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Frank's early essay on the term ma'na in Arabic usually regarded as purely semantic in force, Frank shows that its meaning went beyond semantics. He does this on the basis of studying texts in Muslim theology (Kalam).
Frank's early essay on the term ma'na in Arabic usually regarded as purely semantic in force, Frank shows that its meaning went beyond semantics. He does this on the basis of studying texts in Muslim theology (Kalam).
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Frank's early essay on the term ma'na in Arabic usually regarded as purely semantic in force, Frank shows that its meaning went beyond semantics. He does this on the basis of studying texts in Muslim theology (Kalam).
Copyright:
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
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Scarica in formato PDF, TXT o leggi online su Scribd
AI-na'na Sone BeJIeclions on lIe TecInicaI Meanings oJ lIe Tevn in lIe KaIn and Ils Use
in lIe FIsics oJ Mu'annav
AulIov|s) BicIavd M. FvanI Souvce JouvnaI oJ lIe Anevican OvienlaI Sociel, VoI. 87, No. 3 |JuI. - Sep., 1967), pp. 248- 259 FuIIisIed I Anevican OvienlaI Sociel SlaIIe UBL http://www.jstor.org/stable/597718 . Accessed 11/02/2014 1348 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . American Oriental Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of the American Oriental Society. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Tue, 11 Feb 2014 13:48:36 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 248 FISCHnL: Exploration of the Jewish Antiquities of Cochin The facsimiles of the copper plate inscription, first brought to the notice of Europe by Anquetil du Perron in 1771, then around 1780 by A. s'Gravezande and in 1806 by Buchanan have been supplanted by the meticulous critical work carried out by experts in the field during the nineteenth century, thus affording a sound basis for the understanding of these remnants of the Jewish antiquities in Cochin. This historical-critical survey may have indi- cated the great efforts made throughout the last two and a half centuries to acquaint the Western world with these Jewish antiquities of Cochin. During the 20th century, the interest in them did not diminish as attested by the flow of publications by casual visitors as well as serious scholars.106 106 Among those from the second half of the 19th cen- tury, mention ought to be made of Benjamin II (1850), J. Sapir (1860), S. Reinman (1884), E. N. Adler (1906), E. Thurston (1909), C. Z. Kloetzel (1938), and D. Mandelbaum (1938). AL-MAtNA: SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE TECHNICAL MEANINGS OF THE TERM IN THE KALAM AND ITS -USE IN THE PHYSICS OF MU'AMMAR RICHARD M. FRANK THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA I THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF ATTEMPTS to define the meaning of the term matna as it is used in the thought of Muammar and to describe the significance of the concept in his system, as well as to trace the origin of the term and concept to earlier, non-Islamic sources. The most recent of these is the short article of Professor H. Wolfson in Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamil- ton A. R. Gibb.' Indeed, the remarks which I shall present here were, in some sense, provoked by my reading of Professor Wolfson's article, for, though I must confess (to borrow a phrase from Plato) s/tAav yE rtva /HE Kat aiCo C'K 7ratso3 cxovaav in regard to Prof. Wolfson's contributions to the history of philosophy and to the study of Islamic thought, I cannot but differ from his understand- ing of the term and its function in the "physics" of Mutammar. The simple fact is that there remains a clear need, within the body of scholar- ship devoted to the kalam, for a systematic study both of the term itself, in the specialised use in which it is found in Mutammar's work and that of other kalam writers, and of the structure or func- tion of the concept in the "physics" peculiar to Mutammar. It is not my intention here to make a detailed analysis of Mucammar's entire theological and philosophical system. Rather, I shall limit myself to determining the exact meaning of the term matna' in the kalam generally and to trying to place this meaning within what I should call the physics of Mutammar's system. This is the abso- lute prerequisite to any attempted hypothesis con- cerning the source of the concept through parallels in classical or Hellenistic thought. The term, in this specialised use, is to be found virtually throughout the kalam (at least into the eleventh century) and it is important, I think, to keep in mind that Mutammar, in all probability, was led by reasons first historical and then of logical con- sistency within his own theoretical framework, to carry the principle denoted by it to a kind of extreme. Although the author best known for his use of the term is unquestionably Mutammar, it would be best to begin with a brief review and examination of the term as it is used by other kalam authors from abuf 1-iudhayl into the period following abuf lalsim al-6lubba&i and al-'A3arli but prior to the general tendency to hellenize much of the kalam and its terminology. I shall not make any pretense of completeness of citations (for they are far too many, especially in the extensive writings of 'Abd al-Oxabbar) but shall limit myself to a few 'Ed. George Makdisi (Leiden, 1965), pp. 673-88; on earlier studies by Horovitz and Horten, cf. ibid., 685 ff. This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Tue, 11 Feb 2014 13:48:36 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions FRANK: Al-mata: Some Reflections on the Technical Meaning of the Term in the Kalem 249 citations illustrative of typical usage, found in several authors of different periods. This should be quite sufficient to establish the overall pattern of the term's use and, this done, it will then be easier to discuss the meaning and function of the ma'dni in the work of Mutammar. Professor Wolfson remarks 2 that in restating the position of Mutammar we find, with both eAbd al-Qahir al-Bagdadi and gahrastani, an apparent substitution of the term "accident" (tarad) for the original matna.s The fact is that in many instances the term matna is indeed used where we might well expect the word accident; the two are frequently used almost interchangeably. Al-'A9tari, in the Maqdiltt al-'Islamityin, has a short section concerning the question of whether "the maan' which subsist in bodies are called accidents." 4 Again, abfU Il-Hudhayl al- Allaf is quoted as saying that the act of perception ('idra&c) is a mana. We find, in another place, the inverse of this proposition, as it were, argued by al-'As'ari, who says that the act of seeing does not imply the coming to be of a matna in the object seen, i. e., no new, intrinsic determination of the being of the object that defines it in its being perceived. Going on in his discussion of the vision of God by the blessed (ibid., ? 74), al-'Astari says that " some of our fellows say that the one who holds [the aforementioned thesis] must perforce mean, when he mentions taste, touch, and smell, either that God (the Exalted) creates an act of perception of Himself in these members, without there coming to be in Him any maca', or must mean that a matna comes to be in Him. Now if he means the coming to be of a macna in Him, this is impossible; but if he means the coming to be of an act of perception in us, this is possible." So also, rather frequently, we find motion (Qaraka) and in general the so-called 'akwan (the modes of being-in-space), referred to by the term matnd. In the classical proof of the existence of God that is based on the temporality of bodies, attributed to abuf 1-Hudhayl, the first two premises are formulated by 'Abd al-xabbar in the following terms: "that there exist ma"'ni [sc., union, sepa- ration, movement, and rest] in bodies; and that these ma'Ani are generated." The same author, again, refers to desire (sahwa) as a macna, in a passage that we can take as typical of all these cases in which matna is used as the equivalent of accident. He says: 8 "Now as for how he knows that he is desiring because of a macnd, it is this: he becomes desiring something subsequent to his not being desirous of it, all the rest of his states being the same [as they were]; there must, there- fore, be something ['amr] which necessitates his being desiring and there is no way in which he may become desiring except through the presence of a matna in him. He must, then, become desir- ing because of an act of desiring [li-sahwa]." Ibn tAyyas, another member of the Basra school of the Muttazila, denies that the actuality of pain ('alam) is a macnd, arguing that "the pain which occurs in his body is not due to a macna but rather man suffers pain only at the disjoining [of the material parts] of his body, since his health has been vitiated and the equilibrium of his body has ceased." 9 Pain is, he goes on to say, a particular perception ('idradk), defined by its content, not a distinct accident or macnd, viz., al-'alam. Qudra is described as a macna by 'Abd al-Gab- bar: 10 "we have shown that the agent acts only through his being qadir and that he is qadir, when 2 op. cit., 677. 8 Al-Farq bayn al-firaq (ed. M. Badr, Cairo, 1328/ 1910), 137. and K. al-Milal wan-nihal (ed. M. Badran, Cairo 1327/1910-1375/1955), 98. ' Ed. H. Ritter (Istanbul, 1929-30), 369. I do not think that one has to do here with the frequent use of ma'nt as a term for " thing" in the most general sense (on which cf. infra, n. 15). 6 'Abd al-(abbar, al-Mujni, 4 (ed. M. Hilmi and A. al-Afifi, Cairo, n. d.), 55, line 15; the author's disagree- ment here is that whereas abA 1-Hudhayl holds that 'idrdk is a distinct and separate accident existing in the heart ('ilm al-qalb = an interior act of knowing) he considers it to be a kind of function of the faculty of sense (al-hMssa) and its organ, within the structured operation of the organism (binya) ; cf. the discussion of the same topic, ibid., 34 f. On the position of abA 1-Hudhayl, cf. also Maqdldt, 569 and 312, and on his general notion of the discreteness of the accidents in general, cf. infra, n. 25. 6 Kitdb al-Luma' (ed. R. McCarthy in The Theology of al-Ash'ari, Beyrouth, 1953), ?? 68 ff; on the same argu- ment, cf. also 'Abd al-6abbhr, op. cit., 137 f. ?garh al-'usifl al-hamsa (ed. A. Ousman, Cairo, 1384/ 1965), 95 (where the attribution to abil 1-Hudhayl is given) and al-Muhit bit-taklif (ed. 0. Azmi, Cairo, n. d.) 36, where the same formulation with the term ma'na is given. 8 Al-Mu!nf, 4, 19, lines 17-20; in translating the pas- sage I have maintained the participial adjectives since they are central to the structure of his thought, even though they are somewhat awkward in English. 9 Al-Mufntf, 4, 29. 10 Al-Mugni, 5 (ed. M. el-Khodeiri, Cairo, n. d.) 49, lines 6 ff. This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Tue, 11 Feb 2014 13:48:36 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 250 FRANK: Al-macnA: Some Reflections onr the Technical Meaning of the Term in the Kala'm he is corporeal," on account of a mactna [such that], if it were absent, he would no longer be qadir." The point here-and it is one upon which the author dwells at length-is that of the distinc- tion between God, who is qadir per se (bi-dhtihi, li-ma' huwa 'alayhi fi nafsihi, etc.) and whose "being-qadir" (kawnuhu qa'diran) is a hal, and the corporeal agent who is qaydir through the acci- dent (arad) of qudra that is present in him. So also, in another place, we find macna used of the act of knowing (rilm), where, arguing to prove that God is knowing, etc., per se and not through distinct, inherent acts (accidents or attributes) of knowing, etc., the same author says 12 that this may be demonstrated by the fact that "the very attribute [$ifa] of knowing, when it is necessary,'3 is not contingent upon any matna. The manner of its non-contingency upon a marna is nothing other than its necessity. Indeed, if it were possi- ble, there would have then to be some matna, but since it is necessary, it is independent of any ma'na. Thus we know that the necessary attribute [a$-$ifatu l-wadiba] is not contingent upon any marnan and that the cause [-illa] of the non-contin- gency is the necessity and nothing else. If this were not so, then in the matter of His knowing (be He exalted), it would have to be a knowing contingent upon a manan and this would lead to unrestricted marAXnA2." Finally, in another place, he refers to the lack of the power of efficient causality ('agz) in parallel fashion, saying'4 that "in this manner one says of one who is incapable of acting [al-4'aiz], that he is incapable of thus- and-so, in that the power of efficient causality is correlated to the other. Hence the absence of the power of efficient causality is analogous, even if it is not affirmed in a strict sense as a real macnd." From these few examples (and many more might be cited) we can begin to determine the primary content of the term. From one stand- point, the word manad, in all the citations given above, is the equivalent of 'arad, accident, as, for example, 'Abd al-6abbar, in the last two texts, means by ma na precisely the act of knowing or of qudra, as a distinct, real act, existing or inhering in the subject and separable from it. On the other hand, it is equally clear from the same contexts that the reference is not simply to states and con- ditions, considered merely as distinct realities present in a subject, but rather as they constitute separate determinants of its being. That is to say, rather than regarding motion, perception, desire, etc., as accidents ( a radl) of the subject in which they inhere or occur (kala, kadata) or as sepa- rable attributes, permanent or transient, of the subject as qualified (mawsftf) thereby, they are regarded as the intrinsic causal determinants of the thing's being-so: the actuality of the accident of motion in the subject is the immediate causal determinant of its being-in-motion and so also the other accidents are the immediate, intrinsic causes of its being mudrilc, mus'tahi, etc. In this sense, the term is an equivalent of the term " cause " ('illa) and this is one of the mean- ings by which "Abd al-xabbar defines it.15 Funda- t1 The question involved here is that the incorporeal (i. e., God) is qddir per se; the distinction between the qddir bi-nafsihi and the qadir bi-qudra occupies a re- markable quantity of space in the writings of the QA41, being the center of one of the chief quarrels between the Mu'tazila and the followers of al-'Ag'ari. 12 Al-Muhl't bit-taklif, 173 (at the bottom) ; cf. also ibid., 172 f; cf. also garh al-'usul al-hamsa, 199 where, in the same argument, 'illa is used for ma'nn. 13 The "necessary" (al-w "ib) in the present context is that whose non-existence is impossible, as opposed to the "possible" (al-g4'iz), viz., what may exist or not or what exists at one time and not another; note that the term mumkin is not, as a technical term for the possible, a kalam term; rather, the kalAm uses gd'iz and sahih al-wugld (which may be distinguished in certain contexts) as the normal terms for the possible until the period in which the vocabulary tends to become that of the philosophers. 14 Al-Mujni, 5, 247. 15 Ibid., 253; there are a number of contexts in which we find that the terms 'illa and ma'n& seem to be used interchangeably, e. g., in the Tamhid of al-BaqillAni (ed. M. el-Khodeiri and M. abu Rida, Cairo, 1366/1947), p. 42, the author says that in the case of a body's moving after having been at rest, its moving must be either per se or through a cause (li-nafsihi 'aw li-'illa) but then, in repeating the same premise several lines further on, he says that it must be either per se or because of a maPna. 'Illa here, it should be noted, is an intrinsic causal determinant (cf. also infra). In the same way, al-'Ag'arl, in listing various opinions on the classic kalAm question of whether God creates on account of a cause (li-'illa) or not (Maqalat, 252 f.) quotes Mu'am- mar as saying that He does (ibid., 253; cf. also infra, n. 33) whereas, to judge from Mu'ammar's usually quoted usage, he probably used the term ma'na. Con- cerning the use of the term in the sense of " something real" or "something affirmed as having reality" (gay' mutbat-cf. al-MuIni, loc. cit.) we need make no com- ment here save to note that in some instances there is a degree of ambiguity concerning the strict sense in which the term is to be taken, as for example, where abfil-Hudhayl is said to have held that "the soul is a This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Tue, 11 Feb 2014 13:48:36 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions FRANK: Al-matna: Some Reflections on the Technical Meaning of the Term in the Kalem 251 mentally, there can be little doubt that the term matna, in this particular technical use, represents in origin an equivalent of Syriac ?elleta and Greek airta. Both the Greek and Syriac terms, it should be noted, carry also the sense of "charge," "ac- cusation," " pretext," etc., and so validate the parallel also in the usual, non-technical use of the term ma'na' in the sense of "meaning," " intent," etc. Before passing on, it might be well to note briefly the differences between the terms for cause, viz., sabab and 'illa, as they are used in the kalam and to remark briefly on the use of the latter as it relates to that of matna in the sense outlined above. Excluding instances in which the terms are not used strictly-where close distinctions of meaning are not insisted upon-we find the term sabab (most often in the plural, 'asbaib) used to denote the element in a chain or concatenation of causes or the factors in a causal sequence leading from some initial act or event to a resulting event in another subject than that in which the sequence was initiated. The relation of the sabab to its result (musabbab) need not be necessary; i. e., the term, per se, does not imply that the result follows immediately and inevitably from the sabab or the sequence of 'csbab, nor, again, is the sabab neces- sarily the cause of but a single effect. Thus, according to Bisr b. al-Muttamir, describing the notion of tawallud, "whatever arises as the conse- quent of our act . . ., all this is our act, coming to be as the result of the sequence of causes [3asbab] which result from us, as for example the hand's or foot's being broken when a person falls is the act of the one who occasioned its cause ['ata bi-sababihi], as also the soundness of the hand, by being set, or of the foot by being set, is the act of the man." 16 This use of sabab as a causal element or factor in a sequence of events or as the occasion of an event is found throughout the kalam, especially in discussions of tawallud and whenever the term is used strictly, in contra- distinction to "illa, it is to be taken thus. 1Ila, on the other hand, is used, when used in a strict sense, most commonly as the direct or primary determi- nant cause that produces its effect (ma'lul) im- mediately and necessarily, without the interven- tion of any other causal factor; the existence of the 'illca necessitates that of the ma liul and a single "illa, in contrast to sabcab, can produce but a single effect.17 There is some debate among the early mutakallimn as to whether the actuality of the 'illa and that of its mablul are simultaneous or whether the former may be temporally prior to the latter; according to al-(ubba1 it may precede by a single, indivisible instant (waqt) and he adds that whatever may precede its effect by more than a single instant is not an cilla.18 Most importantly, the ailla is most often (almost by definition) an intrinsic cause; it is interior to the thing and automatically produces its effect. Generally thus, according to al-Gubbal' and his followers, no act (fif1-being by definition the the action of an agent who knows, wills, and intends it) can be the effect of an tilla or, to put it the other way, no ma1lul can be fi'l. The same distinction is held by al-'Astarl and goes back, no doubt, to the earliest kalam. The act of the agent can, however, be musabbab (at least for those who hold the doctrine of tawallud), as an agent may initiate a sequence of 'asbAb. Therefore it is said that "the sabab does not necessitate its effect as the tilla necessi- tates its effect. The former comes to be through it only as originating in the qadir, since he is the one who causes the being of the musabbab by causing the being of the sabab. For this reason it is possible [for an agent] to effect [several] actions, separately or together; this is not, how- ever, possible in the case of causes ['ilal] since their action is by way of necessity." 19 mamna other than the spirit " (Maqdldt, 337) and al-'AMarl's statement (ibid., 336) that Aristotle held the soul to be a ma'na so elevated that it is not subject to certain things and his report (ibid., 335) that " some people hold the spirit to be a fifth ma'n4t other than the four natures." In these instances we might have ex- pected the term say' (thing, being) or 'amr (which is used by 'Abd al-dabbar in the passage cited in n. 8 above precisely as a completely neutral term, in order to avoid ma'n& which bears that meaning which he wishes to affirm in the context); on the other hand, Mu'ammar and abA 1-Hudhayl are quoted in the same work (339) as affirming that the soul is " an accident" ('arad). It is possible that the term, even in these contexts, does denote something like a " functioning or operative causal element " or the like. For an instance of ma'n4 as the equivalent of 'illa in a less restricted sense than that pointed out below, cf. at-Mujnf, 4, 337 f. "I Maqalat, 401. 17 N. B. the discussion in al-Mujni, 4, 312-14. 18 MaqAlat, 390; (I am not concerned here with the question of 'iflat al-i*tiydr); on the same subject, cf. al-Mugn', 5, 76 (11. 13 ff.) and 46. "I Al-Mujntd, 4, 313; cf. also Sarh al-'usill al-6amsa, 98 f. This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Tue, 11 Feb 2014 13:48:36 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 252 FRANK: Al-matna: Some Reflections on the Technical Meaning of the Term in the Ka14m To return to our principal subject then, we find the term manac used frequently in the sense of 'illa in such a way that it is a kind of equivalent of the term earad, in that the latter may be con- sidered the immediate cause or determinant of the effect in the thing of its being-so. Thus 'Abd al-Cabbar refers to heat and cold by the term ma na in that they are the immediate determinants of a body's being hot or cold and goes on to say that "it is not possible that a single maena should be the necessitating cause [muftib] of heating [tashin] and of cooling [tabrid], simply because that particular heat [karaira] by which a thing is hot is contrary to that particular coldness by which it is cold. For this reason it is impossible that a single thing [say'] should be the necessitating cause of heating a body and of cooling it." 20 The point that I would make here is that in the kalam the term mana6 (within the area of meaning here under discussion) nearly always means, in one sense or another, an intrinsic, determinant cause of some real aspect of the being of the subject. For most authorities, whether al-'AsAarl and his school or the Mutazila, this determinant cause is usually an accident ('arad) or attribute (qifa), but always an accident or attribute considered as a distinct and separate cause of the thing's being-so (kawnuhu kada' = das Sosein). This may be illustrated quite well by a single passage: in dis- cussing the fact that God's potential of causality is infinite and the fact that some things are, never- theless, impossible, 'Abd al-Nabbar notes that the objective possibility (Pi~ha) or impossibility of a particular thing's being involves a change of rela- tion between God and the possible object of His causality as it bears on its possibility and impossi- bility at one time or another; he says then that the alternation of the relationship resides in the " coming to be of a new state " (tagaddud as-sifa) on the part of the potential object, since God's state is eternal; otherwise God, like human beings, "would be qa'dir through an act of qudra, because, when an attribute [sifa] is subject to becoming or alteration of being [ta'addud], without there being here anything that necessitates its newness or alteration, then that which necessitates its being-new must perforce be a mana' [sc. qudra] that renders it necessary." 21 Taking mana& then in this sense, the most com- mon problem which we find discussed in the sources, where the term is used, is this: given the maend as the intrinsic causal determinant of a certain aspect of the being of the thing, is it, of and in itself, the sufficient cause of the presence of the attribute (the being-so) ? As it is treated in the sources, by Mucammar and the other kalam writers, this question takes on two forms; first that of the cause or ground of the being of the particular accident or attribute, as belonging to or inhering in the particular subject at a particu- lar moment of time and in a specific place, and secondly, the inverse of this, viz., the cause or ground of the particular subject (body, atom, etc.) as it is, in its unique individuality, the subject (mahall) of the particular attribute at a par- ticular moment of time. The questions are quite distinct in that the former involves the cause of the attribute as it comes to be in the particular subject in such wise that the attribute is itself immediately the determinant factor of the thing's being-so, while, in the latter case, the question centers on the subject as mawsuf or qualified by the particular attribute or accident, so that the question becomes one of whether the reality of the being-so of the subject is directly grounded in the attribute or whether its being-so is mediated by another intrinsic causal determinent (maena). Both these aspects of the question will become amply clear when we take up the formulations of Mu'ammar's theory shortly. First however, in order to gain a better general perspective on the question, it were well to look at several texts of other authors. The problem, indeed, is ancient in Islam-as old as the kalam. In examining the question, however, one must be careful to deter- mine the precise meaning of the formulae and their intent, since sometimes seemingly similar formulae represent the expression of radically different conceptions and understandings. The most common aspect under which this question arises, in most of the sources, is, without much doubt, determined by the thesis of Muam- mar and the 'ashab al-macini; that is, it is formed by the polemic directed against their general posi- tion and its implications. Nevertheless the prob- lem is in no sense the unique property of Mucammar and his followers. We read, for in- stance, that "most of the speculative theologians hold that when we affirm that a body is moving after its having been at rest there must perforce 20 A-tqMuTni, 5, 32 (11. 15ff.). 21 Ibid., 4, 330. This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Tue, 11 Feb 2014 13:48:36 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions FRANK: Al-ma'na: Some Reflections on the Technical Meaning of the Term in the Kalam 253 be a motion on account of which it has moved, but the motion is not a motion of the body on account of the coming to be of some intrinsic causal de- terminant [manan] because of which it is its motion, and they hold a like position regarding the other accidents." 22 This statement simply says that the motion is itself the sufficient cause of the body's being in motion without the intervention of any other cause being necessary to explain the actuality of its being moved. The question of an external "moving cause" is not raised since the focus is exclusively on the function of the motion as the determinant of the fact of the body's being moved. Where one has to do with the question of the mamna the problem is not considered by the kalam as one of the extrinsic cause or source of the movement or one of a transfer of energy, through which a new state is effected in the object.23 Again, on the same subject, in order to avoid any possible ambiguity in defining his own notion of the relationship between the body as moved and the reality of the accident of motion in the body, al-6ubba'i says that the motion "is a motion of it [sc. the body] neither per se nor by an intrinsic causal determinant [macna], while others say that it is its motion per Se." 24 The positions differ in that the latter (that of "the others") would seem, according to the formulation, to give a greater ontological independence to the motion as a distinct element in the complex (gumla) while al-Oubbai, it would seem, here tends to make the motion more explicitly the actuality of the body insofar as it is in motion. The statement is quite possibly an indication of the kind of thinking which led his son abft Halim to the formulation of the theory of 'ahwat.25 Against any inter- mediary determinant in the case of motion 'Abd al-Nabbar argues26 that "indeed, we hold that to affirm the reality, along with the motion, of an intrinsic causal determinant [maena] that, apart from the motion, necessitates the body's being moved, is to exclude it [sc. the motion] from necessitating it, despite the fact that the knowl- edge of its being what necessitates it is well estab- lished since, when its being the necessitating cause [kawnuhad muigiban-leg. mu'gibatan?] is not pos- sible, that which is proximate to it cannot be the necessitating cause either." Many other examples may be found but these few will more than suffice to demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt that the term matn&, in this technical sense, means an immediate, intrinsic causal determinant. II With this preface we may now proceed to a brief examination of Mutammar's use of the con- cept. A number of the principal texts concerning the maedni in the thought of Mucammar have been cited and translated in the article of Prof. Wolfson mentioned above. I shall here restrict myself to treating the citations found in the Kitab al-In- titisar of al-Hayyat and those of the Maqailat of al2AsAari; these are the earliest sources of our information on the subject and are quite adequate to the present discussion. Furthermore, there are some grounds, as we shall see, to believe that some of the later sources have, in part, at least, restruc- tured certain aspects of the original conception of the problem in such wise as to distort Mu'ammar's true position. In the K. al-Intisdr we read 27 concerning Mu-ammar that "when he observed two bodies at rest, the one next to the other, and then observed that one had moved and not the other, Mutammar asserted that the former must have some causal determinant [matnan] that came to inhere in it and not the latter,28 on account of which it moved. 22 Maqdldt, 373, 6 if. 23 The context is isolated conceptually from any ques- tion of the source of the impetus or of the initial cause which determines that there shall be a motion (whether God, man, or a " natural cause"). It should be re- membered that for the kalAm, primary efficient causality is generally taken to be conscious and willing, i. e., that of an agent who is 'dlim, murid, qdsid, but this is not here in question. The treatment of the " accident " of i'timdd verges, in some contexts, towards the question of the transfer of energy or force, but nonetheless i'timdd remains an accident, to be explained like other accidents in its inherence in the subject. 24 Maqdldt, loc. cit., lines 11 f. Note that the "per se" (li-nafsihi) here refers only to this limited idea of the nexus between the motion (haraka) and the actual- ity of the body's being in motion (kawnuhu mutaharri- kan), not as to whether motion per se belongs to a body in such wise that it could not exist without it. 25 Most notably abA 1-Hudhayl tended to insist on the ontological discreteness and separateness of all acci- dents; cf. the text cited above (n. 5) and the remarks on this question in my Metaphysics of Created Being according to abi2 1-Hudhayl al-'Alldf (Uitgaven van het Nederlands historisch archaeologisch Instituut te Istan- bul 21, Istanbul, 1966), ch. 2, n. 6. 26 al-Mujni, 4, 327. 27 Ed. A. Nader (Beyrouth, 1957), 46. 28 CC Ma'nan hallahu duina fdhibihi "; Prof. Wolfson's This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Tue, 11 Feb 2014 13:48:36 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 254 FRANK: Al-matan: Some Reflections on the Technical Meaning of the Term in the KaUlm Otherwise it would have no more reason to move than the other. Since this is a valid judgement therefore, there must also perforce have come to be in it a causal determinant on account of which the motion came to inhere in one of them rather than the other. Otherwise there would be no more reason for its inhering in one of them than for its inhering in the other. So also, if you ask concerning that causal determinant . ..." Much the same thing is stated by al-'A~sarl, who re- ports 29 that Mutammar held that when a body moved it did so "on account of a causal determi- nant without which it would have no more reason to be moved than another and would have no more reason to move at the moment in which it moved than to have moved prior to that moment. They [sc. Mutammar and his followers] say: since this is true, the same situation obtains in the case of the motion: were there not a causal determinant on account of which it became a motion of the moved it would have no more reason to be its motion than to be the motion of another, and this causal determinant was a causal determinant of the motion's being a motion of the moved on account of another causal determinant, and the causal determinants have no finite whole or total- ity. Further [they say] that they [sc. the causal determinants-ma'Anil] take place in a single in- stant. The same also is the case with blackness and whiteness, in the former's being the blackness of one body rather than of another and the latter's being the whiteness of one body rather than of another. The same statement is made concerning the difference of black from white and likewise, according to them, the same is to be said concern- ing all the other classes ['agrnas] and accidents, and that when two accidents differ or are similar one must perforce affirm the reality of infinite causal determinants. They also assert that the causal determinants-which have no finite total- ity-are the act of the place 30 in which they inhere." There are a number of elements contained in these texts which, taken up one by one, should lead to a fairly clear definition of Muammar's position. First, it is to be noted that the question to which he addresses himself is one of "why this rather than this." In each case the example is clearly set in terms of the paired attributes that form, for the kalam, sets or classes ('agnas) of contraries: why the realisation of this one and not that or, more exactly, why, when one is present in several subjects (e. g., rest), does its contrary arise in one and not the other? From this it is quite clear that we have no unambiguous grounds for seeing in the present passages any direct reflection of the discussion of the categories found in Plato's Sophist (254E) as has been suggested.31 The mention of the classes or types of accidents, as it occurs here, is classically consistent with kalam usage, and though there should be little question that the generality of kalam speculation on the subject does ultimately reflect a classical and Hel- lenistic background, the exact determination of the source is extremely difficult to make. Again, it must be noted, it is not classes or accidents in the sense of this kind of movement or a particular pattern or type of motion (or whatever other accident) that Mutammar wished to explain in terms of his infinite series of causal determinants. Rather, as is obvious from the con- text, it is the ground of the particular accident (each and every accident, taken individually) as it comes to exist in the particular substrate at the particular moment of time that he seeks to ex- plain-part of the question that is discussed by the later kalam and especially the falsafa most fre- quently under the term targth and the mura "ih. It is therefore impossible, given the structure of the context and the nature of Mu'ammar's orienta- tion to the problem, to find in the term ma-na any direct and meaningful reflection of Aristotle's con- cept of "nature," a suggestion put forth by Prof. Wolf son in his article on the mnatnd.32 However, before hazarding myself any attempt to suggest certain possible parallels in Greek thought to cer- rendering of the verb halla (which in the kalam means to inhere in, come to inhere in) as "abide" (op. cit., 675) may be misleading since this may tend to imply some permanence of the hall in its mahall, something which is not to be inferred in the use of the term apart from some specification of the context; for example motion is said to inhere (ihalla) in a subject but by most of the mutakallimin cannot have any perdurance (al-baqd') at all. " Maqdalt, 372 f. (I have here paraphrased the be- ginning of this citation-which may be corrupt-since the question of the status of motion, as such, is to be taken up below). 30 Makan, used here simply as a normal equivalent for body (#ism), substrate (ma hall), etc., as the subject in which the accident inheres; on the substrate however, cf. infra n. 46. 31 Wolfson, op. cit., 676, n. 1; cf. also infra. -32 Op. cit., 683. This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Tue, 11 Feb 2014 13:48:36 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions FRANK: Al-ma'La: Some Reflections on the Technical Meaning of the Term in the Katm 255 tain aspects of Mu'ammar's understanding of the function of the matna in the nature of things, it is necessary to clarify in greater detail the structure of the causal determinant as an operative function in the material being of things, as this is mani- fested in the recorded fragments of Mu'ammar's own system. Without defining this as closely as can be done on the basis of the available informa- tion, we should be seeking a parallel to an unde- termined quantity. Now albeit the passage of the K. al-Intisair cited above may be subject to more than one interpreta- tion on some points, several things are clear enough. Particularly, from the report of al-'As ari, which is more precise and detailed, there can be no question but that the series of causal determinants discussed is, in the immediate context, entirely intrinsic to the individual subject. That is, however he may have analysed the more general problem of causality as a causal nexus may exist between two spatially distinct entities, the discus- sion in our present texts, as also that reflected in the polemics of later authors, concerns only fac- tors or causal determinants which exist and func- tion within the individual subject. The formula- tion of al-'AsMari is absolutely unambiguous: in the infinite series, the causal determinants exist, as actually determinant of the effect, simultane- ously 33 as " an act of the place in which they inhere." The act or attribute, quality, accident, or what- ever you will, inheres in the body or substrate as the result of immanent causes. Consistently then with his system (cf. also infra) Mu'ammar allows the inversion of this proposition (cf. the double aspect of the problem mentioned above) so that we may also say that the true causes or determi- nants of the being of any attribute are immanent or reside in the material subject in which the attribute is realised. From this then there are two consequents that we must outline before going on with the discussion of the mal'ni and taking up their relation to the "nature" of material bodies. The first is that, following the logic of the system (and Mutammar would seem to be nothing if not rigorously consistent, to the end) he says that God has not the power to create any accident ('arad) of any kind, but rather creates bodies alone; 34 nevertheless he insisted that, in the sense that God has created them as endowed with their natures (tab', pl. taba'it) or structure (hay'a), it is ulti- mately and truly He who is the creator of their total reality in all its real aspects.35 Against God's creating accidents he is reported to have argued that whoever has the power of causing motion is capable of being moved, etc.,36 since the effect, within the system, is realised in the subject that contains the immediate causes. Bodies, i. e., the atoms that constitute them in their simple materi- ality, are, of themselves, entirely without quality or attribute (alrota) so that in creating them, in their unqualified materiality (though containing their natures), God is not involved in the im- mediate production of any accident. The second consequent (which has undoubtedly deep historical roots though it appears within the system as a direct consequent of the thesis men- tioned above) is rather more complicated but, from the standpoint of the present investigation, is of greater significance. Al-'As arl mentions, in the passage translated above,37 that "when two accidents differ or are similar, one must perforce affirm the reality of infinite causal determinants." It is clear from the statement-which is absolutely explicit-that the difference or similarity of two accidents mentioned in this context refers to their similarity or dissimilarity in terms of their actuality as they are concretely realised in dis- tinct subjects, not their similarity or dissimi- larity as they may be considered in them- selves, as accidents, apart from their reality in such subjects. The whole question is laid in terms of the why of the occurrence of a particular acci- 33 See the text cited above, n. 29; cf. also infra. By the logic of the system he is led to posit the same kind of infinite series even in God, in order to explain the realisation of His act of creation (cf. Maqdldt, 253, 511-as also in His act of knowing, ibid., 168); the act of creation (though the matter was much debated by the mutakallimin) could not for Mu'ammar be the thing created (i.e., the thing is not, for him, its own being- created) (Maqdtdt, 511 and 514) as it was for some (cf. my Metaphysics of Created Being . . . , ch. 5). With Mu'ammar, thus, we have the creation of the act of creation, etc. (ibid. 364 and 511), and the annihilation of the act of annihilation, etc. (ibid., 367, Inti~sar, 22 f., and al-Bagdadi, 'UAl ad-Din [Istanbul, 1346/1928] 87 and 231; cf. also infra, n. 38). Thus, albeit there is an unquestionable parallelism of logic, the infinite series of ma ani do not meaningfully reflect Aristotle's infinity of successive motions (cf. Wolfson, loc. cit.). 84 Cf. MaqdIdt, 199, 554, 564, and esp., 548 f. 85 Cf. Intisdr, 45-47. 86l Maqdlat, 548. 87 Supra, n. 29. This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Tue, 11 Feb 2014 13:48:36 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 256 FRANK: Al-matnA: Some Reflections on the Technical Meaning of the Term in the Kaldm dent in a given subject at a particular instant of time and of why similar or dissimilar accidents occur in different subjects. The fundamental attitude and orientation is, if you will, one of a thoroughgoing " materialism." 38 The ma'anit or causal determinants are the cause of their simi- larity or dissimilarity as they determine the sepa- rate existences of accidents as these are distin- guished as like or unlike in distinct substrates. The similarity and dissimilarity are first thus con- sidered in terms of a function of the separateness of their existence: of their being in spatially (i. e., materially) distinct and separate subjects, or of their being temporally separated in the same sub- ject. Secondly then, the cause of their being so is, in each separate case, the series of intrinsic causal determinants inherent in each subject (not in the accidents). The accidents are present in two sepa- rate substrates through the action of the causal determinants intrinsic to each distinct body or subject, and their similarity or dissimilarity (whether identical accidents, contrary, or different ones are present) is due to the series of causal determinants which are the cause of their reality and actuality in being the particular accidents that they are in the particular subjects. While this would seem to be the clear sense of al-'AsMarl's account of Mu'ammar's thought on the subject and is fully consistent with what we have examined of the system thus far, the account given by Rahrastan 19 and Raz140 would seem to conceive a rather different problem. That is, where the function of the causal determinants in the sameness and difference of accidents is con- sidered, according to the report of al-'As arl, from the standpoint of their real, material presence in their substrates, the latter two authorities would make it a question of their difference or similarity considered in themselves-in Plato's terms, as it were, the otherness of the other from the other as such and the sameness of the same with the same. It is, of course, conceivable that, following the logic of his system, Mu'ammar made all determina- tion of being and of any modality of being, even its relational aspects as viewed from a purely con- ceptual standpoint, dependent upon the intrinsic causal determinants. From the accounts given of his theory of the function of the causal determi- nants in producing the actualisation of accidents, however, and that of bodies and their "natures "- a function which is, to judge from the earlier witnesses, always that of a real (i. e., material) functional determinant, inhering in a concretely existing substrate it would appear to me that the aspect from which Rahrastanl and Razli describe the question is not fully in harmony with the basic "materialism" of the system. That is, without violating the logic-the logos-of the system, it would be difficult to abstract the accidents from their subjects, inhering and functioning within which the "causal determinants" determine their being and also their being like or unlike; how shall one do this, viz., keep the maani conceptually, while considering the accidents in themselves? The ma'ani reside (inhere) within the material substrate of atoms, not within the accidents, and for this reason it would be nigh impossible to treat the accidents in complete abstraction while yet keeping the determinants which belong to and function exclusively within the particular, material substrate from which the abstraction is made. Any notion of " forms " or " essences " as abstract entities is clearly foreign to the fundamental con- creteness of Mutammar's universe. It is to be sug- gested therefore that most likely the statements of Rahrastanl and Razi on this subject represent a transfer of the problem out of the original context of Mu'ammar and the earliest kalam into one which was more real and present to the later kalam.41 It well may be that the account they give is based on a truncated exposition of the doctrine given originally by al-Kabli and repeated (and perhaps "8This kind of "materialism" (I mean one in some respects more extreme than that of the normal kalam) is confirmed by the statement of Intisdr 22 that the act of annihilation or of the passing away of an accident (al-fand') -thus even the cessation of being-must itself always be in a subject, wherefore, in a sense, even God cannot completely annihilate His creation, since the material substrate must forever remain with some attribute! 89 Al-Milal wan-nihal, 98 f. 40Muqhaal 'afkdr al-mutaqaddimsn wal-muta'ab1hirin (Cairo, 1323), 104; (both this and the text cited in the previous note are given and commented by Wolfson, op. cit., 687 f.; cf. however below). 41 For a detailed discussion of the problem of the sameness and otherness of attributes apart from the consideration of the material reality of an accident or attribute in a material substrate and whether this can be li-ma'n& or not, cf. e. g., 'Abd al-4abbar, al-Muht4 bit-taklif, 178ff. (where the question is of the differen- tiation of God's attributes); on the same subject, cf. also al-4uwaynt, as-,gdmil ft 'us2al ad-din (ed. H. Klopfer, Cairo, n. d.) 169ff. This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Tue, 11 Feb 2014 13:48:36 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions FRANi: Al-matna: Some Reflections on the Technical Meaning of the Term in the Kalhm 257 further paraphrased) by al-BagdAdl.42 On the other hand it may well be that the use of ma'tn in the sense of cause ('illa) or intrinsic determi- nant was simply lost to later writers. 4urga'n does not mention it in his Tatrifdt although he does try to derive the general meaning of "thing" from that of "meaning," "sense," etc.,43 and if he was unaware of this specialised sense it is not inconceivable that he and a number of other late kalam authors simply read the sense "meaning" into the accounts of Mutammar's thought in some places and "thing" in others, understanding thereby some kind of logical abstraction or ens rationis, an jlog or what have you. Concerning Mu'ammar's original thought it might be noted that the notion of linking logical or conceptual categories and distinctions rigidly to the order of material reality is a central element of Stoic thought. We have yet to consider the question of causality in general and the place of nature (tab-) in the context of the causal determinants, as conceived by Mu'ammar, for this is central to the under- standing of the whole system; i. e., the function of "nature" is inseparable from the notion of the causal determinants as they function in the mate- rial world conceived by the system. How Mutam- mar understood the relationship between external causes and the actualisation of some effect in the subject or in the generation of the thing as a whole is not to be determined exactly and in detail on the basis of the texts, insofar as I have been able to discover. It is, in fact, of considerable signifi- cance that the problem of external causality would seem to have held a position of little importance within the system as a whole; that is, it did not have any position of major concern for Mutam- mar's understanding of the nature of things. Quite clearly he held that the characteristics, qualities, etc., of things were to be explained on the basis of their internal strncture (hay'a) and as a function of the nature (tab") of the material being ('ism). He is reported to have said that "things effected through a series of causes [al-mutawallid&t] and that which comes to inhere in a body, such as motion, rest, color, . . ., heat, cold, dampness and dryness, are the act of the body [PI al-'ism] in which they inhere, by its 'nature' [bi-tabtihi] and that inert matter pro- duces [yaf'alu], by its 'nature,' the accidents that inhere in it." 44 In a number of passages we are similarly informed that the attributes of things- the accidents which determine and define their being-are realised in them through their na- tures.45 Each individual atom (guz'), in fact, produces (yaftalu) whatever accidents it has as an act of the necessity of its nature (bi-'i_2b at-tab-).46 Mutammar is reported to have described the func- tion of this nature in the following terms: " When the Creator causes color to be in a body, either it belongs to the body to be such that it takes on color or it does not, and if it belongs to the body to take on color then the color must come to be [yalcznu] by its nature, and since the color comes to be by the nature of the body it is, then, its act. It is impossible that there come to be by its nature what is consequent on something else." 47 We 42 Cf. al-Farq bayn al-Firaq, 138; al-BakdAdt's account, however, still leaves the relationship clearly within the context of the accidents as concretely realised in their separate substrates. 43 G. Fltigel's edition (Leipzig, 1845), 235 f. 44 Maqdtdt, 405 (where even the Koran is said to arise within that from which it is heard). The external cause is removed hereby from the question of the being of things and the causes of their being, since this is restricted to the determination of internal causes; he says (ibid.) that the act of perception and the act of sensation are purely the act of the sentient subject; cf. also ibid., 382. 45E.g. Intiar, 45ff., Maqdldt, 382, 405 f., 409, 417, etc., and Bakdafdl, op. cit., 136. 4" Maqtdlt, 303; he is reported in this passage to have held that " when the parts are joined, the accidents are necessary; they [so. the parts] produce them by the necessitating action of nature [tab'] and each part pro- duces whatever accidents inhere in it." It would seem from this that Mu'ammar probably distinguished be- tween the atoms as materia and the atom as a con- stituent part of a body and it is tempting, on this basis, to think that there was perhaps a differentiation in the terminology, #uz' (part) being used for the atom as the real indivisible part of a body with its inherent qualities and determinations, etc., and #awhar (atom: oi5ala in the Stoic sense-cf. P. Kraus, Jabir ibn Hayyan, 2, Mdmoires de l'Institut d'Egypte 45, [Cairo, 1942] 170) as the qualitiless substrate ( drvow V OKCIe4EVOv) . I have been unable to give this latter hypothesis any confirmation in a quite cursory survey of a number of texts but, nevertheless, it is quite possible that since the distinction is not significant to the later systems, it may have been lost already by the end of the ninth century and is therefore not reflected in any of our sources. This distinction between the material substrate as actively constitutive of things (bodies) and as a materia prima is quite Stoic. 47Maqdldt, 415. This, as well as the passages cited in the preceding notes, clearly precludes any Aristotelian notion of "nature" from Mu'ammar's tab'; within his system the function of tab'/ma'n4 is rather Stoic in the This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Tue, 11 Feb 2014 13:48:36 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 258 FRANK: Al-matna: Some Reflections on the Technical Meaning of the Term in the Kaltm should hypothesize then-for our texts are silent on the subject-that the intrinsic causal determi- nants (matdmi) are the operative determinant causes in the actualisation of the variable possi- bilities of the nature of the particular body. On the other hand, the structure of the particular body, i. e., that structure or configuration in terms of which it is such a kind of body and so liable to various categories of accidents rather than others, is itself a function of the "nature" of the mate- rial substrate (the individual atoms of formed bodies and their parts) and, in the final analysis, is formed through the action of other causal de- terminants. The reality of the particular thing therefore is a function of the nature (tab') of the material substrate considered in its structured materiality, while the functional or active causes in the realisation of a particular accident are the causal determinants inherent in the thing. The " nature " and the intrinsic causal determinants will be then so linked that, in the real order, each is in fact a function of the other. On the subject of external causes Sahrastani, reporting the teaching of Mutammar,48 speaks of the sun's producing heat, fire's producing burning ('ihra'q), and the moon coloration (talwin) by nature (tabiam) and there can be little doubt that Mutammar accounted for and somehow described the causality of exterior forces and the like. It is quite clear, nonetheless-and this is certainly the central emphasis of the whole, if not its very heart-that the primary concern of Mutammar's thought was the character of the being of things as determined by intrinsic causes and principles. That is, the being of any being-its reality in being what it is, with all its permanent and tran- sient qualities and attributes-is determined by materially operative causes inherent in itself inso- far as it is a material body; the accidents (and they are, in a real sense, constitutive of the being of the thing in being what it is 49) of a thing are to be explained, as accidents of the particular being, and understood in the fact of their coming to be realised in the thing, in terms of determinant causes inherent in the material substrate that underlies the being of the whole. If a thing comes to be hot through the action of the sun, its being hot is determined by the presence of heat in it, which is immediately due to its nature's being such as it is; it is possible because, given the antecedent external cause or sequence of causes, its nature allows of its becoming hot through a series of causal determinants, whose actualisation, in effecting the attribute, is a function of its nature, constituting the actuality of the nature at the moment. From one standpoint it is as if he came to the point of making the total series of causes that effect the being of the thing interior to it in any moment of its actuality. The insistence that mate- rial reality makes up the totality of the real (ex- clusive of God) is common to all the mutakallimin as also the atomists, the Stoa, and others in antiquity. With Mutammar, however, we find a peculiar concentration on the functional elements that are constitutive and determinant causes of the thing as they exist in the immediate present of the moment of its realisation, even though these in- trinsic elements or causes are, in fact, operative causes only through being affected by exterior causes. The universal mesh of interacting causes is, as it were, viewed as it is actually operative (EvEpyEta) in the present subject.50 That is, the intrinsic elements or constituents of the thing are by nature (Iv'an) the active determinants of its being as they are ultimately related to a series of events stretching far beyond the temporal and spatial limits of the individual body, but Mucam- mar chose to consider all these in terms of the interior determinants and elements of the singu- lar, corporeal unit of existence, as actuated in it in the single effect of their presence at the par- ticular instant of the realisation of a particular event or accident in the thing. Everything is concentrated in the real (sc. material) present which is the actual locus of all its causes as causes. Thus the infinity of causal determinants exists simultaneously in a single instant and a man, in a single act, effects an infinity of acts simultane- overall structure of the context. For an indication of the functional relationship between the ma'na and the tab', cf. al-Mfu~ni 12 (ed. I. Madkour, Cairo, n. d.) p. 320, 11. 15 ff., in which the author probably refers to the general position of Mu'ammar. 48 op. cit., 97. 49 Cf. generally my Metaphysics of Created Being ac- cording to abil 1-Hudhayl, ch. 4. 50 Thus is it in the same way that he says (Intisar, 46) that in any single act the agent produces an infinity of acts; these are, no doubt, the consequences and effects produced by the determinant causes arising in the body which is the locus of the act, as the result of the realisation of the act in it at the instant of its realisa- tion. Both causes and effects, in this way, are viewed as they exist in the present actuality of the subject in which their own actuality is realised in the particular moment. This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Tue, 11 Feb 2014 13:48:36 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions FRANK: Al-matna: Some Reflections on the Technical Meaning of the Term in the Kalam 2`9 ously. Although Mu'ammar quite clearly recog- nised that all bodies have natures and that events take place through these natures in the interaction of many bodies, the system, as reflected in our sources, centers its attention on the sole primary reality which is the individual body in the real present. Consequently it is the nature of the materially unified body and the function of causes intrinsic to it or inherent in it, as they are present in their effect at the particular moment, which becomes the primary locus of the investigation and understanding of the being of things in all their attributes, acts, etc., for this is their actuality in being and the actuality in being of the causality of their causes. The notion of the accident as direct cause of the effect while its presence as cause depends on a series of other causal determinants reflects, in a rather obvious sense, the distinction made by the physicians and the Stoics between the tTLOV aUTO- TEXES and the many secondary prior and concomi- tant causes that effect and determine the actualisa- tion of a particular state in the subject. Mutam- mar, however, has restricted his view to that of the individual thing in the single, real moment of its present. For him, as it were, primary and secon- dary intrinsic causal determinants function co- herently, of themselves, entirely according to the nature of the thing (4ihots, kiydmi) according to a Xo'yos inherent in matter itself (al-'agza'), a Xo'yos, according to Mu ammar, given matter in its crea- tion by God. Again, however, his almost exclusive concentration on the individual in the immediate present as also his apparent denial of the reality of motion unquestionably (though only super- ficially, perhaps) appear to reflect certain atti- tudes of the Megarians, even though what kinship there may be between the two is certainly distant and tenuously affirmed.51 To try to work out these analogies and confirm their possible validity, whether in whole or in part, is beyond the scope of this paper. In conclusion, however, I should like to remark that the fact that one may find apparent remnants and traces of a number of diverse classical systems in Mutammar's thought-besides those mentioned, others which appear quite Neoplatonic 52-should give no diffi- culty, as the same combination of disparate ele- ments is to be found in nearly every kalam system. Generally, insofar as individual systems are studied for their own consistence and coherent meaning these elements are found to be not simply juxtaposed in eclectic salads but quite on the con- trary, are revealed to be integrated into tightly constructed and coherent syntheses, both in the Muztazila and in the school of al-'Asarl. What makes the kalam a really unique phenomenon in the history of speculative thought is the way in which this has been done and the basic orientation that directed its formation and evolution. Finally, it is for this reason that the primary task, in my opinion, for scholarship on the kalam must be, for some years to come, to elucidate the philosophical and theological meaning of the kalam itself in the individual systems of single authors. Only after this has been accomplished will it become possible to discover and describe genuinely mean- ingful and significant relations between the kalam and the thought of antiquity. 51 He is reported to have denied the reality of motion saying that bodies are said to move only by way of denomination (ft I-luja) (Maqdldt, 325 and 347) but that in reality they are at rest (sakina) ; all modes of being-in-space ('akwdn), he says, are really rest (suklin) (ibid., loc. cit., and 355). The denial of motion is certainly related to his apparent insistence on the exclusive reality of the thing in the present moment and this much concords with the ideas of the Megarians, even though other elements of the system, e. g., the absence of any evidence for "essences" or " forms" and the nigh total concentration on material reality insofar as his " physics " is concerned, clearly separate Mu'am- mar from the basic foundation of their thought. On the other hand, he clearly allowed motion some reality as a distinct accident which inheres in things, as is amply clear from his primary argument for the reality of infinite causal determinants (cit. supra) and from his argument against God's creation of movement (Maqdtdt, 548, cit. supra, n. 36). His understanding of the nature of movement would seem to be perhaps no more than an extreme version of one like that of abA I-Hudhayl, for whom the reality of movement is not the passage over a trajectory through space but rather consists in the act of having arrived in "the second place "; the progression through space (as opposed to the accident of motion [haraka] which comes to be in the body when it arrives in the second place) abui I-Hudhayl accounts for in a separate accident of kawn (that is also recognized by certain later members of the Basra school); on abA 1-Hudhayl's treatment of motion, kawn, and becoming in general, cf. my Meta- physics of Created Being . . ., ch. 2, ? B. 52 E. g., his description of man (Intisdr, 46, 11. 6 f. and Maqdldt, 318 and 331 f.); as also in the charge against him that he denied that God knows Himself, since this would introduce into Him the duality of knower and known (Intisdr, 45, al-Farq bayn al-Firaq, 141, and al-Milal wan-nihal, 100 f.) which, valid or not, shows him to have had a sufficient reputation for Neoplatonist leanings to have made the charge at least credible or likely. This content downloaded from 128.135.12.127 on Tue, 11 Feb 2014 13:48:36 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions