Speech at the 44th Munich Conference on Security Policy 02/10/2008 Thank you for that introduction.

I would also like to thank the people of Munich for once again allowing us to gather in this beautiful city. I am glad to see many of my colleagues here as well as many of the delegations that were with us in !ilnius for the "#T$ ministerial. #s I said in !ilnius % three weeks ago I accomplished a key goal I ha&e been pursuing for the last year' through the good offices of the (os #ngeles Times I finally brought unity to "#T$ % though not as I wished. It is an honor to be in&ited to speak here for a second and last year as ).*. *ecretary of +efense. !ilnius was my fourth "#T$ ministerial since taking this post but my first in a nation that had been part of the former *o&iet )nion. (ithuania was one of the first nations to be swallowed by the *o&iets and the first republic to declare its independence as ,altic push came to *o&iet sho&e. It is now a proud member of "#T$ and the leader of a -ro&incial .econstruction Team in #fghanistan. /or the transatlantic alliance the period in which (ithuania and other capti&e nations gained their independence was a time of reflection. "ot only were we pondering enlargement to secure the wa&e of democracy sweeping across 0astern 0urope but "#T$ was also pondering the &ery concept of collecti&e self1defense in a post1 2old 3ar world. 3e saw this in 1441 when "#T$ issued its first *trategic 2oncept. This document recogni5ed that 67)$T08 a 9single massi&e and global threat ha6d8 gi&en way to di&erse and multi1directional risks: 6)"7)$T08 % challenges such as weapons proliferation; disruption of the flow of &ital resources; ethnic conflict; and terrorism. $&ercoming these threats the document stated would re<uire a 9broad approach to security : with political economic and social elements. /rom the perspecti&e of one who played a role in that effort to redirect "#T$ 1= years ago today I would like to discuss a sub>ect that embodies the security challenges that ha&e emerged since that time and correspondingly the capabilities we need in this new era. That sub>ect is not surprisingly #fghanistan. #fter si? years of war at a time when some may sense frustration impatience or e&en e?haustion with this mission I belie&e it is &aluable to step back and take stock of #fghanistan'

/irst within the conte?t of the long1standing purpose of the #lliance and how it relates to the threats of a post 2old 3ar world; *econd with regard to "#T$@s &ision of becoming a transformed multifaceted e?peditionary force % and how we ha&e e&ol&ed in accordance with that &ision; and /inally to recapitulate to the people of 0urope the importance of the #fghanistan mission and its relationship to the wider terrorist threat.

There is little doubt that the mission in #fghanistan is unprecedented. It is in fact "#T$@s

first ground war and it is dramatically different than anything "#T$ has done before. Aowe&er on a conceptual le&el I belie&e it falls s<uarely within the traditional bounds of the #lliance@s core purpose' to defend the security interests and &alues of the transatlantic community. +uring the 1440s e&en as we tried to predict what form the threats of the 21st century would take #fghanistan was in reality becoming e?actly what we were discussing in theory. *ubse<uent e&ents during the inter&ening years ha&e shown that'

Instability and conflict abroad ha&e the potential to spread and strike directly at the hearts of our nations; "ew technology and communications connect criminal and terrorist networks far and wide and allow local problems to become regional and e&en global; 0conomic social and humanitarian problems caused by massi&e immigration flows radiate outward with little regard for national borders; # ne?us between narcotics and terrorists increases the resources a&ailable to e?tremists in the region while increasing the drug flow to 0uropean streets; and The presence of safe ha&ens combined with a lack of de&elopment and go&ernance allow Islamic e?tremists to turn a poisonous ideology into a global mo&ement.

More than fi&e years ago in -rague in the wake of the *eptember 11th attacks our nations set out to transform "#T$ into an e?peditionary force capable of dealing with threats of this type % capable of helping other nations help themsel&es to a&oid #fghanistan@s fate. #t the time I imagine many were unsure of what e?actly this would look like % what new structures training funding mindsets and manpower would be needed. *ince then howe&er we ha&e applied our &ision on the ground in #fghanistan. Today'

"early B0 000 troops from some C0 allies and partner nations ser&e under "#T$ command thousands of miles from the #lliance@s traditional borders; Drowing numbers of reconstruction and security training teams are making a real difference in the li&es of the #fghan people; and "#T$@s offensi&e and counterinsurgency operations in the *outh ha&e dislodged the Taliban from their strongholds and reduced their ability to launch large scale or coordinated attacks.

+ue to "#T$@s efforts as Minister Eung pointed out yesterday #fghanistan has made substantial progress in health care education and the economy % bettering the li&es of millions of its citi5ens. Through the #fghan mission we ha&e de&eloped a much more sophisticated

understanding of what capabilities we need as an #lliance and what shortcomings must be addressed. *ince the .iga summit there has been much focus on whether all allies are meeting their commitments and carrying their share of the burden. I ha&e had a few things to say about that myself. In truth &irtually all allies are fulfilling the indi&idual commitments they ha&e made. The problem is that the #lliance as a whole has not fulfilled its broader commitment from .iga to meet the force re<uirements of the commander in the field. #s we think about how to satisfy those re<uirements we should look more creati&ely at other ways to ensure that all allies can contribute more to this mission % and share this burden. ,ut we must not % we cannot % become a two1tiered #lliance of those who are willing to fight and those who are not. *uch a de&elopment with all its implications for collecti&e security would effecti&ely destroy the #lliance. #s many of you know a *trategic !ision document is being drafted that will assess "#T$@s and our partners@ achie&ements in #fghanistan and will produce a set of realistic goals and a roadmap to meet them o&er the ne?t three to fi&e years. 3e continue urgently to need a senior ci&ilian % a 0uropean in my &iew % to coordinate all non1military international assistance to the #fghan go&ernment and people. The lack of such coordination is seriously hampering our efforts to help the #fghans build a free and secure country. The really hard <uestion the #lliance faces is whether the whole of our effort is adding up to less than the sum of its parts and if that is the case what we should do to re&erse that e<uation. #s an #lliance we must be willing to discard some of the bureaucratic hurdles that ha&e accumulated o&er the years and hinder our progress in #fghanistan. This means more willingness to think and act differently % and <uickly. To pass initiati&es such as the "#T$ 2ommander@s 0mergency .esponse /und. This tool has pro&en itself elsewhere but will for "#T$ re<uire a more fle?ible approach to budgeting and funding. #dditionally it is clear that we need a common set of training standards for e&ery one going to #fghanistan % whether they are combat troops conducting counterinsurgency operations; ci&ilians working in -ro&incial .econstruction Teams; or members of operational mentoring and liaison training teams. )nless we are all on the same page % unless our efforts are tied together and unified by similar tactics training and goals % then the whole of our efforts will indeed be less than the sum of the parts. I also worry that there is a de&eloping theology about a clear1cut di&ision of labor between ci&ilian and military matters % one that sometimes plays out in debates o&er the respecti&e roles of the 0uropean )nion and "#T$ and e&en among the "#T$ allies. In many respects this con&ersation echoes one that has taken place % and still is % in the )nited *tates within the ci&ilian and military agencies of the ).*. go&ernment as a result of the #fghanistan and Ira< campaigns.

/or the )nited *tates the lessons we ha&e learned these past si? years % and in many cases re1learned % ha&e not been easy ones. 3e ha&e stumbled along the way and we are still learning. "ow in Ira< we are applying a comprehensi&e strategy that emphasi5es the security of the local population % those who will ultimately take control of their own security % and brings to bear in the same place and often at the same time ci&ilian resources for economic and political de&elopment. 3e ha&e learned that war in the 21st century does not ha&e stark di&isions between ci&ilian and military components. It is a continuous scale that slides from combat operations to economic de&elopment go&ernance and reconstruction % fre<uently all at the same time. The #lliance must put aside any theology that attempts clearly to di&ide ci&ilian and military operations. It is unrealistic. 3e must li&e in the real world. #s we noted as far back as 1441 in the real world security has economic political and social dimensions. #nd &ice &ersa. In the future the 0.). and "#T$ will ha&e to find ways to work together better to share certain roles % neither e?cluding "#T$ from ci&ilian1 military operations nor barring the 0.). from purely military missions. In short I agree entirely with *ecretary Deneral de Aoop *cheffer and Minister Morin@s comments yesterday that there must be a 9complimentarity: between the 0.). and "#T$. #t the same time in "#T$ some allies ought not to ha&e the lu?ury of opting only for stability and ci&ilian operations thus forcing other #llies to bear a disproportionate share of the fighting and the dying. $&erall the last few years ha&e seen a dramatic e&olution in "#T$@s thinking and in its posture. 3ith all the new capabilities we ha&e forged in the heat of battle % and with new attitudes % we are seeing what it means to be e?peditionary. 3hat is re<uired to spread stability beyond our borders. 3e must now commit oursel&es to institutionali5e what we ha&e learned and to complete our transformation. Eust as we must be realistic about the nature and comple?ity of the struggle in #fghanistan so too must we be realistic about politics in our &arious countries. "#T$ after all is an alliance whose constituent go&ernments all answer to their citi5ens. My colleagues in !ilnius and those in this room certainly understand the serious threat we face in #fghanistan. ,ut I am concerned that many people on this continent may not comprehend the magnitude of the direct threat to 0uropean security. /or the )nited *tates *eptember 11th was a gal&ani5ing e&ent % one that opened the #merican public@s eyes to dangers from distant lands. It was especially poignant since our go&ernment had been hea&ily in&ol&ed in #fghanistan in the 1480s only to make the grie&ous error % of which I was at least partly responsible % of abandoning a destitute and war1torn nation after the last *o&iet soldier crossed the Terme5 bridge. 3hile nearly all the #lliance go&ernments appreciate the importance of the #fghanistan mission 0uropean public support for it is weak. Many 0uropeans <uestion the rele&ance of our actions and doubt whether the mission is worth the

li&es of their sons and daughters. #s a result many want to remo&e their troops. The reality of fragile coalition go&ernments makes it difficult to take risks. #nd communicating the seriousness of the threat posed by Islamic e?tremism in #fghanistan the Middle 0ast 0urope and globally remains a steep challenge. #s opinion leaders and go&ernment officials we are the ones who must make the case publicly and persistently. *o now I would like to add my &oice to those of many allied leaders and speak directly to the people of 0urope' The threat posed by &iolent Islamic e?tremism is real % and it is not going away. Fou know all too well about the attacks in Madrid and (ondon. ,ut there ha&e also been multiple smaller attacks in Istanbul #msterdam -aris and Dlasgow among others. "umerous cells and plots ha&e been disrupted in recent years as well % many of them seeking large1scale death and destruction such as'

# comple? plot to down multiple airliners o&er the #tlantic that could ha&e killed hundreds or e&en thousands; # plot to use ricin and release cyanide in the (ondon )nderground; # separate plan for a chemical attack in the -aris metro; -lots in ,elgium 0ngland and Dermany in&ol&ing car bombs that could ha&e killed hundreds; Aomemade bombs targeting commuter and high1speed trains in *pain and Dermany; Indi&iduals arrested in ,osnia with e?plosi&es a suicide belt and an instructional propaganda &ideo; Two plots in +enmark in&ol&ing e?plosi&es fertili5er and a bomb1making &ideo; and Eust in the last few weeks *panish authorities arrested 1C Islamic e?tremists in ,arcelona suspected of planning suicide attacks against public transport systems in *pain -ortugal /rance Dermany and ,ritain. Imagine for a moment if some or all of these attacks had come to pass. Imagine if Islamic terrorists had managed to strike your capitals on the same scale as they struck in "ew Fork. Imagine if they had laid their hands on weapons and materials with e&en greater destructi&e capability % weapons of the sort all too easily accessible in the world today. 3e forget at our peril that the ambition of Islamic e?tremists is limited only by opportunity. 3e should also remember that terrorist cells in 0urope are not purely homegrown or unconnected to e&ents far away % or simply a matter of domestic law and order. *ome are funded from abroad. *ome hate all western democracies not >ust the )nited *tates. Many who ha&e been arrested ha&e had direct connections to #l 7aeda. *ome ha&e met with top leaders or attended training camps abroad. *ome are connected to #l 7aeda in Ira<. In the most recent case the ,arcelona cell appears to ha&e ties to a terrorist training network run by ,aitullah Mehsud a -akistan1based e?tremist commander affiliated with the Taliban and #l 7aeda % who we belie&e was responsible for the assassination of ,ena5ir ,hutto.

3hat unites them is that they are all followers of the same mo&ement % a mo&ement that is no longer tethered to any strict hierarchy but one that has become an independent force of its own. 2apable of animating a corps of de&oted followers without direct contact. #nd capable of inspiring &iolence without direct orders. It is an ideological mo&ement that has o&er the years been methodically built on the illusion of success. #fter all about the only thing they ha&e accomplished recently is the death of thousands of innocent Muslims while trying to create discord across the Middle 0ast. *o far they ha&e failed. ,ut they ha&e twisted this reality into an aura of success in many parts of the world. It raises the <uestion' 3hat would happen if the false success they proclaim became real successG If they triumphed in Ira< or #fghanistan or managed to topple the go&ernment of -akistanG $r a ma>or Middle 0astern go&ernmentG #side from the chaos that would instantly be sown in the region success there would beget success on many other fronts as the cancer metastasi5ed further and more rapidly than it already has. Many more followers could >oin their ranks both in the region and in susceptible populations across the globe. 3ith safe ha&ens in the Middle 0ast and new tactics honed on the battlefield and transmitted &ia the Internet &iolence and terrorism worldwide could surge. I am not indulging in scare tactics. "or am I e?aggerating either the threat or inflating the conse<uences of a &ictory for e?tremists. "or am I saying that the e?tremists are ten feet tall. The task before us is to fracture and destroy this mo&ement in its infancy % to permanently reduce its ability to strike globally and catastrophically while deflating its ideology. $ur best opportunity as an alliance to do this is in #fghanistan. Eust as the hollowness of 2ommunism was laid bare with the collapse of the *o&iet )nion so too would success in #fghanistan as well as in Ira< strike a decisi&e blow against what some commentators ha&e called #l 7aeda1ism. This is a steep challenge. ,ut the e&ents of the last year ha&e pro&en one thing abo&e all else' If we are willing to stand together we can pre&ail. It will not be <uick and it will not be easy % but it can be done. In the years ahead the credibility of "#T$ and indeed the &iability of the 0uro1 #tlantic security pro>ect itself will depend on how we perform now. $ther actors in the global arena % Ae5bollah Iran and others % are watching what we say and what we do and making choices about their future course. 0&eryone knows that in 2004 the )nited *tates will ha&e a new administration. #nd this time ne?t year you will be hearing from a new *ecretary of +efense. ,ut regardless of which party is in power regardless who stands at this podium the threats we face now and in the future are real. They will not go away. $&ercoming them will re<uire unity between opposition parties and across &arious go&ernments and uncommon purpose within the #lliance and with other friends and partners. I began my remarks with a bit of history about "#T$ in the 1440s. I would like to close with a few words about the dawn of the transatlantic #lliance.

/rom our present1day &antage point &ictory in the 2old 3ar now seems almost preordained. ,ut as we prepare to celebrate "#T$@s H0th anni&ersary ne?t year it is useful to recall that H0 years ago in 14C8 the year of the ,erlin airlift few people would ha&e been all that optimistic about the future of 0urope or the prospect of a 3estern alliance. The 2ontinent was de&astated its economy in shambles. The )nited *tates was debating the 0uropean reco&ery program % known as the Marshall -lan % and faced a resurgent isolationism. 0urope was under siege % with pressure from communism being felt in Dermany /rance /inland "orway Italy 25echoslo&akia and Dreece. In Eanuary of that year 0rnest ,e&in the ,ritish foreign secretary went before parliament to discuss the *o&iet )nion and other threats to the )nited Iingdom. ,etween all the 9kindred souls of the 3est : he said 9there should be an effecti&e understanding bound together by common ideals for which the 3estern -owers ha&e twice in one generation shed their blood.: (ess than two months later -resident Aarry Truman stood in the )nited *tates 2ongress and echoed that sentiment. Ae said' 9The time has come when the free men and women of the world must face the threat to their liberty s<uarely and courageously . . . )nity of purpose unity of effort and unity of spirit are essential to accomplish the task before us.: That unity held for decades through ups and downs. It held despite di&isions and discord stresses and strains and through se&eral crises where another ma>or war in 0urope loomed large. #le?is de Toc<ue&ille once warned that democracies when it came to foreign affairs were ill1suited to pursue a 67)$T08 9great undertaking: and 9follow it 6through8 with determination.: ,ut the democracies of the 3est did >ust that % for more than C0 years. #nd they can do so once more today. 3e must find the resol&e to confront together a new set of challenges. *o that many years from now our children and their children will look back on this period as a time when we recommitted oursel&es to the common ideals that bind us together. # time when we again faced a threat to peace and to our liberty s<uarely and courageously. # time when we again shed blood and helped war de&astated people nourish the seeds of freedom and foster peaceful producti&e societies. That mission drew us together in 14C8 and keeps us together today. Many years from now perhaps future generations will look back on this period and say 9&ictory seemed almost preordained.: Thank you.