Axel Honneth (1992)

Crime and Ethical Life: Hegels Intersubjectivist Innovation

Source: Chapter 2 of The Struggle for Recognition; Published: Polity Press 199!; "ranslated: by #oel Anderson$

%y the ti&e He'el too( up the &odel of social stru''le that )achia*elli and Hobbes had each independently i&ple&ented the theoretical context +as entirely chan'ed$ ,n his 1-.2 essay on /"he Scientific 0ay of "reatin' 1atural 2a+3 in +hich he outlined a plan for his future +or(s on practical and political philosophy the hundred years of intellectual de*elop&ent that separate hi& fro& Hobbes are already expressed in a shift to a co&pletely different set of 4uestions$ 5nder the influence of H6lderlin3s philosophy of unification 7Vereinigungsphilosophie8 he had co&e to 4uestion the indi*idualistic presuppositions of 9ant3s &oral theory a theory +hich had deter&ined the hori:on of his thin(in' until +ell into his years in ;ran(furt$ At the sa&e ti&e his readin' of Plato and Aristotle had fa&iliari:ed hi& +ith a current +ithin political philosophy that ascribed a &uch 'reater role to the intersub<ecti*ity of public life than did co&parable approaches of his ti&e$ And finally as a result of his study of %ritish political econo&y he had also already co&e to the soberin' insi'ht that any future or'ani:ation of society +ould ine*itably ha*e to rely on a sphere of &ar(et=&ediated production and distribution in +hich sub<ects could only be included in society on the basis of the ne'ati*e freedo& 'uaranteed by for&al ri'hts$ %y the start of the century these ne+ly ac4uired i&pressions and orientations had 'radually &atured +ithin He'el3s thou'ht into the con*iction that for the foundation of a philosophical science of society it +ould first be necessary to brea( the 'rip that ato&istic &isconceptions had on the +hole tradition of &ode& natural la+$ "his raised in a funda&ental +ay a nu&ber of theoretical proble&s for +hich the lon' essay on natural la+ su''ests a first approach to a solution$ >espite all the differences bet+een the t+o conceptions of &ode& natural la+ that he distin'uishes in his text He'el sees the& as &ar(ed by the sa&e funda&ental error$ %oth the /e&pirical3 and /for&al3 treat&ents of natural la+ cate'orically presuppose the /bein' of the indi*idual3 to be /the pri&ary and the supre&e thin'3$ ,n this context He'el labels all those approaches to natural la+ /e&pirical3 that start out fro& a fictitious or anthropolo'ical characteri:ation of hu&an nature and then on the basis of this and +ith the help of further assu&ptions propose a rational or'ani:ation of collecti*e life +ithin society$ "he ato&istic pre&ises of theories of this type are reflected in the fact that they al+ays concei*e of the purportedly /natural3 for& of hu&an beha*iour exclusi*ely as the

isolated acts of solitary indi*iduals to +hich for&s of co&&unity=for&ation &ust then be added as a further thou'ht as if externally$ "he approaches +ithin the natural la+ tradition that He'el ter&s /for&al3 proceed in principle no differently since instead of startin' fro& a characteri:ation of hu&an nature they start fro& a transcendental concept of practical reason$ ,n such theories represented abo*e all by 9ant and ;ichte the ato&istic pre&ises are e*ident in the fact that ethical acts cannot be thou'ht of except as resultin' fro& the exercise of reason purified of all of the e&pirical inclinations and needs of hu&an nature$ Here too hu&an nature is understood as an a''re'ate of e'ocentric (or as He'el puts it /unethical?) dri*es +hich sub<ects &ust first learn to suppress before they can attain ethical attitudes that is attitudes conduci*e to co&&unity$ "hus both approaches re&ain trapped +ithin the basic concepts of an ato&is& that presupposes as so&ethin' li(e a natural basis for hu&an sociali:ation the existence of sub<ects +ho are isolated fro& each other$ A condition of ethical unification a&on' people can ho+e*er no lon'er be seen as de*elopin' or'anically out of this fact of nature but has to be added externally as /so&ethin' other and alien3$ "he conse4uence of this accordin' to He'el is that +ithin &ode& natural la+ a /co&&unity of hu&an bein's3 can only be conceptuali:ed on the abstract &odel of a /unified &any3 that is as a cluster of sin'le sub<ects and thus not on the &odel of an ethical unity$ %ut +hat concerned He'el in his political philosophy +as the possibility of theoretically explicatin' <ust such an ethical totality$ As far bac( as the period in +hich to'ether +ith Schellin' and H6derlin he dre+ up the pro'ra&&atic text that has 'one do+n in intellectual history as /"he @arliest Syste&atic Pro'ra&&e of Aer&an ,dealis&3 one can find in He'el3s thou'ht the idea that a reconciled society could be properly understood only as an ethically inte'rated co&&unity of free citi:ens$ ,n the &eanti&e of course this intuition of his youth had out'ro+n the aesthetic fra&e+or( +ithin +hich it had ori'inated and as a result of his confrontation +ith the Classical doctrine of the state had found in the polis a political and institutional &odel$ ,n the essay on natural la+ +hene*er He'el spea(s in a nor&ati*e sense of the ethical totality of a society he has in &ind the relations +ithin the city=states of anti4uity$ 0hat he ad&ires about the& is the ro&antically transfi'ured circu&stance that in publicly practised custo&s &e&bers of the co&&unity could also +itness the intersub<ecti*e expression of their o+n particularity$ And do+n to the details of the account of the @states his text reproduces the theory in +hich Plato and Aristotle had presented the institutional constitution of those city=states$ Already at this point ho+e*er He'el distils fro& the concrete ideal that he enthusiastically belie*ed he had found in the idea of the polis the 'eneral features of an ideal co&&unity$ ,ndeed he does this so clearly that one 'ains at least a rou'h sense of the conception of ethical totality that he e&ploys in the text$ ;irst the sin'ularity of such a society could be seen by analo'y +ith an or'anis& in the /li*ely unity3 of /uni*ersal and indi*idual freedo&3$ 0hat this &eans is that public life +ould ha*e to be re'arded not as the result of the &utual restriction of pri*ate spheres of liberty but rather the other +ay around na&ely as the opportunity for the fulfil&ent of e*ery sin'le indi*idual3s freedo&$ Second He'el *ie+s the &ores and custo&s that co&e to be e&ployed co&&unicati*ely +ithin a social co&&unity as the social &ediu& throu'h +hich the

inte'ration of uni*ersal and indi*idual freedo& is to occur$ He chose the concept /Sitte 7?&ores3 or /custo&s?8 4uite intentionally in order to be able to &a(e clear that neither la+s prescribed by the state nor the &oral con*ictions of isolated sub<ects but only attitudes that are actually acted out intersub<ecti*ely can pro*ide a sound basis for the exercise of that extended freedo&$ ;or this reason the public /syste& of le'islation3 is al+ays intended to express only the /li*in' custo&s3 actually /present in the nation3 as the text has it$B "hird and lastly He'el ta(es a decisi*e step beyond Plato and Aristotle by includin' +ithin the institutional or'ani:ation of absolute ethical life a sphere that he pro*isionally labels /the syste& of property and la+3$ "his is lin(ed to the intent to sho+ that indi*iduals3 &ar(et=&ediated acti*ities and interests C 0hich later co&e to be 'athered under the title /ci*il society3 C co&prise a /ne'ati*e3 thou'h still constituti*e /:one3 of the /ethical3 7sittlich8 +hole$ A further exa&ple in the text of He'el3s atte&pt to render his societal ideal realistic can be found in his departure fro& the Classical doctrine of the state throu'h the initial introduction of the unfree @state as a class of producin' and tradin' citi:ens$ ,nsofar as the fore'oin' discussion ade4uately describes the fra&e+or( +ithin +hich He'el atte&pted in #ena to reappropriate the societal ideal of his youth it also outlined the &ain proble& that +ill confront hi& fro& no+ on$ ,f indeed it turned out that &ode& social philosophy is not in a position to account for such a hi'her=le*el for& of social co&&unity o+in' to the fact that it re&ains trapped +ithin ato&istic pre&ises then the first i&plication of this for political theory is that a ne+ and different syste& of basic concepts &ust be de*eloped$ He'el thus faces the 4uestion of +hat these cate'orial tools &ust be li(e if they are to &a(e it possible to explain philosophically the de*elop&ent of an or'ani:ation of society +hose ethical cohesion +ould lie in a for& of solidarity based on the reco'nition of the indi*idual freedo& of all citi:ens$ >urin' the #ena years He'el3s +or( in political philosophy +as directed to+ards findin' a solution to the syste&atic proble&s that this 4uestion 'enerates$ "he *arious proposals that he de*eloped +ithin the context of the e&er'in' syste& of the lo'ic of the hu&an spirit ha*e their co&&on roots in this enterprise and they all refer bac( to it$ ,n his essay on the different theories of natural la+ ho+e*er He'el has not yet de*eloped a solution to this proble& but he has already &ar(ed out the rou'h contours of the route by +hich he +ill reach it$ His first step in atte&ptin' to 'i*e the philosophical science of society a ne+ foundation is to replace ato&istic basic concepts +ith cate'ories that are 'eared to the social nexus bet+een sub<ects$ ,n a no+ fa&ous passa'e He'el 4uotes Aristotle as follo+s: /"he nation 7Volk8 co&es by nature before the indi*idual$ ,f the indi*idual in isolation is not anythin' self=sufficient he &ust be related to the +hole nation in one unity <ust as other parts are to their +hole3$ ,n the context in +hich this 4uotation occurs He'el &erely +ants to say that e*ery philosophical theory of society &ust proceed not fro& the acts of isolated sub<ects but rather fro& the fra&e+or( of ethical bonds +ithin +hich sub<ects al+ays already &o*e$ "hus contrary to ato&istic theories of society one is to assu&e as a (ind of natural basis for hu&an sociali:ation a situation in +hich ele&entary for&s of intersub<ecti*e coexistence are al+ays present$ ,n so doin' He'el is 4uite clearly ta(in' his lead fro& the Aristotelian notion that there is

inherent in hu&an nature a substratu& of lin(s to co&&unity lin(s that fully unfold only in the context of the polis$ 0hat is crucial for e*erythin' that follo+s ho+e*er is the second step in +hich He'el has to sho+ ho+ he can explain the transition fro& such a state of /natural ethical life3 to the for& of societal or'ani:ation that he pre*iously defined as a relationship of ethical totality$ in the theories of natural la+ critici:ed by He'el the theoretical position thus delineated is occupied either by the &odel of an ori'inal social contract or by *arious assu&ptions about the ci*ili:in' effects of practical reason$ "hey are each supposed to explain ho+ the o*erco&in' of hu&an /nature3 can brin' about an orderly condition of collecti*e social life$ %ut for He'el there is no need to appeal to such external hypotheses for the si&ple reason that he has already presupposed the existence of intersub<ecti*e obli'ations as a 4uasi=natural precondition for e*ery process of hu&an sociali:ation$ 0hat he has to explain then is not the 'enesis of &echanis&s of co&&unity=for&ation in 'eneral but rather the reor'ani:ation and expansion of e&bryonic for&s of co&&unity into &ore enco&passin' relations of social interaction$ ,n order to address the issue this raises He'el be'ins by appealin' once a'ain to Aristotelian ontolo'y fro& +hich he borro+s the$ idea that this transition &ust ha*e the for& of a teleolo'ical process in +hich an ori'inal substance 'radually reaches its full de*elop&ent$ At the sa&e ti&e ho+e*er he e&phasi:es so decisi*ely the ne'ati*e a'onistic character of this teleolo'ical process that one can easily detect in his reflections the basic thou'ht that he +or(s out +ith the help of the concept of reco'nition in repeated proposals in the subse4uent years$ He'el sets out to conceptuali:e the path by +hich /ethical nature attains its true ri'ht3 as a process of recurrin' ne'ations by +hich the ethical relations of society are to be successi*ely freed fro& their re&ainin' one= sidedness and particularities$ As he puts it the /existence of difference3 is +hat allo+s ethical life to &o*e beyond its natural initial sta'e and in a series of rectifications of destroyed e4uilibria ulti&ately leads to a unity of the uni*ersal and the particular$ Put positi*ely this &eans that the history of hu&an spirit is to be understood as a conflictual process in +hich the /&oral3 potential inherent in natural ethical life (as so&ethin' /enclosed and not yet unfolded?) is 'radually 'enerali:ed$ ,n the sa&e passa'e He'el spea(s of the /buddin' of ethical life3 as /the e&er'in' pro'ressi*e supersession of the ne'ati*e or sub<ecti*e3$ 0hat re&ains co&pletely unclear +ith re'ard to this basic conception ho+e*er is +hat these unde*eloped potentials of ethical life &ust be li(e if they are to be already inherent as an existin' difference in the initial structures of social +ays of life$ And left e4ually open in the text is the 4uestion of the proposed shape of this process of recurrin' ne'ations by +hich these sa&e ethical potentials could de*elop in the direction of uni*ersal *alidity$ ;or He'el the solution to these t+o proble&s is further co&plicated by the need to describe the nor&ati*e content of the first sta'e of sociali:ation in such a +ay that a process can arise in*ol*in' both a 'ro+th of co&&unity ties and at the sa&e ti&e an increase in indi*idual freedo&$ ;or only if the +orld=historical course of the /buddin' of ethical life3 can be concei*ed as an interpenetration of sociali:ation and indi*iduation can

one assu&e that the or'anic coherence of the resultin' for& of society lies in the intersub<ecti*e reco'nition of the particularity of all indi*iduals$ ,n the early #ena years ho+e*er He'el does not yet ha*e the suitable &eans for sol*in' the proble&s 'enerated by this difficult tas($ He is able to find a satisfactory ans+er only after in the course of reinterpretin' ;ichte3s theory of reco'nition he has also 'i*en the Hobbesian concept of stru''le a ne+ &eanin'$ ,n the be'innin' of his #ena period <ust as pre*iously in ;ran(furt He'el al+ays referred to ;ichte only critically$ As +e ha*e seen He'el considered hi& to be the central representati*e of the /for&al3 approach +ithin the natural la+ tradition +hich +as unable to pro*ide a theoretical account of a /'enuinely free co&&unity of li*in' relations3$ %ut in the System of Ethical Life +ritten in 1-.2 i&&ediately after the co&pletion of the natural la+ essay C He'el treats ;ichte3s theory positi*ely dra+in' on it in order better to describe the internal structure of those for&s of ethical relations that he +ished to presuppose as a funda&ental /first3 of hu&an sociali:ation$ ,n his essay /"he ;oundations of 1atural 2a+3 ;ichte had concei*ed of reco'nition as the /reciprocal effect3 7Wechselwirkung8 bet+een indi*iduals that underlies le'al relations: by both &utually re4uirin' one another to act freely and li&itin' their o+n sphere of action to the other3s ad*anta'e sub<ects for& a co&&on consciousness +hich then attains ob<ecti*e *alidity in le'al relations$ He'el first re&o*es the transcendental i&plications fro& ;ichte3s &odel and then applies it directly to *arious different for&s of reciprocal action a&on' indi*iduals$ He thus pro<ects onto the intersub<ecti*e process of &utual reco'nition co&&unicati*e for&s of life +hich he had heretofore described follo+in' Aristotle &erely as *arious for&s of ethical life$ He no+ sees a society3s ethical relations as representin' for&s of practical intersub<ecti*ity in +hich the &o*e&ent of reco'nition 'uarantees the co&ple&entary a'ree&ent and thus the necessary &utuality of opposed sub<ects$ "he structure of any of these relationships of &utual reco'nition is al+ays the sa&e for He'el: to the de'ree that a sub<ect (no+s itself to be reco'ni:ed by another sub<ect +ith re'ard to certain of its 7the sub<ect3s8 abilities and 4ualities and is thereby reconciled +ith the other a sub<ect al+ays also co&es to (no+ its o+n distincti*e identity and thereby co&es to be opposed once a'ain to the other as so&ethin' particular$ %ut in this lo'ic of the reco'nition relationship He'el also detects an i&plicit inner dyna&ic +hich allo+s hi& to ta(e a second step beyond ;ichte3s initial &odel$ Since +ithin the fra&e+or( of an ethically established relationship of &utual reco'nition sub<ects are al+ays learnin' so&ethin' &ore about their particular identity and since in each case it is a ne+ di&ension of their sel*es that they see confir&ed thereby they &ust once a'ain lea*e by &eans of conflict the sta'e of ethical life they ha*e reached in order to achie*e the reco'nition of a &ore de&andin' for& of their indi*iduality$ ,n this sense the &o*e&ent of reco'nition that for&s the basis of an ethical relationship bet+een sub<ects consists in a process of alternatin' sta'es of both reconciliation and conflict$ ,t is not hard to see that He'el thereby infuses the Aristotelian concept of an ethical for& of life +ith a &oral potential that no lon'er arises &erely out of the funda&ental nature of hu&an bein's but rather out of a particular (ind of relationship bet+een the&$ "hus the coordinates of his political philosophy shift fro& a teleolo'ical concept of nature to a concept of the social in +hich an internal tension is contained constituti*ely$

%y thus usin' a theory of conflict to &a(e ;ichte3s &odel of reco'nition &ore dyna&ic He'el 'ains not only the possibility of pro*idin' a first deter&ination of the inner potential of hu&an ethical life but also the opportunity to &a(e its /ne'ati*e3 course of de*elop&ent &ore concrete$ "he path that ta(es hi& there consists in a reinterpretation of the &odel of an ori'inal stru''le of all a'ainst all +ith +hich "ho&as Hobbes (dra+in' on )achia*elli) had opened the history of &odern social philosophy$ ,f the reason +hy sub<ects ha*e to &o*e out of ethical relationships in +hich they find the&sel*es is that they belie*e their particular identity to be insufficiently reco'ni:ed then the resultin' stru''le cannot be a confrontation purely o*er self=preser*ation$ Dather the conflict that brea(s out bet+een sub<ects represents fro& the outset so&ethin' ethical insofar as it is directed to+ards the intersub<ecti*e reco'nition of di&ensions of hu&an indi*iduality$ ,t is not the case therefore that a contract a&on' indi*iduals puts an end to the precarious state of a stru''le for sur*i*al of all a'ainst all$ Dather in*ersely this stru''le leads as a &oral &ediu& fro& an underde*eloped state of ethical life to a &ore &ature le*el of ethical relations$ 0ith this reinterpretation of the Hobbesian &odel He'el introduces a *irtually epoch=&a(in' Efe+ *ersion of the conception of social stru''le accordin' to +hich practical conflict bet+een sub<ects can be understood as an ethical &o&ent in a &o*e&ent occurrin' +ithin a collecti*e social life$ "his ne+ly created conception of the social thereby includes fro& the start not only a field of &oral tensions but also the social &ediu& by +hich they are settled throu'h conflict$ ,t is only in the #ena +ritin's ho+e*er that the basic theoretical idea resultin' fro& this inno*ati*e couplin' of Hobbesian and ;ichtean the&es 'radually ta(es shape$ ,n the System of Ethical Life, the first in this series of +ritin's this ne+ly ac4uired &odel first beco&es e*ident in the construction of the ar'u&ent +hich represents as it +ere a &irror i&a'e of the &odel of the state in Leviathan ,nstead of startin' fro& a stru''le of all a'ainst all He'el be'ins his philosophical account +ith ele&entary for&s of interpersonal reco'nition +hich he presents collecti*ely under the headin' /natural ethical life3$ And it is not until these initial relations of reco'nition are in<ured by *arious (inds of stru''le C 'rouped to'ether as an inter&ediate sta'e of /cri&e3 C that a state of social inte'ration e&er'es that can be conceptuali:ed for&ally as an or'anic relationship of pure ethical life$ ;or &ethodolo'ical reasons He'el atte&pted (follo+in' Schellin') to 'i*e his text a *ery sche&atic for& of presentation$ %ut if subse4uently one peels this for& a+ay fro& the substance of the ar'u&ent the indi*idual steps of a social=theoretical &odel beco&e clearly *isible$ He'el initially describes the process by +hich the first social relations are established in ter&s of the release of sub<ects fro& their natural deter&inations$ "his 'ro+th of /indi*iduality3 occurs in t+o sta'es of &utual reco'nition +hich differ fro& each other in the di&ensions of personal identity that recei*e practical confir&ation$ ,n the relationship bet+een /parents and children3 +hich represents /the uni*ersal reciprocal action and for&ati*e education of hu&an bein's3 sub<ects reco'ni:e each other reciprocally as li*in' e&otionally needy bein's$ Here the co&ponent of indi*idual personality reco'ni:ed by others is /practical feelin'3 that is the dependence of indi*iduals on *itally essential care and 'oods$ "he /labour3 of raisin' children +hich for He'el constitutes the inner deter&ination of the fa&ily is directed to+ards the for&ation

of the child3s /inner ne'ati*ity3 and independence so that as a result /the unification of feelin'3 &ust be /superseded3$ He'el then follo+s this (no+ superseded) for& of reco'nition +ith a second sta'e still under the headin' /natural ethical life3 of contractually re'ulated relations of exchan'e a&on' property o+ners$ "he path leadin' to this ne+ social relationship is described as a process of le'al uni*ersali:ation$ "he practical relations to the +orld that sub<ects had in the first sta'e are then +renched fro& their &erely particular conditions of *alidity and transfor&ed into uni*ersal contractually established le'al clai&s$ ;ro& no+ on sub<ects &utually reco'ni:e each other as bearers of le'iti&ate clai&s to possession thereby constitutin' each other as property o+ners$ ,n the act of exchan'e they relate to each other as /persons3 +ho are accorded the /for&al3 ri'ht to respond to all offered transactions +ith /yes3 or /no3$ "o this extent the reco'nition that sin'le indi*iduals recei*e here in the for& of a le'al title represents the ne'ati*ely deter&ined freedo& /to be the opposite of oneself +ith respect to so&e specific characteristic3$ "he for&ulations +ith +hich He'el chooses to portray this second sta'e suffice to &a(e clear +hy he considered this still to be a /natural3 for& of ethical life as +ell$ "he establish&ent of le'al relations actually creates a social situation that is itself still &ar(ed by the /principle of sin'ularity3 fro& +hich only relations of absolute ethical life are co&pletely free$ ;or in a type of societal or'ani:ation characteri:ed by le'al for&s of reco'nition sub<ects are constituti*ely inte'rated only *ia ne'ati*e liberties that is &erely on the basis of their ability to ne'ate social offers$ %y this point of course the sociali:in' &o*e&ent of reco'nition has already bro(en throu'h the particularistic constraints placed on it in the first sta'e by affecti*e fa&ily ties$ %ut initially pro'ress in social uni*ersali:ation is paid for +ith an e&ptyin' and for&ali:in' of the aspects of the indi*idual sub<ect that recei*e intersub<ecti*e confir&ation$ 0ithin society the indi*idual is not yet as He'el says posited as a /totality3 and thus not yet as a /+hole that reconstructs itself out of difference3$ 0hat sets the System of Ethical Life apart is the fact that He'el counterposes the t+o /natural3 for&s of reco'nition (as a +hole) to *arious (inds of stru''le +hich he su&&ari:es in a separate chapter$ 0hereas the social=philosophical proposals of the follo+in' years are constructed in such a +ay that the stru''le for reco'nition leads fro& one sta'e of ethical life to the next here there is only one sin'le sta'e of *arious different stru''les bet+een the t+o sta'es of ele&entary and absolute ethical life$ ,t is difficult to see +hat theoretical reasons &ay ha*e &o*ed He'el to this uncon*entional &odel a &odel that is not particularly plausible either in ter&s of social history or of de*elop&ental lo'ic$ ,n part of course these reasons are 'enerated by the &ethodolo'ical restrictions that acco&pany the sche&atic application of Schellin'3s episte&olo'y$ %ut they are also in part the result of the direct opposition to Hobbes +hich &ay ha*e pro*o(ed hi& to depict the /natural3 state of conflict=free ethical life in a unified &anner$ ,n any case He'el does not yet use his &odel of stru''le here to theori:e the transition bet+een the indi*idual sta'es already distin'uished +ithin the &o*e&ent of reco'nition$ Dather he follo+s the& +ith a sin'le sta'e of different stru''les +hose collecti*e effect consists in continually interruptin' already established processes of &utual reco'nition +ith ne+ conflicts$ 0hat pri&arily interests He'el is the internal

course of the stru''le resultin' fro& these disruptions of social life and his analysis of this is based on interpretatin' acts of destruction as expressions of /cri&e3$ ;or He'el the *arious acts of destruction that he distin'uishes in his inter&ediate chapter represent different for&s of cri&e$ He connects cri&inal acts +ith the pre*ious sta'e of ethical life by characteri:in' each type as a for& of the ne'ati*e exercise of abstract freedo& specifically the abstract freedo& that sub<ects had already been 'ranted in <uridified relations of reco'nition$ "he clai& that the for& of la+ on the one hand and cri&inal acts on the other are dependent on each other beco&es theoretically co&prehensible once one also ta(es into account the conception of /cri&e3 already contained in He'el3s early theolo'ical +ritin's$ "here he had concei*ed of cri&inal acts as actions that are tied to the social precondition of le'al relations in the sense that they ste& directly fro& the indeter&inacy of a for& of indi*idual freedo& that is &erely le'al$ ,n a cri&inal act sub<ects &a(e destructi*e use of the fact that as the bearer of ri'hts to liberty they are inte'rated only ne'ati*ely into the collecti*e life of society$ ,n the context of the ne+ text ho+e*er He'el &ade no further use of the other side of the theoretical deter&inations that he had de*eloped in his earlier +ritin's for characteri:in' cri&e$ @xcluded here is the &oti*ational consideration that the act of a cri&inal represents so&ethin' li(e a reaction=for&ation *is=A=*is the abstractness and one= sidedness structurally inherent in le'al relations as such$ F+in' to the lac( of this affir&ati*e co&ponent the System of Ethical Life lea*es unans+ered the 4uestion as to +hich &oti*es pro*ide the i&pulse for cri&inal acts$ "here are only a fe+ places in the ar'u&ent +here one can find co&&ents su''estin' an ans+er alon' the ori'inal lines$ /1atural annihilation3 for instance is said to be directed a'ainst the /abstraction of the cultured3 and He'el spea(s else+here of cri&e in 'eneral as an /opposition to opposition3$ ,f one pulls such for&ulations to'ether and connects the& +ith the older conception one be'ins to suspect that He'el traces the e&er'ence of cri&e to conditions of inco&plete reco'nition$ "he cri&inal3s inner &oti*e then consists in the experience of not bein' reco'ni:ed at the established sta'e of &utual reco'nition in a satisfactory +ay$ "his far=reachin' theory is further supported by the fact that it enables one to decipher the lo'ic upon +hich He'el based his account of the different species of cri&e$ "he order in +hich he presents the indi*idual types of destructi*e beha*iour &a(es sense +hen one (eeps in &ind that the point of the enterprise lies in tracin' cri&e bac( to inco&plete for&s of reco'nition$ He'el introduces into his account the idea of a still fully pointless act of destruction$ ,n acts of /natural de*astation3 or /annihilation3 as he calls the& indi*iduals react ai&lessly to the experience of the /abstraction3 of already established ethical life$ ,t is unclear +hether this is to be ta(en as &eanin' that ele&entary for&s of disrespect here constitute the occasion for destructi*e acts$ )oreo*er such acts of blind destruction are in He'el3s sense not really cri&es at all since they lac( the social precondition of le'ally reco'ni:ed freedo&$ ,n the stricter sense cri&e only e&er'es +ith the (ind of ne'ati*e action that He'el introduces in the second sta'e$ ,n robbin' another person a sub<ect +ilfully *iolates the uni*ersal for& of reco'nition that had already de*eloped +ith the establish&ent of le'al relations$ Althou'h He'el refuses to say anythin' about the &oti*es for this type of

destructi*e act the context of his ar'u&ent su''ests that they &ay lie in the experience of abstract le'al reco'nition itself$ "his is supported not only by the acti*ist character of for&ulations in +hich He'el spea(s of the /in<ury to the la+3 as +ell as of the /'oal of robbin'3 B but also by his portrayal of the pro'ression of the conflict situation that e&er'es +ith the act of predatory cri&e$ "he cri&e of robbery initially only restricts a sub<ect in its ri'ht to its o+n property$ %ut at the sa&e ti&e the sub<ect is also attac(ed in such a +ay that it is in<ured in its entirety as a /person3 as He'el puts it$ Since +e are still operatin' here at the sta'e of natural ethical life C +here the abstractness of la+ /does not yet ha*e its reality and support in so&ethin' itself uni*ersal3 and thus lac(s the executi*e po+er found in state authority C e*ery sub<ect &ust defend its ri'hts by itself and hence each sub<ect3s entire identity is threatened by theft$ "he affected sub<ect3s only appropriate response to this in<ury to its o+n person is to defend itself acti*ely a'ainst its assailant$ "his /repercussion3 of the cri&e for its perpetrator C in the for& of the in<ured person3s resistance C is the first se4uence of actions that He'el explicitly calls a /stru''le3$ 0hat e&er'es is a stru''le of /person3 a'ainst person3 that is bet+een t+o ri'hts=bearin' sub<ects a stru''le for the reco'nition of each party3s different clai&: on the one hand the conflict='eneratin' clai& to the unrestricted de*elop&ent of that sub<ect3s sub<ecti*ity; on the other hand the reacti*e clai& to social respect for property ri'hts$ He'el considers the outco&e of the stru''le unleashed by the collision of these t+o clai&s to be a fore'one conclusion in that only one of the t+o di*ided parties can refer the threat unconditionally bac( to itself as a personality because only the in<ured sub<ect stru''les in resistin' for the inte'rity of its +hole person +hereas the cri&inal is actually &erely tryin' to acco&plish so&ethin' in his or her o+n particular interest$ "herefore as He'el 4uic(ly concludes it is the first attac(ed sub<ect that /&ust 'ain the upper hand3 in the stru''le because it /&a(es this personal in<ury a &atter of its entire personality3$ He'el follo+s this social conflict +hich starts +ith a theft and ends +ith the /coercion3 of the cri&inal +ith a third and final sta'e of ne'ation na&ely the stru''le for honour$ 0ith re'ard to its startin' conditions alone this case of conflict represents the &ost de&andin' for& of intersub<ecti*e dire&ption 7Ent!weiung8$ "his conflict is based not on a *iolation of an indi*idual assertion of ri'hts but rather on a *iolation of the inte'rity of the person as a +hole$ Ad&ittedly He'el once a'ain lea*es the particular &oti*es behind this conflict='eneratin' cri&e indeter&inate here$ "he reasons in each case +hy a person sets about destroyin' the fra&e+or( of an existin' relationship of reco'nition by in<urin' or insultin' the inte'rity of another sub<ect re&ain unclear$ At this point ho+e*er the reference to a totality is presupposed for both participants in the conflict in the sense that each is fi'htin' for the /entirety3 of his or her indi*idual existence$ "his can be understood to &ean that the intention behind the cri&inal3s insultin' act is to de&onstrate one3s o+n inte'rity publicly and thereby &a(e an appeal for the reco'nition of that inte'rity but then the cri&inal3s insultin' act +ould for its part ha*e its roots in a prior experience of bein' insufficiently reco'ni:ed as an indi*iduated personality$ ,n any case the t+o opposin' parties in the e&er'in' conflict both ha*e the sa&e 'oal na&ely to pro*ide e*idence for the /inte'rity3 of his or her o+n person$ ;ollo+in' the

usa'e of his day He'el traces this &utually pursued intention bac( to a need for /honour3$ "his is initially to be understood as a type of attitude to+ards oneself as it is phrased in the text throu'h +hich /the sin'ular detail beco&es so&ethin' personal and +hole3$3 /Honour3 then is the stance 1 ta(e to+ards &yself +hen 1 identify positi*ely +ith all &y traits and peculiarities$ Apparently then the only reason that a stru''le for /honour3 +ould occur is because the possibility of such an affir&ati*e relation=to=self is dependent for its part on the confir&in' reco'nition of other sub<ects$ ,ndi*iduals can only identify co&pletely +ith the&sel*es to the de'ree to +hich their peculiarities and traits &eet +ith the appro*al and support of their partners to interaction$ /Honour3 is thus used to characteri:e an affir&ati*e relation=to=self that is structurally tied to the presupposition that each indi*idual particularity recei*es intersub<ecti*e reco'nition$ ;or this reason both sub<ects in the stru''le are pursuin' the sa&e 'oal na&ely the re= establish&ent of their honour G +hich has been in<ured for different reasons in each case by atte&ptin' to con*ince the other that their o+n personality deser*es reco'nition$ %ut they are only able to do this He'el further asserts by de&onstratin' to each other that they are prepared to ris( their li*es$ Fnly by bein' prepared to die do 1 publicly sho+ that &y indi*idual 'oals and characteristics are &ore si'nificant to &e than &y physical sur*i*al$ ,n this +ay He'el lets the social conflict resultin' fro& insult turn into a life= and=death stru''le a stru''le +hich al+ays occurs outside the sphere of le'ally bac(ed clai&s since /the +hole 7of a person8 is at sta(e3$ Ho+e*er unclear this account &ay be on the +hole it offers for the first ti&e a &ore precise o*er*ie+ of He'el3s theoretical ai&s in the inter&ediate chapter on /cri&e3$ "he fact that in the pro'ression of the three sta'es of social conflict the identity clai&s of the sub<ects in*ol*ed 'radually expand rules out the possibility of 'rantin' a &erely ne'ati*e si'nificance to the acts of destruction that He'el describes$ "a(en to'ether the *arious different conflicts see& rather to co&prise precisely the process that prepares the +ay for the transition fro& natural to absolute ethical life by e4uippin' indi*iduals +ith the necessary characteristics and insi'hts$ He'el not only +ants to describe ho+ social structures of ele&entary reco'nition are destroyed by the ne'ati*e &anifestation of freedo&; he also +ants to sho+ beyond this that it is only *ia such acts of destruction that ethically &ore &ature relations of reco'nition can be for&ed at all relations that represent a precondition for the actual de*elop&ent of a /co&&unity of free citi:ens3$B Here one can analytically distin'uish t+o aspects of intersub<ecti*e action as the di&ensions alon' +hich He'el ascribes to social conflicts so&ethin' li(e a &oral= practical potential for learnin'$ Fn the one hand it is apparently *ia each ne+ pro*ocation thrust upon the& by *arious cri&es that sub<ects co&e to (no+ &ore about their o+n distincti*e identity$ "his is the de*elop&ental di&ension that He'el see(s to &ar( lin'uistically +ith the transition fro& /person3 to /+hole person3$ As in the earlier section on /natural ethical life3 the ter& /person3 here desi'nates indi*iduals +ho dra+ their identity pri&arily fro& the intersub<ecti*e reco'nition of their status as le'ally co&petent a'ents +hereas the ter& /+hole person3 by contrast refers to indi*iduals +ho 'ain their identity abo*e all fro& the inter=rsub<ecti*e reco'nition of their /particularity3$ Fn the other hand ho+e*er the route by +hich sub<ects 'ain 'reater autono&y is also supposed to be the path to 'reater (no+led'e of their &utual dependence$ "his is the de*elop&ental di&ension that He'el see(s to &a(e clear by lettin' the stru''le for

honour in the end chan'e i&perceptibly fro& a conflict bet+een sin'le sub<ects into a confrontation bet+een social co&&unities$ 5lti&ately after they ha*e ta(en on the challen'es posed by different cri&es indi*iduals no lon'er oppose each other as e'ocentric actors but as /&e&bers of a +hole3$ 0hen these t+o di&ensions are considered to'ether and as a unity then one be'ins to see the for&ati*e process +ith +hich He'el ai&s to explain the transition fro& natural to absolute ethical life$ His &odel is 'uided by the con*iction that it is only +ith the destruction of le'al for&s of reco'nition that a consciousness e&er'es of the &o&ent +ithin intersub<ecti*e relationships that can ser*e as the foundation for an ethical co&&unity$ ;or by *iolatin' first the ri'hts and then the honour of persons the cri&inal &a(es the dependence of indi*iduals on the co&&unity a &atter of co&&on (no+led'e$ "o this extent the social conflicts that shattered natural ethical life prepare sub<ects to &utually reco'ni:e one another as persons +ho are dependent on each other and yet also co&pletely indi*iduated$ ,n the course of his ar'u&ent ho+e*er He'el continues to treat this third sta'e of social interaction +hich is supposed to lead to relations of 4ualitati*e reco'nition a&on' the &e&bers of a society &erely as an i&plicit presupposition$ ,n his account of /absolute ethical life3 +hich follo+s the cri&e chapter the intersub<ecti*e foundation of a future co&&unity is said to be a specific relationship a&on' sub<ects for +hich the cate'ory of /&utual intuition3 e&er'es here$ "he indi*idual /intuits hi&self as hi&self in e*ery other indi*idual3$ As the appropriation of Schellin'3s ter& /intuition3 "#nschauung$ sug'ests He'el surely intends this for&ulation to desi'nate a for& of reciprocal relations bet+een sub<ects that 'oes beyond &erely co'niti*e reco'nition$ Such patterns of reco'nition extendin' e*en into the sphere of the affecti*e (for +hich the cate'ory of /solidarity3 +ould see& to be the &ost li(ely label) 3 are apparently supposed to pro*ide the co&&unicati*e basis upon +hich indi*iduals +ho ha*e been isolated fro& each other by le'al relations can be reunited +ithin the context of an ethical co&&unity$ ,n the re&ainin' parts of the System of Ethical Life, ho+e*er He'el does not pursue the fruitful line of thou'ht thus outlined$ At this point in fact the thread of the ar'u&ent dra+in' specifically on a theory of reco'nition brea(s off entirely and the text li&its itself fro& here on to an account of the or'ani:ational ele&ents that are supposed to characteri:e political relations in /absolute ethical life3$ As a result ho+e*er the difficulties and proble&s that He'el3s reconstructi*e analysis had already failed to address at the pre*ious sta'es re&ain open at the end of the text$ A&on' the unclarities that characteri:e the System of Ethical Life as a +hole the first 4uestion to be as(ed is to +hat de'ree the history of ethical life is in fact to be reconstructed here in ter&s of the 'uidin' idea of the de*elop&ent of relationships of reco'nition$ Ad&ittedly one &i'ht ob<ect to this readin' on the 'rounds that the text3s Aristotelian fra&e of reference is not at all sufficiently differentiated conceptually to be able to ade4uately distin'uish *arious for&s of intersub<ecti*e reco'nition$ ,n &any places ho+e*er the ar'u&entation does su''est a distinction bet+een three for&s of reco'nition differin' fro& each other +ith re'ard to the /ho+3 as +ell as the /+hat3 of practical confir&ation: in the affecti*e relationship of reco'nition found in the fa&ily

hu&an indi*iduals are reco'ni:ed as concrete creatures of need; in the co'niti*e=for&al relationship of reco'nition found in la+ they are reco'ni:ed as abstract le'al persons; and finally in the e&otionally enli'htened relationship of reco'nition found in the State they are reco'ni:ed as concrete uni*ersals that is as sub<ects +ho are sociali:ed in their particularity$ ,f further&ore in each of the relations of reco'nition the institution is &ore clearly distin'uished fro& the &ode the sta'e theory that He'el had in &ind can be su&&ari:ed in the sche&a sho+n in fi'ure 1$ ,n such a sta'e theory of social reco'nition different &odes of reco'nition correspond to different concepts of the person in such a +ay that a se4uence e&er'es of e*er &ore de&andin' &edia of reco'nition$ ,n the System of Ethical Life, ho+e*er the correspondin' distinctions are too e*idently lac(in' for the certain presence of such a theory

to be una&bi'uously assu&ed$ @*en if it +ere possible to extract a sufficiently clear distinction of three &odes of reco'nition fro& He'el3s application of Schellin'3s &odel of (no+led'e the text +ould still be ob*iously &issin' the co&ple&entary concepts of a theory of sub<ecti*ity +ith +hich one could also effect such a differentiation +ith re'ard to +hat it is about a person that 'ets reco'ni:ed$ "he second difficulty that the System of Ethical Life fails to consider arises fro& the 4uestion as to the status of /cri&e3 +ithin the history of ethical life$ "here is 'ood reason to belie*e that He'el 'ranted cri&inal acts a constructi*e role in the for&ati*e process of ethical life because they +ere able to unleash the conflicts that for the first ti&e +ould &a(e sub<ects a+are of underlyin' relations of reco'nition$ ,f this +ere the case ho+e*er then the &o&ent of /stru''le3 +ithin the &o*e&ent of reco'nition +ould be 'ranted not only a ne'ati*e transitional function but also a positi*e (that is

consciousness=for&in') function$ Alon' the dia'onal axis (in fi'ure 1) that points in the direction of increasin' /uni*ersali:ation3 this &o&ent of /stru''le3 +ould then represent in each case the practical conditions of possibility for the transition to the next sta'e in social relations of reco'nition$ A'ainst this readin' ho+e*er it &ust be pointed out that He'el3s theory lea*es the *arious cri&es too un&oti*ated for the& to be able to assu&e this sort of syste&atic position in his ar'u&entation$ ,f +ithin this theoretical construct social conflicts +ere in fact supposed to ta(e on the central role of clarifyin' the reciprocity of specific reco'nition rules then it +ould ha*e been necessary to explicate its internal structure &ore precisely both in theoretical and in cate'orial ter&s$ "hus in the System of Ethical Life, the social=philosophical &odel that He'el de*elops in #ena in order to explain the history of hu&an ethical life is e*ident only in outline$ He is still lac(in' the crucial &eans that +ould put hi& in a position to pro*ide a &ore deter&inate *ersion of his &ediation of ;ichte and Hobbes$ ,t beco&es possible for He'el to ta(e such a step to+ards 'reater precision once he be'ins to replace the Aristotelian fra&e+or( 'uidin' his political philosophy +ith a ne+ fra&e of reference$ 5p to this point he has dra+n his conception of /ethical life3 fro& a philosophical +orld of ideas for +hich the ontolo'ical reference to a natural order C ho+e*er it +as concei*ed C +as central$ ;or this reason he could describe ethical relations a&on' people only as 'radations of an underlyin' natural essence so that their co'niti*e and &oral 4ualities had to re&ain peculiarly indeter&inate$ ,n the /;irst Philosophy of Spirit3 +ritten in 1-.H I J ho+e*er +hich ste&s fro& the proposal for a syste& of speculati*e philosophy once labelled /Realphilosophie, ,3 the concept of /nature3 has already lost its o*erarchin' ontolo'ical &eanin'$ He'el no lon'er uses it to desi'nate the constitution of reality as a +hole but only of the real& of reality that is opposed to spirit as its other C that is prehu&an physical nature$ Ff course at the sa&e ti&e that the concept of nature +as thus restricted the cate'ory of Ispirit3 or that of /consciousness3 increasin'ly too( o*er the tas( of characteri:in' exactly that structural principle accordin' to +hich the social life+orld is de&arcated fro& natural reality$ Here for the first ti&e the sphere of ethical life is thus freed up for the cate'orial definitions and distinctions that are ta(en fro& the process of Spirit3s reflection$ "he place occupied by Aristotelian natural teleolo'y +hich still had a co&plete hold on the System of Ethical Life, 'radually co&es to be ta(en by a philosophical theory of consciousness$ Ad&ittedly in this process of conceptual transfor&ation +hich already points in the direction of the final syste& the fra'&ents fro& 1-.HIJ ha*e only the status of an inter&ediate sta'e$ Here He'el still clin's to the for&al structure of his ori'inal approach both in the sense that the ethical relations associated +ith the State continue to for& the central point of reference for the reconstructi*e analysis and in the sense that the cate'ory of consciousness &erely ser*es the explication of for&s of ethical life$ %ut e*en by itself the turn to cate'ories of the philosophy of consciousness is enou'h to 'i*e the &odel of a /stru''le for reco'nition3 a &ar(edly altered for&ulation$ He'el can no lon'er concei*e of the e&er'ence of a State co&&unity as the a'onistic de*elop&ent of ele&entary structures of an ori'inal /natural3 for& of ethical life but &ust instead consider it directly to be the process by +hich Spirit is for&ed$ "his process occurs *ia the se4uence of the &ediatin' instances of lan'ua'e tool and fa&ily 'oods throu'h the

use of +hich consciousness 'radually learns to co&prehend itself as an /i&&ediate unity of sin'ularity and uni*ersality3 3 and accordin'ly reaches an understandin' of itself as /totality3$ ,n this ne+ context /reco'nition3 refers to the co'niti*e step ta(en by a consciousness that has already de*eloped /ideally3 into a totality at the &o&ent in +hich it /percei*es itself C in another such totality consciousness C to be the totality it is3$ And the reason +hy this experience of percei*in' oneself in others has to lead to a conflict or stru''le is that it is only by &utually *iolatin' each other3s sub<ecti*e clai&s that indi*iduals can co&e to (no+ +hether or not in the& the respecti*e others also re= identify the&sel*es as a /totality?: %ut this that &y totality as the totality of a sin'le consciousness is precisely this totality subsistin' on its o+n account in the other consciousness +hether it is reco'ni:ed and respected this 1 cannot (no+ except throu'h the appearance of the actions of the other a'ainst &y totality; and li(e+ise the other &ust e4ually appear to &e as a totality as 1 do to hi&$ As this sho+s He'el has i&pro*ed the theoretical clarity of his deri*ation of the stru''le for reco'nition 4uite a bit in co&parison +ith the earlier text fro& the #ena period$ "he turn to philosophy of consciousness no+ allo+s hi& una&bi'uously to locate the &oti*es for initiatin' a conflict in the interior of the hu&an spirit +hich is supposed to be constructed in such a +ay that for its co&plete reali:ation it presupposes (no+led'e of its reco'nition by others +hich can only be ac4uired throu'h conflict$ ,ndi*iduals can feel sure that they are reco'ni:ed by their partners to interaction only by experiencin' the practical reaction +ith +hich the others respond to a tar'eted e*en pro*ocati*e challen'e$ Fn the other hand it is clear that the social function that the stru''le thus initiated is to ha*e in the context of the process of ethical for&ation re&ains basically unchan'ed in the ne+ theoretical context$ ,ndeed as in the System of Ethical Life, conflict represents a sort of &echanis& of social inte'ration into co&&unity +hich forces sub<ects to co'ni:e each other &utually in such a +ay that their indi*idual consciousness of totality has ulti&ately beco&e inter+o*en to'ether +ith that of e*eryone else into a /uni*ersal3 consciousness$ As in the earlier text this no+ /absolute3 consciousness finally pro*ides He'el +ith the intellectual basis for a future ideal co&&unity: produced by &utual reco'nition as a &ediu& of social uni*ersali:ation /the spirit of a people3 is for&ed and to that extent the /li*in' substance3 of its ethics is for&ed as +ell$ >espite these rou'h points of a'ree&ent in outco&e ho+e*er there can be no &ista(e as to the serious difference bet+een the t+o fra'&entary texts at the le*el of funda&entals$ %oth texts do of course concei*e of the stru''le for reco'nition as a social process that leads to increasin' inte'ration into co&&unity in the sense of a decentrali:ation of indi*idual for&s of consciousness$ %ut only the earlier text that is to say only the System of Ethical Life attaches to this stru''le the further si'nificance of bein' at the sa&e ti&e a &ediu& of indi*iduali:ation of increasin' e'o=co&petence$ "his surprisin' contrast beco&es co&prehensible in syste&atic ter&s +hen one considers &ore closely the points of conceptual di*er'ence to +hich the different approaches &ust necessarily 'i*e rise$ As has been sho+n the chan'e in hu&an interacti*e relations described in the

System of Ethical Life is a chan'e +ith a direction$ ;ro& the start o+in' to the text3s Aristotelian fra&e of reference the fore'oin' reconstructi*e analysis has centred on the nor&ati*ely substanti*e relationships of co&&unication out of +hich indi*iduals &ust be differentiated before they can understand each other to be indi*iduated sub<ects$ "a(en to'ether ho+e*er both the e&ancipation of indi*idual sub<ects and their 'ro+in' co&&unali:ation a&on' each other should be initiated and dri*en on by the stru''le for reco'nition +hich to the de'ree to +hich it 'radually &a(es the& a+are of their sub<ecti*e clai&s si&ultaneously allo+s a rational feelin' for their intersub<ecti*e si&ilarities to e&er'e$ %ut He'el &ust distance hi&self fro& the co&plex tas( thus for&ulated as soon as he replaces the Aristotelian fra&e of reference +ith a theory of consciousness as the basis for his political philosophy$ %ecause the ob<ect do&ain of his reconstructi*e analysis is no+ no lon'er co&posed pri&arily out of for&s of social interaction that is of /ethical relations3 C but consists rather in sta'es of the self= &ediation of indi*idual consciousness co&&unicati*e relations bet+een sub<ects can no lon'er be concei*ed as so&ethin' that in principle precedes indi*iduals$ 0hereas He'el3s philosophical in*esti'ations had until this point proceeded fro& the ele&entary syste& of relationships associated +ith co&&unicati*e action here (in the fra'&ents of 1-.HIJ) the analysis be'ins +ith the theoretical and practical confrontation of indi*iduals +ith their en*iron&ent$ "he intellectual for&ati*e process resultin' fro& this confrontation C the further de*elop&ent of +hich ta(es the for& of Spirit3s reflection on the &ediations that it has already intuiti*ely acco&plished C allo+s first a consciousness of totality to e&er'e in the indi*idual sub<ect +hich leads second to the sta'e of uni*ersali:ation or decentrali:ation of e'o=perspecti*es that acco&panies the stru''le for reco'nition$ "o this extent the conflict bet+een sub<ects ha*e lost the second di&ension of si'nificance that it had in the System of Ethical Life ;or it no lon'er represents a &ediu& for consciousnessfor&ation of indi*iduals as +ell but is left instead only +ith the function of bein' a &ediu& of social uni*ersali:ation that is of inte'ration into co&&unity$ %ecause He'el 'i*es up alon' +ith the Aristotehanis& of his early #ena +ritin's the notion of an ori'inal intersub<ecti*ity of hu&an life he can no lon'er concei*e the process of indi*iduali:ation in ter&s of the a'onistic release of indi*iduals fro& already existin' co&&unicati*e relations$ ,n fact his political theory of ethical life co&pletely loses the character of a /history of society3 of an analysis of directional chan'es in social relations and 'radually ta(es on the for& of an analysis of the education 7%il&ung8 of the indi*idual for society$ ,f these considerations are correct He'el paid for the theoretical 'ains of his turn to the philosophy of consciousness by sacrificin' his stron' intersub<ecti*is&$ %y &a(in' the conceptual &odification first introduced in the proposed syste& of 1-.HIJ He'el does create for the first ti&e the theoretical possibility for conceptually distin'uishin' &ore precisely bet+een the indi*idual sta'es of indi*idual consciousness=for&ation$ At the sa&e ti&e this 'enerates the opportunity for differentiatin' *arious concepts of the person that his approach had been lac(in'$ %ut the benefit thus obtained in ter&s of a theory of sub<ecti*ity co&es at the expense of a co&&unication=theoretical alternati*e +hich +as in fact also i&plicit in the reference to Aristotle$ "he turn to the philosophy of consciousness allo+s He'el to co&pletely lose si'ht of the idea of an ori'inal

intersub<ecti*ity of hu&an(ind and bloc(s the +ay to the co&pletely different solution that +ould ha*e consisted in &a(in' the necessary distinctions bet+een *arious de'rees of personal autono&y +ithin the fra&e+or( of a theory of intersub<ecti*ity$ %ut the cate'orial ad*anta'es and the theoretical losses that this co'niti*e step 'enerates for He'el3s idea of a /stru''le for reco'nition3 can only be ade4uately assessed in connection +ith the text in +hich this conceptual reorientation co&es to a pro*isional conclusion$ Already in the 1-.HIJ draft of his Realphilosophie the last text before the 'henomenology of Spirit He'el analysed the for&ati*e process of Spirit entirely +ithin the fra&e+or( of the ne+ly ac4uired paradi'& of the philosophy of consciousness$ >espite the fact that *irtually all echoes of the System of Ethical Life ha*e disappeared fro& this text ne*er a'ain in the later political philosophy is the /stru''le for reco'nition3 'i*en such a stron' syste&atic position as here$

Fn @thics K Philosophy Archi*e L &arxists$or' K He'el=by=Hyper"ext