Berthold-Bond, Hegel, Nietzsche and Freud On Mandness and The Unconscious

Hegel, Nietzsche, and Freud on Madness and the Unconscious Author(s): DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND Source: The Journal of Speculative
Philosophy, New Series, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1991), pp. 193-213 Published by: Penn State University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25669999 . Accessed: 11/02/2014 15:20
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DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND
Hegel, Nietzsche, and Freud on Madness and theUnconscious
INTRODUCTION
Hegel's theory of insanity or madness (Verrucktheit)has been largely ne glected. This is partly due, no doubt, to the facts that his one detailed discussion of the topic is confined to a few pages inhis Encyclopaedia,1 and
that he makes only passing reference to insanity inhis other works. And yet many of the themes Hegel develops inhis anatomy ofmadness are mirrored inhis phenomenology of the healthy or rational mind.2 Madness is in many respects the invertedmirror of the developed consciousness, incorporating the structures of rationality within a different construction of the relation
We might therefore think that Hegel is simply one more of "the philoso phers" so frequently criticized byNietzsche and Freud, who, as Freud says, "protest that they could not conceive of such a monstrosity as the uncon " scious, and are thus doomed to a fundamental misunderstanding of human experience (AS 31).3 Nietzsche writes in a similar vein:
ical project. One such theme, which will serve as the focus of the present article, is the role of the unconscious in mental life. As in the case ofmadness, Hegel does not often directly refer to the unconscious inhis writings, and does not explicitly develop this concept as a central principle of his phenomenology.
between the self and its world. By occupying in thisway a sort of "negative space" relation to the healthy mind, insanity provides us with an intriguing point of access to the study of themes that occur in Hegel's largerphilosoph
THE JOURNALOF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY, Vol. V, No. 3, 1991.

Copyright ? 1991 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA.
194
The unconscious disguise of physiological needs under the [philoso pher's] cloaks of the objective, ideal, [and] purely spiritual goes to often I have asked myself whether . . . frightening lengths?and
body.(GS Pref?2)
And
of. . . the unconscious,"
[thewhole of) philosophy has not been
... a misunderstanding of the
yet it is simply not true that Hegel

as one
"totally lacked the Freudian

suggests.4 The unconscious
idea
commentator
does emerge, albeit infrequently, at several junctures of Hegel's phenome nology of the developed consciousness?for example, inhis doctrine of the List der Vernunft, and in his theory of guilt and intentionality.5 More importantly,however, the unconscious plays a central role inhis portrait of insanity, and it ishere that a comparison ofHegel with Nietzsche and Freud becomes particularly interesting. In this article I will seek to clarify Hegel's unconscious inmadness theory of the role of the the of against general features ofNietz backdrop sche's and Freud's thoughts. By allowing Hegel to enter into dialogue with the more fullydeveloped theories of Nietzsche and Freud, we may gain a
Further, all three regard the unconscious as crucial to the development of a decisively new orientation for psychology. Finally, all link this new psychological orientation to the need for a "physiology": The unconscious
Iwill show that while in important writers offer competing psychologies, there are sub respects these three as well. For example, we will see that all three propose an stantial parallels understanding of illness as essential for an appreciation of health.
clearer sense of his own contributions.
points towards the domain of the body, nature, instinct. As Nietzsche says, the new psychology will be a "physio-psychology, . . . daring to descend to the depths," and will "translate man back into nature," into the "eternal basic text of homo natura" recovering the biological roots of human
just as Freud adopts as the motto for his InterpretationofDreams move the Virgil's dictum that "if I cannot bend the higher powers, I will infernal regions"?the higher powers being the sphere of consciousness and rationality, whose structures cannot be fullyunderstood without trac Thus, speaks ing them back to the "infernal regions" of the unconscious?Hegel ofmadness as a reversion to the unconscious, where "the earthly elements" of the body have theirhome, and "the dark, infernal powers of the heart are set free." (PM ? 408 6k Z) Only a phenomenology of these infernal regions of mental life.
philosophy.(BGE ?? 23, 230)
experience
from their exile by the puritanical,
spiritualistic tradition of
will allow for a full explanation
MADNESSAND THE UNCONSCIOUS
195
There are, of course, important and far-reaching differences between the theories of Hegel, Nietzsche, and Freud on illness and the unconscious, and I will especially stress three such oppositions in this article. First, Nietzsche and Freud both effect a reversal of the values Hegel assigns to consciousness and the unconsciousness, or rationality and instinct. Con sciousness is a mere surface, a disguise, parable, and facade covering over the true depth of the psyche, the unconscious. Thus Freud: Consciousness is the surface of the mental apparatus. (EL 19) It is essential to abandon the overvaluation of the property of being . . .The unconscious is the true conscious. psychical reality. (ID
613)
And Nietzsche: The world of which we can become conscious isonly a surface-and
All our so-called consciousness is a more or less fantastic commen taryon an unknown, perhaps unknowable, but felt text. (D ? 119) is the merely "immedi ate" stage of spirit, spirit asleep, the inarticulate voice of nature awaiting education into the language of rationality which is itsdestiny and truth. In this sense it is the unconscious which isa mere surface, and consciousness or rationality which is the genuine text of the psyche. And yet while Hegel would reverse Nietzsche's view (shared by Freud) that "thoughts are the For Hegel, on the other hand, the unconscious
(GS ? 354) sign-world.
shadows of our feelings" (GS ? 179), he would still agree on the intimate connection between thought and feeling, consciousness and the uncon scious. Nature, the domain of spirit sleeping and hence unconscious to itself, is a "riddle," Hegel says, since while it appears alien to spirit, it is
spirit's presupposition. (PN Intro) A second difference is that the line of demarcation between madness and health ismore clearly drawn by Hegel than it is by either Nietzsche or Freud, forwhom this line is at best tenuous. Third, Nietzsche must be distinguished fromHegel and Freud in terms of his evaluation of illness. In speak Nietzsche. Specifically, illness isnot necessarily pathological for ing of his own illness, he writes that "even in times of grave illness I did not
become pathological."6 Indeed, we will see thatNietzsche views a certain formof illness as essential to health. Further, Nietzsche tends to locate the source of disease not in the unconscious, as Hegel and Freud do, but in
196 consciousness.
DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND itself is often described as a disease and a Nietzsche will often stand as counterpoint such, to Hegel and Freud in their thoughts on illness.
Consciousness state.7 As
pathological rather than companion
THE DEFINITION OF MADNESS: REGRESSION, SEPARATION, NOSTALGIA

Hegel defines madness as "a state inwhich themind is shut up within itself, has sunk into itself, whose peculiarity . . . consists in itsbeing no longer in immediate contact with actuality but in having positively separated itself from it." (PM ? 408 Z) Freud's definition of neurosis is a very close echo of Hegel's view.8 He speaks of "the low valuation of reality, the neglect of the distinction between
[reality] and phantasy" (IL 368), and the "path of regression" taken by the libido which has been "repulsed by reality" and must seek satisfaction through a "withdrawal from the ego and its laws." (IL 359) In both accounts, two points are stressed: a regressive withdrawal or "sinking back" of the developed mind, and a resulting separation from
reality.
connections with reality?becomes "self-supporting and independent" of the "threads ... of interconnection between [the] self and the . . . external world" (PM ? 406)?and adopts an essentially new form of discourse,
basically pre-rational, pre-conscious level ofmental life,what Hegel calls the "life of feeling" (Gefiihlsleben). Like Freud, Hegel associates the domain of feeling with the unconscious, the body, nature, instinct. In undertaking this regressive path to the world of the unconscious, the mind severs its
We will elaborate on these two essential features of illness shortly, but should clarify here that the movement of withdrawal is a retreat to a
displacing the centrality of the reality principle and the "laws of the ego" by a more primitive language of fantasy. Hegel's and Freud's definition ofmental illness as a regression shows that they both see madness as presupposing a healthy consciousness (see PM ? 408 Z). Insanity is a response to the developed mind's encounter with an is experience of pain that it cannot cope with. In this sense, madness ironically a therapeutic attempt, an effort to heal what Hegel calls the "wounds of spirit" through a self-protective gesture of retreat.9 But there is an even stronger relation between the mad and healthy selves than the fact that madness presupposes health: Insanity and ra
tionality share some of the same basic underlying structures. For both Hegel and Freud the basic desire of all mind is to achieve a reconciliation and
197
gives rise to a vigorous attempt to recover that state." (Nar 100) As such, the impulse towards withdrawal and regression that characterizes neurosis isalso a basic drive of all ego development. So too for Hegel, all mind, and not only the deranged mind, engages in a recurring cycle of withdrawal from the world of suffering,followed by the attempt to external other?"and project a unity from out of itself. This parallelism of the structures of madness and health is important, and calls for some further elaboration. A helpful point of departure is to look at the basic duality of instinct in Freud and desire inHegel.10 Freud's final theory of the instincts, developed in the 1920s, proposes a conflictual relation between the two primary instincts of Eros and Death. Eros is the
unity between the inner and outer worlds, subject and object, self and other, and yet all mind is perpetually confronted with the experience of disunity and contradiction. This iswhy for Freud ego development "con initial state of unity of sists in a departure from primary narcissism"?the self and world in the infant, prior to the "cathexis" or "binding" of an
instinct of life,of growth, the drive toward union with the other, while the death instinct is regressive and destructive, the urge to recreate and restore a primal sense of unity and rest, "to return to the quiescence of the inorganic world." (BPP 62) There is a quite similar duality inHegel's portrait of desire. While Hegel most known forhis emphasis on the progressive, evolutionary character is
of desire, there is also what Ihave called elsewhere a "second face of desire" in his dialectic, which is retrogressive and nostalgic, calling consciousness
back to a past that it yearns for as a scene of peace and
the power of the death instinct, or Hegel's second face of desire, becomes dominant, leading the rational consciousness back to the archaic world of the unconscious. As for the life instinct, inmadness it isdisplaced from its search for unity in the external world and now assumes the function of
repose.11
In madness,
womblike
autonomy. (PS 1040 While Hegel shows that this desire to completely coincide with oneself is inherently unstable, the condition of the 'I am V remains a continuing object of nostalgic desire in all the subsequent shapes of consciousness, a sort of seductive siren's song promising a sense of security and primordial peace from the toils of existence.
projecting itsdesires in fantasy. The first point to emphasize is that all instinct is animated bywhat Hegel ... for unity." (PM ? 379) This is a calls "craving exemplified in the first shape of self-consciousness inHegel's Phenomenology, the standpoint of the 'I am I,' the self's sense of certainty which recognizes no challenge to its
198
Thus
Freud also sees the goal of the instincts to be the attainment of unity. the "oceanic feeling" of "being one with the external world as a whole," is explained by Freud as a nostalgic vestige of the firstperiod of infancy,when the ego does not yet distinguish anything outside itself. (CD 117ff)Our instincts reflect the universal human desire to recover this state
can never entirely of its primary narcissism. Consciousness itsdesire for a recovery of its lost primordial unity. This is the paradox at the heart ofHegelian desire and Freudian instinct, that while we can never achieve a permanent state of happiness, "yet we must not, cannot, give up our efforts" to achieve it. (CD 83) What results is a continually renewed temptation to withdrawal, the gesture of retreat from the disheartening world of external reality to the internal world of the serves as the mind. We see this inHegel's account of Stoicism?which movements of withdrawal in further paradigm for all of the successive recover the standpoint of to the stoic seeks shapes of consciousness?where the 'I am P through a retreat from the world which causes it somuch pain. And we see it in Freud's hypothesis of a "compulsion to repeat," which animates the instincts with a retrogressive urge to recover the "ancient recollection exorcise (BPP 12ff,38) goal" of quiescence. This basic structural dynamic of the mind, the desire for unity which leads to themovement of withdrawal, is, again, precisely the fundamental structure of madness. Nostalgia, whether qualified as madness or not, is always on the borderline of disease, sion to a more primitive condition luring consciousness towards a regres and a corresponding rejection of the
estrangement. (PS 51; ISA passim)12 The starkwords of Freud's Civilization and itsDiscontents, that "all the regulations of the universe run counter to. .. the intention thatman should be 'happy'" (CD 76), echo the famous Hegelian characterization of history as "the slaughter-bench at which the . . . [is] victimized." (RH 27) Anxiety explains the happiness of peoples presence within consciousness of the nostalgic yearning for an idealized past, the sense of the ego being haunted by the (at least unconscious)
of primary narcissism, the original state of unity. Both Hegel and Freud see consciousness as delivered over to a fundamen tal experience of anxiety in its inevitable encounter with discord and
world we actually live in. A question that both Hegel and Freud must face, given their view of the overlapping of the formal structures of mental disease and health, is just how distinct these two states are. In his Encyclopaedia discussion of mad ness, Hegel gives the appearance of not really taking this question seriously.

Madness
199
occurs when the rational mind has reverted to the lifeof feeling, and when the connections to reality have been severed, while the healthy mind retains these rational threads of association with reality. But Hegel should have considered this question more carefully,13 since his phenome nology of the developed, rational consciousness is so strongly committed to showing how the connections between self and world are never stable. The goal of the unity of consciousness and reality is constantly under mined, beset again and again by the essential "negativity" of lifewhich
entails an "infinite pain." (PM ? 382) The path of consciousness seeking its reconciliation with reality is a road of loss, a "pathway of despair," to use Hegel's well-known image.We need not go as far as Jean Hyppolite, who sees this essential negativity of life as itself entailing that "the essence of is to be mad [for Hegel]."14 It does seem plausible, however, to assume that the struggle of the rational mind with its experience of despair will constantly threaten consciousness with the possibility of becoming radi cally dislocated from itsworld, and beckon the mind to "sink back" into
man
madness.
Freud takes the question of the distinction between health and disease more seriously than Hegel, and tends to see the substantial mirroring of the formal structures of these states as blurring the line of demarcation. The difference between madness and health is essentially a practical rather than a theoretical one, having to do simplywith a matter of degree: "If you take up a theoretical point of view and disregard thismatter of quantity [degree],
is, neurotic." (IL 358) you may quite well say that we are all ill?that It is at this juncture, where the line separating illness from health has become obscure, that we must turn toNietzsche. If anything, Nietzsche's even is than Freud's: stronger position Health
as such does not exist. It isyour goal that determines what health ought to mean even for your body. . . . The concept of normal health . . .must be given up.15 By now we have learned better than to speak of healthy and sick
as of an antithesis.(WP ? 812)
Health
and sickness are not essentially different. (WP ? 47)
I have delayed Nietzsche's entry into the dialogue with Hegel and Freud until this point because, typically, he is much more elusive inhis definitions of health and illness.16 One might try to discover similarities with Hegel's and Freud's characterizations of mental disease in terms of the double
200 movement
of withdrawal and separation from reality. For example, Nietz sche is grateful to his own experience with illness for its reinforcement of his tendency towards isolation and solitude?his "pathos of distance" from others, his dislocation from the human-all-too-human world of conven illness allows for a new form of experience; he lives in a differentworld, "an as yet undiscovered country whose boundaries nobody terrible . . . that [his] has surveyed yet, . . . [so] strange, questionable, craving to possess ithas got beside itself." (GS ? 382) What complicates the comparison with Hegel and Freud is that Nietz sche also calls this "illness" his "great health" (diegrosseGesundheit; see GS tional values. His
(GS ? 382), quite different from the common concept of health which essentially sanctifies the status quo and regards as sick "any inconve nient disturber of the peace."17 The great health isone "that one does not merely have but also acquires continually, and must acquire because one health"
WP ? 1013).The great health is"a new ? 382,HH Pref? 4,GM II ? 24,
gives it up again and again, and must give it up." (GS ? 382) By this valuation, genuine health incorporatesdisease as itsclosest com panion, its secret sharer, itsnecessary other. The great health sees disease as necessary for self-transcendence, as an education into new ways to see and create: It is a "health which cannot do without even illness itself, as an instrument and fishhook of knowledge, . . .which permits paths tomany opposing ways of thought." (HH Pref ? 4) Disease is the descent or going
under (Untergang) that is necessary for health: Only "from such abysses, from such severe sickness," is one able to "return newborn, having shed one's skin." (GS Pref ?4) Nietzsche thus revalues the opposition between health and disease, reconstructing the pedestrian definition of health as herd morality, and disease as any way of thinking that calls the common value of "rationality"
into question. Nietzsche's revalued disease, the disease that is essential to the great health, allows a closer contact with the depths, an Untergang into the domain of nature, where we may shed the skin of conventional mores
and tap the source of a more elemental creativity. That which is truly sick seeks to repress nature, the body, the unconscious world of instinct; of these our rational, logical schemes are merely epiphenomenal sign-languages. Nietzsche is pathology, is a sort of The common ideal of health, which for
will, instinct, pas "vampirism," sucking the lifeblood of the body?the of the corpse sion, feeling?and "pure spirit," a sheer surface leaving only without depth, a hollow husk of consciousness that has utterly repressed its darker but more vital unconscious origin.

Nietzsche
201
in fact replaces the age-old motivating drive of philosophy, the will-to-truth, with the will to health (e.g. GS Pref ?? 2-3, EH 1, ? 2), and calls for a "philosophical physician" to replace the metaphysician and see in is Freud like that Pref Nietzsche both ? 2) here, they logician. (GS a as fantastic falsification of the essential subjectivity of the will-to-truth reality. Metaphysical Weltanschauungen, the constructs of thewill-to-truth, are no more than projected wish-fulfillments of the philosophers' yearning forultimate answers in a world that remains mockingly silent.18We must,
Hegel, of course, has gone down in the annals of the history of philoso the pursuer of Absolute phy as the consummate Weltanschauung-builder, Truth in the grand style.And as such he is seen as the archetypal opponent of the Nietzschean and Freudian critiques of philosophy. Yet we must be
ority of the physician over the philosopher, and the deposing of the pursuit ofTruth with the agenda of diagnosing the causes of cultural pathology, the sources of decadence, weariness, nihilism, ressentiment, and guilt.
as Freud says, "transform metaphysics into metapsychology" (PEL 259), into of the the "true mythologies translating philosophic Weltanschauungen inner unconscious instinct. of of Hence the world the pri psychical reality"
cautious, forHegel also effects a revaluation of Truth.19 Truth no longer resides in the serene immobility of Platonic forms, nor in the cosmic eternity of the rationalists' eye of God, nor in the brute givenness of the empiricists' Nature. Truth is a becoming, with an intrinsic historicity. And it is just this dynamic, bacchanalian character of truth that results in the essential negativity of human history, the perpetual loss and death of our
successive constructions of reality.
Human existence is a pathway of doubt and despair, a theater of suffer ing, a slaughter-bench of happiness, a constant reopening of the "wounds of spirit."We would surely need to look much more closely at Hegel's phenomenological method to determine towhat extent it could be seen as thework of a "philosophical physician." But however we finally decide this
question, Hegel's interest in the darker side of the human spirit?spirit in its negativity, dismemberment, and infinite pain?positions him more closely with Nietzsche's too hasty caricature.20 and Freud's concerns than might be supposed by a
FEELING, DREAM, SUBLIMATION

Let us turn to a closer examination of what Hegel calls the "life of feeling" intowhich themind withdraws in madness. In insanity,Hegel writes, there
202
is a "reversion to mere nature" in which "the natural self . . . gains the mastery over the objective, rational. . . consciousness." (PM ? 408 & Z) In nature, the self is "mastered" by, "imprisoned" in, and becomes "fixed" to feeling states. This language foreshadows the Freudian analysis of the regressive turnof neurosis, with the resulting fixation of an archaic content that gains mastery over the ego and its laws.21 For both Hegel and Freud this reversion and imprisonment in nature is linked to the body.22 Just as Freud constantly reminds us that the neuroses have an "organic
foundation" (e.g. IL 389), Hegel repeatedly insists that "mental illness is not merely to be compared with physical illness, but is more or less bound up with it." (PM ? 406 Z) Further, the body is the domain of the unconscious. The feeling soul "is the stage of [mind's] darkness," where the "light" of consciousness is not yet explicit. (PM ? 404) Gefuhlsleben is the "dull stirring, the inarticulate breathing, of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent [pre-rational] individuality (in seiner bewufit-und ver
dreams, the projected images of "the night of themind," as central symbols of the unconscious, and as presenting important clues to our understanding of illness. Freud's use of dreams as a paradigm forhis study of the neuroses is well known. Dreams are themselves often described as neurotic symp toms?distorted substitute formations of underlying unconscious drives and wishes. Hegel holds a similar position, and proposes as one of the central analogies of his discussion ofmadness that illness is to health as the dream is to waking life: "Between . . . the self-possessed and healthy . . . and insanity the difference is like that between subject waking and in the dream falls the within that insanity dreaming; only waking limits." like the dream, entails a form of flightor escape, a withdrawal Madness, from the external world: "The soul immersed in its inwardness," Hegel writes, "contemplates its individual world not outside, but within itself." (PM ? 406 Z) There is a fundamental rupture of the relation to reality.As Freud says, when I dream "I want to know nothing of the external world." (IL 88) With thismovement of withdrawal and rupture, the language of rationality is replaced by amore primitive, archaic discourse of unconscious madness as indreams, are projected wishes, fantasies, and drives, which, in onto reality as substitutes. In at least one place Nietzsche also links "the fantasizing of dreams and
The language of darkness with which Hegel characterizes feeling and nature and the body points to another close parallel with Freud: Both see
standbsen (PM ? 400)23 IndividualitatV
whileawake. (PM ? 408 Z) (PM ? 408) Madness isa dreaming
203
insanity" together. (D ? 312) But more usually, he effects a reversal, so typical of his thinking, whereby the reality projected by dreams in no way stands in a less privileged position than the reality of waking life.Thus in his Daybreak he writes that "there isno essential difference between waking and dreaming . . . [since even] our moral judgments and evaluations are only images and fantasies based on a physiological process unknown to us." has been put into question? (D ? 119) Once themyth of a Reality in itself or actually "abolished" projected by the mind. Nietzsche's (Tl p. 486)?there remains only dream, reality as
any straightforward explanatory value for illness. A more subtle typology of dreams isneeded, just as we must distinguish between illness that accom panies the great health and the neurotic illness of, for example, religion. In an analogous way, we may make value judgments between different types of
claim that there is no clear distinction between dreaming and waking directly mirrors his view that "health and sickness are not essentially different." Unlike Hegel and Freud, then, dreams will not hold
to be sure, by appealing to the standard ofReality, but on an dreams?not, aesthetic basis. "It isonly as an aesthetic phenomenon that exis essentially tence and the world may be eternally justified,"Nietzsche writes. (BT ? 5, and cf.GS ? 107) As creative projections of values, all dreams are aesthetic phenomena, and the question then becomes whether our dreams are a form of self-affirmationor self-denial, and whether they appropriate and express the "eternal basic text of homo natura" or seek an escape from it.24 This
nature, Apollo with Dionysus, the "beautiful illusion of the inner [dream] world of fantasy" (BT ? 1) with the primal unconscious force of nature which is the heart of all great art. Nietzsche argues that art becomes sick when dream is detached from nature, as occurred inGreek tragedy with
last point ismade clear inNietzsche's Birth of Tragedy, where he art holds the power to heal and redeem us from the "horror that argues and absurdity of existence" (BT ? 7), but only ifdream is united with
Euripides, who purportedly substituted an "aesthetic Socratism" for Diony sian nature, a glorification of rationality, logic, and the "cool clarity of consciousness11 (BT ? 14) for the bacchanalian forces of the unconscious. Nietzsche's distance from Hegel and Freud on the nature of illness comes into further focus when we look at the way "nature," "feeling," and "instinct" are described. All three associate the domain of the unconscious and instinctwith the particularityof human lifeopposed to our social being. It is true that both Freud and Nietzsche recognize a collective character of
(See BT ?? 10-15)
204 our unconscious?both,
forexample, speak of our dreams as expressing the Hegel too there are phylogenetic prehistory of human instincts.25And for certainly universal features of feeling. The point is that these features express our private interests, the laws of
instinct" of pre-historical way of being, as the "innermost, unconscious to is For all socialization. which nature, (RH 30) genuine history to prior to we move must of T of 'We', which the that from arise, standpoint requires, Hegel insists, that the purely private, isolating language of feeling be sacrificed, renounced, surrendered, (see PS 136-39, 212f) Similarly, regression from reason to feeling, fromhistory to fantasy, is the emergence of disease.26 At least at firstglance, itwould seem that Freud and Nietzsche depart fromHegel on this point, and would see his call for the sacrifice of the particularity of feeling as simply a call for repression, and hence as an invitation to disease itself. For Nietzsche, the "slanderers of nature" (GS ? 294) who sacrifice the body and fightagainst instinct as a sickness, are the
the individual heart: Feeling is the terrain of seclusion, subjectivity, isola it speaks tion. As such, feeling precludes community and communication; a private, pre-rational "language." The lifeof feeling is in thisway a sort of
heralds of decadence, weariness, ressentiment, neurosis. Their "priestly is a disguised "lust for nothingness" that is itself the greatest medicine" illness of all. (GM 1 ? 6) If "nothing else [is] 'given' as real except our world of desires and passions" (BGE ? 36), then to renounce this reality is to repress life itselfand become sick. And Freud sees the essential neurosis of civilization as resulting from the "psychologically unrealistic" demands of the social repression of our instincts. (CD 86, 111, 143-44) There is a real difference between Hegel, Nietzsche, and Freud here, but it is not as simple as itmight seem. For Hegel's recurring claim that a
sacrifice and renunciation of particularity and "the heart" is necessary in order for universality and reason to emerge is not in fact a call for the annihilation of nature, but for itsAufhebung and sublimation.27 Again, nature is the "presupposition" of spirit, and as such must be preserved, or to incorporated, or "taken up" (auf-gehoben) in the transition from feeling reason. "Everything spiritual, every content of consciousness, anything that is product and subject of thought. . .must also, and originally does, exist in the mode of feeling." (RH 17) The "sacrifice" of feeling is thus in fact its sublimation. Feeling isdethroned but not destroyed, nor can it ever be destroyed except in the illusions of ascetic self-mortification. This is just as ill for Nietzsche and Freud: Asceticism, Hegel says, is a Hegel as it is for
MADNESS
AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
205
"self-deception" that pursues a "false tranquility," but "sinks into helpless ness, anxiety, and self-distrust, a psychical state that often develops into madness." (PCR ? 29)28 The fact is that all three writers insist on the need for a sublimation of feeling. For Hegel, this isperhaps seen most clearly inhis aesthetics. Art is
the expression of the human "impulse to produce [irjself," to find itself "reduplicated" or mirrored in the external world. (A 401) This expression is the representation of human feelings and passions, but not through any direct discharge?not through what John Dewey calls "an instantaneous mere a "inner emission," seething" and inchoate "babbling."29 Rather, art is the objectification and reconstruction of passion, which allows for its "purification" or sublimation. (A 419) What was previously shut up in the privacy and subjectivity of the unconscious becomes an "address" or "summons" or "question" posed to the conscious mind (A 427), "calling forth a response and echo in the mind from all the depths" of the unconscious. (A 409) Passion unsublimated ... so entire that he has no will outside this the man, "appropriates as in madness we are "imprisoned" in the particular passion" (A 419), just
mirror of art, and as they know themselves they are transfigured."30 Freud also sees art as the sublimation of instinct. The artist "knows how to link so large a yield of pleasure to [the] representation[s] of his uncon scious [that]. . . repressions are outweighed and liftedby it." (IL 376) More generally, sublimation is the only healthy alternative to repression and neurosis, effecting a "deflection" of instincts from their originally egoistic and often destructive aims.
lifeof feeling. By sublimating passion, art frees us from the enslavement to not by eliminating the body but by transfiguring it.To the body?again, quote Dewey again, aesthetic "expression is the clarification of turbid emotion; our appetites know themselves when they are reflected in the
lettinghimself go his 'most natural' state is"?the goal isnot a "laisser aller" but rather an "education" and "discipline" of the passions; not a crude reveling in nature but self-conquest, self-elevation, self-transcendence. (BGE ? 188) "In man creature and creator are united: in man there is man there is also creator, material, fragment, excess, clay, . . . chaos; but in artistic the force which chaos the of nature is "formed, form-giver," by broken, forged, torn, burnt, made incandescent, and purified." (BGE ?
Finally, Nietzsche regards the sublimation of passion and instinct as as to crucial health well. And like Hegel and Freud, he looks to art as a paradigm of sublimation. "Every artist knows how far from any feeling of
206
225) Sublimation is the refinement, cultivation, assimilation, channeling, integration, and "spiritualization" (Vergeistigung)of nature. It is contrasted with repression in that sublimation is a form of "employing" and "econo mizing" "those impetuous torrents of the soul that are so often dangerous and overwhelming,"
Hegel is reallymuch closer toNietzsche and Freud in his interpretation of the feeling soul than appears at first glance: For all three, sublimation is a middle path between the laisser aller of nature and its repression, and to leave this path in either direction is to risk illness. The real differences lie elsewhere. First, while Hegel sees the sublimation of feeling as entailing a movement
them dryup." (WP ?? 382, 383-84)
rather than "enfeebling" them and "wanting tomake
who needs his masks and concealments, his "citadel of secrecy," who prizes interiorityover community and silence over language. (BGE ?? 26, 289) "All community makes men?somehow, somewhere, sometime 'com mon,'" "unclean," unhealthy. (BGE ? 284) Nietzsche's great "nausea" is in fact his "nausea over man," which can be cured only by solitude, a "return idealization of the Second, while Freud does not share Nietzsche's of a genuinely is the of he individual, possibility skeptical equally private our individual is For social construction of Freud, "every being. healthy of sublimation an social culture" and of every 9), enemy (FI virtually instinct is inherently unstable, precisely because it demands so much by way of sacrifice. (IL 23) Hegel ismore optimistic here, seeing the human struggle forcommunity and social synthesis as a genuinely achievable goal, and indeed as a goal that has been achieved in every great epoch of world
away from the particularity and privacy of the heart, Nietzsche's psychology of sublimation is committed to preserving and nourishing this privacy. Nietzsche idealizes the hermit, who lives in "the desolate regions,"
tomyself."(EH I ? 8)
insists on the contrary that history is the slaughter bench of happiness, that spirit exists only in "the power of the negative" must confront itselfagain and again "in utter dismemberment." whereby it (PS 19) Our social being isnot easily won, and Hegel knows fullwell the in the possibility of pathology arising in civilization, as, for example, a will to universal construct French revolution. There the desire genuinely heart of desire. He
history. We must be careful, however, not to reduce Hegel to the sort of cartoon image that compares his optimism to that of "Voltaire's Doctor Pangloss [who] sees only the harmony of all things."31 Hegel isnot ignorant of the force of the death instinct, the destructive power that lies so close to the
MADNESS of the people
AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
207
whichhe explicitly diagnosesasmadness. (PS 355-63; PM ? 408 Z) CONCLUSION: THE DOUBLE CENTER OF MADNESS
resulted in the law of the guillotine and the reign of terror
Hegel's and Freud's basic characterization ofmental illness as a withdrawal or retreat into the lifeof feeling and the unconscious, and a resulting sever ing of the connections to reality, leads to a view of madness as entailing
what Hegel calls a "double center" of reality.The mad self is "driven out of its [rational] mind, shifted out from the center of its actual world and . . . has two centers"?the displaced, decentered, lost but still recollected trace (as in a dream) of its rationality, and the new center constructed by the life of feeling. It is in this sense that Hegel refers to madness as a double personality: "The insane subject is therefore in communion with himself in a subject the negative of himself, . . . but knows himself [only as] ... two into different 408 ? (PM Z) disrupted personalities." illness as situated within a doubled center of which the ego has withdrawn but still retains a the world from reality, tenuous relation to, and the substitution formations enacted by the projec tions of unconscious wishes. Similarly, Freud compares the neurotic to the dreamer: Both are like "two separate people," the one representing the and the other thewishes of the censoring agency of consciousness and the reality principle. (IL 216; ID 561) Nietzsche, as we should expect, holds a more ambiguous position. On the one hand, since he effects an erasure of the distinction between waking Freud also sees mental
wishes of the unconscious
and dreaming, and between reality and appearance, the idea of a double center of reality becomes questionable. The objective, external reality of which Hegel and Freud speak so confidently, which is displaced by the fantastic realities ofmadness, is "abolished" byNietzsche and can no longer serve as a standard by which tomeasure its "other," the reality projected by the mind. On the other hand, Nietzsche partly restores the distinction two centers of reality in his diagnosis of neurotic illness. For he anticipates themajor features of Freud's analysis of religion as a example, neurosis, which seeks to replace the reality of the earth with the myth of between heaven,
the reality of the body with the illusion of the eternal soul, the reality of thisworld with the superstition of another world. Thus there are certain givens of reality forNietzsche, against which a kind of mental in be the described may projection language ofmyth, illusion, superstition. But there is an even deeper sense in which Nietzsche may be seen to
208
model
share the Hegelian and Freudian notion of a double center of reality as a for understanding illness. When he turns to a description of the dialectical relation between his own health and illness, Nietzsche directly appropriates the language of a "dual series of experiences" and a corre sponding double personality:
For a [truly]healthy person, . . . being sick can even become an energetic stimulus for life, for livingmore. ... A long, all too long, series of years signifies recovery for me; unfortunately italso signifies . . . a of the kind of decadence. Looking periodicity relapse, decay, from the perspective of the sick toward healthierconcepts and values and, conversely, looking again from the fullness and self-assurance of a rich life down into the secret work of the instinct of deca this I have had the longest training. . . .Now I know dence?in ... to reverseperspectives. ... I have a subtler sense of smell for how This the signs of ascent and decline ... I know both, I am both. . . . dual series of experiences, this access to apparently separate worlds, is repeated in my nature in every respect: I am aDoppelganger, Ihave a 'second' face in addition to the first. (EH I ?? 1-3)
intimate interweaving of health and illness, this double strand of two faces, double perspectives, and separate worlds of personality?these both Nietzsche's closeness to and his departure theDoppelganger?reveals from Hegel and Freud. Like them, Nietzsche sees a double center of reality This as entailed by the descent into illness. But while Hegel and Freud diagnose this as pathology, Nietzsche sees it as the potentiality for a great health. Illness that isnot simply a neurotic denial of instinct brings us closer to the
world of the body and nature and also to the source of all human creativity. iswhy it is "impossible to be an artist and not to be sick." (WP ? 811) Neither Hegel nor Freud denies an essential ontological duality of consciousness, nor sees health as an overcoming of this duality. Freud's whole psychoanalytic theory insists on a basic doubleness of the lifeof the mind, a dynamic interplay between conscious and unconscious structures, and defines neurosis as the repression of instinct. And Hegel's phenome a "notwendige nology is committed to what Friedrich Grimmlinger calls to The self mind.32 is all internal that and "Doppeltheit" Zweideutigkeit" This discovers itselfonly in its relation to itselfas other ; it is in the gesture of self externalization, Enuau$erung becoming-other, and the subsequent doub our center of of the experience, that the self exists. ling
209
scious" feature of action (RH 35) that accounts for the "double meaning" of the deed with the result that the self "become[s] a riddle to itself." (PS 220) The unconscious, nature, isour internal riddle, and Hegel no more sees the than does solution to this riddle to be the denial of the unconscious woof: Nietzsche or Freud.33 We cannot remove the warp of history from its
is one of the central elements of the selfs Further, the unconscious as is for Nietzsche it and Freud. Unconscious for just Hegel, duality intentions?the motive forces of our desires, passions, and instincts?are interwoven with conscious intentions in every human action, as the warp and woof of our history. (RH 26-31) There is always a "latent, uncon
Feeling must be integrated into rationality, nature must be sublimated into the lifeof spirit. What Hegel and Freud both deny is that the reversion or Untergang into nature is the key to genuine health. Nietzsche sees this going-under as the to a casting off of the constricting shackles of necessary propaedeutic socially constructed norms and a revaluation of decadent values. Hegel and Freud, on the other hand, see our social being as our trulyhuman essence, so that a reversion to the domain of instinct will be an imprisonment in a
pre-rational, pre-social, and hence essentially pre-human level of life.The person who "makes his appeal to feeling," Hegel writes, "is finished and done with anyone who does not agree; he only has to explain that he has nothing more to say to anyone who does not find and feel the same in
himself."(PS 43)
In comparing Hegel's theory ofmadness and the unconscious with those ofNietzsche and Freud, we certainly must not minimize the differences? for example, Nietzsche's and Freud's reversal of the values of consciousness and
the essential negativity of life, the characteristics of withdrawal and the decentering of reality, the conflictual duality of instinct or desire, the structures of nostalgia, narcissism, and the death instinct, the importance of dreams as a model forunderstanding the unconscious and illness, and the crucial role of sublimation. Hegel does not explicitly integrate his theory of Verrucktheit into the larger project of his philosophy, nor does he give his theory of the uncon scious the central place it is accorded in the works ofNietzsche and Freud.
the unconscious, Nietzsche's revaluation of the relation between illness and health and his idealization of seclusion, and Hegel's relative optimism about our social being. Still, such a comparison shows thatHegel anticipates many of the themes thatwere to occupy Nietzsche and Freud in their new psychologies of the depths: the view ofmadness as a response to
210
And yet a close reading of his largely overlooked thoughts on madness and the unconscious shows that these themes are more important than the space he allots to them might suggest.We get a good sense of the impor tance of an understanding of madness when we read that "insanity [is] a
necessarily occurring form or stage in the development of the soul." (PM ? 408 Z) Hegel's point isnot, of course, that we will all necessarily become insane, but rather that the possibility of a pathological reversion to nature is constantly prepared forby the encounter with the essential negativity of lifeand the presence in consciousness of the nostalgic face of desire. Hence also the importance of a knowledge of the "infernal regions" of the uncon scious, where madness has its origin.
Bard College
NOTES
1. In the anthropology section of the Phibsophy of Mind, section 408, and Zusatz (122 translation: see fh 3 below). 139 inMiller's one of the very few scholars to have written on Hegel's 2. Darrel Christensen, theory of and the Role Verrucktheit, makes this point as well. See "The Theory ofMental Derangement in Hegel," The Personalist 49 (1968): 433-53, and "Hegel's and Function of Subjectivity International Philosophical Quarterly Analysis and Freud's Psychoanalysis," Phenomenological between Hegel's I have explored a number of the connections 356-78. 8, no. 3 (1968): project in a recently completed companion theory of madness and his larger philosophical article
of Reason: to the present essay, "The Decentering Hegel's Theory of Madness," forthcoming in International Studies in Philosophy. in and Freud will be given parenthetically 3. References to the works ofHegel, Nietzsche, the text and abbreviated. Works cited are as follows:
HEGEL
References 'Z' designates A Selections to the three volumes of the Encyclopaedia (SL, PN, SL) additions (Zusatze) to the original text. are to sections (?), and
in J.Glenn Gray, ed., On Art, Religion, from Hegel's lectures on aesthetics, 6k 1970. New York: Row, Harper Philosophy, Press, LL Hegel's Science of Logic ("larger" Logic), tr.,A. V. Miller, New York: Humanities
1969.
Christian Religion, inHegel's Early Theological Writings, ed., T. M. PCR The Positivity of the Press, 1977. Knox, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Oxford: Clarendon PM Hegel's Philosophy ofMind, Press, 1978? tr.,William Wallace, vol. 3 of the Encyclopaedia of thePhilosophical Sciences. PN Hegel's Phibsophy ofNature, Press, 1970?vol. tr.,A. V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon of the Encycbpaedia. PS Phenomenology of Spirit, tr.,A. V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. 2

RH Reason inHistory, tr., R. S. Hartman, Indianapolis to the Lectures on thePhilosophy ofHistory. William tr., Wallace, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, Clarendon
211
1953?the Press, 1975?
Introduction
SL Hegel's Logic ("shorter" Logic), vol. 1 of the Encyclopaedia.
Oxford:
NIETZSCHE
All (?) unless otherwise noted. Beyond Good and Evil, in The Basic Writings ofNietzsche, 1968. York: Random House, BGE references are to sections ed. W. Kaufmann, New
The Gay Science, tr., W. Kaufmann, New York: Random House, 1974. HH Human, All Too Human, tr.,Marion Faber, Lincoln NE: University ofNebraska Press, 1984. Tl Twilight of the Idols, in The Portable Nietzsche, ed., W. Kaufmann, New York: Viking Press, 1966. to Power, tr.,W. Kaufmann WP The Will New York: Random and R. ]. Hollingdale, GS House, 1967.
D Daybreak, tr., R. J.Hollingdale, Cambridge: Cambridge in The Basic Writings. EH Ecce Homo, in The Basic Writings. GM The Genealogy ofMorals,
The Basic BT The Birth Writings. ofTragedy,in
University
Press,
1982.
FREUD
references are to the Standard Edition of theComplete Psychological Works Freud, 24 vols., ed., James Strachey, London: Hogarth Press, 1953fY. AS An Autobiographical Study, 1925, SE vol. 20. BPP Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 1920, SE vol. 18. All CD of Sigmund
ID The Interpretation of Dreams, 1900, SE vols. 4, 5. IL Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, SE vols. 15, 16. 1916-17, ISA Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, 1926, SE vol. 20. Nar On Narcissism: An Introduction, 1914, SE vol. 14. NIL New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, 1933, SE vol. 22.
EI The Ego and theId, 1923,SE vol. 19. FI The Future ofan Illusion,1927,SE vol. 21.
Civilization
and its Discontents,
1923, SE vol.
18.
PEL The Psychopathology ofEveryday Life, 1901,SE vol. 6.
PA/RO
Psychoanalysis
and Religious Origins,
1919, SE vol.
17.
IN: Indiana University 4. Clark Butler, in his edition of Hegel's Letters (Bloomington Press, 1984), 407. 5. For Hegel's theory of the List der Vernunft, see LL 746, RH 44, PS 33, SL ? 209. On "The Ethical World; Human and Divine guilt and intentionality, see especially PS 267-289, Law: Man and Woman," and "Ethical Action; Human and Divine Knowledge; Guilt and in intentionality, see PS Destiny." For more general passages on the role of the unconscious 6. This citation is taken from Karl Jaspers'sNietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding ofHis Philosophical Activity, tr., C. F. Wallraff and F. J. Schmitz (Chicago: Henry Regnery, text 1965), 115. The translators omit all of Jaspers's references, and in the original German de Gruyter (Nietzsche: Einfuhrung in das Verstdndnis seines Philosophierens, Berlin: Walter 1936), Jaspers refers to the early edition of the collected works prepared by Nietz Verlag, sche's sister Elizabeth 16 vols., Leipzig: Kroner Verlag, (the so-called Kleinoktavausgabe, 1899-1912), which I have been unable to locate. Since Jaspers nowhere specifies which of
220f,249,RH 26-36.
212
vol. 15, 47. Kleinoktavausgabe, 7. See, e.g, BGE ? 354: "Whatever shallow,
Nietzsche's works correspond to the different volumes of the collected works, Iwill refer the reader to pages in Jaspers's text, and, for those more fortunate in their search for Elizabeth's to volume and page numbers of that edition. The present citation is from Kleinoktavausgabe, becomes conscious becomes by the same token thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, herd signal, . . . falsification, reduction to . . . the growth of consciousness becomes a danger; and anyone Ultimately, superficialities. who lives among the most conscious Europeans even knows that it is a disease." Also BGE ? constitutes only one state of our spiritual and psychic world 357: "What we call consciousness state). ..." (perhaps a pathological 8. Christensen Freud
its repression, the will to health and the will to nothingness, affirmation and the will to life and the "will to death" (GS ? 344). We will see, growth and decadence, however, that Nietzsche develops his view in a significantly different way than do Hegel and Freud. inHegel's Theory of Desire," 11. See my "Evolution and Nostalgia forthcoming inClio. to power and denial,
that Hegel and Freud offer shared analyses of such themes as anxiety and guilt, projection, dreams, and transference. 9. See Freud's notion of "secondary gain" and the "need for illness," IL 382ff, EL 49, ISA 99f. 10. Nietzsche also often presents a basic duality of instinct, described variously as the will
also argues that Hegel's theory of Verrucktheit is substantially paralleled by is particularly Christensen interested in Analysis"). ("Hegel's Phenomenological a illness (see PM ? 408 Z) anticipates threefold typology of mental showing how Hegel's similar typology in Freud (hysteria, obsessional neurosis, psychosis), and in demonstrating
Journal ofAbnormal and Social Psychology 25 (no. 2), 1930, pp. 259f. Derangement," in and Psychoanalysis," tr.,Albert Richer, 14. Jean Hyppolite, "Hegel's Phenomenology Warren E. Steinkraus, ed., New Studies in Hegel's Philosophy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 64. vol. 5, p. 159. 15. Jaspers, 112; Kleinoktavausgabe 16. One factor is that when Nietzsche complicating sometimes has mental speaking of purely physical pains. or spiritual factors inmind.
view of anxiety is very similar to Freud's notion of 12. Christensen argues that Hegel's "free-floating anxiety," which sees anxiety as more basic than its attachment to any particular 364f. Analysis," object of fear. "Hegel's Phenomenological Fialko is getting at the same point when he writes that "the very 13.1 believe thatNathan since the rational, developed fact of the existence of insanity [is] a great problem forHegel," meant to be entirely "free and . . .not subject to disease." That is, the line of is consciousness conscious is too strictly drawn to account for the motivation of the developed demarcation on Mental ness to give up its rationality and sink back into madness. "Hegel's Views
refers to his own illness he is I have been careful to select passages where he
vol. 1, p. 193. Note the similarity between Nietzsche's 17. Jaspers, 112; Kleinoktavausgabe view and those of such modem writers as Thomas Foucault, Szasz, R. D. Laing, and Michel "Mental illness for the "medical model": who substitute a "labelling theory" of mental illness" isnot a medical condition but a socially constructed label for deviance from accepted norms. have "The delusions of paranoics 18. Freud in fact compares metaphysical systems to paranoia: an . . . internal kinship to the systems of our philosophers." (PA/RO 94) Both the events in the world philosopher and the paranoid schizophrenic share "the belief that the real take the course which our thinking seeks to impose on them." (NIL 165f) Compare own Nietzsche's description of philosophy as the "tyrannical drive" to "create the world in its
image."(BGE ? 9)

19. For a fuller discussion of Hegel's revaluation of truth, see my Hegel's Grand
213
: Synthesis A
"Hegel's Theory of Truth." 20. Fialko goes so far as to say that "the system of Hegel modern psychiatry has evolved." (263) 21. Timo Airaksinen gives a nice analysis of Hegel's
andHistory (Albany:SUNY Albany Press, 1989),Chapter Two: Study ofBeing, Thought,

contains, in fact, all the ideas that
view of "fixation" in his article Social Theory and Practice 15 (no. "Insanity, Crime and the Structure of Freedom inHegel," 2), 1989, 156-58. 22. See Fialko, 262: "It is the moment of corporeity, in which the spiritual is still that constitutes the domain where insanity is generated [forHegel]." undifferentiated, scious." 23. See Hyppolite's (59-60) 24. See Nietzsche's discussion of what he calls Hegel's idea of an "ontological uncon
See also Robert Herrera's "Freud on 548f (where Freud refers to his debt to Nietzsche). Nietzsche?A Fantastic Commentary?" 1985, 341. Philosophy Today, Winter 26. See Hyppolite's that "withdraws to itself analysis of the position of the consciousness as the and rejects all communication," of relationship," initiating a "total breakdown
and ID See, e.g., IL 179-81, 199,210-11, 213, 226; EL 36-38, 48-49, 55; FI17; CD 13f;
notion of "the artists of decadence." (WP ? 852) HH ? 13: "Dreams take us back again to distant conditions of human 25. See Nietzsche, culture and put a means at our disposal for understanding them better." And D ? 312: "In the fantasizing of dreams and insanity, a man rediscovers his own and mankind's prehistory." on many occasions. Freud speaks of the archaic phylogenetic heritage of the unconscious
epitome of the death instinct (70). shows how Hegel's key concept of the Aufhebung "is compatible with the 27. Christensen in something like the Freudian way." "Theory ofMental notion of an unconscious conceived 434ff. Derangement," 28. Similarly, in his analysis of the "Unhappy Consciousness," Hegel describes ascetic "a personality brooding over itself, as wretched as it is mortification as a will to nothingness, 29. John Dewey, Art as Experience, inA. Hofstadter and R. Kuhns, eds., Philosophies ofArt and Beauty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 604-6. 30. Dewey, 614. 31. This quotation Chase Greene, appears in an otherwise splendid book byWilliam Moira: Fate, Good, and Evil inGreek Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 96. 32. Friedrich Grimmlinger, "Zum Begriff des absoluten Wissens in Hegels Phanomeno logie," in Geschichte und System: Festschrift fur Erich Heintel zum 60. Geburtstag, hrsg. von Hans-Dieter Klein 33. Christensen
(PS 135f) impoverished."
und Erhard Oeser (Miinchen: R. Oldenbourg 1972), 29If. Verlag, a similar point when he argues that "the unconscious makes is the is potential for the individual," and that Hegel subjective ground of the integrity which would entirely agree with Freud's view of the unconscious having "a continuing function in even the normal and mature consciousness." 444, 440. "Theory of Mental Derangement,"

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Hegel, Nietzsche, and Freud on Madness and the Unconscious Author(s): DANIEL BERTHOLD-BOND Source: The Journal of Speculative

Hegel, Nietzsche, and Freud on Madness and theUnconscious

THE JOURNALOF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY, Vol. V, No. 3, 1991.

[thewhole of) philosophy has not been

... a misunderstanding of the

yet it is simply not true that Hegel

"totally lacked the Freudian

clearer sense of his own contributions.

philosophy.(BGE ?? 23, 230)

from their exile by the puritanical,

will allow for a full explanation

MADNESSAND THE UNCONSCIOUS

(GS ? 354) sign-world.

pathological rather than companion

THE DEFINITION OF MADNESS: REGRESSION, SEPARATION, NOSTALGIA

MADNESSAND THE UNCONSCIOUS

MADNESSAND THE UNCONSCIOUS

and sickness are not essentially different. (WP ? 47)

WP ? 1013).The great health is"a new ? 382,HH Pref? 4,GM II ? 24,

MADNESSAND THE UNCONSCIOUS

FEELING, DREAM, SUBLIMATION

standbsen (PM ? 400)23 IndividualitatV

whileawake. (PM ? 408 Z) (PM ? 408) Madness isa dreaming

MADNESSAND THE UNCONSCIOUS

204 our unconscious?both,

AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

them dryup." (WP ?? 382, 383-84)

rather than "enfeebling" them and "wanting tomake

MADNESS of the people

AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

resulted in the law of the guillotine and the reign of terror

wishes of the unconscious

MADNESSAND THE UNCONSCIOUS

MADNESSAND THE UNCONSCIOUS

SL Hegel's Logic ("shorter" Logic), vol. 1 of the Encyclopaedia.

The Basic BT The Birth Writings. ofTragedy,in

and its Discontents,

PEL The Psychopathology ofEveryday Life, 1901,SE vol. 6.

and Religious Origins,

MADNESSAND THE UNCONSCIOUS

andHistory (Albany:SUNY Albany Press, 1989),Chapter Two: Study ofBeing, Thought,

(PS 135f) impoverished."

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