1. Hanopol v CA FACTS: SM extended credit accommodations in favor of Sps Hanopol in the amount of 300Kphp.

In consideration thereof, sps Hanopol mortgaged real properties in favor of SM. For failure to pay, SM executed extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against the mortgaged properties. To enjoin SM from proceeding with the scheduled foreclosure sale, sps Hanopol instituted a civil case for breach of contract alleging that SM breached the contract when it failed to furnish with the sps the requisite documents by which the spss liability shall be determined, namely: charge invoices, purchase booklets and purchase journal, as provided in their contract; that without the requisite documents, spouses Hanopol had no way of knowing that, in fact, they had already paid, even overpaid, ISSUE: W/N the failure of SM to furnish the sps Hanopol with the said documents constituted a breach of contract HELD: NO. The Court have thoroughly perused the contract between the parties and found that nowhere is it stated therein that Shoemart is obliged to provide spouses Hanopol with charge invoices and purchase booklets. What the contract merely provided was that spouses Hanopol had three (3) days to question the correctness of the Statement of Account and their failure to do so would render the Statement conclusive. Petitioners failed to explain their failure to question or take action regarding any discrepancies in the Statement of Account they received, doing so only when they had difficulty settling their account with Shoemart. They never raised their claim of overpayment throughout the entire duration of the contract. By their silence and inaction, petitioners are deemed to have admitted the correctness of the Statement of Account of Shoemart. They are estopped from questioning the veracity of the same and claim overpayment. Shoemart has in its favor the presumption that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact. The principle of estoppel in pais applies wherein when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.

2. People v LEONITO Macagaling y Atillano FACTS: The prosecution's version: In connection with the barangay fiesta of Calabasahan, Concepcion, Romblon, a coronation ball was held at the public plaza. Present on said occasion, among others, were Antonieto Fabella, barangay captain; Anita Macagaling, mother of the deceased Dennis Macagaling; Pfc. Fesalbon, investigator of the local police station; and Roger Lacambra, stepson of Teotimo Fameronag. At about 10:00 P.M., Antonieto Fabella, who was also the brother-in-law of Dennis Macagaling, was watching the festivities when all of a sudden he noticed Leonito Macagaling point and then fire a gun at his own nephew, Dennis Macagaling. The bullet missed Dennis but wounded Teotimo Fameronag. Dennis tried to escape from Leonito by running away. At this juncture, Anita saw that her son Dennis was . She embraced him to prevent him from falling. Leonito grabbed the hair of Dennis and yanked his head, pulling the latter away from his mother. Leonito pointed the gun at the temple of Dennis and shot him point-blank. Dennis fell down on the cement floor. Leonito then shot the prostrate Dennis three times successively on the neck and then tried to leave the vicinity. Pfc. Fesalbon was at the barangay tanod outpost. Hearing a gunshot, he immediately went out to investigate and, on his way, he saw Teotimo Fameronag fall down on the floor of the plaza. He proceeded to the place of the incident and saw Dennis Macagaling lying on the floor while Leonito Macagaling was holding a firearm. Sensing that Leonito was about to flee, he fired three warning shots to prevent him from doing so. Initially, Leonito refused to hand over his gun but the later relented. Pfc. Fesalbon arrested Leonito and took him to the latter's house which was near the scene of the incident. Fesalbon inspected the gun which he had retrieved from Leonito and found five empty shells and one live bullet. The serial number of the gun had been erased. Pfc. Fesalbon decided to go back to the crime scene to proceed with the investigation. He verified that Fameronag had one gunshot would while Dennis was shot four times. He also found out that the motive of the killing might have been Leonito's suspicion that Dennis was divulging information about the former's participation in illegal fishing. The defenses version: Dennis Macagaling and his friends were drinking. Leonito was getting ready to sleep when he heard a gunshot coming from the plaze. He ran towards the plaza and saw the group of Dennis. He approached them and when he was about two meters from the group, he became aware of Dennis Macagaling who was intoxicated and holding a gun. Leonito asked Dennis to drop the gun but the latter retorted, "Isa ka pa." Without warning, Dennis fired at him but missed. Leonito dashed towards Dennis and tried to wrestle the gun away from him. A struggle for the firearm ensued and they grappled for it on the floor. While they

were thus wrestling for the gun, it went off and hit Dennis. Leonito then stood up, went home, and informed his wife of what had just happened. Leonito's wife, after observing that he had some bruises, proceeded to clean them. Shortly thereafter, policemen Roque Fesalbon and Sofronio Fabregas, together with Ferrancullo, arrived and inquired if the gun was his. He denied ownership of the firearm. Informed by them that Dennis was dead, Leonito said it was not his fault. The policemen then left 2 separate informations were filed against LEONITO for the murder of DENNIS and TIMOTEO and for illegal possession of ammunition. ISSUE: (1) W/N the accused has presented sufficient evidence to support him claim of self-defense. (2) whether or not the appellant may properly be convicted of the illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in the aggravated form. HELD: (1) As to self defense: Where the accused admits the killing of the victim but invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in legitimate defense of himself. As the burden of proof is shifted to him, he must consequently rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. Accordingly, the proverbial bone of contention with respect to a killing under such circumstances, is whether or not the accused has presented sufficient evidence to support him claim of self-defense. If, as Leonito asserted, he had tried to get Dennis to hand over the gun because he was even concerned that an innocent bystander might be hurt, it baffles the Court why he did not immediately rush his own nephew Dennis to the hospital for medical care and attention when the latter was shot. It is a most unusual reaction for one who had accidentally shot another to just leave the vicinity with the victim unattended to or without even making arrangements for his care. Furthermore, as will hereafter be discussed, the number of wounds sustained by the victim completely demolishes this theory of accidental shooting. The number of wounds sustained by the victim, which physical evidence is vital since it could lend credence to appellant's claim of self-defense. However, as earlier stated, appellant's version and concomitant claim of self-defense is belied and negated precisely by the number of wounds sustained by the deceased and the location thereof. Appellant maintains that while both he and Dennis were struggling for control of the gun, the same accidentally fired, hitting the latter. If indeed the firing of the gun was merely accidental and it fired only once, it would be impossible for Dennis to sustain four gunshot wounds, one in the temple and three in the neck. 31 Furthermore, the number of wounds indicate that the act was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined effort to kill the victim. 32 Such wounds are indicative of aggression and confirm the theory of the prosecution that appellant assaulted the deceased.

(2)

As to the charge of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition:

Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the gravamen of the offense is basically the fact of possession of a firearm without a license, it being assumed that it was so possessed with animus possidendi. We have heretofore explained that, in view of the text of said decree, the crime may be denominated as simple illegal possession, to distinguish it from the aggravated form wherein such firearm is used in the commission of a homicide or murder. 50 However, to be liable for the aggravated form of illegal possession of a firearm which entails the capital punishment, such illegal possession must be the specific and principal offense charged, with the fact of killing being included in the particulars of the indictment. 51 In either case, the offense is committed not on the basis of ownership but of possession of the firearm without the requisite license or permit, and this disposes of appellant's objection on this score. What, however, is of greater concern to the Court is whether the prosecution has discharged the burden of proof on this charge. Corollarily, the inquiry should be whether there was sufficient identification of the firearm presented in the trial court and, more importantly, whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the negative allegation that appellant possessed the gun "without legal authority therefor." This brings us to the question of the necessity and the quantum of evidence for proving a negative allegation in an information, in this case the lack of a firearms license or permit. The evidentiary rule on negative averments in the 1940 Rules of Court 54 as adopted in the 1964 Rules of Court 55 in criminal cases was as follows: Sec. 2. Burden of proof in criminal case. In criminal cases the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution. A negative fact alleged by the prosecution need not be proved unless it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged. (Emphasis ours.) While the italicized portion was not carried over to the revised Rules on evidence, there is no reason to believe that such requirement for proof of a negative element of the offense charged has been dispensed with, since it is specifically provided therein that the "(b)urden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law." 56 It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The information filed against appellant . . . specifically alleged that he had no "license or permit to possess" the .45 caliber pistol mentioned therein. Thus, is seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty not merely to allege that negative fact but to prove it. . . . (Emphasis supplied.) It may be well to recall that how the firearm came into appellant's possession is a seriously contested issue, with the prosecution witnesses merely stating that they saw the gun only when appellant aimed and fired at the victims, but with appellant contending that he actually wrested it from Dennis Macagaling. As to who in truth

was the possessor of the firearm prior to the incident cannot be determined with certitude due to the paucity of the evidence thereon. In fine, since all that can be deduced is that appellant was in possession of the gun only on that occasion for a transitory purpose and for the short moment coeval therewith, it cannot be concluded that he had the animus possidendi which is required for the offense charged. The highly unsatisfactory identification of the gun, coupled with the intervening time between its retrieval from appellant to its presentation in the court below, increases our misgivings on whether it was in fact the weapon involved. Indeed, such lack of positive identification is virtually equivalent to the non-production of the real firearm in court

3. People v Amania and Guevarra FACTS: The People's version of the case, which has been correctly summarized by the trial court, is reproduced hereunder: The theory of the prosecution as testified to mainly by Arsenia Omangay and Isidra Omangay is that at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 14, 1987 while they, Arsenia and Isidra Omangay, together with Leonides Omangay and victims Primo Omangay and Macario Omangay were negotiating (walking in a single file) a small trail at Sitio Talustos, Barangay Amio, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental, accused Eduardo Amania, sitting on a stone at the left side of the trail suddenly stabbed with his bolo victim Primo Omangay. Immediately after he fell down, co-accused Gaudencio Guevarra, who was standing at the right side of the trail, suddenly hacked several times and beheaded victim Macario Omangay. After killing the two victims, Amania carried away the half sack (of) corn grits earlier carried by Primo while Gaudencio Guevarra got the P700.00 which was wrapped in plastic and placed inside the pocket of Primo and also carried away the other half sack of corn grits earlier carried by Macario Omangay. Upon seeing Primo who was the husband of Arsenia and father of the other Omangays, and Macario, the son of Primo and Arsenia, killed, Arsenia, Isidra and Leonides fled as the two accused also attempted to assault them as in fact they chased them, though for a short distance. The two accused then carried away the two victims' load and left. 5 On the other hand, appellant Eduardo Amania's version, as condensed in his brief, is of the following tenor: On July 14, 1987 at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant Eduardo Amania was on his way home after spear-fishing at the Talustos river, (in) Barangay Amio, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental. Primo Omangay was on his way home together with his son Macario, wife Arsenia and a daughter. Primo inquired from accusedappellant if he have (sic) plenty of catch and the latter answered he had no catch. Primo and Macario were not carrying any bundles while Arsenia and her daughter carried plastic bags. Macario Omangay cut a fruit-bearing banana tree growing by the roadside within Gaudencio Guevarra's property, thus prompting Primo to invite Amania to their house to eat the bananas gathered by his son. Meanwhile, Guevarra who was gathering firewood within his farmland, heard the sound of a falling banana tree. He rushed to the site and admonished Macario saying: "So you are the one cutting down my bananas." Macario, holding his bolo used in cutting down the banana tree, rushed towards Guevarra and stabbed the latter. Guevarra dropped his bundle of firewood and fled, pursued by Macario. Arsenia and her daughter ran home. Primo told Amania to chase Guevarra. Primo became angry and boxed Amania on the chest when the latter refused to follow his order. As a result, Amania stabbed Primo once on the left abdomen. Amania ran away and proceeded to surrender to Noe Romero, barangay captain of Barangay Marsogomayon, Sta. Catalina. 6

ISSUE: W/N the appellants may properly be convicted for the complex crime of robbery with double homicide HELD: NO there is no crime of robbery with double homicide. The term "homicide" in paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is to be understood in its generic sense. 8 The juridical concept of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide does not limit the taking of human life to one single victim. 9 In this special complex crime, the homicides or murders and the physical injuries, irrespective of their number, committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged in the single composite crime of robbery with homicide. 10 Therefore, the crime in this case should have been properly denominated as robbery with homicide. Again, in criminal cases the burden of proof is generally on the prosecution. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. Herein appellants have raised self-defense, thereby shifting the burden of evidence to them and the onus of which they must satisfactorily discharge, otherwise conviction would follow from their admission that they killed the victim. 11 Further, appellants must this time rely on the strength of their own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if that were weak, it cannot be disbelieved after appellants themselves admitted the killing. 12 Aside from the foregoing flaws in the prosecution's evidence as to how the victims were killed, that deficiency is more pronounced with respect to the charge of robbery which is the principal felony with which the homicides are sought to be complexed. On this point, the settled doctrine is that to integrate the component felonies of this complex crime, the killing must have been directly connected with the robbery. It is necessary that there must have been an intent on the part of the offenders to commit robbery from the outset and, on the occasion or by reason thereof, a killing takes place. 20 The original design must have been robbery and the homicide, even if it precedes or is subsequent to the robbery, must have a direct relation or was committed with a view to consummate the robbery, 21 and not where the taking of the property was only an afterthought which arose subsequent to the killing. 22 The records of this case do not yield the requisite quantum of evidence on the aforesaid requisite which would produce the special complex crime charged. In fact, we have reason to believe that the incident was unpremeditated for when appellant Amania went to surrender to the barangay captain thirty minutes thereafter, he was half-naked since he had just come from spear-fishing in the river and had merely proceeded thereafter to the scene of the crime. 23 Even indulging appellant Amania in his asseverations, the same nonetheless disclose that he was not justified in stabbing Primo Omangay. Assuming that the victim did deal a fistblow on said appellant, which may be considered as unlawful aggression, the second requisite for self-defense is not present. There should be a necessity in both the action taken as well as the means used, and the latter depends on whether or not the aggressor himself was armed, the nature and quality of the weapon used and the physical condition and size of both the aggressor and the person defending himself. Primo Omangay was unarmed. Although a bit taller,

Primo was of the same size as appellant Amania. 25 The means used by appellant Amania was clearly unreasonable Moreover, the number of wounds inflicted on the victim, their location on his neck, back, lap and abdomen, as well as their depths and areas of penetration constitute ample evidence belying self-defense. In the case at bar, Macario Omangay sustained fourteen wounds, one of which almost completely severed his head. While the People, as earlier explained, failed to prove said special complex crime, the evidence fully sustains the charge that appellants killed the victims Primo and Macario Omangay. With respect to the unlawful taking of their lives, appellants miserably failed in their bid for exoneration by their allegedly having acted in selfdefense. Furthermore, appellants having admitted the homicidal acts, the Court is left with no option but to find each of them guilty of homicide, appellant Amania for the death of Primo Omangay and appellant Guevarra for the death of Macario Omangay, there being no qualifying circumstance attending the killing and no evidence of conspiracy between appellants having been proved. Barangay captain Noe Romero testified that at around 4:30 P.M. of that fateful day, appellant Amania surrendered to him, followed for the same purpose by appellant Guevarra some thirty minutes later. 36 A barangay captain or chairman was and still is considered a person in authority. 37 Hence, appellants Amania and Guevarra may be granted the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same since the allegation of evident premeditation is without evidentiary basis, with the result that the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide shall be im posed in its minimum period.

4. Sps. Lorena v Judge Adolfo FACTS: Spouses Gregorio and Teresita Lorena, in a sworn letter-complaint, charged Judge Adolfo V. Encomienda of the Municipal Trial Court of Pagbilao, Quezon, with grave abuse of authority. In charging Judge Adolfo V. Encomienda with grave abuse of authority, Spouses Gregorio and Teresita Lorena contend that their illegal arrest and subsequent detention which lasted three days, from July 4 to 7, 1997, was due to his machination and influence. They point to the fact that respondent judge is a brother of the deceased Herminio Encomienda and an uncle of Tadito Encomienda, the plaintiffs in the ejectment case filed against them. To support this allegation, complainants aver that on July 4, 1997, Judge Encomienda spoke to Gregorio on the telephone while the latter was at the police station, urging him to heed Tadito Encomiendas demand for the spouses to sign certain papers. When Gregorio refused, Judge Encomienda allegedly said, Tarantado, mabulok kayo sa kalabos! and then slammed the phone down. ISSUE: W/N the complainants were able to prove the grave abuse of authority against respondent judge. HELD: NO. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint.[6] In the present case, we believe that the complainants were not able to do so. There is no showing that respondent judge used the powers and influence of his office in an arbitrary and opprobrious manner. From the documents presented, it is apparent that he had no hand in bringing the Lorenas to the police station. Likewise, it cannot be said that he had any participation in the conflict between his brothers family and the Lorenas. The complainants may have surmised otherwise, but mere suspicion without proof cannot be the basis of conviction.[7] Although the charge of grave abuse of authority was not proven, the respondent judge cannot be completely exonerated. He himself admitted having spoken to Gregorio on the phone in order to assist the family of Herminio Encomienda, the judges brother. The circumstances surrounding the controversy clearly show the impropriety of respondents act.

5. Ibaan Rural Bank v CA FACTS: Spouses Cesar and Leonila Reyes were the owners of three (3) lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 33206, 33207 and 33208 of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City. On March 21, 1976, the spouses mortgaged these lots to Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. [herein petitioner]. On June 11, 1976, with the knowledge and consent of the petitioner, the spouses as sellers, and Mr. and Mrs. Ramon Tarnate [herein private respondents] as buyers, entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage of the lots in question. Private respondents failed to pay the loan and the bank extra-judicially foreclosed on the mortgaged lots. The Provincial Sheriff conducted a public auction of the lots and awarded the lots to the bank, the sole bidder. On December 13, 1978, the Provincial Sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale which was registered on October 16, 1979. The certificate stated that the redemption period expires two (2) years from the registration of the sale. No notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure was given to the private respondents. On September 23, 1981, private respondents offered to redeem the foreclosed lots and tendered the redemption amount of P77,737.45. However, petitioner Bank refused the redemption on the ground that it had consolidated its titles over the lots. The Provincial Sheriff also denied the redemption on the ground that private respondents did not appear on the title to be the owners of the lots. Private respondents filed a complaint to compel the bank to allow their redemption of the foreclosed lots. They alleged that the extra-judicial foreclosure was null and void for lack of valid notice and demand upon them. They further argued that they were entitled to redeem the foreclosed lots because they offered to redeem and tendered the redemption price before October 16, 1981, the deadline of the 2-year redemption period. The bank opposed the redemption, contending that the private respondents had no right to redeem the lots because they were not the real parties in interest; that at the time they offered to redeem on September 23, 1981, the right to redeem had prescribed, as more than one year had elapsed from the registration of the Certificate of Sale on October 16, 1979; that there was no need of personal notice to them because under Section 3 of Act 3135, only the posting of notice of sale at three public places of the municipality where the properties are located was required.[1] ISSUE: What was the period of redemption: two years as unilaterally fixed by the sheriff in the contract, or one year as fixed by law? HELD: two years as unilaterally fixed by the sheriff in the contract. When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its contents.[5] For two years, it did not object to the two-year redemption period provided in the certificate. Thus, it could be said that petitioner consented to the two-year redemption period specially since it had time to object and did not. When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as consent.[6] By

its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private respondents to believe that they had two years within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of two years, petitioner is estopped from asserting that the period for redemption was only one year and that the period had already lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.[7] In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on Lazo vs. Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.,[8] where the court held that the one year period of redemption provided in Act No. 3135 is only directory and can be extended by agreement of the parties. True, but it bears noting that in Lazo the parties voluntarily agreed to extend the redemption period. Thus, the concept of legal redemption was converted by the parties in Lazo into conventional redemption. This is not so in the instant case. There was no voluntary agreement. In fact, the sheriff unilaterally and arbitrarily extended the period of redemption to two (2) years in the Certificate of Sale. The parties were not even privy to the extension made by the sheriff. Nonetheless, as above discussed, the bank can not after the lapse of two years insist that the redemption period was one year only.

6. Sps. Alcaraz v Tangga-an FACTS: The complaint alleged that the late Virginia Tangga-an (the spouse of respondent Pedro Tangaa-an and mother of the rest of the respondents) leased a residential building (house) located at Premier Street, Hipodromo, Cebu City to the petitioner spouses. The lease contract was limited to the use and occupancy of the said residential building and did not include the lot on which it was constructed because the said lot was then owned by the National Housing Authority (NHA). Under the contract, the petitioner spouses bound themselves for five years to pay Virginia a monthly rental of P4,000 beginning November 22, 1991. However, since November 1993, they failed to pay rent. Thus, as of October, 1994, they were in arrears in the amount of P48,000. Despite repeated demands by respondents to pay the rentals in arrears and to surrender the possession of the residential building, the petitioner spouses refused to vacate the same. Respondents sought to repossess the property for their own use and benefit. On the other hand, the petitioner spouses alleged that, on July 23, 1993, the ownership of the lot on which the house stood was transferred by the NHA to Virgilio and Angelita D. Tangga-an. Virgilio Tangga-an is the son of the late Virgilia Tangga-an and respondent Pedro Tangga-an, and the brother of the other respondents. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 125657 was consequently issued in the name of Virgilio Tangga-an. According to the petitioner spouses, the subsequent change in ownership of the lot and the house resulted in the cancellation of the contract of lease between respondents and petitioner spouses. Thereafter, they paid the rent to the new owners of the lot (Virgilio and Angelita) and not to respondents since the latter supposedly no longer had the legal right to collect rentals. ISSUE:whether the petitioner spouses, as lessees, were excused from paying the rent because of the change in the ownership of the land on which the rented house was built. HELD: the petitioner spouses failed to substantiate their factual averment that Virgilio not only acquired the lot but also the house. On the other hand, the respondents proved that, as compulsory heirs of Virginia, they were the rightful owners of the subject house. To support their argument that the house necessarily became Virgilios property as a result of the acquisition of the lot on which the same was built, the petitioner spouses invoke the principle that the accessory follows the principal. Being an accessory, the house is necessarily owned by the owner of the lot on which it is built. There is no need, however, to disturb and analyze the applicability of this wellentrenched principle because the petitioner spouses are estopped from raising the same. Both parties knew that their contract pertained only to the lease of the house, without including the land. The contract states: 1. That the lessor is the owner of a building of mixed materials situated at Premier St., Mabolo, Hipodromo, Cebu City.[16] At the time of the perfection of the contract, the petitioner spouses,

as lessees, were aware that the NHA, and not Virginia, the lessor, owned the land on which the rented house stood yet they signed the same, obliged themselves to comply with the terms thereof for five years and performed their obligations as lessees for two years. Now they assume a completely different legal position. They claim that the lease contract ceased to be effective because Virgilios assumption of ownership of the land stripped the respondents of ownership of the building. They argue that, under Article 440 of the Civil Code, Virgilios title over the lot necessarily included the house on the said lot, thus automatically canceling the contract. Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive presumption that: Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive presumptions: (a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it; xxx xxx xxx

After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the petitioner spouses are barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the respondents lost ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired title over the lot.

7. People v Padrigone FACTS: It appears that at 3:00 in the morning of January 3, 1995, appellant Roberto Padrigone and the other accused broke into the house of Rowena Contridas, then 16 years old, situated in San Benito, Salvacion, Buhi, Camarines Sur. Appellant Roberto Padrigone and accused Jocel Ibaneta poked a knife at Rowena and her fourteen year-old sister, Nimfa,[2] and threatened to kill them if they reported the incident to others. They gagged Rowena with a handkerchief and Nimfa with a handtowel. Then, appellant undressed Rowena, forced her to lie down and sexually violated her while his co-accused watched with glee. Accused Jocel Ibanita tried to rape Nimfa but failed because she was able to elude him. After appellant satisfied his lust on Rowena, the other accused took their turns. Every one of the accused raped Rowena. Before they left, they warned the sisters not to report the incident or else they will kill them. Despite the threats, Rowena and Nimfa reported the incident to the police and identified appellant and his co-accused as the perpetrators. However, based on the police blotter, Rowena stated that it was only appellant who raped her. All the accused, including appellant Roberto Padrigone, interposed the defense of denial and alibi. Appellant claimed that in the evening of January 2, 1995, he and his companions, Jocel Ibanita and Michael San Antonio, visited Rowena at her house. According to him, Rowena was crying when they arrived. When appellant asked her what was wrong, she told him that she wanted to elope with him. He replied that he was not ready as he was still studying. Rowena snapped, its up to him but he might regret it.[7] While appellant and Rowena were talking, Jocel Ibanita and Michael San Antonio were in the kitchen cooking noodles. Later, a certain Ismeraldo Quirante, in the presence of several barangay watchmen patrolling the area, passed by the Contridas house and advised the accused to go home because it was getting late. They heeded the advice and left the Contridas house at around 11:30 p.m. ISSUE: W/N there was suppression of evidence. HELD: NO. Regardless, the most telling indication that would belie appellants sweetheart theory was the fact that he had carnal knowledge of Rowena in the presence of Nimfa and his co-accused. It is most unnatural for lovers to engage in the ultimate expression of their love for each other in the presence of other people. Appellant assails the procedural irregularities committed by the prosecution and by the trial court. He claims that the prosecution suppressed evidence by not presenting Rowena, the victim, when the latter should have had her sane moments. As a consequence, the trial court deprived appellant of the opportunity to cross-examine her when she allegedly declared before the Chief of Police of Buhi that it was only appellant who raped her which declaration became the basis for the latters conviction.

Appellants contention is misplaced if not misleading. The basis of his conviction was not Rowenas declaration before the Chief of Police but rather Nimfas testimony. Besides, the non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as suppression of evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.[18] Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. First, the defense had the opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a witness. Instead, the defense failed to call her to the witness stand. Second, Rowena was certified to be suffering from Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition and thus cannot stand judicial proceedings yet.[19] The non-presentation, therefore, of Rowena was not willful. Third, in any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact witnessed the violation committed on her sister.

8. People v Mallari y Sanchez FACTS: At 8:30 in the evening of December 9, 1990, Alfredo Mendoza, Wilfredo Eyas, and Ricardo Borja were having a drinking spree at the corner of Claro M. Recto and Elcano Streets, Binondo, Manila.[2] Eyas sat in front of Mendoza about an armslength away while Borja sat on his right.[3] About four (4) meters away was the pushcart owned by a certain Aling Vicky where they bought beer.[4] Mendoza, Eyas and Borja were drinking for more or less thirty (30) minutes and consumed six (6) bottles of beer.[5] While Mendoza was pouring beer into his glass, accusedappellant suddenly appeared from behind Mendoza and stabbed him on the chest once with a pointed weapon.[6] After stabbing Mendoza, accused-appellant casually walked away and then fled from the scene. Eyas ran after accused-appellant but when the latter saw Eyas running after him, he turned around and ran after Eyas instead. Afraid, Eyas retraced his steps and returned to where he left his wounded comrade.[7] Mendoza, by then, had already been brought to Mary Johnston Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. The guard on duty called up the homicide section of the Western Police District and reported the stabbing incident. Responding to the call, Pfc. Norberto Obrero and Pat. Henry Nuez went to the hospital where they saw Bartolome Castro and Joey Angeles who claimed to have been likewise stabbed by Romy Toyo on C.M. Recto and Elcano Streets, Binondo, Manila. They likewise learned that a certain Alejandro Quintana was also stabbed dead by Romy Toyo on the same street corner. At around 9:30 in the evening of December 9, 1990, the police investigators went to the crime scene where they were informed by a certain Aling Vicky that Wilfredo Eyas was one of the drinking companions of the victim. They sought Eyas but the latter only told them his name and address and did not give any statement regarding the incident. Eyas knew accused-appellant was then still at large and a notorious killer. Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Marcial Ceido autopsied the cadaver of Mendoza. According to him, Mendoza died of a penetrating stab wound right anterior thorax appearing at the right ventricle of the heart.[8] In his opinion, the relative position of the wound would be more in line with the theory that the assailant could have been standing when he attacked his seated victim.[9] Based on the information gathered, Pfc. Obrero prepared the Advance Information naming Romy Toyo or Meo as the suspect. On January 7, 1991, operatives of the Patrol Division of the Western Police District apprehended accused-appellant in connection with a robbery with homicide case.[10] Apprised of the apprehension, Pfc. Obrero asked Eyas and Borja to identify him. Eyas pointed to accused-appellant in a police line-up of seven persons as the killer of Alfredo Mendoza. On the basis of the identification, accusedappellant was formally charged for the killing of Alfredo Mendoza. Accused-appellant denied knowing Alfredo Mendoza or killing him. He confirmed being called Romy Toyo by his family and friends but denied being called

Meong.[11] He claimed he was resting in his house at J.P. Rizal St., Makati on the day the stabbing occurred.[12] Accused-appellant also testified that he was invited to the Makati Police Station where he was informed of the charge of murder against him.[13] He admitted being made to join a police line-up twice in the Western Police District Station but denied that Eyas pointed or identified him. He further alleged that he did not even see Eyas during the police line-up.[14] He claimed that the police officers maltreated him while in detention and forced him to admit the charges filed against him.[15] In addition, accused-appellant alleged that Pfc. Obrero demanded money supposedly for the dropping of charges against him. Since the money given by his father and sister was not enough, only three (3) out of five (5) charges against him were dropped.[16] ISSUE: W/N the failure of the prosecution to present Borja amounts to suppression of evidence fatal to their case HELD: NO Contrary to the assertion of the defense, the prosecution is not guilty of suppression of evidence. The disputable presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced is not even applicable in the instant case. It is extant from the records that the prosecution has satisfactorily established its case against accused-appellant through the sole testimony of Wilfredo Eyas. Hence, there is no more necessity to present Borja as his testimony would only be corroborative, if not cumulative. In People v. Pagal[21] citing People v. de Jesus,[22] this Court has ruled that the adverse presumption arising from suppression of evidence is not applicable when the evidence is merely corroborative or cumulative and/or likewise available to the defense. In the instant case, Borja was not a material witness but merely a corroborative one. If at all, Borja would only confirm the matters already testified to by Eyas. It should be noted that Borja was a drinking companion of Mendoza and Eyas and in all likelihood, would only testify on what he saw during the incident which would not have been substantially or significantly different from what Eyas had testified on. In any event, it was within the prerogative of the prosecution whom to present as witness. More importantly, Borja was at the disposal of both the prosecution and the defense. Both parties subpoenaed Borja but the latter failed to appear at both times. The defense did not proffer proof that the prosecution prevented Borja from testifying. There is therefore no basis for it to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of suppression of evidence. The defense was not short of alternative remedies for their failure to compel Borja to appear before the court. They could have asked that Borja be cited for contempt, or if they were really desperate to disprove the eyewitness account of Eyas, they could have summoned other witnesses aside from Borja because, to borrow the words of the defense, there are of course others who have witnessed the crime.[23] In People v. Jumanoy,[24] this Court held:

The prosecutions failure to present the other witnesses listed in the information did not constitute, contrary to the contention of the accused, suppression of evidence. The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine the witnesses to be presented for the prosecution. If the prosecution has several witnesses, as in the instant case, the prosecution need not present all of them but only as many as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with for being merely corroborative in nature. This Court has ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses would not constitute suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the prosecutions case.

9. Metropolitan Bank v CA FACTS: The subject property is a parcel of land in Diliman, Quezon City consisting of six hundred ninety (690) square meters originally owned by businessman Tomas Chia under Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-16753 (106901) of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City. Saddled with debts and business reverses, Mr. Chia offered the subject property for sale to private respondent G.T.P. Development Corporation (hereafter, GTP), with assumption of the mortgage indebtedness in favor of petitioner METROBANK secured by the subject property. Pending negotiations for the proposed sale, Atty. Bernardo Atienza, acting in behalf of respondent GTP, went to the METROBANK branch in Quiapo, Manila sometime in the last week of August 1980 to inquire on Mr. Chia's remaining balance on the real estate mortgage. METROBANK obliged with a statement of account of Mr. Chia amounting to about P115,000.00 as of August ,1980. The deed of sale[2] and the memorandum of agreement[3] between Mr. Chia and respondent GTP were eventually executed and signed on 04 September 1980 in the office of Atty. Atienza. Twelve (12) days later, or on 16 September 1980, Atty. Atienza went to METROBANK Quiapo Branch and paid one hundred sixteen thousand four hundred sixteen pesos and seventy-one centavos (P116,416.71),[4] for which METROBANK issued an official receipt acknowledging payment. This notwithstanding, petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real estate mortgage on the subject property despite repeated requests from Atty. Atienza, thus prompting respondent GTP to file on October 17, 1980 an action for specific performance against petitioner METROBANK and Mr. Chia. In answer to the complaint, Mr. Chia denied having executed any deed of sale in favor of respondent GTP involving the subject property. Petitioner for its part justified its non-release of the real estate mortgage (1) upon the advise of Mr. Chia that he never executed any sales agreement with respondent GTP, and (2) by the fact that there are other loans incurred by Mr. Chia which are also secured by the subject property. ISSUE: W/N metrobank may deny the execution of any sales agreement between mr chia and gtp. HELD: NO. Petitioner METROBANK is estopped from refusing the discharge of the real estate mortgage on the claim that the subject property still secures "other unliquidated past due loans." In Maneclang vs. Baun,[14] this Court enumerated the requisites for estoppel by conduct to operate, to wit: "1.....there must have been a representation or concealment of material facts; "2.....the representation must have been with knowledge of the facts; "3.....the party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter; and "4.....it must have been with the intention that the other party would act upon it.

Respondent GTP, thru Atty. Atienza, requested from METROBANK that he be furnished a copy of the full indebtedness secured by the real estate mortgage. [15] In response thereto, petitioner METROBANK issued a statement of account as of September 15, 1980[16] which amount was immediately settled and paid the next day amounting to P116, 416.71. Petitioner METROBANK is thus barred from taking a stand inconsistent with its representation upon which respondent GTP, as an innocent third person to the real mortgage agreement, placed exclusive reliance. Respondent GTP had the reasonable right to rely upon such representations as true, considering that it had no participation whatsoever in the mortgage agreement and the preparation of the statement of account, coupled with the expectation that a reputable banking institution such as petitioner METROBANK do conduct their business concerns in the highest standards of efficiency and professionalism. For an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against a person relying thereon. A party may not go back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party who relied upon them. In the law of evidence, whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it. [17] Just as decisive is petitioner METROBANK's failure to bring before respondent Court of Appeals the current statement evidencing what it claims as "other unliquidated past due loans." Verily, petitioner METROBANK's omission to present its evidence only created an adverse inference against its cause.

10. People v Gonzales FACTS: At about 9:30 oclock in the evening of July 5, 1992, the spouses Nicanor and Carolita Suralta had visitors at their house in Bagsac, Manikling, San Isidro, Davao Oriental. Nicanor was having drinks with Arsenio Abonales, Bobong Lamanilao, and Nicasio Lamanilao when two armed men, one carrying a gun and the other a knife, suddenly entered the house through the kitchen door. The one carrying a gun had a bonnet over his face, with only his eyes exposed, while the other one carrying a knife had the lower half of his face covered with a handkerchief. The knife-wielder held Chona, the third child of the Suralta spouses, and announced a holdup. All persons in the house were ordered to go inside the bedroom, about two meters away from the sala. There, the man with a gun demanded a gun and money from Nicanor. Nicanor answered that he had no gun, but asked his wife to give money to the holduppers. Carolita gave P2,100.00, which was intended to be deposited in the bank, to the knife-wielder, who placed it in his pocket. Then the knife-wielder ransacked the cabinet and took the remaining amount of P325.00, which was intended for the school expenses of the Suralta children. In addition, he took the familys Sanyo cassette recorder and some clothes. The holduppers also divested Arsenio Abonales, one of the guests, of his Seiko divers wristwatch and then left.[5] As the holduppers were leaving, two gunshots rang out. Carolita thought that the first one was a mere warning shot, but later Nicanor was heard moaning. Carolita became hysterical after seeing her husband lying in a pool of his own blood. Nicanor was immediately brought to the Lupon Emergency Hospital where he was given first aid. Thereafter, he was transferred to the Tagum Regional Hospital but he eventually died. On July 12, 1992, there was another holdup inside the ACF passenger bus compound in the neighboring municipality of Magdug, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental. The police team sent to investigate the incident was able to pick up suspects,[9] one of whom was accused-appellant Joel Gonzales. He was wearing a wristwatch (Exh. A) and had a handgun (Exh. H). Other items, consisting of watches, a cassette recorder (Exh. D), a chain saw, and spare parts, were recovered from his house, some of which were claimed by passengers of the ACF bus line.[10] Police Inspector Arnold Malintad of Governor Generoso, head of the team investigating the robbery of the ACF bus compound, informed Capt. Adane Sakkam, Police Chief of San Isidro, about the apprehension of accused-appellant Gonzales and the recovery of the items from him. Accordingly, on July 14, 1992, Capt. Sakkam, Carolita Suralta, and Arsenio Abonales proceeded to the Governor Generoso Police Station. Carolita and Arsenio identified accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez as the holduppers. Joel Gonzales was identified as the man armed with a gun who wore a bonnet to cover his face, while Romeo Bernaldez was identified as the knife-wielder who wore a handkerchief to cover the lower portion of his face.[11] Accused-appellants put up the defense of denial and alibi. Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales testified that he was in Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental the whole day of July 5, 1992 working in his mother-in-

laws farm, piling coconut palm leaves together with his brother-in-law. In the evening, he had supper in his house and slept there together with his family.[14] On July 13, 1992, Gonzales was suffering from a fever. While he was sleeping, he was awakened by Policeman Danny Cabanilas, Inspector Arnold Malintad and Eddie Tano, who took him to the Governor Generoso police station in connection with a robbery in the ACF bus compound. At the police station, he was investigated by Inspector Malintad and thereafter put in jail. While inside the jail, people came to see him. Malintad pointed at him and asked a woman companion if he was one of the persons who committed the robbery in San Isidro. The woman answered, I do not know them. For this reason, both Malintad and the woman left. However, upon their return, the woman said that she recognized the men and pointed to him and accused-appellant Romeo Bernaldez as those who were involved in the robbery.[15] ISSUE: W/N the fact that the stolen items were found in the appellants possession sufficiently proves that they were the ones who took such stolen items. HELD: YES. Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales denies that the stolen goods had been taken from him. Inspector Malintad testified that he recovered watches, a cassette recorder, a chainsaw, and spare parts from accused-appellant Joel Gonzales when he arrested the latter in his house. There is no reason to doubt Inspector Malintads claim that the stolen items were indeed recovered from accused-appellant Gonzales. These items were definitively identified by the owners as those taken from them. Between the testimonies of the police officers, who enjoy the presumption of regularity in their duties, and the bare denials of accused-appellants, we are more inclined to believe the police officers. This is true especially considering that the police officers have not been shown to have any motive to testify falsely against accused-appellants. Rule 131, 3(j) of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him. Since the subject items were found in the possession of accused-appellant Joel Gonzales, he is then presumed to be the taker of the stolen items. Accused-appellant Gonzales was unable to satisfactorily explain his possession of the stolen items.

11. People v Mendoza FACTS: In the evening of August 22, 1991, private complainant's husband went to San Jose del Monte, Bulacan to haul chicken. She retired to their bedroom. She was joined by her three (3) children, while their maid went down to the basement to sleep.[5] Private complainant woke up when she felt her thighs being rubbed. Thereupon, she saw two (2) men in black jackets with their faces covered with handkerchiefs.[9] She described one of them as medium built and the other as a small man. The medium-built man poked a 6-inch knife at her neck and ordered her to open the vault inside the room.[10] The two men took the cash in the vault amounting to P2,000.00 and jewelry worth P12,000.00.[11] Upon orders of the medium-built man, the small man untied the curtain band and handed the same to him. While undoing the curtain, the handkerchief loosened, revealing the small man's face to be that of Eric Mendoza.[12] Private complainant recognized him because he used to work in her uncle's steel factory in Tumana, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.[13] After the medium-built man had tied her hands with the curtain band and gagged her with a torn t-shirt, the small man helped him carry private complainant to the bathroom. It was then that she noticed the missing jalousie blades on the window.[14] The medium-built man sent the small man out of the bathroom, through the window, to stand guard on the terrace roof.[15] Alone with private complainant inside the bathroom, the medium-built man removed the handkerchief covering his face, raised her t-shirt and began sucking her breast. While keeping the knife pointed at her neck, he forcibly removed her jogging pants and underwear, laid her on the bathroom floor, and sexually abused her for about two minutes.[16] In the meantime, private complainant could see the small man peeping through the window and watching her being raped.[17] After satisfying his lust, the medium-built man threatened to kill her and her family if she would tell anyone about what had happened. He went out through the bathroom window and joined the small man on the terrace roof.[18] In the early morning of August 23, 1991, private complainant's husband arrived and learned of the incident from her. At about 10:00 o'clock that morning, they reported the crime to Mr. Rico Jude Sto. Domingo, the Barangay Chairman of Tumana, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.[19] Defense: alibi Mendoza testified that he was in their house in Tumana, Sta. Maria, Bulacan with his grandparents and cousins, Totoy, Rodel, Buboy and Ana in the early morning of August 23, 1991. He denied any confrontation with private complainant at her house where he allegedly confessed his complicity in the robbery incident. He claimed to have been brought by Mr. Sto. Domingo, the Barangay Chairman, to the municipal building in August, 1991 where he was detained in a cell, investigated and forced to admit his guilt after having been mauled for about fifteen (15) minutes.

ISSUE: W/N the fact that the stolen items were not found in the appella nts possession constitutes a presumption that they were not the ones who took such items. HELD: NO. Mendoza underscores that the stolen items were not recovered from him by the police. It has never been the rule in this jurisdiction, however, that such a fact can diminish the guilt of a robber whose complicity in the crime has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption that a person in whose custody are found stolen items, is prima facie the robber or the thief,[40] does not translate into a converse presumption that a person indicted for robbery or theft should be acquitted when the authorities do not recover the stolen items from him. The production in court of the stolen property is not an indispensable requisite to sustain conviction as long as there is clear proof of the commission of the crime charged.[41]

12. Mabunga v People FACTS:

Around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of October 15, 1994, as Diana was in front of her store in Capaclan, Romblon, Romblon waiting for a tricycle, she saw appellant, a dealer of marble slabs, who was carrying a box which bore the marking HOPE and tied with gray straw string, board a pedicab driven by Bernardo. Having heard from her husband Rodolfo Malay who works with the BFP that appellant was the prime suspect of the police for the robbery at the BFP, Diana immediately informed her husband of what she saw. She was thereupon instructed by her husband to follow appellant.[3] As Diana noticed that the pedicab was heading for the pier, she proceeded on foot to the house of Villaruel[4] whom she informed of what she had witnessed. After the lapse of about 5 minutes,[5] Villaruel, on board his scooter, proceeded to the pier. By that time appellant had reached the pier, alighted from Bernardos tricycle, and unloaded the HOPE box. On Villaruels entering the terminal[9] he was told by Sylvia, the cashier on duty at the restaurant therein, that a man, whom she later identified to be appellant through a photograph shown to her that same day, entrusted the box to her, he telling her that it contained a damaged electric fan.[10] Villaruel thereupon kept watch over the box, as SPO2 Madali and PO2 Rogero later did discreetly, until M/V Peafrancia departed for Batangas at 8:00 p.m., with appellant on board the same. About an hour later, PPA officers Reynaldo Dianco and Leo Vedito Fontellera arrived at the terminal and the box was turned over by them to SPO2 Madali and PO2 Rogero. The box, when opened, contained the lost BFP typewriter.

ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly be presumed to be the one who stole the typewriter HELD: NO.
While courts have consistently looked upon alibi with suspicion not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable as a defense, but because it can easily be fabricated,[19] the basic rule is for the prosecution, upon which lies the onus, to establish all the elements of a crime to thereby hold him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Such burden does not shift as it remains with the prosecution. Tasked with the burden of persuasion, the prosecution must thus rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.[20] Admittedly, the evidence for the prosecution is circumstantial. The alleged robbery was discovered when the employees of the BFP reported for work on October 2, 1994 and noticed that the hasp of the office door was broken and the typewriter was missing. On the sole basis of the presumption laid down under above-quoted Section 3(j) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of appellant. A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action.[21] It is an inference as to the existence of a fact not actually known, arising from its usual connection with another which is known, or a conjecture based on past experience as to what course of human affairs ordinarily take.[22] A presumption has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the party who would be disadvantaged by a finding of the presumed fact. The presumption controls decision on the presumed fact unless there is counterproof that the presumed fact is not so.[23] In criminal cases, however, presumptions should be taken with caution especially in light of serious concerns that they might water down the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. As special considerations must be given to the right of the accused to be presumed innocent, there should be limits on the use of presumptions against an accused. Before an inference of guilt arising from possession of recently stolen goods can be made, however, the following basic facts need to be proven by the prosecution: (1) that the crime was committed; (2) that the crime was committed recently; (3) that the stolen property was found in the possession of the defendant ; and (4) that the defendant is unable to explain his possession satisfactorily.[26]

For purposes moreover of conclusively proving possession, the following considerations have to be emphasized: (1) the possession must be unexplained by any innocent origin; (2) the possession must be fairly recent; and (3) the possession must be exclusive.[27] Contrary to the findings of both the trial and appellate courts, the People failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was caught in exclusive possession of the recently stolen good. While possession need not mean actual physical control over the thing for it may include constructive possession, it is still necessary that for possession to be deemed constructive the accused knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person.[28] The HOPE box was not concealed and anyone entering and leaving the PPA terminal had access to it, it having been placed just below one of the benches, around three meters from the cashier, Sylvia. To assume that in a busy place, such as the PPA terminal, the HOPE box that was opened by the police authorities and found to contain the missing typewriter is the same box allegedly entrusted by appellant to the cashier is to form an inference which is, however, doubtful, more than six hours having elapsed from the time the box was allegedly left at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon until it was opened by the police authorities at around 9:00 oclock in the evening after appellant had already boarded the ship. A presumption cannot be founded on another presumption. It cannot thus be concluded that from the time the box was left under the bench, appellant was still in constructive possession thereof, the exercise of exclusive dominion or control being absent.

13. People v Burton FACTS: At about 9:30 in the evening of December 26, 1992, accused William Burton y Robert, 30 years old, a British national, checked in at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), Pasay City, for his trip to Sydney, Australia, on board Flight No. 209 of the Philippine Airlines. The accused had two pieces of luggage with him which he passed through the x-ray machine at the departure area of the airport. The machine showed certain portions of the sidings of one bag and the bottom of the other to be dark in color, making its operator to suspect that something illegal was inside them. Upon the request of the Customs examiner in the NAIA to whom the x-ray finding was referred, accused Burton removed all his belongings from the travelling bags. The two bags of the accused were then subjected to another x-ray examination. The same finding was revealed. During his investigation, the accused was observed to be walking in an uneasy manner. Suspecting that there was something hidden in his shoes, the investigator requested Burton to remove his shoes to which the accused consented. Retrieved from inside the shoes, hidden between their soles and the upper covers, were four (4) blocks, each about one-fourth () of an inch thick, of the same dark brown substance

ISSUE: W/N there was animus possidendi on the part of the appellant HELD: YES. In criminal cases involving prohibited drugs, appellant argues that there can be no conviction unless the prosecution shows that the accused knowingly possessed the prohibited articles in his person, or more legally put, that animus possidendi is shown to be present together with his possession or control of such article.[21] Under the Rules of Evidence (Sec. 3[j], Rule 131, Rules of Court), things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him. Such disputable presumption is based upon the principle that direct proof of facts of this nature is rarely available, except in cases of confession. In several cases, the Court has held that possession of a considerable quantity of marijuana cannot indicate anything except the intention of the accused to sell, distribute and deliver said prohibited drug.[22] Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from the attendant events in each particular case.[23] In prosecutions involving prohibited drugs, the state has a right to specify what proofs shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and thereafter to place upon

the accused the burden of showing that his act or acts are innocent and are not committed with any criminal intent or intention.[24] The existence of animus possidendi is only prima facie. Thus, it is subject to contrary proof and may be rebutted by evidence that the accused did not in fact exercise power and control over the thing in question, and did not intend to do so.[25] The constitutional presumption of innocence will not apply as long as there is some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be (a) purely arbitrary mandate.[26] The burden of evidence is thus shifted to the possessor to explain absence of animus possidendi. A mere uncorroborated claim of the accused that he did not know that he had a prohibited drug in his possession is insufficient. Any evasion, false statement, or attempt at concealment on his part, in explaining how the drug came into his possession, may be considered in determining his guilt.[27] Under the facts obtaining in this case, the 5.6 kilos of hashish cleverly and painstakingly concealed inside appellants luggage and rubber shoes can be said to be in the possession and control of appellant with his knowledge. Not only were the blocks and bars of the prohibited drug of a considerable amount, but they were placed inside three different objects in order to escape detection by the authorities. The Court also finds incredible appellants allegation that he had no idea that the luggage and rubber shoes he purchased from a certain John Parry contained prohibited drugs.

14. People v Ong and Ching de Ming FACTS: The prosecution, through the testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales, sought to establish that on July 23, 1998 at around 5:00 P.M., a confidential informant (CI) of the Special Operations Division (SOD), PNP Narcotics Group, reported to Chief Inspector Albert Ignatius D. Ferro about the alleged illicit drug activities of a certain William Ong and an unidentified Chinese male partner. After an evaluation of the confidential information, Chief Inspector Ferro decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. He constituted a team of eight (8) with Police Inspector Medel N. Poe as team leader, SPO1 Gonzales as poseur-buyer and the rest as back-up support. According to SPO1 Gonzales, the CI called up the alleged pusher, placed an order for one (1) kilo of shabu and agreed to a P600,000.00 consideration. The CI likewise agreed to meet with his contact on July 24, 1998 at 6th Street corner Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City, between 4:00 and 5:00 A.M. The boodle money was prepared consisting of six (6) bundles of cut bond paper with a marked P1,000.00 peso bill on top of each bundle. On July 24, 2004 at 3:00 A.M., the CI received a call from the drug dealer changing the meeting time between 2:00 and 3:00 P.M. on the same day. The team, together with the CI, proceeded to the meeting place and arrived there at around 1:30 P.M. The CI rode with SPO1 Gonzales. They parked their car along 6th Street corner Gilmore Avenue. The rest of the team posted themselves at their back and their right side. A little while, accused Ong approached their car. The CI introduced him to SPO1 Gonzales who told accused Ong in broken Tagalog to get in the car. When Ong inquired about the money in payment of the shabu, SPO1 Gonzales showed him the slightly opened plastic bag containing the boodle money. SPO1 Gonzales then demanded to see the shabu. Accused Ong excused himself, went out of the car, walked a few steps and then waved his right hand to somebody. While accused Ong was walking back to the car, SPO1 Gonzales and the CI saw a green Toyota Corolla coming. The Corolla parked in front of their car and a Chinese-looking male, later identified as accused Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu alighted, approached accused Ong and handed to him a gift-wrapped package. SPO1 Gonzales opened it and inside was one (1) sealed plastic bag with a white crystalline substance. After its inspection, accused Ong demanded for its payment. SPO1 Gonzales gave to accused Ong the boodle money placed in a W. Brown plastic bag. Thereafter, SPO1 Gonzales signaled his back-up team by turning on the hazard lights of the car. SPO1 Gonzales himself arrested accused Ong while the CI and the back-up agents arrested accused De Ming. ISSUE: HELD: It is abundantly clear that it was the CI who made the initial contact, albeit only through the telephone, with the pusher. The CI was likewise the one who closed the deal with appellant Ong as to the quantity of shabu to be purchased and its price. He also set the venue and time of the meeting when the sale would take place.

Since only the CI had personal knowledge of the offer to purchase shabu, the acceptance of the offer and the consideration for the offer, we hold that SPO1 Gonzales is, in effect, not the poseur-buyer but merely the deliveryman. His testimony therefore on material points of the sale of shabu is hearsay and standing alone cannot be the basis of the conviction of the appellants.[21] To determine whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of the operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent evidence. For, the courts could not merely rely on but must apply with studied restraint the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement agents. This presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally protected rights of the individual.[27] It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement.[28] Courts should not allow themselves to be used as instruments of abuse and injustice lest innocent persons are made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.[29] In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The confidential informant who had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and how it was perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO1 Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of the same. On this score, SPO1 Gonzales testimony is hearsay and possesses no probative value unless it can be shown that the same falls within the exception to the hearsay rule.[33] To impart probative value to these hearsay statements and convict the appellant solely on this basis would be to render nugatory his constitutional right to confront the witness against him, in this case the informant, and to examine him for his truthfulness.[34] As the prosecution failed to prove all the material details of the buy-bust operation, its claim that there was a valid entrapment of the appellants must fail.

15. People v Gallego FACTS: The records show that at about 7:30 p.m. on February 8, 1995, Raul Gallego appeared at the residence of spouses Wilfredo and Lucia Lamata in Barangay Sebaste, Jordan, Guimaras. At that time, the Lamata spouses 12-year old granddaughter, Avelyn Lamata, and their daughter, Lina Echavez, were watching television in the living room. A flourescent lamp lighted the living room. Lucia was also inside the house sewing clothes while Wilfredo was ill and in bed in a room upstairs. From outside the Lamata abode, Gallego called Avelyns attention through a window. Avelyn asked him who he was and he replied that he was a relative from Negros.[2] Avelyn opened the main door of the house, but Gallego remained standing outside.[3] Avelyn informed Lucia that a relative of her grandfather was looking for him, then continued watching television.[4] Lucia stepped out and asked Gallego who he was. The latter replied that he was a military man named Col. Latumbo. He also said that he was Wilfredos relative from Negros and he was eager to see Wilfredo whom he had not seen for seven years. Lucia invited him to come in and talk with Lina while she (Lucia) fetched Wilfredo upstairs. Gallego remained outside the house.[5] Lina opened the main door a bit wider. The light coming from the living room illuminated the area outside the main door where Gallego stood. Lina stepped out and talked to him. They were about two feet apart. She asked Gallego who he was, and the latter repeated that he was a relative from Negros and a military man. Lina invited him inside the house because he said he was a relative but he preferred to wait for Wilfredo outside.[6] Meanwhile, Wilfredo, got up from bed and together with Lucia went downstairs and headed for the main door.[7] Lina and Gallego were still standing by the main door with Gallego facing the living room. As the Lamata spouses were approaching, Lina invited Gallego to come in and opened the door wider.[8] Upon seeing Wilfredo from a distance of about five feet, Gallego rushed to him saying, "(h)ere is my relative whom I am very anxious to see". With his left hand, Gallego embraced Wilfredo and held him on his right shoulder. All of a sudden, with his right hand, Gallego drew a knife and stabbed Wilfredo on the lower left chest.[9] Lucia, who was by Wilfredo's left side, embraced her husband to protect him from Gallego but it was too late. She was slashed in the upper left arm when Gallego withdrew the knife from Wilfredo. Wilfredo uttered, "I have no fault, why did you do it to me?" and ran to the kitchen.[10] Lina also saw Gallego stab her father. After opening the main door for Gallego to come in, she headed for the kitchen. But before she could reach the kitchen, she turned back towards the direction of her father. With Gallego to her left, she was Standing at an angle in front of her father about one meter away. Suddenly, she saw Gallego stab Wilfredo on the left breast. Taken aback, Lina shouted, "Guinbuno si Tatay!" ("Tatay was stabbed!").[11] Gallego then ran out of the house and Lina immediately closed the door after him. He fled on a motorcycle.[12] The following day, Lucia was informed by a relative that her husband's assailant had been caught. At about 1:30 p.m., she went to the Jordan police station. There she was asked to identify her husband's assailant. At that time, the accused was sitting at the porch of the police station along with other people.[16] She identified him as

the culprit and later on found out that his name was Raul Gallego. She executed an affidavit narrating the killing of Wilfredo.[17] The accused Gallego posed the defense of denial and alibi. Francisco Mesa, a good friend of Gallego, testified that Gallego is from Negros, but he has relatives in Barangay Dasal, Jordan, Guimaras. On February 5, 1995, Mesa met Gallego in the Barangay Dasal market. Gallego told him that he was in Barangay Dasal visiting his relatives.[24] Thereafter, during the whole day of February 8, 1995 up to 7:00 p.m., Mesa saw Gallego sitting alone outside the store of a certain Lydia Gallego at the Barangay Dasal market where Mesa was a fish vendor. The distance between Lydia Gallego's store and Mesa's vending place was about 30 meters. At 7:00 p.m., he walked with Raul Gallego to the house of the latter's cousin, Lorio Gallego. There were many people holding a family reunion in the said house in Barangay Dasal.[25] While there, Mesa talked with Raul Gallego. He did not see him leave the house until he (Mesa) went home at past 11:00 p.m.[26] Mesa also testified that Barangay Dasal and Barangay Sebaste (where Wilfredo Lamata lives) are about three kilometers, apart and are connected by a rough road where trucks, jeeps, cars, tricycles, and motorcycles can pass. By jeep, the distance can be traversed in ten minutes, and by motorcycle, about 30 minutes.[27] Lorio Gallego testified for the defense. On February 8, 1995, he was at home hosting a dinner on the occasion of the first death anniversary of his daughter. There were about 50 people in his house, among whom were Raul Gallego and Francisco Mesa who arrived together at about 6:30 to 7:00 p.m. Raul did not leave his house until the next morning.[28] He likewise testified that the distance between Barangay Dasal and Barangay Sebaste is about eight kilometers. These barangays are connected by a road where a passenger jeepney plies once or twice a day. If a passenger misses the jeepney, motorcycles are available for hire to negotiate the distance. Otherwise, one would have to travel by foot to get to Barangay Sebaste.[29] ISSUE: The bone of contention in the case at bar is the identity of Wilfredo Lamata's assailant. There is no doubt that a man mortally stabbed Wilfredo on the left chest on that fateful night in the Lamata abode. To establish the identity of Wilfredo's assailant, the prosecution relies on Lucia and Avelyn Lamata's and Lina Echavez' positive identification of Raul Gallego as the assailant. On the other hand, Raul Gallego cries foul and alleges that Lucia and Lina identified him as the culprit upon suggestion of the policemen at the police station. HELD: He has not adequately proven this allegation. The police investigators are presumed to have performed their duties regularly and in good faith,[39] and in the absence of adequate proof to overthrow this presumption, his positive identification remains free from any taint of irregularity. In light of the positive identification of Raul Gallego as Wilfredo Lamata's assailant, the accused's defense of denial and alibi must fall. Time and again, this Court has

ruled that positive identification of the accused will prevail over the defense of denial and alibi.[49] Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission.[50] This, the accused failed to do. As borne out by the testimonies of the defense witnesses, Lorio Gallego's house (where Raul. Gallego supposedly was at the time Wilfredo Lamata was stabbed) was only about three to four kilometers away from the scene of the crime - a distance which by motorcycle could be negotiated in ten minutes