Sei sulla pagina 1di 36

STAT CON PART 2 G.R. No. 104712 May 6, 1992 MANUEL T.

DE GUIA, in his capacity as Councilor of the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. BELLOSILLO, J.: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and the enforcement by respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of its RESOLUTION NO. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars (Annex "A", Petition), RESOLUTION NO. 2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313 (Annex "B", Petition), and RESOLUTION UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections (Annex "C", Petition). Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, having been elected in the January 1988 local elections. He prays, more particularly, for reversal of the position of respondent insofar as it affects the municipality of Paraaque and all the other municipalities in the Metro Manila Area. He claims that the second proviso of par. (c), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, which requires the apportionment into districts of said municipalities does not specify when the members of their Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by district. He would consequently lean on par. (d) of Sec. 3, which immediately succeeds par. (c), to support his view that the elected members of these municipalities mentioned in par. (c) should continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992 elections. Paragraph (d) states that "[F]or purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of the Sangguniang Panlunsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. However, beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district." Petitioner therefore insists that the elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Paraaque fall under this category so that they should continue to be elected at large until the 1995 regular elections. Before addressing the crux of the controversy, the Court observes that petitioner does not allege that he is running for reelection, much less, that he is prejudiced by the election, by district, in Paraaque. As such, he does 1 not appear to have a locus standi, a standing in law, personal or substantial interest. He does not also allege any legal right that has been violated by respondent. If for this alone, petitioner does not appear to have any cause of action. However, considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the political exercise of qualified voters affected by the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the Constitution by respondent, We resolve to brush aside the question of procedural infirmity, even as We perceive the petition to be one of declaratory relief. We so held similarly 2 through Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras in Osmea v. Commission on Elections. Now on the meat of the dispute. On November 18, 1991, Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It is "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes." At issue in this case is the proper interpretation of Sec. 3 thereof which provides: Sec. 3. Elections of Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan. The elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected as follows: (a) For provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts, the elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall be elected by legislative districts . . . (b) For provinces with only one (1) legislative district, the Commission shall divide them into two (2) districts for purposes of electing the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan . . . (c) The number and election of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the Metro Manila Area, City of Cebu, City of Davao and any other city with two (2) or more legislative districts shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 6636 . . . Provided, further, That, the Commission shall divide each of the municipalities in Metro Manila Area into two (2) districts by

barangay for purposes of representation in the Sangguniang Bayan . . . . and, (d) For purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. However, beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district . . . . On November 20, 1991, respondent COMELEC, invoking authority of the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, R.A. 6636, R.A. 3 6646 and R.A. 7166, issued Resolution No. 2313 and the subsequent resolutions in question. On February 20, 1992, in view of the perceived ambiguity in the meaning of par. (d), particularly in relation to par. (c), Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, petitioner filed with COMELEC a Motion for Clarification of its Resolution No. 2313 inquiring whether the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Paraaque and the other municipalities of Metro Manila enumerated therein, which are all single-district municipalities, would be elected by district in May 11, 1992 or in the 1995 regular elections. Meanwhile, on March 3, 1992 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2379 approving the guidelines submitted by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Municipal Election Registrars concerned pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and stating therein its purpose in recommending to Congress the districting/apportionment of Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan seats, i.e., to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections. In this Project of Apportionment, Paraaque together with the other twelve (12) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area was divided into two (2) districts with six (6) elective councilors for each district. On March 10, 1992, COMELEC resolved petitioner's Motion for Clarification by interpreting Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, to mean that the election of elective members of the Sangguniang Bayan, by district, of the thirteen (13) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area shall apply in the May 11, 1992 elections (Resolution UND. 92-010, prom. March 10, 1992). Petitioner says that he received copy of Resolution UND. 92-010 on March 13, 1992. On April 7, 1992, apparently not satisfied with this third Resolution of COMELEC, petitioner filed the instant petition asserting that under par. (d), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 the elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and the Sangguniang Bayan, for purposes of the May 11, 1992 regular elections, shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. He would include in this class of sanggunian members to be elected at large those of the municipality of Paraaque. Petitioner therefore imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating Resolution No. 2313, Resolution No. 2379 and Resolution UND. 92-010 which clarifies, contrary to his view, that the district apportionment of the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area is applicable to the May 11, 1992 regular elections. We have carefully examined pars. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, and its precursor bills on synchronized elections, Senate Bill No. 1861 and House Bill No. 34811, and We realize the web of confusion generated by the seeming abstruseness in the language of the law. Some framers of the law were even fazed at the empirical implications of some of its provisions, particularly Sec. 3 thereof, and they admitted in fact that said provisions were susceptible of varied interpretations, as borne by the sponsorship and explanatory speeches now spread in the Journals of Congress. Hence, We can understand why petitioner would interpret Sec. 3 as he would. But if we pursue his course, we may conclude in absurdity because then there would have been no reason for R.A. 7166 to single out the single-district provinces referred to in par. (b), and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area mentioned in the second proviso of par. (c), to be apportioned at once into two (2) districts each if the members of their respective sanggunian after all would still be elected at large as they were in the 1988 elections. No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must therefore, as far as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the legislature intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute. If the statute needs 4 construction, as it does in the present case, the most dominant in that process is the purpose of the act. Statutes should be 5 construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such 6 construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. A construction should be rejected that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted, and 7 that tends to defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the enactment. The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861 which states in part: This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for May 11, 1992, and provide for the necessary implementing details. It also endorses reforms and measures to ensure the conduct of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Specifically, it seeks to: (1) Reduce the number of positions to be voted for by providing therein that the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan be elected not at large, but by district . . . .

That respondent COMELEC is cognizant of this legislative intent of R.A. 7166 is reflected in the "WHEREAS" clauses constituting the preamble to Resolution No. 2379. Thus WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, in order to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections recommended, among others, to the Congress of the Philippines, the districting/apportionment of sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan seats; WHEREAS, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act 7166, and approved by the President of the Philippines on November 26, 1991, adopting among others, the recommendation of the Commission on Elections aforestated; WHEREAS, pursuant to, and in implementation of Republic Act 7166, particularly Section 3 thereof, the Commission promulgated Resolution No. 2313, directing the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars concerned to submit, after consultation, public hearings, and consensus-taking with the different sectors in the community, the Project of District Apportionment of single legislative-district provinces and municipalities in the Metro Manila area; WHEREAS, the established criteria/guidelines in the determination of the district apportionment are as follows: a. compactness, contiguity and adjacentness of territory; b. apportionment shall be based on the 1990 census of population; c. no municipality, in the case of provinces, and no barangay, in the case of cities and municipalities, shall be fragmented or apportioned into different districts. This avowed policy of having sanggunian members elected by district is also manifest from the four corners of Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. 8 Thus, a careful analysis of the provisions of Sec. 3 shows that the purpose of districting/apportionment of the sanggunian seats is to reduce the number of positions to be voted for in the May 11, 1992, synchronized elections and ensure the efficiency of electoral process. Considering that the single-district provinces and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which are all singledistricts, and under pars. (b) and (c) have already been apportioned into two (2) districts, they will henceforth be electing the members of their Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Bayan by district in the coming May 11, 1992, elections, although under par. (d), the single-district cities and all the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area which are all likewise single-districts, will have to continue electing at large the members of their Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan as they have yet to be apportioned. But beginning the regular elections of 1995, they will all have to be elected by district. By then, COMELEC would have had enough time to apportion the single-district cities and the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area. As they now stand in relation to the districting/apportionment of local government units for purposes of election under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, it is clear that: (1) for provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts contemplated in par. (a), they shall continue to be elected by district; (2) for provinces with single legislative districts, as they have already been apportioned into two (2) districts each under par. (b), they shall henceforth be elected likewise by district; (3) for cities with two (2) or more legislative districts, e.g., the cities of Manila, Cebu and Davao, they shall also continue to be elected by district under the first part of par. (c); and (4) for the thirteen (13) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which have already been apportioned into two (2) districts each under the second proviso of par. (c), they shall likewise be elected by district in the regular elections of May 11, 1992. Then, that should leave us the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remain single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. They will have to continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166. That is the true import of par. (d). Consequently, as We view it, where he stands, petitioner must fall. WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, on the part of respondent, and for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976, 73 SCRA 333; Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, G.R. No. L-28113, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 533. 2 G.R. No. 100318, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750. 3 R.A. 7166 was approved only on November 26, 1991, when the President signed it into law, although it was passed by Congress on November 18, 1991, or before COMELEC promulgated its Resolution No. 2313. 4 De Jesus v. City of Manila, 29 Phil. 73 [1914]; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas De Seguros; 107 Phil. 1055 [1960]; Garcia v. Ambler, 4 Phil. 81 [1904]; McMicking v. Lichauco, 27 Phil. 386 [1914].

5 LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Phil. Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725 [1961]; People v. Purisima, G.R. No. 52050, November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 542; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipina Compania De Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055 [1960]. 6 Rivera v. Campbell, 34 Phil. 348 [1916]. 7 Muoz & Co. v. Hord, 12 Phil. 624 [1909]; Ty Sue v. Hord, 12 Phil. 485 [1909]; Sarcos v. Castillo, G.R. No. 29755, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 853; Republic Flour Mills. Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. L-28463, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 269; People v. Gatchalian, 104 Phil. 664 [1958]). 8 Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41001, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 162.

G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989 ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE RAYMUNDO SEVA, JUDGE OF BRANCH 38 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAMARINES NORTE and WILLIAM GUERRA, respondents. Jose L. Lapak for petitioners. Jose T. Atienza for private respondent. SARMIENTO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal and setting aside of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari against Judge Raymundo Seva of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte and the private respondent, William Guerra, involves a pure question of law i.e., the coverage and application of Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, known otherwise as the Public Land Act. The facts are undisputed. The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No. 192765, in favor of the spouses, Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso. The said original certificate of title was inscribed in the Registration Book for the Province of Camarines Norte on December 10, 1961. On February 28, 1970, the patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00. Petitioner Elena Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos. As a result of the aforementioned sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte was issued in the name of the Salenillas, cancelling Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248. On June 30, 1971, the petitioners mortgaged the property now covered by T.C.T. No. T-8104 with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. The mortgage was subsequently released on November 22, 1973 after the petitioners paid the amount of P1,000.00. Later, or on December 4, 1975, the petitioners again mortgaged the property, this time in favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan of P2,500.00. For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, pursuant to Act No. 3135, was instituted by the Philippine National Bank against the mortgage and the property was sold at a public auction held on February 27, 1981. The private respondent, William Guerra, emerged as the highest bidder in the said public auction and as a result thereof a "Certificate of Sale" was issued to him by the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Norte. Ultimately, on July 12, 1983, a "Sheriff's Final Deed" was executed in favor of the private respondent. On August 17,1983, the Philippine National Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte at Daet, a motion for a writ of possession. The public respondent, Judge Raymundo Seva of the trial court, acting on the motion, issued on September 22, 1983 an order for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the private respondent. When the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte however, attempted on November 17, 1983, to place the property in the possession of the private respondent, the petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the same and instead offered to repurchase it under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. On August 15, 1984, another motion, this time for the issuance of an alias writ of possession was filed by the private respondent with the trial court. The petitioners, on August 31, 1984, opposed the private respondents' motion and instead made a formal offer to repurchase the property. Notwithstanding the petitioners' opposition and formal offer, the trial court judge on October 12, 1984 issued the alias writ of possession prayed for the private respondent. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order but their motion was denied. Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari claiming that the respondent trial court judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated October 12, 1984 granting the writ of possession, and the order dated October 22, 1984, denying their motion for reconsider consideration.
1 2

In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent appellate court gave due course to the petition; required the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda in support to their respective positions; and restrained the trial court and the private respondent from executing, implementing or otherwise giving effect to the assailed writ of possession until further orders from the 3 court. However, in a decision promulgated on September 17, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of merit. According to the appellate court: It must be noted that when the original owner, Florencia H. Enciso whose title, OCT No. P-1248, was issued on August 9, 1961, executed a deed of absolute sale on February 28, 1970 of the property covered by said title to spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas, the five year period to repurchase the property provided for in Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended could have already started. Prom this fact alone, the petition should have been dismissed. However, granting that the transfer from parent to child for a nominal sum may not be the "conveyance" 4 contemplated by the law. We will rule on the issue raised by the petitioners. xxx xxx xxx Applying the case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al., the appellate court went on to hold that the five-year period of the petitioners to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land Act had already prescribed. The point of reckoning, ruled the respondent court in consonance with Monge is from the date the petitioners mortgaged the property on December 4, 1973. Thus, when the petitioners made their formal offer to repurchase on August 31, 1984, the period had clearly expired. In an effort to still overturn the decision, the petitioners moved for reconsideration. Their motion apparently went for naught because on May 7, 1987, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the same. Hence, this petition. Before us, the petitioners maintain that contrary to the rulings of the courts below, their right to repurchase within five years under Section 119 of the Public Land Act has not yet prescribed. To support their contention, the petitioners cite the cases of Paras vs. 6 7 Court of Appeals and Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al. On the other side, the private respondent, in support of the appellate court's decision, states that the sale of the contested property by the patentees to the petitioners disqualified the latter from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said property. As such, they (the 8 petitioners) no longer enjoy the right granted to heirs under the provisions of Section 119 of the Public Land Act. In fine, what need be determined and resolved here are: whether or not the petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the Public Land Act; and assuming the answer to the question is in the affirmative, whether or not their right to repurchase had already prescribed. We rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right to repurchase their property and their right to do so subsists. Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full: Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance. From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of persons are bestowed the right to repurchase the applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal heirs. Consequently, the contention of the private respondent sustained by the respondent appellate court that the petitioners do not belong to any of those classes of repurchasers because they acquired the property not through inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis. The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the Encisos, patentees of the contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent and the appellate court would be to contravene the very purpose of Section 119 of the Public Land Act which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and 9 his family the land that the State had gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating it. Considering that petitioner Salenillas is a daughter of the spouses Florencia H. Enciso and Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that allowing her (Elena) and her husband to repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail. Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding to the other issue here raised, we rule that the five-year period for the petitioners to repurchase their property had not yet prescribed.
5

The case of Monge et al. vs. Angeles, et al., cited as authority by the respondent Court of Appeals is inapplicable to the present controversy. The facts obtaining there are substantially different from those in this case. In Monge the conveyance involved was a pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale. More importantly, the question raised there was whether the five-year period provided for in Section 119 "should be counted from the date of the sale even if the same is with an option to repurchase or from the date the ownership of the land has become consolidated in favor of the purchaser because of the homesteader's failure to 11 redeem it. It is therefore understandable why the Court ruled there as it did. A sale on pacto de retro immediately vests title, ownership, and, generally possession over the property on the vendee a retro, subject only to the right of the vendor a retro to repurchase within the stipulated period. It is an absolute sale with a resolutory condition. The cases pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position, on the other hand, present facts that are quite identical to those in the case at bar. Both cases involved properties the titles over which were obtained either through homestead or free patent. These properties were mortgaged to a bank as collateral for loans, and, upon failure of the owners to pay their indebtedness, the mortgages were foreclosed. In both instances, the Court ruled that the five-year period to. repurchase a homestead sold at public auction or foreclosure sale under Act 3135 begins on the day after the expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale is executed thereby formally transferring the property to the purchaser, and not otherwise. Taking into account that the mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgaged property sold at a public auction to the private respondent on February 27, 1981, with the "Sheriff's Final Deed" issued on July 12, 1983, the two offers of the petitioners to repurchase the first on November 17, 1983, and the second, formally, on August 31, 1984 were both made within the prescribed five-year period. Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petitioners should reimburse the private respondent the amount of the purchase price at the public auction plus interest at the rate of one per centum per month up to November 17, 1983, together with the amounts of assessments and taxes on the property that the private respondent might 13 have paid after purchase and interest on the last named amount at the same rate as that on the purchase price. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 17, 1986, and the Resolution dated May 7, 1987 of the Court of Appeals, and the Orders dated September 22, 1983, October 12, 1984, and October 22, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one ENTERED directing the private respondent to reconvey the subject property and to execute the corresponding deed of reconveyance therefor in favor of the petitioners upon the return to him by the latter of the purchase price and the amounts, if any, of assessments or taxes he paid plus interest of one (1%) per centum per month on both amounts up to November 17, 1983. No costs. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Promulgated on September 17, 1986; Ejercito, B.C., J., ponente; Coquia, J.R. and Martinez, A.M.,JJ., concurring. 2 CA-G.R. S.P. No. 04603, Elena Salenillas et al. vs. Hon. Raymundo Seva, etc., et al. 3 Rollo, 20. 4 Id., 16. 5 101 Phil. 563 (1957). 6 91 Phil. 389 (1952). 7 101 Phil. 968 (1957). 8 Rollo, Id., 44. 9 Santana vs. Marias, No. L-35537, December 27, 1979, 94 SCRA 853; Vargas vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-35666, June 29, 1979, 91 SCRA 195; Simeon vs. Pea, No. L-29049, December 29, 1970, 36 SCRA 610. 10 Supra. 11 Id., 564. 12 Paras vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra; and Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al., supra. 13 PNB vs. Court of Appeals, et al., No. L-60208, December 5, 1985, 140 SCRA 360; Dulay vs. Carriage, No. L-52831, July 29, 1983, 123 SCRA 794; DBP vs. Zaragosa, No. L-23493, August 23, 1978, 84 SCRA 668.
12

10

G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991 B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT. MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PERA, MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT.

FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM, CAPT. ELMER AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners, vs. GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI INVESTIGATING PANEL COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ. FELIX V. BALDONADO and MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14 COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, respondents. No. 95020 August 2, 1991 B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, petitioners, vs. HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA., respondents. No. 96948 August 2, 1991 B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners, vs. B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents. No. 97454 August 2, 1991 AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL. ALBERTO OLARIO, Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention Center/Jail, petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, CAPTAIN REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1 LT SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT. ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO CABREROS PMM 2LT MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC, respondents. Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio Fusillero, Ericson Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo Arnon Vergel Nacino, Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and Joey Sarroza. Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim. Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros. Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison. Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro. Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo. Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador. Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando. Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio. Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson. M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison . Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot. Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena. Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro. Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No. 93177. The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:p These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and related issues arising from the same incident.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989. The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder). In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate the charges against them and the creation of the General Court Martial GCM convened to try them. In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14, seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408. In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are assailed on certiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private respondents. In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020. I Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the petitioners, to wit: You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City, then and there to submit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial investigation of the charge/charges against you for violence of AWs _______________. DO NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS. Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of your right to submit controverting evidence. On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion. At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing This was done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated February 21, 1990. In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses. On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. This was done on March 14,1990. The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71, which provides: Art. 71. Charges Action upon. Charges and specifications must be signed by a person subject to military law, and under the oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief. No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what disposition of the case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation full opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)

They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion for summary dismissal was denied, the motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to date and they have not been able to submit their counter-affidavits. At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they were exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No. 39. In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional liberty to Ligot. On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and to declare in contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said order. He later also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this Court. After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of additional intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison. On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia: (a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all persons with the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court- Martial No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and void. Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which may as well include other persons facing charges before General Court-Martial No. 14. Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No. 14, this Court reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson. On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpuson the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was raffled to respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release. II The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows. It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. This they did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect denied when the PTI Panel resolved to recommend that the charges be referred to the General Court Martial for trial. The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the investigation was resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits. They had been expressly warned In the subpoena sent them that "failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. As their motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to submit their defense. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights. There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is now settled that "even a failure 1 to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court- martial of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v. Espino, thus: xxx xxx xxx

But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction. The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory, and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court said: We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70 (The Philippine counter-part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408) can properly be construed as an indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise of the Army General court martial jurisdiction.. The Article does serve important functions in the administration of court-martial procedures and does provide safeguards to an accused. Its language is clearly such that a defendant could object to trial in the absence of the required investigation. In that event the court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the investigation. And the military reviewing authorities could consider the same contention, reversing a court- martial conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has substantially injured an accused. But we are not persuaded that Congress intended to make otherwise valid court-martial judgments wholly void because pre-trial investigations fall short of the standards prescribed by Article 70. That Congress has not required analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication that the investigatory plan was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional level. xxx xxx xxx Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the Army did hold that where there had been no pre-trial investigation, court-martial proceedings were void ab initio. But this holding has been expressly repudiated in later holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This later interpretation has been that the pre-trial requirements of Article 70 are directory, not mandatory, and in no way effect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War Department's interpretation was pointedly called to the attention of Congress in 1947 after which Congress amended Article 70 but left unchanged the language here under consideration. compensable pre-requisite to the exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under article of war 71 would of course be altogether irregular but the court-martial might nevertheless have jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue was resolved more than two years ago 2 in Kapunan v. De Villa, where we declared: The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and their co-respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he had investigated the matter through an evaluation of the pertinent records, including the reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers, and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies on record. The charge sheets were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance with and in the manner provided under Art. 71 of the Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, is only of suppletory application, the fact that the charge sheets were not certified in the manner provided under said decrees, i.e., that the officer administering the oath has personally examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood its affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their counter-affidavit. However, instead of doing so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the dismissal of the charges against them. That petitioners were not able to confront the witnesses against them was their own doing, for they never even asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses so that they may be made to answer clarificatory questions in accordance with P. D, No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911. The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with Article 8 of the Articles of War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body, was not signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff. Article of War No. 8 reads: Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when empowered by the President, the commanding officer of a major command or task force, the commanding officer of a division, the commanding officer of a military area, the superintendent of the Military Academy, the commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may appoint general courts-martial; but when

10

any such commander is the accuser or the prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the court shall be appointed by superior competent authority. ... While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt that he authorized it because the order itself said it was issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it has not been shown to be spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the Summary Disposition Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its president and members. It is significant that General De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the said order, as he would certainly have done if his authority had been improperly invoked. On the contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the other respondents by the Solicitor General. Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally provided for under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948, to wit: Art. 18. Challenges. Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall determine the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more than one member at a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented and decided before those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled to the peremptory challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for cause. The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro, thus: In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a handful of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and naval academies who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of officers learned in military law, its aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing army was numerically made equate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the national defense program. Because of these considerations it was then felt that peremptory challenges should not in the meanwhile be permitted and that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no mention or reference to any peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a court- martial or by the accused. After December 17,1958, when the Manual for CourtsMartial of the Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and education in military law, encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines. This program was pursued until the outbreak of World War 11 in the Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very large number, and a great many of the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It was in these environmental circumstances that Article of War 18 was amended on June 12,1948 to entitle "each side" to one peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law member of court shall not be challenged except for cause. On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them. On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge, thus: No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained to insure impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by a majority of the members excluding the challenged member. A tie vote does not disqualify the challenged member. A successfully challenged member shall be immediately replaced. On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security Code, which was a compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies intended "to meet the continuing threats to the existence, security and stability of the State." The modified rule on challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this decree. On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final determination of the cases pending therein. P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders mentioned therein. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
3

11

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul. Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge. We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative, having been cast out under the new dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime. The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is curious that the present government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its action against the accused officers. The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited by a respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. It is hoped that the accused officers in the cases at bar will not be so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present circumstances, is a matter addressed to the lawmakers and not to this Court. The judiciary can only interpret and apply the laws without regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a problem only the political departments can resolve. The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition for certiorari and mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private respondents with the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of Appeals is vested with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, 4 instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the case of Yang v. Court of Appeals where this Court held that "appeals from the Professional Regulation Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals. It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary appeals and not to the remedies employed by the accused officers before the respondent courts. In Martelino, we observed as follows: It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in the exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of discretion what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" as to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point at issue in this action suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition ... . The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, 5 prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions forhabeas corpus and quo warranto. In the absence of a law providing that the decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or the Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction. We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows: The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail. Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against the existing political system.

12

xxx xxx xxx National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25,1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice. The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians. On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991, and was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on February 26, 1991, by the respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the charge memorandum and specifications against the private respondents dated January 30, 1991. On February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was created and initial investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991, the private respondents received the copies of the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were required to submit their counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of more than one year in the investigation and preparation of the charges against the private respondents. However, this was explained by the Solicitor General thus: ... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it pre-charge investigation only after one (1) year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. All of them, as well as other witnesses, had to be interviewed or investigated, and these inevitably took months to finish. The pre-charge investigation was rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved were dispersed and scattered throughout the Philippines. In some cases, command units, such as the Scout Rangers, have already been disbanded. After the charges were completed, the same still had to pass review and approval by the AFP Chief of Staff. While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following admonition: This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point that if the participation of petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges can be filed against him or the existence of a prima facie case warranting trial before a military commission is wanting, it behooves respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to release petitioner. Respondents must also be reminded that even if a military officer is arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War, indefinite confinement is not sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates that immediate steps must be taken to try the person accused or to dissmiss the charge and release him. Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating or 6 carrying the case to a final conclusion may even be punished as a court martial may direct. It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on February 26, 1991, the government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for reconsideration, the latter was ultimately denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48hour period for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did not run until after notice of such denial was received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the private respondents' contention, therefore, the decision had not yet become final and executory when the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was filed with this Court on March 12, 1991. III Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following observations of the Court in Arula: The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ ofcertiorari.

13

As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should not have been ordered released. ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur. Separate Opinions SARMIENTO, J., concurring: I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I dissent insofar as he would deny bail to accused military personnel. The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before conviction, with the only exception of "those charged with 1 offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong." The Charter also states that "[T]he right to bail shall 2 not be impaired even if the writ of habeas corpus is suspended." To deny the military officers here concerned of the right to bail is to circumscribe the inclusive meaning of "all persons" the coverage of the right. I believe that military officers fall within "persons". The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail [t]he sheer number alone is already discomforting . . . [b]ut, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their 3 own concept of government and justice." But would a scenario of 1,000 murderers or drug pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis justify a denial of the right to bail? Would not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General be reproduced by 1,000 "equally dangerous" elements of society? We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the petitioners should not be granted the same right. The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an argument to deny bail. I submit, however, that tradition is no argument. First, the Constitution does not say it. Second, we are a government of laws, not tradition. If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a reexamination is in order. Separate Opinions SARMIENTO, J., concurring: I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I dissent insofar as he would deny bail to accused military personnel. The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before conviction, with the only exception of "those charged with 1 offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong." The Charter also states that "[T]he right to bail shall 2 not be impaired even if the writ of habeas corpus is suspended." To deny the military officers here concerned of the right to bail is to circumscribe the inclusive meaning of "all persons" the coverage of the right. I believe that military officers fall within "persons". The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail [t]he sheer number alone is already discomforting . . .

14

[b]ut, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their 3 own concept of government and justice." But would a scenario of 1,000 murderers or drug pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis justify a denial of the right to bail? Would not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General be reproduced by 1,000 "equally dangerous" elements of society? We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the petitioners should not be granted the same right. The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an argument to deny bail. I submit, however, that tradition is no argument. First, the Constitution does not say it. Second, we are a government of laws, not tradition. If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a reexamination is in order. Footnotes 1 28 SCRA 540, 2 168 SCRA 264. 3 32 SCRA 106. 4 186 SCRA 287. 5 Sec. 5, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; Sec. 9l and Sec. 21(l), B.P. 129. 6 Elepante v. Madayag, G.R. No. 93559, April 26, 1991. SARMIENTO, J. 1 CONST., art. III, sec. 13. 2 Supra. 3 Decision, 20.

G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992 LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner, vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents. PADILLA, J.: Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows: Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to 1 the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results. Her letter for reconsideration dated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus: xxx xxx xxx With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of RA 6683 does not conform with the beneficent purpose of the law. The law merely requires that a government employee whether regular, temporary, emergency, or casual, should have two consecutive years of government service in order to be entitled to its benefits. I more than meet the requirement. Persons who are not entitled are consultants, experts and contractual(s). As to the budget needed, the law provides that the Department of Budget and Management will shoulder a certain portion of the benefits to be allotted to government corporations. Moreover, personnel of these NIA special projects art entitled to the

15

regular benefits, such (sic) leaves, compulsory retirement and the like. There is no reason why we should not be entitled to RA 6683. xxx xxx xxx
2

Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) emphasized: xxx xxx xxx We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision of Section 3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an applicant to have two years of satisfactory service on the date of separation/retirement but further requires said applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status as of December 2, 1988, the date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate contractual employees in the coverage. Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your separation from the service, is co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature, this Commission shall sustain its original decision. xxx xxx xxx
3

In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari, insisting that she is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments: It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 requires an applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status. Likewise, the provisions of Section 23 ( sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683, provides: "2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the following: a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities or services with a definite expected output: i.e. membership in Task Force, Part-Time, Consultant/Employees. b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police (PC-INP). c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be separated from the service for optional retirement with gratuity under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with pension under R.A. No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, an amended, or vice- versa. d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the enactment of this law and have received the corresponding benefits of that retirement/separation. e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by mandatory separation from the service under existing civil service laws, rules and regulations; provided that if such officials and employees apply in writing within the prescriptive period for the availment of the benefits herein authorized, shall be allowed only if acquitted or cleared of all charges and their application accepted and approved by the head of office concerned." Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one of them. Ms. Chua is a full time employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits provided for by the Civil Service Commission. She held a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs to the Administrative Service. . . . If casuals and emergency employees were given the benefit of R.A. 6683 with more reason that this petitioner who was holding a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A and has rendered almost 15 years of faithful, continuous service in the government should be 4 similarly rewarded by the beneficient (sic) purpose of the law. The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment petitioner's exclusion from the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683, because: 1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers kept by the Administrative Service in the head office of NIA (the service record was issued by the Watershed Management and Erosion Control Project (WMECP), Pantabangan,

16

Nueva Ecija). The project, funded by the World Bank, was completed as of 31 December 1988, after which petitioner's position became functus officio. 2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA her position is not included in its regular plantilla. She belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient; on the other hand, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. The most that a non-career personnel can expect upon the expiration of his employment is financial assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire under the GSIS law. 3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent, security of tenure is available only for the term of office (i.e., duration of project). 4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or retirement benefits but reorganization to streamline government functions. The application of the law must be made consistent with the purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize the government, it will not have any application to special projects such as the WMECP which exists only for a short and definite period. This being the nature of special projects, there is no necessity for offering its personnel early retirement benefits just to induce voluntary separation as a step to reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of 6 reorganizing the WMECP considering its short and limited life-span. 5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters and local government units. Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the parties, the Court is called upon to define the different classes of employees in the public sector (i.e. government civil servants). Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended) deems an employment regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. No equivalent definition can be found in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975, which superseded the Civil Service Act of 1965 R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683) merely includes such class of employees (regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no such specie is employed in the public sector. The appointment status of government employees in the career service is classified as follows: 1. permanent one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which appointment is made, in accordance 7 with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards promulgated in pursuance thereof; 2. temporary In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment should be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available. 8 The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as: (1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required; (2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems; (3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President. (4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs; (5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system; (6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and
5

17

(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:

. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made. Included in the non-career service are: 1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff; 2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal confidential staff(s); 3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential staff; 4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency. 5. emergency and seasonal personnel. There is another type of non-career employee: Casual where and when employment is not permanent but occasional, unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945) Consider petitioner's record of service: Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated as a laborer holding emergencystatus with the 11 NIA Upper Pampanga River Project, R & R Division. From 24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a research aide with temporary status on the same project. On 1 September 1975 to 31 December 1976, she was with the NIA-FES III; R & R Division, then on 1 January 1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with NIA UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1 June 1980, she went to NIA W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed Management & Erosion Control Project) retaining the status oftemporary employee. While with this project, her designation was changed to personnel assistant on 5 November 1981; starting 9 July 1982, the status became permanent until the completion of the project on 12 31 December 1988. The appointment paper attached to the OSG's comment lists her status as co-terminus with the Project. The employment status of personnel hired under foreign assisted projects is considered co-terminous, that is, they are considered employees for the duration of the project or until the completion or cessation of said project (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June 1990). Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service. Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides: WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the Civil Service Commission is charged with the function of determining creditable services for retiring officers and employees of the national government; WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides that all previous services by an officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved appointment to a position in the Civil Service are considered creditable services, while Section 6 (a) thereof states that services rendered oncontractual, emergency or casual status are non-creditable services; WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as some contractual, emergency or casual employment are covered by contracts or appointments duly approved by the Commission.
10

18

NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on contractual, emergency or casual status, irrespective of the mode or manner of payment therefor shall be considered as creditable for retirement purposes subject to the following conditions: (emphasis provided) 1. These services are supported by approved appointments, official records and/or other competent evidence. Parties/agencies concerned shall submit the necessary proof of said services; 2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June 22, 1984, the effectivity date of Executive Order No. 966; and 3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement are continuous and fulfill the service requirement for retirement. What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, co-terminous or contractual personnel? All 13 are tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary. The 12 May 1989 CSC letter of denial characterized herein petitioner's employment as co-terminous with the NIA projectwhich in turn was contractual in nature. The OSG says petitioner's status is co-terminous with the Project. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the status of a co-terminous employee (3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the service is characterized by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure. The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the following: a) co-terminous with the project When the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same; b) co-terminous with the appointing authority when appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority. c) co-terminous with the incumbent when appointment is co-existent with the appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a period of 3 years" the appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed abolished. It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c) and (d), what is termed co-terminous is the position, and not the appointee-employee. Further, in (c) the security of tenure of the appointee is guaranteed during his incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure is limited to a specific period. A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual andemergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not have made a specific enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning 14 and confine its terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned or casus omissus pro omisso habendus est A person, object or 15 thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. Yet adherence to these legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., comes to mind where, workers belonging to a work pool, hired and re-hired continuously from one project to another were considered non-project-regular and permanent employees. Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a span of fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can be assumed, her service record cannot be disregarded. Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
16

19

. . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are 17 substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause were we to sustain respondents' submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that: No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in 18 the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus. During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in response to Congressman Dimaporo's interpellation on coverage of state university employees who are extended appointments for one (1) year, renewable for two (2) or 19 three (3) years, he explained: This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and voluntary separation. It is irrespective of the actual status or nature of the appointment one received, but if he opts to retire under this, then he is covered. It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal to extend the scope of the Early Retirement Law). Its wording supports the submission that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill, on coverage of early retirement, would provide: Sec. 3. Coverage. It will cover all employees of the national government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual, emergency and contractual employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service as of the date of separation. The term "contractual employees" as used in this Act does not include experts and consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities or services with definite expected output. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act. (emphasis supplied) The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are deemed abolished upon early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Will the inclusion of co-terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such objective? In their case, upon termination of the project and separation of the project personnel from the service, the term of employment is considered expired, the officefunctus officio. Casual, temporary and contractual personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only have to establish two (2) years of continuous service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG's argument that co-terminous or project employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient, whereas, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. Here, violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution becomes glaring because casuals are not even in the plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the benefits of early retirement. How can the objective of the Early Retirement Law of trimming the bureaucracy be achieved by granting early retirement benefits to a group of employees (casual) without plantilla positions? There would, in such a case, be no abolition of permanent positions or streamlining of functions; it would merely be a removal of excess personnel; but the positions remain, and future appointments can be made thereto. Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous service should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 (5 20 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, requires, as a condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government service which need not be continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency, seasonal, contractual or co-terminous including military and police service, as evaluated and confirmed 21 by the Civil Service Commission. A similar regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-terminous personnel who survive the test of time. This would be in keeping with the coverage of "all social legislations enacted to promote the

20

physical and mental well-being of public servants" After all, co-terminous personnel, are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions, medicare and income tax payments, with the general disadvantage of transience. In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. While the application was filed after expiration of her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she originally filed the application on her own without the assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683, in accordance with the pronouncements in this decision. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur. Separate Opinions GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring: I concur but only insofar as our rulings are applied to RA 6683 applicants. Separate Opinions GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring: I concur but only insofar as our rulings are applied to RA 6683 applicants. Footnotes 1 Letter of Commissioner Samilo Borlongay, 17 March 1989. 2 Annex "E", Rollo, P. 11 3 Annex "F", Rollo, p. 14. 4 Rollo, p. 24-25. 5 AN ACT PROVIDING BENEFITS FOR EARLY, RETIREMENT AND VOLUNTARY SEPARATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE, AS WELL AS INVOLUNTARY SEPARATION OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO VARIOUS EXECUTIVE ORDERS AUTHORIZING GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 6 See Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, 12 December 1988, Rollo, 61. 7 Sec. 25, a and b, P.D. No. 807; see also CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, S. of 1991, 5 April 1991. 8 Ibid., also Perez v. City of San Carlos, G.R. No. L-48196-R, 11 July 1978; Ata v. Namocatcat, G.R. No. L-35703, 30 October 1972, 47 SCRA 320. 9 Executive Order No. 292, Section 7, 83 O.G. No. 39, 75 (September 1987) 10 Ibid, Section 9, p. 77. 11 Per Service Record, Rollo, p. 7. 12 Rollo, p. 70. 13 Page 3, this decision. 14 See Agpalo, Ruben. Statutory Construction, 1986 ed. p. 161. 15 People v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 664. 16 G.R. No. 54083, 28 February 1983, 120 SCRA 910. 17 Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, L-23794, 17 February 1968. 18 Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, 1986 ed., p. 118-119 citing In re Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918); City of Manila v. Gomez, G.R. No. L-37251, August 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 98; Escribano v. Ovila, G.R. No. L-30375, September 12, 1978, 85 SCRA 245 (1978), also Go Chico v. Martinez, 45 Phil. 256 (1923); Gatchalian v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-32560, October 22, 1970, 35 SCRA 435 (1970); People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679 (1957) and People v. Aquino, 83 Phil. 614 (1949). 19 Deliberations House Bill No. 4942 8 March 1988, 6:30. p.m.

22

21

20 An Act to Grant Civil Service Eligibility Under Certain Conditions to Government Employees Under Provisional or Temporary Status Who have rendered a Total of Seven (7) Years of Efficient Service and for other Purposes. 21 Rule 1, Sec. 2(c) as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 25, series of 1990, 21 May 1990. 22 See Joint CSC-DBM Circular No. 1, series of 1991, 27 June 1991.

G.R. No. L-14129

August 30, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee. Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant. Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee. RESOLUTION REGALA, J.: This resolution refers to a motion for reconsideration filed by the counsel for defendant-appellee, Guillermo Manantan. Defendant-appellee does not dispute the correctness of this Court's ruling in the main case. He concedes that a justice of the peace is covered by the prohibition of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However, he takes exception to the dispositive portion of this Court's ruling promulgated on July 31, 1962, which reads: For the above reasons, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case is remanded for trial on the merits. It is now urged by the defendant-appellee that the ultimate effect of remanding the case to the lower court for trial on the merits is to place him twice in jeopardy of being tried for the same offense. He calls the attention of this Court to the fact that when the charge against him was dismissed by the lower court, jeopardy had already attached to his person. To support his claim, he cites the case of People vs. Labatete, G.R. No. L-12917, April 27, 1960. Defendant-appellee's plea of double jeopardy should be rejected. The accused cannot now invoke the defense of double jeopardy. When the government appealed to this Court the order of dismissal, defendant Manantan could have raised that issue by way of resisting the appeal of the state. Then again, when defendant-appellee filed his brief, he could have argued therein his present plea of double jeopardy. Yet, on neither occasion did he do so. He must, therefore, be deemed to have waived his constitutional right thereunder. This is in accord with this Court's ruling in the cases of People vs. Rosalina Casiano, G.R. No. L-15309, February 16, 1961 and People vs. Pinuila, G.R. No. L-11374, May 30, 1958, hereunder quoted: . . . defendant herein has filed a brief in which she limited herself to a discussion of the merits of the appeal. Thus, she not only failed to question, in her brief, either expressly or impliedly, the right of the prosecution to interpose the present appeal, but also, conceded in effect the existence of such right. She should be deemed, therefore, to have waived her aforementioned constitutional immunity.1wph1.t It is true that in People vs. Hernandez (49 O.G. 5342), People vs. Ferrer, L-9072 (October 23, 1956),People vs. Bao, L-12102 (September 29, 1959) and People vs. Golez, L-14160, we dismissed the appeal taken by the Government from a decision or order of a lower court, despite defendant's failure to object thereto. However, the defendants in those cases, unlike the defendant herein, did not file any brief. Hence, they had performed no affirmative act from which a waiver could be implied. (People vs. Casiano, supra). In his appeal brief, appellant's counsel does not raise this question of double jeopardy, confining himself as he does, to the discussion of the evidence in the record, contending that the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. One aspect of this case as regards double jeopardy is that defense may be waived, and, that failure to urge it in the appeal may be regarded as a waiver of said defense of double jeopardy .(People vs. Pinuila, supra). There are other grounds raised by the defendant-appellee in this motion for reconsideration. The Court, however, does not believe that they were well taken. FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the motion for reconsideration filed in this case, is, as it is hereby, denied.

22

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978 J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON, TERESA TUASON, CELSO S. TUASON and SEVERO A. TUASON, petitioners, vs. HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal MANUELA AQUIAL, MARIA AQUIAL, Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C. CORDOVA, respondents. Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for petitioners. Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials. Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas.

AQUINO, J.: This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covering the Santa Mesa and D Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with areas of 877 (879) and 1,625 hectares, respectively (Barrette vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin case, infra). On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and bounded on the north by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio, Tiburcio on the east by Sapang Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang Kuliat The land, which has an area of three hundred eighty-three quiones was allegedly acquired by their father by means of a Spanish title issued to him on May 10, 1877 (Civil Case No. 8943). They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of defendants Mariano, Teresa, Juan, Demetrio and Augusta all surnamed Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on July 6. 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to defendants J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Nawasa) which leased a portion of its land to defendant Capitol Golf Club. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. They asked for damages. Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses. On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C. Cordova, who had bought eleven hectares of the disputed land from the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the case. On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties the Register of Deeds of Rizal to produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT No. 735 and certain transfer certificates of title derived from that first or basic title. Later, the court required the production in court of the plan of the land covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the purpose of determining whether the lands claimed by the plaintiffs and the intervenors are included therein. On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding in the said case. After the petitioners had

23

filed the proper bond, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova answered the petition. The parties, except the Aquials, filed memoranda in lieu of oral argument. The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova. The supposed irregularities in the land registration proceeding, which led to the issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735 was based, are the same issues raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower court. The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias in those cases, in validating OCT No. 735, is annexed to the complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them to support their support their action and it might have encouraged them to ventilate their action in court. On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom was once more upheld. (Benin vs. Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs. Tuason, L-26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L-26129, all decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531). The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella, L-40511, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a reiteration or confirmation of the holding in the following cases directly or incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I. vs. Acua, 59 Phil. 183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 447;Galvez and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de la Paz, 119 Phil. 612; Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. 110 Phil. 16; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaos, 95 Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre, 117 Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People's Homesite and Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1031. Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack. It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the court's time and energies at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, supra). Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court is directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs. SO ORDERED. Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur. Fernando, J, took no part.

G.R. No. 72005 May 29, 1987 PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT; SYCWIN COATING & WIRES, INC., and DOMINADOR CACPAL, CHIEF DEPUTY SHERRIF OF MANILA, respondents. GANCAYCO, J.: This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Resolution dated September 12, 1985 of the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CR-05409 1 granting private respondent's motion for execution pending appeal and ordering the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution on the counterbond to lift attachment filed by petitioner. The focal issue that emerges is whether an order of 2 execution pending appeal of a judgment maybe enforced on the said bond. In the Resolution of September 25, 1985 this Court as prayed for, without necessarily giving due course to the petition, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order complaint of. The records disclose that private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the pendency of the suit, private respondent 3 succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond. The latter 4 in turn posted a counterbond in the sum of P1,400, 000.00 thru petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were released.

24

On December 28, 1984, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED, and judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Varian Industrial Corporation, and the latter is hereby ordered: 1. To pay plaintiff the amount of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation with 12% interest per annum from the date of default until fully paid; 2. To pay plaintiff 5% of the principal obligation as liquidated damages; 3. To pay plaintiff P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; 4. To pay plaintiff 15% of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation, as and for attorney's fees; and 5. To pay the costs of suit. Accordingly, the counterclaim of the defendant is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
5

Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the respondent Court. Sycwin then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian in respondent Court. Varian was required to file its comment but none was filed. In the 6 Resolution of July 5, 1985, respondent Court ordered the execution pending appeal as prayed for. However, the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon demand. In a Petition dated August 13, 1985 filed with respondent Court Sycwin prayed that the surety (herein petitioner) be ordered to pay the value of its 7 8 bond. In compliance with the Resolution of August 23, 1985 of the respondent Court herein petitioner filed its comment. In the 9 Resolution of September 12, 1985, the respondent Court granted the petition. Hence this action. It is the submission of private respondent Sycwin that without a previous motion for reconsideration of the questioned resolution, certiorari would not lie. While as a general rule a motion for reconsideration has been considered a condition sine qua non for the granting of a writ of certiorari, this rule does not apply when special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action. 10 It has been held further that a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with in cases like this where execution had been ordered and the need for relief was extremely urgent. 11 The counterbond provides: WHEREAS, in the above-entitled case pending in the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch LXXXV, Quezon City, an order of Attachment was issued against abovenamed Defendant; WHEREAS, the Defendant, for the purpose of lifting and/or dissolving the order of attachment issued against them in the above-en-titled case, have offered to file a counterbond in the sum of PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY (P1,400,000.00), Philippine Currency, as provided for in Section 5, Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. NOW, THEREFORE, we, VARIAN INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, as Principal and the PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, as Surety, in consideration of the above and of the lifting or dissolution of the order of attachment, hereby jointly and severally, bind ourselves in favor of the above Plaintiff in the sum of PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY (P1,400,000.00), Philippine Currency, under the condition that in case the Plaintiff recovers judgment in the action, and Defendant will, on demand, re-deliver the attached property so released to the Officer of the Court and the same shall be applied to the payment of the judgment, or in default thereof, the defendant and Surety will, on demand, pay to the Plaintiff the full value of the property released. EXECUTED at Manila, Philippines, this 28th day of June, 1984. 12 Sections 5, 12, and 17 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court also provide: SEC. 5. Manner of attaching property. The officer executing the order shall without delay attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, all the properties of the party against whom the order is issued in the province, not exempt from execution, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the clerk or judge of the court from which the order issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an

25

amount sufficient to satisfy such demand besides costs, or in an amount equal to the value of the property which is about to be attached, to secure payment to the applicant of any judgement ment which he may recover in the action. The officer shall also forthwith serve a copy of the applicant's affidavit and bond, and of the order of attachment, on the adverse party, if he be found within the province. SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. At any time after an order of attachment has been granted, the party whose property has been attached, or the person appearing on his behalf, may, upon reasonable notice to the applicant, apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which the action is pending, for an order discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the security given. The judge shall, after hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if a cash deposit is made, or a counter-bond executed to the attaching creditor is filed, on behalf of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court where the application is made, in an amount equal to the value of the property attached as determined by the judge, to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the action. Upon the filing of such counter-bond, copy thereof shall forthwith be served on the attaching creditor or his lawyer. Upon the discharge of an attachment in accordance with the provisions of this section the property attached, or the proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the party making the deposit or giving the counterbond aforesaid standing in place of the property so released. Should such counterbond for any reason be found to be, or become, insufficient, and the party furnishing the same fail to file an additional counterbond, the attaching creditor may apply for a new order of attachment. SEC. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. If the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any counter-bond given pursuant to the provisions of this rule to secure the payment of the judgment shall become charged on such counter- bond, and bound to pay to the judgement creditor upon demand, the amount due under the judgment, which amount may be recovered from such surety or sureties after notice and summary hearing in the same action. (Emphasis supplied.) Under Sections 5 and 12, Rule 57 above reproduced it is provided that the counterbond is intended to secure the payment of "any judgment" that the attaching creditor may recover in the action. Under Section 17 of same rule it provides that when "the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part" it is only then that "payment of thejudgment shall become charged on such counterbond." The counterbond was issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court as provided in the second paragraph aforecited which is deemed reproduced as part of the counterbond. In the third paragraph it is also stipulated that the counterbond is to be "applied for the payment of the judgment." Neither the rules nor the provisions of the counterbond limited its application to a final and executory judgment. Indeed, it is specified that it applies to the payment of any judgment that maybe recovered by plaintiff. Thus, the only logical conclusion is that an execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied maybe charged against such a counterbond. It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos. 13 "The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. 14 The rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. 15 In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated.16 For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences. 17 A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.18 Thus where a statute grants a person against whom possession of "any land" is unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action for unlawful detainer, this Court held that the phrase "any land" includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural, residential, or mineral.19 Since the law in this case does not make any distinction nor intended to make any exception, when it speaks of "any judgment" which maybe charged against the counterbond, it should be interpreted to refer not only to a final and executory judgment in the case but also a judgment pending appeal. All that is required is that the conditions provided for by law are complied with, as outlined in the case of Towers Assurance 20 Corporation v. Ororama Supermart, Under Section 17, in order that the judgment creditor might recover from the surety on the counterbond, it is necessary (1) that the execution be first issued against the principal debtor and that such execution was returned unsatisfied in whole or in part; (2) that the creditor make a demand upon the surety for the satisfaction of the judgment, and (3) that the surety be given notice and a summary hearing on the same action as to his liability for the judgment under his counterbond.

26

The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgement but also the execution of a judgment pending appeal. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the restraining order issued on September 25, 1985 is hereby dissolved with costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Sarmiento, JJ., concur. Feliciano, J., is on leave. Footnotes 1 Annex A, Petition, page 22, Rollo. 2 Page 61, Rollo. 3 Annex H, Petition, page 56, Rollo. 4 Annex D, page 36, Rollo. 5 Annex B, Petition, page 29, Rollo. 6 Annex C, Pages 31-35, Rollo, Annex C, Page 40, Rollo. 7 Annex F, Pages 41-42, Rollo. 8 Annex G, Pages 47-55, Rollo. 9 Annex A, Pages 22-23, Rollo. 10 Uy Chu vs. Imperial, et al., 44 Phil. 27, Matutina vs. Buslon, et al., L-14637, Aug. 24, 1960, 109 Phil. 140. 11 Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs. De Marbella, et al., L-16088, September 30, 1960, l09 Phil. 734 and Socio vs. Vda. de Leary, 12 SCRA 326, 329. 12 Annex D, page 36, Rollo. 13 Colgate-Palmolive Phil., Inc. v. Gimenez, G.R. No. 14787, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 267 (1961); Libudan v. Gil, G.R. No. 21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17 (1972); Dominador v. Derahunan 49 Phil. 452 (1926); Guevarra v. Inocentes, G.R. No. 25577, March 15, 1966, 16 SCRA 379 (1966); Director of Lands v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 32522, Jan. 28 1963; Alfato v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52749, March 31, 1981, 103 SCRA 741 (1981); Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, 1986, pp. 143-144. 14 Loc Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 (1946), 15 Social Security System v. City of Bacolod, G.R. No. 35726, July 21, 1982, 115 SCRA 412 (1982); Director of Lands v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 32522, Jan. 28, 1983. 16 Lo Cham vs. Ocampo, supra. 17 Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720 (1903). 18 Tolentino v. Catoy 82 Phil. 300 (1948). 19 Social Security System v. City of Bacolod, supra; see also Robles v. Zambales Chromite Co., 104 Phil. 688 (1958); Government v. Municipality of Binalonan, 32 Phil. 634 (1915); Director of Lands v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 32522, Jan. 28,1983; Oliva v. Lamadrid, G.R. No. 23196, Oct. 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 737 (1967); Escosura v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., 114 Phil. 225 (1962); Alfato v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52749, March 31, 1981,103 SCRA 741 (1981); Liggett & Myers Tobacco v. Collector of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 9415, April 22, 1957, 101 Phil. 106 (1957); Tiu San v. Republic, 96 Phil. 817 (1955); Agpalo, supra, pp, 143-147. 20 80 SCRA 262, 264 (1977); See also Leelin Marketing Corp. v. C & S Agro Dev. Co., 121 SCRA 725, 730-731 (1983); Dizon vs. Valdez, 23 SCRA 200, 203 (1968).

G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995 JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. QUIASON, J.: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Resolution dated April 28, 1994 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in UND No. 94-040. I

27

On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 (Rollo, p. 14). Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994 (Rollo, pp. 10-13). Hence, this petition for certiorari. We dismiss the petition. II Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes" provides as follows: Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election. No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required. The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidate fails to file the statement required herein within the period prescribed by this Act. Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or reports in connection with electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender. It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar to advise in writing, by personal delivery or registered mail, within five (5) days from the date of election all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures. For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this Section, the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office (Emphasis supplied). To implement the provisions of law relative to election contributions and expenditures, the COMELEC promulgated on January 13, 1992 Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions and Expenditures in Connection with the National and Local Elections on May 11, 1992). The pertinent provisions of said Resolution are: Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures: Reminders to candidates to file statements. Within five (5) days from the day of the election, the Law Department of the Commission, the regional election director of the National Capital Region, the provincial election supervisors and the election registrars shall advise in writing by personal delivery or registered mail all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy with them to comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures in connection with the elections. Every election registrar shall also advise all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with said obligation (Emphasis supplied).

28

Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required. The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidates fails to file the statement required within the period prescribed by law. (b) Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file statements or reports in connection with the electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000), in the discretion of the Commission. The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender. For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section, the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office. Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost" ( Rollo, p. 39). Petitioner's argument is without merit. Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos (Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]; cf Olfato v. Commission on Elections, 103 SCRA 741 [1981]). No distinction is to be made in the application of a law where none is indicated (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 [1946]). In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall (The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Art. IX(C), Sec. 2[1]), issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation or interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7166 on election contributions and expenditures. Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy." Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the general rule (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757 [1988]; Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil. 608 [1952]). The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of candidates, and compelling the publication of the same. Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 94; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 1). Thus, laws and regulations prescribe what contributions are prohibited (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 95, Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 4), or unlawful (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 96), and what expenditures are authorized (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 102; R.A. No. 7166, Sec. 13; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 7) or lawful (Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 8). Such statutes are not peculiar to the Philippines. In "corrupt and illegal practices acts" of several states in the United States, as well as in federal statutes, expenditures of candidates are regulated by requiring the filing of statements of expenses and by limiting the amount of money that may be spent by a candidate. Some statutes also regulate the solicitation of campaign contributions (26 Am Jur 2d, Elections 287). These laws are designed to compel publicity with respect to matters contained in the statements and to prevent, by such publicity, the improper use of moneys devoted by candidates to the furtherance of their ambitions (26 Am Jur 2d, Elections 289). These statutes also enable voters to evaluate the influences exerted on behalf of candidates by the contributors, and to furnish evidence of corrupt practices for annulment of elections (Sparkman v. Saylor [Court of Appeals of Kentucky], 180 Ky. 263, 202 S.W. 649 [1918]).

29

State courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing (State ex rel. Butchofsky v. Crawford [Court of Civil Appeals of Texas], 269 S.W. 2d 536 [1954]; Best v. Sidebottom, 270 Ky. 423,109 S.W. 2d 826 [1937]; Sparkman v. Saylor, supra.) It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote. It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact." Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur. Kapunan, J., is on leave. Separate Opinions MELO, J., dissenting: The majority opinion is to the effect that every candidate, including one who has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy, is obliged to file his statement of contributions and expenditures in line with Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 vis-a-vis the pertinent portions of Comelec Resolution No. 2348. I must concede that the use of the word "shall" in the main statute as well as the implementing rules generally suggest mandatoriness as to cover all candidates. But is an anspirant for public office who had a sudden change of heart, so to speak, still considered a candidate to begin with? I am of the impression that he is not and is thus not bound to render an accounting subsequent to election for the simple reason that the term 'candidate' is used to designate a person who actually submits himself and is voted for at our election (Santos vs. Miranda, 35 Phil. 643, 648 (1916) citing State vs. Hirsch, 125 Ind., 207; 9 L.R.A. 107; Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 2nd ed., p. 84) Certainly, one who withdraws his certificate of candidacy 3 days after the filing thereof, can not be voted for at an election. And considering the shortness of the period of 3 days from the filing to the withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy, petitioner cannot be accused, as indeed there is no such charge, of utilizing his aborted candidacy for purposes to raise funds or to extort money from other candidates in exchange for the withdrawal. I, therefore, vote to grant the petition. Padilla, J., concurs. Separate Opinions MELO, J., dissenting: The majority opinion is to the effect that every candidate, including one who has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy, is obliged to file his statement of contributions and expenditures in line with Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 vis-a-vis the pertinent portions of Comelec Resolution No. 2348. I must concede that the use of the word "shall" in the main statute as well as the implementing rules generally suggest mandatoriness as to cover all candidates. But is an aspirant for public office who had a sudden change of heart, so to speak, still considered a candidate to begin with? I am of the impression that he is not and is thus not bound to render an accounting subsequent to election for the simple reason that the term 'candidate' is used to designate a person who actually submits himself and is voted for at our election (Santos vs. Miranda, 35 Phil. 643, 648 (1916) citing State vs. Hirsch, 125 Ind., 207; 9 L.R.A. 107; Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 2nd ed., p. 84) Certainly, one who withdraws his certificate of candidacy 3 days after the filing thereof, can not be voted for at an election. And considering the shortness of the period of 3 days from the filing to the withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy, petitioner cannot

30

be accused, as indeed there is no such charge, of utilizing his aborted candidacy for purposes to raise funds or to extort money from other candidates in exchange for the withdrawal. I, therefore, vote to grant the petition. Padilla, J., concurs.

G.R. No. 110898

February 20, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE ANTONIO C. EVANGELISTA, as Presiding Judge of Branch XXI, 10th Judicial Region, RTC of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, and GRILDO S. TUGONON, respondents. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: Private respondent Grildo S. Tugonan was charged with frustrated homicide in the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental (Branch 21), the information against him alleging That on or about the 26th day of May, 1988, at more or less 9:00 o'clock in the evening at Barangay Publican+.3, Municipality of Villanueva, Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill and with the use of a knife, which he was then conveniently provided of, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab Roque T. Bade thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit: Stab wound, right iliac area, 0.5 cm. penetrating non perforating lacerating posterior peritoneum, 0,5 cm. thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Homicide as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is by timely medical attendance which prevented his death. CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. After trial he was found guilty and sentenced to one year of prision correccional in its minimum period and ordered to pay to the offended party P5,000.00 for medical expense, without subsidiary imprisonment, and the costs. The RTC appreciated in his favor the privileged mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed private respondent's conviction but modified his sentence by imposing on him an 1 indeterminate penalty of 2 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum. On December 21, 1992, respondent Judge Antonio C. Evangelista of the RTC set the case for repromulgation on January 4, 1993. On December 28, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for probation, alleging that (1) he possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for probation under P.D. No. 968, as amended; (2) the Court of Appeals has in fact reduced the penalty imposed on him by the trial court; (3) in its resolution, the Court of Appeals took no action on a petition for probation which he had earlier filed with it so that the petition could be filed with the trial court; (4) in the trial court's decision, two mitigating 3 circumstances of incomplete self-defense and voluntarily surrender were appreciated in his favor; and (5) in Santos To v. Pao, the Supreme Court upheld the right of the accused to probation notwithstanding the fact that he had appealed from his conviction by the trial court. On February 2, 1993, the RTC ordered private respondent to report for interview to the Provincial Probation Officer. The Provincial 4 Probation Officer on the other hand was required to submit his report with recommendation to the court within 60 days.
2

31

On February 18, 1993, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Isias B. Valdehueza recommended denial of private respondent's application for probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial court, when he could have then applied for probation, private respondent waived the right to make his application. The Probation Officer thought the present case to be distinguishable from Santos To v. Pao in the sense that in this case the original sentence imposed on private respondent by the trial court (1 year of imprisonment) was probationable and there was no reason for private respondent not to have filed his application for probation then, whereas in Santos To v. Pao the penalty only became probationable after it had been reduced as a result of the appeal. On April 16, 1993 Valdehueza reiterated his "respectful recommendation that private respondent's application for probation be denied and that a warrant of arrest be issued for him to serve his sentence in jail." The RTC set aside the Probation Officer's recommendation and granted private respondent's application for probation in its order of 6 April 23, 1993, Hence this petition by the prosecution. The issue in this case is whether the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion by granting private respondent's application for probation despite the fact that he had appealed from the judgment of his conviction of the trial court. The Court holds that it did. Until its amendment by P.D. No. 1990 in 1986, it was possible under P.D. No. 986, otherwise known as the Probation Law, for the accused to take his chances on appeal by allowing probation to be granted even after an accused had appealed his sentence and 7 failed to obtain an acquittal, just so long as he had not yet started to serve the sentence. Accordingly, in Santos To v. Pao, it was held that the fact that the accused had appealed did not bar him from applying for probation especially because it was as a result of the appeal that his sentence was reduced and made the probationable limit. The law was, however, amended by P.D. No. 1990 which took effect on January 15, 1986 precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction even if the sentence is probationable for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for probation only if the accused fails in his bid. Thus, as amended by P.D. No, 1990, 4 of the Probation Law now reads: 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphasis added). Since private respondent filed his application for probation on December 28, 1992, after P.D. No. 1990 had taken effect, it is covered by the prohibition that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction" and that "the filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal," Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and having applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction, private respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation. Private respondent argues, however, that a distinction should be drawn between meritorious appeals (like his appeal notwithstanding the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction) and unmeritorious appeals. But the law does not make any distinction and so neither should the Court. In fact if an appeal is truly meritorious the accused would be set free and not only given probation. Private respondent's original sentence (1 year of prision correccional in its minimum period) and the modified sentence imposed by the Court of Appeals (2 months ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum) are probationable. Thus the fact that he appealed meant that private respondent was taking his chances which the law precisely frowns upon. This is precisely the evil that the amendment in P.D. No. 1990 sought to correct, since in the words of the preamble to the amendatory law, "probation was not intended as an escape hatch and should not be used to obstruct and delay the administration of justice, but should be availed of at the first opportunity by offenders who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated." The ruling of the RTC that "[h]aving not perfected an appeal against the Court of Appeals decision, [private respondent] is, therefore, not covered by [the amendment in] P.D. 1990" is an obvious misreading of the law. The perfection of the appeal referred in the law refers to the .appeal taken from a judgment of conviction by the trial court and not that of the appellate court, since under the law an application for probation is filed with the trial court which can only grant the same "after it shall have convicted and sentenced
9 8 5

32

[the] defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal. "Accordingly, in Llamado 10 v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the petitioner who had appealed his sentence could not subsequently apply for probation. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the order of April 23, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental (Branch 21) granting probation to private respondent Grildo S. Tugonon is SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED. Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur. Footnotes
1

Decision dated January 23, 1992, per Associate Justice Lorna S. Lombods-dela Fuente and concurred in by Associate Justices Alfredo M. Marigomen and Jainal D. Rasul, Petition Annex D, Rollo, pp. 44-49. 2 Petition, Annex F, Rollo, pp. 51-53. 3 120 SCRA 8 (1983). 4 Petition, Annex I, Rollo, p. 56. 5 Petition, Annex N, Rollo, pp. 66-67. 6 Petition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 28-33. 7 P.D. No. 968, 4; as amended by P.D. No. 1287 provided: Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence and upon his application, suspend the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best. The prosecuting officer concerned shall be notified by the court of the filing of the application for probation and he may submit his comment on such application within ten days from receipt of the notification. Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine with subsidiary imprisonment in ease of in solvency. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction.The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal . In the latter case, however, if the application is filed on or after the date of the judgment of the appellate court, said application shall be acted upon by the trial court on the basis of the judgment of the appellate court An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphasis added). 8 P.D. No. 1990 was promulgated on October 5, 1985 and was published in the Official Gazette on December 30, 1985. Under its effectivity clause it shall take effect "after 15 days following its publication in the Official Gazette." 9 P.D. No. 1990, 3 provides that the "provisions of Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, as above amended, shall not apply to those who have already filed their respective applications for probation at the time of the effectivity of this Decree." 10 174 SCRA 566 (1989).

G.R. No. 87416 April 8, 1991 CECILIO S. DE VILLA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, and ROBERTO Z. LORAYES, respondents. San Jose Enriquez, Lacas Santos & Borje for petitioner. Eduardo R. Robles for private respondent. PARAS, J.:p This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision * of the Court of Appeals promulgated on February 1, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 16071 entitled "Cecilio S. de Villa vs. Judge Job B. Madayag, etc. and Roberto Z. Lorayes," dismissing the petition for certiorari filed therein. The factual backdrop of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, is as follows: On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, allegedly committed as follows:

33

That on or about the 3rd day of April 1987, in the municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ, to apply on account or for value a Depositors Trust Company Check No. 3371 antedated March 31, 1987, payable to herein complainant in the total amount of U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he had no sufficient funds in or credit with drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment which check when presented to the drawee bank within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored for the reason "INSUFFICIENT FUNDS" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor said accused failed to pay said ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ the amount of P50,000.00 of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice. After arraignment and after private respondent had testified on direct examination, petitioner moved to dismiss the Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no offense was committed since the check involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency). On July 19, 1988, respondent court issued its first questioned orders stating: Accused's motion to dismiss dated July 5, 1988, is denied for lack of merit. Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof, or made payable and dishonored in the Philippines though drawn and issued outside thereof, are within the coverage of said law. The law likewise applied to checks drawn against current accounts in foreign currency. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was subsequently denied by respondent court in its order dated September 6, 1988, and which reads: Accused's motion for reconsideration, dated August 9, 1988, which was opposed by the prosecution, is denied for lack of merit. The Bouncing Checks Law is applicable to checks drawn against current accounts in foreign currency (Proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa, February 7, 1979, p. 1376, cited in Makati RTC Judge (now Manila City Fiscal) Jesus F. Guerrero's The Ramifications of the Law on Bouncing Checks, p. 5). (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, pp. 20-22). A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the aforequoted orders dated July 19, 1988 and September 6, 1988 was filed by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals wherein he contended: (a) That since the questioned check was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, respondent court has no jurisdiction over the same or with accounts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 could have not contemplated extending its coverage over dollar accounts; (b) That assuming that the subject check was issued in connection with a private transaction between petitioner and private respondent, the payment could not be legally paid in dollars as it would violate Republic Act No. 529; and (c) That the obligation arising from the issuance of the questioned check is null and void and is not enforceable with the Philippines either in a civil or criminal suit. Upon such premises, petitioner concludes that the dishonor of the questioned check cannot be said to have violated the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, p. 22). On February 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, p. 5) A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the petitioner on February 7, 1989 (Rollo, Petition, p. 6) but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated March 3, 1989 (Rollo, Annex "B", p. 26). Hence, this petition.

34

In its resolution dated November 13, 1989, the Second Division of this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda (Rollo, Resolution, p. 81). The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati has jurisdiction over the case in question. The petition is without merit. Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases (Velunta vs. Philippine Constabulary, 157 SCRA 147 [1988]). Jurisdiction in general, is either over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendant, or over the issues framed in the pleadings (Balais vs. Balais, 159 SCRA 37 [1988]). Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of commencement of the action (De la Cruz vs. Moya, 160 SCRA 538 [1988]). The trial court's jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, can not be questioned. Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide that: Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients thereof occured at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place wherein it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense or is necessary for identifying the offense charged. Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place. In the case of People vs. Hon. Manzanilla (156 SCRA 279 [1987] cited in the case of Lim vs. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487 [1988]), the Supreme Court ruled "that jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the information." The information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was committed in Makati, Metro Manila and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action (Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]). Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People of the Philippines (154 SCRA 160 [1987] cited in the case of People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that "the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check." On the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the Ministry of Justice, citing the case of People vs. Yabut (76 SCRA 624 [1977], laid down the following guidelines in Memorandum Circular No. 4 dated December 15, 1981, the pertinent portion of which reads: (1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered; (2) the place where the check was written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix the place where it was executed, as what is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof which is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation; . . . (Res. No. 377, s. 1980, Filtex Mfg. Corp. vs. Manuel Chua, October 28, 1980)." (See The Law on Bouncing Checks Analyzed by Judge Jesus F. Guerrero, Philippine Law Gazette, Vol. 7. Nos. 11 & 12, October-December, 1983, p. 14). It is undisputed that the check in question was executed and delivered by the petitioner to herein private respondent at Makati, Metro Manila. However, petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22). But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. As the trial court correctly ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988:

35

Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are within the coverage of said law. It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]). More importantly, it is well established that courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body to assist in determining the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning (Palanca vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 [1920]). Thus, where there is doubts as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted (Arenas vs. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318 [1978]). The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view, as follows: xxx xxx xxx THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman from Basilan is recognized. MR. TUPAY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker. THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman may proceed. MR. TUPAY. Mr. Speaker, it has been mentioned by one of the Gentlemen who interpellated that any check may be involved, like U.S. dollar checks, etc. We are talking about checks in our country. There are U.S. dollar checks, checks, in our currency, and many others. THE SPEAKER. The Sponsor may answer that inquiry. MR. MENDOZA. The bill refers to any check, Mr. Speaker, and this check may be a check in whatever currency. This would not even be limited to U.S. dollar checks. The check may be in French francs or Japanese yen or deutschunorhs. (sic.) If drawn, then this bill will apply. MR TUPAY. So it include U.S. dollar checks. MR. MENDOZA. Yes, Mr. Speaker. xxx xxx xxx (p. 1376, Records of the Batasan, Volume III; Emphasis supplied). PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur. Footnotes * Penned by Associate Justice Jose A. R. Melo and concurred in by Associate Justices Manuel C. Herrera and Jorge S. Imperial.

36

Potrebbero piacerti anche