54.

Republic v Enciso on April 24, 2000, the respondent, alleging to be the owner in fee simple of a parcel of residential land located inBarangay South Poblacion, Masinloc, Zambales, filed a petition for land registration before the RTC of Iba, Zambales. The respondent averred, inter alia, that he acquired title to the said lot by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement of estate and quitclaim on March 15, 1999; the said property is not tenanted or occupied by any person other than the respondent and his family who are in actual physical possession of the same; and the respondent and his predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, peaceful, open, notorious, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner for not less than 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application. The respondent presented tax receipts to show that the property was declared for taxation purposes in his name. He also testified that he acquired the property by inheritance from his deceased father, Vicente Enciso, who died on May 18, 1991. He then immediately took possession of the property and constructed a house thereon in 1991. On March 15, 1999, he and his siblings executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate where the land was adjudicated in his favor. The respondent further narrated that the property was originally owned by the Municipality of Masinloc, Zambales. On October 5, 1968, the municipality passed Resolution No. 71,[8] undertaking to construct a road along the shoreline of the poblacion, but requiring landowners adjoining the roads to share in the expenses for an inner wall adjacent to their lots. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application on the following grounds: (a) neither the respondent nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (b) the respondent failed to adduce any muniment of title and/or the tax declaration with the application to prove bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or its open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (c) the alleged tax declaration adverted to in the application does not appear to be genuine and the tax declarations indicate such possession to be of recent vintage; (d) the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the respondent considering that he failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the period of six months from February 16, 1976 as required by P.D. No. 892; and (e) the subject land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines which is not subject to private appropriation. RTC and CA: Approved and affirmed the registration. Issue: WON the land is A and D Held: NO. Applicants for registration of title must therefore prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial, or since June 12, 1945. It is not disputed that the land sought to be registered was originally part of the reclamation project undertaken by the Municipality of Masinloc, Zambales. The prevailing rule is that reclaimed disposable lands of the public domain may only be leased and not sold to private parties. These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain which the government could not sell to private parties except if the legislature passes a law authorizing such sale. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service.[24] The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine, which declares that all lands and waters of the public domain belong to the State. Indeed, there is nothing to support the respondents claim that the property was reclassified as residential already segregated from the public domain and assumed the character of private ownership. At the moment, it is not clear as to when the proper authorities classified the subject as alienable and disposable. It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. While the subject property was still in the hands of the municipality, it was undeniably part of the public domain. The municipality cannot then be considered a predecessor-in-interest of the applicant from whom the period of possession and occupation required

by law may be reckoned with. Any other interpretation would be dangerously detrimental to our national patrimony. Petition granted. 63. Ting v Heirs of Lirio GR 168913 March 14, 2007 Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title to the same lot. The application was docketed as LRC No. 1437-N. The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover, who were afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to petitioners application by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer2 calling attention to the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final and executory on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of petitioners application on the ground of res judicata. After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed petitioners application on the ground of res judicata. 31vvphi1.nt Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which raises the sole issue of whether the decision in LRC No. N983 constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N. Issue: whether the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N. Held: No. Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree provides: SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. The judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days8 to be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases. After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration. In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world.9 It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration.10 The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration courts approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienzas application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world including petitioner. Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. 72. Sanchez v Quinio At the core of this case is a parcel of land with an area of 300 square meters, more or less, located at San Antonio Valley I, Paraaque City and originally owned by and registered in the name of one Celia P. Santiago (Santiago, hereinafter) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 391688 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. On 12 July 1979, Santiago sold the disputed parcel to herein respondents Rodolfo M. Quinio and Ismael M. Quinio (collectively the Quinios). Following the registration of the conveying deed of absolute sale, the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila, District IV (Makati) issued on 13 July 1979 TCT No. S-89991 in herein respondents name. A little over thirteen (13)

years later, one Renato Sanding, by virtue of a deed of absolute sale covering the same parcel of land purportedly executed in his favor on 22 February 1993 by Santiago, was issued TCT No. 70372 of the Registry of Paranaque. Renato Sanding subsequently sold the property to Romeo Abel, married to Ma. Nora S. Abel, resulting in the issuance in the latters name of TCT No. 72406. In turn, Romeo Abel sold the subject parcel of land to herein petitioner Renato Sanchez on 16 November 1993, executing for this purpose a deed of absolute sale in the latters favor. This sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Paranaque, and, on 17 May 1994, TCT No. 81125 was issued in the name of petitioner. petitioner, who happened to own the lot adjacent to the parcel sought to be acquired, repaired to the Registry of Deeds of Paranaque to look into the authenticity of TCT No. 72406 which was then in the hands of Romeo S. Abel. Only upon being assured of the authenticity of Romeo S. Abels TCT No. 72406 did petitioner conclude the purchase. The Quinios filed to the court for a quieting of the title. RTC: dismissed the complaint, Sanchez is an innocent purchaser for value. CA: reversed RTCs decision. Issue: Who among the parties is entitled to the land. Held: It cannot be over-emphasized that Santiago sold the subject land in July 1979 to respondents, who lost no time in registering the conveying deed of sale and securing title in their names. From that time on, ownership and other rights flowing therefrom over the land in question pertained to respondents. In other words, Santiago was no longer possessed of transmissible rights over such property when she executed on 22 February 1993 a deed of sale in favor of Renato Sanding. The aforesaid deed, in fine, could not have conveyed valid title over the land. in cases where two (2) certificates of title covering the same parcel of land are issued to two (2) different persons, he who holds in good faith that certificate which is earlier in date has superior right over the land covered thereby. although the records do not provide clear answer on how the second vendee, Renato Sanding, in this case, was able to secure a certificate of title despite the existence of an outstanding valid certificate of title in the hands and name of the first vendee, herein respondents, who appear to have never relinquished the document, the stubborn reality is that such a second title was issued and whence two (2) other titles eventually descended.