SOUTH ASIAN LANGUAGE REVIEW VOL. XIV, JANUARY 2004, Nos.1&2.

Modality, Subjectivity, and Logic

Li Renzhi Shantou University, China rzli@stu.edu.cn

Abstract: This paper studies subjectivity and modal logic in alethic, epistemic, deontic, participant-external and -internal modalities. It calls in question some traditional views on these issues. It suggests that epistemic modality should be differentiated from alethic modality and participant-internal modality can be excluded in terms of modal logic. Modality is a unity of two opposite concepts: subjectivity and objectivity. Subjectivity is observable in epistemic and sometimes deontic modalities, but it cannot be of the greatest importance for understanding modality or an essential character or criterion of modality as remarked by Lyons (1977: 739) and Palmer (1986: 16), respectively.

1. Introduction
Modality is not only a linguistic category, but also a logical category. Linguistically, it involves modal verbs which express a series of concepts that can be reduced to possibility and necessity. Logically, it demonstrates some rules. Lyons (1977: 739) mentions subjectivity and objectivity in his analysis of epistemic and deontic modalities. By subjectivity, he refers to a feature of device whereby the speaker, in making an utterance, simultaneously comments upon that utterance and expresses his attitude to what he is saying. The feature that modality is independent of the speakers comments and attitude, can be described as objectivity. Apart from epistemic and deontic modalities, Palmer (1990: 36) incorporates dynamic modality. Van der Auwera & Plungian (1998: 80-1) split dynamic modality into participant-external and -internal modalities. None of them examine the subjectivity of these new modalities. This paper is to present a comprehensive study of subjectivity in modality from the perspective of modal logic. It involves alethic, epistemic, deontic, participant-external (and -internal) modalities. It

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calls in question some traditional views on modality. The aim is to observe the relationship between modality, subjectivity, and modal logic.

2. Epistemic Modality: Subjective and Objective?

Lyons (1977) makes an analysis of epistemic modality, stating that an epistemically modalized utterance is an utterance in which the speaker explicitly qualifies his commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed by the utterance (p.797). It involves the speakers knowledge and understanding about the event or state described in the proposition (p.793). It tends to be concerned with matters of opinion, rather than fact (p. 681-2). Lyons claims that epistemic modality can be subjective (p.797), indicating the speakers opinion, or hearsay, or tentative inference about the proposition embedded in his utterance, rather than factuality (p.799). Its very essence is to express the speakers reservations about giving an unqualified, or categorical, I-say-so to the factuality of the proposition (p.797). He exemplifies his point with (1), in which the speaker subjectively qualifies his commitment to the possibility of Alfreds being unmarried. He tends to believe that Alfred is unmarried, but he is uncertain. (1) clearly indicates the subjectivity of the speakers commitment. (2) can also be subjective, showing that the speaker is highly committed to the truth of the proposition, but he is not absolutely sure. (1) Alfred may be unmarried. (Lyons 1977: 797) (2) Alfred must be unmarried. (Ibid) Lyons (1977) also claims that epistemic modality can be objective, indicating the speakers commitment to the factuality of the information that he is giving to the addressee. Using an objective epistemically modalized statement, the speaker is performing an act of telling (p.799). Lyons (1977: 798) gives two scenarios of objectivity. One is that Alfred is a member of community of ninety people. We know that thirty of them are unmarried, without however knowing which of them are unmarried and which are not. In this situation, Lyons claims that the possibility of Alfreds being unmarried is presentable as an objective fact. The speaker might reasonably say that he knows,

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and does not merely think or believe, that there is a possibility of Alfreds being unmarried (p.798). If he is irrational, the speakers subjective commitment to the truth of the proposition might be quite unrelated to his knowledge of the objective possibility. (1) can express the objective epistemic possibility. The other scenario is that after establishing the marital status of every member of the community except Alfred, we have identified exactly twenty-nine unmarried people. In this circumstance, it would be appropriate to utter (2), which is now a statement of objective epistemic necessity, indicating that the speaker is completely committed to the truth of the proposition. Lyons (1977) category of epistemic modality is widely accepted (cf Palmer 1986, 1990; Bybee et al 1994). However, it seems to us that his comments about subjectivity and objectivity of epistemic modality are problematic. The reasons are twofold. Firstly, in the first scenario, there are two possibilities: Alfred is unmarried and he is not unmarried. These two possibilities are contradictory to each other, but equally presentable. It is a lopsided view that the possibility of Alfreds being unmarried is presentable as an objective fact. In (1) the speaker is inclined to think that he is unmarried. It expresses the speakers preference between the two possibilities and, therefore, indicates the subjectivity of the speakers commitment. The knowledge that the speaker used in the inference is objective, but the inclination or preference is subjective. The speaker is not just performing an act of telling, but making a subjective and indeterminate judgment. Therefore, (1) is not an objective epistemic statement, but a subjective one. If there really is a so-called objective epistemic possibility, then it cannot be expressed until the speaker equally mentions all the possibilities without indicating his personal inclination or preference, as exemplified by (3). Meanwhile, it should be noted that epistemic modality is based on the speakers knowledge and understanding of the external world. In an epistemically modalized statement, the speakers commitment to the truth or falsity of a proposition more or less, consciously or unconsciously, involves his knowledge and understanding of the event or state described in the proposition. An epistemically modalized statement without this involvement does not exist. The term epistemic is derived from the Greek word epistm meaning knowledge. If the indeterminate inference

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based on the speakers knowledge and understanding of the external world were related to objective epistemic modality, then subjective epistemic modality would not exist. (3) He may be unmarried and he may not be unmarried. (altered from van der Auwera 1996: 183) Secondly, after a deliberate analysis of Lyons epistemic modality, it can be found that there is a contradiction between his definition and objectivity. If epistemic modality is concerned with matters of opinion, rather than fact (p. 681-2), then the so-called objectivity as he claims in (2) deserves no place in epistemic modality. This is because that the objective interpretation of (2) is concerned with a fact. The speaker is sure about the truth of what he asserts and makes no qualification about his commitment to the truth of the proposition. It seems to us that Lyons confuses epistemic modality with alethic modality. Both epistemic and alethic modalities can be expressed with the same grammatical forms, but they differ greatly in semantics. Epistemic modality qualifies the speakers commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed by the sentence he utters, but alethic modality does not. This feature of alethic modality is explicitly reflected in (4). In an epistemically modalized statement, the modal verb is indispensable, but in an alethically modalized statement, the necessity modal can be omitted. For example, in (4) must be can be substituted for is without altering the meaning (Palmer 1986: 11). (2) can receive the same treatment when it is interpreted as an objective statement in the second scenario. (4) He is a bachelor, so he must be unmarried. (Palmer 1986: 11) Lyons (1977: 797) argues that any utterance in which the speaker explicitly qualifies his commitment to the truth of the proposition is an epistemically modalized utterance, but in his actual description he incorporates the statement which unqualifies the speakers commitment into his epistemic category and assigns to it the label of objective. Lyons mentions that it is difficult to draw a sharp distinction between objective epistemic modality and alethic modality (p.797). We would like to argue that they two just belong to the same type of modality, i.e. alethic. After a close examination,

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it can be seen that epistemic modality shows no objectivity. Epistemic modality emphasizes the speakers qualified commitment to the truth of the proposition. This is a crucial distinction between epistemic modality and alethic modality. If the distinction is overlooked, it would be difficult to understand epistemic modality, and the objectivity of alethic modality would be mistaken for that of epistemic modality.

3. Deontic Modality: Subjective?

Lyons (1977: 823) defines deontic modality as necessity or possibility of acts performed by morally responsible agents. This definition is somewhat hard to understand. Palmer (1986: 16) offers a simple and concise one, stating that deontic modality indicates a kind of directive whereby the speaker issues permission or lays an obligation for the addressee to do (or not to do) something. Deontic modality can be exemplified by (5) and (6), which are respectively concerned with deontic possibility and necessity. (5) (6) You may open the door. (Lyons 1977: 832) You must open the door. (Ibid)

Palmer (1986: 16) claims that modality is the grammaticalization of speakers (subjective) attitudes and opinions and subjectivity is an essential criterion for modality. With respect to deontic modality, Palmer (1987: 100) justifies his claim with purely formal evidence that deontic modals have no past tense/past time forms. Palmer (1990: 10) argues that (7) and (8) are unacceptable. He claims that deontic possibility and necessity go along with the speech act. It is logically impossible to give permission or lay an obligation in the past and there is no place in English for past tense/past time forms of these modals (p.11), thus pushing his view of subjectivity forward to the extreme. (7) (8) *John must(ed) come yesterday. (Palmer 1990: 10) *John might come yesterday. (Ibid)

However, we find that Palmers argument is problematic. With respect to epistemic modality, subjectivity is never overemphasized.

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But for deontic modality, his argument is somewhat biased. In Lyons (1977: 849), deontic modality is described to have an objective subtype next to a subjective one. Lyons does not justify his description, but both subjectivity and objectivity are applicable to deontic modality. Deontic modality can be subjective since it can express the speakers attitude, as exemplified by (5) and (6). The compelling circumstances of the modality, which are called deontic source, can directly be related to the speaker. However, the notions of deontic modality do not always come from the speaker. When the compelling circumstances are related to other persons, authoritative institutes, and social or ethical norms, deontic modality does not express the speakers attitude, thus demonstrating no subjectivity but objectivity instead. In (9) and (10), the speaker conveys the deontic necessity compelled by some social or ethical norms. The modality involved is absolutely not a speaker-related, purely subjective one. (9) You shouldnt drink and drive. (Hornby 1995: 1091) (10) In the library you can take a book out and keep it out for a whole year unless it is recalled. (Palmer 1990: 103) We agree that must has no past tense or past time form for deontic necessity. In (11) must is the present tense form, but used in the indirect speech against a past background. However, this does not suggest that other modal verbs have no past tense forms either. In (12), the speaker uses could, which is the past tense form of the deontic possibility modal can and indicates deontic possibility in the past. The deontic source of the possibility here has nothing to do with the speakers attitude. So the statement is objective. In (13) the speaker uses might, which is the past tense form of another deontic possibility modal may and indicates deontic possibility in the past. This use is similar to (8) and leads us to doubt if (8) is really unacceptable as claimed by Palmer (1990: 10). We would like to argue that deontic modality usually expresses permission or obligation in the present time. However, when the deontic source is related to something in the past, deontic modality indicates permission or obligation in the past. It can be interpreted into was/were allowed/obliged to. The time reference of deontic modality bears no stereotyped connection with subjectivity.

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(11) I told him he must be home early. (Quirk et al 1985: 234) (12) In those days only men could vote in elections. (Ibid: 222) (13) We might leave the school only at weekends. (Ibid: 232)

4. What about Participant-External Modality?

In his study of modality, Palmer (1990: 36) incorporates dynamic modality, which has been rejected by Lyons (1977). Van der Auwera & Plungian (1998: 80) split off the neutral or circumstantial sub-branch from dynamic modality and term it as participant-external modality, which is parallel with epistemic and deontic modalities and indicates the possibility and necessity compelled by the circumstances external to the participant engaged in the state of affairs, as exemplified by (14) and (15). The other sub-branch, i.e. the so-called subject-oriented dynamic modality (excluding the part that indicates volition), is labeled as participantinternal modality, referring to the possibility (ability) or necessity (need) internal to the participant engaged in the state of affairs. Participant-internal modality is to be discussed in the next section. (14) To get to the station, you can take bus 66. (van der Auwera and Plungian 1998: 80) (15) You must go now if you wish to catch the bus. (Palmer 1986: 102) Alethic, epistemic, and deontic modalities are observable with the logical relations which function between possibility and necessity in terms of negation or entailment (cf. Lyons 1977: 787-8, Palmer 1990: 9, 77). So is participant-external modality in our view. Some of these relations can be represented by the symbolic expressions (16) to (21), in which stands for possibility, for necessity, for not, p for proposition, and for entailment. Each symbolic expression is followed with a literary interpretation. An easy example is that, for participant-external possibility and necessity, we can say: if one must go now he cannot

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not go since the bus is leaving soon. This reflects the logical relation that (18) illustrates. Participant-external modality agrees with modal logic. This property justifies van der Auwera & Plungians (1998: 80) recognition of participant-external modality as another, distinct kind of modality. (16) p = (17) p = p p p It is necessary that not p iff it is not possible that p It is possible that not p iff it is not necessary that p It is necessary that p iff it is not possible that not p It is possible that p iff it is not necessary that not p Necessity entails possibility Negation of possibility entails the negation of the necessity

(18) p = (19) p =

(20) p p (21) p p

It is found in our research that the point of view of subjectivity is problematic with participant-external modality. Participantexternal modality involves neither the attitude nor the opinion of the speaker (except that is true). It does not arise out of the speakers opinion or attitude, but is independent of them. For example, (14) expresses a kind of external possibility: bus 66 is one of the means to go to the station. This possibility is often labeled as situational permission (L 1942 [rpt 1982: 246]). It has nothing to do with the speakers subjective attitude and differs in nature from permission in deontic modality. (15) expresses exclusively that it is necessary for you to go now. This necessity is compelled by a non-deontic, external circumstance: the bus will be leaving soon, and involves no subjective factor on the part of the speaker. Using an externally modalized statement, the speaker performs an act of telling rather than conveys anything of his subjectivity. Therefore, it can be argued that participant-external modality demonstrates no subjectivity, but objectivity.

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5. Status of Participant-Internal Modality?

Let us now look at the status of participant-internal modality. As mentioned previously, participant-internal modality refers to a kind of possibility (ability or capacity) or necessity (need) internal to the participant engaged in the state of affairs. The statement with a participant-internal possibility modal can be paraphrased as have the ability to do , as exemplified by (22), and the one with participant-internal necessity modal as have the need to do as exemplified by (23). (22) He can lift a hundredweight. (Perkins 1983: 31) (23) To be healthy, a plant must receive a good supply of both sunshine and moisture. (Quirk et al 1985: 225) The point of view of subjectivity faces questions in analysis of participant-internal modality. This modality simply asserts the participants potential ability and need. For example, (22) states that somebody has the ability to lift a hundredweight. This ability has nothing to do with the speakers attitude. (23) expresses that a plant needs sufficient sunshine and water. This need is an internal quality of the plant and independent of the speakers interference. Participant-internal modality is a little special with respect to modal logic. The greatest difference from other types of modality is that participant-internal possibility and necessity are not observable with the logical relations as represented by (16) to (21). For example, for deontic possibility (permission) and necessity (obligation), we can say that, if one is not obliged to do a, he is permitted not to do a, as illustrated by (17); and if he is obliged to do a, he is not permitted not to do a, as illustrated by (18). However, for participant-internal possibility and necessity we cannot say that, if one does not need to do a, he has the ability not to do a; and if he needs to do a, he does not have the ability not to do a. Also, for deontic modality we can say that, if one is permitted to do a, he is not obliged not to do a, as illustrated by (19); and if one is not permitted to do a, he is obliged not to do a, as illustrated by (16). However, for participant-internal modality we cannot say that, if one has the ability to do a, he does not need not to do a; and if one does not have the ability to do a, he needs not to do a.

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Another example, as indicated by (20), necessity entails possibility in the logic of alethic, epistemic, deontic, and participant-external modality. But for participant-internal modality, this entailment does not work, since it is not true to say that one has the need to do a entails one has the ability to do a. Therefore, we would like to point out that participant-internal modality is very different from the other types of modality. It is of great help in the diachronic study of modality since it is usually the origin of other modal senses (van der Auwera & Plungians 1998: 111), but it does not agree to modal logic. Van der Auwera & Plungian (1998: 86) sought to characterize modality in terms of possibility and necessity where logic is at work, but the inclusion of participant-internal modality goes far away from their original intention. Li (2003: 34) defines modality as a fuzzy set of the semantic notions related to possibility and necessity and claims that participant-internal modality is peripheral in the general set. But considered from the logical point of view, the participant-internal can be excluded from modality. A logical scope seems to cover alethic, epistemic, deontic, and participant-external modalities exclusively.

6. Conclusion
Possibility and necessity are two central notions of traditional modal logic and linguistic modality. They are different, but mutually related, concepts in terms of negation and entailment. Alethic, epistemic, deontic, and participant-external modalities are observed with logical relations and agree with modal logic in all respects. The issue of subjectivity and objectivity can be tackled in such a logically restricted scope of modality. Subjectivity and objectivity are two contradictory concepts. Modality is subjective when it is related to the speaker. Otherwise it is objective. Modality is a unity of these two opposite concepts. Only when epistemic modality is distinguished from alethic modality can we find that epistemic modality shows only subjectivity, but not objectivity. With deontic modality, subjectivity is observed only when the deontic source is related to the speaker. When the deontic source turns to other figures, authoritative institutes, and social or ethical norms, deontic modality shows

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objectivity. An utterance of participant-external (and -internal if it were not excluded) modality performs the speakers act of telling, thus demonstrating objectivity. The concept of subjectivity is not of the greatest importance for the understanding of both epistemic and deontic modality as remarked by Lyons (1977: 739) when he sets up no independent category of alethic modality. Palmers (1986: 16) argument that modality is the grammaticalization of speakers (subjective) attitudes and opinions only applies to the alethic-excluded epistemic and, partially, deontic modalities, but not to the rest of deontic modality or alethic and participant-external modalities. Contrary to another of his arguments, subjectivity is not an essential character or criterion of modality.

References
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