Oil World Production 2030

215
World conventional petroleum liquids

GeoArabia, vol. 14, no. 1, 2009, p. 215-267
Gulf PetroLink, Bahrain
World production of conventional petroleum liquids to 2030:
A comparative overview
Moujahed Al-Husseini
ABSTRACT
This paper compares estimates of reserves, resources and future production
scenarios of conventional petroleum liquids for ve peaked countries and the World
as determined by various analytical techniques. It starts by illustrating Hubberts
Model using historical production from offshore Norway and the United Kingdom
(UK), and onshore Oman, Syria and Yemen, to estimate the resource, peak rate and
year. For all ve countries the estimated resources were found to signicantly differ
from known reserves (cumulative production plus proved reserves) and ultimate
recoverable resources estimated by geologic studies; accordingly the models
estimate is here referred to as the producing resource. Importantly, the producing
resource not the known reserves or ultimate recoverable resources represents
the quantity that most closely predicted the peak (rate and year) and early decline
for these countries. The models production trajectory became accurate after the
producing resource was between 1030% depleted for four countries; the exception
was for the UK at 44% depletion and due to non-geological circumstances. In the
ve countries, the peak occurred when the producing resource was approximately
50% depleted, and within a production plateau here dened as exceeding 91% of
the peak rate.
The Hubbert Model cannot be applied to all basins and/or countries. Its World
predictions are controversial and therefore presented as a Production Base Case and
compared to those from other studies. The Base Case for conventional petroleum
liquids predicted: (1) average producing resource of c. 2,860 billion barrels (Gb),
(2) peak rate of c. 85.7 Mb/d (31.3 Gb/year), and (3) peak year in ca. 2016. The
data used for this analysis is oil production as reported by BP (2008) from 1991 to
2007, consisting mostly of crude oil, lease condensates and natural gas liquids. The
producing resource is just 3% greater than the 95%-condence estimate for ultimate
recoverable resources of 2,770 Gb effective in 2025 by the United States Geological
Survey (with 152 Gb added for Canadian oil sands, BP, 2008). It is 351 Gb greater
than the end-2007 known reserves of 2,509 Gb, consisting of 1,119 Gb produced,
1,238 Gb proved, and 152 Gb in Canadian oil sands (BP, 2008). The unproven
resource of 351 Gb is achievable if the 20 Gb/year rate of new liquids reserves
(undiscovered and reserves growth), added in 2005, is maintained on average
between 20082025. The convergence of these three independent techniques on a
resource of c. 2,860 Gb makes no assumption about the price of oil.
The predicted peak rate (85.7 Mb/d in 2016) is 4.2 Mb/d greater than the 2007
average oil production of 81.5 Mb/d (BP, 2008). It compares closely to the peak
rate of 86.2 Mb/d in 2012 obtained by balancing new megaprojects (more than 40
Kb/d) coming onstream in 20052014, against existing 2004 production declined
at 4.5%/y. The Base Case predicts that production in 2030 will be 78.0 Mb/d, as
consistent with the high-price scenario for conventional petroleum liquids production
by the Energy Information Agency (2008): price of oil to increase to $186/barrel by
2030 but production to fall to 80.3 Mb/d in 2030 from 81.8 Mb/d in 2004.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades many analysts have applied Hubberts Model to forecast the production
of petroleum from various countries and the World (Hubbert, 1956a, b, 1969, 1982; Hubberts Curve
sometimes referred to as the derivative of the Logistic Curve; e.g. Campbell, 1997, 2004, 2006; Campbell
216
Al-Husseini
and Laherrre, 1998; Laherrre, 2000; Laherrre and Wingert, 2008; Duncan, 2001; Cavallo, 2002, 2004;
Deffeyes, 2005; see review in Al-Husseini, 2006). The model suggests a simple relationship between
annual discoveries, annual production, peak production and year, and the ultimate recoverable
resources. The predictions, however, vary considerably depending on the analysts condence in the
reported ultimate resources and the suitability of the model to the target region (e.g. Nehring, 2006a,
b, c). Moreover, because the model does not explicitly account for the price of oil, some analysts
have regarded its application to be of limited scope. In particular, for the USA and World cases,
it has been convincingly argued that because the price of oil varies over time then so do supply,
demand, reserves and the ultimate resource itself (see McCabe, 1998, and related Discussion in 2001
by Laherrre, Campbell and Duncan, and Reply by McCabe, 2001; Ahlbrandt, 2004, 2006; Nehring,
2006a, b, c).
One signicant aspect of Hubberts Model is that it offers a simple technique that uses only historical
production data to estimate: (1) resource; (2) maximum sustainable production (peak); and (3)
peak year (Hubbert, 1982; see Duncan, 2001; Deffeyes, 2005; de Sousa, 2008). The application of
this technique here referred to as the Hubbert Line is illustrated using production data from ve
countries with declining production (Table 1); two offshore (Norway and the United Kingdom - UK)
and three onshore (Oman, Syria and Yemen). These ve countries were specically chosen to illustrate
how the technique works when applied to suitable regions, and more importantly to quantitatively
determine what is meant by the terms resource, peak, plateau and peak year as determined by the
Hubbert Line. This paper shows that the resource estimated by Hubberts Model using production
data referred to as the producing resource differs from known reserves (produced plus proved) and
ultimate recoverable resources; importantly, in the studied countries, it is the crucial quantity that
determined the peak, plateau and early decline of production.
The nal part of the paper applies the Hubbert Line to the Worlds production of conventional petroleum
liquids to compute its producing resource and peak. The results are interpreted as the Production Base
Case, and compared with those from other independent studies of ultimate recoverable resources
(USGS, 2000; Ahlbrandt et al., 2005; Ahlbrandt, 2004, 2006; J. Laherrre, 2008, written communication),
known reserves (produced and proved; BP, 2008), rates of reserves additions (Chew, 2006), near-
future production from megaprojects and decline rates (Skrebowski, 2007; Jackson, 2008).
PRODUCTION, RESOURCES AND RESERVES
OF CONVENTIONAL PETROLEUM LIQUIDS
Annual Production of Conventional Petroleum Liquids
The annual oil production data (Tables 2 and 5) used in this paper are from the BP (2008) data base,
which is unique in several ways: (1) it is readily available from their website for producing countries
and the World (www.bp.com), (2) it lists production and reserves back to the 1960s in spreadsheets, (3)
the data most closely represents the conventional petroleum liquids extracted from crude oil reservoirs
and wet-gas reservoirs locally (lease condensates) and from gas plants, and (4) it is widely quoted as
a source in many other studies.
BP includes in the category of oil production commercially traded crude oil, which is a stabilized liquid
of processed hydrocarbons at atmospheric temperature and pressure. BP includes condensates (lease
condensates), which act as a gas in the reservoir but are liquid at surface conditions and processed in a
manner similar to crude oil. Natural gas liquids (NGL) are also included in oil production, and referred
to as natural gas plant liquids (NGPL) by the USAs Energy Information Administration (EIA). NGL
consist of C2 (ethane), C3 (propane), C4 (butane), C5 and C6 (pentane and hexane used to produce
light naphtha or natural gasoline and fractionated into liqueed petroleum gas LPG). NGL and their
derivative LPG are distinguished from condensates because they are totally volatile at atmospheric
conditions, more so for the lower weight components. Other petroleum liquids included by BP are
oil sands (Canada) and shale oil (USA); not included are liquid fuels recovered from coal, gas-to-liquids
(GTL) and biofuels.
Occidental Middle East Development Company
A Subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corporation A Subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corporation
The above illustration depicts a cross-section of an
Oxy offshore development near the Qatar peninsula.
Occidental Middle East Development Company
Occidental Tower, 4th Street, Muroor
P.O. Box 73243, Abu Dhabi, U.A.E.
Tel: +9712 691 7200
Fax: +9712 691 7300
Partners in Progress
Oxy has been a partner in the Middle East
and North Africa for four decades, working
with the governments of Bahrain, Libya,
Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates
and Yemen.
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221
The BP database distinguishes between oil production and oil consumption, the latter being generally
several million barrels per day (Mb/d) greater due to renery gains, additives and discrepancies in
reporting. For example, average 2007 production was reported as 81.5 Mb/d while consumption
as 85.2 Mb/d a difference of 3.7 Mb/d. Also, as noted later, some organizations quote volumes in
terms of production capacity (e.g. International Energy Agency, IEA), which can be as much as 10 Mb/d
greater than BPs reported production (Cambridge Energy Research Associates - CERA).
Reserves and Resources of Conventional Petroleum Liquids
Petroleum reserves and resources are categorized and dened, mainly in terms of their probability of
occurrence and commerciality, by several organizations including a team of geologists and engineers
from the Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE, 2008; see www.spe.org), the American Association
of Petroleum Geologists (AAPG; www.aapg.org), the World Petroleum Council (WPC; www.world-
petroleum.org) and the Society of Petroleum Evaluation Engineers (SPEE; www.spee.org). This paper
is primarily concerned with comparing the producing resource estimated from historical production
data by the Hubbert Line to those from other studies, particularly by the United States Geological
Survey (USGS). For this reason the paper follows the USGS (2000; Ahlbrandt, 2004, 2006; Ahlbrandt
et al., 2005) and casts the estimated ultimate recoverable resources (EURR; ultimate resources for short) in
terms of four categories (Figure 1):
(1) Cumulative Production (produced) obtained by adding annual production (BP, 2008) to start-up.
(2) Remaining Proved Reserves (proved) are reported in various publications (e.g. Table 4, BP, 2008; Oil
& Gas Journal, annual issue) but their denitions may vary by country or source. For example, the
Canadian National Energy Board (CNEB) reports Canadas proved oil reserves at c. 180 billion
barrels (Gb) of which oil sands account for 174 Gb. In contrast, BP (2008) divides the same quantity
into proved developed reserves of 27.7 Gb, and 152.2 Gb for undeveloped oil sands. Moreover, the
CNEB estimates the ultimate recoverable resources in oil sands at 315 Gb and the oil-originally-
in-place at 1,701 Gb. The denitions for proved reserves also vary by region, organization and
certainty (e.g. United States of America - USA, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
- OPEC, Former Soviet Union - FSU, etc.). The USGS uses the IHS database, which essentially
includes proved plus probable (P50 or 2P), as consistent with the view of J. Laherrre (2008, written
Cumulative
Production
1,119 Gb
1,238 Gb
152 Gb
351 Gb
Proved
Reserves
Canadian
Oil Sands
Reserves
Growth
Undiscovered
Resources
Not Recoverable Oil
Very Heavy Oil (API <15)
Oil from coal, oil shales?
Unconventional
Oil
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Figure 1: In this paper, the term oil is consistent
with BP's definition for conventional
petroleum liquids. At end-2007, the World's
cumulative production was 1,119 billion
barrels (Gb, produced), proved reserves were
1,238 Gb (proved) and Canadian oil sands held
152 Gb (BP, 2008). The sum of produced and
proved, referred to as known reserves, was
2,509 Gb. Undiscovered resources (to be added
by exploration and outpost drilling) and
reserves growth (to be added from
undeveloped or developed reservoirs by new
technology, improved reservoir management
and better commercial conditions) constitute
the unknown resource. The estimated ultimate
recoverable resources (EURR) consists of the
known and unknown resources. It is the
amount of oil-originally-in-place (OOIP) that can be apparently recovered. It does not include
unconventional oil resources such as oil shales, extra-heavy oil (API < 15), biofuels, coal
derivatives and gas-to-liquids. The Hubbert Line estimates the producing resource for the 1990s
2007 at 2,860 Gb (see Figure 16).
WORLDS OIL RESERVES AND RESOURCES
222
Al-Husseini
communication). In this paper all proved reserves are quoted from BP (2008) without any attempt
to qualify their certainty. The term Known Reserves is the sum of cumulative production and
remaining proved reserves.
(3) Undiscovered Resources (undiscovered or yet-to-nd) are uncertain, and typically estimated by
geological studies involving quantitative modeling of petroleum systems in different regions (i.e.
basin modeling), sometimes qualied with probabilities of occurrence (e.g. USGS, 2000; Ahlbrandt
et al., 2005; Ahlbrandt and Klett, 2005).
(4) Reserves Growth (growth) are unproven resources in developed or undeveloped reservoirs, and
attributed to new technology, improved reservoir management, changes in commerciality and
other considerations, and believed to increase along historical trends established in producing
elds (e.g. McCabe, 1998, 2001; Klett and Tennyson, 2008; Klett and Gautier, 2005). Nehring
(2006a, b, c) showed the importance of reserves growth in two USA mature provinces and how
the application of Hubberts Model resulted in incorrect predictions of production.
Table 1
Production Parameters for Five Peaked Countries and the World.
Country Norway
United
Kingdom
Oman Syria Yemen World
Hubbert Line
Year Interval Fit 19982007 19942007 19862007 19912007 19982007 19952007
Number of Years 10 14 22 17 10 13
A (intercept) 0.155 0.133 0.105 0.149 0.194 0.044
B (slope) -5.00E-06 -4.40E-06 -8.50E-06 -2.52E-05 -5.73E-05 -1.53E-08
Resources *(J. Laherrre, 2009, written comm.) and ** USGS 95% by Year 2025
Reserves BP (2008)
Cumulative Production 22.5 Gb 24.9 Gb 8.5 Gb 4.7 Gb 2.46 Gb 1,119 Gb
Proved Reserves 8.2 Gb 3.6 Gb 5.6 Gb 2.5 Gb 2.80 Gb 1,390 Gb*
Unknown Resource 4.9 Gb 4.4 Gb 3.6 Gb 1.6 Gb 0.60 Gb -90 Gb
Ultimate Recoverable* 36.0 Gb 35.0 Gb 16.0 Gb 7.5 Gb 4.00 Gb 2,770 Gb* **
Unknown Resource (%) 13.6% 12.5% 22.5% 21.3% 15.0% -3.1%
Plateau and Peak
Years >91% Peak 10.0 12.0 12.0 8.5 6.0 28.0
PlateauYears 1996-2005
1984-1987,
1994-2001
1994-2005 1993.5-2002 2000-2005 2003-2030
Model Peak Year 2001 1996 1999 1998 2002 2016
Actual Peak Year 2001 1999 2001 1995 2002 N/A
Model Peak Rate 1.21 Gb/y 1.02 Gb/y 325 Mb/y 219 Mb/y 163 Mb/y 31.3 Gb/y
Actual Peak Rate 1.25 Gb/y 1.06 Gb/y 351 Mb/y 218 Mb/y 167 Mb/y N/A
Model Peak Rate 3.32 Mb/d 2.79 Mb/d 891 Kb/d 601 Kb/d 448 Kb/d 85.7 Mb/y
Actual Peak Rate 3.42 Mb/d 2.91 Mb/d 961 Kb/d 597 Kb/d 458 Kb/d N/A
Depletion and Decline
Max Depletion Rate 3.89% 3.56% 2.62% 3.72% 4.82% 1.10%
End-2007 Depletion 72.3% 81.3% 68.5% 79.7% 72.4% 39.0%
2007 to Peak Production 74.8% 56.2% 74.7% 66.1% 73.5% 95.0%
2008Annual Decline 7.0% 8.5% 4.5% 8.7% 9.8% N/A
31.1 Gb 30.6 Gb 12.4 Gb 5.9 Gb 3.40 Gb 2,860 Gb Producing Resource
30.7 Gb 28.5 Gb 14.1 Gb 7.2 Gb 5.26 Gb 2,509 Gb Known Reserves
2010Annual Decline 7.9% 9.0% 5.3% 9.5% 11.2% N/A
* Includes Canadian Oil Sands (152 Gb)
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Whereas the produced is fairly accurately
known, the quantities attributed to the
other three categories are successively
less well dened and uncertain,
and greatly debated (Caruso, 2005;
Skrebowski, 2006a, b, c, 2007; Jackson,
2006; see reviews in Edwards, 1997; Kerr,
2005; Al-Husseini, 2006; Ahlbrandt, 2004,
2006; National Petroleum Council, 2007).
For the ve countries studied here the
comparisons show signicant diffe-
rences between producing resource,
known reserves (BP, 2008) and ultimate
recoverable resources (Table 1). The
ultimate resources in Table 1 were
determined by J. Laherrre (2008,
written communication) and are
between 12.522.5% greater than the
producing resource. His estimates are
based on applying the Hubbert Model to
historical reserves data (creaming curve)
rather than production data, and are
therefore more likely to represent the
ultimate recoverable resources (EURR).
Another discrepancy occurs because
the historical production data do not
necessarily account for booked reserves
from future projects that have not yet
started producing (enhanced oil-recovery
projects - EOR, liquids from undeveloped
wet-gas reservoirs, sulfurous and/or
heavy-oil reservoirs, etc.).
Conventional and
Unconventional Petroleum
Liquids
Some confusion occurs when comparing
production, reserves and resources
across studies because certain analysts
exclude, for example, NGL, very deep
water, Arctic resources, etc. Water depth
has been considered as one criterion for
distinguishing between conventional
and unconventional petroleum liquids;
but the cut-off depth has changed as E&P
technology has advanced into increas-
ingly deeper waters. For example T.
Ahlbrandt (2008, written communication)
noted that Campbell set the cut-off at
200 m in 1989 but extended it to 500 m in
2008. In contrast, the USGS (2000) initially
set it at 2,000 m but later increased it to
4,000 m when Brazilian wells were drilled
in water depths of 3,000 m.
Table 2
Oil Production for Peaked Countries
(Million barrels per year, Mb/y) (BP, 2008).
Year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Total
Norway
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.2
12.1
11.7
12.8
69.0
101.8
104.8
129.9
148.6
192.7
186.9
194.2
241.3
274.5
300.4
331.1
384.7
436.5
572.0
626.3
713.6
809.2
867.6
983.0
1,059.6
1,179.7
1,197.2
1,145.4
1,145.7
1,221.3
1,247.6
1,216.6
1,191.4
1,164.0
1,068.0
1,014.3
932.9
22,490.3
UK
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
1.5
1.8
2.9
3.3
3.7
12.4
92.4
289.1
408.4
588.0
607.0
676.4
784.8
877.5
960.7
976.4
974.9
946.5
874.5
704.1
700.1
700.4
723.1
773.4
976.4
1,003.4
998.3
986.2
1,024.6
1,061.8
973.5
903.7
899.0
823.8
740.2
660.3
597.1
597.1
24,932.2
Oman
0.0
0.0
20.8
88.0
119.4
121.2
107.3
102.9
106.9
105.9
124.5
134.0
124.1
114.6
107.7
104.0
120.5
123.4
142.7
152.9
183.2
205.9
214.6
228.1
237.6
253.7
261.3
273.0
286.5
298.9
318.8
327.4
331.8
330.3
332.5
350.0
350.8
328.5
300.8
275.9
287.3
274.5
262.1
8,534.3
Syria
0.0
0.0
0.0
7.7
19.3
31.0
38.7
42.7
40.5
47.1
70.1
73.4
66.8
65.3
61.0
57.7
59.9
56.6
58.8
59.1
58.0
73.4
84.3
97.8
124.5
148.6
172.3
187.6
206.6
205.5
217.5
213.9
210.6
210.2
211.3
200.0
212.1
200.0
192.4
180.7
164.3
153.7
143.8
4,724.8
Yemen
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.7
9.5
62.1
65.0
66.4
71.9
67.2
76.3
126.3
128.1
130.3
136.9
138.7
147.8
164.3
166.1
166.8
163.5
153.3
151.8
138.7
122.6
2,457.3
Total
0.7
0.7
21.5
96.4
139.4
153.7
150.0
160.6
162.4
169.4
276.0
401.6
584.7
718.3
905.3
961.4
1,043.6
1,158.9
1,320.2
1,447.2
1,518.0
1,589.0
1,639.6
1,699.1
1,703.2
1,795.1
1,919.5
2,060.1
2,210.5
2,590.0
2,727.4
2,849.6
2,862.7
2,849.1
2,899.1
2,909.1
2,880.3
2,810.9
2,671.9
2,514.1
2,331.7
2,178.4
2,058.6
63,138.9
228
Al-Husseini
Extra-heavy oil (e.g. Venezuelas Orinoco oil with an API of c. 1012
o
) is considered unconventional
and not included by BP (2008) with reserves (Figure 1); however the cut-off API for extra-heavy oil
can vary according to analyst (e.g. 15
o
API by the USGS, Ahlbrandt et al., 2005; or 17.5
o
API, Campbell,
2006). BP does not include oil shale in proved reserves, and the quantities attributed to shale oil
production are mainly from the USA and relatively small.
In this paper all production and reserves data are based on BP (2008) and different conventions for
conventional/unconventional petroleum liquids are explicitly noted in comparisons and Tables 6 to
8 (Figure 1).
ILLUSTRATION OF HUBBERT MODEL FOR FIVE COUNTRIES WITH
DECLINING PRODUCTION
Hubbert Line
Consider a simple relationship between a nite producing resource (R) and maximum production (P
M
)
both assumed to be constants, and the variables annual production (P
A
) and cumulative production
(P
C
):
P
A
/ P
C
= 4 x (P
M
/R) x (1 - P
C
/ R) (1)
The variables P
A
and P
C
are known year-by-year and are published for most producing countries and
the World (e.g. BP, 2008). By setting Y = P
A
/ P
C
and X = P
C
, Equation 1 is recognized as a straight line
here referred to as the Hubbert Line (Hubbert, 1982; Duncan, 2001; Deffeyes, 2005; de Sousa, 2008),
with the form shown in Equations (2) to (4):
Y = A + B x X (2)

A = 4 x P
M
/ R (3)
B = - 4 x P
M
/ R
2
(4)
The constants A and B respectively correspond to the intercept with the Y-axis and the slope of the
line. The straight line can be drawn visually or determined by least-square regression. Once A and B
are estimated, then from equations (3) and (4):
R = - A/B (5)
P
M
= A x R /4 (6)
Note from Equation 2, when X = - A/B then Y = 0, so that the X-intercept of the line is X = - A/B and
from Equation 5, the resource R.
Norways Hubbert Line
Norway production history (Figure 2 and Table 2, BP, 2008) provides a good case study to test how
well these equations work in a particularly suitable region. Norways production peaked in 2001 at a
rate of 1.25 billion barrels per year (Gb/y), and by end-2007 22.5 Gb was produced and 8.2 Gb proved
(BP, 2008) totaling 30.7 Gb in known reserves (Table 1).
In Figure 3 the ratio of Norways annual-to-cumulative production (Y = P
A
/P
C
) is plotted against
produced (X = P
C
). Three Hubbert Lines were determined using least-square regression for different
time intervals. When the data from 19822007 was used the producing resource R was 29.8 Gb and
peak rate P
M
was 1.25 Gb/y. When the pre-peak 19891997 data was separately used, R was 30.4 Gb
and P
M
= 1.30 Gb/y. The most recent straight-line trend from 19982007 in Figure 3 predicted R as
31.1 Gb and P
M
= 1.21 Gb/y. Essentially all three lines predicted R and P
M
to within a few percentages
of the peak level and known reserves.
ADVERT
230
Al-Husseini
Figure 3: Norway's Hubbert Line varies slightly depending on which time interval is used. When
the 19822007 data is considered for the straight line the resulting estimate of the producing
resource (R = X-intercept) is 29.8 billion barrels (Gb), which is greater than the 26 Gb obtained by
Zittel and Schindler (2003), and less than the 36 Gb obtained by the exploration creaming curve
(Laherrre, 2006, written communication). When the pre-peak 19891997 or plateau-peak
19982007 straight-line segments were used individually, the resource was found to be between
30.4 and 31.1 Gb. All three estimates are close to Norway's known reserves of 30.7 Gb. The
predicted maximum production P
M
is the Y-intercept (A) multiplied by R/4 and ranges from 1.21
to 1.30 Gb/y for the three lines, compared to 1.25 Gb/y in 2001.
P
A
/P
C
=Maximum
A
R
Producing
Resource
Mid-Depletion
03
02
00
99
98
88
87
86
83
82
81
84
89
85
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
04
05
06
07
B =Slope
2001 - Peak Year at 1.25 Gb/y
NORWAYS HUBBERT LINE
A
n
n
u
a
l
/
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e

P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n

(
P
A
/
P
C
)
Cumulative Production (Billion barrel) P
C
0.15
0.20
0.10
0.05
0.0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Time
Interval
1998-2007
1989-1997
1982-2007
A
0.155
0.171
0.168
R
(Gb)
31.1
30.4
29.8
P
M
(Gb/y)
1.21
1.30
1.25
B
-5x10
-6
-5.6x10
-6
-5.63x10
-6
Signicantly, the pre-peak 19891997 Hubbert Line carried sufcient information to predict the peak
year and known reserves. The most recent straight-line trend between 19982007 estimates R as 31.1
Gb, which is only 0.4 Gb greater than the known reserves (30.7 Gb). This would at rst suggest that
the unknown resource (undiscovered and growth, Figure 1) is c. 1.3% (100 x 0.4/30.7; see Table 1). In
contrast, the creaming curve based on historical reserves data predicted Norways ultimate recoverable
Figure 2: Norway and the United Kingdom (UK) started producing from the North Sea in the early
1970s (Tables 1 and 2, BP, 2008). Norway's production built-up gently reaching a peak in 2001. The
UK's production peaked in 1999 after a major downturn due to the tragic Piper Alpha accident in
1985. Between 1999 and 2007 the combined production of Norway and the UK has declined from
2.21 billion barrels per year (Gb/y) to 1.53 Gb/y in 2007 or by nearly 30%.
United Kingdom (UK)
end-2007
Produced: 24.9 Gb
Proved: 3.6 Gb
Total: 28.5 Gb
Norway end-2007
Produced: 22.5 Gb
Proved: 8.2 Gb
Total: 30.7 Gb
Piper
Alpha
Accident
in 1985
UK Peak
1.06 Gb/y
in 1999
Norway Peak
1.25 Gb/y
in 2001
OIL PRODUCTION
FROM NORWAY
AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM
A
n
n
u
a
l

P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n

(
B
i
l
l
i
o
n

b
a
r
r
e
l
s
/
y
e
a
r

-

G
b
/
y
)
year
D
a
i
l
y

P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n

(
M
i
l
l
i
o
n

b
a
r
r
e
l
s
/
d
a
y

-

M
b
/
d
)
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
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25402.004_BG_Oman_291x207:24526_BG_Oman_ENG_291x207 30/5/08 16:43 Page 1
ADVERT
232
Al-Husseini
resource at 36.0 Gb (J. Laherrre, 2008, written communication) such that the unknown resource is
c. 4.9 Gb (13.6%, Table 1). The differences between the producing resource, known reserves and ultimate
recoverable resources emphasize the importance of distinguishing between these terms.
In order to compare Norways Hubbert Line to those from other regions it is helpful to use a normalized
graph. Equation 1 can be rewritten in a normalized form as:
(P
A
/P
M
)/(P
C
/ R) = 4 x (1 - P
C
/ R) (7)
In this equivalent graph, the Y-intercept is 4.0, slope - 4.0 and X-intercept 1.0 (100%). In Figure 4, the
normalized Norwegian data is plotted in this graphical form for R = 31.1 Gb in a manner that can be
compared to other countries and the World (Figures 6, 9, 11, 13 and 16).
Norways Hubbert Parabola
Clearly Norways Hubbert Line carries important information about this countrys production history,
and in hindsight its predictions were important well before the plateau occurred and subsequent
decline started. But what does Hubberts Line physically mean? To clarify its signicance, Equation
1 is rewritten as follows:
P
A
/P
M
= 4 x (P
C
/R) x (1 - P
C
/ R) (8)
Equation 8 has the same information as the previous ones but it now shows how the percentage
ratio of annual-to-maximum production (100 x P
A
/P
M
) follows a parabolic trajectory as a function of
percent depletion (D = 100 x P
C
/R) (Hubbert, 1982; Duncan, 2001). In Figure 5, Norways production
trajectory is plotted along Hubberts Parabola using the producing resource R of 31.1 Gb. The following
model-data comparisons standout:
Annual and cumulative production are zero at start-up in 1977; P
C
= P
A
= 0.
Annual production should reach 36% of the peak (P
M
) at 10% depletion Norway closely attained
these two levels in 1988.
At 15% depletion, production should attain half the peak this occurred in 1990.
At quarter-depletion, production should reach 75% of peak Norway reached a slightly higher
rate of 80% of peak in 1994 at quarter-depletion.
Figure 4: The Norwegian Hubbert Line in Figure 3 can be replotted using a normalized form. The
plotted data are annual production (P
A
) divided by maximum production (P
M
= 1.21 Gb/y) over
depletion (P
C
/R) versus cumulative production (P
C
) divided by the producing resource (R = 31.1
Gb; Note Depletion in percentage is 100 x P
C
/R). In this graph the normalized Hubbert Line has
the same form for any country or the World (see Figures 6, 9, 11, 13 and 16).
P
M
=1.21 Gb/y
Model Peak in 2001
Straight line
19982007
Producing Resource
R =31.1 Gb
NORMALIZED HUBBERT LINE FOR NORWAY
Model
Mid-Depletion
15.56 Gb
88
87
86
85
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
02
03
04
05
06
07 P
A
P
M
P
C
R
N
o
r
m
a
l
i
z
e
d

A
n
n
u
a
l
/
D
e
p
l
e
t
i
o
n
Depletion (D =P
C
/R) Cumulative Production/Producing Resource (%)
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
End - 2007
Produced
Proved
Total known
: 22.5 Gb
: 8.2 Gb
: 30.7 Gb
233
Annual production should reach a peak (P
A
= P
M
) when half of the resource has been produced,
or mid-depletion (D = 50%, P
C
= 15.5 Gb) in 2001 this occurred in 2001.
The plateau (dened here as greater than 91% of peak) should be symmetrical and correspond to
depletion between 35% and 65%, or the mid-30% depletion interval Norway's plateau occurred
between 19962005 when depletion increased from 30% to 65%.
After mid-depletion, the decline is predicted to be symmetrical to the build-up, as approximately
the case since the 2001 peak.
Annual production returns to zero (P
A
= 0) when all the resource has been depleted (D = 100%, P
C

= R = 31.1 Gb). This is predicted to occur well past 2020.
In summary it is evident that the closer the data adhere to Hubberts Line (Figures 3 and 4), the closer
the production trajectory follows Hubberts Parabola (Figure 5). Importantly, it demonstrates that the
producing resource (31.1 Gb) not the ultimate resources (36.0 Gb) best calibrates the Hubbert Parabola
from 1977 to 2007. Indeed this distinction argues that all the ultimate resources may not contribute
Figure 5: Norway's annual production when plotted against depletion follows a parabolic
trajectory. The more the data plots as a straight Hubbert Line (Figures 3 and 4), the more parabolic
the production trajectory. The 50%-depletion level corresponds to the maximum level of
production (P
M
= 1.21 Gb/y). The model also predicts the time history and annual decline rate
(year-to-year or natural decline) based on the maximum depletion rate of 3.89%/y at
mid-depletion. For comparison to other countries and the world, the graph depicts the ratio (in
percent) of the annual-to-peak production (P
A
/P
M
) versus depletion (percent).
75% P
M
at 25% and 75% D
1994 and 2008 symmetric for 2001
36% P
M
at 10% Depletion (D)
50% P
M
at 15% and 85% D
1990 and 2012 symmetric for 2001
Producing Resource R =31.1 Gb
2001
Peak P
M
=1.21 Gb/y
=3.32 Mb/d
Produced 22.49 Gb ? Proved 8.2 Gb
HUBBERT
PARABOLA
FOR
NORWAY
Plateau at 91% P
M
30% Produced
A
n
n
u
a
l
/
P
e
a
k

P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n

(
P
A
/
P
M

%
)
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n

(
G
b
/
y

a
n
d

M
b
/
d
)
Depletion (D =P
C
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
30
20
10
0
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
.
8
%
Annual Decline
77
78
79
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
01
01
02
02
03
04
05
06
07
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
20
2000
8082
2
.
3
%
3
.
8
%
5
.
2
%
6
.
6
%
7
.
9
%
9
.
1
%
1
0
.
0
%
9
.
8
%
10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 Gb 5.0
0.9
1.2
1.5
1.8
2.1
2.4
2.7
3.0
3.3
234
Al-Husseini
Table 3
Time (T) and Annual Decline (D
A
)
for Maximum Depletion (D
M
) of 1.0%/Year.
Build-Up
Depletion
(%)
Past-Peak
Depletion
(%)
Annual/
Peak Prod
(%)
Time from
Peak
(Year)
Annual
Decline
(%/Year)
1 99 4 117.2
1.8
5 95 19 74.1
2.5
10 90 36 55.3
2.5
15 85 51 43.7
2.3
20 80 64 35.0
2.0
25 75 75 27.8
1.7
30 70 84 21.6
1.4
35 65 91 15.8
1.0
40 60 96 10.7
0.6
45 55 99 5.0
0.2
50 50 100 0.0
The maximum depletion rate (D
M
in percent/year) is 100
times the maximum production (P
M
) divided by the producing
resource (R). The table shows the time (years from mid-
depletion) and annual (year-to-year) decline at different
levels of depletion (cumulative production divided by
producing resource) for D
M
= 1.0%/y. For other maximum
depletion rates, the time interval changes in inverse
proportion and annual decline in direct proportion (for
example for D
M
= 2.0%/y, divide time from peak by 2.0 and
multiply decline by 2.0).
to production in the critical plateau and early
decline phases, but moreso in the advanced
decline phase. So far the Norwegian illustration
has not shown time explicitly in the equations
a matter that is accounted for below.
Norways Maximum Depletion and
Annual Decline Rates
Time can be factored in the model by considering
small time increments (dT) required to produce
small amounts of oil (dP). Returning to Equation
8, substitute depletion D = P
C
/ R and a small
production rate dP/dT instead of P
A
:
dP/dT = 4 x P
M
x (D) x ( 1 - D) (9)
inverting both sides of the equation yields:
dT = 0.25 x (dP/P
M
) / [D x ( 1 - D)] (10)
The time interval (T) from the mid-depletion
is calculated by adding the time increments dT
(integrate or sum over time; de Sousa, 2008). Two
commonly cited yearly rates (percentages) are
introduced here to describe how time stretches
and contracts the Hubbert Model.
The rst is the maximum depletion rate (D
M
in
percent per year), here dened as the peak rate
(P
M
multiplied by 100) divided by the producing
resource (R). During Norways peak year in
2001, D
M
was 3.89%/y (D
M
= 100 x 1.21/31.1 Gb;
Table 1). As seen in Figure 5, over the 19962005
plateau, one-year time steps approximately
depleted the maximum rate (i.e. annual P
A
and
peak P
M
production are nearly equal in the
plateau).
The second commonly cited rate is the irreversible annual decline (D
A
sometimes referred to as year-to-
year decline or natural decline; e.g. Skrebowski, 2006a, b, c; 2007; Jackson, 2008); it is the percentage fall
of annual production relative to the previous year. In Table 3, the time interval from peak year (T) and
annual decline are shown for D
M
= 1.0%/y. For other maximum depletion rates, the time interval (T)
changes in inverse proportion (for example for D
M
= 2.0%/y, divide time by 2.0) and annual decline
in direct proportion (for D
M
= 2.0%/y, multiply decline by 2.0).
For Norway (Figure 5), the post-peak years from mid-depletion in 2001 to 95% depletion in ca. 2020
are calculated from Equation 10. Also shown are the average annual decline rates (D
A
) for every
5% depletion increment. The actual decline trajectory between 2001 and 2007 is comparable to the
models prediction. The Norwegian model predicts that the annual decline rate increases from
0.8%/y shortly after the peak, to c. 6.6%/y in 2007 reaching c. 10%/y in the next decade. The models
decline trajectory is predicted to be time-symmetrical to the build-up when reected by the peak year
2001. This is approximately the case so far; for example 2007 (six years post-peak) is mirrored with
1994 (seven years pre-peak).
ADVERT
236
Al-Husseini
Having noted these model predictions for annual decline (D
A
), it is emphasized that the decline
rate for mature basins may not necessarily follow the models prediction (Nehring, 2006a, b, c). As
noted earlier, Norways producing resource (31.1 Gb) may be as much as 13.6% less than the ultimate
resources (36.0 Gb, J. Laherrre, 2008, written communication). This difference implies that additional
and yet-unproved resources may go into production in the future rendering the decline rate less steep
and causing the parabola to become less symmetrical over longer time intervals. This pattern may
be true in general, and particularly when oil prices increase and/or advanced recovery technology
is applied.
Hubbert Model for the United Kingdom (UK)
Whereas Norways production history closely matches the Hubbert Model, the UKs does not.
Although both countries started producing from the North Sea at about the same time (Figure 2
and Table 2, BP, 2008), the UKs production history has a much steeper build-up, an early 1985
peak, followed by a sharp valley between 19891993. The production valley after 1985 was in part a
consequence of the tragic Piper Alpha accident and the subsequent safety measures, which took the
industry several years to implement before returning to full production (Zittel and Schindler, 2003). It
also resulted from reduced production in the Brent eld when gas-producing facilities were installed
(J. Laherrre, 2008, written communication). Production returned to the plateau level in 1993, peaked
in 1999, after which it started to decline.
The UKs end-2007 produced and proved were respectively 24.9 and 3.6 Gb totaling 28.5 Gb in known
reserves, compared to Norways 30.7 Gb (Table 1, BP, 2008). In Figures 6 and 7, the UKs normalized
production, Hubbert Line and Parabola are plotted. The UKs producing resource (R), based on the
19942007 straight line, was found to be 30.6 Gb, which is 2.1 Gb greater than the known reserves
(28.5 Gb) (Table 1). The maximum production is predicted at 1.02 Gb/y in 1996 and compares better
with the second peak in 1999 at 1.06 Gb/y.
As in the case of Norway, the UKs producing resource is again substantially less (12.5%) than
the ultimate recoverable resources (EURR) of 35.0 Gb obtained by J. Laherrre (2008, written
communication). The UKs Hubbert Parabola predicts production to fall to c. 700 Kb/d by 2015 and c.
100 Kb/d by 2030. These predictions are unlikely to be true because by 20152030 currently marginal
resources may become commercially viable to produce. The likelihood of a less steep decline is
reinforced in the IEAs draft of the World Energy Outlook 2008 obtained by Londons Financial Times
(C. Hoyos and J. Blas, October 29, 2008): the report predicts that the UKs North Sea oil production by
2030 will be about 500 Kb/d not 100 Kb/d.
Multimodal Production Curve
The two peaks seen in the UKs production history characterize it as bimodal, whereas Norways is
monomodal (Figure 2). Using only the UKs Production Line before 1994 would have substantially
under-estimated the producing resource at c. 10 Gb (Figure 6). This demonstrates an important
pitfall that occurs when it is assumed that all the resources are in production. Similar multimodal
production curves occur in many countries due to disruptions caused by wars, disasters, sabotage,
strikes, sanctions, quotas, embargoes, price variations and other non-geological factors. It may also
occur in politically stable regions, such as the USAs San Joaquin Valley and Permian Basin, due to
variations in the price of oil, advanced recovery (e.g. impact of waterooding) and other technological
advances (Nehring, 2006a, b, c).
Nevertheless an important observation to note here is that the UKs 19932007 production still tracked
the Hubbert Model quite faithfully over the most critical second plateau and early decline phase
(Figure 7). This observation is relevant to the later discussion of the Worlds production curve, which
is multi-modal (see Figures 15 and 17).
ADVERT
238
Al-Husseini
Comparison of Hubbert Models for Norway and UK
The UKs maximum annual depletion rate (D
M
) was 3.56%/y compared to Norways 3.89%/y.
Norways plateau (> 91% of Peak) lasted ca. 10 years (19962005); in contrast the UK attained two
plateaus (19841987 and 19942001) for ca. 12 years in total (Figure 2, Table 1). At end-2007, the UK
is at 81.3% depletion and Norway at 72.3% of the producing resource. Post-peak, both countries are
tracking the models decline trajectory; at end-2007, the UK was at 56.2% and Norway at 74.8% of
peak production. The close tracking of the models decline-depletion curve is an important result it
appears to be independent of the countrys build-up prole, or whether production is monomodal
or bimodal.
For the North Sea, reserve growth has contributed signicantly for oil and moreso for natural gas
reserves, with for example the giant Ekossk eld surpassing its original estimated recoverable
reserves (Klett and Gautier, 2005; T. Ahlbrandt, 2008, written communication). Nevertheless, taken
together the production of the two countries has declined from 2.21 Gb/y in 1999 to 1.53 Gb/y in
2007, and is predicted by the model to reach c. 0.70 Gb/y by 2015 (Table 2). The predicted 19992015
decline amounts to 1.5 Gb/y (4.1 Mb/d); if true this loss would require new production that nearly
equals the annual crude oil production of Iran, OPECs second largest producer in 2007.
Hubbert Model for Three Onshore Middle East Countries
To illustrate the Hubbert Model for onshore countries that have different reserves, resources and
production histories, three peaked Middle Eastern countries (Oman, Syria and Yemen) are considered
(Figure 8 and Table 2, BP, 2008). In Figures 9 to 14 and Table 1, their productions are compared to the
models graphs. The Hubbert Line became straight after c. 20% depletion for Oman, and 30% for Syria
and Yemen. At end-2007, the ratio of annual-to-peak production (P
A
/P
M
) for Oman was 74.7%, Syria
66.1%, and Yemen 73.5%. In all three cases the model matches the plateau and early decline phases
closely.
A notable difference between the three countries can be observed for the maximum depletion rate
at the peak (D
M
). Yemen with the highest at 4.82%/y has the briefest plateau (six years from 2000 to
2005) and highest annual decline rate (D
A
predicted to reach 9.8%/y in 2008, Figure 14). Syrias D
M
=
3.72%/y corresponds to an 8.5-year plateau (mid-1993 to end-2002) and a maximum decline rate of
8.7%/y in 2008 (Figure 12). Omans D
M
is the least at 2.62%/y, and so the plateau was more long-lived
(12 years from 1994 to end-2005) and the maximum decline rate less steep and predicted to reach
4.5%/y in 2008 (Figure 10).
Figure 6: The normalized UK's Hubbert Line became straight when depletion exceeded 44% in
1994. The data from 1985 to 1993 reflect the tragic Piper Alpha accident and its aftermath, which
involved the implementation of increased safety measures. The producing resource (R = 30.6 Gb)
is 12.5% less than the estimate of the ultimate recoverable resources (EURR = 35 Gb) obtained by
J. Laherrre (2008, written communication).
P
M
=1.02 Gb/y
Model Peak in 1996
Straight line
19942007
Producing Resource
R =30.6 Gb
NORMALIZED HUBBERT LINE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
Model
Mid-Depletion
15.3 Gb
Early Peak
1985 Piper
Alpha Accident
88
87
86
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
01
2000
02
03
04
05
06
07
P
A
P
M
P
C
R
N
o
r
m
a
l
i
z
e
d

A
n
n
u
a
l
/
D
e
p
l
e
t
i
o
n
Depletion (D =P
C
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
End - 2007
Produced
Proved
Total known
: 24.9 Gb
: 3.6 Gb
: 28.5 Gb
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
239
The above comparisons illustrate that the models annual decline rate (D
A
) varies by country (Table 1,
Figures 5, 7, 10, 12 and 14) and over time (see Table 3 and its footnote). The higher the maximum
depletion rate (D
M
= P
M
/R) over the plateau, the shorter its duration and the steeper the annual
decline rate. Signicantly, the time history of production after the build-up phase is predicted to only
depend on the peak production level (P
M
) and the producing resource (R), or equivalently their ratio,
the maximum depletion rate (D
M
) (see Table 3). This prediction is probably more true for the two
North Sea countries than for the onshore Middle Eastern countries.
Unlike most offshore production, onshore production generally includes opportunities for additional
and more expensive projects (enhanced oil recovery - EOR, NGL from undeveloped wet-gas reservoirs,
heavy and/or sulfurous oil reservoirs). These future projects are booked as proved reserves but are
not yet apparent in the historical data; therefore the producing resource R is consistently less than the
known reserves (Table 1): for Oman 12.1% (12.4 versus 14.1 Gb), Syria 18.1% (5.9 versus 7.2 Gb), and
Figure 7: The UK's production has closely followed the parabolic trajectory since 1993 when
depletion exceeded 44%. By end-2007 depletion was 82%, production was at 60% of the peak level
and the annual decline rate was about 8%/y. The model predicts that the natural decline rate will
increase to about 9%/year in the next decade and by 2015 production will be at 25% of the peak
level. These predictions may be too severe if enhanced recovery and higher oil prices result in
additional producing reserves.
Produced 24.9 Gb ?
Proved
3.6 Gb
HUBBERT
PARABOLA
FOR THE
UNITED KINGDOM
(UK)
Aftermath of
Piper Alpha accident
and new safety
measures, and
installation of gas
production facilities.
1996
Peak P
M
=1.02 Gb/y
=2.79 Mb/d
A
n
n
u
a
l
/
P
e
a
k

P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n

(
P
A
/
P
C

%
)
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n

(
G
b
/
y

a
n
d

M
b
/
d
)
Depletion (D =P
C
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
30
20
10
0
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
2.0
2.5
2.8
1.5
1.0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
.
7
%
Annual Decline
01
99
97
96
98
2000
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
77
76
75
78
79
83
80
81
82
84
85 86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93 94
95
96
97
98
99
01
02
03
04
05
06 07
2000
2
.
1
%
3
.
5
%
4
.
8
%
6
.
1
%
7
.
3
%
8
.
3
%
9
.
0
%
9
.
0
%
10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 Gb 5.0
240
Al-Husseini
Figure 8: The production histories of Oman, Syria and Yemen vary significantly in time and level
of plateaus (Table 2, BP, 2008). Their end-2007 known reserves range from 5.26 Gb for Yemen,
7.2 Gb for Syria, to 14.1 Gb for Oman. The Hubbert Lines and Parabolas for all three countries can
be represented by the same normalized graphs (see Figures 9 to 14).
Oman end - 2007
Produced: 8.5 Gb
Proved: 5.6 Gb
Total known: 14.1 Gb
Syria end - 2007
Produced: 4.7 Gb
Proved: 2.5 Gb
Total known: 7.2 Gb
Yemen end - 2007
Produced: 2.46 Gb
Proved: 2.80 Gb
Total known: 5.26 Gb
Yemen Peak
167 Mb/y in 2002
Syria Peak
218 Mb/y in 1995
Oman Peak
351 Mb/y in 2001
OIL PRODUCTION FROM
OMAN, SYRIA AND YEMEN
A
n
n
u
a
l

P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n

(
M
i
l
l
i
o
n

b
a
r
r
e
l
/
y
e
a
r

-

M
b
/
y
)
A
n
n
u
a
l

P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n

(
M
i
l
l
i
o
n

b
a
r
r
e
l
/
d
a
y

-

M
b
/
d
)
Year
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
360
260
280
300
320
340
60
40
20
0 0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Figure 9: The normalized Omani Hubbert Line became straight when depletion exceeded 20% in
1986. The 22-year straight line from 1986 to 2007 points to a producing resource of 12.4 Gb, which
is 12.24% less than the known reserves (14.1 Gb). The producing resource does not account for
many significant projects that are in development and booked as proved but are not detected by
the historical production. Indeed the producing resource is 22.5% less than the estimated ultimate
recoverable resources (EURR = 16.0 Gb; J. Laherrre, 2008 written communication).
P
M
=325 Mb/y
Model Peak in 1999
Straight line
19862007
Producing Resource
R =12.4 Gb
NORMALIZED HUBBERT LINE FOR OMAN
Model
Mid-Depletion
6.2 Gb
2001 - Peak Year at 351 Mb/y
88
87
86
78
79
80
81
83
84
85
82
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
02
2000
03
04
05
06
07
P
A
P
M
P
C
R
N
o
r
m
a
l
i
z
e
d

A
n
n
u
a
l
/
D
e
p
l
e
t
i
o
n
Depletion (D =P
C
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
End - 2007
Produced
Proved
Total known
: 8.5 Gb
: 5.6 Gb
: 14.1 Gb
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
241
Yemen 35.4% (3.4 versus 5.26 Gb). It is also consistently less than the ultimate recoverable resources
(EURR) as estimated by the creaming curve (J. Laherrre, 2008, written communication): for Oman
22.5% (12.4 versus 16.0 Gb), Syria 21.3% (5.9 versus 7.5 Gb), and Yemen 15.0% (3.4 versus 4.0 Gb).
These comparisons illustrate another pitfall in the Hubbert Line technique namely that historical
production data may not account for signicant undeveloped but proved and/or probable reserves.
In such cases, the annual decline should again become less steep as the new projects go onstream.
Indeed the predictions made by Syrias Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources S. Alaw (MEES,
2008) in September 2008 highlight this pitfall. He stated that Syria had recoverable oil reserves of
7.0 Gb, or 5.0 Gb greater than reported in BP (2008). Adding the produced (4.7 Gb) and proved (7.0
Gb) raises the known reserves to 11.7 Gb, or c. 4.0 Gb greater than the estimated ultimate resources of
7.5 Gb (J. Laherrre, 2008, written communication). Moreover, the Minister stated that oil production
in 2008 would increase by 5 Kb/d relative to 2007 thus reversing decline, and would remain above
320 Kb/d until 2020. His 2020 prediction for production is more than three times greater than the one
predicted in Figure 12.
Figure 10: Oman's production has closely followed the parabolic trajectory since 1986. By end-2007
depletion was 69% of the producing resource, production was at 74.7% of the peak level and the
annual decline rate was about 4.5%/y in 2007. The decline curve is expected to become less steep
as new projects start producing in the future.
Produced 8.5 Gb Proved 5.6 Gb
HUBBERT
PARABOLA
FOR OMAN
A
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n
u
a
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/
P
e
a
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P
r
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(
P
A
/
P
C

%
)
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
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n

(
M
b
/
y

a
n
d

K
b
/
d
)
Depletion (D =P
C
/R) Cumulative Production/Ultimate Resource (%)
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
30
20
10
0 0
50
100
150
200
250
300
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
890
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
.
5
%
Annual Decline
01
99
2000
02 03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
20
27
77
76
75
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
67
78
79
83
80
81
82
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97 98 99
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
2000
1
.
6
%
2
.
6
%
3
.
5
%
4
.
5
%
5
.
3
%
6
.
1
%
6
.
7
%
6
.
6
%
10.0 Gb 5.0
1999
Peak P
M
=325 Mb/y
=891 Kb/d
242
Al-Husseini
Figure 11: The normalized Syrian Hubbert Line became straight when depletion
exceeded 30% in 1991.
P
M
=219 Mb/y
Model Peak in 1998
Straight line
19912007
Peoducing Resource
R =5.9 Gb
NORMALIZED HUBBERT LINE FOR SYRIA
Model
Mid-Depletion
2.85 Gb
88
87
86
85
84
83
82
81
80
79
78
89
90
91
92
93
94
96
97
98
99
01
2000
02
03
04
05
06
07
P
A
P
M
C
P
R
N
o
r
m
a
l
i
z
e
d

A
n
n
u
a
l
/
D
e
p
l
e
t
i
o
n
Depletion (D =P
C
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
End - 2007
Produced
Proved
Total known
: 4.7 Gb
: 2.5 Gb
: 7.2 Gb
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Figure 12: Syria's production has closely followed the parabolic trajectory since the early 1990s.
Produced 4.7 Gb
Proved 2.5 Gb
HUBBERT
PARABOLA
FOR SYRIA
A
n
n
u
a
l
/
P
e
a
k

P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n

(
P
A
/
P
C

%
)
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n

(
M
b
/
y

a
n
d

K
b
/
d
)
Depletion (D =P
C
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
30
20
10
0 0
50
100
150
200
220
200
300
400
500
600
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
.
7
%
Annual Decline
01
99
98
2000
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
77
76
75
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
78
79
83
80
81
82
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
2000
2
.
2
%
3
.
6
%
5
.
0
%
6
.
3
%
7
.
6
%
8
.
7
%
9
.
5
%
9
.
4
%
5.0 Gb 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
Peak P
M
=219 Mb/y
=601 Kb/d
243
Figure 13: The normalized Yemeni Hubbert Line became straight when depletion
exceeded 30% in 1998.
P
M
=163 Mb/y
Model Peak in 2002
Straight line
19982007
Producing Resource
R =3.4 Gb
NORMALIZED HUBBERT LINE FOR YEMEN
Model
Mid-Depletion
1.7 Gb
92
93
95
94
96
97
98
99
01
2000
03
04
05
06
07
P
A
P
M
P
C
R
N
o
r
m
a
l
i
z
e
d

A
n
n
u
a
l
/
D
e
p
l
e
t
i
o
n
Depletion (D =P
C
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
End - 2007
Produced
Proved
Total known
: 2.46 Gb
: 2.80 Gb
: 5.26 Gb
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Figure 14: Yemen's production has closely followed the parabolic trajectory since the late 1990s.
The depletion rate of 4.8% over the plateau was the highest amongst the five countries studied in
this paper. As a result the plateau was the the briefest.
Produced 2.46 Gb
Proved
2.86 Gb
HUBBERT
PARABOLA
FOR YEMEN
A
n
n
u
a
l
/
P
e
a
k

P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n

(
P
A
/
P
C

%
)
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n

(
M
b
/
y

a
n
d

K
b
/
d
)
Depletion (D =P
C
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
30
20
10
0 0
50
100
150
200
300
400
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
1
.
0
%
Annual Decline
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
2000
2
.
9
%
4
.
7
%
6
.
5
%
8
.
2
%
9
.
8
%
1
1
.
2
%
1
2
.
3
%
1
2
.
1
%
1.0 2.0 3.0 Gb
2002
Peak P
M
=163.5 Mb/y
=448 Kb/d
ADVERT
ADVERT
246
Al-Husseini
Uzbekistan 0.6 0.05% 1999 191 114 59.7% 0.1%
Peru 1.1 0.09% 1982 196 114 58.2% 0.1%
Indonesia 4.4 0.36% 1991 1,685 969 57.5% 1.2%
UK 3.6 0.29% 1999 2,909 1,636 56.2% 2.0%
Libya 41.5 3.35% 1970 3,357 1,848 55.0% 2.2%
Cameroon 0.00% 1985 181 82 45.3% 0.1%
Romania 0.5 0.04% 1977 313 105 33.5% 0.1%
1,238.0 100% 85,698 81,540 77.6% 100%
Canadian Oil Sands
World Subtotal
World Total
152.2 Not in production
1,390.2
Table 4
Reserves and Production for Oil-Producing Countries
(Ranked according to Ratio of 2007 to Maximum Past Production; BP, 2008).
Country
Reserves
(Gb)
World
Share
Max
Year
Maximum
Production
2007
Production
2007/Max
Production
2007
Share
Table 4 (Continued)
(Production in Million barrels per day, Mb/d).
Country
Reserves
(Gb)
Reserves
Share
Max
Year
Maximum
Production
2007
Production
2007/Max
Production
2007
Share
Angola 9.0 0.73% 2007 1,723 1,723 100.0% 2.2%
Azerbaijan 7.0 0.57% 2007 868 868 100.0% 1.1%
Brazil 12.6 1.02% 2007 1,833 1,833 100.0% 2.3%
Canada 27.7 2.24% 2007 3,309 3,309 100.0% 4.1%
China 15.5 1.25% 2007 3,743 3,743 100.0% 4.8%
Kazakhstan 39.8 3.21% 2007 1,490 1,490 100.0% 1.8%
Other Africa 0.6 0.05% 2007 85 85 100.0% 0.1%
Qatar 27.4 2.21% 2007 1,197 1,197 100.0% 1.4%
Sudan 6.6 0.53% 2007 457 457 100.0% 0.6%
Thailand 0.5 0.04% 2007 309 309 100.0% 0.3%
Algeria 12.3 0.99% 2005 2,014 2,000 99.3% 2.2%
India 5.5 0.44% 2004 812 801 98.6% 1.2%
Italy 0.8 0.06% 1997 124 122 98.4% 0.2%
UAE 97.8 7.90% 2006 2,971 2,915 98.1% 3.5%
Turkmenistan 0.6 0.05% 2003 202 198 98.0% 0.3%
Equatorial Guinea 1.8 0.15% 2005 373 363 97.3% 0.5%
Malaysia 5.4 0.44% 1998 779 755 96.9% 0.9%
Ecuador 4.3 0.35% 2006 545 525 96.3% 0.7%
Saudi Arabia 264.2 21.34% 2005 11,114 10,413 93.7% 12.6%
Other S&C America 1.3 0.11% 2003 153 141 92.2% 0.2%
Nigeria 36.2 2.92% 2005 2,580 2,356 91.3% 2.9%
Mexico 12.2 0.99% 2004 3,824 3,477 90.9% 4.4%
Russia 79.4 6.41% 1987 11,484 9,978 86.9% 12.6%
Other Asia-Pacific 0.9 0.07% 1993 276 234 84.8% 0.3%
Congo 1.9 0.15% 1999 266 222 83.5% 0.3%
Chad 0.9 0.07% 2005 173 144 83.2% 0.2%
Tunisia 0.6 0.05% 1980 118 98 83.1% 0.1%
Denmark 1.1 0.09% 2004 390 312 80.0% 0.4%
Vietnam 3.4 0.27% 2004 427 340 79.6% 0.4%
Kuwait 101.5 8.20% 1972 3,339 2,626 78.6% 3.3%
Argentina 2.6 0.21% 1998 890 698 78.4% 0.9%
Egypt 4.1 0.33% 1993 941 710 75.5% 0.9%
Venezuela 87.0 7.03% 1998 3,480 2,613 75.1% 3.4%
Norway 8.2 0.66% 2001 3,418 2,556 74.8% 3.0%
Oman 5.6 0.45% 2001 961 718 74.7% 0.9%
Brunei 1.2 0.10% 1979 261 194 74.3% 0.2%
Yemen 2.8 0.23% 2002 457 336 73.5% 0.4%
Iran 138.4 11.18% 1974 6,060 4,401 72.6% 5.4%
Australia 4.2 0.34% 2000 809 561 69.3% 0.6%
Trinidad/Tobago 0.8 0.06% 1978 230 154 67.0% 0.2%
Colombia 1.5 0.12% 1999 838 561 66.9% 0.7%
Other Middle East 0.1 0.01% 2002 48 32 66.7%
Syria 2.5 0.20% 1995 596 394 66.1% 0.5%
Gabon 2.0 0.16% 1996 365 230 63.0% 0.3%
Iraq 115.0 9.29% 1979 3,489 2,145 61.5% 2.7%
USA 29.4 2.37% 1970 11,297 6,879 60.9% 8.0%
Other Europe-Eurasia 2.1 0.17% 1986 762 456 59.8% 0.6%
HUBBERT MODEL FOR OTHER COUNTRIES AND BASINS
The Hubbert Model for the ve countries considered so far offered useful insights regarding their
reserves, resources and production. In all cases their E&P activities are driven by production-sharing
agreements (PSA), which result in production rapidly converging on the Hubbert Model. In general,
the model works well for regions that have undergone major early development, have a geographically
limited resource base and are in an early phase of reserves growth efforts (T. Ahlbrandt, 2008, written
communication). It will not generally apply to countries that do not meet some of these preconditions;
some examples are Algerias Ghadames Basin, Neuquen Basin in South America, Brazilian and US
offshore where large deepwater discoveries have recently been made (Ahlbrandt and Klett, 2005), or
the USAs San Joaquin Valley heavy oils and Permian Basin (Nehring 2006a, b, c).
Another important example where Hubberts Model does not apply is represented by the Gulf-5
countries (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), which together account
for 58% of the reported World proved reserves (c. 720 Gb; Table 4, BP, 2008). Their production is
multimodal and mainly been determined by non-geological factors described as an undulating
plateau (T. Ahlbrandt, 2008, written communication). Their known reserves are currently at c. 30%
depletion some more, some less. For these countries, the historical production data do not plot
as a straight Hubbert Line and cannot be used to predict future production proles or estimate the
producing resources.
Irans Production, Reserves and Resources
Irans production illustrates to some degree some of the uncertainties and errors that occur when
applying the Hubbert Model to countries with undulating plateaus (see review of Iran in Al-Husseini,
2007). Irans production ramped-up quickly in the 1960s and early 1970s reaching an early peak of
6.02 Mb/d in 1974. It plateaud in the range of c. 56 Mb/d until 1979, after which it dropped to
1.56 Mb/d in 1981 during the Iran-Iraq War. Since the end of the War, Irans production has risen
steadily reaching 4.4 Mb/d in 2007 (crude oil and condensates). Irans E&P strategy is not driven by
PSA contracts; nevertheless, the country seeks to continuously maximize production and reserves.
By 2007, c. 65 Gb was produced and remaining proved reserves were 138.4 Gb, totaling 203.4 Gb
in known reserves (BP, 2008). The reserves are reported as primary and secondary, the latter mostly
involving gas-injection EOR projects in mature reservoirs.
Contrary to the Hubbert Model prediction, the 1974 peak was attained when cumulative production
was only c. 10% (c. 20 Gb), compared to 50% depletion in the model. When the Hubbert Line was
tentatively applied to Irans 19912007 data, the producing resource (R) was found to range between
156177 Gb, some 1323% less than the known reserves (203.4 Gb). The peak rate at mid-depletion was
found to vary from 4.54.7 Mb/d and to occur in ca. 2020. These results suggest that it is unlikely that
247
Uzbekistan 0.6 0.05% 1999 191 114 59.7% 0.1%
Peru 1.1 0.09% 1982 196 114 58.2% 0.1%
Indonesia 4.4 0.36% 1991 1,685 969 57.5% 1.2%
UK 3.6 0.29% 1999 2,909 1,636 56.2% 2.0%
Libya 41.5 3.35% 1970 3,357 1,848 55.0% 2.2%
Cameroon 0.00% 1985 181 82 45.3% 0.1%
Romania 0.5 0.04% 1977 313 105 33.5% 0.1%
1,238.0 100% 85,698 81,540 77.6% 100%
Canadian Oil Sands
World Subtotal
World Total
152.2 Not in production
1,390.2
Table 4
Reserves and Production for Oil-Producing Countries
(Ranked according to Ratio of 2007 to Maximum Past Production; BP, 2008).
Country
Reserves
(Gb)
World
Share
Max
Year
Maximum
Production
2007
Production
2007/Max
Production
2007
Share
Table 4 (Continued)
(Production in Million barrels per day, Mb/d).
Country
Reserves
(Gb)
Reserves
Share
Max
Year
Maximum
Production
2007
Production
2007/Max
Production
2007
Share
Angola 9.0 0.73% 2007 1,723 1,723 100.0% 2.2%
Azerbaijan 7.0 0.57% 2007 868 868 100.0% 1.1%
Brazil 12.6 1.02% 2007 1,833 1,833 100.0% 2.3%
Canada 27.7 2.24% 2007 3,309 3,309 100.0% 4.1%
China 15.5 1.25% 2007 3,743 3,743 100.0% 4.8%
Kazakhstan 39.8 3.21% 2007 1,490 1,490 100.0% 1.8%
Other Africa 0.6 0.05% 2007 85 85 100.0% 0.1%
Qatar 27.4 2.21% 2007 1,197 1,197 100.0% 1.4%
Sudan 6.6 0.53% 2007 457 457 100.0% 0.6%
Thailand 0.5 0.04% 2007 309 309 100.0% 0.3%
Algeria 12.3 0.99% 2005 2,014 2,000 99.3% 2.2%
India 5.5 0.44% 2004 812 801 98.6% 1.2%
Italy 0.8 0.06% 1997 124 122 98.4% 0.2%
UAE 97.8 7.90% 2006 2,971 2,915 98.1% 3.5%
Turkmenistan 0.6 0.05% 2003 202 198 98.0% 0.3%
Equatorial Guinea 1.8 0.15% 2005 373 363 97.3% 0.5%
Malaysia 5.4 0.44% 1998 779 755 96.9% 0.9%
Ecuador 4.3 0.35% 2006 545 525 96.3% 0.7%
Saudi Arabia 264.2 21.34% 2005 11,114 10,413 93.7% 12.6%
Other S&C America 1.3 0.11% 2003 153 141 92.2% 0.2%
Nigeria 36.2 2.92% 2005 2,580 2,356 91.3% 2.9%
Mexico 12.2 0.99% 2004 3,824 3,477 90.9% 4.4%
Russia 79.4 6.41% 1987 11,484 9,978 86.9% 12.6%
Other Asia-Pacific 0.9 0.07% 1993 276 234 84.8% 0.3%
Congo 1.9 0.15% 1999 266 222 83.5% 0.3%
Chad 0.9 0.07% 2005 173 144 83.2% 0.2%
Tunisia 0.6 0.05% 1980 118 98 83.1% 0.1%
Denmark 1.1 0.09% 2004 390 312 80.0% 0.4%
Vietnam 3.4 0.27% 2004 427 340 79.6% 0.4%
Kuwait 101.5 8.20% 1972 3,339 2,626 78.6% 3.3%
Argentina 2.6 0.21% 1998 890 698 78.4% 0.9%
Egypt 4.1 0.33% 1993 941 710 75.5% 0.9%
Venezuela 87.0 7.03% 1998 3,480 2,613 75.1% 3.4%
Norway 8.2 0.66% 2001 3,418 2,556 74.8% 3.0%
Oman 5.6 0.45% 2001 961 718 74.7% 0.9%
Brunei 1.2 0.10% 1979 261 194 74.3% 0.2%
Yemen 2.8 0.23% 2002 457 336 73.5% 0.4%
Iran 138.4 11.18% 1974 6,060 4,401 72.6% 5.4%
Australia 4.2 0.34% 2000 809 561 69.3% 0.6%
Trinidad/Tobago 0.8 0.06% 1978 230 154 67.0% 0.2%
Colombia 1.5 0.12% 1999 838 561 66.9% 0.7%
Other Middle East 0.1 0.01% 2002 48 32 66.7%
Syria 2.5 0.20% 1995 596 394 66.1% 0.5%
Gabon 2.0 0.16% 1996 365 230 63.0% 0.3%
Iraq 115.0 9.29% 1979 3,489 2,145 61.5% 2.7%
USA 29.4 2.37% 1970 11,297 6,879 60.9% 8.0%
Other Europe-Eurasia 2.1 0.17% 1986 762 456 59.8% 0.6%
248
Al-Husseini
Irans production will reach the 56 Mb/d 1970s level. This prediction is supported by reports that
Irans annual natural decline in the main mature reservoirs ranges between 250500 Kb/d between
5.811.6%/year (see references in Al-Husseini, 2007). This range of decline is large enough to nearly
offset new production.
Maximum Past to Current Production Ratio
In Table 4, oil-producing countries are ranked in terms of the maximum level of past production
compared to their production in 2007 (2007/Past Ratio); for example, Irans 2007-to-1974 ratio is
72.6% (100 x 4.40/6.06). Also shown are reserves and production statistics (BP, 2008), which provide
an approximate overview regarding which countries may have production still rising, on-a-plateau
or in decline. Countries with year 2007 marking maximum production (2007/Past Ratio = 100%) are
clearly in the rising mode. Those with 2007 production at better than 90% of their past maximum
level are probably on their plateau and may be capable of raising production. Countries with ratios
of 8090% are probably on the plateau, but unlikely to increase production. Those with ratios of less
than 80% may be either in the late plateau or in decline.
Iraq with proved reserves of 115 Gb is specically noted for having an exceptionally low ratio of
61.5%; little doubt exists that the past peak level of c. 3.5 Mb/d can be signicantly surpassed.
Table 4 shows that nearly 62% of total 2007 World production is from countries that have a potential
to increase production (2007/Past > 80%) and these hold a 54% share of World reserves (excluding
Canadian oil sands). Another 38% of 2007 production is from countries with ratios of less than 80%
corresponding to 46% of reported reserves; these countries are unlikely to increase their production
(except for Iraq, which accounted for a production share of 2.7% in 2007).
PRODUCTION BASE CASE FOR WORLD CONVENTIONAL
PETROLEUM LIQUIDS
The historical productions of many countries do not plot along a straight Hubbert Line, and therefore
the Worlds producing resource cannot be determined by adding up estimates for individual countries.
Instead this section starts out by applying the Hubbert Line to total World production in order to
estimate the producing resource (R), peak and plateau production levels and peak year (at mid-
depletion); these results are referred to as the Production Base Case and compared to those obtained
by other analysis.
Annual and Cumulative Production Data Base
The Worlds annual production data (P
A
) are listed in Table 5 and plotted in Figure 15, along with
the price of oil in 2007-adjusted US dollars (BP, 2008). The Worlds cumulative production (P
C
) was
calibrated at end-1997 at 838 Gb (Ivanhoe, 2000) and BPs annual production data were used to
calculate P
C
for other years. The resulting P
C
compare closely with published ones for other years; for
example within 14 Gb to the estimates by Hubbert (1969) and the EIA (1985, 1987), by c. 2% (17 Gb)
for 1993 (Shell data in Romm and Curtis, 1996; Edwards, 1997) and 1% (10 Gb) for end-2004 (de Sousa,
2008) and end-2005 (R. Nehring, 2006, AAPG Hedberg Research Conference, November 2006).
Base Case Estimate for Producing Resource (R)
The Worlds production prole is multimodal (Figure 15) and somewhat comparable to that of the
UK (compare Figures 2 and 15). The main build-up phase occurred between 19501974 when many
giant elds were brought into production; between 19601974 production grew c. 2.3 Mb/d annually
while oil prices remained between $1015/barrel (in 2007 dollars). This phase ended with a 3.0 Mb/d
drop in 1975, due mainly to the Arab oil embargo. Following the 1975 valley, the years 19761979 saw
the oil price quadruple and the production trajectory turning upwards. A second valley occurred
between 19791985 due to several factors including the Iran-Iraq War (19801986), as well as peaks
or plateaus in many countries. These included the USAs Lower-48 States 1970 peak, total USA (with
Alaska) peak in 1985, the 19741979 Gulf-5 plateau (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates). In the 1970s the USA and Gulf-5 alone accounted for 50% of World production.
ADVERT
250
Al-Husseini
In Figure 15, a new build-up trend is evident between 19852007; it shows that production growth
was halved relative to the 19601970s (from 2.3 to 1.1 Mb/d) even though prices doubled on average
(from $1015 to $2535/barrel). When the data is plotted along the normalized Hubbert Line, the
1990s2007 interval forms the most current straight-line trend, and in particular the 19952007 data
was used to estimate the Worlds producing resource as 2,860 Gb (Table 1, Figure 16). This estimate
varied by only 50 Gb when the regression was started from 1993 through 1997 and ended in 2007.
Estimates for the producing resource started from 1998 and later years varied by as much as 2,860
300 Gb. The Production Base Case estimate of c. 2,860 Gb was chosen as the average for the overall
interval 1990s2007. It is 351 Gb (14%) greater than the end-2007 known reserves of 2,509 Gb, consisting
of 1,119 Gb produced, 1,238 Gb proved and 152 Gb for undeveloped Canadian oil sands (BP, 2008;
Table 1 and Figure 1).
Comparison of World Resource Using Hubberts Model
The Base Case estimate for the producing resource is substantially greater than those obtained with
the same Hubbert Line technique by Deffeyes (2005) at 2,013 Gb, and de Sousa (2008) at 2,165 Gb.
This discrepancy is apparently due to their lines being applied to a much longer time interval, which
included years that reected constrained production. The time interval 19832003 used by Deffeyes
Table 5
Price and Production of Oil for the World (BP, 2008).
Year
Price
$
Price
2007$
Daily
Kb/d
Annual
Mb/y
Year
Price
$
Price
2007$
Daily
Kb/d
Annual
Mb/y
1950 1.71 14.81 10,420 3,803
1951 1.71 13.72 11,730 4,281
1952 1.71 13.42 12,340 4,504
1953 1.93 15.04 13,150 4,800
1954 1.93 14.96 13,740 5,015
1955 1.93 15.03 15,410 5,625
1956 1.93 14.80 16,780 6,125
1957 1.90 14.06 17,640 6,439
1958 2.08 15.00 18,100 6,607
1959 2.08 14.88 19,540 7,132
1960 1.90 13.37 21,030 7,676
1961 1.80 12.54 22,430 8,187
1962 1.80 12.40 24,330 8,880
1963 1.80 12.24 26,130 9,537
1964 1.80 12.09 28,250 10,311
1965 1.80 11.89 31,806 11,609
1966 1.80 11.53 34,571 12,618
1967 1.80 11.23 37,121 13,549
1968 1.80 10.78 40,438 14,760
1969 1.80 10.23 43,635 15,927
1970 1.80 9.65 48,064 17,543
1971 2.24 11.53 50,846 18,559
1972 2.48 12.36 53,668 19,589
1973 3.29 15.42 58,465 21,340
1974 11.58 48.92 58,618 21,396
1975 11.53 44.64 55,826 20,376
1976 12.80 46.84 60,412 22,050
1977 13.92 47.83 62,714 22,891
1978 14.02 44.77 63,332 23,116
1979 31.61 90.68 66,050 24,108
1980 36.83 93.08 62,948 22,976
1981 35.93 82.25 59,595 21,752
1982 32.97 71.08 57,298 20,914
1983 29.55 61.73 57,686 21,055
1984 28.78 56.14 57,686 21,055
1985 27.56 53.21 57,472 20,977
1986 14.43 27.22 60,467 22,070
1987 18.44 33.64 60,790 22,188
1988 14.92 26.24 63,165 23,055
1989 18.23 30.47 64,056 23,380
1990 23.73 37.82 65,477 23,899
1991 20.00 30.57 65,294 23,832
1992 19.32 28.65 65,802 24,018
1993 16.97 24.52 66,058 24,111
1994 15.82 23.37 67,129 24,502
1995 17.02 23.40 68,132 24,868
1996 20.67 27.54 69,939 25,528
1997 19.09 24.97 72,231 26,364
1998 12.72 16.69 73,588 26,860
1999 17.97 22.74 72,377 26,418
2000 28.50 34.92 74,916 27,344
2001 24.44 29.03 74,847 27,319
2002 25.02 29.06 74,478 27,184
2003 28.83 32.51 77,031 28,116
2004 38.27 42.02 80,326 29,319
2005 54.52 57.90 81,255 29,658
2006 65.14 67.03 81,659 29,806
2007 72.39 72.39 81,533 29,760
Cumulative Production: 1,119 Billion barrels (Gb)
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252
Al-Husseini
Figure 15: The price of oil (in 2007-adjusted US dollars) and production history of petroleum
liquids for the World are from BP (2008). The 19501974 build-up phase took production from
about 4 billion barrels/y (Gb/y) to 21 Gb/y. Between 1960 and 1974 production increased on
average by 2.3 million barrels per day (Mb/d) annually while the price of oil remained between
US$1015/barrel. The period between 1974 and 1985 included several important geological events
(USA Lower-48 States and Iran peaked) and non-geological events (Arab Oil Embargo, Iran-Iraq
War) with prices between US$4090/barrel. After the 1986 oil-price crash, World production grew
at a more moderate rate of about 1.1 Mb/d at US$2535/barrel. The trend between 19912007 forms
a straight line when plotted in Figure 16, with a predicted peak in 2016 at 31.3 Gb/y (85.7 Mb/d,
compared to 81.5 Mb/d for 2007, BP, 2008).
WORLD OIL PRODUCTION
(Includes Condensates
and NGL, BP, 2008)
A
n
n
u
a
l

P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n

(
B
i
l
l
i
o
n

b
a
r
r
e
l
/
y
e
a
r

-

G
b
/
y
)
(
M
i
l
l
i
o
n

b
a
r
r
e
l
/
d
a
y

M
b
/
d
)
P
r
i
c
e

o
f

O
i
l

p
e
r

B
a
r
r
e
l

(
2
0
0
7

-

U
S
$
)
Year
1986
Oil Price Crash
Arab
Oil
Embargo
USA-48
Peak
1970
All
USA
Peak
1985
1974 Iran Peak
1980-1986
Iran-Iraq
War
2007 at
29.76 Gb/y
(81.5 Mb/d)
Price of Oil
(2007 Dollars)
1
9
8
5
-
2
0
0
7

R
a
m
p
A
n
n
u
a
l

G
r
o
w
t
h
1
.
1

M
b
/
y

a
t

$
2
5
-
3
5
2016 at
31.3 Gb/y
(85.7 Mb/d)
2030 at
28.5 Gb/y
(78.0 Mb/d)
1
9
6
0
-
1
9
7
4

B
u
i
l
d
-
u
p
A
n
n
u
a
l

G
r
o
w
t
h
2
.
3

M
b
/
y

a
t

$
1
0
-
1
5
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
6
4
2
0 0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
85
10
Figure 16: The normalized World Hubbert Line has been straight since 1991; the 19952007 data
points to an estimate of producing resource of 2,860 Gb, which exceeds the known reserves (2,509
Gb) by 14% (Table 1). It closely corresponds to the USGS-95% confidence estimate for end-2025
(Table 5). The depletion level of the producing resource is estimated to be 39% at end-2007. The
mid-depletion level corresponds to a maximum sustainable level of 31.3 Gb/y (85.7 Mb/d,
compared to 81.5 Mb/d for 2007, BP, 2008).
P
M
=31.3 Gb/y
Model Peak in 2016
19822003
Straight Line
2,046 Gb
19952007
Straight Line
Producing Resource
R =2,860 Gb
NORMALIZED HUBBERT LINE FOR THE WORLD
Model
Mid-Depletion
1,430 Gb
1982
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2007
P
A
P
M
P
C
R
N
o
r
m
a
l
i
z
e
d

A
n
n
u
a
l
/
D
e
p
l
e
t
i
o
n
Depletion (D =P
C
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
End - 2007
Cumulative Production
Proved Reserves
Canadian Oil Sands
: 1,119 Gb
: 1,238 Gb
: 152 Gb
Known Reserves : 2,509 Gb
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
253
(2005) was here found to predict a resource of 2,046 Gb (Figure 16). This interval included the later
part of the 19801986 Iran-Iraq War, which reduced supplies by some 56 Mb/d for several years. It
also included the period of reduced global demand, which in turn caused OPEC to cut production
by more than 10 Mb/d from about 1981 until 1993. Moreover, due to low oil prices and demand, the
non-OPEC countries also substantially reduced their E&P activities during most of the late 1980s and
1990s.
Clearly the production data is time-dependent and in particular the 1980s were unrepresentative of
the Hubbert Line; especially when the 1990s2007 data clearly form a distinct new straight-line trend
(Figure 16). The 1990s-2007 average straight line suggests that the Worlds production is following a
Hubbert Parabola with an estimated producing resource of c. 2,860 Gb (Figure 17), a quantity that is
more consistent with geological studies noted below.
Figure 17: Since 1995 World production has been following a parabolic trajectory corresponding to
27% to 39% depletion. Between 39% (end-2007) and 60% depletion at end-2025 it is predicted to
remain at a plateau level of between 29.76 and 31.3 Gb/y (81.5 and 85.7 Mb/d). By 2030 it is
estimated to decline to 28.5 Gb/y (78.0 Mb/y). The maximum depletion rate over the plateau is
predicted to be 1.1%/y of the producing resource. The annual decline rate is predicted to be about
1.1%/y between 2025 and 2030.
2007 at 39% Depletion Canadian Oil Sands
Producing Resource 2,860 Gb for
BP defined oil (crude oil, lease condensate, NGL
Canadian oil sands, oil shale;
no biofuels or coal derivatives)
Actual Production (not consumption,
not production capacity)
Cumulative Produced 1,119 Gb Proved Reserves 1,238 Gb
152
Gb
Unknown
351 Gb
WORLD
HUBBERT
PARABOLA
A
n
n
u
a
l
/
P
e
a
k

P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n

(
P
A
/
P
C

%
)
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n

(
G
b
/
y

a
n
d

M
b
/
d
)
Depletion (D =P
C
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
30
20
10
0 0
10
5
20
15
30
25
31.3
10
30
50
70
40
60
80
85.7
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
.
7
%
Annual Decline Increase
2.860
Gb
20
25
30
35
40
45
80
70
60
50
55
65
75
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
01
02
03
04
05
50
55
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
06
07
2000
0
.
2
%
0
.
2
%
0
.
7
%
1
.
1
%
1
.
5
%
1
.
9
%
2
.
2
%
2
.
6
%
2
.
8
%
2
.
8
%
500 2,000 2,500 Gb 1,500 1,000
2016
at 31.3 Gb/y
(85.7 Mb/d)
relative to
81.5 Mb/d in 2007
2007 at 29.76 Gb/y
(81.5 Mb/d)
254
Al-Husseini
Comparison of Base Case Producing
Resource to Geological Studies of
Estimated Ultimate Recoverable
Resources (EURR)
USGS 95% Condence EURR
The most recent study of conventional petro-
leum resources (crude oil, lease condensates
and NGL) was completed in 2000 by the
United States Geological Survey (USGS) and
summarized by Ahlbrandt et al. (2005). The
USGS does not predict future production,
peaks or plateaus. They estimated unknown
resources (undiscovered and reserves growth)
for the period 1996 to 2025, and used IHS data
for end-1995 known reserves (produced 710 Gb,
proved 959 Gb) but did not include Canadian
oil sands. By adding 152 Gb for the latter, the
known reserves for end-1995 are 1,821 Gb. In
Table 6, the USGS unknown resources for their
three cited probabilities are added to BPs (2008)
quantities for end-1995 known reserves. The
Base Case producing resource (2,860 Gb) is just
3% greater than the 95%-condence ultimate
recoverable resources (EURR = 2,770 Gb; USGS-
95% for short), involving an unknown resource
of 805 Gb.
The USGS-95% unknown resource (805 Gb)
may prove to be approximately correct by 2025,
the ending year for their projection (Klett et al.,
2005). Consider that between end-1995, when
the USGS study was closed, to end-2007, known
reserves (produced plus proved, excluding
Canadian oil sands for consistency with USGS
criteria) increased by 544 Gb from 1,813 to
2,357 Gb (BP, 2008). Therefore, of the unknown
resource of 805 Gb, 544 Gb was accounted for by
end-2007, and the difference of 261 Gb remains
to be added between 20082025 as undiscovered
and growth. This translates to adding c. 14.5 Gb
annually for the subsequent 18 years, which is
achievable if the reserves additions of c. 20 Gb
in 2005 are maintained to 2025 (Chew, 2006,
based on the IHS data base). Noteworthy is that of the 20 Gb in added reserves in 2005, 12 Gb was
discovered whereas the remainder was attributed to reserves growth.
Higher EURR
The Base Case producing resource is 21% less than the USGS Mean EURR (2000; Ahlbrandt et al.,
2005) of 3,634 Gb (Table 6) by end-2025. It is 13% less than the estimated resources of crude oil, lease
condensates and NGL reported in Edwards (1997; 3,298 Gb, Table 7) for the end of this century. The
Base Case falls in the middle range of the 136 estimates compiled by Ahlbrandt (2004, 2006; see also
National Petroleum Council, 2007) and below estimates for crude oil only by two oil companies
(reported at the meeting of the National Academy of Science, Washington D.C., USA, October 2021,
2005): 3,200 Gb (S. Nauman, ExxonMobil) and 3,000 Gb (D. Paul, ChevronTexaco). Jackson (2006,
Table 8) estimated the ultimate resources for conventional petroleum liquids at 3,673 Gb, essentially
Table 6
USGS (2000, Ahlbrandt et al., 2005)
(Billion barrels - Gb).
End-1995 to 2025
Cumulative Production, end-1995
(BP, 2008)
Proved Reserves, end-1995
(BP, 2008)
Canadian Oil Sands, end-2007
(BP, 2008)
Total Known Reserves
at 95% Confidence for end-2025
Undiscovered Oil (non-USA)
Undiscovered Oil+NGL (USA)
Reserves Growth Oil (non-USA)
Reserves Growth Oil+NGL (USA)
Undiscovered NGL (non-USA)
Reserves Growth NGL (non-USA)
Total New Resources
Total Petroleum Liquids
at Mean Confidence for end-2025
Total New Resources
at 5% Confidence for end-2025
786
1,027
152
334
66
192
76
95
42
649
83
612
76
207
42
1,017
104
1,031
76
378
42
Total New Resources
1,965
805
2,770
1,669
3,634
2,648
4,613
ADVERT
256
Al-Husseini
the Mean USGS EURR. Taken together with
unconventional petroleum liquid resources
of 1,148 Gb, he estimated total oil resources at
4,820 Gb.
Lower EURR
In contrast to the above noted higher estimates
of resources, C. Campbell (2008, written
communication) considered regular conventional
oil as being the primary category of petroleum
liquids that is relevant to consider in the
prediction of peak oil. He denes this category to
exclude (1) oil from coal and shale, (2) bitumen
(oil sands), (3) extra-heavy and heavy oil (less
than 17.5
o
API), (4) deepwater oil (> 500 m), (5)
polar (Arctic) oil, and (6) NGL from gas plants.
He estimates the Worlds ultimate reserves of
regular conventional oil is about 1,900 Gb.
J. Laherrre (2008, written communication)
estimated the petroleum liquids resources at
between 2,700 and 3,000 Gb as follows: (1) crude
oil at 2,000 Gb, (2) NGL and gas-to-liquids at
250 Gb, (3) renery gains, oil sands and coal-to-
liquids between 150250 Gb, and (4) extra-heavy
oil between 300500 Gb. His estimate for crude
oil and NGL (2,250 Gb) added to BPs oil sands
(152 Gb) amounts to about 2,400 Gb compared
to 2,860 Gb for the Base Case. Moreover, he
considered estimates as high as 3,0004,000 Gb
to be very unlikely.
Production Costs
The focus by Campbell and Laherrre on regular conventional oil and/or liquids is intended by
these authors to emphasize the much greater costs and lead times involved in producing the other
categories. They argue that expensive resources may only reduce the decline rate following the peak,
and these realities are typied by statements made by Frances Total oil company Chief Executive C.
de Margerie. He reported that in 2004 a 12.5% return on investment could be achieved at a price of
$20/barrel; however in 2008 the marginal cost for one barrel reached $70 (e.g. offshore Angola) and
c. $90 for heavy oil (The Times, London, September 12, 2008). These higher costs reect high ination
in the industry at 20% in 2008.
Higher costs also affect the major producers of regular oil. Washington consultancy PFC Energy
reported that Saudi Arabia required average oil prices at c. $55/barrel in 2008 to balance external
accounts. According to PFC and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the costs were higher for
Iran, Nigeria, Russia and Venezuela at between $68 to $94/barrel (B. Lewis and S. Webb, Reuters,
September 7, 2008; N. King Jr. and S. Swartz, Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2008).
Early Production Plateau at 39% Depletion
The Base Case implies the producing resource is 39% depleted at end-2007 (produced/resource = 100
x 1,119/2,860) and within the early part of the plateau (Figure 17). This level falls halfway between
the 3246% depletion range for conventional petroleum liquids estimated by Chew (2006). It is 10%
less than the depletion estimate by Zittel and Schindler (2007). The 39%-depletion of the producing
resource is well beyond the level at which the Hubbert Line became an accurate predictive tool for
four peaked countries studied here: generally past the 2030% range (Figures 4, 9, 11 and 13). In
Table 7
Edwards (1997) End-1993 to 2100
(Billion barrels - Gb).
Cumulative Production, end-1993 720
Proved Reserves, end-1993 1,115
Undiscovered Conventional Oil,
end-2100 1,111
Total Conventional Oil, end-2100 2,946
Total NGL, end-2100 200
Canadian oil sands (BP, 2008) 152
Total Petroleum Liquids, end-2100 3,298
World Unconventional Oils,
end-2100 (Venezuelan heavy oil
and USA oil shale) 158
Total Conventional and Unconventional 3,456
Table 8
Jackson (2006) End-2006 (Billion barrels - Gb).
Resource/Region USA Canada
Rest of
World
Total
Cumulative Production 234 31 813 1,078
Proved 19 7 1,042 1,066
Reserves Growth (EOR) 76 6 510 592
Undiscovered Deepwater 8 3 50 61
UndiscoveredArctic 5 3 100 108
Undiscovered Elsewhere 83 15 660 758
Total Conventional 3,673
Extra-Heavy Oil 0 167 277 444
Oil Shale 500 4 200 704
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Figure 16, the 19952007 straight-line segment corresponds to World depletion increasing from 27%
and 39%, well within the range of prediction established in all but the UKs 44% exceptional case.
Peak Year and Maximum Sustainable Production
According to the Base Case, the maximum production at mid-depletion is predicted at 31.3 Gb/y
(85.7 Mb/d, relative to 81.5 Mb/d at end-2007; BP, 2008) and to occur in 2016 (Equation 10). When
different upwards-trending line segments were separately considered they pointed to between 27.5
and 31.3 Gb/y (75.385.7 Mb/d), regardless of price ranges (2007 dollars): 19751979 at $40, 1986
2003 at $2535 and 20042007 at $5070. The predicted peak differs somewhat from predictions by
several analysts:
Edwards (1997): crude oil at 88 Mb/d in 2020, and with NGL at 96 Mb/y in 2025.
Association for Study of Peak Oil (www.peakoil.net): at 90 Mb/y in 2020 for conventional
petroleum liquids.
R. Nehring (Chairman of the AAPG Hedberg Research Conference, held in November, 2006):
90100 Mb/d plateau extending from 20202040 for the Low Resource case of conventional
petroleum liquids (from R. Nehring, 2007, reported in Kerr, 2007, and Petzet, 2007). For 2020,
Nehring stated: I have a hard time seeing us get to 90 Mb/d seeing us ever reaching 100
Mb/d requires a major stretch on my part (in Andrews, 2007).
Jackson (2006): 95 Mb/d plateau between 20302045 for conventional petroleum liquids
production and for all liquids at 130 Mb/d between 20302050.
Total's CEO C. de Margerie stated (The Times, London, September 12, 2008): "We [Total] still keep
our target that peak production will be below 100 Mb/d. The gure we are using is much more
95 Mb/d." This estimate is relative to 87.0 Mb/d in 2007 compared to 81.5 Mb/d (BP, 2008) and
implies a net gain of 8.0 Mb/d.
The 2016 peak year is qualitatively consistent with the statement by Shell's CEO J. van der Veer: "Shell
estimates that after 2015 supplies of easy-to-access oil and gas will no longer keep up with demand"
(The Times, London, January 25, 2008).
MEGAPROJECTS & DECLINE TECHNIQUE
The predictions of the Base Case (Figures 1517) can be further assessed by comparison to those
from the Megaprojects & Decline technique pioneered by Skrebowski (2006a, b, c; 2007). It involves
adding-up future projects to the existing production, after the latter is discounted for natural decline.
Whereas this technique bypasses assumptions regarding reserves and resources, it is more sensitive
to oil prices, project delays and how to determine a global decline rate.
Future Megaprojects for Conventional Petroleum Liquids
Skrebowski (2006a, b, c; 2007) compiled new petroleum liquids projects (including gas-to-liquids)
with maximum production exceeding 40 Kb/d and identied about 32.4 Mb/d coming onstream
between 20052014 (Table 9). His early 2007 compilation did not include some giant elds discovered
since then, especially in deep offshore Brazil (e.g. Tupi eld with estimated reserves of 58 Gb in
2007, and Iara eld with 34 Gb in 2008). He found that from discovery-to-production averaged six
years for 19972006, and increased to about eight years for projects discovered after 1997 and coming
onstream between 20072012. He concluded that major discoveries in 2008 would be unlikely to come
onstream before the middle of the next decade.
In regards to deepwater and Arctic regions, T. Ahlbrandt (2008, written communication) noted elds
in these settings may take much longer than a decade to come onstream. He stated that the latest
USGS study (Gautier et al., 2008) predicted the Arctic region holds 22% of the Worlds undiscovered
conventional petroleum (Mean estimate of c. 90 Gb oil equivalent - includes dry gas), basically
consistent with the USGS 2000 assessment. However, due to the very difcult logistics, the USGS in
2000 gave a zero probability in the 95%-condence scenario to production from the East Greenland
Province before 2025, a conclusion shared by Cavallo (2002). Ahlbrandt predicted that the Barents
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260
Al-Husseini
Sea will be one of the rst signicant new Arctic
provinces to be developed, but set no specic
date for start-up. These considerations suggest
ruling out Arctic megaprojects coming onstream
before 2025.
Decline Rates for Existing Production
of Conventional Petroleum Liquids
Skrebowski (2006b, 2007) studied the production
histories of 108 giant elds (each with more than
2.0 Gb of original reserves), and reported that
47 elds were in decline, 42 were not, 7 were
undeveloped and 12 uncertain. Taken together
with ve additional elds, these giants account
for about half of the Worlds production and
contained two-thirds of its reserves. He also
reported that 28% of the Worlds production is
from countries with declining production, and
concluded that the average decline rate for end-
2006 production is c. 5.0%/y.
Reporting in a press release on a more comprehensive proprietary CERA-IHS study, Jackson (2008)
summarized the production characteristics of 811 giant oil elds (each with more than 300 Mb of
original reserves). He reported that these elds account for two-thirds of Worlds production in 2007,
of which 41% is from declining elds. The remaining 59% production was from elds that are still
either in the build-up phase or on their plateaus, and these account for 63% of proved reserves in the
811 elds. He concluded that the aggregate decline rate for all these elds is 4.5%/y.
In 2008, the IEA assembled a team of 25 analysts to further assess the Worlds top 800 producing
oil elds using the IHS data base. They estimated the average rate for elds-in-decline at 9.1%/y
a rate that decreases to 6.7%/y when companies invest in more wells and techniques (IEA World
Energy Outlook 2008, IEA Fact Sheet). According to the IEAs Executive Director N. Tanaka, the
global average decline in 2008 was 5.2%/y up from 4.0% in 2007. The IEA concluded that around
7.0 Mb/d of additional capacity over and above the 23.0 Mb/d that will come from 20082015
megaprojects needs to be brought on stream just to hold global production steady. The IEAs
conclusions essentially duplicate those obtained by Skrebowski (2006a, b, c, 2007): decline rate of
5.2%/y versus 5.0%/y and total megaprojects of 30.0 Mb/d versus 32.4 Mb/d by 2015.
Decline rates of 4.59.1%/y are very substantial and choosing an average rate for the Worlds existing
production may be misleading. For the ve peaked countries, considered in this paper, natural
decline was found to vary according to their maximum depletion rates and with time following the
plateau (Table 1). For 2008, it differed by country and predicted to range between 4.5 and 9.8%/y
for all production. No attempt was made to distinguish between decline to existing production and
how much was compensated for by new projects. This issue is illustrated, for example, by Irans
production where natural decline in the mature producing reservoirs ranges between 5.811.6%/
year. Nevertheless, the countrys production is infact increasing at a rate of c. 100 Kb/d annually
as new reservoirs (crude oil and condensates) come onstream, while inll wells are being drilled
and recompleted in mature ones. Moreover, many supergiant and giant elds in the Arabian Gulf
countries are not in decline and it is unclear how this aspect is accounted for by various analysts. This
suggests that the average decline to apply to existing World production should favor a lower estimate
of perhaps 4.5%/y.
Net Production and Decline Rate
Skrebowski (2006b, 2007) concluded that based on balancing megaprojects (32.4 Mb/d) against
his average 5.0%/y decline for existing 2006 production (c. 81.5 Mb/d for crude oil, condensates
and NGL in his study) that only c. 4.0 Mb/d net production would be added by 2011. Because in
Table 9
Projects and Decline Scenario
(Million Barrels per Day - Mb/d).
Year
OPEC
(1)
Non-
OPEC
(1)
Total New
Projects
(1)
Actual (2)
(BP, 2008)
Net after
4.5%
Decline (3)
2004 N/A N/A 80.33 80.33
2005 1.346 1.250
N/A
2.596 81.25 79.31
2006 1.559 1.660 3.219 81.66 79.07
2007 2.844 1.715 4.559 81.53 80.34
2008 2.431 1.955 4.386 N/A 81.57
2009 2.383 2.670 5.053 N/A 83.62
2010 1.995 2.070 4.025 N/A 84.77
2011 1.785 1.877 3.662 N/A 85.69
2012 1.810 1.307 3.117 N/A 86.19
2013 1.012 155 1.167 N/A 84.86
2014 645 0 645 N/A 83.47

(1) Projects exceeding 40,000 barrels/day (Skrebowski,
2007), (2) BP (2008), (3) Decline rate for 811 giant fields
(Jackson, 2008).
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262
Al-Husseini
subsequent years decline would overtake new production, he forecast World peak for conventional
petroleum liquids to occur at c. 85.5 Mb/d in 2011 or so; nearly equal to and ve years earlier than
the prediction of the Base Case (85.7 Mb/d in 2016).
To illustrate the Megaprojects & Decline technique at 4.5%/y decline (Jackson, 2008), Table 9 shows
the combined production increments from new projects (Skrebowski, 2007) assuming no time delays
occur. The 4.5%/y was only applied to existing production, starting at end-2004 when it was 80.3
Mb/d (BP, 2008). For example, for end-2010, the total production P
A
(2010) is obtained by discounting
80.3 Mb/d and adding the total of new increments for six years (2005 to 2010):
P
A
(2010) = P
A
(2004) x (1.0 - 0.045)
6
+ New Increments (2005 to 2010)
P
A
(2010) = 80.3 x (0.955)
6
+ 23.8 Mb/d
P
A
(2010) = 80.3 x (0.759) + 23.8 = 60.9 + 23.8 = 84.8 Mb/d
This example illustrates that a decline rate of 4.5%/y over six years reduces existing production by
24% (80.3 - 60.9 = 19.4 Mb/d), which offsets nearly 81% of the new production increments (23.8
Mb/d). The application of this approach predicts a maximum production of 86.2 Mb/d in 2012
(Table 9). Assuming higher decline rates (e.g. 5.2%/y of the IEA, 2008) would reduce the maximum
production and bring the peak year forward. This led the IEA to conclude: Even if oil demand was
to remain at to 2030, 45 Mb/d of gross capacity roughly four times the current capacity of Saudi
Arabia would need to be built worldwide by 2030 just to offset the effect of oileld decline.
UNCONVENTIONAL PETROLEUM LIQUIDS PRODUCTION BY 2030
In their draft World Energy Outlook 2008 report the IEA projected the global supply of unconventional
petroleum liquids to increase from 1.7 Mb/d in 2007 to 8.8 Mb/d in 2030, of which Canadian oil
sands accounts for 4.0 Mb/d (C. Hoyos and J. Blas, Financial Times, October 29, 2008). R. Nehring
(in Andrews, 2007) predicted that by 2020, Canadian oil sands could produce 4.0 Mb/d, Venezuelas
heavy oil 0.51.0 Mb/d and oil shale zero. In the present papers Base Case, Canadian oil sands
were included in the producing resource implying only some 4.8 Mb/d would be added from other
unconventional petroleum liquids (extra-heavy oil, gas-to-liquids, oil from coal, etc.). This translates
to about 210 Kb/d being added annually for unconventional petroleum liquids by 2030.
Jackson (2008) reported that CERAs 2007 global liquids capacity model stood at around 91.0 Mb/d,
which is 9.5 Mb/d greater than actual production (BP, 2008). He predicted that World production
capacity of conventional and unconventional petroleum liquids could climb from 91.0 to 112.0 Mb/d
by 2017, resulting in a net gain of 21.0 Mb/d. CERAs database of new eld developments expected
to come on stream in the next four or ve years includes some 350 projects (120 OPEC and 230 non-
OPEC) with gross annual contributions of approximately 3.0 Mb/d from OPEC and 3.5 Mb/d from
non-OPEC countries. For the period 20082017, this implies adding c. 5.5 Mb/d annually on average
in order to overcome a decline rate of 4.5%/y. It would total to 55.0 Mb/d in new production capacity
(compared to 32.4 Mb/d for conventional petroleum liquids obtained by Skrebowski, 2007).
The EIA, in their International Energy Outlook (June 2008), predicted two scenarios for petroleum
liquids production. For their reference scenario, the price of oil was projected between $75100 (2007
dollars) between 20072030 and World production of conventional petroleum liquids (crude oil, lease
condensates, natural gas plant liquids and renery gains) increases by 21.0 Mb/d from 81.8 Mb/d
in 2005, to 102.8 Mb/d in 2030. This scenario projected that by 2030 an additional 9.7 Mb/d could be
produced from unconventional resources (oil sands, extra-heavy oils, biofuels, coal-to-liquids and
gas-to liquids) for a total of 112.5 Mb/d. In their high-price scenario the price rises from $100 to $186/
barrel almost linearly to 2030, and demand is curtailed to 99.3 Mb/d in 2030. Now unconventional
petroleum liquids account for nearly 20% of total supply (19.0 Mb/d) and conventional ones decrease
by 1.5 Mb/d to 80.3 Mb/d in 2030.
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264
Al-Husseini
The EIAs high-price scenario for 2030 conventional petroleum liquids (80.3 Mb/d) is consistent with
the Base Case, which predicts 2030 production at 78.0 Mb/d (Figure 15). The Base Case includes
Canadian oil sands (EIAs unconventional) but not renery gains (not included in BPs production or
reserves); they are of comparable magnitude and approximately balance out.
CONCLUSIONS
Historical production data from ve countries with declining production (Norway, Oman, Syria,
UK and Yemen, BP, 2008) were used to illustrate Hubberts Model. The model can be graphically
presented by the Hubbert Line, and used in a straightforward manner to calculate the producing
resource (R). The producing resource does not equal known reserves (produced plus proved) or the
estimated ultimate recoverable resources (EURR). For the ve countries it is between 12.522.5% less than
the EURR. Importantly, it is the producing resource that closely calibrates the production trajectory
Hubbert Parabola particularly over the late build-up, plateau and the critical early decline phase.
In all but the UKs special case, the Hubbert Parabola predicted the production trajectory after the
producing resource was only 1030% depleted, and well before the peak occurred at approximately
50% depletion. The difference between ultimate recoverable and producing resources (EURR - R)
represents more marginal and costly production in the later and more advanced decline phase. These
additional resources are likely to reduce the models predicted decline rate, particularly in times
when oil prices increase.
With oil prices having spiked at $147/barrel in mid-2008, the debate over Hubberts World peak
has peaked in its own right (Figure 15). This paper suggests that the crucial question to consider in
this debate is: Which quantity of hydrocarbon volumes in the ground calibrates the Worlds rate of petroleum
liquids production to about 2030? The lesson learnt from the ve peaked countries is that it is the Worlds
producing resource, not its known reserves or ultimate recoverable resources. This is not to say that
the latter two quantities are not important. Instead it suggests that although great marginal resources
undoubtedly occur in the World (deepwater, Arctic, unconventional petroleum liquids, etc.), their
conversion into producing reserves requires great investments and a time frame that may be well
beyond the next decade, especially if the price of oil is low (Hirsch et al., 2006; Hirsch, 2006).
To test this hypothesis the Worlds Hubbert Line for conventional petroleum liquids (as reported by
BP, 2008) was plotted and found to be a straight line since 1991 (Figure 16). The 19952007 segment
converges on an average producing resource of about 2,860 billion barrels (Gb), corresponding
to peak production at 31.3 Gb/year in 2016 (85.7 Mb/d relative to 81.5 Mb/d in 2007, BP, 2008).
This hypothesis was considered as the Production Base Case and compared to results from several
independent analytical techniques, each based on unrelated types of technical databases compiled by
different authoritative organizations. The producing resource (2,860 Gb) compares closely to:
2,770 Gb by 2025 at 95%-condence (USGS, 2000; Ahlbrandt et al., 2005; including Canadian oil
sands at 152 Gb, BP, 2008).
2,869 Gb by adding 20 Gb/y annually to 2025 (2005 new reserves; Chew, 2006; CERA-IHS data
base) to known reserves (BP, 2008).
The Base Case's peak (85.7 Mb/d in 2016) is close to the 86.2 Mb/d in ca. 2012 using the future
Megaprojects & Decline technique (Skrebowski, 2007, Petroleum Review data base; Table 9) and
the lowest average decline rate of 4.5%/y for existing production (Jackson, 2008, CERA-IHS data
base).
These close results argue that the Base Case producing resource calibrates the World's Hubbert
Parabola through ca. 2025 or later (Figure 17), and if true then this quantity is about 39% depleted. This
level is past the range of depletion for the accurate prediction of the peak/plateau and early decline
in the studied countries (1030%). The Base Case implies that net new production of conventional
petroleum liquids will be c. 500 Kb/d annually to 2016, on average, and then unlikely to increase
beyond.
265
The Base Case makes no assumptions about the price of oil, which at rst seems to defy the laws of
supply and demand. But this is not necessarily true; instead it suggests that the high oil prices since
2003 marked the entry into the supply-constrained World plateau for conventional petroleum liquids
(Figure 15). In the plateau, high prices are required to reduce demand growth, while simultaneously
insuring protable returns from more costly resources. The EIA (2008) arrived at a similar conclusion
in their high-price scenario predicting production of conventional petroleum liquids decreases to 80.3
Mb/d by 2030, compared to the Base Cases 78.0 Mb/d in 2030 (Figures 15 and 17). These results argue
for accelerated E&P investments in conventional and unconventional petroleum liquids and other
energy forms, greater energy efciencies (particularly in the transportation sector, which consumes
nearly 70% of petroleum liquids) and other measures aimed at meeting the Worlds demand for
energy.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author thanks Thomas Ahlbrandt, Hassan I. Al-Husseini, Sadad. I. Al-Husseini, Colin Campbell,
Robert Hirsch, Jean Laherrre, Joerg Mattner, Richard Nehring and Karen Wagner for their important
comments and suggestions, which greatly improved the paper. The interpretations of the results
presented in this paper may not reect their views in part or completely. The author regrets that
attempts to contact K. Chew and P. Jackson (CERA-IHS) and Chris Skrebowski (Petroleum Review)
were not successful, and hopes that their studies have been faithfully reported in the paper.
GeoArabias Arnold Egdane is thanked for designing the paper.
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Moujahed Al-Husseini founded Gulf PetroLink in 1993 in Manama,
Bahrain. Gulf PetroLink is a consultancy aimed at transferring technology
to the Middle East petroleum industry. Moujahed received his BSc in
Engineering Science from King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals
in Dhahran (1971), MSc in Operations Research from Stanford University,
California (1972), PhD in Earth Sciences from Brown University, Rhode
Island (1975) and Program for Management Development from Harvard
University, Boston (1987). Moujahed joined Saudi Aramco in 1976 and
was the Exploration Manager from 1989 to 1992. In 1996, Gulf PetroLink
launched the journal of Middle East Petroleum Geosciences, GeoArabia, for
which Moujahed is Editor-in-Chief. Moujahed also represented the GEO
Conference Secretariat, Gulf PetroLink-GeoArabia in Bahrain from 1999-2004. He has published
about 30 papers covering seismology, exploration and the regional geology of the Middle East,
and is a member of the AAPG, AGU, SEG, EAGE and the Geological Society of London.
geoarabi@batelco.com.bh
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