d e p e n d e n ce of these k n o w l e d g e s also made i n d i v i d u a l s i n d e p e n d e n t . So m u l t i p l e k n o w l e d g e , k n o w l e d g e - a s - s e c r e t, k n o w l e d g e functioning a s w e a l t h a n d a s a guarante e of i n d e p e n d e n c e : technological k n o w l e d g e functioned

w i t h i n this p a t c h w o r k . N o w , as both the p r o d u c t i v e forces a n d econ o m i c d e m a n d developed, the price of these k n o w l e d g e s rose, a n d the struggle b e t w e e n t h e m , the need to d e l i n e a te t h e i r i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d the need for secrecy intensified a n d b e c a m e , so to s p e a k , more tense. At the s a m e t i m e , w e s a w the developmen t of processes t h a t a l l o w e d bigger, more g e n e r a l , or more i n d u s t r i a l i z e d k n o w l e d g e s , or k n o w l edges t h a t c i r c u l a t e d more easily, to a n n e x , confiscate, a n d t a k e over smaller, more p a r t i c u l a r , more local, a n d more artisanal k n o w l e d g e s .

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There w a s a sort of immense economico-political struggle around or over these k n o w l e d g e s , their dispersal, or their heterogeneity, an i m mense struggle over the economic inductions and power-effects were bound that up with the exclusive o w n e r s h i p of a k n o w l e d g e , its

dispersal a n d its secret. W h a t has b e en called the development of technological k n o w l e d g e in the eighteenth century has to be thought of in t e r m s of a form of m u l t i p l i c i t y , a n d not in terms of the t r i u m p h of l i g h t over d a r k n e s s or of k n o w l e d g e over ignorance. N o w , the State will intervene, either directly or i n d i r e c t l y, in these attempts at annexation, which a r e also a t t e m p t s at generalization, in four m a in w a y s . First, by e l i m i n a t i n g or disqualifyin g w h a t m i g h t be termed useless and irreducible l i t t l e k n o w l e d g e s that are expensive in economic t e r m s : e l i m i n a t i o n a n d disqualification, then. Second, b y n o r m a l i z i n g t h e s e k n o w l e d g e s ; t h i s makes it possible to fit t h e m together, to m a k e t h e m c o m m u n i c a te w i t h one another, to b r e a k d o w n the b a r r i e r s of secrecy and technological and geographical boundaries. In short, this m a k e s not only k n o w l e d g e s , b u t also those w h o possess them, interchangeable. The normalization of dispersed knowledges. T h i r d operation: the hierarchical classification of k n o w l e d g e s a l l o w s t h e m to become, so to speak, interlocking, starting w i t h the most p a r t i c u l a r and materia l k n o w l e d g e s , which are also subordinate d k n o w l e d g e s , and ending w i t h the most general forms, w i t h the most formal k n o w l e d g e s , which are also the forms that envelop and direct k n o w l e d g e . So, a hierarchica l classification. A n d finally, once a l l this has been done, a fourth operation becomes possible: a p y r a m i d a l cent r a l i z a t i o n that allow s these k n o w l e d g e s to be controlled, w h i c h ensures that they can be selected, and both that the content of these k n o w l e d g e s can be t r a n s m i t t e d u p w a r d from the bottom, and that the overall directions and the g e n e r a l organizations it wishes to p r o mote can be t r a n s m i t t e d d o w n w a r d from the top. The tendency to organize technological k n o w l e d g e s brings w i t h it a w h o l e series of practices , projects, and i n s t i t u t i o n s. The for e x a m p l e . The Encyclopedic Encyclopedic is usually seen only in terms of its po-

litical or ideological opposition to the m o n a r c h y a n d at least one form of C a t h o l i c i s m . Its interest in technology is not in fact a reflection of

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some philosophica l m a t e r i a l i s m ; it is a c t u a l l y an attempt to homog e n i z e technological k n o w l e d g e s , a n d it is at once political a n d economic. The g r e a t studies of handicraft methods, metallurgical techniques, and m i n i n g t h e g r e a t s u r v e y s that w e r e m a d e b e t w e e n the m i d d l e a n d the end of the eighteenth centurycorresponded to this a t t e m p t to n o m a l i z e technical k n o w l e d g e s . The e x i s t e n c e , foundation, or development of grandes ecoles such as the Ecole des M i n e s a n d the Ecole Ponts et Chaussees, and so on, m a d e it possible to establish both q u a n t i t a t i ve a n d q u a l i t a t i ve levels, b r e a k s a n d strata b e t w e e n these different k n o w l e d g e s , and t h a t a l l o w e d t h e m to b e a r r a n g ed into a h i e r a r c h y . A n d finally, the corps of inspectors w h o , t h r o u g h o u t the k i n g d o m , advised a n d counseled people on how to develop a n d use these different k n o w l e d g e s ensured that k n o w l e d g e w a s centralized. I h a v e t a k e n the e x a m p l e of technical k n o w l e d g e s , b u t the s a m e could b e said of medical k n o w l e d g e . T h r o u g h o u t the w h o l e second half of the eighteenth century w e see a huge effort b e i n g m a d e to homogenize, normalize, classify, a n d centralize m e d i c a l k n o w l e d g e . H o w could medical k n o w l e d g e b e given a form a n d a content, how could h o mogeneous l a w s b e imposed u p o n the practice of h e a l t h c a r e , how could r u l e s be imposed u p on the populationnot so much to m a k e it share this k n o w l e d g e , as to m a k e it find it a c c e p t a b l e ? A l l this led to t h e creation of hospitals, dispensaries, a n d of the Societe r o y a l e de medecine, the codification of t h e medical profession, a huge p u b l i c hygiene campaign, a huge c a m p a i g n to i m p r o v e the h y g i e n e of n u r s lings and children, and so on.
9

A l l these projectsand I have cited only two e x a m p l e s b a s i c a l l y had four goals: selection, normalization , hierarchicalization, a n d centralization. These a r e the four o p e r a t i o n s that w e see at w o r k in a fairly d e t a i l e d study of w h a t w e call d i s c i p l i n a r y p o w e r .
10

The e i g h -

teenth century w a s the century w h e n k n o w l e d g e s were d i s c i p l i n e d , or w h e n , in other w o r d s , the i n t e r n a l organization of e v e r y k n o w l e d g e became a discipline w h i c h had, in its own field, c r i t e r ia of selection that a l l o w e d it to eradicate false k n o w l e d g e or n o n k n o w l e d g e . W e also h a v e forms of normalization a n d homogenization of k n o w l e d g e contents, forms of hierarchicahzation, a n d an internal organization

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that could c e n t r a l i z e k n o w l e d g e s around a sort of d e facto a x i o m a t i zation. So every k n o w l e d g e w a s organized into a discipline . These k n o w l e d g e s t h a t ha d been d i s c i p h n a r i z e d from w i t h i n were then a r r a n g e d , m a d e to communicate w i t h one another, redistributed, a nd organized into a hierarchy w i t h i n a sort of overall field or overall d i s c i p l i n e t h a t w a s k n o w n specifically as science. Science in the sing u l a r did not e x i s t before the eighteent h century. Sciences existed, k n o w l e d g e s existed, and philosophy, if y o u like, existed. Philosophy w a s , precisely, the organizational system, the system t h a t a l l o w e d k n o w l e d g e s to communicate w i t h one anotherand to t h a t e x t e n t it could p l a y an effective, real, a nd operational role w i t h i n the d e v e l o p m e n t of technical k n o w l e d g e s . The d i s c i p h n a r i z a t i o n of k n o w l e d g e s , a nd its p o l y m o r p h o u s s i n g u l a r i t y , now l e a d s to the emergence of a p h e n o m e n o n a n d a constraint t h a t is now an integral p a r t of our society. W e call it "science." A t the same time, a nd for the same reason, philosophy loses its foundational a n d founding role. Philosophy no longer has any real role to play w i t h i n science and the processes of k n o w l e d g e . A t the same t i m e , an d for the s a m e reasons, mathesisor the project of a universal science that could serve as both for a formal instrument for every science an d a rigorous foundation

all sciencesalso disappears. Science, defined as a general domain, as the d i s c i p l i n a r y p o l i c i n g of k n o w l e d g e s , takes over from both p h i l o s ophy a n d mathesis. From now on, it w i l l raise specific p r o b l e ms relatin g to the d i s c i p l i n a r y policing of k n o w l e d g e s : p r o b l e m s of classification, p r o b l e m s of h i e r a r c h i c a h z a t i o n, p r o b l e m s of proximity, an d so on. A belief in the progress of reason w a s the eighteent h c e n t u r y 's only awareness of this far-reaching change in the d i s c i p h n a r i z a t i o n discourse operatin g w i t h i n science a nd the sciences' internal for a mathesis. phnarization of k n o w l e d g e s a n d the subsequen t e l i m i n a t i o n of both the philosophical project I think, however, t h a t if w e can g r a s p w h a t w a s going of p o l y m o r p h o us a nd heterogeneous knowledgeswe

on b e n e a t h w h a t is called the progress of reasonnamely the disciw i l l b e able to u n d e r s t a n d a certain n u m b e r of things. First, the a p pearance of the university . Not of course in the strict sense, as the universities had their function, role, and existence long before this.

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B u t from t h e end of t h e eighteenth a n d b e g i n n i n g of the nineteenth centuries onwardthe Napoleonic university w a s established at p r e cisely this timewe see the emergence of something like a sort of great uniform a p p a r a t u s of k n o w l e d g e s , w i t h its different stages, its different extensions, its different levels, and its pseudopodia. The u n i v e r s i t y ' s p r i m a r y function is one of selection, not so much of people ( w h i c h i s , after a l l , basically not very i m p o r t a n t ) as of k n o w l e d g e s . It can play this selective role because it has a sort of de factoand de juremonopoly, w h i c h means that any k n o w l e d g e tha t is not b o r n or s h a p e d w i t h i n t h i s sort of institutional fieldwhose l i m i t s a r e in fact relatively fluid b u t w h i c h consists, r o u g h l y s p e a k i n g , of the u n i v e r s i ty a nd official r e s e a r c h b o d i e s t h a t a n y t h i n g t h a t exists outsid e it, any k n o w l e d g e t h a t e x i s t s in t h e w i l d , any k n o w l e d g e t h a t is b o r n e l s e w h e r e , is a u t o m a t i c a l l y, an d from the outset, if not a c t u a l l y e x cluded, disqualified a priori. That the a m a t e u r scholar ceased to e x i st in the eighteenth an d nineteenth centuries is a w e l l - k n o w n fact. So the university has a selective role: it selects k n o w l e d g e s . Its role is to distinguish b e t w e e n q u a l i t a t i v e and q u a n t i t a t i v e levels of k n o w l e d g e , an d to d i s t r i b u t e k n o w l e d g e s accordingly. Its role is to teach, w h i c h means respecting the b a r r i e r s that e x i s t b e t w e e n the different floors of the university a p p a r a t u s . Its role is to homogenize k n o w l e d g e s by establishing a sort of scientific c o m m u n i t y w i t h a recognized status; its role is to o r g a n i z e a consensus. Its role i s , finally, to use, eithe r d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , State a p p a r a t u s e s to c e n t r a l i z e k n o w l e d g e . W e c a n now u n d e r s t a n d w h y somethin g r e s e m b l i n g a university, w i t h i t s ill-defined extensions a n d frontiers, s h o u l d have emerge d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of the nineteenth century, or in o t h e r w o r d s a t the v e r y t i m e when this disciphnanzation of k n o w l e d g e s , this organization of k n o w l e d g e s into d i s c i p l i n e s , w a s g o i n g on. T h i s also a l l o w s us to u n d e r s t a n d a second phenomenon, or w h a t m i g h t be termed a change in the form of dogmatism. You see, once the mechanism, or the internal d i s c i p l i n e of k n o w l e d g e s , includes controls, an d once those controls are exercised by a p u r p o s e - b u i lt a p p a r a t u s ; once w e have this form of controlyou must understand t h i s w e can do a w a y w i t h w h a t w e m i g h t call the orthodoxy of

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statements. This old o r t h o d o x y w a s costly, for this p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h functioned a s a religiou s or ecclesiastical mode of functioning, h a d r e s u l t e d in the condemnation a nd exclusion of a certain n u m b e r of statements t h a t w e r e scientifically t r u e a n d scientifically productive. The d i s c i p l i n e, the d i s c i p l i n a r i z a t i on of k n o w l e d g e s established in the eighteenth century, w i l l replace that orthodoxy, which a p p l i e d to s t a t e m e n t s themselves an d sorted those that w e r e acceptabl e out from those that w e r e unacceptable, w i t h something else: a control that a p plies not to the content of statements themselves, to their conformity or nonconformity to a certain t r u t h , but to the r e g u l a r i t y of e n u n c i ations. The problem is now: W h o is s p e a k i n g , are they qualified to speak, at w h a t level is the statement situated, w h a t set can it be fitted into, a n d how and to w h a t extent does it conform to other forms a nd other typologies of k n o w l e d g e ? This a l l o w s a liberalism that i s , if not boundless, at least more b r o a d - m i n d e d in terms of the content of statements and, on the other hand, more rigorous, more comprehensiveand has a m u c h g r e a t e r w i n g areaat the level of enunciatory procedures. A s a result, a n d as y o u might have deduced, statements could rotate much more q u i c k l y , and truths became obsolete much more quickly. A s a result, a number of epistemological obstacles could be removed. J u s t as an orthodoxy that concentrated on the content of statements h a d become an obstacle to the r e n e w a l of the stock of scientific k n o w l e d g e s , so, in contrast, d i s c i p l i n a r i z a t i on at the level of enunciations a l l o w e d the stock to be r e n e w e d much more q u i c k l y . W e move, if you like , from the censorship of s t a t e m e n t s to the d i s c i p l i n a r i z a t i o n of enunciations, or from orthodoxy to w h a t I w o u l d call "orthology," to a form of control that is now exercised on a d i s c i p l i n a r y basis. Right! I've s t r a y e d a w a y from the point w i t h all this. W e h a v e been s t u d y i n g , looking at h o w the d i s c i p l i n a r y technique s of power,
11

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at their most subtle or e l e m e n t a r y level, taken at the level of i n d i v i d ual bodies, succeeded in c h a n g i n g the political economy of p o w e r , and modified its apparatuses; w e have also seen how d i s c i p l i n a r y techniques of p o w e r applied to bodies not only led to an accumulation of k n o w l e d g e , b u t also identified possible domains of k n o w l e d g e . W e

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t h e n saw how t h e applicatio n of d i s c i p l i n e s of power to bodies could extract from those subjugated bodies something like a soul-subject, an "ego," a psyche, et cetera. I t r i ed to look at all this last y e a r . " I t h i n k that we now have to study the emergence of a different form of disciplining , of d i s c i p l i n a r i z a t i o n , w h i ch is contemporary w i t h the first b u t w h i c h a p p l i e s to k n o w l e d g e s a n d not bodies. A n d it can, I t h i n k , be d e m o n s t r a t ed that t h i s d i s c i p l i n a r i z a t i on of k n o w l e d g e s r e s u l t e d in b o t h the removal of certain epistemological obstacles a n d a n e w form, a n e w r e g u l a r i t y in the proliferation of disciplines. It can be d e m o n s t r a t e d that this d i s c i p l i n a r i z a t i on established a new mode of relationshi p b e t w e e n p o w e r a n d k n o w l e d g e . It can, finally, be d e m onstrated t h a t the d i s c i p l i n a r i z a t i o n of k n o w l e d g e s gave rise to a n e w constraint: no longer the constraint of t r u t h , b u t the constraint of science. A l l this is t a k i n g us a w a y from the historiograph y of the k i n g , Racine, a n d M o r e a u . W e could pick u p the analysis ( b u t I will not do so n o w ) a n d show t h a t at the v e r y moment w h e n history, or historical discourse, w a s e n t e r i n g a g e n e r a l field of conflict, history found itself, for different reasons, in the same position as the technical k n o w l e d g e s I w a s t a l k i n g about a m o m e nt ago. These technological k n o w l e d g e s , their dispersal, their v e r y morphology, their localized n a t u r e , and the secrecy that s u r r o u n d e d the m w e r e b o t h an issue a n d an i n s t r u m e n t in an economic struggle and a political s t r u g g l e . The S t a t e intervened in the struggle t h a t these technological k n o w l e d g e s w e r e w a g i n g against one another: its function or role w a s to d i s c i p l i n a r i z e t h e m , or in other w o r d s , to select a n d homogenize k n o w l e d g e s , and to arrange them into a h i e r a r c h y. For v e r y different reasons, historical k n o w l e d g e entered a field of s t r u g g l e s an d battles at m u c h the same time. Not for directly economic reasons, b u t for reasons pertaining to a struggle, a political s t r u g g l e. W h e n historical k n o w l e d g e , w h i c h h a d until t h e n been part of the discourse that the State or power pronounced on itself, w a s enucleated from t h at p o w e r , a n d in the political struggle that lasted for the became an instrument

w h o l e e i g h t e e n t h century, the State attempted, in the same w a y an d for the same reason, to take it in hand a n d d i s c i p l i n a n z e it. The

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establishment, at the end of the eighteenth century, of a m i n i s t r y of history, the establishment of the great repository of archives that was to become the Ecole des C h a r t e s in the nineteenth century, w h i c h more or less c o i n c i d ed w i t h the establishmen t of the Ecole des M i n e s an d the Ecole d e s Ponts et Chausseesthe Ecole des Ponts et C h a u s sees is a l i t t l e different, not that it mattersalso corresponds to the d i s c i p l i n a r i z a t i o n of k n o w l e d g e . Royal p o w e r ' s objective w a s to d i s cipline historical k n o w l e d g e , or historical k n o w l e d g e s , and thus to establish a State k n o w l e d g e . The difference b e t w e e n this an d technological k n o w l e d g e is that insofar as history w a s indeedI think an a n t i - S t a t e k n o w l e d g e , there w a s a p e r p e t u a l confrontation b e t w e e n the history that h ad been d i s c i p l i n a r i z e d by the State and that ha d become the content of official teaching, and the history that was b o u n d u p w i t h struggles because it w a s the consciousness of subjects involved in a s t r u g g l e . D i s c i p l i n a r i z a t i on d i d not defuse the confrontation. W h i l e it can be said that the d i s c i p l i n a r i z a t i o n introduced in the eighteent h c e n t u r y w a s b r o a d l y effective and successful in the realm of technology, where historical k n o w l e d g e is concerned, disciplinarization did occur, b u t it not only failed to block the non-Statist history, the decentered history of subjects in struggle, but a c t u a l l y made it stronger t h a n k s to a w h o l e set of struggles, confiscations, a nd mutual challenges. A n d to that extent, you a l w a y s have t w o levels of historical k n o w l e d g e and consciousness, and the two levels obviously drift further a nd further apart. But the g a p b e t w e e n the two never prevents either of them from existing. So w e have on the one h a n d a k n o w l e d g e that has effectively been d i s c i p l i n a r i z e d to form a historical discipline, an d on the other hand, a historical consciousness that is polymorphous, divided, and combative. It is s i m p l y the other side, the other face of a political consciousness. I w o u l d like to try to say a littl e a b o u t these things by looking at the end of the eighteenth century a nd the beginnin g of the nineteenth.

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I.Jules Michelet, Le Peuple (Paris, 1 9 4 6 ) . 2. Niccolo Machiavelh, II Principe (Rome, 1532); Discorsi sopra la prima deca di tito Livio, op. at.; Dell'arte della guerra ( Florence, 1521); htoriefiorentini( Florence, 1531). There are manv French translations of II Principe (English translation by George Bull: The Prince [Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1 9 6 1 ] ) . The other texts referred to may be consulted in E. Bar inou, ed., Machiavel, Oeuvres completes (Pans: Bibliotheque de la Plei'ade, 1952); this is a revised and updated version of J. Guiraudet's old translations ( 1 7 9 8 ) . English translation by Leslie J . Walker: The Discourse of Nkcolo Machiavel/i (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1 9 5 0 ) . Foucault discusses Machiavelli in "Oranes et singulatim" ( 1 9 8 1 ) and "The Political Technology of Individuals," and in his lecture "On Governmentality"; cf. note 13 to the lecture of 21 January above. 3. Pierre le Pesant de Boisguilbert, Le Detail de la France (s.1, 1 6 9 5 ) ; Factum de la France ( 1 7 0 7 ) , m Economistes financiers du XVIIIe siecle (Paris, 1843); Testament politique de M. de Vauban, Marechal de France, 2 vols. (s.1. 1707); Dissertation sur la nature des richesses, de Vargent et des tributs (Paris, n.d.). 4- Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban, Methode generate et facile pourfaire le de'nombrement des peu pies (Paris, 1 6 8 6 ) ; Pvjet d'une dixme royale (s.1. 1 7 0 7 ) . 5. On the antihistoncism of contemporary knowledge, see in particular chapter 4 of Les Mots et les choses (English translation: The Order of Things). 6. The passage in brackets has been reconstructed from Foucault's manuscript. 7. Characters in, respectively, Corneille's Cinna and Racine's Britannkus and Andromaque. [Trans.] 8. The results of the enormous task undertaken by Moreau will be found in his F*rincipes de morale, de politique, et de droit public; for examples of the criteria used bv Moreau in preparation for this work, and for its history, see also his Plan des travaux litte'raires ordonnes par Sa Majeste. 9- On the procedures of normalization in medical knowledge, the reader is referred to Naissance de la clinique: une axhe'ologie du regard medical (Pans: PUF, 1 9 6 3 ) (English translation bv Alan Sheridan: Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical F*reception [London: Tavistock, 1973]); the lecture given by Foucault in Brazil in 1974 on the history or medicine, "El nacimento de la medicine social" ("La Naissance de la medicine sociale," Dits et ecrits, vol. 3, pp. 207-27); "Incorpoacion del hospital en la tecnologia moderna" ("L'incorporation de I'hopital dans la technologie moderne," in Dits et ecrits, vol. 3, pp. 5 0 8 - 2 1 ) ; and the analysis of medical policing made in "La Politique de la sante au XVIIIe siecle," in Dits et ecrits, vol. 3, pp. 13-27 (English translation: "The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century," in Power/Knowledge, pp. 1 6 6 - 8 2 ) ; and "La Politique de la sante au XVIIIe siecle," in Dits et ecrits, vol. 3, pp. 725-41. 10. On disciplinary power and its effects on knowledge, see in particular Suweiller et punir: Naissance de la prison (Pans: Gallimard, 1975)- English translation by Alan Sheridan: Discipline and Finish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Allen Lane, 1977). 11, See in particular the lectures given at the College de France in 1971-1972: Theories et institutions pe'nales, and in 1972-1973: La socie'te punitive, forthcoming. 12. Michel Foucault, Les Anormaux: Cours au College de France, 7974-7975 (Pans: Gallimard and Le Seuil, 1 9 9 9 ) .