1961 Indian Annexation of Goa

Contents
Articles
1961 Indian annexation of Goa Indian annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli Operation Polo History of Sikkim Indian integration of Junagadh 1 21 25 32 37
References
Article Sources and Contributors Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors 41 42
Article Licenses
License 43
1961 Indian annexation of Goa

Invasion of Goa, Daman and Diu
Date 1819 December 1961
Location Portuguese India and surrounding sea and airspace Result Decisive Indian victory and incorporation of territories into the Republic of India
Belligerents
Portugal
India
Portuguese India
Commanders and leaders

Amrico Toms Antnio de Oliveira Salazar Governor-General of Portuguese India Manuel Antnio Vassalo e Silva Rajendra Prasad Jawaharlal Nehru Major General K. P. Candeth Air Vice Marshal Elric Pinto V. K. Krishna Menon
Strength
3,995 Army 200 Naval personnel 1 frigate 3 patrol boats 45,000 infantry 1 Light Aircraft Carrier 2 Cruisers 1 destroyer 8 frigates 4 Minesweepers 20 Canberras 6 Vampires 6 Toofanis 6 Hunters 4 Mysteres
Casualties and losses

30 killed [] 57 wounded [] 4,668 captured [][] 1 Frigate disabled
[]
22 killed [] 54 wounded
[]
The 1961 Indian annexation of Goa (also referred to as the Invasion of Goa,[1] the Liberation of Goa,[2] the Fall of Portuguese India [3] and the Portuguese-Indian War[citation needed]), was an action by India's armed forces that ended the colonial rule of Portugal in its exclaves in India in 1961. The armed action, codenamed Operation Vijay by the Indian government, involved air, sea and land strikes for over 36 hours, and was a decisive victory for India, ending 451 years of Portuguese colonial rule in Goa. Twenty two Indians and thirty Portuguese were killed in the fighting.[] The brief conflict drew a mixture of worldwide praise and condemnation. In India, the action was seen as a liberation of historically Indian territory, while Portugal viewed it as an aggression against national soil.
Background
At the time of Union of India's independence from the British Empire in 1947, Portugal held a handful of exclaves on the Indian subcontinent - the districts of Goa, Daman and Diu and Dadra and Nagar Haveli - collectively known as the Estado da ndia. Goa, Daman and Diu covered an area of around 1,540 square miles (4,000km2) and held a population of 637,591.[4] The Goan diaspora was estimated at 175,000 (about 100,000 within the Indian Union).[5] Religious distribution was 61% Hindu, 36.7% Christian (mostly Catholic), 2.2% Muslim.[5] Economy was primarily based on agriculture, although the 1940s and 1950s saw a boom in mining - principally iron ore and some manganese.[5]
Local resistance to Portuguese rule

Resistance to Portuguese rule in Goa in the 20th century was pioneered by Tristo de Bragana Cunha, a French-educated Goan engineer who founded the Goa Congress Committee in Portuguese India in 1928. Da Cunha released a booklet called 'Four hundred years of Foreign Rule', and a pamphlet, 'Denationalisation of Goa', intended to sensitise Goans to the oppression of Portuguese rule. Messages of solidarity were received by the Goa Congress Committee from leading figures in the Indian independence movement like Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Jawaharlal Nehru, Subhas Chandra Bose, and several others. On 12 October 1938, Da Cunha with other members of the Goa Congress Committee met Subhas Chandra Bose, the President of the Indian National Congress, and on his advice, opened a Branch Office of the Goa Congress Committee at 21, Dalal Street, Bombay. The Goa Congress was also made affiliate to the Indian National Congress and Da Cunha was selected its first President.[6] In June 1946, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, an Indian Socialist leader, entered Goa on a visit to his friend, Dr. Julio Menezes, a nationalist leader, who had founded in Bombay the Gomantak Praja Mandal and edited the weekly newspaper, Gomantak. Da Cunha and other leaders were also with him.[6] Ram Manohar Lohia advocated the use of non-violent Gandhian techniques to oppose the government.[7] On 18 June 1946, the Portuguese government disrupted a protest in Panaji (then spelled as Panjim) against the suspension of civil liberties organised by Lohia, Da Cunha along with others like Purushottam Kakodkar and Laxmikant Bhembre in defiance of a ban on public gatherings and arrested them.[8][9] There were intermittent mass demonstrations from June to November. In addition to non-violent protests, armed groups such as the Azad Gomantak Dal (The Free Goa Party) and the United Front of Goans conducted violent attacks aimed at weakening Portuguese rule in Goa.[10] The Indian government supported the establishment of armed groups like the Azad Gomantak Dal, giving them full financial, logistic and armament support. The armed groups acted from bases situated in Indian territory and under cover of Indian police forces. The Indian government - through these armed groups - attempted to destroy economic targets, telegraph and telephone lines, road, water and rail transport, in order to impede economic activity and create conditions for a general uprising of the population.[11] Commenting on the armed resistance, Portuguese army officer, Capt. Carlos Azaredo (now retired General) stationed with the army in Goa, stated in the Portuguese newspaper O Expresso: "To the contrary to what is being said, the most evolved guerilla warfare which our Armed Forces encountered was in Goa. I know what Im talking about, because I also fought in Angola and in Guin. In 1961 alone, until December, around 80 policemen died. The major part of the terrorists of Azad Gomantak Dal were not Goans. Many had fought in the British Army, under General Montgomery, against the Germans."[]
Diplomatic efforts to resolve Goa dispute

On 27 February 1950, the Government of India asked the Portuguese government to open negotiations about the future of Portuguese colonies in India.[12] Portugal asserted that its territory on the Indian subcontinent was not a colony but part of metropolitan Portugal and hence its transfer was non-negotiable; and that India had no rights to this territory since the Republic of India did not exist at the time when Goa came under Portuguese rule.[13] When the Portuguese Government refused to respond to subsequent aide-mmoires in this regard, the Indian government, on 11 June 1953, withdrew its diplomatic mission from Lisbon.[14] By 1954, the Republic of India instituted visa restrictions on travel from Goa to India which paralysed transportation between Goa and other exclaves like Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli.[12] Meanwhile, the Indian Union of Dockers had, in 1954, instituted a boycott on shipping to Portuguese India.[15] Between 22 July and 2 August 1954, armed activists attacked and forced the surrender of Portuguese forces stationed in Dadra and Nagar Haveli.[16]
Goa, Western India
On 15 August 1955, 3000-5000 unarmed Indian activists[17] attempted to enter Goa at six locations and were violently repulsed by Portuguese police officers, resulting in the deaths of between 21[18] and 30[19] people.[20] The news of the massacre built public opinion in India against the presence of the Portuguese in Goa.[21] On 1 September 1955, India shut its consul office in Goa.[22] In 1956, Portuguese ambassador to France, Marcello Mathias, along with Portuguese Prime Minister Antnio de Oliveira Salazar, argued in favour of a referendum in Goa to determine its future. This proposal was however rejected by the Ministers for Defence and Foreign Affairs. The demand for a referendum was again made by Presidential candidate General Humberto Delgado in 1957.[12] Portugals Prime Minister, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, alarmed by Indias hinted threats at armed action against its presence in Goa, first asked the United Kingdom to mediate, then protested through Brazil and eventually asked the UN Security Council to intervene.[23] Mexico offered the Indian government its influence in Latin America to bring pressure on the Portuguese to relieve tensions.[24] Meanwhile, Krishna Menon, Indias defence minister and head of Indias UN delegation, stated in no uncertain terms that India had not abjured the use of force in Goa,[23] The U.S. ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, requested the Indian government on several occasions to resolve the issue peacefully through mediation and consensus rather than armed conflict.[25][26] Eventually, on 10 December, nine days prior to the invasion, Nehru stated to the press that "Continuance of Goa under Portuguese rule is an impossibility".[23] The American response was to warn India that if and when Indias armed action in Goa was brought to the UN security council, it could expect no support from the US delegation.[27] On 24 November 1961, the Sabarmati, a passenger boat passing between the Portuguese-held island of Anjidiv and the Indian port of Kochi, was fired upon by Portuguese ground troops, resulting in injuries to the chief engineer of the boat, as well as the death of a passenger. The action was precipitated by Portuguese fears that the boat carried a military landing party intent on storming the island.[28]Wikipedia:Citing sources The incidents lent themselves to foster widespread public support in India for military action in Goa.
The occupation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli

The hostilities between India and Portugal started seven years before the invasion of Goa, when Dadra and Nagar Haveli were invaded and occupied by pro-Indian Union forces with the support of the Indian authorities. Dadra and Nagar Haveli were two Portuguese landlocked exclaves of the Daman district, totally surrounded by territory of the Indian Union. The connection between the exclaves and the costal territory of Daman had to be made by crossing about 20km of Indian Union territory. Dadra and Nagar Haveli did not have any Portuguese military garrison, but only police forces. The Indian Government started to develop isolation actions against Dadra and Nagar Aveli already in 1952, including the creation of impediments to the transit of persons and goods between the two landlocked enclaves and Daman. In July 1954, pro-Indian Union forces, including members of organisations like the United Front of Goans (UFG), the National Movement Liberation Organisation (NMLO), the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and the Azad Gomantak Dal, with the support of Indian Police forces, started to launch assaults against Dadra and Nagar Haveli. On the night of 22 July, UFG forces stormed the small Dadra police station, killing police sergeant Aniceto do Rosrio and constable Antnio Fernandes while resisting to the attack. On 28 July, RSS forces took Naroli police station. Meanwhile, the Portuguese authorities asked the Indian Government for permission to cross their territory with reinforcements to Dadra and Nagar Haveli, which was denied. Surrounded and prevented from receiving reinforcements by the Indian Authorities, the Portuguese Administrator and police forces in Nagar Haveli eventually surrendered to the Indian police forces on 11 August 1954. Portugal appealed to the International Court of Justice, which, in the decision of 12 April 1960 "Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory [29]", was favourable to the Portuguese cause, stating its sovereign rights over the territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli. However, no military actions were taken by the Portuguese authorities to reoccupy the exclaves. The Indian Government went forward with the official integration of Dadra and Nagar Haveli in its territory, only after the invasion of Goa in 1961. Until then, it enjoyed a de facto independence, although not internationally recognised.
Events preceding the hostilities

Indian military build-up
On receiving the go-ahead for military action and the mandate of the capture of all occupied territories for the Indian government, Lieutenant-General Chaudhari of India's Southern Army fielded the 17th Infantry Division and the 50th Parachute Brigade commanded by Major-General K.P. Candeth. The assault on the enclave of Daman was assigned to the 1st Maratha Light Infantry while the operations in Diu were assigned to the 20th Rajput and 4th Madras battalions.[30] Meanwhile, the Commander-in-Chief of India's Western Air Command, Air Vice Marshal Erlic Pinto, was appointed as the commander of all air resources assigned to the operations in Goa. Air resources for the assault on Goa were concentrated in the bases at Pune and Sambra.[31] The mandate handed to Air Vice Marshal Erlic Pinto by the Indian Air Command was listed out as follows: 1. The destruction of Goas lone airfield in Dabolim, without causing damage to the terminal building and other airport facilities. 2. Destruction of the wireless station at Bambolim, Goa. 3. Denial of airfields at Daman and Diu, which were, however, not to be attacked without prior permission. 4. Support to advancing ground troops.
1961 Indian annexation of Goa The Indian Navy deployed two warshipsthe INS Rajput, an 'R' Class destroyer, and the INS Kirpan, a Blackwood class frigate anti-submarine frigateoff the coast of Goa. The actual attack on Goa was delegated to four task groups: a Surface Action Group comprising five ships: Mysore, Trishul, Betwa, Beas and Cauvery; a Carrier Group of five ships: Delhi, Kuthar, Kirpan, Khukri and Rajput centred around the light aircraft carrier Vikrant; a Mine Sweeping Group consisting of mine sweepers including Karwar, Kakinada, Cannonore and Bimilipatan and a Support Group which consisted of the Dharini.[32]
The Portuguese Mandate

In March 1960, Portuguese Defence Minister General Botelho Moniz, told Prime Minister Salazar that a sustained Portuguese campaign against decolonisation would create for the army "a suicide mission in which we could not succeed". His opinion was shared by Army Minister Colonel Almeida Fernandes, by the Army under secretary of State Lieutenant-Colonel Costa Gomes and by other top officers.[33] Ignoring this advice, Salazar sent the following message to Governor General Vassalo e Silva in Goa on 14 December, in which he ordered the Portuguese forces in Goa to fight till the last man.[34] Radio 816 / Lisbon 14-Dec.1961: You understand the bitterness with which I send you this message. It is horrible to think that this may mean total sacrifice, but I believe that sacrifice is the only way for us to keep up to the highest traditions and provide service to the future of the Nation. Do not expect the possibility of truce or of Portuguese prisoners, as there will be no surrender rendered because I feel that our soldiers and sailors can be either victorious or dead. These words could, by their seriousness, be directed only to a soldier of higher duties fully prepared to fulfill them. God will not allow you to be the last Governor of the State of India. Salazar then asked Vassalo e Silva to hold out for at least eight days, within which time he hoped to gather international support against the Indian invasion.[34]
Portuguese Military Preparations

Portuguese military preparations began in earnest in 1954, following the Indian economic blockade, when three army battalions were transported to Goa, raising the Portuguese military presence there to 12,000 men. However, by late 1960, the Army under-secretary of State, Costa Gomes, conducted a survey visit to Goa and proposed a reduction in the military grouping reducing the strength from 12,000 men to around 3,500.[] In accordance with Prime Minister Salazars instructions to resist the Indian invasion, the Portuguese administration in Goa prepared for war. One Portuguese Navy' sloop, the NRP Afonso de Albuquerque,[35] was present in Goa at the time of invasion. The vessel was armed with four 120mm guns capable of two shots per minute, and four automatic rapid firing guns. In addition to the sloop, the Portuguese Navy had three light patrol boats (lanchas de fiscalizao), each armed with a 20mm Oerlikon gun, one based in each Goa, Daman and Diu. There were also five merchant marine ships in Goa.[36] Portuguese ground defences consisted of a total of 3,995 men, including 810 native (Indo-Portugueses Indo-Portuguese) soldiers, many of whom had little military training and were utilised primarily for security and anti-extremist operations. In addition there were about 1,040 police officers and 400 border guards. These forces were divided amongst the three Portuguese enclaves in India. The strategy employed to defend Goa against an Indian invasion was based in the Plano Sentinela (Sentinel Plan) which divided the territory into four defence sectors (North, Center, South and Mormugo). The Portuguese Army forces in Goa were composed of four motorised reconnaissance squadrons, eight rifle companies (caadores), two artillery bateries and an engineer detachment, divided by four battlegroups (agrupamentos), with a battlegroup assigned to each sector and tasked with slowing the progression of an invading force. These plans were however unviable because of the desperate shortage of mines and ammunition and of communication equipment.[37]
1961 Indian annexation of Goa Commenting on the Plano Sentinela, Capt. Carlos Azaredo who was stationed in Goa at the time of hostilities states in Portuguese newspaper Expresso on 8 December 2001, "It was a totally unrealistic and unachievable plan, which was quite incomplete. It was based on exchange of ground with time. But, for this purpose, portable communication equipment was necessary".[] Regarding the defence of Daman and Diu, although formally under the command of the governor-general and commander-in-chief in Goa, given the isolation and enormous distances of those districts from Goa, the local small Portuguese garrisons would have to be left to themselves, ensuring alone the defense against the Indian invasion, without any possibility of cooperation with the rest of the Portuguese forces. On 16 December, the Portuguese Air Force was placed on alert to transport ten tons of anti-tank grenades in two DC-6 aircraft from Montijo Air Base in Portugal to Goa assist in its defence. However the aircraft were denied stop-over facilities at the US Wheelus Air Base in Libya. When the Portuguese Air Force was unable to obtain such facilities at any other air base along the way - most nations including Pakistan denying passage of Portuguese military aircraft - the mission was passed on to the civilian airline TAP which offered a Lockheed Constellation (registration CS-TLA) on charter for the job. However, when permission to transport weapons through Karachi was denied by the Pakistani Government, the Lockheed Constellation landed in Goa at 18:00 hours on 17 December with a consignment of half a dozen bags of sausages as food supplies instead of the intended grenades.[38] However the aircraft also arrived with a contingent of female paratroopers to assist in the evacuation of Portuguese civilians. The Portuguese air presence in Goa was thus limited to the presence of two transport aircraft, one belonging to the Portuguese international airline (TAP) and the other to the Goan airline Portuguese India Airlines (TAIP): a Lockheed Constellation and a Douglas DC-4 Skymaster aircraft. The Indians claimed that the Portuguese had a squadron of F-86 Sabres stationed at Dabolim Airportwhich later turned out to be false intelligence. Air defence was limited to a few obsolete anti-aircraft guns manned by two artillery units who had been smuggled into Goa disguised as soccer teams.[28] Meanwhile, back on 14 December, the Portuguese administration in Goa received orders from the Ministry of the Overseas in Lisbon to transfer the relics of St. Francis Xavier, patron saint of Goa, to Lisbon. Orders were also received ordering the Portuguese forces in Goa to destroy any buildings of non-military Portuguese heritage in Goa. Accordingly, barrels filled with petrol were transported to the Idalcao Palace in Panaji, which served as the administrative headquarters, but were removed on orders from Governor Vassalo e Silva who stated "I cannot destroy the evidence of our greatness in the Orient".[]
Portuguese civilian evacuation

The military buildup created panic amongst Europeans in Goa, who were desperate to evacuate their families before the commencement of hostilities. On 9 December, the vessel India arrived at Goa's Mormugo port en route to Lisbon from Timor. Despite orders from the Portuguese government in Lisbon not to allow anyone to embark on this vessel, the Governor General of Goa, Manuel Vassalo e Silva, allowed 700 Portuguese civilians of European origin to board the ship and flee Goa. The ship had had capacity for only 380 passengers, and was filled to its limits, with evacuees occupying even the ship's toilets.[28] On arranging this evacuation of women and children, Vassalo e Silva remarked to the press, "If necessary, we will die here." Evacuation of European civilians continued by air even after the commencement of Indian air strikes.[39]
Indian reconnaissance operations

Indian reconnaissance operations had commenced on 1 December, when two Indian Leopard class frigates, the INS Betwa and the INS Beas, undertook linear patrolling of the Goan coast at a distance of 8 miles (13km). By 8 December, the Indian Air Force had commenced baiting missions and fly-bys to lure out Portuguese air defences and fighters. On 17 December, a tactical reconnaissance flight conducted by Sqn Ldr I S Loughran in a Vampire NF.54 Night Fighter over Dabolim Airport in Goa was met with 5 rounds fired from a ground anti aircraft gun. The aircraft took evasive action by drastically dropping altitude and escaping out to sea. The anti aircraft gun was later recovered near the ATC building with a round jammed in its breech.[40] The Indian light aircraft carrier INS Vikrant was deployed 75 miles (121km) off the coast of Goa to head a possible amphibious operation on Goa, as well as to deter any foreign military intervention.
Commencement of Hostilities
The military actions in Goa
The ground attack on Goa: North and North East sectors On 11 December 1961, 17 Infantry Division and attached troops of the Indian Army were ordered to advance into Goa to capture Panaji and Mormugo. The main thrust on Panaji was to be made by the 50 Para Brigade Group - one of the Indian armys most elite airborne units - led by Brigadier Sagat Singh from the north. Another thrust was to be carried by 63 Infantry Brigade from the east. A deceptive thrust, in company strength, was to be made from the south along the Majali-Canacona-Margao axis.[41] Although the Indian 50 Para Brigade (also called the Pegasus Brigade) was charged with merely assisting the main thrust conducted by the 17th Infantry, its units moved rapidly across minefields, roadblocks and four riverine obstacles to be the first to reach Panaji.[42] Hostilities at Goa began at 9:45 on 17 December 1961, when a unit of Indian troops attacked and occupied the town of Maulingum in north east Goa, killing two Portuguese soldiers in the process. The Portuguese 2nd EREC (esquadro de reconhecimento - reconnaissance squadron) - stationed near Maulingum - asked for permission to engage the Indians, but permission was refused at about 13:45.[43] During the afternoon of the 17th, the Portuguese command issued instructions that all orders to defending troops would be issued directly by headquarters, bypassing the local command outposts. This led to confusion in the chain of command.[43] At 02:00 on 18 December, the 2nd EREC was sent to the town of Doromagogo to support the withdrawal of police forces present in the area, and were attacked by Indian Army units on their return journey.[43] At 04:00, the Indian assault commenced with artillery bombardment on Portuguese positions south of the town of Maulingum, which was launched on the basis of the false intelligence that the Portuguese had stationed heavy battle tanks in the area. By 04:30, Bicholim was under fire. At 04:40, the Portuguese forces destroyed the bridge at Bicholim and followed this with the destruction of the bridges at Chapora in Colvale and at Assonora at 05:00.[43] On the morning of 18 December, the 50 Para Brigade of the Indian Army moved into Goa in three columns. 1. The eastern column comprised the 2nd Para Maratha advanced towards the town Ponda in central Goa via Usgo. 2. The central column consisting of the 1st Para Punjab advanced towards Panaji via the village of Banastari. 3. The western column - the main thrust of the attack - comprised the 2nd Sikh Light Infantry as well as an armored division which crossed the border at 6:30 a.m. in the morning and advanced along Tivim.[41] At 05:30, Portuguese troops left their barracks at Ponda in central Goa and marched towards the town of Usgo, in the direction of the advancing eastern column of the Indian 2nd Para Maratha. At 09:00, these Portuguese troops marching towards Usgo, reported that Indian troops had already reached halfway to the town of Ponda.[43]
1961 Indian annexation of Goa By 10:00, Portuguese forces of the 1st EREC, faced with the advancing 2nd Sikh Light Infantry, began a south-bound withdrawal to the town of Mapuca where, by 12:00, they came under the risk of being surrounded by Indian forces. At 12:30, the 1st EREC began a retreat from the town of Mapuca, making way through the Indian forces, with its armoured cars firing ahead to cover the withdrawal of the personnel carrier vehicles. This unit relocated by ferry further south to Panaji.[43] At 13:30, the bridge at Banastarim was destroyed by the Portuguese, just after the retreat of the 2nd EREC, thus cutting off all road links to the capital city of Panaji. By 17:45, the forces of the 1st EREC and the 9th Caadores Company of the Portuguese Battlegroup North had completed its ferry crossing of the Mandovi River to Panaji, just minutes ahead of the arrival of the Indian armoured forces.[43] The Indian tanks had reached Betim, just across the Mandovi River from the capital town of Panaji without encountering any opposition. The 2 Sikh LI joined it by 21:00, crossing over mines and demolished bridges en route. In the absence of orders, the unit stayed at Betim for the night. The same night Major Sidhu of the 7th Cavalry was killed when Portuguese guards fired on an unsuspecting Indian unit at Aguada Fort.[41] At 20:00 hours, a Goan by the name of Gregrio Magno Anto crossed the Mandovi River from Panaji and delivered a ceasefire offer letter from Major Accio Tenreiro of the Portuguese Army to Major Shivdev Singh Sidhu, the commanding officer of the Indian units camped there. The letter stated "The Military Commander of the City of Goa states that he wishes to parley with the commander of the army of the Indian Union with respect to the surrender. Under these conditions, the Portuguese troops must immediately cease fire and the Indian troops do likewise in order to prevent the slaughter of the population and the destruction of the city." [44] The order to cross the Mandovi River was received on the morning of 19 December, upon which two rifle companies of the 2nd Sikh Light Infantry advanced on Panaji at 07:30 and secured the town without facing any resistance. On orders from Brigadier Sagat Singh, the troops entering Panaji removed their steel helmets and donned the Parachute Regiments maroon berets. Fort Aguada was also captured on that day when the Indian 7th Cavalry attacked the fort with assistance from the armoured division stationed at Betim, and freed its political prisoners. The advance from the East Meanwhile, in the east, the 63rd Indian Infantry Brigade advanced in two columns. The right column comprising the 2nd Bihar and the left column consisting of the 3rd Sikh linked up at the border town of Mollem and then advanced upon the town of Ponda taking separate routes. By night fall, the 2nd Bihar had reached the town of Candeapur, while the 3rd Sikh had reached Darbondara. Although neither column had encountered any resistance, their further progress was hampered because all bridges spanning the river had been destroyed. The rear battalion comprised the 4th Sikh Infantry, which reached Candeapar in the early hours of 19 December, and not to be bogged down by the absence of the Borim bridge(already blown up), went across the Zuari river in their military tankers and then waded across a small creek, in chest high water, to reach a small dock known as Embarcadouro de Tembim in Raia, presently under survey No.44/5 of Raia Village, from where there exists a connecting road to Margao (Old Portuguese Planta 4489 & 4493). At Tembim the 4th Sikh Infantry rear battalion, took some rest in a cattle shed on the small dock, and sprawled on the ground and in the balcony of a house adjacent to the dock, drank some water, retrieved their tankers and then proceeded to Margao... Margao - the administrative centre of Southern Goa - by 12:00. From here, the column advanced towards the harbour of Mormugo. En route to this target, the column encountered fierce resistance from a 500-strong Portuguese unit at the village of Verna, where the Indian column was joined by the 2nd Bihar. The Portuguese unit surrendered at 15:30 after fierce fighting, and the 4th Sikh then proceeded to Mormugo and Dabolim Airport, where the main body of the Portuguese army awaited the Indians. A decoy attack was staged south of Margao by the 4th Rajput company to mislead the Portuguese. This column overcame minefields, roadblocks and demolished bridges, and eventually went on to help secure the town of Margao.
1961 Indian annexation of Goa By the evening of 19 December, most of Goa had been overrun by advancing Indian forces, and a large party of more than two thousand Portuguese soldiers had taken position at the military base at Alparqueiros at the entrance to the port town of Vasco da Gama. Per the Portuguese strategy code named Plano Sentinela the defending forces were to make their last stand at the harbour, holding out against the Indians until Portuguese naval reinforcements could arrive. Orders delivered from the Portuguese President called for a scorched earth policy - that Goa was to be destroyed before it was given up to the Indians.[45] The air raids over Goa The first Indian raid was conducted on 18 December on the Dabolim Airport and was in the form of 12 English Electric Canberra aircraft led by Wing Commander N.B. Menon. The raid resulted in the dropping of 63,000 pounds of explosives within minutes, completely destroying the runway. In line with the mandate given by the Air Command, structures and facilities at the airfield were left undamaged.[46] The second Indian raid was conducted on the same target by eight used the small and lightweight Canberra Canberras led by Wing Commander Surinder Singh, which again left bombers. the airports terminal and other buildings untouched. Two transport aircrafta Lockheed Constellation belonging to the Portuguese airline TAP and a Douglas DC-4 belonging to the Goan airline TAIPwere parked on the apron. On the night of 18 December, the Portuguese used both aircraft to evacuate the families of some government and military officials in spite of the heavily damaged runway. During the first hours of the evening, airport workers hastily recovered part of the runway. The first aircraft to leave was the TAP Constellation commanded by Manuel Correia Reis, which took off using only 700 metres; the debris from the runway damaged the fuselage with 25 holes and a flat tire. In order to take off in the short distance, the TAP pilots had jettisoned all the extra seats and other unwanted equipment so that they could do a 'short take-off'.[47] The second to leave was the TAIP DC-4, piloted by TAIP Director Major Solano de Almeida. Both aircraft used the cover of night and very low altitudes to break through Indian aerial patrols and escape to Karachi, Pakistan.[] A third Indian raid was carried out by six Hawker Hunters, and was targeted at the wireless station at Bambolim, which was successfully attacked with rockets and gun cannons. The mandate to support ground troops was served by the de Havilland Vampires of No. 45 squadron which patrolled the sector but did not receive any requests into action. In an incident of friendly fire, two Vampires fired rockets into the positions of the 2nd Sikh Light Infantry injuring two soldiers, while elsewhere, Indian ground troops mistakenly opened fire on an IAF T-6 Texan, causing minimal damage. In later years, commentators have maintained that India's intense air strikes against the airfields were uncalled-for, since none of the targeted airports had any military capabilities and did not cater to any military aircraft[citation needed] . As such, the airfields were defenceless civilian targets.[] To this day, the Indian navy continues to control the Dabolim Airport, although this is now used as a civilian airport as well. The storming of Anjidiv Island The Indian Naval Command assigned the task of securing the island of Anjidiv to the INS Trishul and the INS Mysore. Under covering fire from the ships, Indian marines under the command of Lt. Arun Auditto stormed the island at 14:25 on 18 December, and engaged the Portuguese defenders. The Portuguese ceased fire, and raised a white flag, thus luring the Indian marines out of their cover, before opening fire again, killing 7 marines and wounding 19. Among the casualties were two officers. The Portuguese defences were eventually overrun after fierce shelling from the Indian ships offshore. The island was secured by the Indians at 1400 on the next day.
A Canberra PR.9 taking off. The Indian Air Force
1961 Indian annexation of Goa Naval battle at Mormugo harbour On the morning of 18 December, the Portuguese sloop Afonso de Albuquerque was anchored off Mormugo Harbour. Three Portuguese patrol boats were also present at Goa and Daman and Diu. Besides engaging Indian naval units, the Afonso de Albuquerque was also tasked with providing a coastal artillery battery for the defence of the harbour and adjoining beaches, as well as providing vital radio communications with Lisbon after on-shore radio facilities had been destroyed in Indian airstrikes.
10
The NRP Afonso de Albuquerque
At 09:00, three Indian frigates led by the INS Betwa took up position off the Harbour, awaiting orders to attack the NRP Afonso and secure sea access to the port. At 11:00, Indian planes bombed Mormugo harbor.[48] At 12:00, upon receiving clearance from HQ, the INS Betwa, accompanied by the INS Beas entered the harbour and opened fire on the NRP Afonso with their 4.5-inch guns while transmitting requests to surrender in morse code between shots. In response, the NRP Afonso lifted anchor, headed out towards the enemy and returned fire with its 120mm guns. Besides being outnumbered by the Indians, the Afonso was also at a severe disadvantage since it was in a confined position that restricted its maneuverability, and also because its four 120mm guns were capable of only two rounds a minute, as compared to the 60 rounds per minute cadence of the guns aboard the Indian frigates. A few minutes into the exchange of fire, at 1215, the Afonso took a direct hit in its control tower, injuring its weapons officer. At 12:25, an anti-personnel shrapnel bomb fired from an Indian vessel exploded directly over the ship, killing its radio officer and severely injuring its commander, Captain Antnio da Cunha Arago, after which the First Officer Pinto da Cruz took command of the vessel. The ships propulsion system was also badly damaged in this attack. At 12:35, the NRP Afonso swerved 180 degrees and was run aground against Bambolim beach. At that time, against the commander's orders, a white flag was hoisted under instructions from the sergeant in charge of signals. But the flag coiled itself around the mast and as a result was not spotted by the Indians, who continued their barrage. The flag was immediately lowered. Eventually at 12:50, after having fired nearly 400 rounds at the Indians, hitting two of the Indian vessels, and having taken severe damage, the order was given to initiate the abandonment of the ship. Under heavy fire, directed both at the ship as well as at the coast, non-essential crew including weapons staff left the ship and made their way to the shore. They were followed at 13:10 by the rest of the crew, who along with their injured commander, disembarked directly onto the beach after setting fire to the ship. Following this, the commander was transferred by car to the hospital at Panaji. In all, the NRP Afonso lost 5 dead and 13 wounded in the battle.[48] The sloop's crew formally surrendered with the remaining Portuguese forces on 19 December 1961 at 2030 hrs.[49] As a gesture of goodwill, the commanders of the INS Betwa and the INS Beas later visited Captain Arago as he lay recuperating in bed in Panaji. The Afonso - having been renamed as Saravastri by the Indian Navy - lay grounded at the beach near Dona Paula, until 1962 when it was towed to Bombay and sold for scrap. Parts of the ship were recovered and are on display at the Naval Museum in Bombay.[48]
11
The military actions in Daman

The ground attack on Daman Daman, approximately 72km2 in area, is located at the southern end of Gujarat bordering Maharashtra and just about 193km north of Bombay. The countryside is broken and interspersed with marsh, salt pans, streams, paddy fields, coconut and palm groves. The river Daman Ganga splits the capital city of Daman into two-halves Nani Daman (Damo Pequeno) and Moti Daman (Damo Grande). The Portuguese garrison in Daman was headed by a Governor, Major Antnio Jos da Costa Pinto, with 360 Portuguese Army soldiers, 200 policemen and about 30 customs officials under him. The strategically important features were Daman Fort and the Air Control Tower of the Daman Airport.[50] The Portuguese Army garrison included two companies of caadores (light infantry) and a battery of artillery, but these were armed with insufficient and old ammunition. The Portuguese also placed a 20mm anti-aircraft gun ten days before the invasion to protect the artillery. Daman had been secured with small minefields and defensive shelters had been built.[36] The advance on the enclave of Daman was conducted by the 1st Maratha Light Infantry under the command of Lt-Col SJS Bhonsle[50] in a pre dawn operation on 18 December.[41] The plan was to capture Daman piecemeal in four phases, to start with the area of the airfield, then progressively to area garden, Nani Daman and finally Moti Daman to include the fort.[50] The advance commenced at 04:00 when one battalion and three companies of Indian soldiers progressed through the central area of the northern territory, aiming to seize the airfield.[36] However, the surprise was lost when the Indian A Company tried to capture the Air Control Tower and the Indian battalion suffered three casualties. The Portuguese lost one soldier dead and six taken captive. The Indian D Company captured a position named "Point 365" just before the next morning. At the crack of dawn, two sorties by Indian Air Force Mystere fighters struck Portuguese mortar positions and guns inside Moti Daman Fort.[50] At 04:30, the Indian artillery commenced the bombardment of Damo Grande. The artillery attack, coupled with difficulties in transportation, isolated the Portuguese command post in Damo Grande from the forces in Damo Pequeno. At 07:30, a Portuguese unit stationed at the fortress of So Jernimo opened mortar fire on Indian forces attempting to capture the airstrip.[36] At 11:30, Portuguese forces resisting an Indian advance on the eastern border at Varacunda ran out of ammunition and withdrew westwards to Catra. At 12:00, to delay the Indian advance following the withdrawal from Varacunda, the Portuguese artillery battery on the banks of the Rio Sandalcalo is ordered to open fire. The commander of the battery, Captain Felgueiras de Sousa, instead dismantled the guns and surrendered to the Indians.[36] By 12:00, the airfield was assaulted by the Indian A and C companies simultaneously. In the ensuing exchange of fire the A Company lost one more soldier killed while seven were wounded.[50] By 13:00, the remaining Portuguese forces on the eastern border at Calicachigo-A exhausted their ammunition and retreated towards the coast. By 17:00, in the absence of any resistance, the Indians had managed to occupy most of the territory, with the exception of the airfield and Damo Pequeno, where the Portuguese were making their last stand. By this time, the Indian Air Force had conducted as many as six air attacks, severely demoralising the Portuguese forces. At 20:00, after a meeting between the Portuguese commanders, a delegation was dispatched to the Indian lines in order to open negotiations, but was fired upon, and was forced to withdraw. A similar attempt by the artillery to surrender at 08:00 of the next day was also fired on.[36] The Indians assaulted the airfield the next morning, upon which the Portuguese surrendered at 11:00 without a fight.[41] The Portuguese garrison commander Major Antnio Jos da Costa[50] - although wounded - was stretchered to the airfield, as the Indians were only willing to accept a surrender from him.[36] Approximately 600 Portuguese soldiers (including 24 officers[50]) were taken prisoner. The Indians suffered 4 dead and 14 wounded,[50] while the Portuguese suffered 10 dead and two wounded.[41] The 1st Light Maratha Infantry was decorated for the battle with
1961 Indian annexation of Goa one VSM for the CO, two Sena Medals and five Mentioned in Dispatches.[50] The Daman air raids In the Daman sector, Indian Mysteres flew 14 sorties, continuously harassing Portuguese artillery positions. Naval Action at Daman Like the Vega in Diu, the patrol boat Antares at Daman under the command of 2nd Lt. Abreu Brito was ordered to sail out and fight the imminent Indian invasion. The boat stayed in position from 0700 on 18 December and remained a mute witness to repeated air strikes followed by ground invasion until 1920 when it lost all communications with land. With all information pointing to total occupation of all Portuguese enclaves in India, Lt. Brito attempted to save his crew and boat by escaping to Karachi in Pakistan. The boat traversed 530 miles (850km), escaping detection by Indian forces to arrive at Karachi at 2000 on 20 December.
12
The military actions in Diu

The ground attack on Diu Diu is a 13.8km by 4.6km Island (area about 40km2) located at the southern tip of Gujarat. The island is separated from the mainland by a narrow channel running though a swamp. The channel could only be used by fishing boats and small craft. No bridges existed to cross the channels at the time of hostilities.[51] Diu was attacked on 18 December from the north west along Kob Forte by two companies of the 20th Rajput - with the capture of the Diu Airfield being the primary objective - and from the northeast along Gogal and Amdepur by the Rajput B Company and the 4 Madras.[41] These Indian army units ignored requests from Wg Cdr MPO (Micky) Blake, planning-in-charge of the Indian Air Force operations in Diu, to attack only on first light when close air support would be available.[51] The Portuguese defences repulsed the attack backed by 87.6mm artillery and mortars,[36] inflicting heavy losses on the Indians.[51] The first attack was made by the 4 Madras on a police border post at 01:30 on 18 December at Gogol and was repulsed by 13 Portuguese police officers.[36] Another attempt by the 4 Madras at 02:00 was again repulsed, this time backed with Portuguese 87.5mm artillery and mortar which suffered due to poor quality of munitions. By 04:00, ten of the original 13 Portuguese defenders at Gogol had been wounded and were evacuated to a hospital. At 05:30, the Portuguese artillery launched a fresh attack on the 4 Madras assaulting Gogol and forced their retreat.[36] Meanwhile at 03:00, two companies of the 20th Rajput attempted to cross a muddy swamp[36] separating them from the Portuguese forces at Passo Covo under cover of dark on rafts made of bamboo cots tied to oil barrels.[51] The attempt was to establish a bridgehead and capture the airfield.[41] This attack was repulsed with fairly heavy losses by a well entrenched unit of between 125 to 130 Portuguese soldiers armed with small automatic weapons and sten guns[51] as well as light and medium machine guns.[41] According to Portuguese sources, this post was defended by only eight soldiers.[36] As the Rajputs reached the middle of the creek, the Portuguese on Diu opened fire with two medium and two light machine-guns, capsizing some of the rafts. Major Mal Singh of the Indian army along with five men pressed on his advance and crossed the creek. On reaching the far bank, he and his men assaulted the LMG trenches at Fort-De-Cova and silenced them. The Portuguese MMG fire from another position wounded the officer and two of his men. However, with the efforts of company Havildar Major Mohan Singh and two other men, the three wounded were evacuated back across the creek to safety. As dawn approached, the Portuguese increased the intensity of fire and the battalions water crossing equipment suffered extensive damage. As a result the Indian battalion was ordered to fall back to Kob village by first light.[50]
1961 Indian annexation of Goa Another assault at 05:00 was similarly repulsed by the Portuguese defenders. At 06:30, Portuguese forces retrieved rafts abandoned by the 20th Rajput, recovered ammunition left behind and rescued a wounded Indian soldier who was given treatment.[36] At 07:00, with the onset of dawn, Indian air strikes commenced, forcing the Portuguese to retreat from Passo Covo to the town of Malala. By 09:00 the Portuguese unit at Gogol also retreated[36] allowing the Rajput B Company (who replaced the 4 Madras) to advance under heavy artillery fire and occupy the town.[41] By 10:15, the Indian cruiser the INS Delhi, anchored off Diu, commenced the bombardment of targets on the shore.[36] At 12:45, Indian jets fire a rocket at a mortar at Diu Fortress causing a fire in close proximity to a munitions dump, forcing the Portuguese to order the evacuation of the fortress - a task completed by 14:15 under heavy bombardment from the Indians.[36] At 18:00, the Portuguese commanders agreed in a meeting that, in view of repeated air strikes and the inability to establish contact with headquarters in Goa or Lisbon, there was no way to pursue an effective defence and decided to surrender to the Indians.[36] On 19 December, by 12:00, the Portuguese formally surrendered. The Indians took 403 prisoners, which included the Governor of the island along with 18 officers and 43 sergeants.[50] In surrendering to the Indians, the Diu Governor stated that he could have kept the Army out for a few weeks but he had no answer to the Air Force. The Indian Air Force was also present at the ceremony and was represented by Gp Capt Godkhindi, Wing Cmdr Micky Blake and Sqn Ldr Nobby Clarke.[51] 7 Portuguese soldiers were killed in the battle.[51] Major Mal Singh and Sepoy Hakam Singh of the Indian army were awarded Ashok Chakra (Class III).[50] On 19 December, the 4th Madras C Company landed on the island of Panikot off Diu, where a group of 13 Portuguese soldiers surrendered to them there.[41] The Diu air raids The Indian air operations in the Diu Sector were entrusted to the Armaments Training Wing led by Wg Cdr Micky Blake. The first air attacks were made at dawn on 18 December and were aimed at destroying Diu's fortifications facing the mainland. Throughout the rest of the day, the Air Force had at least two aircraft in the air at any time, A retired "Black Archers" Toofani (MD450 giving close support to advancing Indian infantry. During the morning, Ouragan) on display at the Indian Air Force the air force attacked and destroyed Diu Airfield's ATC as well as parts Museum, Palam, New Delhi. These formed the of Diu Fort. On orders from Tactical Air Command located at Pune, a backbone of the air strikes on Diu. sortie of two Toofanis attacked and destroyed the airfield runway with 4 1000lb Mk 9 bombs. A second sortie aimed at the runway and piloted by Wg Cdr Blake himself was aborted when Blake detected what he reported as people waving white flags. In subsequent sorties, the Indian Air Force attacked and destroyed the Portuguese ammunition dump as well a patrol boat that attempted to escape from Diu. In the absence of any Portuguese air presence, Portuguese ground based anti-aircraft units attempted to offer resistance to the Indian raids, but were overwhelmed and quickly silenced, leaving complete air superiority to the Indians. Continued air attacks forced the Portuguese governor of Diu to surrender.
13
1961 Indian annexation of Goa Naval action at Diu The Indian naval cruiser INS Delhi was anchored off the coast of Diu and offered a barrage of from its 6-inch guns at the Diu Fortress where the Portuguese were holed up. The Commanding Officer of the Indian Air Force operating in the area reported that some of the shells fired from the New Delhi were bouncing off the beach and exploding on the Indian mainland. However, no casualties were reported from this.[52] At 04:00 on 18 December, the Portuguese patrol boat Vega encountered the New Delhi around 12 miles (19km) off the coast of Diu, and was attacked with heavy machine gun fire. Staying out of range, the boat had no casualties and minimal damage, the boat withdrew to the port at Diu. At 07:00, news was received that the Indian invasion had commenced, and the commander of the Vega, 2nd Lt Oliveira e Carmo was ordered to sail out and fight until the last round of ammunition. At 07:30 the crew of the Vega spotted two Indian aircraft on patrol missions and opened fire on them with the ship's 20mm Oerlikon gun. In retaliation the Indian aircraft attacked the Vega twice, killing the captain and the gunner and forcing the rest of the crew to abandon the boat and swim ashore, where they were taken prisoners of war.
14
Portuguese surrender
Despite orders from Lisbon, Governor General Manuel Antnio Vassalo e Silva took stock of the numerical superiority of the Indian troops, as well as the food and ammunition supplies available to his forces and took the decision to surrender. He later described his orders to destroy Goa as "um sacrifcio intil" (a useless sacrifice). In a communication to all Portuguese forces under his command, he stated, Having considered the defence of the Peninsula of Mormugo from aerial, naval and ground fire of the enemy and having considered the difference between the forces and the resources the situation does not allow myself to proceed with the fight without great sacrifice of the lives of the inhabitants of Vasco da Gama, I have decided with my patriotism well present, to get in touch with the enemy I order all my forces to cease-fire.[] The official Portuguese surrender was conducted in a formal ceremony held at 20:30 on 19 December when Governor General Manuel Antnio Vassalo e Silva signed the instrument of surrender bringing to an end 451 years of Portuguese Rule in Goa. In all, 4668 personnel were taken prisoner by the Indians - a figure which included military and civilian personnel, Portuguese, Africans and Indians (Goans).[] This comprised 3412 prisoners in Goa, 853 in Daman and 403 in Diu. Portuguese non-combatants present in Goa at the time of the surrender - which included Mrs Vasalo D'Silva, wife of the Portuguese Governor General of Goa - were transported by 29 December to Bombay from where they were repatriated to Portugal. Manuel Vassalo, however remained along with approximately 3300 Portuguese combatants as POWs in Goa. Upon the surrender of the Portuguese governor general, Goa, Daman and Diu was declared a federally administered Union Territory placed directly under the President of India, and Major-General K. P. Candeth was appointed as its military governor. The war had lasted two days. India lost 34 killed and 51 wounded. Portugal lost 31 killed, 57 wounded, and 4668 captured. Those Indian forces who served within the disputed territories for 48 hours, or flew at least one operational sortie during the conflict, received a General Service Medal 1947 with the Goa 1961 bar.[53]
15
Portuguese actions post-hostilities

On 18 December, even as Indian forces were rolling into Goa, a special emergency session of the United Nations Security Council was convened at the request of the Portuguese government. At the meeting, called to consider the Indian invasion of Portuguese territories in Goa, Daman and Diu, Adlai Stevenson, the US representative to the UN, criticised the Indian military action. He then submitted a draft resolution that called for a ceasefire, a withdrawal of all Indian forces from Goa, and the resumption of negotiations.[54] This resolution was co-sponsored by France, UK and Turkey, but failed after the Soviet Union, Indias long-time Cold War ally, exercised its veto. The New York Times of 19 December 1961 reporting the Western response to the invasion of Goa stated: "Adlai E. Stevenson warned the Security Council early today that the United Nations was in danger of dying as the result of a Soviet veto killing a Western resolution to tend the Indian invasion of Goa. The resolution would have urged India to accept an immediate cease-fire and recall her invasion troops from Goa and two other Portuguese enclaves on the Indian coast. Moscow, however, hailed the invasion as a liberation drive and accused the United States of hypocrisy in its criticism of India's military moves. Observers believed the Russians were trying to fan resentment against NATO, to which both Portugal and the United States belong."[55] Canadian political scientist AR Bandeira has argued that the sacrifice of Goa was an elaborate public relations stunt calculated to rally support for Portugal's wars in Africa.[33] Upon receiving news of the fall of Goa, the Portuguese government formally severed all diplomatic links with India and refused to recognise the incorporation of the seized territories into the Indian Republic. An offer of Portuguese citizenship was instead made to all Goan natives who wished to emigrate to Portugal rather than remain under Indian rule. This was amended in 2006 to include only those who had been born before 19 December 1961. Later, in a show of defiance, Salazar's government offered a reward of US$10,000 for the capture of Brigadier Sagat Singh, the commander of the maroon berets of Indias parachute regiment who were the first troops to enter Panaji, Goas capital.[56] On receiving news of the fall of Portuguese India, Lisbon went virtually into mourning, and Christmas celebrations were extremely muted. The US embassy placed a curtain in front of its Christmas display in the ground-floor window of the U.S. Information Office. Cinemas and theatres shut down as tens of thousands of Portuguese marched in a silent parade from Lisbon's city hall to the cathedral, escorting the relics of St. Francis Xavier.[57] Portuguese Prime Minister Salazar, while addressing the National Assembly on 3 January 1962, invoked the principle of national sovereignty, as defined in the legal framework of the Constitution of the Estado Novo. "We can not negotiate, not without denying and betraying our own, the cession of national territory and the transfer of populations that inhabit them to foreign sovereigns," said Salazar.[58] Relations between India and Portugal thawed only in 1974, when, following an anti-colonial military coup d'tat and the fall of the authoritarian rule in Lisbon, Goa was finally recognised as part of India, and steps were taken to re-establish diplomatic relations with India. In 1992, Portuguese President Mrio Soares became the first Portuguese head of state to visit Goa after its annexation by India; following Indian President R. Venkataramans visit to Portugal in 1990.[59]
16
Internment and repatriation of POWs

Following their surrender, the Portuguese soldiers were interned by the Indian Army at their own military camps at Navelim, Aguada, Pond and Alparqueiros and were kept under harsh conditions which included sleeping on cement floors and hard manual labour.[28] By January 1962, most POWs had been transferred to the newly established camp at Ponda where conditions were substantially better.[28] Air Marshal S Raghavendran, who met with some of the captured Portuguese soldiers, wrote in his memoirs several years later "I have never seen such a set of troops looking so miserable in my life. Short, not particularly well built and certainly very unsoldierlike."[60] In one incident, recounted by Lt. Francisco Cabral Couto (now retired general), an attempt was made on 17 January, by some of the prisoners to escape the camp. The attempt was foiled, and the Portuguese officers in charge of the escapees were threatened with court martial and execution by the Indians. This situation was defused by the timely intervention of a Jesuit military chaplain.[28] Following the foiled escape attempt, Capt. Carlos Azaredo (now retired general) was beaten with rifle butts by four Indian soldiers while a gun was pointed at him, on the orders of Captain Naik, the 2nd Camp Commander. The beating was in retaliation for Azaredo's telling Captain Naik to "Go to Hell" and was serious enough to make him lose consciousness and cause severe contusions. Captain Naik was later punished by the Indian Army for violating the Geneva Convention.[] During the internment of the Portuguese POWs at various camps around Goa, the prisoners were visited by large numbers of Goans - described by Capt. Azaredo as "Goan friends, acquaintances, or simply anonymous persons" who offered the internees cigarettes, biscuits, tea, medicines and money. This surprised the Indian military authorities who first limited the visits to twice a week, and then only to representatives of the Red Cross.[] The captivity lasted for six months "thanks to the stupid stubbornness of Lisbon" (according to Capt. Carlos Azeredo). The Portuguese Government insisted that the POWs be repatriated by Portuguese aircraft - a demand that was rejected by the Indian Government who instead insisted on aircraft from a neutral country. The negotiations were delayed even further when Salazar ordered the detention of 1200 Indians in Mozambique allegedly as a bargaining chip in exchange for Portuguese POWs.[] By May 1962, most of the POWs had been repatriatedbeing first flown to Karachi, in chartered French aircraft, and then sent off to Lisbon by three ships: Vera Cruz, Ptria and Moambique.[61] On arrival at Tejo in Portugal, returning Portuguese servicemen were taken into custody by military police at gunpoint and without immediate access to their families who had arrived to receive them. Following intense questioning and interrogations, the officers were charged with direct insubordination on having refused to comply with directives not to surrender to the Indians. On 22 March 1963, the governor general, the military commander, his chief of staff, one naval captain, six majors, a sub lieutenant and a sergeant were cashiered by the council of ministers for cowardice and expelled from military service. Four captains, four lieutenants and a lieutenant commander were suspended for six months.[33] Ex-governor Manuel Antnio Vassalo e Silva was greeted with a hostile reception when he returned to Portugal. He was subsequently court martialed for failing to follow orders, expelled from the military and was sent into exile. He returned to Portugal only in 1974, after the fall of the regime, and was given back his military status. He was later able to conduct a state visit to Goa, where he was given a warm reception.[62]
17
International reaction to the capture of Goa

"The casualties were minimum. I am in favour of all wars being like the war between India and Portugal peaceful and quickly over!" - J. K. Galbraith, former US ambassador to India[]
United States of America

The United States' official reaction to the invasion of Goa was delivered by Adlai Stevenson in the UN Security Council, where he condemned the armed action of the Indian government and demanded that all Indian forces be unconditionally withdrawn from Goan soil. To express its displeasure with the Indian action in Goa, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee attempted, over the objections of President John F. Kennedy, to cut the 1962 foreign aid appropriation to India by 25 percent.[63] Referring to the perception, especially in the West, that India had previously been lecturing the world about the virtues of nonviolence, US President Kennedy told the Indian ambassador to the US, You spend the last fifteen years preaching morality to us, and then you go ahead and act the way any normal country would behave.... People are saying, the preacher has been caught coming out of the brothel.[64] In an article titled "India, The Aggressor", The New York Times on 19 December 1961, stated "With his invasion of Goa Prime Minister Nehru has done irreparable damage to India's good name and to the principles of international morality."[65] Life International, in its issue dated 12 February 1962, carried an article titled "Symbolic pose by Goa's Governor" in which it expressed its vehement condemnation of the military action. The world's initial outrage at pacifist India's resort to military violence for conquest has subsided into resigned disdain. And in Goa, a new Governor strikes a symbolic pose before portraits of men who had administered the prosperous Portuguese enclave for 451 years. He is K. P. Candeth, commanding India's 17th Infantry Division, and as the very model of a modern major general, he betrayed no sign that he is finding Goans less than happy about their "liberation". Goan girls refuse to dance with Indian officers. Goan shops have been stripped bare by luxury-hungry Indian soldiers, and Indian import restrictions prevent replacement. Even in India, doubts are heard. "India", said respected Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, leader of the Swatantra Party, "has totally lost the moral power to raise her voice against the use of military power" "Symbolic pose by Goa's Governor", Life International, 12 February 1962
Soviet Union
The head of state of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, who was touring India at the time of the war, made several speeches applauding the Indian action. In a farewell message, he urged Indians to ignore Western indignation as it came "from those who are accustomed to strangle the peoples striving for independence... and from those who enrich themselves from colonialist plunder". Nikita Khrushchev, the de facto Soviet leader, telegraphed Nehru stating that there was "unanimous acclaim" from every Soviet citizen for "Friendly India". The USSR had earlier vetoed a UN security council resolution condemning the Indian invasion of Goa.[66][67][68]
18
China
In an official statement, released long after the action in Goa, Peking stressed the support of the Chinese government for the struggle of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America against "imperialist colonialism". China neither condemned nor applauded the invasion, despite Portuguese rule of Macau, as at the time, it was enjoying cordial relations with India, although the Sino-Indian War would begin only months later.
Pakistan
In a letter to the US President on 2 January 1962, the Pakistani President General Ayub Khan stated: My Dear President, The forcible taking of Goa by India has demonstrated what we in Pakistan have never had any illusions about--that India would not hesitate to attack if it were in her interest to do so and if she felt that the other side was too weak to resist.[69]
Africa
Before the invasion the press speculated about international reaction to military action and recalled the recent charge by African nations that India was "too soft" on Portugal and was thus "dampening the enthusiasm of freedom fighters in other countries".[] Many African nations - themselves former European colonies - reacted with delight to the capture of Goa by the Indians. Radio Ghana termed it as the Liberation of Goa and went on to state that the people of Ghana would long for the day when our downtrodden brethren in Angola and other Portuguese territories in Africa are liberated. Adelino Gwambe, the leader of the Mozambique National Democratic Union stated: We fully support the use of force against Portuguese butchers.[]
The Catholic Church

In December 1961, just days before the annexation of Goa by Indian troops, the Vatican appointed Dom Jos Pedro da Silva, a Portuguese priest as the auxiliary bishop of Goa, and granted him the right to succeed as the Patriarch of the Church in Goa. Although the Vatican did not voice its reaction to the annexation of Goa, it delayed the appointment of a native head of the Goan Church until the inauguration of the Second Vatican Council in Rome, when Msgr Francisco Xavier da Piedade Rebelo was consecrated Bishop and Vicar Apostolic of Goa in 1963.[70] Simultaneously, the Church in Goa was placed under the patronage of the Cardinal of India and its links with the Church in Portugal were severed.[71]
Cultural Depiction
Saat Hindustani (1969), the debut film of Amitabh Bachchan with an ensemble cast, was about Operation Vijay. It won the 1970 Nargis Dutt Award for Best Feature Film on National Integration, and the Lyric-Writer of the Best Film Song on National Integration Award for Kaifi Azmi. Trikal, a film by Shyam Benegal also has a storyline on the backdrop of 1960s Goa.
References
Citations
[4] Numbers from 1955, thus excludes Dadra and Nagar-Haveli. The bulk (547,448) was in Goa (composed of the districts of Old and New Goa, Bardez, Mormugo and Salsete, and the offshore island of Anjediva), remainder in Damman (69,005) and Diu (21,138). See Kay (1970) Salazar and Modern Portugal, New York: Hawthorn, p. 295) [5] H. Kay (1970) Salazar and Modern Portugal, New York: Hawthorn [6] Prof. Frank D'Souza, FRANKLY SPEAKING, The Collected Writings of Prof. Frank D'Souza" Editor-in chief Mgr. Benny Aguiar, published by the Prof. Frank D'Souza Memorial Committee, Bombay 1987. (http:/ / www. goacom. com/ culture/ biographies/ tristao. html) [7] Goa's Freedom Movement (http:/ / www. goacom. com/ culture/ history/ history4. html) By: Lambert Mascarenhas [8] Kamat Research Database - Goa's Freedom Struggle (http:/ / www. kamat. com/ database/ content/ goa_freedom/ ) [9] Mainstream, Vol XLVII, No 14, 21 March 2009 (http:/ / www. mainstreamweekly. net/ article1247. html)

[11] Francisco Monteiro, CHRONOLOGY OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY UNLEASHED BY THE INDIAN UNION AGAINST THE TERRITORIES OF GOA, DAMO AND DIU (http:/ / www. colaco. net/ 1/ India-ter. htm) [12] SuperGoa: Imagens, Factos, Notcias, Informaes e Histria sobra Goa India (http:/ / www. supergoa. com/ pt/ 40anos/ vijay. asp) [13] Goa was first recognised as equal to the metropolis in the Royal Charter of 1518, and affirmed in subsequent legislation. The term 'province' was first used in 1576, and the term 'overseas provinces' used in virtually all legislation and constitutions thereafter, e.g. Art.1-3 & Art. 162-64 of 1822 Constitution online (http:/ / www. arqnet. pt/ portal/ portugal/ liberalismo/ const822. html), 1826 constitution online (http:/ / www. arqnet. pt/ portal/ portugal/ liberalismo/ carta826. html), Art. I & Title X of the constitution of 1838 online (http:/ / www. arqnet. pt/ portal/ portugal/ liberalismo/ const838. html), Title V of the Republican constitution of 1911 online (http:/ / www. arqnet. pt/ portal/ portugal/ liberalismo/ const911. html) and the 1932 Constitution of the Estado Novo. [14] (http:/ / www. goacom. com/ culture/ history/ history4. html) Lambert Mascarenhas, "Goa's Freedom Movement," excerpted from Henry Scholberg, Archana Ashok Kakodkar and Carmo Azevedo, Bibliography of Goa and the Portuguese in India New Delhi, Promilla (1982) [15] Sankar Ghose (1993) Jawaharlal Nehru: A biography. Mumbai: Allied. p.283 [16] P.W. Prabhakar (2003) Wars, proxy-wars and terrorism: post independent India New Delhi: Mittal, p.39 [17] Sankar Ghose (1993) Jawaharlal Nehru: A biography. Mumbai: Allied. p.282 [18] "Indian Volunteers Invade Goa; 21 Die; Unarmed Indians March into Goa", New York Times, 15 August 1955 [19] Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, Published by Columbia University Press, 1998 [20] Time Magazine 29 August 1955 (http:/ / www. time. com/ time/ magazine/ article/ 0,9171,823878,00. html) [21] Goa's Freedom Movement (http:/ / www. goacom. com/ culture/ history/ history4. html) [22] Francisco Monteiro - India supported banditry in Goa (http:/ / www. colaco. net/ 1/ India-ter. htm) [23] Comrades at Odds: The United States and India Page 185 [24] US Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 - 561. (http:/ / www. state. gov/ r/ pa/ ho/ frus/ kennedyjf/ 46453. htm) Document 66, [25] US Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 - 1161 (http:/ / www. state. gov/ r/ pa/ ho/ frus/ kennedyjf/ 46453. htm) Document 68 [26] US Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 - 1261 (http:/ / www. state. gov/ r/ pa/ ho/ frus/ kennedyjf/ 46453. htm) Document 69 [27] US Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 - 1461 (http:/ / www. state. gov/ r/ pa/ ho/ frus/ kennedyjf/ 46453. htm) Document 72 [28] Remembering the Fall of Portuguese India in 1961 [29] http:/ / www. icj-cij. org/ docket/ files/ 32/ 4521. pdf [30] LN Subramanyam, The Liberation of Goa (http:/ / www. bharat-rakshak. com/ IAF/ History/ 1960s/ Goa01. html), bharat-rakshak.com [31] The Liberation of Goa by Jagan Pillarisetti (http:/ / www. bharat-rakshak. com/ IAF/ History/ 1960s/ Goa01. html) [32] http:/ / www. bharat-rakshak. com/ NAVY/ History/ 1950s/ Kore. html The Liberation of Goa by Lieutenant-Commander V.S. Kore [33] The Portuguese armed forces and the ... - Google Books (http:/ / books. google. co. in/ books?id=ncoOAAAAQAAJ& pg=PA36& lpg=PA36& dq=salazar+ goa+ sacrifice+ troops#v=onepage& q& f=false) [34] SuperGoa: Imagens, Factos, Notcias, Informaes e Histria sobra Goa India (http:/ / www. supergoa. com/ pt/ read/ news_noticia. asp?c_news=603) [36] http:/ / www. areamilitar. net/ analise/ analise. aspx?NrMateria=52& p=6 [37] Dispositivo de defesa (http:/ / www. areamilitar. net/ analise/ analise. aspx?NrMateria=52& p=4) [38] OS TRANSPORTES AREOS DA NDIA PORTUGUESA (http:/ / goancauses. com/ 9. html) (TAIP), Geographical Society of Lisbon By Major-General aviator (retd) Jos Krus Abecasis [39] ""Intolerable" Goa" (http:/ / www. time. com/ time/ magazine/ article/ 0,9171,827139,00. html), Time, 22 December 1961 [40] Four Sorties Over Goa (http:/ / www. bharat-rakshak. com/ IAF/ History/ 1960s/ Goa03. html) [41] B.C. Chakravorty, Operation Vijay, Bharat Rakshak Website (http:/ / www. bharat-rakshak. com/ LAND-FORCES/ History/ 1961Goa/ 262-Operation-Vijay. html) [42] P V S Jagan Mohan, Remembering Sagat Singh (1918-2001), Bharat Rakshak Monitor Volume 4(3) (http:/ / www. bharat-rakshak. com/ MONITOR/ ISSUE4-3/ jagan. html) [43] Paulo Mendona, Invaso de Goa (ltima actualizao: 16.12.2009) (http:/ / www. areamilitar. net/ analise/ analise. aspx?NrMateria=52& p=5) [44] http:/ / archiveofgoanwritinginportuguese. blogspot. com/ 2011/ 06/ telo-de-mascarenhas-carta-de-rendicao. html A carta de Rendio, Telo de Mascarenhas [46] The Liberation of Goa: 1961 by Jagan Pillarisetti (www.bharat-rakshak.com) (http:/ / www. bharat-rakshak. com/ IAF/ History/ 1960s/ Goa01. html) [47] Air Marshal Air Marshal S Raghavendran, 'Eyewitness to the Liberation of Goa', para 8, (http:/ / www. bharat-rakshak. com/ IAF/ History/ 1961Goa/ 1050-Raghavendran. html) [48] http:/ / www. areamilitar. net/ DIRECTORIO/ NAV. aspx?NN=128 [49] http:/ / semanal. expresso. pt/ revista/ artigos/ interior. asp?edicao=1519& id_artigo=ES44188 [50] Anil Shore, The Forgotten Battles of Daman and Diu, The Tribune (http:/ / www. tribuneindia. com/ 1999/ 99feb21/ sunday/ head3. htm) [51] Gp Capt Kapil Bhargava (Retd), Operations at Diu : The One day war, Bharatrakshak.com (http:/ / www. bharat-rakshak. com/ IAF/ History/ 1961Goa/ 1013-Diu. html) [52] The Liberation of Goa: 1961 (http:/ / www. bharat-rakshak. com/ IAF/ History/ 1960s/ Goa02. html) [53] General Service Medal (http:/ / www. prideofindia. net/ general. html)
19

[54] American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1961, By U. S. Department of State, Historical Office Staff, Published by Ayer, ISBN 0-405-01795-2, ISBN 978-0-405-01795-7, pages 956-960 (http:/ / books. google. co. in/ books?id=IJvVAAAACAAJ& dq=American+ Foreign+ Policy:+ Current+ Documents,+ 1961) [55] Janaka Perera, Goa's Liberation and Sri Lanka's Crisis, Asian Tribune, 18 December 2006 (http:/ / www. asiantribune. com/ node/ 3709) [57] Time Magazine 29 December 1961 (http:/ / www. time. com/ time/ magazine/ article/ 0,9171,827193-2,00. html) [58] Jos Manuel Barroso, S soldados vitoriosos ou mortos, 2 January 2001 (http:/ / www. supergoa. com/ pt/ 40anos) [60] Air Marshal S Raghavendran, 'Eye Witness to the Liberation of Goa', para 8, Bharatrakshak.com, (http:/ / www. bharat-rakshak. com/ IAF/ History/ 1961Goa/ 1050-Raghavendran. html) [61] Histria e Cincia: ENFERMEIRAS PRA-QUEDISTAS EM ACO NO PORTUGAL COLONIAL: testemunhos- 2 (http:/ / historiaeciencia. weblog. com. pt/ arquivo/ 049503. html) [64] (http:/ / books. google. co. in/ books?id=zcylFXH9_z8C) India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941-1991 By Dennis Kux Published by DIANE Publishing, 1993, ISBN 0-7881-0279-6, ISBN 978-0-7881-0279-0, Page 198 [65] (http:/ / select. nytimes. com/ gst/ abstract. html?res=F10E14FD3E591A728DDDA00994DA415B818AF1D3& scp=1& sq=With his invasion of Goa Prime Minister Nehru has done irreparable damage to India's good name and to the principles of international morality& st=cse) New York Times, Page 32, 19 December 1961 [66] India-USSR Relations 1947-71: (From Ambivalence to Steadfastness) PART-I (http:/ / books. google. co. in/ books?id=vTEge1JWK8oC& pg=PA29& lpg=PA29& dq=Goa+ vetoes+ USSR#v=snippet& q="deploring India's police action was vetoed by the USSR"& f=false), Shri Ram Sharma, Shri Ram Sharma, Discovery Publishing House, 1999, ISBN 81-7141-486-9, ISBN 978-81-7141-486-4 [67] Saude, Goa (http:/ / www. forbes. com/ 2011/ 01/ 26/ forbes-india-fifty-years-after-liberation-fron-portuguese-rule-tourism-boom-returns. html), Prince Mathews Thomas Thomas, 01.26.11, 06:00 PM EST, Fifty years after its liberation from Portuguese rule, this tiny tourist state is rethinking its future again. [68] LIFE (http:/ / books. google. co. in/ books?id=nE0EAAAAMBAJ& pg=PA60& lpg=PA60& dq=India+ Goa+ veto+ USSR+ indian+ express#v=onepage& q="U. S. , over the Soviet Veto"& f=false) 5 January 1962, Vol. 52, No. 1, ISSN 0024-3019, Published by Time Inc, 'LIFE Magazine is the treasured photographic magazine that chronicled the 20th Century. It now lives on at LIFE.com, the largest, most amazing collection of professional photography on the internet. Users can browse, search and view photos of todays people and events. They have free access to share, print and post images for personal use.' [69] Letter From President Ayub to President Kennedy (http:/ / history. state. gov/ historicaldocuments/ frus1961-63v19/ d83), Rawalpindi, 2 January 1962. My Dear President, The forcible taking of Goa by India has demonstrated what we in Pakistan have never had any illusions aboutthat India would not hesitate to attack if it were in her interest to do so and if she felt that the other side was too weak to resist. Krishna Menon, in fact, blatantly said as much in his statement of 23 December. [70] Teotonio R. de Souza, Goa to Me, New Delhi: Concept Publ. Co., 1994 (ISBN 81-7022-504-3) (http:/ / www. goacom. com/ culture/ biographies/ tdesbio. html) [71] Teotonio R. de Souza, "Unless Ye Become Like Children..." Goa Today, December 1986 Issue (http:/ / www. goacom. com/ culture/ history/ church. html)
20
Bibliography Rotter, Andrew Jon (2000). Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964. Cornell University Press. ISBN0-8014-8460-X. Couto, Francisco Cabral. Remembering the Fall of Portuguese India in 1961. ISBN972-8799-53-5. ( Partial online version at GoaBooks2 (http://goabooks2.blogspot.com/2007/01/remembering-fall-of-portuguese-india. html))
External links
Time Magazine Coverage of the conflict (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,827139,00. html) Photo gallery of the Liberation of Goa (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/ Images-1961.html) Image: Ram Manohar Lohia (http://www.kamat.org/picture.asp?Name=16333.jpg) Image: The Protests of 18 June 1946 (http://www.kamat.org/picture.asp?Name=16334.jpg) Image: Foreign journalists rescue a protestor shot by Portuguese police officers (http://www.kamat.org/picture. asp?Name=16338.jpg) Portugal-India relations (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India) (http://meaindia.nic.in/ foreignrelation/portugal.pdf)
Indian annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli
21

Invasion of Dadra and Nagar Haveli
Date 22 July 11 August 1954
Location Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Portuguese India Result Decisive Indian victory
Belligerents
Portugal Indian annexation supporters Supported by: Republic of India

Virglio Fidalgo, Administrator of Nagar Haveli J.D. Nagarwala, DIG of Maharashtra Police Francis Mascarenhas, leader of UFG Raja Wakankar, leader of RSS Prabhakar Sinari, leader of AGD
Strength
320 Portuguese India Police constables, customs guards and rural guards Volunteer fighters of UFG, NMLO, RSS and AGD Indian Police forces

2 killed Unknown
The Indian annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli (also referred to as Liberation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli or Invasion of Dadra and Nagar Haveli) was the conflict in which the territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli passed from the Portuguese rule to the Indian Union rule in 1954. Dadra and Nagar Haveli were small Portuguese overseas territories, part of Portuguese India from 1779 until 1954. The territories were enclaves, without any access to the sea, administered by the Portuguese Governor of the Daman district. After India attained independence in 1947, some residents, with the help of volunteers of organisations such as the United Front of Goans (UFG), the National Movement Liberation Organisation (NMLO), the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and the Azad Gomantak Dal occupied Dadra and Nagar Haveli in 1954 and displaced Portuguese rule. The territories were subsequently merged into the Indian Union in 1961.
22
Background
After Indian independence in 1947, pro-India activists in the Portuguese Indian provinces, as well as Indians from other places, proposed of removing Portuguese control of Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli and integrating them with India.[1] This was in line with the ideology of Mahatma Gandhi, who had, before India's independence, affirmed that "Goa cannot be allowed to exist as a separate entity in opposition to the laws of the free State [of India]".[2] Appasaheb Karmalkar, a bank employee with the Goa government took the reins of the National Liberation Movement Organization (NLMO) for the liberation of the Portuguese-ruled Indian territories. Simultaneously the AGD (led by Vishwanath Lavande, Dattatreya Map of Dadra and Nagar Haveli in the 1950s. Deshpande, Prabhakar Sinari and Gole) and volunteers of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (led by Raja Wakankar and Nana Kajrekar) had been planning an armed assault for freeing Dadra and Nagar Haveli. Wakankar and Kajrekar visited the area around Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman several times in 1953 to study the topography and to get acquainted with the local workers and leaders who were agitating for the liberation of the Portuguese territory. In April 1954 the NLMO, AGD and RSS agreed to form a United Front for liberation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli. At a meeting in Elphinstone garden, an armed assault was planned. Independently, another organization, United Front of Goans (UFG), also pursued similar plans.[1] J.D. Nagarwala, DIG of the Special Reserve Police, which had been deployed along the territory, had been sympathetic with the nationalists. He had himself visited the area often and advised the nationalists on the next moves.[1]
Liberation of Dadra
The UFG, led by Francis Mascarenhas, Viman Sardesai and others, attacked the police station in Dadra on the night of 22 July 1954, assassinating Aniceto Rosrio, sub-inspector at Dadra Police Station.[3] The next morning, the Indian flag was hoisted and Dadra was declared a free territory. A panchayat led by Jayanti Bhai Desai was formed for the administration of Dadra.[1]
Liberation of Naroli
On 28 July some 20 to 25 RSS volunteers led by Wakankar and 8 to 10 AGD volunteers led by Sinari crossed the Darotha river and reached Naroli. The Portuguese police officers in Naroli police station were asked to surrender. The Chief and his constable surrendered. Thus on 28 July 1954 Naroli was liberated from the Portuguese rule. On 29 July the Gram Panchayat of Free Naroli was established.[1]
23
Liberation of Silvassa
After Naroli had been captured, the Portuguese police, under the leadership of Nagar Haveli Administrator, Captain Virglio Fidalgo, was concentrated at Silvassa. The nationalists led by volunteers of the RSS and the AGD took the opportunity and captured Piparia.[1] Captain Fidalgo was asked by the nationalists (led by Karmalkar) to surrender, but as there was no response from the Administrator the nationalists decided to march towards Silvassa. Two units were led by RSS and the third was led by AGD. All three units moved from three different directions to Silvassa. Fidalgo with 150 Police personnel fled to Khanvel, hence the nationalists were offered no resistance as they entered Silvassa on 2 August and declared the territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli liberated. The RSS's Kajrekar was placed in charge of the unit, while the AGD's Lavande was put in charge of treasury.[1]
Surrender of Captain Fidalgo

Rumours were circulating that Portuguese reinforcements were coming to Nagar Haveli from Goa via Daman, so Kajrekar immediately contacted Nagarwala and requested a wireless set to enable the nationalists to keep in contact with the Indian SRP Headquarters. The wireless set obtained from the Indian SRP was installed in one of the houses by the riversid; Bandu Karkhanis, an RSS volunteer, who knew how to operate the wireless set was put in charge. He was under instructions that in case of emergency, he should throw the set in the river, cross the river and take shelter in the Indian territory which was just nearby and protected by Indian SRP.[1] Captain Fidalgo who was moving deep in Nagar Haveli with his 150 men were constantly followed by the volunteers. While the Portuguese set up rearguard defenses on the river bank, the Indian volunteer forces crossed the flooded river with local ferries on 10 August, assaulting the Portuguese forces at Khandvel and forcing them to retreat. The Portuguese unit eventually surrendered to the SRP at Udva on 11 August 1954.[1] At a public meeting, Karmalkar was chosen as the first administrator of Dadra and Nagar Haveli.[1]
Integration into India

Dadra and Nagar Haveli became, in the eyes of international law, an independent country becauseWikipedia:Please clarify that was never recognized by any other country before 1974. In the decision of the 12th of April 1960 in the "Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory [29]", the International Court of Justice clearly stated that Portugal had sovereign rights over the territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli. The residents of the former colony requested the Government of India for administrative help. K.G. Badlani, an officer of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) was sent as the administrator. From 1954 to 1961, the territory was administered by a body called the Varishta Panchayat of Free Dadra and Nagar Haveli.[4][5] In 1961 when Indian forces took over Goa, Daman, and Diu, Badlani was, for one day, designated the Prime Minister of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, so that, as Head of Government, he could sign an agreement with the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, and formally merge Dadra and Nagar Haveli with the Republic of India. The territory was only recognised as part of the Indian Union, together with all the other former Portuguese possessions, after the recognition of that fact by Portugal, after the Carnation Revolution of 1974. A treaty was signed on 31 December 1974 between India and Portugal on recognition of India's sovereignty over Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli.[6] Until 2006, Portugal continued to grant Portuguese citizenship to all natives of Dadra and Nagar Haveli who wished to have it. In that year, this was amended to include only those who had been born before 19 December 1961.[citation
needed]
24
References
[1] [2] [4] [5] P S Lele, Dadra and Nagar Haveli: past and present, Published by Usha P. Lele, 1987, M.K. Gandhi, H, 30-6-1946, p. 208 (http:/ / www. mkgandhi. org/ momgandhi/ chap69. htm) Constitution of India, 10th Amendment Umaji Keshao Meshram & Ors v. Radhikabhai w/o Anandrao Banapurkar AIR 1986 SC 1272 (http:/ / www. austlii. edu. au/ ~andrew/ CommonLII/ INSC/ 1986/ 43. html): this judgment mentions the Administration of Dadra and Nagar Haveli in this period [6] TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF PORTUGAL ON RECOGNITION OF INDIA'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER GOA, DAMAN, DIU, DADRA AND NAGAR HAVELI AND RELATED MATTERS 1974 (http:/ / www. commonlii. org/ in/ other/ treaties/ INTSer/ 1974/ 53. html)
Operation Polo
25
Operation Polo
Operation Polo (1948)
The State of Hyderabad in 1909 (excluding Berar). Date 13 September 1948 18 September 1948
Location Hyderabad State, South India Result Decisive Indian victory; State of Hyderabad annexed to the Union of India
Belligerents
India Hyderabad

Major General Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri Home Minister Sardar Patel Lt. General E. N. Goddard General Bucher S.A. El Edroos Qasim Razvi
Strength
35,000 Indian Armed Forces 22,000 Hyderabad State Forces est. 200,000 Razakars (Irregular forces)[citation needed]

32 killed 97 wounded
[1]
Hyderabad State Forces:490 killed 122 wounded [2] 1,647 POWs Razakars: [2] 1,373 killed, 1,911 captured
Operation Polo, the code name of the Hyderabad Police Action[3][4] was a military operation in September 1948 in which the Indian Armed Forces invaded the State of Hyderabad and overthrew its Nizam, annexing the state into the Indian Union. The conflict began after Nizam Osman Ali Khan, Asif Jah VII decided not to join the princely State of Hyderabad to either India or Pakistan after the partition of India. The Nizam's defiance was backed by Qasim Razvi's armed militias, known as Razakars and had the moral support of Pakistan.[2] After a stalemate in negotiations between the Nizam and India, and wary of a hostile independent state in the centre of India, Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel decided to annex the state of Hyderabad. He sent the Indian Army and the Hyderabad State Forces were defeated within five days.
Operation Polo
26
Background
The State of Hyderabad, located over most of the Deccan Plateau in southern India, was established in 1724 by Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah after the collapse of the Mughal Indian Empire. As was the case in several Indian royal states, the Nizam was a Muslim, while a majority of the subject population was Hindu. In 1798, Hyderabad became the first Indian royal state to accede to British protection under the policy of Subsidiary Alliance instituted by Arthur Wellesley. When the British finally departed from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, they offered the various princely states in the sub-continent the option of acceding to either India or Pakistan, or staying on as an independent state. The State of Hyderabad under the leadership of its 7th Nizam, Mir Usman Ali, was the largest and most prosperous of all princely states in India. It covered 82,698 square miles (214,190km2) of fairly homogenous territory and comprised a population of roughly 16.34 million people (as per the 1941 census) of which a majority (85%) was Hindu. Hyderabad State had its own army, airline, telecommunication system, railway network, postal system, currency and radio broadcasting service. Nizam decided to keep Hyderabad independent. The leaders of the new Union of India however, were wary of having an independent - and possibly hostile - state in the heart of their new country and were determined to assimilate Hyderabad into the Indian Union, even if it were by compulsion, unlike the other 565 princely states, most of which had already acceded to India or to Pakistan voluntarily.
Events preceding hostilities

Political and diplomatic negotiations
The Nizam of Hyderabad initially approached the British government with a request to take on the status of an independent constitutional monarchy under the British Commonwealth of Nations. This request was however rejected. When Indian Home Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel requested the Hyderabad Government to sign the instrument of accession, the Nizam refused and instead declared Hyderabad as an independent nation on 15 August 1947, the same day that India became independent. Alarmed at the idea of an independent Hyderabad in the heart of Indian territory, Sardar Patel approached the governor general of India, Lord Mountbatten who advised him to resolve the issue without the use of force. Accordingly, the Indian government offered Hyderabad a 'Standstill Agreement' which made an assurance that the status quo would be maintained and no military action would be taken. Unlike in the case of other royal states, instead of an explicit guarantee of eventual accession to India, only a guarantee stating that Hyderabad would not join Pakistan was given. Negotiations were opened through K.M. Munshi, Indias envoy and agent general to Hyderabad, and the Nizams envoys, Laik Ali and Sir Walter Monckton. Lord Mountbatten, who presided over the negotiations, offered several possible deals to the Hyderabad government which were rejected. The Hyderabadi envoys accused India of setting up armed barricades on all land routes and of attempting to economically isolate their nation. The Indians retaliated by accusing the Hyderabad government of importing arms from Pakistan. Hyderabad had given Rupees 200 million to Pakistan, and had stationed a bomber squadron there. In June 1948, Mountbatten prepared the 'Heads of Agreement' deal which offered Hyderabad the status of an autonomous dominion nation under India. The deal called for the restriction of the regular Hyderabadi armed forces along with a disbanding of its voluntary forces. While it allowed the Nizam to continue as the executive head of the state, it called for a plebiscite along with general democratic elections to set up a constituent assembly. The Hyderabad government would continue to administer its territory as before, leaving only foreign affairs to be handled by the Indian government. Although the plan was approved and signed by the Indians, it was rejected by the Nizam who demanded only complete independence or the status of a dominion under the British Commonwealth.
Operation Polo The Nizam also made unsuccessful attempts to seek the arbitration of the President Harry S. Truman of the United States of America and intervention of the United Nations.
27
Civil unrest in Hyderabad

The 1941 census had estimated the population of Hyderabad to be 16.34 million, over 85% of who were Hindus and with Muslims accounting for about 12%. It was also a multi-lingual state consisting of peoples speaking Telugu (48.2%), Marathi (26.4%), Kannada (12.3%) and Urdu (10.3%). In spite of the overwhelming Hindu majority, Hindus were severely under-represented in government, police and the military. Of 1765 officers in the State Army, 1268 were Muslims, 421 were Hindus, and 121 others were Christians, Parsis and Sikhs. Of the officials drawing a salary between Rs.600-1200 per month, 59 were Muslims, 5 were Hindus and 38 were of other religions. The Nizam and his nobles, who were mostly Muslims, owned 40% of the total land in the state [5] Even as India and Hyderabad negotiated, most of the sub-continent had been thrown into chaos as a result of communal Hindu-Muslim riots pending the imminent partition of India. Fearing a Hindu civil uprising in his own kingdom, the Nizam allowed Qasim Razvi, a close advisor, and leader of the radical Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (MIM) Party, to set up a voluntary militia of Muslims called the 'Razakars'. The Razakars - who numbered up to 200,000 at the height of the conflict - swore to uphold Islamic domination in Hyderabad and the Deccan plateau in the face of growing public opinion amongst the majority Hindu population favouring the accession of Hyderabad into the Indian Union. As the manpower and arsenal of the Razakars grew, there was an escalation of violence between the Razakars and Hindu communities. In all, more than 150 villages (of which 70 were in Indian territory outside Hyderabad State) were pushed into violence. In Telangana, large groups of peasants, aided by the Communist Party of India and Andhra Mahasabha, revolted against local Hindu and Muslim landlords, and also came into direct confrontation with the Razakars, in what became known as the Telangana Rebellion. Meanwhile, parties like the Hyderabad State Congress were involved in non-violent protests against the Nizam's rule. On 4 December 1947, Narayan Rao Pawar, a member of a Hindu nationalist organisation called the Arya Samaj, made a failed attempt to assassinate the Nizam outside his palace.[6]
Hyderabadi military preparations

The Nizam of Hyderabad had a large army with a tradition of hiring mercenary forces. These included Arabs, Rohillas, North Indian Muslims and Pathans. The State Army consisted of three armoured regiments, a horse cavalry regiment, 11 infantry battalions and artillery. These were supplemented by irregular units with horse cavalry, four infantry battalions (termed as the Saraf-e-khas, paigah, Arab and Refugee) and a garrison battalion - all forming a total of 22,000 men. This army was commanded by Major General El Edroos, an Arab.[7] 55 per cent of the Hyderabadi army was composed of Muslims, with 1,268 Muslims in a total of 1,765 officers as of 1941.[8] In addition to these, there were about 200,000 irregular militia called the Razakars under the command of civilian leader Kasim Razvi. A quarter of these were armed with modern small firearms, while the rest were predominantly armed with muzzle-loaders and swords.[7] It is reported that the Nizam received arms supplies from Pakistan and from the Portuguese administration based in Goa. In addition, additional arms supplies were received via airdrops from an Australian arms trader Sidney Cotton.
Operation Polo
28
Breakdown of negotiations
As the Indian government received information that Hyderabad was arming itself and was preparing to ally with Pakistan in any future war against India, Sardar Patel described the idea of an independent Hyderabad as an ulcer in the heart of India - which had to removed surgically. In response, Hyderabad's prime minister Laik Ali stated "India thinks that if Pakistan attacks her, Hyderabad will stab her in the back. I am not so sure we would not." Sardar Patel responded later by stating "If you threaten us with violence, swords will be met with swords".[8] In Hyderabad, militia leader Qasim Razvi told a crowd of Razakars, "Death with the sword in hand, is always preferable to extinction by a mere stroke of the pen". Razvi was later described by Indian government officials as "The Nizams Frankenstein Monster". In response to reports that India was planning to invade Hyderabad Razwi stated, "If India attacks us I can and will create a turmoil throughout India. We will perish but India will perish also." Time magazine pointed out that if India invaded Hyderabad, the Razakars would massacre Hindus, which would lead to retaliatory massacres of Muslims across India.[9]
Skirmish at Kodar
On 6 September an Indian police post near Chillakallu [10] village came under heavy fire from Razakar units. The Indian Army command sent a squadron of The Poona Horse led by Abhey Singh and a company of 2/5 Gurkha Rifles to investigate who were also fired upon by the Razakars. The tanks of the Poona Horse then chased the Razakars to Kodar, in Hyderabad territory. Here they were opposed by the armoured cars of 1 Hyderabad Lancers. In a brief action the Poona Horse destroyed one armoured car and forced the surrender of the state garrison at Kodar.
Indian military preparations

On receiving directions from the government to seize and annex Hyderabad, the Indian army came up with the Goddard Plan (laid out by Lt. Gen. E. N. Goddard, the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Command). The plan envisaged two main thrusts - from Vijayawada in the East and Solapur in the West - while smaller units pinned down the Hyderabadi army along the border. Overall command was placed in the hands of Lt. Gen. Rajendrasinghji, DSO. The attack from Solapur was led by Major General J.N. Chaudhari and was composed of four task forces: 1. 2. 3. 4. Strike Force comprising a mix of fast moving infantry, cavalry and light artillery, Smash Force consisting of predominantly armoured units and artillery, Kill Force composed of infantry and engineering units Vir Force which comprised infantry, anti-tank and engineering units.
The attack from Vijayawada was led by Major General A.A. Rudra and comprised the 2/5 Gurkha Rifles, one squadron of the 17th (Poona) Horse, and a troop from the 19th Field Battery along with engineering and ancillary units. In addition, four infantry battalions were to neutralize and protect lines of communication. Two squadrons of Hawker Tempest aircraft were prepared for air support from the Pune base. The date for the attack was fixed as 13 September, even though General Sir Roy Bucher, the Indian chief of staff, had objected on grounds that Hyderabad would be an additional front for the Indian army after Kashmir.
Commencement of hostilities
Day 1, 13 September
The first battle was fought at Naldurg Fort on the Solapur Secundarabad Highway between a defending force of the 1st Hyderabad Infantry and the attacking force of the 7th Brigade. Using speed and surprise, the 7th Brigade managed to secure a vital bridge on the Bori river intact, following which an assault was made on the Hyderabadi positions at Naldurg by the 2nd Sikh Infantry. The bridge and road secured, an armoured column of the 1st Armoured Brigade - part of the Smash force - moved into the town of Jalkot, 8km from Naldurg, at 0900 hours,
Operation Polo paving the way for the Strike Force units under Lt. Col Ram Singh Commandant of 9 Dogra (a motorised battalion) to pass through. This armoured column reached the town of Umarge, 61km inside Hyderabad by 1515 hours, where it quickly overpowered resistance from Razakar units defending the town. Meanwhile, another column consisting of a squadron of 3rd Cavalry, a troop from 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry, a troop from 9 Para Field Regiment, 10 Field Company Engineers, 3/2 Punjab Regiment, 2/1 Gurkha Rifles, 1 Mewar Infantry, and ancillary units attacked the town of Tuljapur, about 34km north-west of Naldurg. They reached Tuljapur at dawn, where they encountered resistance from a unit of the 1st Hyderabad Infantry and about 200 Razakars who fought for two hours before surrendering. Further advance towards the town of Lohara was stalled as the river had swollen. The first day on the Western front ended with the Indians inflicting heavy casualties on the Hyderabadis and capturing large tracts of territory. Amongst the captured defenders was a British mercenary who had been tasked with blowing up the bridge near Naldurg. In the East, forces led by Lt. Gen A.A. Rudra met with fierce resistance from two armoured units of Humber armoured cars and Staghound armoured cars, but managed to reach the town of Kodar by 0830 hours. Pressing on, the force reached Mungala by the afternoon. There were further incidents in Hospet - where the 1st Mysore assaulted and secured a sugar factory from units of Razakars and Pathans - and at Tungabhadra - where the 5/5 Gurkha attacked and secured a vital bridge from the Hyderabadi army.
29
Day 2, 14 September
The force that had camped at Umarge proceeded to the town of Rajasur, 48km east. As aerial reconnaissance had shown well entrenched ambush positions set up along the way, the air strikes from squadrons of Tempests were called in. These air strikes effectively cleared the route and allowed the land forces to reach and secure Rajasur by the afternoon. The Assault force from the East was meanwhile slowed down by an anti-tank ditch and later came under heavy fire from hillside positions of the 1st Lancers and 5th Infantry 6km from Suryapet. The positions were assaulted by the 2/5 Gurkha - veterans of the Burma Campaign - and was neutralised with the Hyderabadis taking severe casualties. At the same time, the 3/11 Gurkha Rifles and a squadron of 8th Cavalry attacked Osmanabad and took the town after heavy street combat with the Razakars who determinedly resisted the Indians.[] A force under the command of Maj. Gen. D.S. Brar was tasked with capturing the city of Aurangabad. The city was attacked by six columns of infantry and cavalry, resulting in the civil administration emerging in the afternoon and offering a surrender to the Indians. There were further incidents in Jalna where 3 Sikh, a company of 2 Jodhpur infantry and some tanks from 18 Cavalry faced stubborn resistance from Hyderabadi forces.
Day 3, 15 September
Leaving a company of 3/11 Gurkhas to occupy the town of Jalna, the remainder of the force moved to Latur, and later to Mominabad where they faced action against the 3 Golconda Lancers who gave token resistance before surrendering. At the town of Surriapet, air strikes cleared most of the Hyderabadi defences, although some Razakar units still gave resistance to the 2/5 Gurkhas who occupied the town. The retreating Hyderabadi forces destroyed the bridge at Musi to delay the Indians but failed to offer covering fire, allowing the bridge to be quickly repaired. Another incident occurred at Narkatpalli where a Razakar unit was decimated by the Indians.
Operation Polo
30
Day 4, 16 September
The task force under Lt. Col. Ram Singh moved towards Zahirabad at dawn, but was slowed down by a minefield, which had to be cleared. On reaching the junction of the Bidar road with the Solapur-Hyderabad City Highway, the forces encountered gunfire from ambush positions. However, leaving some of the units to handle the ambush, the bulk of the force moved on to reach 15 kilometres beyond Zahirabad by nightfall in spite of sporadic resistance along the way. Most of the resistance was from Razakar units who ambushed the Indians as they passed through urban areas. The Razakars were able to use the terrain to their advantage until the Indians brought in their 75mm guns.
Day 5, 17 September
In the early hours of 17 September, the Indian army entered Bidar. Meanwhile, forces led by the 1st Armoured regiment were at the town of Chityal about 60km from the capital city, while another column took over the town of Hingoli. By the morning of the 5th day of hostilities, it had become clear that the Hyderabad army and the Razakars had been routed on all fronts and with extremely heavy casualties. At 5PM of 17 September Nizam announced ceasefire thus ending the armed action.[]
Capitulation and surrender

Consultations with Indian envoy
On 16 September, faced with imminent defeat, the Nizam summoned the Prime Minister Mir Laik Ali and requested his resignation by the morning of the following day. The resignation was delivered along with the resignations of the entire cabinet. On the noon of 17 September, a messenger brought a personal note from the Nizam to India's Agent General to Hyderabad, K.M. Munshi summoning him to the Nizam's office at 1600 hours. At the meeting, the Nizam stated "The vultures have resigned. I don't know what to do". Munshi advised the Nizam to secure the safety of the citizens of Hyderabad by issuing appropriate orders to the Commander of the Hyderabad State Army, Major General El Edroos. This was immediately done.
Radio broadcast after surrender by Nizam

It was the Nizam's first visit to the radio station. The Nizam of Hyderabad, in his radio speech on 23 September 1948, said "In November last [1947], a small group which had organized a quasi-military organization surrounded the homes of my Prime Minister, the Nawab of Chhatari, in whose wisdom I had complete confidence, and of Sir Walter Monkton, my constitutional Adviser, by duress compelled the Nawab and other trusted ministers to resign and forced the Laik Ali Ministry on me. This group headed by Kasim Razvi had no stake in the country or any record of service behind it. By methods reminiscent of Hitlerite Germany it took possession of the State, spread terror ... and rendered me completely helpless." [11]
Operation Polo
31
The surrender ceremony

According to the records maintained by Indian Army, General Chaudhari lead an armoured column into Hyderabad at around 4 p.m. on September 18 and the Hyderabad army, led by Major General El Edroos, surrendered.[12]
References
[1] http:/ / indianarmy. nic. in - Official Indian army website complete Roll of Honor of Indian KIA [2] Hyderabad 1948 Revisited (http:/ / www. indiadefence. com/ hyderabad. htm) IndiaDefence.com [3] http:/ / indianarmy. nic. in/ Site/ FormTemplete/ frmTempSimple. aspx?MnId=K/ KtVO4bQNg=& ParentID=a2GSpnDbruI= [4] http:/ / www. hyderabad. co. uk/ policeaction. htm [6] http:/ / www. boloji. com/ analysis2/ 0233. htm [7] http:/ / www. bharat-rakshak. com/ MONITOR/ ISSUE2-3/ lns. html [8] http:/ / www. indianofficer. com/ forums/ history-wiki/ 899-operation-polo-liberation-hyderabad. html [10] https:/ / maps. google. co. in/ maps?q=chillakallu+ andhra+ pradesh& safe=active& ie=UTF-8& hl=en [11] Autocracy to Integration, Lucien D Benichou, Orient Longman (2000), p. 237 Major General El Edroos (at right) offers his surrender of the Hyderabad State Forces to Major General (later General and Army Chief) Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri at Secunderabad
Zubrzycki, John. (2006) The Last Nizam: An Indian Prince in the Australian Outback. Pan Macmillan, Australia. ISBN 978-0-330-42321-2.
External links
A Blog by Narendra Luther on Operation Polo (http://narendralutherarchives.blogspot.com/2006/12/ nizam-and-radio.html) Picture of VII Nizam with Sardar Patel after his surrender (http://www.hindu.com/2004/09/17/stories/ 2004091706840400.htm) From the Sundarlal Report (http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1805/18051140.htm), Frontline Of a massacre untold - A.G.Noorani (http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1805/18051130.htm) In the Nizam's dominion (http://ags.ou.edu/~bwallach/documents/In the Nizam.pdf) Armchair Historian - Operation Polo (Monday, 18 September 2006) - Contributed by Sidin Sunny Vadukut - Last Updated (Monday, 18 September 2006) (http://google.com/search?q=cache:pQ9_Olx6aCYJ:www.haftamag. com/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=176+operation+polo&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=3& gl=us|The)
History of Sikkim
32
History of Sikkim
The history of Sikkim begins with ancient Hindu and Tibetan contacts, followed by the establishment of a Tibetan kingdom (Chogyal) in the 17th century. Sikkim emerged as a polity in its own right against a backdrop of incursions from Tibet and Bhutan, during which the kingdom enjoyed varying degrees of independence. In the early 18th century, the British Empire sought to establish trade routes with Tibet, leading Sikkim to fall under British suzerainty until independence in 1947. Initially, Sikkim remained an independent monarchy, however in 1975, its subjects voted by plebiscite to become a state of India.
Statue of Guru Rinpoche, the patron saint of Sikkim in Namchi is the tallest statue of the saint in the world at 36 meters (120 ft.).
Ancient history
Not much is known about Sikkim's ancient history, except that the first inhabitants were the Lepcha people (or "Rong"). They were later encompassed and absorbed by other groups. Sikkim also finds its mention on many Hindu texts as Indrakil or "Garden of Lord Indra." The Buddhist saint Guru Rinpoche is said to have passed through the land in the 9th century. According to legend the Guru blessed the land, introduced Buddhism to Sikkim and also foretold the era of the monarchy in the state, which would arrive centuries later. There are numerous stories regarding the migration of Tibetans into Sikkim and the establishment of the Sikkimese monarchy. The most popular states that in the 13th century, Guru Tashi, a prince from the Mi-nyak House in Kham in Eastern Tibet, had a divine revelation one night instructing him to travel south to seek his fortunes. Guru Tashi settled down in the Chumbi Valley in Sikkim. In recent years a number of scholarly article have been written on the history of Sikkim, which cast doubt over the validity of these stories.[1][2]
History of Sikkim
33
Kingdom of Sikkim
In 1642, the fifth generation descendant of Guru Tashi, Phuntsog Namgyal was consecrated as the first Denjong Gyalpo or the Chogyal (king) of Sikkim by the three great Lamas who came from the north, west and south to Yuksom Norbugang in West Sikkim. The event, Naljor Chezhi, was as predicted by Guru Rinpoche some eight hundred years before. This historical gathering of the three virtuous lamas is called Yuksom, which in Lepcha means the 'The Place where the Three monks met' as in Lepcha a lama is called a "Yukmun" and three is called "Som". The chogyal, along with the three lamas proselytised the Lepcha tribes into Buddhism and annexed the Chumbi Valley, the present-day Darjeeling district and parts of today's eastern Nepal.
Invasions from Bhutan and Nepal

Phuntsog Namgyal was succeeded by his son, Tensung Namgyal in 1670. The reign of the chogyal was peaceful and saw the capital being shifted from Yuksom to Rabdentse. Chakdor Namgyal, the king's second wife's son, took over the throne from him in 1700. This outraged his elder half-sister Pendiongmu, who ousted him with Map of Sikkim the help of the Bhutanese. From 1700 to 1706, when Chakdor Namgyal, the third chogyal, ruled the Kingdom of Sikkim, most parts of Sikkim were under the invasion of Deb Naku Zidar, the king of Bhutan. Chakdor Namgyal went in exile into Tibet. The Tibetan people expelled the Bhutanese army, and called Chakdor Namgyal back to Sikkim.[] Chakdor's son Gyurmed Namgyal succeeded him in 1717. Gyurmed's reign saw many skirmishes between the Nepalese and Sikkimese. Phuntsog Namgyal II, the illegitimate child of Gyurmed, succeeded his father in 1733. His reign was tumultuous as he was faced with attacks by the Bhutanese and the Nepalese who managed to capture the capital Rabdentse. Tenzing Namgyal, chogyal from 1780 to 1793, was a weak ruler, and his sovereignty saw most of Sikkim being appropriated by Nepal. In 1788, the Nepali Gurkha Army invaded Sikkim, and took Limbuana and the former capital Rabdentse by storm. The king of Sikkim went into exile in Tibet for a second time. In 1788, the 8th Dalai Lama stationed him in Chumbi Valley in Rn zong (also "Rr," today's Yadong County).[][3] Tshudpud Namgyal, his son returned to Sikkim in 1793 to reclaim the throne with the help of China. Finding Rabdentse too close to the Nepalese border, he shifted the capital to Tumlong.
Relations with the British Empire

With the arrival of the British in neighbouring India, Sikkim allied itself with them as they had a common enemy Nepal. The infuriated Nepalese attacked Sikkim with vengeance, overrunning most of the region including the Terai. This prompted the British East India Company to attack Nepal resulting in the Gurkha War in 1814. Treaties signed between Sikkim and Nepal the Sugauli Treaty and Sikkim and British India Titalia Treaty, returned the territory annexed by the Nepalese to Sikkim in 1817. Meanwhile the British were looking for a route to establish trading links with Tibet. An offshoot of the ancient Silk Road through Sikkim meant that the kingdom was ideal as a transit route. A secondary reason for the establishment
History of Sikkim of links was to quell the growing Russian influence in Tibet. However ties between Sikkim and India grew sour with the taxation of the area of Morang by the British. In 1835, Sikkim was forced to cede the town of Darjeeling to the British on the condition that a compensation of Rs 35,000 be paid to him. In 1849, a pair of British doctors, Campbell and Hooker, ventured into the mountains of Sikkim unannounced and unauthorised by the Chogyal of Sikkim. The doctors were detained by the Sikkim government, which led to a punitive British expedition against the Himalayan kingdom, in which the whole of Darjeeling district and Morang were annexed in 1861, although the kingdom continued to exist as an independent rump state centred around the capital at Gangtok. The old Chogyal was forced to abdicate in favour of his son, Sidekong Namgyal in 1863. The Chogyals of Sikkim endeavoured to modernise their state in the succeeding decades, along with their army. A state visit to Darjeeling by Sidekong's half brother, Chogyal Thutob Namgyal in 1873 failed to yield such results, and he returned to Tumlong disappointed. In 1886, the British, interested in trade with Tibet, launched a brief expedition into Sikkim. The Tibetans occupied several of Sikkim's northern border forts, and the Chogyal and his wife were held prisoner by the British when they came to negotiate at Calcutta. In 1888, the Tibetans were defeated and northern Sikkim came under the rule of British India. The British established new landholdings in Sikkim, but released the Chogyal only to have him captured again in 1891. In 1894, the capital was shifted to Gangtok. In 1895, the Chogyal was released, but the British governors in India reneged on an agreement the Ten Clauses Agreement which returned sovereignty to Sikkim. The governor of British India, Claude White, refused to return any sovereignty, and only let the Chogyal retain the judiciary of Sikkim. In 1905, the Prince of Wales the future King George V arrived in Calcutta on a state visit during which he met the Chogyal. The two made an excellent acquaintance and the Crown Prince of Sikkim, Sidkeong Tulku was sent to study at Oxford University. When Sidkeong came to power, he arranged widened sovereignty for Sikkim from King George's government and endorsed sweeping reforms in his short rule as Chogyal, which ended in 1914. In 1918, Sikkim's independence in all domestic affairs was restored, and in the next decade she embarked on a policy to end social ills, outlawing gambling, child labour, and indentured service.
34
History of Sikkim
35
Independent monarchy
Sikkim had retained guarantees of independence from Britain when she became independent, and such guarantees were transferred to the Indian government when it gained independence in 1947. A popular vote for Sikkim to join the Indian Union failed and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru agreed to a special protectorate status for Sikkim. Sikkim was to be a tributary of India, in which India controlled its external defence, diplomacy and communication. A state council was established in 1953 to allow for constitutional government for the Chogyal, which was sustained until 1973. In 1962, India and the People's Republic of China went to war. Although Sikkim was an independent country, skirmishes occurred at the Nathula Pass between Indian border guards and the Chinese soldiers. After the war, the ancient pass was shut down (it reopened July 6, 2006). The old ruler Tashi Namgyal died in 1963 after suffering from cancer. The last hereditary ruler, the Chogyal Palden Tashi Namgyal, Chogyal of Sikkim. 1938. Thondup Namgyal, ascended to the throne in 1965. Trouble began to brew for the crown even before the Chogyal assumed the throne, as Indian Prime Minister Nehru, who had carefully preserved Sikkim's status as an independent protectorate, died in 1964. His daughter Indira Gandhi, who became Prime Minister in 1966, would have little patience for maintaining an independent Sikkim or its monarchy. The chogyal, who responded to the increased pressure by drinking, was viewed by India as politically dangerous, especially after his wife, the American socialite Hope Cooke, published a journal article advocating a return of certain former Sikkimese properties. In early 1970 the anti-monarchy Sikkim National Congress Party demanded fresh elections and greater representation for the Nepalese. In 1973, anti-royalty riots in front of the palace led to a formal request for protection from India. India worried that an unstable Sikkim would invite China to act on its claims that Sikkim was part of Tibet, and therefore part of China. The Indian government appointed a Chief administrator, Mr. B. S. Das, who effectively wrested control of the country away from the Chogyal. Frosty relations between the Chogyal and the elected Kazi (Prime Minister) Lhendup Dorji resulted in an attempt to block the meeting of the legislature. The Kazi was elected by the Council of Ministers which was unanimous in its opposition to the retention of the Monarchy. Indian reserve police were moved in and took control of the streets of Gangtok, the borders were closed and little was known until American climber Caril Ridley happened into the capital and was able to smuggle photos and legal documentation out. When confirmed by China, Indias actions were brought into the spotlight of world awareness, However history had already been written and matters came to a head in 1975, when the Kazi (Prime Minister) appealed to the Indian Parliament for representation and change of status to statehood. On April 14, 1975, a referendum was held, in which Sikkim voted to merge with the union of India. Sikkim became the 22nd Indian State on April 26, 1975. On May 16, 1975, Sikkim officially became a state of the Indian Union and Lhendup Dorji became head of State (chief minister). This was promptly recognised by the United Nations and all countries except China.
History of Sikkim The position of Chogyal was thus abolished, ending the monarchy. In 1982, Palden Thondup succumbed to cancer in the United States.
36
State of India
The 1979 assembly election saw Nar Bahadur Bhandari elected Chief Minister of Sikkim. Bhandhari held on to win again in 1984 and 1989. In 1994, Assembly politician Pawan Kumar Chamling became the Chief Minister of Sikkim. In 1999 and 2004, Chamling consolidated his position to sweep the polls. Sino-Indian relations were somewhat bruised in 2000 by an event in Sikkim which challenged China's longstanding claim of Sikkim as an independent country. The unusual event was the escape of Ogyen Trinley Dorje from Tibet to Dharamsala, India. Ogyen Trinley Dorje is one of the two rival claimants who seeks recognition as the 17th Karmapa, the head of the Black Hat branch of Tibetan Buddhism (see Karmapa controversy). The two claimants did battle in the Indian court system for control of the considerable funds collected by the 16th Karmapa for the restoration and maintenance of Rumtek Monastery, located in Gangtok, Sikkim. The Chinese, who recognize Ogyen Trinley Dorje as the true Karmapa, were unhappy about the court outcome which awarded the monastery funds to the other rival. However, the Chinese government was in a quandary as to what to do about it, as any protest to India would mean an explicit endorsement that the high court of India holds jurisdiction over Sikkim. In 2003, with the thawing of ties between the two nations, Indian sovereignty over Sikkim was finally recognised by China. The two governments also proposed to open the Nathula and Jelepla Passes in 2005. On 18 September 2011, a magnitude 6.9Mw earthquake struck Sikkim, killing at least 116 people in the state and in Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Tibet.[4] More than 60 people died in Sikkim alone, and the city of Gangtok suffered significant damage.[5]
References Further reading

Datta-Ray, Sunanda K. (1980). Smash and Grab: The Annexation of Sikkim (http://books.google.com/ books?id=RCMuAAAAMAAJ). Vikas. ISBN0-7069-2509-2. Retrieved September 26, 2011. Forbes, Andrew ; Henley, David (2011). China's Ancient Tea Horse Road. Chiang Mai: Cognoscenti Books. ASIN: B005DQV7Q2
External links
Genealogy of the Namgyal dynasty of Sikkim (http://www.4dw.net/royalark/India/sikkim.htm) Discuss History & Culture of Sikkim (http://www.sikkimonline.info/forumdisplay.php?f=54)
Indian integration of Junagadh
37

Junagadh was a princely state of India, located in what is now Gujarat, outside but under the suzerainty of British India. In the independence and partition of British India of 1947, the 562 princely states were given a choice of whether to either join the new Dominion of India or the newly formed state of Pakistan or to remain independent. The Nawab of Junagadh, Muhammad Mahabat Khanji III, a Muslim whose ancestors had ruled Junagadh and small principalities for some two hundred years, decided that Junagadh should become part of Pakistan, much to the displeasure of many of the people of the state, an overwhelming majority of whom were Hindus. The Nawab acceded to the Dominion of Pakistan on 15 September 1947, against the advice of Lord Mountbatten, arguing that Junagadh joined Pakistan by sea.[1] The principality of Babariawad and Sheikh of Mangrol reacted by claiming independence from Junagadh and accession to India.[1] When Pakistan accepted the Nawab's Instrument of Accession on 16 September, the Government of India was outraged that Muhammad Ali Jinnah could accept the accession of Junagadh despite his argument that Hindus and Muslims could not live as one nation, though this was a seen as a strategy to get a plebiscite held for the case of Kashmir which was a Muslim majority with a Hindu ruler.[] Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel believed that if Junagadh was permitted to go to Pakistan, it would exacerbate the communal tension already simmering in Gujarat. The princely state was surrounded on all of its land borders by India, with an outlet onto the Arabian Sea. The unsettled conditions in Junagadh had led to a cessation of all trade with India and the food position became precarious. With the region in crisis, the Nawab, fearing for his life, felt forced to flee to Karachi with his family and his followers, and there he established a provisional government. Vallabhbhai Patel offered Pakistan time to reverse its acceptance of the accession and to hold a plebiscite in Junagadh. Samaldas Gandhi formed a government-in-exile, the Aarzi Hukumat (in Urdu:Aarzi: Temporary, Hukumat: Government) of the people of Junagadh. Eventually, Patel ordered the forcible annexation of Junagadh's three principalities. Junagadh's state government, facing financial collapse and lacking forces with which to resist Indian force, invited the Government of India to take control. A plebiscite was conducted in December, in which approximately 99% of the people chose India over Pakistan.[]
Background
After the announcement by the last Viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten, on 3 June 1947, of the intention to partition British India, the British parliament passed the Indian Independence Act 1947 on 11 July 1947. as a result, the native states were left with these choices: to remain independent or to accede to either of the two new dominions, the Union of India or the Dominion of Pakistan. The Indian Government made efforts to persuade Nawab Sahab of Junagadh to accede to India, but he remained firm. The Indian minister V. P. Menon came to request an accession to India, threatening consequences in case of denial. The Nawab however decided to accede to Pakistan, and an announcement to this effect was made in the gazette of Junagadh (Dastrural Amal Sarkar Junagadh) on 15 August 1947.[2]
Instrument of accession
Immediately after making the announcement in Dastrural Amal Sarkar Junagadh, the Jungadh government communicated to Pakistan its wish to accede, and a delegation headed by Ismail was sent to Karachi with the Instrument of Accession signed by the Nawab. The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan considered the proposal in detail and approved it. The Quaid-e-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, as Governor General of Pakistan, counter-signed the Instrument of Accession on 15 September 1947. This was notified in the Gazette of Pakistan and Dasturul Amal, the Gazette of Junagadh, on that date.
Indian integration of Junagadh The Instrument of Accession provided for the right of the Pakistan legislature to legislate in the areas of Defence and Communication, as well as others. Although the territory of Junagadh was geographically not adjoining the existing Pakistan, it had a link by sea through the Veraval Port of Junagadh.
38
Menon's reaction
V. P. Menon, the Secretary of the States department of the Government of India, travelled to Junagadh on 17 September 1947 and met Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, the dewan (or Chief Minister) of Junagadh. Menon said he had brought a message from the Indian Government and wished to deliver it to the Nawab in person. Bhutto said he could not arrange a meeting with the Nawab as he was not feeling well. Menon expressed displeasure, but conveyed the message of the Indian Government to Bhutto, insisting that Junagadh should withdraw its accession to Pakistan. Bhutto told Menon that the accession was now complete and that according to international law only the Government of Pakistan was responsible. Menon went to Bombay and met Samaldas Gandhi, a journalist of Rajkot who was related to Mohandas Gandhi, and others, and unfolded the scheme of "Arziee Hukumat" (Provisional Government).[3] On 24 September 1947, Mohandas K. Gandhi condemned the action of the Junagadh government in a prayer meeting held at Delhi.
Provisional government (Aarzee Hukumat)

In the meanwhile, there were exchanges between the governments of India and Pakistan. Pakistan told the Indian Government that the accession was in accordance with the Scheme of Independence announced by the outgoing British and that Junagadh was now part of Pakistan. While this exchange of correspondence was going on, India closed all its borders to Junagadh and stopped the movement of goods, transport and postal articles. In view of worsening situation, the Nawab and his family left Junagadh and arrived in Karachi on 25 October 1947. On 27 October 1947, Bhutto, as Chief Minister of Junagadh, wrote a letter to Jinnah explaining the critical situation of which the State government. As the situation worsened, he wrote again on 28 October 1947 to Ikramullah, Secretary of the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, seeking help and directions. When all hopes for assistance from Pakistan were lost, Bhutto wrote by telegram on 1 November 1947 to Nawab Saheb at Karachi, explaining the situation and the danger to life and property, considering an armed attack was imminent. In a return telegram, the Nawab authorised Bhutto to act in the best interests of the Muslim population of Junagadh.[4] A meeting of the Junagadh State Council was called on 5 November to discuss the critical situation. The Council authorised Bhutto to take appropriate action. He sent Captain Harvey Johnson, a senior member of the Council of Ministers, to Rajkot to meet Indian officials.[5] Another meeting of the Junagadh State Council was convened on 7 November, and some prominent citizens of Junagadh state were also invited. The meeting continued till 3 o'clock in the morning and decided that instead of surrendering to the "Provisional Government", the Indian Government should be requested to take over the administration of Junagadh to protect the lives of its citizens, which were being threatened by Provisional Government forces. On 8 November, Bhutto sent a letter to Nilam Butch, Provincial Head of the Indian Government in Rajkot, requesting him to help to restore law and order in Junagadh to prevent bloodshed. Harvey Johnson took the message to Rajkot. The head of the Indian administration telephoned V. P. Menon in Delhi and read out the letter. Menon immediately rushed to see Jawaharlal Nehru and explained the situation. After consultation with other ministers and V. B. Patel, the home minister, a formal order was drafted and a notification issued announcing the take-over of Junagadh at the request of its Chief Minister. The notification promised a referendum in due course.
Indian integration of Junagadh Bhutto left Junagadh for Karachi on the night of 8 November 1947. On 9 November, the Indian Air Force flew several sorties at low level over Junagadh. [6]
39
Entry of Indian forces

Soon columns of Indian tanks and other vehicles carrying Indian soldiers entered Junagadh state. At 6 p.m. on 9 November, Captain Harvey Johnson and Chief Secretary Gheewala, a civil servant of Junagadh state, formally handed over the charge of the State to the Indian Government. On the same day, Nehru sent a telegram to Liaquat Ali Khan about the Indian take-over of Junagadh. Khan sent a return telegram to Nehru stating that Junagadh was Pakistani territory, and nobody except the Pakistan government was authorised to invite anybody to Junagadh. He also accused the Indian Government of naked aggression on Pakistan's territory and of violating international law. The Government of Pakistan strongly opposed the Indian occupation. Nehru wrote In view of special circumstances pointed out by Junagadh Dewan that is the Prime Minister of Junagadh our Regional Commissioner at Rajkot has taken temporarily charge of Junagadh administration. This has been done to avoid disorder and resulting chaos. We have, however, no desire to continue this arrangement and wish to find a speedy solution in accordance with the wishes of the people of Junagadh. We have pointed out to you previously that final decision should be made by means of referendum or plebiscite. We would be glad to discuss this question and allied matters affecting Junagadh with representatives of your Government at the earliest possible moment convenient to you. We propose to invite Nawab of Junagadh to send his representatives to this conference. [7] The Government of Pakistan protested, saying that the accession of the state to Pakistan was already accepted. In reply to the above telegram, the Prime Minister of Pakistan sent the following: Your telegram informing that your Government had taken charge of Junagadh was received by me on November 10, 1947. Your action in taking over State Administration and sending Indian troops to state without any authority from Pakistan Government and indeed without our knowledge, is a clear violation of Pakistan territory and breach of International law. Indian Governments activities on accession of Junagadh to Pakistan have all been directed to force the State to renounce accession and all kinds of weapons have been used by you to achieve this end. We consider your action in taking charge of Junagadh Administration and sending Indian troops to occupy Junagadh to be a direct act of hostility against Pakistan Dominion. We demand that you should immediately withdraw your forces, and relinquish charge of administration to the rightful ruler and stop people of Union of India from invading Junagadh and committing acts of violence. This was the followed by a Press Statement made by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. It was communicated to Prime Minister of India on November 16, 1947 and read as follows: In spite of the gravest provocation, we have refrained from any action which should result in armed conflict. We could with full justification and legal right could have sent our forces to Junagadh but at no time since the accession of state, was a single soldier sent by us to Junagadh and our advice throughout to the State Authorities was to exercise the greatest restraint. Manavadar, another State which had acceded to Pakistan and Mangrol and Babariawad have also been occupied by Indian troops. Immediately after the take-over of the state, all rebel Muslim officials of the state were put behind the bars.[8]They included Ismail Abrehani, a senior minister in the Junagadh government, who had taken the instrument of Accession to Jinnah for his signature. Abrehani refused to leave Junagadh, even when he was offered in jail the option of going to Pakistan, saying that despite its occupation Junagadh was part of Pakistan according to international law and he preferred to remain. He stayed and later died in Junagadh.[9]
40
Plebiscite
A plebiscite was held on 20 February 1948, in which all but 91 out of 190,870 who voted (from an electorate of 201,457) voted to join India, i.e. 99% of the population voted to join India.[10]
Later arrangements
Junagadh became part of the Indian Saurashtra State until November 1, 1956, when Saurashtra became part of Bombay State. Bombay State was split into the linguistic states of Gujarat and Maharashtra in 1960, and Junagadh is now one of the modern districts of Saurasthra in Gujarat.
References
[1] History introduction (http:/ / www. hellojunagadh. com/ history_introduction. aspx) at hellojunagadh.com: "On September 15, 1947, Nawab Mohammad Mahabat Khanji III of Junagadh, a princely state located on the south-western end of Gujarat and having no common border with Pakistan, chose to accede to Pakistan ignoring Mountbatten's views, arguing that Junagadh adjoined Pakistan by sea. The rulers of two states that were subject to the suzerainty of Junagadh Mangrol and Babariawad reacted by declaring their independence from Junagadh and acceding to India." [2] http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=wmKIiAPgnF0C& dq=Instrument+ of+ accession+ Junagadh& source=gbs_navlinks_s [3] http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=wmKIiAPgnF0C& dq=Instrument+ of+ accession+ Junagadh& source=gbs_navlinks_s [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=wmKIiAPgnF0C& dq=Instrument+ of+ accession+ Junagadh& source=gbs_navlinks_s http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=wmKIiAPgnF0C& dq=Instrument+ of+ accession+ Junagadh& source=gbs_navlinks_s http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=wmKIiAPgnF0C& dq=Instrument+ of+ accession+ Junagadh& source=gbs_navlinks_s http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=Fr1PAQAAIAAJ& dq=Nehru%20letters%20Junagadh& source=gbs_similarbooks http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=wmKIiAPgnF0C& dq=Instrument+ of+ accession+ Junagadh& source=gbs_navlinks_s http:/ / books. google. com/ books?id=wmKIiAPgnF0C& dq=Instrument+ of+ accession+ Junagadh& source=gbs_navlinks_s
Article Sources and Contributors
41
Article Sources and Contributors

1961 Indian annexation of Goa Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=564766333 Contributors: A suyash, Abhi2point0, Abhi6693, Ad80, Adaptifada, Adnan.jsr, AgarwalSumeet, Angrense, Anirudhnandan, Anthony Appleyard, Antonio Manuel Saraiva, Arctic Night, Aumnamahashiva, Axeman89, BBird, BD2412, Bazj, Bentogoa, Binksternet, Blanche of King's Lynn, Bluedenim, Boaby, Bob103051, Bogdan Nagachop, BritishWatcher, Bry9000, Buckshot06, Calbaer, CaliforniaAliBaba, Carioca, Chanakyathegreat, Chris the speller, ChrisGualtieri, Chromium12, Chronodm, Chwyatt, Clarificationgiven, CommonsDelinker, Crab182, Cuchullain, Cyrexxx, Dantadd, Dave1185, Davidiad, De Administrando Imperio, Deepak D'Souza, Desione, Dewritech, Dimadick, Doorvery far, Dwaipayanc, E Wing, Echuck215, EdJohnston, El C, Embarcadourodetembim, EricSerge, Erik-the-red, Eumolpo, Evanh2008, Evilhairyhamster, EyeSerene, FMPARENTE, Feroshki, Flamarande, Flatronwide, Fnlayson, Fram, GHOStSHARK111, Gavia immer, GeorgeLouis, Gian-2, Giraffedata, Goali, GoonerDP, Graham87, GregorB, Greswik, Ground Zero, Gugganij, HappyInGeneral, Hcdc83, Headbomb, Heimstern, Hellobobroberts, Hendrick 99, Herostratus, History Sleuth, Howcheng, Hugo999, Humphrey20020, Husond, Iridescent, JHunterJ, Jeremiestrother, Joeldrodrigues, Joeylawn, John, John Nevard, Joseon Empire, Joseph Solis in Australia, Joshua, JosueM, Jovianeye, Kallgan, Karnan, KathrynLybarger, King Philip V of Spain, Kingal86, Koavf, Lightmouse, Lihaas, Lt.Specht, Madmonk11, Makrandjoshi, Manxruler, Maproom, Maralia, Marathi mulgaa, MarchOrDie, Mcferran, Miguelzinho, MilborneOne, Mimihitam, Mlavannis, Moonraker12, Morgan Hauser, Mouramoor, Mr.Xp, Namaacha, Neelkamala, Nick Number, Nick-D, Nirvana888, Nolanpinto, Novulus, Olivena, Open2universe, Optimist on the run, Orangewhitegreen, Otolemur crassicaudatus, Pablo X, Panzerkampf1990, Paris1127, Pauli133, PaulinSaudi, PauloMendona, Peroxwhy2gen, Phil Bridger, PhilKnight, Pjs.judge, Poliocretes, Pwt898, Quiensabe, Quintucket, R'n'B, Ragib, Raju C, Rao Ravindra, Raptus Regaliter Cattus Petasatus, Ratmangxa, Ravichandar84, Reaper Eternal, Reenem, RegentsPark, Relata refero, Rich Farmbrough, Richard Weil, Rjwilmsi, Robert1947, Rockybiggs, Rogriv, Rsrikanth05, S h i v a (Visnu), Salmanazar, Sangjinhwa, Sardanaphalus, Sdrtirs, Sentinel R, Ser Amantio di Nicolao, Shadowjams, Shovon76, Shyamsunder, Sir Nicholas de Mimsy-Porpington, Skcpublic, Skorpio78, Smith2006, SnowFire, Solankijayant, Speedboy Salesman, Stanguy, Stifle, Sundaryourfriend, Supergodzilla2090, Surajhpatil, Tedder, TejinderSR, The Discoverer, The Madras, The Ogre, The Red Hat of Pat Ferrick, Theo47, Theodore!, Theoffice89, Thisthat2011, Thumperward, Tigerassault, Triplejumper, Turbnz, Turgidson, Uch, Ulric1313, Utcursch, Valenciano, Vedant, Vishnava, Walrasiad, Waqas1987, Warut, Welsh, Woohookitty, XPTO, XavierGreen, YSSYguy, YUL89YYZ, Yosy, Zack Holly Venturi, , 352 anonymous edits Indian annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=561889959 Contributors: AJ-India, AJ.iitm, BDD, Binksternet, Chatfecter, Davshul, Hmains, Hullaballoo Wolfowitz, Joseon Empire, Joshua Issac, Jsobral, MatthewVanitas, Neelkamala, Nihar S, Peroxwhy2gen, Prodigyhk, Shyamsunder, Sumanch, Tabletop, Themightyquill, Thisthat2011, 23 anonymous edits Operation Polo Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=567686645 Contributors: .marc., A2Kafir, Abdaal, Abhishekmathur, Abrahamlast, Acroterion, Aftab Kiran, Aja1210, Alex43223, Alren, Andrew Gwilliam, Andris, Animum, Anthony Appleyard, Anurag Garg, ArchStanton69, Arskoul, Axeman89, Baba Ovian, Bharatveer, Bowlhover, Brutaldeluxe, Caerwine, Chasingsol, Chedorlaomer, Chirags, CommonsDelinker, Daily Goals, Dattakillerneo, Dawkeye, Deepak D'Souza, Deville, Dimadick, Dormskirk, Download, Dreadstar, Eluchil404, Fauwaz, Fleiger, Fowler&fowler, Gaius Cornelius, Gaurav, GeeJo, Ghirlandajo, Gobeshock Gobochondro Gyanotirtho, Grafen, Greg Grahame, Ground Zero, Grubb, Gunnala, Guptadeepak, Hardik jadeja, HarryHenryGebel, Hebrides, Hibernian, Hu, Hugo999, Idleguy, JForget, Jaiiaf, Jethwarp, John Hill, Jon C., JorgeGG, Josemanimala, Jovianeye, JustAGal, Kajasudhakarababu, Kazipetasurya, Kelvinc, Kirill Lokshin, Kishanjoshi, LaMenta3, Lightmouse, Lilaac, Lionheart5, MaGioZal, Mac Davis, MantisEars, Manujfloyd, Mark83, Mike Rosoft, Mohitkhullar, Moonraker, Moshe Constantine Hassan Al-Silverburg, Muro, Niceguyedc, Nikai, Nishkid64, OceanMash, Olegwiki, Open2universe, Pallab1234, PamD, Pnr26j, Qwyrxian, Race911, Rama's Arrow, Randhirreddy, Rao Ravindra, Rapidsurfer, Reenem, Rjwilmsi, Rmetre, RobNS, Rohit1987, Rubber soul, Rueben lys, S h i v a (Visnu), Sainathgupta, Sardanaphalus, Sarvagyana guru, Savitr, Scuffy05, Secret of success, Shining.Star, Shyamsunder, Sixtynotes, Skcpublic, Somdev, Sumanth Mamidala, Tbhotch, Techcorp, Theycrashed, Thisthat2011, Tienouchou, Tigerassault, Tim!, Tristan benedict, Urduboy, Utcursch, Uzdzislaw, Vacuumloops, Vegaswikian, Vinchem, Vipinhari, Vishnava, Voorlandt, Vyzasatya, Wandalstouring, Welsh, Wetman, Whoop whoop pull up, Woohookitty, XavierGreen, Xn4, YellowMonkey, Yorkiano, Zezolock, , 132 anonymous edits History of Sikkim Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=562680199 Contributors: Academic Challenger, Ahoerstemeier, Alren, Andres rojas22, Andrew Gray, Antemister, Bhadani, BikashDai, BillShurts, Centauri, Chirags, Coemgenus, DabMachine, Darwinek, Download, Dvd Avins, Epbr123, Evryman, Firsfron, Gonzonoir, Ground Zero, ImpuMozhi, JFHJr, John Hill, John K, Joy1963, Kintetsubuffalo, MZMcBride, Michaelmas1957, Mr Tan, Nichalp, Norm mit, Paxsimius, Pearle, PhnomPencil, Pradiptaray, Pwt898, Rangan datta, Rebroad, Rich Farmbrough, Ronz, Satyenpandey, Sesel, Shyamsunder, Sikkiboy, Sikkimmomo, Sikkimonline, Special Cases, , 50 anonymous edits Indian integration of Junagadh Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=552325018 Contributors: Advil, Altetendekrabbe, Andrew Gwilliam, Ardfern, Atulsnischal, Aumnamahashiva, Bogdan Nagachop, Caiaffa, Cherrysmith1, Darkness Shines, Ekabhishek, EoGuy, GoingBatty, Golgofrinchian, Ground Zero, Harish Jasani, Heracletus, Hugo999, Idleguy, Jethwarp, LibStar, Mandarax, Mar4d, Moonraker, Mushroom9, Narayansg, Night w, Nightstallion, Patelurology2, Paxse, R'n'B, Rgiyer, Rjwilmsi, Sardanaphalus, Shahab, Shovon76, Shyamsunder, SimonP, Sobreira, TopGun, Tovojolo, Tutu1234, Umar Zulfikar Khan, Vimalkalyan, Vishnava, Yessrao, 45 anonymous edits
Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors
42
Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors

File:Flag of Portugal.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Flag_of_Portugal.svg License: Public Domain Contributors: Columbano Bordalo Pinheiro (1910; generic design); Vtor Lus Rodrigues; Antnio Martins-Tuvlkin (2004; this specific vector set: see sources) File:Flag of India.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Flag_of_India.svg License: Public Domain Contributors: Anomie, Mifter File:Goamap.png Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Goamap.png License: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported Contributors: User:Nichalp File:Canberra.pr9.takeoff.arp.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Canberra.pr9.takeoff.arp.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Arpingstone, De728631, Groumfy69, Mattes, PMG File:NRP Afonso de Albuquerque.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:NRP_Afonso_de_Albuquerque.jpg License: Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 3.0 Contributors: User:Chanthujohnson File:MD450 Ouragon 2.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:MD450_Ouragon_2.jpg License: GNU Free Documentation License Contributors: Ad Meskens, Pibwl, Stahlkocher, 1 anonymous edits File:Dadra-Nagarhaveli 1956.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Dadra-Nagarhaveli_1956.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Aotearoa, Juiced lemon Image:Hyderabad state from the Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1909.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Hyderabad_state_from_the_Imperial_Gazetteer_of_India,_1909.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Avicennasis, John of Reading, MaGioZal Image:In hyder1900a.png Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:In_hyder1900a.png License: GNU Free Documentation License Contributors: AnonMoos, Himasaram, Jjvaca, Juiced lemon, Roland zh, Smooth O File:White flag icon.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:White_flag_icon.svg License: Public Domain Contributors: Ash Crow, Captaincollect1970, Cycn, Ludger1961, Rocket000, Sarang, SiBr4, W!B:, Xiengyod, 1 anonymous edits File:Op Polo Surrender.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Op_Polo_Surrender.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Unknown File:Gururinpochen.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Gururinpochen.jpg License: GNU Free Documentation License Contributors: User:Nichalp File:Sikkim.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Sikkim.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: CIA. Original uploader was Pascal at en.wikipedia File:Bundesarchiv Bild 135-S-03-24-03, Tibetexpedition, Der Maharaja von Sikkim.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_135-S-03-24-03,_Tibetexpedition,_Der_Maharaja_von_Sikkim.jpg License: Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 3.0 Germany Contributors: Origamiemensch, Roland zh
License
43
License
Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported //creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/

1961 Indian Annexation of Goa

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

1961 Indian Annexation of Goa

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Contents

1961 Indian annexation of Goa

1961 Indian annexation of Goa

Commanders and leaders

Casualties and losses

1961 Indian annexation of Goa

Local resistance to Portuguese rule

1961 Indian annexation of Goa

Diplomatic efforts to resolve Goa dispute

Goa, Western India

1961 Indian annexation of Goa

The occupation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli

Events preceding the hostilities

The Portuguese Mandate

Portuguese Military Preparations

Portuguese civilian evacuation

1961 Indian annexation of Goa

Indian reconnaissance operations

The NRP Afonso de Albuquerque

1961 Indian annexation of Goa

The military actions in Daman

The military actions in Diu

1961 Indian annexation of Goa

Portuguese actions post-hostilities

1961 Indian annexation of Goa

Internment and repatriation of POWs

1961 Indian annexation of Goa

International reaction to the capture of Goa

United States of America

1961 Indian annexation of Goa

The Catholic Church

1961 Indian annexation of Goa

1961 Indian annexation of Goa

Indian annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli

Indian annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli

Commanders and leaders

Casualties and losses

Indian annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli

Indian annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli

Surrender of Captain Fidalgo

Integration into India

Indian annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli

Commanders and leaders

Casualties and losses

Events preceding hostilities

Civil unrest in Hyderabad

Hyderabadi military preparations

Indian military preparations

Capitulation and surrender

Radio broadcast after surrender by Nizam

The surrender ceremony

Invasions from Bhutan and Nepal

Relations with the British Empire

References Further reading

Indian integration of Junagadh

Indian integration of Junagadh

Provisional government (Aarzee Hukumat)

Entry of Indian forces

Indian integration of Junagadh

Article Sources and Contributors

Article Sources and Contributors

Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors

Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors

Potrebbero piacerti anche