Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.

com/abstract=1913739
1
Rethinking Power
Mark Haugaard
In the literature, there have been two essentially contrasting views of power: one of
power as domination, largely characterized as power over, and the other of power as
empowerment, frequently theorized as power to. To date, the four (Lukes plus
Foucault) dimensions of power have been considered forms of domination. In this
article it is argued that the processes of four-dimensional power also constitute the
process of normatively desirable power as emancipation. Key is the realization that
structured power over has the potential to be positive-sum, rather than zero-sum;
furthermore, that the exclusions of two-dimensional power also constitute the
conditions of possibility for justice. The fact that normatively desirable power and
domination are constituted through the same processes is not chance: the effectiveness
of power as domination is parasitic upon power as emancipation.

Introduction: bringing the power debates together:
In the power literature that there have been two essentially contrasting views of
power, one of power as domination, largely characterized as power over, and the
other of power as empowerment, frequently theorized as power to. The best known
proponents of the former include Weber (1948), Dahl (1957), Bachrach and Baratz
(1962) Lukes ([1974] 2005)
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, Mann (1983) and Hayward (1999 and 2008). The latter

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In the second edition of Power: A Radical View, in response to Morriss, Lukes
acknowledges that he did not provide conceptual space for power that does not
concern domination. In particular, he acknowledges that in some instances power can
be exercised over an actor in their interests. Instances would include paternalism.
However, this constitutes a more confined analysis than most of the consensual power
theorists have in mind. Also, as argued by Morriss (2006) despite the
acknowledgment, Lukes does not develop a wider analysis of power to which has
anything approaching the depth of his analysis of power over. As acknowledged by
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1913739
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include Arendt (1958 and 1971), Parsons (1963), Barnes (1988) and Searle (2005). A
number of other authors, most notably (Allen 1999 and 2007), Giddens (1984), Clegg
(1989), Morriss (2002) and (Haugaard 1997 and 2003) have attempted to bring these
positions together. Arguably Foucault can be placed in both camps, arguing that
modern power is positive, which he contrasts with Sovereign power that works
through repression (see Allen 2001).
In international relations there has been a longstanding debate between realist
and idealist interpretations of power politics between sovereign territorial states.
Recently this has taken the form of a debate over the relationship between hard and
soft power. The term soft power was coined by Nye (1990) to denote what he terms
the power of attraction (Nye 2011:21) or what Gallarotti calls endearment
(Gallarotti 2011). This suggests that soft power is similar to the consensual view of
Arendt, Parsons, Barnes and Searle. Yet, Nye interprets soft power as similar to the
conflictual three-dimensional view (Nye 2011a 2011b), which, as observed by
Gallarotti (2011: 29), appears implausible since Lukes intended three-dimensional
power as domination, not attraction.
So far, in the power debates there has been a tendency either to take sides or to
bridge-build by bringing the sides together. The bridge-building approaches have
usually argued that power is not a single entity. Rather, power covers a cluster of
concepts and phenomena, including power to, power with and power over (Allen
1999, Haugaard 2010). Implicit in this has been the general assumption that the form
of power that Arendt normatively endorses and the manifestations of power that
Lukes criticises have different referents. In short, the power to act in concert
(Arendt) and three-dimensional power represent different aspects of social reality.

Lukes in his exchange with Hayward (2008), Lukes is primarily interested in power
as domination.
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The hypothesis which I wish to explore in this article is the idea that the process that
Lukes describes as three-dimensional power has the potential to be emancipating, a la
Arendt
2
. This constitutes a counter-intuitive claim, as Lukes is emphatic that his
interest in three-dimensional analysis is in power as domination (Hayward and Lukes
2008). I will add to this analysis elements taken from Foucault, as the fourth
dimension of power
3
. As observed, Foucault is ambiguous on whether or not power is
negative or positive, so maybe this reading of Foucault will not appear as
counterintuitive. Although the outcome will run contrary to the usual conclusion of
Foucauldians, which is that resistance, or agonism, is the only route of freedom.
As I have argued elsewhere at greater length (Haugaard 2010), it is important
to keep normative and empirical claims distinct. When moving from one language
game to the next, the same signifier can have significantly different meaning. To take
a classic instance, the statement in society X, an exercise of power of the kind Y is
legitimate has very different meaning normatively and empirically. The former
entails a normative evaluation on behalf of the observing theorist, to the effect that
he/she considers a specific exercise of power justified. In contrast, as a
sociological/political science
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empirical observation, the same statement concerns the
beliefs and perceptions of the actors of that specific society Y
5
. Thus, for instance, a

2
This is contrary to my previous work, for instance, 1997 and 2010.
3
Digeser 1992 was the first to add Foucault to the three-dimensional debate, as the
fourth dimension. Although, I will not be following Digesers theorization, as the
theoretical perspective is somewhat different.
4
From now on I will drop the cumbersome sociological/political science
empirical/analytic observation for the neater empirical analysis. Thus the contrast
will be normative versus empirical perspective, with the latter signifying all that is
implied in the fuller phrase.
5
Weber famously defined legitimate power in terms of a belief in legitimate power on
the part of those subject to that power (Weber 1947: 324-6). Many have disputed the
coherence of this definition, including Beetham (1991: 9) and Pitkin (1972: 283),
because it would appear to render critique impossible. In contrast, I would argue that
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feminist sociologist can perfectly write that in traditional society X patriarchal social
practice Y is legitimate without in anyway endorsing that practice normatively.
The hypothesis that I will be exploring in this article contains both empirical
and normative elements. In essence, the argument is that the empirical phenomena
referred to by four-dimensional power have the normative potential both toward
domination and emancipation. Foucault has argued that there is no escape from
power, which is a conclusion that Fraser argues entails nihilism and defeat (1985).
However, if we take seriously the consensual idea of power as the key to agency then
the lack of an escape from power can be normatively desirable. If subjectification has
the potential to be liberating, maybe resistance is not the only way toward (limited)
emancipation and, furthermore, the three dimensions of power could be the key to
justice.
To be clear, I am not claiming that Lukes and Foucault were in some way
incorrect to think that what they describe is normatively worthy of critique, and I
would concur that in some instances these processes should be resisted. Rather, I wish
to explore the idea that the four dimensions of power when interpreted empirically, as
social processes, have the potential for both domination and normatively desirable
political structures.
Exploring the full normative implications of this way of thinking constitutes
an enormous undertaking that is outside the scope of an article. Therefore this article
constitutes more an exploratory sketch of how we might consider the four dimensions
of power from two opposing normative perspectives: as domination and as
commendation or emancipation. In terms of explanation, I tend to begin from

Weber is using an empirical sociological perspective that refers to the social subject,
which contrasts with a normative language game of social critique.
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empirical analysis, slowly weaving in normative theory, making clear when the
language game is being changed.
In retheorizing the three dimensions of power, I will adjust the dimensions.
Therefore this representation will aim at the spirit of the dimensions, rather than
sticking literally to them. Foucault once said the greatest tribute he could pay to
Nietzsche was to use his work, make it groan and protest, rather than replicate it
(Foucault 1980: 53-4). The same principle applies here, including to my use of
Foucault!

The first dimension of power:
As set out by Dahl, the first dimension of power constitutes the ability of A to prevail
over B, by making B do something which B would not otherwise have done (1957) - a
theorization which constitutes the core of the classic Weberian view of power (Weber
1948: 180).
This power over view is usually interpreted normatively as domination.
However, as has been conceded by Lukes (Lukes 2005: 83), this has to be modified
by the observation that actors can prevail over each other in ways that may be
beneficial to those who are being prevailed upon in instances where A knows Bs
interests better than B, which would include benign paternalism and so on. However,
I wish to go much further than this to argue that in complex democratic political
systems routine power over is not reducible domination or coercion, as is frequently
assumed
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. Crucial to this argument is the distinction between zero-sum and positive-
sum power. Zero-sum power is power in which one part gains at the expense of the

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In democracies we must use power to get things done. By power I mean coercion
getting other people to do what they would not otherwise do by threat of sanction or
the use of force. (Mansbridge 1994)
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other. Nonzero-sum or positive-sum power is power in which one party does not gain
at the expense of the other. Rather, the power of both is expanded.
Parsons made a significant contribution to the power debate (1963) when he
observed that, contra Mills (1956), power, like wealth, is not necessarily zero-sum.
However, the divide between nonzero-sum and positive-sum power is usually drawn
along the lines of a contrast between power over and power to. Thus, Parsons (1963)
observations are usually taken as observations with regard to power to. However, this
actually goes against the substance of the article, which is all about leadership, not
simply joint capacity for action. The same applies to Arendt (1971), who is
interpreted as a theorist of power to (for instance, Allen 1999 and Goehler 2009). Yet
Arendts work is about leadership, which suggests power over.
Power over also has the capacity for being positive-sum. However, in order to
explain this claim I have to introduce the distinction between two types of prevailing
over, which have significant implications for the other three dimensions of power. In
re-theorizing power over we must distinguish between exercises of power that are
effective due to the reproduction of a structural context and ones which do not depend
upon structural constraints. If A prevails over B in an election, it is different (both
empirically and normatively) from A prevailing over B by using a gun your money
or I shoot. The former presupposes mutual structural reproduction while the latter
does not. In the former the motivation of B toward compliance is usually internal to
the process of structural reproduction, whereas in the latter the source is external
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.
Every meaningful interaction has two aspects that have to be distinguished:
the goal-oriented aspect and the structural aspect. Sometimes these are identical but

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In terms of Cleggs circuits of power (1989), the distinction would be between
episodic power that reproduces the dispositional circuit and episodic power which
does not.
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usually they are not. If A prevails over B in an election, actors A and B are in conflict
with regard to outcomes or goals but, if they both share a commitment to the
democratic process, they have in common a mutual consensus with regard to the
structures. They are both structurally constrained but that constraint is not inimical to
their capacity for action. Quite the contrary, it constitutes an instance of where, to use
Giddens felicitous phrase from the theory of structuration (1984), structures are both
enabling and constraining. Contrary to Lukes (normative) characterization of agency
and structure (Hayward and Lukes 2008), on the empirical level structure is not the
opposite of agency and freedom (as argued by Bates 2010); in this kind of interaction
constraint constitutes the condition of possibility of freedom. However, not all
structures are equally enabling and it is the task of normative theory to distinguish
normatively desirable from undesirable structures.
Foucault argues that with modernity there occurs a fundamental transition
from one type of power to the other, which is a claim that is found in much of social
theory. In Foucaults account the sovereign model is characterized by coercive
domination while the modern is variously described as working through constitutive
and disciplinary power (Foucault 1979). In Ernest Gellners more sociologically
informed account of modernity there is also a move from crude domination to more
subtle power, which he theorizes as transition from the sword to the plough, or from
predation to taxation (Gellner 1989). In his account of the emergence of modernity,
Norbert Elias (2000) also argues that modernity entails a move from obedience based
upon coercion, to compliance based upon internalized self-restraint. I would argue
that what lies behind these observations is a move from power over which is primarily
based upon compliance due to goal-oriented aspects to compliance that is due to
structural factors.
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Commenting upon power of his, pre-modern, time, Machiavelli famously
asked himself: is it better for a prince to be feared or to be loved? His answer was that
it is better to be both but if one can be only one then fear is best (Machiavelli 1961:
95). If we look to the political power base of Gaddafi in Tripoli at this moment in
time (August 2011), we observe a contemporary prince whose power rests upon these
two sources he is both loved and feared arguably more the latter than the former.
However, this is not typical of modern power. Most political leaders are neither feared
nor loved. Rather, they are in power because they have prevailed over other in
democratic contests: they have followed the correct structured procedures they have
been empowered through a process that approximates to a Weberian ideal type of
legally/instrumentally rational power.
Power over of the pre-modern kind, as described by Machiavelli, is zero-sum.
To the extent to which A prevails over B, B loses. If Prince A prevails over subject B,
based upon fear, then the relationship is zero-sum. However, in a structured
democratic contest As gain is not Bs loss in the long-term. In the short-term B has
sacrificed a goal. However, in interaction structures have been reproduced which give
B a chance to prevail over A at some future date. Hence, As gain is not entirely Bs
loss. If B is a democrat, through compliance he/she has gained the benefits of
reproducing certain structures that he/she endorses. The more frequently structures are
reproduced the more they become part of the natural order of things, thus they
become more dependable. Therefore, the structural reproduction of structures actually
enhances the power of all, including those who lose elections episodically, at singular
points in time.
For the purposes of this article, I will take the Kantian categorical imperative
as our normative base line. An exercise of power is normatively legitimate if it can be
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generalized and none of the actors involved is a means to an end. If A is a
Machiavellian prince, then B clearly is a means to an end and the relationship cannot
be generalized or reversed. In contrast, if A and B are democrats fighting an election
contest and the number of votes are reversed, the rules would still hold, thus the
structures are generalizable. Furthermore, B is not purely a means to an end, as the
structures constitute a future resource for B.
The idea that in principle not all exercises of power over constitute domination
shifts the lines between the consensual and conflictual traditions. It has generally been
assumed that consensual traditions concerned power to, while the conflictual power
over. Thus, power over equates with domination. What always was slightly
anomalous in this consensus was that the main consensual theorists (Arendt, Parsons,
Barnes and Searle) clearly saw themselves as writing about power over, as well as
power to
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.
In a normatively legitimate structurally constituted exercise of power over, the
gain of B is relative to future agency. Following Cleggs distinction (1989) between
episodic power, which focuses upon specific outcomes, and dispositional power,
which defines structured rules of the game which defines the power dispositions of
actors over time, the episodic exercise of power over B contributes to the creation or
recreation of the future dispositional power of actor B. A exercises power over B
episodically and, in so doing, the structures are reproduced that gives both actors the
dispositional power to replay the democratic game, which includes the possibility of

8
In a well-known critique of Parsons, Giddens wrote that what disappears from view
in Parsons perspective is that power is exercised over someone (Giddens 1968).
While this criticism is widely accepted, it is not borne out by the substance of
Parsons article as is evidenced by his definition of power in terms of the generalized
capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system
(Parsons 2002:78 italics not original), which is a point partly conceded by Giddens
in his later writings (1984: 257).
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B exercising power over A at a different episodic moment. In that sense, the
dispositional power which is created in the moment of successful structural
reproduction re/creates subject positions of empowerment. While episodic power may
be zero-sum (A wins and B loses), at a dispositional level the relationship of is
positive-sum (structures are reproduced which guarantee future agency). At a
dispositional level, B is not a means to an end. In contrast, where compliance is not
relative to such structured rules, and the compliance comes purely from actor A
making non-compliance more costly for actor B than compliance, power is zero-sum -
A is using B as a means to an end. Thus we can judge the coercive one off coercive
exercise of power as normatively reprehensible domination, while the structured
exercise of power, which empowers B dispositionally, is normatively desirable.

The second dimension of power:
Bachrach and Baratz defined the second dimension of power in the following terms:
A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values
and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public
consideration only of those issues that are comparatively innocuous to A
(Bachrach and Baratz 1962: 948).

Normatively this constitutes domination as the institutions cannot be generalizable to
include the perspective of B and, as a consequence, B becomes a means to As ends.
However, as we are about to demonstrate, this is not inherent to the process of
exclusion.
The central empirical theoretical process underlying As ability to exercise
two-dimensional power is described by Schattschneiders pithy observation:

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All forms of political organization have a bias in favour of the exploitation of
some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organization is the
mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics while others are
organized out. (Schattschneider quoted in Bachrach and Baratz 1962: 949 -
Italics original)

Structures constitute the rules of the game, or what Clegg refers to as dispositional
power (Clegg 1989), that preclude certain action, but also, as observed by Giddens in
his theory of structuration (1984), facilitate other forms of interaction. Structures are
modes of limiting interaction, which create conditions of possibility. In interaction, if
the action of other is unpredictable, collaborative endeavour, action in concert,
becomes more difficult. When Garfinkel (1984)
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instructed his students to breach
social convention by, for instance, interpreting greeting behaviour, such as Hello how
are you? as other than phatic communion, in essence, he was instructing them to
disregard structural constraint. As a consequence their interactions became, to use
Austins phrase (1957), infelicitous.
Structural constraint works by precluding what are perceived to be random
reactions by other, which is a preclusion that constitutes the precondition of social
order. To take language as an example, if we were to invent words at random, as some
kind of free spirits, communication would cease. This is the reason why the concept
of a private language (Wittgenstein 1967) makes no sense: language essentially
constitutes a publically shared set of constraints. Of course, actors can invent words or
even something resembling a complete language but that would not constitute a
language if not publicly shared. The meanings of words are only reproduced in the

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Garfinkel instructed his students to break minor social conventions, such as
interpreting Hello, how are you? as a literal request concerning their wellbeing.
What was remarkable in the experiments was the strength of the negative reactions of
others to these minor deviations from convention and, also, how traumatic and
difficult the students found it to break the conventions in the first place.
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moment of reception by other in a manner that corresponds sufficiently to the
speakers intentions that, from the speakers point of view, alter responds
appropriately structuration followed by confirming-structuration. In Garfinkels
(1984) breaching experiments routine structural reproduction did not take place
because the students were instructed to disregard shared social norms. In other words,
they were instructed to overcome structural constraint, which many of them reported
as traumatic. By excluding such random reactions, structural constraint makes
structurally based political power possible. Excluded actions become perceived as
infelicitous responses.
To return to Schattschneiders observation that organization is the
mobilization of bias, politics constitutes a process whereby some issues are organized
in, while others are organized out. However, this is not simply a description of bias as
domination; it constitutes the precondition of politics as something more sophisticated
than coercion. If A gets more votes than B, it is organized into politics that A wins the
election and organized out that B does anything other than accept defeat. What makes
two-dimensional power as described by Bachrach and Baratz normatively
reprehensible is not simply that issues are organized out. It is that they are organized
out to the systematic disadvantage of B. In that case, structural constraint makes
power over zero-sum. However, if structural constraints are arranged so as to
organize out political procedures that enable actors to use each other means to an end,
excluding zero-sum power and including positive-sum power, this is normatively
commendable. In essence, the organizing out of zero-sum power constitutes the way
to justice as conceived in the liberal tradition.
Rawls characterization of the veil of ignorance constitutes a thought
experiment which, like Schattschneiders characterization of organization/politics,
1S
describes a process whereby some issues are organized into politics and other are
organized out, to quote:
Among the essential features of this situation [the original position] is that no
one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does
anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his
strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their
conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The
principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no
one is advantaged or disadvantaged in his choice of principles by the outcome
of natural chance or the contingencies of social circumstances. Since all are
similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favour his particular
condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.
(Rawls 1971:12)

Any policies that reflect particular contingencies of peoples lives have been
organized out of politics, while the general principles of human behaviour and needs
have been organized in. Rawls and Bachrach and Baratz have in mind manifestations
of two-dimensional power that are at the opposite ends of the normative spectrum, yet
empirically the process is identical. Rawls is writing about justice, while Bachrach
and Baratz are practising critique, yet, counterintuitive as it may appear, both are
describing the same empirical social process of inclusion and exclusion. Structural
constraint can be used either to create a bias in favour of the interests of A and against
those of B or to exclude all the particular interests of both A and B. If the latter, these
structures can be generalized as a universal law and neither A nor B are a means to
the others end.
Contrary to common sense perception, the exclusion of certain forms of
decisions through structural constraint is not inherently normatively reprehensible,
and two-dimensional power does not necessarily entail domination. In fact, as an
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empirical process, the second dimension of power constitutes one of the conditions of
possibility for justice. Thus the critique frequently made of liberalism that it entails
bias misses the mark. Mouffe, for instance, argues that one of the fundamental
insights of Karl Schmitt is the fact that he highlights that democracy always entails
relations of inclusion-exclusion. (Mouffe 2000:43). However, contrary to her
implicit assumptions, the normative point is not that certain issues are organized into
political and others out: it is which issues are organized out. Organizing issues in and
out is not inherently normatively reprehensible: it constitutes a condition of possibility
for positive-sum power over, which is the essence of democracy as institutionalized
just conflict.
The perception of structures as a means to creating contests of power over
which are structured to be positive-sum brings us to a fundamental normative contrast
between coercive violent power and political power which constitutes part of the
normative essence of democratic politics. In contrasting power and violence Arendt
wrote the following:

Power is indeed of the essence of all government, but violence is not. Violence
is by nature instrumental; like all means, it always stands in need of guidance
and justification through the end it pursues. And what needs justification by
something else cannot be the essence of anything. The end of war end taken in
its twofold meaning is peace or victory; but to the question And what is the
end of peace? there is no answer. Peace is an absolute, .. Power is in the same
category; it is, as they say, an end in itself.. And since government is
essentially organized and institutionalized power, the current question What is
the end of government? does not make much sense either. (Arendt 1970 51)

If we take violence in its widest sense to include symbolic violence, as domination,
the contrast she is describing is highly commensurate with what is being argued here.
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The end, or objective, of a set of institutional exclusions that constitute domination,
are goals which are external to those structures, in the form of the interests of a
specific group of actors A. The power generated by such structures is zero-sum,
because the capacity for action that is generated through the structures is only to the
benefit of certain actors. This constitutes power politics in Foucaults sense (1980:91),
whereby institutionalized politics is essentially war by other means.
In contrast, structures that exclude the particular interests of actors A and B
are ends in themselves in the sense that all parties, both A and B, have an interest in
their reproduction. Over the longer term, repeat play does not engender the prospect
of continual defeat of B. Two-dimensional power as domination, or zero-sum power,
has an inherent tendency toward instability that has to be made up for with coercion
of one kind or another, while normatively desirable two-dimensional power that
excludes particular interests tends to have a self-generating reinforcement over time.
The more the latter type of structuration practices are confirm-structured by B the
more stable the system gets, hence the need for coercive supplement becomes less. In
other words, second-dimensional power as justice is functional, in the sense of being
systemically stable, thus it represents a kind of peace, which is other than disguised
war - contra Foucault (1980:91). I would conjecture that it is for this reason that,
despite the development of ever more effective tools of physical repression,
democracy has a tendency to do better functionally speaking, in terms of stability,
than alternative political arrangements. In fact this is the key between justice and
stability on the observed correlation see Rawls (1993: 140-44).

The third dimension of power:

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The general referent of three-dimensional power is the relationship between the
social-consciousness of social actors and the reproduction of relations of power. In
essence, what is proposed by three-dimensional power, and much of Foucaults work
on the relationship between power and knowledge, is that here is a direct relationship
between the social knowledge that actors use to reproduce social structure and
relations of domination. This general hypothesis is not going to be falsified by what
follows. Rather, it will be argued that this relationship between power and knowledge
is also the key to emancipation. As with two-dimensional power, the same processes
have both positive and negative normative potential.
The idea that constraint and exclusion are part of the conditions of possibility
for virtuous politics is part of a wider aspect of the human condition. As was
forcefully argued by Popper, based upon Kant, the process of inclusion and exclusion
constitutes the core of the human cognitive process (Popper 1976: 59). In science we
do not simply observe the world out there, we observe it by imposing hypothesis upon
it, which essentially constitutes categories of inclusion and exclusion. While Kant
considered these categories as a priori and, somehow, inherently true, sociology and
anthropology has taught us that these categories are multiple and variable. The
philosophy of science since Popper (1976) and Kuhn (1971) informs us that these
categories are never true in any absolute sense, only until falsified. We interpret the
world through categories of thought which constitute a historical (varied across time)
and anthropological (across space) systems of categories of meaning which entail
inclusion and exclusion. Our knowledge of structuration practices is directly related to
this knowledge. These broad categories of meaning, inclusion and exclusion, largely
exist in our minds as habitus in Bourdieus terminology (Bourdieu 1993), or what
Giddens (1984) calls practical consciousness knowledge and Foucault terms an
17
episteme, system of thought or historical a priori (Foucault 1970). As re-theorized
here these terms all refer to the same sociological referent and will be used
interchangeably
10
.
Giddens argued that practical consciousness exists relative to two other
categories: discursive consciousness and the unconscious (Giddens 1984: 40-5). I will
depart slightly from this by substituting meaninglessness and ontological insecurity
for the category of the unconscious. Discursive consciousness is what we put into
words. In general, although this is not a hard and fast rule, our practical consciousness
is the source of meaning, while our goals and objectives tend to be largely discursive.
Practical consciousness or habitus knowledge are not unconscious, in the sense of not
being discursively penetrable. However, in routine interaction this knowledge
constitutes taken-for-granted meaning. So, for instance, in communicating I am
largely using my practical consciousness knowledge of the English language, while
my discursive objective is to retheorize contemporary power debates. However, if the
situation should arise, I could discursively reflect upon the structures of the English
language and the precise meaning of the words I use the knowledge is not
unconscious.
To return to our democracy example: if actors A and B stand for election, the
meaning of all that goes into those structuration practices (obtaining a nomination,
canvassing etc) are largely practical consciousness, while their objective of winning is
discursive. All the complex structuration practices that constitute a democratic
system, presuppose shared practical consciousness knowledge. Obviously, if a
democracy is newly established those structuration practices begin as discursive
knowledge. However, over time, these discursive practices become part of practical

10
I will use these concepts on my own theoretical terms, thus there may be
inconsistency with specific statements by Bourdieu, Foucault or Giddens.
18
consciousness knowledge. As has been observed by phenomenological sociologists,
such as Schutz (1972), because all action presupposes a vast and complex knowledge
of the world, it is practically impossible to interact without holding most of our
knowledge of how to interact felicitously at a practical consciousness level, although
in certain instance, knowledge of structuration practices can be discursive. In routine
interaction habitus knowledge is part of our natural attitude. It constitutes part of what
actors consider as the natural order of things. However, if that knowledge is
insufficient then actors become ontologically insecure. Following Erikson (1963), the
first thing the child learns is that when the mothers breast leaves it will return. When
babies enjoy watching an object disappear out of sight and then reappear, behind a
pillow or whatever, they learn object permanence and in so doing their practical
consciousness is constituted through the realization that the external world is ordered.
Following Heidegger (1962), these acts of interpretation are acts of meaning giving
which are not separable from the being-in-the-world of social actors. It constitutes
part of their ontology as meaning giving, interpretive beings. As such they do not
have the choice of stepping outside this to nowhere. Therefore, any radical (although
not minor) undermining of practical consciousness knowledge will entail
meaninglessness and, consequently, fundamental insecurity of being-in-the-world or
ontological insecurity, which will tend to be resisted.
The third dimension of power is constituted relative to this practical
consciousness knowledge, which is a prerequisite for routinized structural
reproduction. Because all structuration practices entail inclusion and exclusion, the
third dimension of power can be theorized in terms of a mapping of structural
inclusions and exclusions of taken-for-granted habitus or practical consciousness onto
19
structural reproduction the inclusions and exclusions appear as part of the natural
order of things.
The third dimension of power works by making certain acts of structuration
appear reasonable, as part of the natural order of things. In discussing critique of
power, Foucault asks himself the question, should we use reason? and replies
rhetorically, that nothing could be more sterile (Foucault 1982: 210). In contrast,
Lukes, following Spinoza, enjoins us to use reason autonomously (Lukes 2005: 115).
This opposing view of reason lies at the core of the opposition between enlightenment
modernism and post-modernism. As I am about to explain, both are intuiting
something correctly, with different conclusions.
Underlying this apparent opposition of enlightenment and postmodernist
views exists an implicit consensus between the two, which is that reason is
fundamental to the workings of agency, thus the third dimension of power. Every act
of structuration is an act of ordering of action relative to a perception in the world,
which avoids logical contradiction. If an anthropologist is confronted with a strange
civilization, a hermeneutic interpreter with a strange text, or a Foucauldian with an
alien system of thought, or a follower of Kuhn with an odd paradigm, they try to
make sense of it by looking the structuration practices which appear unreasonable to
them. Then they ask themselves the question, what kind of interpretative horizon,
which is different from mine, would make this into reasonable behaviour? In other
words, the fundamental premise is the reasonableness of other. It is not some absolute
rationality, because if that were presupposed differences in interpretative horizon
would not exist.
Reasonableness consists in action following logically from the meaning
reproduced: in being felicitous relative to a local system of meaning and being-in-the-
2u
world. To return to our simplified election example: if A and B stand for election it
follows logically from the meaning of that action, the meaning of the act of structural
reproduction, that if B gets fewer votes than A then B should concede defeat. The
meaning of standing for election entails an ought within it, derived from what is
locally considered reasonable relative to the being-in-the-world of someone whose
socialization has taken place in a well established democracy. This locally reasonable
ought derived form locally constituted practical consciousness creates its own
imperative, which is the source of structural constraint for the actor. If the actor were
to violate these meanings they step into ontological insecurity. No actor feels
comfortable with engaging in structuration practices that violate their habitus. As
psychological breaching experiments have shown (Garfinkel 1984), being what is
considered to be locally unreasonable is actually contrary to human predispositions as
interpretive beings-in-the-world. As all structuration practices entail inclusion and
exclusion, this means that all systems of thought, all forms of reasonableness, entail a
bias towards certain forms of distribution of power and against other distributions of
power. Reason as defined according to local meaning constitutes a form of caging of
social actors based upon ontological security.
If we take ideology to mean a practical knowledge that legitimates certain
forms of power relations and de-legitimates others, then we can say that all actors are
ideological. As that ideology is reinforced by reason, Foucault is partly correct in
thinking that one cannot practice critique by any simple appeal to reason, as all forms
of practical consciousness knowledge presuppose a local use of reason. So, for
instance, if actors are socialized into a teleological world-view in which everything
has essences, it appears reasonable that persons have essences too. Hence, essentialist
differentiations of power are reasonable and contain an implicit imperative ought. In
21
contrast, if actors are socialized into thinking that the physical world is made up of
atoms bouncing against each other within a universe governed by impersonal laws of
physics, then it appears logical that the political world should be non-essentialist and
governed by impersonal laws without privilege. Therefore, for instance, to the former,
attribution of essentialist perceptions of gender appears reasonable, whereas to the
latter this is not the case. To the former, essentialist actor, Rawls original position as
a form of caging and structural constraint appears unreasonable and it is for this
reason that modern legal rationality cannot be successfully imposed upon traditional
societies. However, to the latter, non-essentialist actors, engaging in a form of
Rawlsian methodological bracketing and constraint appears entirely reasonable. In
fact, making an exception of yourself appears unreasonable, whatever the
particularities of your life history
11
. When a population shares a habitus that is
conducive to internalized self-restraint along these Rawlsian lines, with regard to
spheres of justice, that society can be said to have a civic culture conducive to liberal
democracy, which would constitute three-dimensional power that is normatively
desirable, as measured by its capacity to facilitate positive-sum power.
The third dimension of power constitutes practical consciousness knowledge
from which actors make sense of structuration practices. These practices are
embedded in systems of meaning that make certain acts appear reasonable and others
unreasonable, thus they legitimate a particular economy of inclusion and exclusion.
Moving to normative analysis, because actors do not have the option of moving
beyond practical consciousness, which constitutes the essence of their being-in-the-
world, they cannot escape from ideology, so to speak. Because the constraints of this

11
This has implications for Sandels (1998) well-known critique of Rawls as being
un-sociological and de-ontological. However, developing this would take me outside
the scope of this article.
22
system of knowledge work through constraints created by local perceptions of
reasonableness, there is no transcendent meta-reason that can be appealed to.
However, that does not mean that all power-reinforcing habitus, or ideology is
reprehensible normatively. Distinguishing between normatively desirable and
normatively reprehensible habitus is an issue of power. If B reproduces structures
which deliver positive-sum power, which is enabling to actor B, as measured over
time, then we can argue that this particular habitus has normative merit. On the other
hand, if the practical consciousness knowledge has the effect of allowing A to exploit
B as a means to an end in a power relationship which is zero-sum, then this ideology
is deserving of critique. Analysing the implications of structuration practices in terms
of zero-sum versus positive-sum power also entails reason, which makes sense of the
Lukes enlightenment claim, that one can use reason for the purposes of social critique.
Analysing the processes whereby B internalizes a habitus that makes B
susceptible to reproducing structures contrary to Bs interests brings us the fourth
level of power.

Power in the fourth dimension:
In the third-dimension of power B willingly reproduces certain social
structures, even in situations where episodic power is exercised over him/her, because
B considers it reasonable to do so. In a normatively desirable situation that
internalized constraint makes sense in terms of Bs long-term interests. However, it
constitutes an interesting, yet counterintuitive, fact that there are also many situations
in which B willingly reproduces zero-sum power. Based upon practical and discursive
consciousness knowledge, it can appear reasonable to B to comply in a situation in
2S
which compliance results in the reproduction of structures which render B a means to
someone elses end the essence of domination.
Structures are, of course, conventional. They are local ways of life. These
conventional structures can appear reasonable because they deliver positive-sum
power. Alternatively, the moral imperative of what is locally considered reasonable
behaviour may derive from some process of reification, whereby the conventionality
of structures disappears from view from the perspective of the social actor. If a
particular structure is considered to derive from the word of God, then a compliant B
may willingly reproduce social structures as these structures are no longer considered
conventional because there is a divine moral imperative keeping those structures in
place. Thus, B may be compliant in the reproduction of zero-sum power, contrary to
his/her interests.
In essence, I would argue that what Foucault observes in his accounts of the
relationship of power and truth (Foucault 1980) is a process whereby structures are
reified through truth claims. If a social structure represents some kind of truth, then a
discourse is created within which B appears unreasonable if B does not to reproduce
those structures, even if the result is zero-sum power against B. Once linked to a
regime of truth, be it scientific or otherwise, by being de-conventionlized in the eyes
of social actors, social structures gain a moral imperative that transcends any
consequentialist calculations of power.
As we have argued above, the practical consciousness knowledge that
supports structuration practices is vast and complex in its extent, which does not mean
that this knowledge is unconscious, in the sense of beyond discursive penetration
(Giddens 1984: 44). However, in a complex society, in which power is routinized,
actors only occasionally reflect upon the systems of meaning that support given social
24
structures or upon the consequences of structural reproduction, by making their
practical consciousness discursive. However, the potential is always there for such
critical reflection, which is where reifying devices have their role in reinforcing
domination. In a complex system in which structural density is great, constant
reflection does lead to ontological insecurity, which creates a natural tendency toward
accepting social structures, thus systemic stability. Thus, even without reification, the
process of three-dimensional power has a certain propensity toward stability, which
will support some level of zero-sum power.
In a society in which it is not possible for actors, however well educated, to
evaluate all truth claims, it makes sense to set up sophisticated accountable systems
which produce specialists in certain forms of knowledge: specialists in truth
production. Thus the modern actor frequently finds themselves as an actor B, having
power exercised over them, and being compliant because he or she believes that actor
A has access to truth in the form of some specific area of expertise. This kind of
behaviour is not unreasonable, either sociologically or normatively. If actor A has
spent years studying a particular discipline, which actor B has not, and, in the capacity
of expert, A demands Bs compliance, it may well be in Bs long term interests to be
compliant. Even if B may lose in the short-term, overall access to expert knowledge is
in their long-term interests. However, A can abuse this. A can expand their authority
to spheres not justified by their knowledge or actor A can over-reify their truth claims.
A can choose to present scientific knowledge (which is not inherently true, only true
until falsified) as an absolute truth beyond question. However, B can also use local
reason to question this extension of authority or to interrogate the foundational claims
made for a specific truth claim.
2S
Significantly, the process of reification through claims to truth is only
effective because it is within the conditions of possibility that compliance has the
potential to be in Bs long-term interests. Truth claims, which lead to zero-sum
power, are only effective, thus appear reasonable, because there are truth claims
which lead to positive-sum power.
The point of four-dimensional power, just like the other three, is that
compliance takes place through internalized constraint, without external coercion.
Compliance to structural constraint, the inclusions and exclusions of the second
dimension power only take place because they appear reasonable. That perception of
reasonableness is not likely to last, even with reification, or power in the fourth
dimension, without the existence of instances in which this is actually reasonable, as
measured in terms of power. If all exercises of power over, by A of B, were zero-sum,
whereby B never realized their interests, willing compliance would be improbable -
you can fool the people some of the time but not all of it.
The act of sustaining power through habitus presupposes that at least some of
the time power is positive-sum. In a pure zero-sum situation power will tend to rely
on coercion. In fact, as a rule of thumb (the effectiveness of reification can interfere
with the rule), the exercise of social power is inversely proportional to coercion. In
this sense I would concur with Hannah Arendts words:
[P]olitically speaking, it is insufficient to say that power and violence
are not the same. Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules
absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy.
(Arendt 1971: 56).

Conclusion:
26
In the literature, power over and power to, power as domination and power as
emancipation, have been considered opposites. In second to fourth dimensions of
power, which are considered forms of domination, the key to the process is actor Bs
willing compliance to having power exercised over them. The question has to be
asked, why would B comply with their domination? By showing that power over can
be positive-sum (the first dimension of power) and that the very same processes of
exclusion through structural constraint (the second dimension of power) are a
condition of possibility for both justice and domination, we learn that both power as
domination and emancipation presuppose the same process. This paves the way for
the third and fourth dimensions of power, which concern the cognitive process
whereby B is compliant. We learn that structural constraint takes place through local
habitus-based perceptions of reasonableness (third dimension of power), which are
frequently reinforced by discursive reification of local structuration practices (the
fourth dimension of power). While the third and fourth dimensions of power leave
actor B open to manipulation into zero-sum structural reproduction, this is only
possible because the very same process also has the potential to deliver positive-sum
power. The fact that normatively desirable power and power as domination are not
separate processes is not chance. The latter presupposes the former. For its
effectiveness, power as domination is parasitic upon power as emancipation. Except
in instances of coercion, zero-sum power is parasitic upon positive-sum power.

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